LEARNING FROM THE PAST

June 2010

© 2010 United Nations Development Programme

Democratic Governance GroupBureau for Development Policy304 East 45th Street, 10th FloorNew York, NY 10017, USAwww.undp.org

The analysis and recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or the United Nations Member States. The report is an independent publication by UNDP and reflects the views of its authors.

Design: Suazion, Inc. (suazion.com)

Cover photograph: Photolibrary (photolibrary.com)

Production: A.K. Office Supplies

UNDP is the UN’s global development network,

advocating for change and connecting countries

to knowledge, experience and resources to help

people build a better life.We are on the ground

in 166 countries,working with them on their own

solutions to global and national development

challenges. As they develop local capacity,

they draw on the people of UNDP and our

wide range of partners.

LEARNING FROM THE PAST

FIGHTINGCORRUPTIONIN POST-CONFLICT AND RECOVERY SITUATIONS

United Nations Development Programme

Acronyms iv

Acknowledgements v

Foreword vii

Executive summary x

1. Background 1

2. Post-conflict corruption and conflict 3

2.1. The way war ends 7

2.2. Legacy of wartime corruption 12

2.3. Post-conflict multiplier effect on ‘normal’ incentives for corruption 14

2.4. Resource wealth 16

2.5. State weakness 18

3. Anti-corruption policymaking 21

3.1. The post-conflict political agenda 23

3.2. Evidence-based policymaking 27

3.3. Public expectations 29

3.4. Donor attitudes towards corruption 32

3.5 Political dialogue with government and development partners 33

4. Anti-corruption programming in post-conflict situations 35

4.1. Nation- and state-building 36

4.2. Implicit and explicit programming to reduce corruption 38

4.3. Integrity and transparency of development partners 41

4.4. Aid coordination 42

4.5. Aid modalities, vulnerabilities and impact on corruption 44

4.6. Trade-offs and their impact on corruption 46

CONTENTS

5. UNDP anti-corruption interventions 49

5.1. Anti-corruption and governance 51

5.2. UNCAC as an entry point 55

6. Challenges and implications for engagement on corruption 59

6.1. Mainstreaming and ‘embedding’ anti-corruption 62

6.2. Starting early to rebuild the state’s pillars: Legality, legitimacy and effectiveness 64

6.3. Addressing corruption: A parallel to peacebuilding and development 67

7. Opportunities for UNDP programming on anti-corruption in post-conflict and recovery processes 69

7.1. Political entry points 70

7.2. Institutional entry points 72

7.3. Timing and content of reform 74

7.4. Ethics, transparency and reduction of fiduciary risk 76

7.5. Social accountability 78

7.6. Process 79

7.7. Coordination 80

7.8. Evidence and learning 81

7.9. Strategic road map 83

8. Conclusion 85

9. Annex: Case studies 89

9.1. Afghanistan 90

9.2. Democratic Republic of the Congo 105

9.3. Iraq 114

9.4. Sierra Leone 122

9.5. Timor-Leste 134

ACT Accountability and transparency

ADB Asian Development Bank

ACTT Anti-Corruption Task Team

AusAID Australian Government Overseas Aid Programme

BDP Bureau for Development Policy

BCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

C4E Communication for Empowerment

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CSO Civil society organization

DFID United Kingdom Department for International Development

DDR Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

HOO High Office of Oversight for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy

IGC Iraqi Governing Council

MP Member of Parliament

NGO Non-governmental organization

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

RUF Revolutionary United Front

UIA United Iraqi Alliance

UN United Nations

UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNCAC United Nations Convention against Corruption

UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNIOSIL United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone

UNIPSIL United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

USAID United States Agency for International Development

VCA Vulnerability to corruption assessment

ACRONYMS

We would like to thank Sarah Dix andNihal Jayawickrama, the principal authors,for conducting the research and compilingthe report.

We are also grateful to the manycolleagues for their invaluable support and in particular to Phil Matsheza, Anti-Corruption Advisor at BDP/DGG,Julia Keutgen, Anti-Corruption Analystat BDP/DGG and Anga Timilsina,Coordinator of the anti-corruption globalprogramme at BDP/DGG for coordina-tion, verification, editing and publicationof the report. The research was guided bya project committee that helped to shapethe report and provided support andnumerous comments on earlier versions of this report. Members of the projectcommittee included Sebastien Gouraud(BCPR), Karen Hussmann (independentconsultant), Harald Mathisen (U4),Oliver Stolpe (UNODC) and MartinTisné (TIRI).

We would like to thank the UNcolleagues in the five countries studied,who generously devoted their time andenergy to this report and in particularEmad Alemamie at UNDP Iraq (Ammanoffice); Jean-Claude Kessous and thegovernance team at UNDP DRC;

Nils Taxell, project manager of the UNDPAccountability and Transparency (ACT)project in Afghanistan; Sophie Conteh,Samuel Harbor and Bernard Mokam at UNDP Sierra Leone; GebremedhinHagoss, head of UNIPSIL’s political andpeace consolidation division; LucianoFreitas and Bryan Holford at UNDPTimor Leste. Thanks to Shane Cave,governance adviser to the UN mission inTimor Leste, whose ideas have shapedthis case study.

We also want to acknowledge all indi-viduals within and outside the govern-ment that who were interviewed duringthe field visit.

Finally, we are grateful for the manyinputs from participants in the UNDPtraining workshop ‘Support for Anti-Corruption Efforts in Post-Conflict Situ-ations’ held at the Dead Sea ( Jordan) from3–6 November 2009.

We are especially grateful to UNDPAfghanistan for co-funding this researchand providing constructive inputs to thisstudy. This research would not have beenpossible without the generous support ofthe governments of Norway, Canada andthe Principality of Liechtenstein.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are pleased to share with you the firstUNDP report entitled ‘Fighting Corrup-tion in Post-Conflict and Recovery Situ-ations: Learning from the Past’. Jointlysupported by the Bureau for DevelopmentPolicy/Democratic Governance Group,the Bureau for Crisis Prevention andRecovery and the UNDP Country Officein Afghanistan, this publication illustratesthe challenges and opportunities for anti-corruption work in these particularlycomplex situations.

Corruption has become an increasinglysalient issue for societies that are transi-tioning from war to peace. When it becomes

endemic, corruption can derail politicaland economic transitions, undermine statecapacity and legitimacy, exacerbate povertyand inflame grievances linked to conflict.Because the proximate causes and patternsof corruption can vary widely across andwithin countries, explicit efforts to analysecorruption are critical. The correlationbetween corruption and lower economicgrowth and the perpetuation of wartimepower structures and the unjust distribu-tion of public resources have made it a key challenge to peacebuilding efforts.Corruption can take a range of differentforms, each one with a different impact on

FOREWORDU

N P

ho

to/K

ho

st O

ffic

e

stability and development.In recent years, there has been increasing

attention to the effects of corruption inpost-conflict and recovery environments.Various studies have shown that manypost-conflict societies return to violencewithin one decade, and corruption can beconsidered as one of the factors thatcontribute to fuelling a conflict and thereturn to violence. Therefore, overcomingcorruption in post-conflict environment isessential to restoring the confidence ofcitizens in the state.

Post-conflict reconstruction is normallycharacterized by large-scale injection ofresources in an environment where thelegal and institutional frameworks are weak,fragile or non-existent and the expertisescarce. Detection of corrupt practices istherefore very low and enforcementdifficult. This is worsened by the fact thatsurviving governing structures have limitedoversight over informal and sometimes

criminalized sectors. These institutionalstructures are often transitional in nature,with limited legitimacy, and thereforeprone to capture by the privileged elitewith access to power and resources.

Most recovery programmes aim atrestoring peace and stabilizing theeconomy through sustainable economicprogrammes. Corruption poses a threat tothese efforts, hence the need to deal withcorruption from the onset. The chaos ofthe wartime economy provides significantopportunities for rent-seeking behaviouras ordinary people resort to corruption todeal with the hardships of war. Privategain becomes undeniably attractive whenfacing the uncertainties and opportunitiesof the transitions from war to peace. Post-conflict states with natural resources facemore challenges because natural resourcesare a major source for rent-seeking andtherefore create contestations amongdomestic leaders. Properties and natural

resources that were previously in posses-sion of the state are often privatizedduring the post-conflict recovery period.In this process, post-conflict fortunes aremade, including buying out of armedopposition groups or peace spoilers.

Therefore, the phenomenon of corrup-tion in post-conflict must require a specificapproach that takes into consideration thepeculiar context of the aftermath of aviolent conflict and sensitive to the factorsthat have contributed to the conflict. The rule of law, transparency and account-ability in the public sector serve not onlyas means to counter corruption but also asfundamental conditions of good governance.

This report explores the dynamicsbetween corruption and post-conflictrecovery processes. It provides insight,based on research in Afghanistan, theDemocratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq,Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, into howUNDP has grappled with the challenges of

anti-corruption interventions. It considerswhen and how corruption emerges as arelevant issue on the political agenda, andhow the international community hasacted and reacted vis-à-vis corruption andits risks, and what challenges and trade-offs they have dealt with. Finally, it givessuggestions on how to mitigate the iden-tified challenges, and elaborates recom-mendations for entry points for UNDPanti-corruption programming in post-conflict situations.

Findings of this report will be used as thebasis for a UNDP programming guide tofurther our understanding of the poten-tials and pitfalls of anti-corruptionapproaches in post-conflict environmentsas well as coordination in this field.

It is our hope that this report will firstand foremost serve as a comprehensivereference document for our UNDP CountryOffices, but ultimately for all developingcountries and their partners.

Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi Miguel BermeoDirector Deputy DirectorDemocratic Governance Group Bureau for Crisis PreventionBureau for Development Policy and Recovery

This report explores the dynamics betweencorruption and post-conflict situationsfollowing violent, widespread armed conflict.It provides insight based on empiricalresearch in five countries (Afghanistan,the Democratic Republic of the Congo,Iraq, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste) aswell as desk research into how the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP)has grappled with the challenges of anti-corruption interventions in post-conflict countries.

Governments in countries that haveexperienced violent conflict are particu-larly vulnerable to corruption. Corruptionthreatens not only governance in general

but also the establishment and stability ofdemocracies. When the corrupt excessesof political leaders lead to lack of basicservices and economic opportunities, thismay generate public frustration which erodesstate legitimacy at a time when it is mostneeded. In the post-conflict environment,especially where democracies are fragile,this may fuel renewed violent conflict.

Factors shaping post-conflict corruption

Four key factors lead to corruption afterwar ends, as seen in the five countriesstudied. The first factor is the way the war

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNCDF/Adam

Rogers

ends and how the peace agreement iscrafted. The second factor shaping thetendency towards corruption is the legacyof wartime corruption. This often resultsin the carry-over of agents, networks andpractices of corruption that persist andmay even challenge state control inpeacetime. A third factor is the turmoilthat the transitional government faces, ormay, in some cases, actually bring about.In these circumstances ‘normal’ incentivesfor corruption multiply as people seekways to get things done. The fourth factoris resource wealth, and how new and oftenmassive influxes of material wealth relatedto income from natural resources or fromforeign aid are managed and distributed.All of these factors are closely correlatedwith the overall weakness of the state.

