LegaL order free of piLLars

Janne salminen fiia BriefiNg paper 90 • November 2011

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

90

europeaN Courts’ JurisdiCtioN iN

the post-treaty of LisBoN settiNg

• Fromthelegalpointofview,themostimportantchangeusheredinbytheTreatyofLisbonconcernsthescopeofthejurisdictionoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion.Thiswaswidenedduetothedismantlingofthepillarstructure.Asageneralrule,thejurisdictionoftheEuropeanCourtsnowcoverspreviousthirdpillarmattersaswell,namelycriminallawandpoliceco-operation.

• Thedismantlingofthepillarstructuredidnot,however,affecttheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy.TheUnionCourts still donothave jurisdiction in this area.This rulehas two importantexceptions.

• AlthoughtheAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJustice iscommunitarisedandmorecoherent thanbefore, the previous limits in its territorial scope, namely the opt-outs of theUK, Ireland andDenmark,didnotdisappear,solimitsintheCourts’jurisdictionremain.

• TheTreatyofLisbonamendmentsdidnotchangethefundamentalsofthejudicialdoctrines,suchasthedirecteffectandprimacyofEuropeanUnionlaw.Importantly,theapplicationofthesedoctrineswaswidenedinstead,owingtothedepillarisation.

• TheTreatyofLisbonamendmentsmeantthatthedecisionsoftheEuropeanCouncilandEuropeanUnionbodies,officesandagenciescanbereviewedunderthepreliminaryrulingprocedure.

• TheTreatyofLisbonchangedthemuch-debatedcriteriaforthestandingofnon-privilegedapplicantsinactionstoreviewthelegalityoftheEuropeanUnionacts.

LegaL order free of piLLars

fiia Briefing paper 90

November 2011

europeaN Courts’ JurisdiCtioN iN

the post-treaty of LisBoN settiNg

the european union research programme

the finnish institute of international affairs

Janne salminen

Lecturer

faculty of Law

university of turku

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

the fiNNish iNstitute of iNterNatioNaL affairs 3

Theeffective legalcontrolof thegoverning institu-tionsoftheEuropeanUnionanditsmemberstates,as well as the intensive protection of individualrights,belongtotheUnion’scentralcharacteristics,distinguishingit fromintergovernmentalorganisa-tions.InthemultilevelanddecentralisedsystemoftheUnion, an importantpartof theeffective judi-cialprotectionof individuals isensuring theunityandeffectivenessofthelawthroughouttheUnion.Therefore,thegoverninginstitutionsofthememberstatesbearthemainresponsibilityforfulfillingthedemandsofEuropeanUnionlaw,andtheEuropeanUnioncourtsconsistofboththeCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion1andnationalcourts.

This stateofaffairsalsoprevails subsequent to theTreatyofLisbonastheCourtofJustice“shallensurethatintheinterpretationandapplicationoftheTrea-tiesthelawisobserved”.2Themainfeaturesofthedifferentproceedings–enforcementactions3,reviewof legality4, review of inaction5, preliminary rul-ings6anddamagesactionsagainsttheUnion7–haveremained as theywere before.The importance ofeffectivelegalprotectionandtheroleofthenational

1 HereaftertheCourtofJustice.

2 TEUArt.19(1).

3 TFEUArt.258–260.

4 TFEUArt.263,seealsoTFEUArt.277.

5 TFEUArt.265.

6 TFEUArt.267.

7 TFEUArt.268and340.

judiciaryintheEuropeancontextarereflectedintheTreatyonEuropeanUnion,asamendedbytheTreatyofLisbon,statingthatthememberstates“shallpro-videremediessufficienttoensureeffectivelegalpro-tectioninthefieldscoveredbyUnionLaw”8.IntheCharterofFundamentalRights,therighttoeffectivelegalprotectionisexpressedbothastherighttoaneffectiveremedyandtoafairtrial.

