Sec 14.

Puyat V De Guzman

Facts: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for interventionin the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10 shares.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution

Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against theintervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact” that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before anadministrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

Sec 16 SANTIAGO V GUINGONA (OFFICERS)

Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the

complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court. 

Sec 16 Avelino V Cuenco (QUORUM)

On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the

then SenatePresident Avelino. He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the next session however,

Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Cuenco and

Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory

and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Tañada et al were being

blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order.

Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they

requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair

and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made

of record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent

upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in

order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later,

Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was

unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day.  Cuenco took

his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the

rightful Senate President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the

separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power

to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC

should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who

are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply

to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall

— not in the Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?

There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and

that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve

senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had

the resolution been approved only by ten or less.

**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)?

Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal.

There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve

senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a

majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority

of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the

House” and a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute

majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for

the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the

arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then,

and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one

against and one abstained.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to

bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no

constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators;

one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the

majority which if mathematically construed is ½ + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being

only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent

events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majority’s pronouncement on the

quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that

regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would

result in Cuenco’s election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions,

has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group,

but to no avail, because of the Avelino’s persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this

reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and

that the majority’s ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.

Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.

SEC 16 OSMENA V PENDATUN (DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR)

Facts: Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives, made serious imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15 members was created to investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the President. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate such imputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior.

Issue: Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmena’s parliamentary privilege of speech

Held: Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of theHouse of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place.

The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Presidentconstitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white forpresentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmena’s conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government. 

SEC 16 SEFERINO PAREDES VS SANDIGANBAYAN (DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS)

On 23 Jan 1990, Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Paredes (who

was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Honrada (the clerk of court).

The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic

Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment has ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding

against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal

case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on

his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes

claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the

Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed

but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan,

despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress.  The SC ruled:

“x x x.  Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the power of each

House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a

vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,

should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in

Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that

the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”

SEC 16 US VS JUAN PONS (JOURNALS)

Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said

barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand,

the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed

merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that

the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act

2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband

material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the

Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was

passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb

1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed

made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the

recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court  and to inquire into the veracity of

the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate

both the letter and the spirit of the organiclaws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to

invade a coordinate and independent department of theGovernment, and to interfere with the legitimate powers

and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the

Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on

February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The

SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

 

SEC 16 CASCO PHIL CHEMICAL CO V GIMENEZ (JOURNAL – ENROLLED BILL)

FACTS: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. The Central Bank issued Circulars fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign

exchange transactions. The bank also issued memorandum establishing the procedure for the applications for

exemption from the payment of said fee as provided by RA 2609. CASCO is a manufacturing firm engaged in the

making of plywood and other similar items wherein one of their production inputs is UREA and FORMALDEHYDE. In

two of their import transactions, they paid the required margin fee. In both of their transactions, they filed a request

of refund to the Central Bank and the CB issued the vouchers but was refused by the Auditor of the Bank. The

refusal was also affirmed by the Auditor General. The refusal was based on the fact that the separate importation of

UREA and FORMALDEHYDE is not in accord with the provisions of RA#2609.

ISSUES: Whether or not the separate importation of UREA and FORMALDEHYDE is allowed under RA#2609.

HELD:

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and

approved by the Executive – on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of

powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system – the remedy is by amendment or

curative legislation, not by judicial decree. Decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with cost against the

petitioner.

SC:Said individual statements do not reflect the view of the Senate, much less the intentof the House. Furthermore, it is settled thatthe enrolled bill– which uses the term “ureaformaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” –is conclusive upon the courts asregards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by thePresident.

SEC 16 PHIL JUDGES ASSOC V PRADO (JOURNAL )

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like theyeas and nays on the final reading of thebill). 8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

Facts;

Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them.

In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming a law. 

Issues;

WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate

enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereonshall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

- Violative of the Equal protection clause

Ruling:

The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SEC 16 JOKER ARROYO V DE VENECIA (RULES)

Petitioners’ principal argument is that R.A. No.  8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the “constitutional mandate” in Art. VI, §16(3) that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself.  They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240.  This case is therefore dismissed.

First.  It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e.,  Art. VI, §§26-27.   Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court.  We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.