Anti-corruption policymaking

Effectively responding to corruption canbe difficult because it nearly alwaysrequires taking political, economic andsocial power away from who benefit fromthe status quo. Therefore, as seen in thefive post-conflict case studies in thisreport, policymaking in corruption as wellas other areas does not seem to follow thetypical policymaking cycle seen in otherdeveloping democracies, and there aremany policy gaps and contradictions.Development partners cannot count ontoday’s policy to be in place when imple-

menting a programme tomorrow. Theremay be no policy, to begin with. In anycase, it is clear that political decision-makers are important determinants ofpost-conflict anti-corruption reform. Acountry’s political players determine whatcan be achieved programmatically, enablingreform or blocking it sometimes passively.

Anti-corruption programming

Evidence from the five country studiessuggests that anti-corruption interven-tions in post-conflict situations often failto achieve substantial success, and in many cases fail altogether. Among theimportant findings is that direct, earlyattempts to challenge the status quo oncorruption may jeopardize elections andprovoke a return to violence. Moreover,across the five countries examined, post-conflict transparency and accountability oranti-corruption programming has beenmore ad hoc than integrated and holistic.

In the five post-conflict countriesreviewed, donors overwhelmingly chose tofund programmes outside national budgetsand preferred to externally manage funds.Donors in post-conflict situations seek toreduce their fiduciary risk through a varietyof means, including direct execution ofprojects by development partners includingUNDP, civil society organizations (CSOs)and others, or through the use of pooledfunds held in trust accounts. Due to the

tremendous post-conflict capacity gapsand human resource shortages, there isalso a tendency to provide technical assis-tance instead of cash. Technical assistance,as well as service delivery, may be contractedout. If done competitively and transpar-ently, contracting out is likely to result ina cost-efficient way to dispense aid. Butthis can also undercut the authority andstrength of the government. Particularlyin the area of infrastructure delivery,contracting out is vulnerable to corruption.

UNDP anti-corruption interventionsin post-conflict situations

In the five countries reviewed, the natureof UNDP’s anti-corruption interventionshas often been determined by the circum-stances in which UNDP first enteredthose post-conflict countries, as well as bythe imperatives of the governments inoffice. As such, UNDP’s anti-corruptionprogramming has varied according to the context. What can be said, lookingacross these five cases, is that UNDP has clearly associated anti-corruption with its governance programming, but has yet to integrate across its otherpractice areas. In two of the cases, Iraq, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan,UNDP has used the United NationsConvention against Corruption (UNCAC)effectively as an entry point for its anti-corruption programming.

Challenges and implications for engagement

The five countries that are the subject ofthis report are among the poorest in theworld, and in all of them years of conflicthave destroyed infrastructure, humancapacity and financial resources. They arealso collectively emerging from decades ofauthoritarianism, repression and patronage.Corruption became entrenched duringthose decades, and it remains pervasivetoday in all five countries. Four additionalchallenges stand out. The first is the fragilenature of the post-conflict environment insome, and the ongoing conflict in others.The second is the apparent lack of politicalsupport for combating corruption at thehighest levels of government. Third is theambivalent attitude of the internationalcommunity to the problem of corruption.Fourth is that corruption is simply notconsidered by the international communityto be an issue that needs to be addressedearly on and as an integral part of allprogramming interventions.

In light of these constraints, the experience of these five countries suggeststaking a different approach with twobroad prongs: (i) mainstreaming anti-corruption, including integrity, trans-parency, and accountability, into post-conflict state building interventions; and(ii) embedding micro-measures within

and along with key national reforms asearly as is practically possible.

A few terms in this approach deservespecial attention to clarify how they areconceptualized in this report. In thisreport, ‘mainstreaming’ means systemati-cally identifying corruption opportunitiesand integrating anti-corruption acrossprogramme sectors. ‘Micro-measures’refers to technocratic interventions thatare small in scope but may take place atany level, national or subnational. Thesemay be explicitly or implicitly related tocorruption. Examples of micro-measuresinclude inserting a clause in the criminalcode, carrying out a national survey ortraining community health workers tofacilitate the formation of self-help groupsthat organize to access existing govern-ment services. And ‘embedding’ thechanges refers to strategically placingthem in government initiatives where theywill enjoy some relative sustainability andpotentially create multiplier effects as theyinteract with other elements of reform. Ifsuccessful, micro-measures will potentiallyresult in significant change over time. Ifunsuccessful, the failures are relatively lowprofile and should allow other anti-corruption programming to continue. Tothe extent that both micro- and macro-reforms are feasible, they are complemen-tary and may both be pursued.

Opportunities for UNDPprogramming in post-conflictand recovery situations

1. Identify and ensure political commit-ment to transparency, accountabilityand anti-corruption, by carrying out apolitical economy analysis or mapping.UNDP should be proactive andgenerate political demand; prioritizepolitically feasible initiatives; seek win-win situations; and institutionalizereforms. Leadership is key to makingthese reforms happen, but UNDPshould work with the bureaucracy toensure the institutionalization ofreforms, so that they continue aftercurrent political leadership moves on.This is particularly challenging butextremely important in a rapidlychanging post-conflict environment.

2. Identify institutional entry points inthe governance framework and createnew frameworks, embedding access toinformation, social accountability andtransparency. Establishing the rule of lawand security is a fundamental conditionfor political legitimacy, democraticstability and peace. To that end,UNDP should:

n facilitate a shared national under-standing of the rule of law andsupport its development;

n support nation- and state-building;

n indigenize models adopted fromoutside; and

n match advisers’ legal backgroundwith the system in-country.

3. Start early after conflict ends. Whilethere is no strict chronological orderto follow, some reform initiatives help lay the groundwork for others.(Re)establishing the rule of law (asopposed to rule by force and completelawlessness) and restoring basic servicedelivery are fundamental to the successof state building. Among the prioritiesUNDP should consider are:

n building anti-corruption intoelectoral support;

n mainstreaming transparency andaccountability into disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration(DDR);

n ensuring decent pay in the civil service;

n making tax collection transparent;and

n making small inroads that lead tobigger initiatives.

As it focuses on all of these strategies,UNDP should facilitate the setting ofnational priorities.

3. Lead by example and build trans-parency into budget support upfront. For example, UNDP should:

n explore pooled funding and make ittransparent;

n provide non-monetary aid to reducefiduciary risk; and

n coordinate with government whencontracting out.

With regard to the last point, govern-ments need to manage or at least coordi-nate all budget and contracting processesso that service providers do notundermine the consolidation of thestate, and/or so the state does notassume that these services are not itsresponsibility.

5. Strategically support the developmentof a variety of non-state groups as away to enhance accountability andstrengthen the state. The groups neednot be oriented towards democratiza-tion, anti-corruption or governanceper se. One suggested strategy is tolink business councils and chambers ofcommerce with government on initia-tives such as removing impediments tobusiness and developing a monitoringsystem for the national budget.

6. Build in more time for the process of consultation, collaboration anddialogue. It is important to choose‘good’ or appropriate and feasiblesolutions and contextualize them. Butit is also useful to recognize that what

the five case studies highlight is thatthe process matters as much or morethan the solution itself.

7. Improve and take the lead on coordi-nation. Coordination of anti-corrup-tion approaches across developmentand humanitarian aid is crucial. UNDPshould seek opportunities to lead inthis area. Its efforts might include:

n ensuring adequate staffing throughfull-time anti-corruption advisers; and

n cooperating with the UnitedNations Office on Drugs andCrime (UNODC) to combine theprevention approaches with well-conceived enforcement approaches.

8. Support the identification, generationand use of evidence and disseminateit widely. UNDP is widely regarded inthis area, and plays an important rolein post-conflict situations where muchaid is delivered through private contrac-tors whose business is not to developand disseminate institutional memory.

9. Develop a strategic road map to theUNDP Country Office’s approach.This could be accomplished through afacilitated workshop and consultations,resulting in a brief write-up. Theprocess of developing the tool willfacilitate a shared understanding andcommitment to address anti-corrup-tion across UNDP programmes. Thetool itself may serve as a guide forpublic relations and programming.

For UNDP to have the impact it seeks inthe area of post-conflict anti-corruption,identifying and generating politicalsupport at different levels of government,as well as at different levels of UNDP andthe UN mission, is required. Implicit orexplicit anti-corruption programmingshould start early after conflict ends. Itshould be sectorally cross-cutting,embedded in government reforms, andflexible to adapt to shifting post-conflictpolitical realities, policies and procedures.

1

UN Photo/John Isaac

S ince late 2007, donors have begun topay specific attention to reviewing,understanding and developing anti-

corruption approaches in post-conflictsituations. In particular, the Anti-Corrup-tion Task Team (ACTT) of the OECDGovnet, of which UNDP is part, hasmade efforts to start building bridgesbetween the anti-corruption and post-conflict/fragile states communities of thedifferent donor agencies. A recent paperon anti-corruption with a state-buildinglens, commissioned by the ACTT, hasbeen welcomed by the anti-corruption donorcommunity and UNDP as an importantstepping stone to inform further anti-corruption work in post-conflict situa-tions.1 At the last ACTT meeting on 1 April 2009 in Paris, donors agreed, forexample, that more research is needed tobetter understand how anti-corruptionapproaches can best be integrated intoearly post-conflict reconstruction andstate building processes.

Some development agencies, includingUNDP with the present initiative and alsothe United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID), are currently in the process of developing specificprogramming guidance for their staff onhow to address corruption and anti-corruption in post-conflict situations.Also, as a result of the above-mentionedpaper, donor agencies that are members ofthe U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre

have decided to create, with the supportand facilitation of U4 and TIRI, a donor-learning network on corruption in post-conflict and fragile state situations.

Corruption in post-conflict and fragilesituations was identified as one of UNDP’spriority issues by the UNDP third globalCommunity of Practice meeting held inAthens (Greece) from 28–29 October2008. The meeting, which gathered 44UNDP anti-corruption practitioners comingfrom Country Offices, regional bureaux/centres and the Headquarters, discussedthe growing challenges posed by corrup-tion on post-conflict and recovery situa-tions and decided that UNDP shouldaddress these challenges, starting with aresearch on UNDP’s interventions in post-conflict countries, in order to better under-stand the dynamics between anti-corruptionand post-conflict reconstruction anddevelop UNDP’s guidance on integratinganti-corruption into post-conflict recon-struction and state building processes.

The need to refocus UNDP’s anti-corruption priorities in post-conflict andrecovery context also arises due to the factthat UNDP is operating in 40 countriesthat are currently in post-conflict andrecovery stages or partially in conflict orknown as fragile states. UNDP worksclosely on governance and anti-corruptionissues, and helps rebuild legal and justicesystems and reform security sectors throughthe ‘Global Programme on Strengthening

the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations’ since 2008 in 20priority countries2 for post-conflict andreconstruction identified by the BCPR.