Inmanyrespects,theTreatyofLisbon–includingtheprocesswhich led to theTreaty–representsamajormilestoneintheconstitutionalevolutionoftheEuropeanUnion’s legalsystem.TheTreatyamend-ments have their effects on the European Courts’jurisdiction, too.These changes pertain in part toactualproceedingsbefore theCourtof JusticeandpartlytothelegalchangesinthescopeoftheCourt’sjurisdiction. However, it is not only the proceed-ingsandthescopeofjurisdictionthataresignificanthere. Indeed, the horizontal changes, new clarityin the legal status of the Charter of FundamentalRightsandtheoverallsimplification,tonamebutafew,certainlyhaveapositiveimpactontheCourt’sjurisdiction inqualitative terms.TheabolishingofthepillarstructureandmergingoftheCommunityandtheUnionstrengthenthejurisdiction,andtheprotectionoffundamentalrightsasaresult.

This paper provides a brief analysis of the Treatyof Lisbon amendments that affect provisions

8 TEUArt.19(1).

the seat of the european Court of Justice is situated in the Kirchberg district of Luxembourg. photo: razvan orendovici / flickr.com

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concerningthejurisdictionoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion.9ThecurrentamendmentsandtheirimpactontheUnionjudicialsystemhavecomeunderintensediscussionintheEuropeanlawlitera-ture.Certainly,thescopeoftheCourt’sjurisdictionisnowviewedmorewidelybecausemattersinJus-ticeandHomeAffairsarenolongerdividedbetweenthe Community and the so- called third pillar onpoliceandjudicialcooperationincriminalmatters,while the changes in various proceedings beforetheCourtareregardedmostlyasfineadjustments.However,therealeffectsoftheamendmentsatthelevelofthecaselawoftheCourtofJusticeremaintobeseen.

Dismantling the pillar structure,

widening the scope of jurisdiction

From the legal point of view, themost importantchange stemming from the Treaty of Lisbon tookplacein the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction.Thisis because the Treaty amendments meant dis-mantling the pillar structure. After the Treaty ofLisbon entered into force, the formal boundarybetweenthefirstpillarandthethirdpillar–which,post-Amsterdam,alsoformedaninternaldivisionoftheAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJustice–hasbeenremoved.Currently,alloftheoperativeprovisionsconnectedwiththeAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJustice, aswell as theprovisionsconcerningotherpoliciesoftheEuropeanUnionare,withoneexcep-tion,concentratedformallyandmateriallyaspartofoneandthesameentity.

TheexceptionisthattheCommonForeignandSecu-rityPolicy,theprevioussecondpillar,isstillseparatefrom the rest of theUnionpowers containing themostnumerousandclearestdeviationfromtheprin-ciplesexpressingtheso-calledCommunitymethod.SomechangeshaveoccurredintheCommonForeign

9 Theamendmentshadsomeeffectsonthejudicialinstitution-

alarchitectureaswell.Thereare,forexample,newelementsin

theappointmentprocedureofthejudges.However,relationsbe-

tweentheCourtandnationaljudiciaryaswellastherelationsbe-

tweentheCourtandtheGeneralCourt(theformerCourtofFirst

Instance)remainunchanged.Ofcourse,thenowpossibleacces-

sionoftheEUtotheEuropeanConventionfortheProtectionof

HumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms(ECHR)willalsohave

animpactontheCourts’jurisdictionanddevelopment.

andSecurityPolicy,butthedismantlingofthepillarstructuredidnotgreatlyaffectthisarea,whichwilllargelyremainintergovernmental.

If assessed ingeneral terms, theCommonForeignand Security Policy is still an anomaly comparedwiththerestoftheEuropeanUnioneveninthefieldof jurisdiction, although there are also some rem-nantsoftheintergovernmentalmodeofintegrationin theprovisionsconcerning theAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJustice.TheUnionCourtsdonothavejurisdiction in matters concerning the CommonForeign and Security Policy, neither in respect ofprovisionsintheTreatynorwhenitcomestoactswhich are based on the Treaty provisions on theCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy.Thisrulehastwoimportantexceptions.

Firstly,privatepartiescantakeanannulmentactionwiththeaimofreviewingthelegalityofdecisionsbytheCouncil,whichprovideforrestrictivemeasuresagainstthem.Evidently,economicsanctionsagainstindividuals,forexample,weresubjecttotheCourt’sjudicialcontrolbeforetheTreatyofLisbon,butthenew Treaty expanded the possibility of review totheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicydecisions,whichaffectpersonsmorethaneconomically.Sec-ondly, the Courts have jurisdiction overmonitor-ing theborderlinebetween implementationof theCommonForeign and SecurityPolicy and the restoftheEuropeanUnioncompetences.Applicationofthe twosetsofcompetencesshouldnotaffectoneanother.AftertheTreatyofLisbonamendments,theCourts’monitoringtaskisareciprocalone.