With the above-mentioned back-ground, in 2009, UNDP commissioned astudy on anti-corruption interventions inpost-conflict situations, particularlylooking at five case studies: Afghanistan,Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq,Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. The aim of the study was to review UNDP’sexperiences from the field, look at gapsand identify concrete challenges, analyseUNDP’s role in coordinating interven-tions, and identify substantive goodpractices and lessons learned by analyzingthe trend on anti-corruption program-ming. In terms of methodology, theoverall guidance for the study wasprovided by a Project Steering Committee,which included experienced practitionersfrom UNDP and other partner organiza-tions including UNODC, U4 and TIRI.The authors went through the desk reviewof cases and also conducted field visits inall five countries. The report also wentthrough a vigorous quality control processto ensure that the data and analysesreflected the actual situation on the ground.A validation workshop, which was held inJordan (Dead Sea) from 3–6 November2009, was attended by 23 participantsincluding practitioners from eight UNDPCountry Offices (DRC, Iraq, Jordan,

Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste,Yemen and Sudan), UNDP practitionersfrom Headquarters and regional centres,representatives of UNODC, individualinternational experts and representativesof partner institutions, such as TIRI,Global Integrity and U4. The workshopclosely looked at the draft report ‘UNDPAnti-Corruption Interventions in Post-Conflict Situations’ and provided inputsincluding discussion on comparativeexperiences and lessons learned from allcase studies.

The findings from the report provideuseful insights on anti-corruption program-ming in post-conflict and recovery contexts.Across all five cases, evidence suggests thatfew existing anti-corruption interventionshave had significant success stories andsome have failed altogether. Moreover,across all cases, the findings also suggestthat the status quo on corruption mayjeopardize peace and stability and invokea return to conflict and violence. Most ofthe anti-corruption interventions arebeing implemented on an ad hoc basis,

The status quo on

corruption may jeopardize

peace and stability and

invoke a return to conflict

and violence.

rather than being integrated in otherdevelopment processes or implementedholistically. Most anti-corruption inter-ventions also tend to be implemented atlate recovery stages. In all countriescovered by this research, poor governance,poverty and weak institutional infrastruc-ture have made the anti-corruption inter-ventions difficult. The decades of civil warand instability have made it difficult forcivic engagement in anti-corruptionprogramming including the participationof civil society, particularly the marginal-ized and vulnerable populations. Acrossall five cases, corruption is present in anenvironment where the existence of weakinstitutional mechanisms and checks andbalances, low detection capacity andpresence of informal networks, elitegroups and armed forces. It is clear fromthe report that political decision makersare important determinants of post-conflict anti-corruption reform, alongwith other factors. Moreover, in all fivepost-conflict case studies, fighting corrup-tion does not seem to be topmost priorityfor policy makers and politicians. It isoften feared that any direct, early attemptsto challenge the status quo on corruptionmay jeopardize the elections and provokea return to violence.

The authors define and conceptualizeanti-corruption reform quite broadly. Itincludes both explicit, ‘traditional’ measures(such as creating laws or national anti-

corruption strategies and strengtheninganti-corruption institutions like auditorgeneral’s offices), as well as implicit changesthat enhance integrity, transparency,accountability and the rule of law. The ruleof law is founded on a social contractcharacterized by trust in laws and institu-tions, and between people. The rule of lawis typically the goal; corruption is sometimesthe prevailing practice. In broad terms,therefore, corruption and the rule of laware closely linked and there is good reasonto believe that efforts to reduce corruptionand strengthen the rule of law aremutually reinforcing.

Anti-corruption efforts and rule of lawprogrammes both deal with a number ofsocietal actors outside the state. However,the former typically focus on corruptionacross all agencies and branches ofgovernment while the latter usually focuson a more narrow set of public actors inthe justice and security sectors. Regulatingthe transparency and accountability inthese sectors is critical not only forcorruption, but also for building a rule oflaw culture in the executive, the publicface of the state most visible to citizens.

The report is structured so that the fiveextensive country-specific case studies arepresented in the final third of the publi-cation (section 9). They are preceded by ananalytical discussion of linked themes,findings and overall recommendations.

2

UN Photo/M

ark Garten

C orruption poses a grave threat notonly to governance in general but alsoto the stability of fragile democracy

in post-war countries. Governments indeveloping countries that have experiencedviolent conflict are particularly vulnerableto corruption. When the corrupt excessesof government officials and politicianslead to lack of basic services and economicopportunities, this may generate publicfrustration which erodes state legitimacyat a time when it is most needed.3 In thepost-war environment this often fuelsrenewed outbreaks of violent conflict.4

However, there are many cases where thepeace process may rely on servicing thepatronage networks of previously warringfactions, making it difficult to address theissue of corruption without unravellingthe peace process itself. For that reason, itis of utmost importance to understandhow and why conflict and post-conflictsituations lead to corruption, and toidentify ways to deal with the situationwithout jeopardizing peace.5

This section identifies and examines fourkey factors that allow, or even encourage,corruption to get entrenched after conflictends. It is based primarily on findingsfrom the experiences in the five countriesstudied: Afghanistan, DRC, Iraq, SierraLeone and Timor-Leste.6 The cases were

selected on the basis of geographical andanti-corruption programming diversity.

The first factor in determining theextent to which corruption grows is theway an armed conflict ends and how thepeace agreement is crafted (discussed insection 2.1). Who won the war, whetherthere is a clear winner at all, and whethera war has really ended all make a hugedifference. The second factor shaping thetendency toward corruption is the legacy ofwartime corruption (section 2.2). A legacyof wartime corruption often results in thecarry-over of agents, networks, and practicesof corruption that persist and may evenchallenge state control in peacetime.7 Athird factor affecting levels of corruptionis the chaos that the transitional govern-ment faces (section 2.3). Where servicesare not promptly restored and looting isallowed to persist, and when there isuncertainty over who is responsible forparticular governmental services or function,the ‘normal’ incentives for corruptionmultiply as people seek ways ‘to get thingsdone’. The fourth main factor is resourcewealth (section 2.4), and how new andoften massive influxes of material wealthrelated to income from natural resourcesor from foreign aid are managed anddistributed. Linked to all of these factorsis the overall weakness of the state,discussed in section 2.5.

The landscape of post-conflict corruptiondepends on the way armed conflict endsand how the peace agreement is crafted.8

Wars typically end with a decisive militaryvictory for one side, while power-sharingagreements that divide control of a centralgovernment are far less common ― butpresent in at least one of the casesanalysed here, DRC.9 The cases studiedhere suggest four different scenarios inwhich post-conflict corruption mayflourish, depending on how the armedconflict is officially ended. It should benoted that when we speak of armedconflict’s end, we do not take this to meanthat conflict has ended. As seen in Iraq,for example, the end of one (inter-state)armed conflict may well lead to another

(intra-state) armed conflict. In Afghanistan,the ‘international’ armed conflict wastransformed into a ‘domestic’ conflict withinternational forces fighting on behalf ofthe transitional government that they hadhelped establish. It is also possible thatwarfare itself has not really ended, butmomentarily subsided as warring factionsreposition themselves. The four basicscenarios are presented below.

Scenario 1: The old regimecontinues in power after thearmed conflict ends

In these cases, state institutions and publicservants such as judges are likely to becarried over, old patterns of corruptioncontinue, and government officials lack

2.1. THE WAY ARMED CONFLICT ENDSUNICEF

/ HQ05

-125

7/Ro

ger LeM

oyne

legitimacy from the outset. At armedconflict’s end, this situation was observedin Sierra Leone where both the incumbentgovernment that continued in office andthe principal opposition party had ahistory of human rights abuses, disrespectfor democratic values, rampant corrup-tion, nepotism and fiscal mismanagement.The 20 years before the outbreak of thearmed conflict had seen the rise of anincreasingly authoritarian government,which undermined the legitimacy ofmany institutions and encouraged asystem of political repression. As this case exemplifies, where the old regimecontinues, corruption is not addressedseriously and with conviction, andtherefore tends to flourish. This is mainlybecause the rule of law, and particularlyjustice, is compromised. That, in turn,discourages meaningful public participa-tion in post-conflict governance.

Scenario 2: One or more parties are militarily defeated or exhausted, and a new regime is established

Under this scenario, where former rebelstake power, they may set out to cleanhouse and at the same time enrich them-selves. This occurred in DRC after MobotuSese Seko was overthrown in 1996 byLaurent-Désiré Kabila, who took overwith the support of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.

Where independence is granted orwon, however, the former power departsand there is no particular mandate toclean house. In some cases, the newgovernment will view the state coffers asthe spoils of power. That said, oldnetworks are unlikely to remain in place.This was seen in Timor-Leste, where anew regime took power through a strugglefor independence. More than 20 yearsafter Indonesia seized control of theterritory from the longstanding colonialstate, Portugal, the international communityinfluenced the government to conduct areferendum in 1999 on the future of whatwas then ruled as an Indonesian province.Following a decisive vote in favour ofindependence, the Indonesian army retal-iated violently, joining irregular militias in killing and displacing residents anddestroying most of the region’s infrastruc-ture. UN peacekeeping forces pushed theIndonesian troops back, and the UnitedNations Transitional Government in EastTimor acted as an interim civil adminis-trator from 1999 until Timor-Leste’sindependence in 2002.

Scenario 3: A power-sharingagreement is reached

In post-war situations in which no clearmilitary victor emerges and power-sharingagreements are the preferred solution,there may be a particular drive to balancegovernment with members of the

different factions. In this case, the natureand structure of the agreement makeaccountability elusive. Often, the veryambiguity of who is in charge createslapses or overlaps in jurisdictionalauthority or unclear chains of command.Consequently, those who wish to takeadvantage can assert themselves, whilemaking it difficult to be held accountable.For example, in situations of bureaucraticintractability, persons who can successfullynavigate between disagreeing powerholders or discover ways around them caneasily become not only attractive butnecessary for those needing to urgentlyreceive a permit or property title or toobtain a government service. Such situa-tions are especially common wherefactionalism presents an obstacle togaining consensus on governance reform,and the question of how to move forwardand set up working institutional infra-structures remains only partially resolved.

This was precisely the situation thatwas encountered in DRC in 2003.10 Thedistribution of power went so far as toensure representation in the form of seatsfor civil society and the private sector onan anti-corruption committee, four othercommittees, and government structures asspecified in the agreement. While thismay have effectively appeased potentialpeace spoilers, it also generated a level offactionalism that rendered the Ethics andAnti-Corruption Commission entirely

ineffective. Moreover, the initial gover-nance structure concentrated power in theexecutive and ensured by design that thispower would be unchecked by any coun-terbalancing entities or representatives.With all factions having a share of particular ministries, the system wasdesigned so as to sever the patronagenetworks of previously warring factions.In those conditions, a too militant anti-corruption campaign could have in factweakened the peace process itself, at leastin the short term.

Sierra Leone provides anotherexample. After years of appalling brutalityagainst the civilian population, a peaceagreement between the government andthe Revolutionary United Front (RUF)was signed at Lomé (Togo) in July 1999.This agreement involved a two-prongedapproach to achieving peace. The firstinvolved a military resolution wherebycombatants were supposed to disarm. Thesecond involved a political settlementwhereby both sides would share powerwithin the government. The RUF leader,Foday Sankoh, was appointed to head theCommission for the Management ofStrategic Resources with the status ofvice-president of the republic, withcontrol over the country’s diamondresources. Diamonds had been both anindirect cause of the war and a factor thatfuelled the continuation of the conflict.Sankoh immediately used his position to

protect RUF’s wartime diamond dealswith Liberian leader Charles Taylor andothers outside the country. This abortiveattempt to secure the peace ended whenRUF fighters refused to report to theestablished disarmament sites, and subse-quently began robbing UN convoys andkidnapping several hundred UNobservers. Sankoh was captured andarrested in May 2000.

Scenario 4: A brokered peacedeal is signed but the root causesare unresolved and armedconflict continues or resurfaces

This is not a problem of parties failing tohonour their commitments, but rather asituation in which there is a lack of broad-based agreement to begin with. Underthese circumstances, not only will corrup-tion flourish, but anti-corruption reformswill be unsustainable.

The case of Iraq, which was invaded bythe United States and its allies in 2003, isan example of a situation in which abroad-based agreement has yet to beachieved and armed conflict has notended. After the US-supported establish-ment of an interim government andconstitution in 2004, elections for theTransitional National Assembly inJanuary 2005 resulted in a Shiite primeminister and a Kurdish president, whileSunni voters remained unrepresented dueto their boycott of the elections. The tran-sitional government drafted a new consti-tution, which was approved by nationalreferendum in October 2005. In theelection for the new four-year parliamen-tary assembly at the end of 2005, theShiite-led United Iraqi Alliance (UIA)received the most votes but did notachieve a majority. UIA Prime MinisterIbrahim al-Jaafari struggled to form acoalition government, amid ongoingsectarian violence. Since then a series oftenuous arrangements have been estab-lished among the Iraqi government, theUS military, and local militias controllingdifficult to govern areas; this has created aseries of interstitial spaces betweendifferent forms of authority where corruptpower brokers and go-betweens are ableto flourish. (Al-Jaafari was succeeded asprime minister in early 2006 by anotherShiite, Nouri al-Maliki.)

In all these scenarios,

the failure to secure a durable

peace leads to increased and

entrenched opportunities

for corruption and results in

a much higher probability

that traditional, explicit anti-

corruption efforts will fail.

Afghanistan offers another example ofa war that has not ended, as of late 2009.The period between 1996 and 2001 couldbe characterized as a war between theTaliban, supported by foreign Islamistmovements, and a loose alliance of formermujahidin groups (such as the NorthernAlliance). Intervention by the UnitedStates in 2001 resulted in a rapid regimechange. A ‘high-level political settlement’negotiated in Bonn (Germany) in late2001 established the Interim AfghanAuthority and led to a new, moderateIslamic constitution that was adopted in2003. However, the Bonn accord was nota comprehensive, inclusive agreement anddid not involve all the key stakeholders.Alleged warlords and drug traffickers wereincluded in the government, ostensibly to ensure stability in potential conflictzones. And the administration — whichincluded some past human rights abusersand criminal elements — perpetuatedpersistent and deep-seated corruption.This led to a lack of public confidence inthe new regime, and generated instability.Initially, in 2002, there was not muchconflict in Afghanistan, but it hadresumed by the end of the decade.11

In all these scenarios, the failure tosecure a durable peace leads to increasedand entrenched opportunities for corrup-tion and results in a much higher proba-bility that traditional, explicitanti-corruption efforts will fail. In such

situations, governments are often far toopreoccupied with the continued securitythreat to spend their limited resources andenergies on increasing accountability andtransparency or improving governance.On the other hand, unstable governmentsmay even consciously seek out ways toraise resources that enables them to wieldextra-legal types of power in a bid to gainstrength against the opposition. Surpris-ingly, even in such situations, donors oftendo not make transparency and accounta-bility mechanisms a priority of theprogrammes they support, such as recon-struction projects and sector reforms. Insuch contexts, explicit anti-corruptionefforts are not likely to succeed, at the veryleast in the short to medium term.

This is prone to be a particularly acuteproblem in the third scenario, when previ-ously warring factions agree on a power-sharing system, under explicit agreementsfor the division of public office amongthem. Without reaching such extremes,this is a situation observable in all otherscenarios as well, as it is often the case thatin order to reach a deal or maintain peaceformer combatants need to be bought off.

Buy-offs pose a particular opportunityfor corruption if the distribution of funds,jobs or other perks is not transparent.Such was the case in Sierra Leone in1999, where former combatants werebought off with limited pardons andgovernment jobs. Such was also the case

in DRC in the 2003–2007 period, whendifferent warring factions were givenshares of a mushrooming number ofministries. Where lack of transparencyprevails, such efforts to politically placate

(as opposed to socially integrate) formercombatants are highly likely to fail andlead to a strengthening of patronagenetworks and, through them, patterns of corruption.

Conflict itself may involve a culture ofsecrecy and impunity that is ostensiblyjustified by security reasons, and whosehabits and legacy persist after the armedconflict has ended. Organized crime andillicit commercial networks flourish with

and can fuel intra-state warfare, as moreor less noticeable state failure means nocontrol over such illegal activities. In manycases, they also effectively pose an alterna-tive set of rules that may actually governsociety in many everyday matters, and

2.2. LEGACY OF WARTIME CORRUPTION

Jacq

ueline Mia Foster/U

NDP

over large parts of national territory.12

Under Scenario 1 above — the oldregime continues in power — it may bepossible to see a radicalization of corruptpractices within the old regime. This willfurther delegitimize the existent order,and insofar as resistance continues to exist,it may allow the losing faction to recoversome of its sway. Sierra Leone before 1999would be a good example of this situation.

Scenario 2, where a new regime isestablished, is much less predictable becausethere are many variables at work. Thepresence of a sufficiently strong foreignpresence may prevent outrageous corruptpractices from being entrenched in thenew system. This is more likely to be thecase if the winning faction won the conflictcompletely, or if it used anti-corruptionrhetoric during the conflict. The case ofTimor-Leste is close to this, partly becauseof the strong presence of Australia.

But then, these conditions may nothold, which brings us to Scenario 3, inwhich a power-sharing agreement isreached. This was clearly the case afterstate breakdown in DRC.13 Typically insuch scenarios, high-level corrupt systems

facilitate the arms trade, the smuggling ofmineral resources, and money laundering.These systems are in turn supported bymore mundane, lower level corruption ingovernment customs and tax practices,which finance the costs of armed conflictfor different factions. When these types ofactivities carry over into the period oftransitional governance, they competewith the state for control over the use ofviolence, over territory and commerce.

Given its fluid, inconclusive character,Scenario 4, in which a brokered peace dealis signed but the initial root causes havenot been resolved and conflict continuesor resurfaces, escapes strict classificationin terms of how the legacy of corruptionwill play out.14

Conflict itself may involve

a culture of secrecy and impunity

that is ostensibly justified by

security reasons, and whose

habits and legacy persist after

the armed conflict has ended.

In all possible scenarios discussed previ-ously, the high levels of chaos, breakdownof the rule of law and lack of effectivegovernment in post-conflict situationstend to result in enhanced opportunitiesfor the development and growth of utterlycorrupt practices. As seen in DRC andTimor-Leste, conflict often leads toperiods of disorganization and weak state control. In other cases, such asAfghanistan and Iraq, the sudden politicalvacuum resulting from the previousregime being vanquished by outside forcesmay at least temporarily create situationsof de facto lawlessness, followed by theneed to manage ongoing conflicts with

the use of warlords or local militias whogenerally operate on their own terms.These contexts often result in situations inwhich state institutions are barely percep-tible in particular areas.15 In the casesdiscussed above, prolonged periods ofweak or absent state control have theunmistakable effect of multiplying thearray of ‘normal’ or commonly foundincentives for corruption.16

Post-conflict DRC, Sierra Leone andTimor-Leste found themselves in asituation of unclear and poorly enforcedstate rules, compounded by a limitednumber of (inadequately remunerated)civil servants and an ineffective judiciary

2.3 POST-WAR MULTIPLIER EFFECT ON ‘NORMAL’ INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION

UN Photo/M

artine Pe

rret

lacking in independence. Although innone of those countries was the situationparticularly good before, the conflictdestroyed what little there was. InAfghanistan and Iraq, ongoing internalconflict and externally established centralgovernments dependent on warlords andlocal militias to keep insurgents in checkmagnified existing gaps between nationaland local authorities, and differencesbetween formal national laws and de factolocal practices. These gaps and differencesled to situations in which ordinary peopleoften needed corrupt go-betweens andpower brokers to navigate the contradic-tions and layers of rules and authority.

The aftermath of conflict also multi-plies the obstacles to simple commerceand business as usual, as small and largeenterprises alike are overwhelmed bydemands for payoffs in order to dobusiness and ensure protection. When thestate breaks down, businesses usuallycannot operate unless they share theirmonies generously with not just govern-ment but with multiple actors with unoffi-cial authority and power. And whilepre-conflict norms for doing business maybe cumbersome, they at least exist and areoften enforced: during and after conflict,old rules may be ignored or jettisonedcompletely or there may be no legitimateauthority to enforce them, leaving anyonewith power a lot of room for discretion.The extent to which obstacles to business

can spiral out of hand, post-conflict, isseen in DRC today, where the chamber ofcommerce has reported that no businesstransaction can be carried out withoutplacing money on the table first. There, theburden is such that members of thechamber say they would be willing to pay100 percent more in taxes to the govern-ment, in order not to have to pay bribes.

Finally, post-conflict infrastructuralinadequacies create great opportunities forcorruption. Armed conflict tends todestroy infrastructure, such as roads andbridges, rendering these necessities of lifeand commerce virtually non-existent inmuch of the territory. Massive post-conflict infrastructure-building efforts arerife with corruption opportunities, bothbecause of the amounts of money involvedand the highly compressed time-frame inwhich such projects are required to becarried out. Since the legitimacy of thenew government depends in part on itsability to deliver these public goods, often the rush to get things done leaveslittle time for the painstaking bidding,accounting and checking proceduresnecessary to ensure that large amounts ofmoney are not misspent or misdirected.This is seen in Iraq, where the newgovernment is heavily dependent on aforeign benefactor who often sets therules, leaving the government little choicebut to accept and, at least theoretically,comply with and enforce them.

Often, it is equally difficult to find thenumber and quality of contractors willingand capable of undertaking these tasks inplaces that have not seen large-scale infra-structural projects for decades and thatremain conflict ridden. The lack of compe-tition in the provision of reconstructionservices is akin to an invitation for collusion

and other forms of corruption. The grossmisuse of funds by private contractors inthe rebuilding of Afghanistan’s schools,roads and airport is a case in point.17 Thepost-conflict ‘spending imperative’ andassociated risks are created by the rapidinflux of short-term foreign aid, discussedbelow in the context of resource wealth.