While it is truethattheCourts’role is limitedandtheTreatyofLisbondidnotextendtheirjurisdictiontothisfieldinlinewiththeconditionsapplicableintherestoftheUnionpolicies,thesetwoexceptionsmanifestaconstitutionalrolefortheCourtsbeyondthe Community. They provide tools for judicialprotection and constitutional unity in the Unionwherethepreviouslydifferentpillarsnowseemtobeinseparable.TheTreatyofLisbondoesnotchangethetraditionalproblemofchoosinga legalbasiswhendrawingthelinebetweentheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicyandothercompetences.ThisproblemwillbecomplexandintenseaftertheTreatyamend-mentstoo.

Making criminal law and police co-operationpreviously covered by the third pillar amatter of

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Communitypolicy(unification)andassuchpartofthesametotalitywithotherJusticeandHomeAffairs(reunification)isoneofthecentralachievementsoftheTreatyofLisbon.Whencriminallawandpoliceco-operationbecameapartof thecommunitarianlegalframework,thepillarstructurewasdismantledin thisrespect.Thepossibilities for judicial reviewhavechangedwiththeentryintoforceoftheTreatyofLisboninsuchawaythatthecompetenceoftheCourtofJusticeintheJusticeandHomeAffairssectorisnolongeraffectedbytherestrictionsthatwereduetothespecificityofthatsectorinthepreviousstagesofintegration.Thereareonlyafewexceptions.First,theevaluationofthevalidityandproportionalityofactionscarriedoutbythepoliceandotherofficialswhosuperviseobediencetothelaw,andsecond,theevaluation of the fulfilment of responsibilities bythememberstateswithrespecttomaintaininglaw,orderandinternalsecurity.

Theseexceptionsareremnantsofthepreviouspillarstructure:eventheprovisionsconcerningtheAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJusticedodemonstrateacertain reserveaboutapillar-free legalorder.Thefactthatthereisadecidedlylongfive-yeartransitionperiodconnectedwith somepartsof the reformu-latedAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJusticeshowthatthemindsetbehindthepillarstructurestillprevails,althoughtoamuchlesserextent.Significantly,dur-ingthetransitionalperiodthepreviouslyestablishedcompetenceoftheCourtofJusticewillapplytotheformerthirdpillarprovisionsthatremainsubjecttoalimitedjurisdictionoftheEuropeanCourtofJus-tice.Afterthisperiod,theCourt’s jurisdictionwillextendwithout limitationstoalsocoverall legisla-tioninpoliceandcriminalco-operationmatters.

Besides these policy-related and temporal excep-tions, territorial exceptions also exist. The vastmajorityofmemberstateshavecommunitarisedtheAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJustice,butsomeoftheprevious limits in its territorial scope and theCourts’jurisdictiondidnotchangewiththeLisbonTreaty.Inparticular,theparticipationoftheUnitedKingdom,IrelandandDenmarkintheAreaofFree-dom, Security and Justice has been limited eitherdirectlyonthebasisoftheTreaties,oronthebasisof possibilities offered by them.TheTreaty of Lis-bonwillnotchangethisbasicarrangement.Rather,theirpositionbecomesevenmoreanomalousthanbefore: the degree of integration in this areawillvarybetweendifferentmemberstatesinnewways,

forexample,when itcomesto the limits inaccesstojusticeimposedbytheprovisionsoftheTreaties.Judicially, the fact that threemember states havea significantlyexceptionalstatus inrelationto theArea of Freedom, Security and Justicemeans thatsome judicialproblemsof theprevious thirdpillarremainunresolvedintheend.