The challenges posed by resource wealthin post-conflict situations deserve specialattention for two reasons. One is thatresource wealth generated by foreign aidis to a certain extent within the control ofthe donor and international communities.A more important reason is that manynatural resource-dependent countries expe-rience conflict.18 In part, this is because

rebels can often comfortably fund theirinsurgencies by appropriating naturalresources in the areas that they are able to control or at least extort.19 This wasevidenced in both DRC and Sierra Leone,where natural resources facilitated theconduct of the armed conflict. The opiumindustry in Afghanistan is another kind ofnatural resource wealth that funds conflict.

2.4. RESOURCE WEALTH

UN Photo/Yutaka

Nag

ata

‘Lootable’ resources are “easier for privateactors including rebel groups to comman-deer, while point-source resources tend tosupply rents to the state.”20

Resource wealth not only providesample opportunities for corruption, butcan also hamper post-conflict anti-corruption efforts. This may be said ofboth natural resources and foreign aid,which may pour in at the end of a conflict.Resource wealth creates ‘rentier states’ inwhich natural resource rents — or otherrents such as foreign aid — provide asignificant share of the government’srevenues.21 Both forms of resource wealthare discussed below because they areanalytically related, and also because theywere both relevant in the five countriesexamined for this report.22

Resource wealth influences publicspending and the revenue generation ofpolitical regimes. Natural resources suchas crude oil, kimberlite, diamonds, copperand other mineral deposits produce rents,or super-normal profits. They are often‘farmed’ out of economic ‘enclaves’ andtend to be appropriated by the state.Resource wealth affects spending in thatit is allocated or distributed by politicalauthorities, with little or no oversightfrom civil society. It also affects revenuegeneration because it lessens the pressureon the state to develop other revenuegenerating activities such as taxation ofbusinesses and individuals.23 This appliesto foreign aid as well as natural resources,

and is problematic because where peopleare not taxed, they are less likely todemand representation, and to receiveadequate levels of public services.24

In Scenario 1, when the old regimecontinues in power after the armedconflict ends, resource wealth is likely toexacerbate traditional corrupt practices.Corruption is enhanced not just by thelegacies of wartime corruption and theimmediate lawlessness of the initial post-conflict situation (as analysed previously),but by the old regime’s control overnatural resources or access to foreign aid,which has been cemented in place. Whilethere is the possibility of a drastic ifpainful reduction in foreign assistance,natural resource wealth is not likely tosubside. This in turn provides the oldregime with funds that allow it to tightenits grip over society, and pushes oppositionforces towards radicalization. The endresult is an even more corrupt and illegit-imate regime that ignores or downplaysincreasing social and economic tension.

In Scenario 2, when a new regime isestablished, it is possible to keep corrup-tion in check despite the presence ofresource wealth. Again, a sufficientlystrong foreign presence may mitigate theproliferation of corruption if the newgovernment has some interest in doing so,as Timor-Leste suggests.

In Scenario 3, in which a power-sharing agreement is reached, forces inte-grated into the power-sharing agreement

may expect, quite explicitly, to controlmineral or foreign aid resources, in partic-ular geographical or functional areas.Again, foreign aid may be cut off orsuspended if that happens. Mineralresource wealth will continue to beavailable, however, providing not justresources for the parties that signed thepower-sharing agreement, but to partiesthat decided not to sign. The situation inEastern Congo is a paradigmatic case ofthis type.

In the fourth scenario, in which abrokered peace deal is signed but theinitial root causes have not been resolved,and armed conflict continues or resur-faces, mineral resource and foreign aidwealth may work in opposite directions.As Afghanistan illustrates, foreign aid islikely to help sustain a struggling nationalgovernment, while natural resource wealthis likely to be outside the government’scontrol, and often farmed out by forcesfighting it.

Not only are post-conflict countries proneto corruption, but corruption contributesto state weakness. Therefore, addressingcorruption is a way to strengthen the state,

as it relates to the core state buildingprocesses supported by the internationalcommunity: political settlement; statesurvival functions such as security, justice,

2.5. STATE WEAKNESS

Rad

hika Chalasan

i/UNDP

revenue; and action on public expectationssuch as service delivery.25 These processesare based on the four central dimensionsof state function: political and economicmanagement, security, and social welfare.26

According to the Index of State Weaknessin the Developing World,27 which ranks all141 developing countries according totheir relative performance in four criticalspheres (economic, political, security, andsocial welfare), Afghanistan, DRC andIraq are at the top of the list of weakstates, while Sierra Leone follows closely.Timor-Leste classifies as slightly lessweak as the others studied here. TheBrookings Institution defines weak statesas countries that lack the essential capacityand/or will to fulfil four sets of criticalgovernment responsibilities: fostering anenvironment conducive to sustainable andequitable economic growth; establishing andmaintaining legitimate, transparent, andaccountable political institutions; securingtheir populations from violent conflict andcontrolling their territory; and meeting thebasic human needs of their population.

In this light, tackling corruption standsto strengthen the state across thesedimensions. Economically, a reduction incorruption stimulates growth and increasesinvestment. Politically, it serves to enhancethe state’s legitimacy. In terms of security,a state that is better able to control corruptactivities will also be able to enforce therule of law in general. And as for socialwelfare, a reduction in corruption has the

potential to translate into better servicedelivery — if funds that would be used forcorrupt purposes are instead put to gooduse for the public, and if more qualifiedpublic servants are in service.

The main implication for UNDPprogramming is that controlling corrup-tion is integral to strengthening the state’sfunctions through core processes. Withregard to the political functions of anti-corruption efforts in particular, it shouldalso be noted that while attention is rightlypaid in post-conflict reconstruction effortsto strengthening institutional frameworksand developing linkages between bodiessuch as CSOs and parliaments that mayprovide oversight, this is only part of thestate’s political functions; the wholespectrum needs to be considered.

Economically, a reduction in

corruption stimulates growth

and increases investment.

Politically, it serves to enhance

the state’s legitimacy. In terms

of security, a state that is better

able to control corrupt activities

will also be able to enforce the

rule of law. And as for social

welfare, a reduction in corruption

has the potential to translate

into better service delivery.

3

UN Photo/Eric Kan

alstein

E ffectively responding to corruptioncan be difficult because it nearlyalways requires taking political,

economic and social power away fromthose who benefit from the status quo. Inthis light, how do decision makers bringabout anti-corruption policy and institu-tional changes in the post-conflict statebuilding process? One finding from thefive case studies is that policymaking —including but not limited to anti-corrup-tion in particular — does not seem tofollow the typical cycle seen in otherdeveloping democracies.28 Also, there aremore policy gaps and contradictions. Onthe one hand, there may be a completevacuum of policies, and on the other hand,there may be a mishmash of policies laidover each other without regard to the

others.29 While developing a model ofpost-conflict policymaking is beyond thescope of this report, it is possible topresent and discuss some initial observa-tions based on the case studies.

When conflict ends, there may besuccessions of different authorities andlittle continuity of policy between transi-tional and first elected governments.Often what is on paper is not carried outin practice, or can shift quickly for reasonsnot apparent to outsiders — or eveninsiders. Therefore, development partnerscannot count on today’s policy to be inplace when implementing a programmetomorrow. There may be no policy, tobegin with. After all, post-conflict statebuilding is initially about developing anagreed upon set of rules, and in the earlyyears, development partners are navigatinguncharted waters.

What the five countries reviewed dohave in common with other developingcountries is that political decision makersare important determinants of anti-corruption reform. A country’s politicalplayers determine what can be achievedprogrammatically, enabling reform orblocking it sometimes passively.

What the five countries reviewed

do have in common with other

developing countries is that

political decision makers are

important determinants of anti-

corruption reform.

When and how the anti-corruption issueenters the political agenda influences thetiming, content and sustainability ofsubsequent government reform initiatives.The post-conflict political agenda may beshaped in five somewhat overlappingperiods: during the peace process itself,during a transitional government, followinga fresh electoral process, following scandalsor rapid rises in corruption levels or in increments over the years.30 These fiveperiods are discussed in greater detail below.

During the peace process, corruption,or transparency and accountability mayemerge as an issue in discussions aboutthe basic governance framework, as they

did in DRC. As the international experi-ence shows, if such issues are raised at thisstage, it is more likely than not due to apush by external actors or the militaryvictor. The usual result is explicit anti-corruption institutions such as an ethicscommittee, ombudsman, or other similaragency. In DRC, the corruption andtransparency issues were pushed bydonors and resulted in the Ethics andAnti-Corruption Commission. However,this institution proved toothless and didnot enjoy broad ownership despite havingmembers from across the political spectrumfor two main reasons: (i) its establishmentwas externally driven and not demanded

3.1. THE POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL AGENDAAnders Gunnartz/U

NDP

by the parties to the deal, and (ii) it wasnot aligned with the interests of all thosesigning the power-sharing deal. (It ispossible that in a different scenario — e.g.,when rebels militarily defeat the formerregime and are intent on cleaning house —the same institution could possibly havebeen demanded, albeit with a politicallybiased agenda that would have its own repercussions.)

Like other aspects of peace agreements,institutions such as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission in DRC are notsustainable in the long term if imposedand accepted without real agreement.Threats to sustainability in this contextinclude not only disregard for the rulesbut also the possibility of a return toviolence. At the very least, anti-corruptioninstitutions will not take root in thisscenario. Without champions willing to orcapable of enforcing them, institutionssuch as these fall short of extending them-selves into society to shape behaviour, and therefore remain ineffective andlargely ignored.

During the transition period, theexecutive may have the authority andrelative freedom to issue legal decrees orstanding orders, and this can be used tocreate anti-corruption laws or institutionsat the stroke of a pen. This was the case inTimor-Leste under the transitionalauthority, which attempted to break withpast corrupt practices under Indonesian

rule. This was an expedient way ofenacting policy, in terms of puttingsomething on paper. In practice, however,this example shows that making highlycontroversial rules by decree will not bringwide acceptance, much less compliance.Institutions created by decree will remainonly as strong as the paper on which theyare written.

As discussed when describing anti-corruption interventions during the peaceprocess, explicit, large-scale anti-corrup-tion interventions during the transitionalperiod may often result in toothless,symbolic acts if not accompanied byimplicit, small-scale, embedded interven-tions. Once again, it is here that donorsmay have more room for action, as theycan avoid potentially corrupt high-levelattention, and bring new political andsocial actors into the mix.

In first or (less likely) subsequentelectoral processes, a political party orcandidates may gather momentum andwin seats by campaigning on an anti-corruption or integrity platform. Timor-Leste’s parliamentary elections of 2007illustrate this. Fernanda Borges, founderof a new political party, Partido UnidadeNacional (PUN), vowed to undo the oldbehaviour of some longstanding politicalparty leaders. PUN also promised toestablish a new political model to ‘servethe people’ and build trust. Likewise, inthe presidential election of 2008 in Sierra

Leone, the opposition candidate, ErnestBai Koroma, offered a platform of changethat included combating corruption.Upon his election, he re-constituted theAnti-Corruption Commission, providingit with credibility, and then encouraged itto formulate a new national anti-corrup-tion strategy. In these cases, anti-corrup-tion interventions often go deeper thanthe creation of explicit anti-corruptioninstitutions, as the political will of the newgovernment and its energized followingmay actually provide some teeth to anti-corruption policies. As part of theirsupport for the new institutions, or(preferably) as part of their day to dayoperations, however, donors may be ableto deepen and sustain this initial pushover time, by engaging in lower profile,smaller scale interventions discussed laterin this report.

In the face of scandal or in momentsof heightened scrutiny that may occur atany time in the post-conflict process,politicians give prominence to integrity oranti-corruption initiatives, and sometimesgo to great lengths to impress the public orthe international community that they donot tolerate corruption. In Timor-Leste, aseries of scandals resulted in the PrimeMinister, Xanana Gusmão, pushing throughlegislation for a new anti-corruption agencyin 2009. This was done despite the factthat it duplicates the functions of existinginstitutions and will diminish their powers.

As the Timor-Leste example illus-trates, anti-corruption reform that isprompted by scandal is problematicbecause in the best of cases, the solutionis rushed in two ways. First, it pre-emptsthe consultation process, which is asimportant to success as the technicaloption itself. Second, the technical optionmay not be a wise choice, given that thereis not much time to explore and consideroptions. In the worst of cases, there is nogenuine political interest in controllingcorruption, and setting up a dysfunctionalor hollow institution is worse for statebuilding than doing nothing at all. As seenin Afghanistan and Iraq, public perceptionof a rapid rise in the scale and incidenceof corruption can have similar effects.

Incremental change may result inmore effective reduction of corruption.For example, after the 2006 elections in DRC, the new government began totake a public stand against corruption.Following suit, UNDP implemented asmall programme within the Ministry ofJustice, to give judges the incentives andcapacity to take up corruption cases that

Anti-corruption reform

that is prompted by scandal is

problematic because in the best

of cases, the solution is rushed.

come before them. While this approachdid not address the issues of prevention orjustice reform, the project met a real need,was supported by the justice minister andgenerated goodwill among participants.This project has fed into a larger adminis-trative reform programme, and hasgenerated interest in a potential full-scalejustice reform programme. In the face ofendemic corruption and many powerfulinterests defending the status quo, thisapproach has proven to be politicallyviable in DRC so far.

An incremental process has theadvantage of being discussed amongdifferent political factions, and if suffi-ciently embedded in the system, it mayalso include consultation with popularsectors often without voice in the policyprocess. Influential actors in this type of

intervention include the media, interestgroups, donors, political or economicelites, elected officials and sometimescommunity organizations. While thismultiplication of actors makes it chal-lenging to reach agreement, the limited,smaller-scope of the interventions, in turn,offers many ways to overcome the collec-tive action problem, particularly if donorsare able to pay the bill for coordinatingmultiple stakes. It must be mentioned thatthis also affords more opportunities fornon-governmental actors to contribute tothe framing of the issue.

Again, donor intervention may befundamental here in helping all the actorswith an interest and stake in a particularissue, sector, ministry or project to realizethe extent to which corruption causesgovernance to deteriorate and weakensthe state’s ability to deliver services.Understanding of this impact by thepopulation is likely to result in growingpressure on politicians to act on corrup-tion, and in deeper and longer termengagement by non-governmental organ-izations. As a result, while limited inscope, the outcome of such interventionsis likely to be robust, reflecting a strong (ifnarrow) consensus across the interests ofdiverse participants or their perception ofthe benefits to them. This contributes tosustainability in the long term.

An incremental process has the

advantage of being discussed

among different political

factions, and if sufficiently

embedded in the system, it may

also include consultation with

popular sectors often without

voice in the policy process.

During post-conflict reconstruction,decision-making is often ad hoc, reac-tionary and involves crisis management ina rapidly changing environment. Tocompound matters, as discussed above, theissue of corruption may gain prominenceon the national political agenda whenthere is a scandal, as seen in DRC andTimor-Leste after the 2006 elections, orwhen there is a rapid rise in perceptionsof corruption, as in Iraq and Afghanistan.Consequently, corruption may become apredominant issue even if politicians donot have the ability or capacity to defineand address it.

More problematic, as seen in Timor-Leste, the issue of corruption may beattached to an unviable — but politically

appealing — anti-corruption ‘solution’that decision makers have no means orwillingness to implement, sustain ordeepen over time. Shrinking the powersof an ombudsman that could investigateand refer cases of corruption, PrimeMinister Gusmao decided in 2008 againstwell-placed technical advice to the contraryto legislate and launch a new anti-corrup-tion agency. Although the legislationpassed in 2009, implementation had notoccurred at the end of 2009.

In 2009, in DRC, President JosephKabila launched a campaign of ‘zerotolerance’ of corruption. This does notappear to have been founded on anyspecific evidence or analysis. As thoseinterviewed within and outside govern-

3.2. EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKINGKy

Chung/U

NMIK/D

PI

ment commented, evidence of corruptionis all around; a study or survey is notneeded to confirm the fact. Such recentdevelopments in DRC are examples ofpoliticians publicly identifying corruptionas a key obstacle to peace and develop-ment and then, instead of defining theproblem more thoroughly and devising awell-conceived solution, latching on to thefirst solution at hand.

While it is too early to tell in DRCand Timor-Leste, it seems that technicalsolutions that may have worked well innormal development situations are beingapplied in post-conflict situations. It islikely, however, that these attempts will fail — as have similar initiativesthroughout Africa to create independentanti-corruption commissions modelledafter those in Hong Kong, Singapore orthe Australian state of New South Wales.

From the outset, it is important tocollect evidence on the nature andmagnitude of the corruption problem.Practically speaking, in the wake of aconflict there is usually a deficit ofresearchers, academic institutions or thinktanks, and a major lack of data on humandevelopment, much less governance andcorruption. Studies may be outsourcedinternationally or government reformersmay attempt to collect evidence them-selves. The latter was the case in DRC, for

example, where the office responsible fordisseminating the public servants code ofethics implemented its own questionnaireto gauge public perceptions of corruption.In Afghanistan, Integrity Watch Afghanistandid the first qualitative study and surveythere, followed by vulnerability assess-ments by the World Bank, the UKDepartment for International Develop-ment (DFID) and UNDP.

The credibility of evidence and how itis communicated matters. Politicians andthe public alike are made aware of corrup-tion through allegations of corruptionreported in the press, as well as their ownexperiences. Studies on what the localpopulation actually considers to be accept-able and unacceptable behaviour, countrydiagnostics, national integrity studies,experience-based corruption surveys andpublic expenditure tracking surveys can be powerful tools to inform the policy-making process if they are developedthrough a broad, consultative process.When developed that way, the tools arenot only better designed, but participantsin the process become active users of theevidence generated. If not developedthrough wide stakeholder consultation,the results are more likely to collect dust,even if they are effectively disseminated.Such studies may also jeopardize reform,if those left out of the process attack it.

Public perceptions of corruption andaccountability matter because the risk ofpolitical instability is predicated on them.After all, if perceptions of corruption arelow, then the system is at low risk forpublic frustration and conflict sparked bythis issue. But there is cause for concern incontexts where corruption is so endemicthat the public assumes the situation willnever change, regardless of what thegovernment does. For example, with somevariation across the five case studies, thegeneral perception is that corruption isrising over time, and overall there seemsto be little faith in the effectiveness ofgovernmental anti-corruption initiatives.

In DRC, for instance, corruption iswidely accepted as a norm. Some inter-views suggest that while ordinary Congolesedo not judge other ordinary Congolesenegatively for paying bribes because it isseen as unavoidable, they do view politi-cians negatively for their excesses. Moststudies and observers concur that thegeneral public is particularly antagonistictoward the leadership that squandersresources for personal gain. There is anegative perception of the ‘political class’,not just ministers but anyone in power,including the police and the army. At thesame time, people feel helpless andvirtually everyone participates in corrup-

3.3. PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS Munira Morshed

Munni/UNDP

tion. There is a sense of injustice createdby a lack of distribution of wealth thatcreates frustration because the state is notsatisfying people’s basic needs.

Partly as a result, most people do notuse their vote to judge politicians on whatthey promise in their campaign platform.Public participation in governance is char-acterized by tribal rivalry and lack ofawareness of the state organization.People may vote on tribal basis, or becausesomeone gave them money or a T-shirt.Moreover, politicians can easily manipu-late the population, due to their access tobetter information and resources onwhich many lives depend.

Effective action at the macro-policylevel is fundamental to overcome theseforces. However, the Congolese govern-ment has yet to develop mechanisms forpopular participation, including dissemina-tion of information about how to formally

approach the state. Similarly, demands inthe justice sector need to be well articulatedso that justice can be delivered.

Such steps are important, but acting atthe macro-level alone is not sufficient. Itis also necessary to embed anti-corruptionin day-to-day interventions by develop-ment partners, so that people are givenclear signs that efficacy is attainable andthat effective, non-corrupt governmentpolicies are a possibility. Churches inDRC have raised awareness about theneed to address social structures, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) talkabout it in plain language. However, inter-views indicate that action is lacking.Change would require the Congolese toact at the micro-policy level, includingmeasures addressing inter-tribal differ-ences, entrenched cultural practices, andotherwise attempting to modify deep-seated social structures.

In Sierra Leone, the Truth and Recon-ciliation Commission reported that thepublic yearns for a principled system ofgovernance. According to the Commis-sion’s report, “They want a system thatupholds the rule of law over the rule ofstrong patrons and protects the peoplefrom the abuse of rulers through a systemof checks and balances. They wish to seehorizontal and vertical accountabilitythrough the effective operation of suchinstitutions as the judiciary, the auditor-general’s office, the electoral commission,

Acting at the macro-level alone

is not sufficient. It is also neces-

sary to embed anti-corruption

in day-to-day interventions by

development partners, so that

people are given clear signs that

efficacy is attainable and that

effective, non-corrupt govern-

ment policies are a possibility.

the media and civil society.”31

In Timor-Leste, public sentiment isthat corruption needs to stop for twomain reasons: (i) because people have topay for government services that shouldbe available for free, or (ii) because theyare paying more than they feel theyshould. At the same time, however, it isimportant to note that the Timoresepeople do not feel oppressed by taxes. Thegovernment currently receives substantialrevenue from oil, diamonds and foreignaid, and therefore does not have to rely toa large extent on taxing its own people forrevenue. So the public does not put manydemands on government.