Notwithstanding the policy-related and territo-rialexceptionsoutlinedabove−andnotforgettingthe transitional period − the new general rule inthescopeoftheCourts’jurisdictionisneverthelessnoteworthy.Specialprovisionsconcerningthecom-petenceoftheCourtinmattersofJusticeandHomeAffairs,whichwereincludedinthepreviousTreaty,havebeenremoved.Asaconsequence,theAreaofFreedom, Security and Justice is more coherentthanbeforeandbelongstothesameoveralljudicialframeworkof theUnion.These changes representthenormalisationof the supervisorypowerof theCommission and enhance theUnion-level compo-nent in legal processes, while the enhanced legalprotection for individuals strengthens judicialanddemocratic legitimacy. In thisoverallcontext, theformalisationoftheCharterofFundamentalRightsalsohasaspecialsignificance.

Continuity in direct effect and primacy?

TheTreaty of Lisbon amendments did not changethefundamentalsofthejudicialdoctrinesthataresoimportantforthefunctioningandeffectoflegalpro-tection.Ofparticularnoteamongtheseareprimacy,directeffect,theobligationofconsistentinterpreta-tionortheliabilityofmemberstatestopaydamagesto individuals in cases of breachofUnion law.Asoneoftheimplicationsofdepillarisation,therearenolongerdistinctlegalinstrumentswiththespecialrestrictionsfortheirlegaleffectinthefieldofpoliceand judicial cooperation in criminalmatters.Thismeansthattheprovisionsinactsconcernedwiththepreviousthirdpillarissueshavedirecteffectincasetheymeetthecriteriafordirecteffect,whichinturnwill probably give rise to several newpreliminaryrulingsproceduresinthenearfuture.

Consequently,theTreatyofLisbonendedsomespec-ulationaboutthenatureandstatusofthenon-firstpillarEuropeanlawinstrumentsinthememberstates,whichhadbeenunderdiscussioneversincetheentryinto force of the European Union Treaty in 1993.

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Afterthedismantlingofthepillarstructure,itisclearthatthereisnolongeranyquestionabouttheextenttowhichtheEuropeanUniongeneralprinciplesoflawandmechanisms,whichweremainlydevelopedoutofthejudicialproceduresoftheCourtofJustice,willalsobeappliedinthelegalsystemoftheentireAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJustice.

Ofcourse,itshouldberememberedthatthistrans-formationisnotsolelyconnectedwiththeentryintoforceof theTreatyofLisbon.Actually, it couldbesaid that theTreatyofLisbonmerelyclarifiedthisquestion. Even before the entry into force of theTreaty,therewereclearreferencesincaselawtotheeffect that theseprinciplescouldbeapplied in thethirdpillar.Fromthepointofviewofconstitutionalprinciples, the dismantling of the pillar structurehadthusalreadybegunbeforetheTreatyofLisbonenteredintoforce.EspeciallyduetothecaselawoftheCourtofJustice,thoseblocksofactivity,whichwereearlierclearlydescribedasUnionpillars,hadalreadytakenonthesamekindsof featuresas theCommunity legal systemassumedduring the con-stitutionalisationoftheCommunity.Therefore,theweakeningofthepillarstructureandtheconstitu-tionalisationoftheUnionhadalreadybegunbeforetheTreatyofLisbon.

Interestingly, in the stage of the ConstitutionalTreaty,therewasanattempttoincludeanarticleontheprimacyofEuropeanUnionlawoverthelawofthememberstates.ThiswasreplacedintheTreatyofLisbonbyadeclarationonprimacy.Consequently,therewillprobablybenosignificantmodificationsinconstitutionaldoctrines,neitherfortheUnionpartnorthenationalconstitutional lawpartbecauseofthisdeclaration.TheCourtwillpresumablycontinuealongthelinesofitspreviousjurisprudence,whilethenon-acceptanceoftotalprimacywillremainaspartofthelegalreality.Thecoexistenceofthetwoviews can be better tolerated because there is no“hard”provision in theTreaty.Discussions on thenatureofprimacyofUnionlawduringtheprepara-tionandratificationoftheTreatyandtheattacheddeclarationhave,assuch,clarifiedandlegitimisedthenotionofprimacy.Asmentionedabove,primacyis of course strengthenedbecause after theTreatyof Lisbon, primacy clearly covers all the previousthirdpillarmatters,butoneshouldnotforgetthatitisacategoryforEuropeanUnionlawinitsentirety,includingtheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy.In sum, primacy is a characteristic feature of all

EuropeanUnionlaw,butnowadaysclashesbetweenthe Union viewpoint and national constitutionalunderstandingaremostlikelytooccurintheformerthirdpillarissues,especiallyinthecriminallaw.