In Afghanistan, most people distin-guish between the giving and taking ofbaksheesh (small gifts), which is generallyconsidered to be acceptable, and otherforms of behaviour that are perceivednegatively. For example, they reject thefollowing, on the basis of their beingagainst the basic principles of Islam: highsalaries and the destruction of poppyfields; corruption faced by people in theirdaily lives, like corruption in gainingaccess to and paying for water and powerservices; paying more than the mandatedfees for licenses and certificates; paying

teachers for extra school time or for gradepromotions; and paying doctors for extracare. But for that reason — the moralcensure based on Islam — the government’sineffectiveness in addressing corruptionposes significant risks to its legitimacy. Alarge majority (81 percent) of respondentsin a recent survey considered that theapplication of Sharia (Islamic law) wouldbe an effective tool to combat corruption,while only a quarter believed that admin-istrative reform could help.32

One of the main factors leading todisenchantment with the current systemand driving Afghans into the arms of theTaliban is that roughly 70 percent ofAfghans encounter corruption in thejustice sector. Corruption is discussedwidely on radio and television by politicalfigures, intellectuals and opinion leaders,contributing to the public perception ofwidespread corruption and adding todisenchantment with the government.Perceptions of corruption undermine the government’s credibility and, moregenerally, the state building agenda. Thishas been exacerbated by the popularconviction that international assistance isbeing squandered by politicians, who areperceived as corrupt.

In most aspects, donor attitudes in the fivepost-crisis case studies are similar to whatone would find in a normal developmentsetting. The donors’ main corruption-related concern in Afghanistan, DRC,Iraq, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste is thefiduciary risk resulting from the misuse oftheir own funds and the need to accountfor these funds to their constituents. Thebig difference in terms of their engagementwith these countries and those in a normaldevelopment setting is that in the former,donors come in with a huge push afterconflict ends and after having been out of

the country often for a long time. There isalso the added dimension of donorconcern of not jeopardizing peace. All ofthese were particularly evident in DRC.

As much as donors, diplomats, UNagencies and the World Bank want to seecorruption controlled, they are still oftenreluctant to talk about it with govern-ments because they perceive it to beintractable, too sensitive, or both — especially in the early post-conflict years.While indicators are hard to come by in light of data constraints discussedelsewhere in this report, donors expect the

3.4. DONOR ATTITUDES TOWARDS CORRUPTION

UN Photo/M

artine Pe

rret

general trend to indicate some progressover time. Where there are no visibleefforts or progress in this area, donors maydisengage or pare down their support,rather than address the issue head-on.That said, this has not been the case withthe United States in Afghanistan and

Iraq. In other post-conflict countries as well, some donors have become moreoutspoken and explicitly engaged in anti-corruption a number of years after conflictended, particularly when corruptionstarted threatening the purpose of theinternational intervention.

Where political dialogue on corruption istaking place between governments anddevelopment partners, it is felt by govern-ment officials interviewed for this study tobe accusatory rather than constructive.

This was heard repeatedly across countries,with some interviewees initially reluctantto discuss the topic. But when assured thatthis was not a blaming session, govern-ment officials were, on the whole, quite

3.5. POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Nora Kush

ti/U

NDP

willing to share their views and experi-ences. The interviews also showed that,specific to post-conflict situations, thedifferent goals of the diplomatic, militaryand development actors at times conflictand send different signals to government.

In the five post-conflict situationsexamined in this report, findings indicatemore success where anti-corruption inter-ventions are embedded in day-to-daygovernment operations rather than ingrandiose macro-initiatives that fail todeliver even piecemeal change. It isimportant to highlight that it is at themicro-policy level that donors have theopportunity to exercise more influence, foractions here are less scrutinized bypolitical opponents of reform and poten-tially bring on board sectors of the popu-lation otherwise left behind.

In post-conflict situations, the

different goals of the diplomatic,

military and development actors

at times conflict and send differ-

ent signals to government.

4

Tran

Thi H

oa/Th

e World Ban

k

A nti-corruption programming aftera conflict ends is beginning to beseen by development partners as

part of a larger state building process.33

From this perspective, corruption is notonly the product of a governance deficit,but also is at the centre of a fundamentaldiscourse over which set of rules overwhich set of rules prevails in society. Thebattle over ‘who has the right and abilityto make the countless rules that guide

people’s social behaviour’ is an open battle,which the state often loses.34 Where localpower is fragmented, the state has failedto grow; DRC and Sierra Leone offerexamples of this. Where the centralorganization of indigenous elites occurs,the state has been strengthened; Timor-Leste is moving in this direction. In thisprocess, development partners typicallyinfluence the choice of rules, rather thanthe state making and implementing them.

Anti-corruption programming in post-conflict countries tends to assume citizensas a given; i.e., it presupposes that thepeople have a national identity and think

of themselves as citizens. This is also seenin the nascent literature on corruption inthe wake of domestic conflict, and is trueof post-conflict development program-

4.1. NATION- AND STATE-BUILDING

UN Photo/M

artine Pe

rret

ming in general. Nation building, partic-ularly post-conflict, is highly relevant toanti-corruption programming, as it allowsshaping of common values (e.g., usually inconstitution making processes) that aimto go beyond identity politics or narrowvested interests by specific castes/classes/gender. Rather, the process of nationbuilding promotes values universallyagreed upon by the society itself, whereaccountability, transparency and integritycan form the bedrock of the notion of a‘nation’ (non-threatening).

However, this assumption is often notvalid after a civil war, as evident across thefive countries studied for this report. Forexample, Sierra Leone emerged fromconflict as a deeply fragmented country,marked by an almost total lack of nationalidentity. Notions of citizenship and patri-otism had become meaningless concepts.Another example is DRC, where surveydata suggest that while the identificationof the Congolese with the DRC nationand state over the last 40 years has becomestronger in general, it has become moreexclusionary with regard to ethnic Rwan-daphone peoples.35

It is difficult for any developmentprogramme or project to achieve its statedgoals if it is based on mistaken assump-tions. More to the point, it is worthwhileconsidering what happens if a civil societystrengthening programme aims to give

grants to organizations where only ahandful exist; a civic education projectaims to raise awareness among voters whodo not consider themselves citizens; a ruleof law programme trains police wherethere is flagrant dismissal of national lawbecause they are at odds with local norms;and a parliamentary support projectbrings in advisers who speak an officiallanguage that is nonetheless not under-stood by most legislators, and who in turndo not share any language in common.None of these interventions would bringany real value, and instead could reverse orhold back any progress made.

Leaders in the five countries reviewedare constructing nation states. In thenation state, the population constitutes anation that could be united by commondescent, language and culture. Statepolicies may promote unity through anational language, primary education anduniform secondary school curricula,including national history. While nationbuilding is an indigenous process, devel-opment partners must recognize its occur-rence, and not count on citizens and anation that may not yet exist. Emphasison common values, such as accountability,transparency, national ownership, partici-pation, gender equality and non-discrim-ination also help to cement a sense ofnational identity.

Governance programming by developmentpartners has, to some extent, contributed totransparency and accountability in the fivecountries examined in this publication,although it has not usually addressedcorruption explicitly in the initial post-conflict years. That said, support for electionsand the rule of law are fundamentallylinked to the prevention and control ofcorruption. Along with the provision ofsecurity, these are building blocks forsustained peace and state building.36

Interviews showed that while programmesin these areas were not explicitly designed

with anti-corruption interventions in themper se, programme staff acknowledged in retrospect their relevance to integrity,accountability and transparency.

In DRC, for example, as well as inTimor-Leste, both UNDP electoralsupport programme staff and electoralcommission officials said their area ofintervention inherently includes attentionto minimizing electoral fraud. Compo-nents include voter registration usingbiometrics, and attempts to improve thesecurity of identification cards. At thesame time, however — in DRC at least —

4.2. IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROGRAMMING TO REDUCE CORRUPTION

UNDP

general budget support is unchecked anduncontrolled, and reportedly could beused to bolster fraud in upcomingelections. This highlights the need forcoordinated action across sectors andpartners as well as greater transparency ofdirect budget support, as discussed later inthis section.

Often it is not until after the firstelections that development partners havetargeted transparency and accountabilityin general, or corruption more explicitly.This has been done directly through thedevelopment of formal anti-corruptionlegal frameworks and institutions, as wellas by strengthening the media and civilsociety’s capacity for anti-corruptionactivity. Such efforts have often taken theform of stand-alone approaches resultingin an anti-corruption agency, anti-corrup-tion units in the attorney general’s office,or national anti-corruption strategies.Corruption has also been addressed indi-rectly through public financial managementand oversight, civil service reform, justicesector reform, and support to nationallegislatures and executive branches.

Across the five cases, developmentpartners have tended to support the devel-opment of legal frameworks and enforce-ment (as opposed to prevention) to a greaterextent than they might in normal devel-opment situations. Generally speaking,prevention has become a standard prescrip-tion in anti-corruption practice, and makes

good sense.37 While the public may wantto see the ‘big fish’ fried, the incentives forcorruption remain even if you put them allin jail — and new corrupt actors willemerge. However, there is a pressing needto restore law and order in the post-conflictstate building process, and therefore theenforcement side of the anti-corruptionequation needs support; this is necessarynot just to curb corruption but crimeoverall. For corruption to be prevented, atleast basic laws and minimal capacity forenforcement must exist.

More than police effectiveness, it iseffective state control over the police forcethat concerns state builders. Examinationof state-society relations in the case studiesclearly indicates that the state has yet toachieve predominance; the authority tomake rules is still much contested betweenthe state and other societal organizations

Prevention has become a

standard prescription in anti-

corruption practice, and makes

good sense. While the public

may want to see the ‘big fish’

fried, the incentives for corrup-

tion remain even if you put them

all in jail — and new corrupt

actors will emerge.

such as clans, tribes, factions, and patron-client networks. At the most basic level,this is seen in different leaders havingtheir own militias, a situation that iscommon today in both Afghanistan andDRC, for example.

Three key factors should be notedregarding programming to reduce corrup-tion. First, to generalize, evidence fromthe five country studies suggests that anti-corruption interventions in post-conflictsituations often fail to achieve majorsuccess, and in many cases fail altogether.While such interventions have beenlargely ineffective, the problem may notstem from the types of approaches, butrather in the way they are chosen andimplemented (top-down, for politicalexpediency). In other instances, they fail because they are predicated onassumptions of conditions that do notexist, such as sufficient human andfinancial resources, among others.

Second, as discussed previously, direct,early attempts to challenge the status quoon corruption may jeopardize theelections and provoke a return to violence.DRC is a case in point. As the interna-tional community perceived it, there wasa palpable tension between maintainingpeace and controlling corruption. It is amatter for speculation as to whetherpushing an anti-corruption or trans-parency and accountability agenda wouldhave had a destabilizing effect in DRC,but evidence indicates that any reforms inthis area would have been significantlyconstrained by the transitional governanceframework of the time, as was the case inUNDP’s failed attempt to strengthen theEthics and Anti-Corruption Commissionbefore the 2006 elections.

Third, across the five cases, post-conflicttransparency and accountability or anti-corruption programming could be char-acterized as more ad hoc than integratedand holistic. Moreover, transparency andaccountability or anti-corruption was notfound to be specifically integrated intoprogramming by development partners inthe areas of security (armed forces, police,DDR).38 It was also not specifically inte-grated into revenue, taxation and customs,economic development or service delivery.39

Post-conflict transparency and

accountability or anti-corruption

programming could be charac-

terized as more ad hoc than

integrated and holistic.