Last but certainly not least, the Treaty of LisbonidentifiestheCharterofFundamentalRightsaspartoftheprimarylawoftheUnion.AlthoughtheCourthasreferredtotheCharterpriortotheTreatyofLis-bon,“theroleoftherights-basedclaimswithinjudi-cialreviewmaynonethelessexpandconsiderably”.10Thus,theChartercouldaffectthegeneralprofileofthejudicialreview.Inparticular,thedepillarisationof the third pillar and the judicial control ofmat-tersconcerningtheAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJustice,whichissosensitiveafieldforconflictswithfundamentalrights,couldgiverisetoclaimsbasedontheCharter.11

Changes in various legal courses of action

ThechangesinvariousproceedingsbeforetheCourtaremostlymodifications and fine adjustments bytheir nature. For example, these modificationsincludechangesintheactionsandstandingofbothprivilegedandnon-privilegedapplicants.Bycallingthese changesfine adjustments I donot intend tounderminetheirsignificance,butonlytocharacter-isethemaspartoftheoverallrevisionoftheTreaties.These adjustments are also important, especiallyfromthejudicialprotectionpointofview.

Of particular interest is the change which hasoccurredduetothealteredstatusoftheEuropeanCouncil. As one of the Union institutions vestedwith decision-making powers, it now falls underthe control of the Court of Justice.The Treaty ofLisbonamendmentsmeantthatthedecisionsoftheEuropeanCouncilaswellasEuropeanUnionbodies,officesandagencies12becamereviewableunderthepreliminary ruling procedure. In addition to thisprocedure,theyareallreferredtoinprovisionson

10 CraigP.,The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform.

OxfordUniversityPress2010p.243.

11 Craig2010p.244.

12 Thesebodies,officesandagenciesincludevariousregulato-

ryandadministrativeUnionactorsliketheEuropeanChemicals

Agency,theOfficeforHarmonisationintheInternalMarketand

EuropeanDefenceAgency,andsoforth.

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actionsforannulment.Theiractswithlegaleffectinrelationtothethirdpartiesaresubjecttothelegalityreview.Theycanbeheldliableforinactionaswell.

These changes contributeboth to the legalprotec-tionofindividualpartiesandtheinter-institutionalbalance.ThereviewabilityoftheEuropeanCouncil’sacts underlines the importance of the rule of lawin theUnion’s legal system.Thisextensionofpre-liminaryrulingsandthechangesindirectactionsareonceagaininlinewiththeCourt’searliercaselaw.ThelackofconstitutionallimitationsinthisrespectisfurthermoreimportantwhenthinkingaboutthepossiblefuturemembershipoftheEUintheECHR.

What is conspicuous about the new status of theEuropeanCouncilisthatitisnotlistedamongthoseprivilegedinstitutionswhichenjoytherighttobringan action for annulment against the acts of otherinstitutions.Thisseemsasymmetrical.Itcouldmeanthat in the inter-institutionaldisputes it lacks thepossibilitytodefenditscompetence.ParticularlyinthecasesthatconcerntheborderlinebetweentheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicyandtherestoftheUnioncompetences,theEuropeanCouncilmighthaveaninterestalthoughthedecisionsaretakenbytheCouncil.However,theEuropeanCouncilhastherighttobringanactionforfailuretoactaswellastobe adefendant in such cases,whichmakes theabove-mentionedasymmetryevenmoreobvious.

Alongside the widening of the list of reviewableactsandprivilegedapplicants,theTreatyofLisbonchanged the standing criteria for non-privileged,individual applicants – any private party fulfill-ingthetestforstanding–inactionstoreviewthelegalityoftheEuropeanUnionacts.Theamendmenttriestoresolvetheacclaimedproblemoftherestric-tivenessofthepreviouscriteriathatwasduetothelongstandinginterpretationoftheCourt.Asaresult,article263(4)TFEUnow includesanewprovisionalongsideitspreviouscontents:anactionforannul-mentispossible“againstaregulatoryactwhichisofdirectconcern”tothatperson“anddoesnotentailimplementingmeasures”.Although thesechangescertainlydonotmeetallthechallengesoftheprevi-oussituation–andtheabilityofprivatepartiestobringtheseactionswillberatherlimitedafterthisamendment too – the amendment will probablyremove some stumbling blocks in contesting thevalidityofUnionactsofageneralnature.Comparedwiththeprevioussituation,individualconcernisno

longerrequiredalongsidethedirectconcern.Ifthereisaneedforimplementingmeasures,theyshouldbetargetsoftheprocedure,whileitwillbeclarifiedincase lawwhat ismeantby“regulatoryact”inthiscontext,astheTreatydoesnotincludethiskindofclassification.

Conclusions

On a general level, themodifications recorded intheTreatyofLisboninfurtherdismantlingthepil-larstructurecontinuealongthelinesoftheTreatyofAmsterdam.TheTreatyofAmsterdamhadalreadyattemptedtoreacttothesameshortcomingssuchasweaklegalinstruments,insufficientaccesstojusticeanddeficientdemocraticmechanisms in the thirdpillar.The Treaty of Lisbon further increases thepossibilityofjudicialreviewingeneralandattemptstoreintegratetheunityofjurisdiction.Nevertheless,there is still one anomaly, namely the CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy.

Despitethemanynewchallengesdiscussedinthispaper,myoverallassessmentofthechangesisposi-tivewhentakingintoconsiderationthecurrentstageofintegrationandtherequirementsconcerningtheprotectionof individuals.Thefactthattheamend-mentsbothmakethecontinuityinjurisdictionpos-sibleandatthesametimeenablewiderlegalcontrolintheUnionisconsideredimportant.Aboveall,theTreatyofLisbonrepresentsapositivedevelopmentfromthestandpointoftheAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJustice,especiallyinrespectof judicialprotec-tionandcontrol.ThewideningofthescopeoftheCourts’jurisdictioniscrucialinthisfieldwherethefundamentalrightsofprivatepartiesarecommonlyconcerned. Particularly from the point of view ofindividuals, it is a positive development that theaccess to justice in questions concerning theAreawillbestrengthened.

Thisdevelopmentisreminiscentoftheattractivenessandstrengthof the so-calledCommunitymethod.Inthisrespect,thereisgoodreasontocalltomindone argument for thepillar structure, namely theprotectionof theCommunity legal systemand itscentralfeaturesagainsttheweakeningeffectsoftherestof theEU.Therelatively rapid transformationoftheJusticeandHomeAffairshasshownthatthedismantlingofthepillarstructurecannolongerbeseen as posing this threat of weakening the legal

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orderoftheCommunity.ThisispartlybecauseoftheTreatyamendmentsandpartlyduetothepracticalactionstakenbyvariousactors,especiallytheCourtof Justice, which through its important case lawhas prevented the colonisation of the CommunitylawbytheUnionlaw.ItisnoticeablehowclosetheeconomicintegrationconnectedwiththeEuropeanCommunityandthepreviousclearlypoliticallyori-entedareasoftheUnionhavebecomeasaresultofthesechanges.

ItwillbeinterestingtofollowhowthisdevelopmentwillbereflectedintheCommonForeignandSecu-rityPolicy,whichisnowmoredifficultthanevertoseparatefromtherestoftheEUactivities.Hopefullytherewillbefascinatingcaseswheretheborderlinebetween theCommonForeignandSecurityPolicyandtherestoftheUnionwillbediscussed.Further-more,asseenpreviously,thecasesinwhichprivateparties bring annulment actions to the Courts’review in the fields close to theCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy,wheretheadequateprotectionoffundamentalrightsandgeneralprinciplesoflawiscrucial,haveimportanceforthedevelopmentoftheUnionasacommunitybasedontheruleoflaw.

Similarly,thereisplentyofroomfornewcaselaw,especiallyregardingtherevisedrulesofstandingfornon-privilegedapplicants.AstheEuropeanCouncilhasnoroleasaclaimantintheannulmentactionsitwillbeinterestingtofollowwhethertherewillbeacasewhereitwouldclaimsuchaposition.Theabol-ishingofthepillarstructure,andtheclearextensionofthegeneralprinciplesandmechanismsoflawintothescopeofthepreviousthirdpillar,willcertainlygiverisetoseveralnewquestionsofinterpretationfromthenationalcourts in thecontextof thepre-liminaryrulingprocedure.

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