The integrity and transparency of devel-opment partners are critical in anti-corruption programming. In practice,development partners do not always lead byexample. With the end of armed conflict,there is often a large influx of aid fundsand personnel vulnerable to corruption. Insome circumstances, there are cases ofpersonnel of development agencies whocollect kickbacks or collude with nationalcounterparts to embezzle funds or partic-ipate in other corrupt schemes. Besidesthese cases, three main issues were iden-tified in the five cases studied.

First, national policy makers questionthe moral imperative of donors whosecountries also have problems of corrup-tion back home. Second, and more partic-

ular to post-conflict countries, there is awidely held perception that if expatriateadvisers enjoy a high standard of living, itis hypocritical or unjust to hold indige-nous public servants to what is perceivedas a different standard.

Third, it was frequently mentionedthat donors and development partnerswere not transparent and did not readilyprovide policy makers, administrators orthe public enough information regardingcommitments and actual expenditures, aswell as programme results and evaluations.The donors and development partners’integrity was not at issue here; rather, itwas a belief that the development partnersshould be cautious to lead by example.

4.3. INTEGRITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Lois Jen

sen/U

NDP

Much has been said elsewhere about theneed for coordination of development aidamong donors, and also between develop-ment aid and humanitarian aid, at thestrategic and implementation levels.40

Not to belabour the point here, but coor-dination of anti-corruption approaches isessential, first and foremost, because of thepotential for multiplier effects. That is tosay, in a coordinated approach, each areaof anti-corruption intervention stands tointeract with the others, and results in morethan the sum of the parts would suggest.

Second, coordination allows develop-ment partners to more easily reach theminimum threshold at which interventioncan make a visible difference. The successof isolated projects notwithstanding, the implementation of a national anti-corruption strategy requires many coordi-nated inputs.

Third, coordination allows donors totake joint positions against corruptionthat they might not be bold enough tomake alone. This was evident, for example,in Afghanistan when UNDP, together

4.4. AID COORDINATION

Fran

cois Goem

ans/EC

HO (E

uropea

n Union Human

itarian Branch

)

with the World Bank, the Asian Develop-ment Bank (ADB), UNODC and devel-opment agencies from Norway, Swedenand the European Union sent a joint letterto the president to express their uneasewith his appointment of a person with acriminal history to head the Anti-Corruption Commission, and thereafterdeclined to deal with that person.

In practice, coordination of anti-corruption interventions leaves much roomfor improvement. Coordination is prob-lematic regardless of the number of donors.In some countries, such as DRC, there areclose to 20 donors, whereas in others(Timor-Leste), there is one main donor(Australian Government Overseas AidProgram, or AusAID, in this case). In bothsituations, coordination needs to improve.In comparison, humanitarian aid in thetwo countries is relatively well coordi-nated, although not with development aid.

Given that corruption is a cross-cuttingissue, it would be beneficial to coordinateon anti-corruption governance program-ming with related interventions to preventcorruption in humanitarian aid flows. In

addition to separating humanitarian anddevelopment aid, aid architecture is suchthat coordination groups are segmentedsectorally, e.g., health, education andgovernance. This poses challenges in effec-tively coordinating on cross-sectoral issueslike corruption.

A number of other coordination issuesobserved are not particular to anti-corrup-tion. All five countries studied, forexample, lacked institutional capacities tolead coordination efforts. This is not aninsurmountable problem if the govern-ment perceives a benefit from the role —whatever that benefit may be. Finally,there is the challenge of coordinationbetween the technical and political levelsof donors and development partners.Messages are far too uncommonly fedboth ways so that concrete agreements onaims and progress review can be reached.

Coordination of anti-corruption

interventions leaves much room

for improvement.

In the five post-conflict countries reviewed,donors overwhelmingly chose to fundprogrammes outside national budgets.Although the trend in developing countriesis moving towards channelling aid throughnational governments, using their ownbudgeting, procurement and monitoringsystems, this trend was not observed inthe five countries reviewed.

More typically, donors in the post-conflict setting seek to reduce theirfiduciary risk through a variety of means,including direct execution of projects bydevelopment partners, CSOs and others,or through the use of pooled funds heldin trust accounts. For example, the AfghanReconstruction Trust Fund is managed by

the World Bank and channels funds tothe government from 24 countries.41

While the use of trust accounts may bea good short-term alternative wherenational budget systems are weak, it alsoraises concerns which deserve seriousconsideration. What is most alarming isthat when funds are managed on behalf ofgovernments — as in the Afghanistanexample cited above — the managementfunction is operating outside the budget.Thus, when the money dries up, themanagement capacity is gone. Externalmanagement creates a parallel instrumentthat cannot be easily integrated in thebudget process; as such, it amounts tomisplaced or wasted capacity. Further-

4.5. AID MODALITIES, VULNERABILITIES, AND IMPACT ON CORRUPTION

UN Photo/M

Kobayashi

more, the use of trust accounts mayincrease accountability to the donor andthe donor’s constituents, but it will notnecessarily be transparent or easilymonitored by the public or even by thegovernment of the recipient country. Thisis a missed opportunity for donors toshow transparency and accountability byexample. In situations in which donors donot trust the partner government to havecontrol, it may be preferable to draw theline at humanitarian aid and not givemoney for development — because takingover core state functions stands to domore harm than good.

Another aid trend specific to conflictand post-conflict situations — due to thetremendous capacity gaps and humanresource shortages — is the tendency toprovide technical assistance instead ofcash. In the case of Timor-Leste, forexample, no Timorese person was licensedto practice law or appointed as a judge inthe entire period of Indonesian rule.While some Timorese received anIndonesian legal education or worked ascourt clerks, at the time of independencethere was not a sufficient reserve of welleducated and experienced Timorese legalprofessionals to effectively run a justicesystem. Thus, a number of Portuguesejudges and legal experts were brought in.

Two observations are of use here aboutthe provision of technical assistance. Oneis that, increasingly, donors are turning to

contractors or implementing serviceproviders to deliver their aid programmes,including advisory facilities. When itcomes to procuring technical advisers, thismodality is in many regards efficient, andoffers a low risk of corruption of aid funds.However, most contractors do not havethe institutional memory that foreign aidagencies or UN agencies may bring to thepost-conflict setting.42 Therefore, their abilityto implement anti-corruption programmesdepends on knowledge inputs from otheragencies such as UNDP.

The second observation about technicalassistance is that, more often than not, ina post-conflict setting, advisers end upserving in line functions and at the end oftheir placement, local capacity remainsweak, if there has not been effectivecapacity-building. This may then inadver-tently perpetuate the conditions underwhich corruption flourishes.

Beyond the provision of technicalassistance, donors in the five post-conflictsituations contracted out other aspects oftheir aid programmes, including massiveinfrastructure projects that are intended topave the way for commerce and economicdevelopment by linking producers tomarkets through road networks — adevelopment that is particularly importantin DRC, whose massive territory isvirtually impassable by land. Health andother basic services are also contracted outto NGOs and other service providers,

rather than being provided with generalbudget support.

If done competitively and transpar-ently, contracting out is likely to result ina cost-efficient way of dispensing aid. Butas was the case with the first few years ofUSAID funding in Afghanistan, this canundercut the authority and strength of thenational government if it does not at leastcoordinate the provision of basic servicedelivery.43 Given the humanitarian natureof the aid, and the fact that all those

services cannot be provided immediatelyby the state, outsourcing needs to avoidcreating a parallel state and should insteadgradually integrate service delivery intogovernment agencies.

It is also important to acknowledge themany scandals that have been reported aroundthe use of aid funds to hire contractors forsecurity and infrastructure in Iraq andAfghanistan. They offer proof that the useof contractors to deliver aid programmesin these areas is vulnerable to corruption.

As discussed above, there is the possibilitythat anti-corruption reform efforts mayprecipitate conflict. Challenges to acorrupt status quo may breed instability

and violence as those who benefited fromthe corrupt system struggle to maintaintheir positions.44 The prospect of demo-cratic elections may be so unsettling to

4.6. TRADE-OFFS AND THEIR IMPACT ON CORRUPTION

UN Photo

those who fear losing power that theycould well resort to corruption andviolence. This is a real concern, and cannotbe discounted.

However, as corruption grows andbecomes more entrenched, it may be moredifficult to begin uprooting it. Ultimately,if corruption is unchecked in the post-conflict environment, it may delegitimizethe fledgling state and lead to furtheroutbreaks of violence and extra-legalprotest. For these reasons, it is worthexploring the possibility of embeddingprevention measures in the governanceand overall reform framework, and actingsooner rather than later to support initia-tives that will promote ethics, accounta-bility and transparency in a way that iscompatible with political stability.

The experience of DRC’s Sun CityAgreements drives home the lesson thatcreating anti-corruption institutions inthe peace agreement can backfire if thereis no real commitment to them. Moreover,the very structure of the framework maylimit accountability. While the complexi-ties of negotiating a deal may precludeother designs, brokers should at leastconsider the deal’s accountability effects.

Another trade-off that merits discus-sion here is the need for short-term versuslong-term results. There is lively debatesurrounding the common practice ofdevelopment partners ignoring corruption

in order to pursue quick impact projectsor tolerating corruption in governmentappointments. In such cases, the long-term effects are not considered, and long-term governance reform is pushed to asecondary place.

The short versus the long term is alsoweighed by governments on the enforce-ment side of the anti-corruption equation.If a government decides to prosecute afew prominent officials to gain publicsupport and show commitment to anti-corruption, this requires the capacity tocollect and study complex evidence. Suchinvestigative capacity and political neutralityof police is likely to be lacking in the earlypost-conflict years. It requires a reliablesystem in place. Thus, before setting up afraud squad or financial intelligence unit,a realistic assessment must be made ofpolice capacity needs and constraints.

As corruption grows and

becomes more entrenched,

it may be more difficult to

begin uprooting it. Ultimately,

if corruption is unchecked in the

post-conflict environment, it may

delegitimize the fledgling state

and lead to further outbreaks of

violence and extra-legal protest.

5

UN Photo/Red

enius

I n the five countries reviewed, the natureof UNDP’s anti-corruption interven-tions has often been determined by

the circumstances in which UNDP firstentered those countries post-conflict, as well as by the imperatives of thegovernments in office. As such, UNDP’santi-corruption programming has varieddepending on the particular context.

The agency’s experience in SierraLeone is an example of early engagement.In 1999, when the Security Councilauthorized the establishment of a United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone(UNAMSIL) to assist in the implemen-tation of the flawed Lomé Agreement,UNDP was embedded in the missionfrom the very beginning. The main focusof its activities for the next three years wasthe DDR process. When UNAMSIL wasreplaced by the United Nations IntegratedOffice for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) in2005, the mandate was specificallybroadened to include, among others focusareas, good governance, transparency andaccountability. In 2008, the SecurityCouncil replaced UNIOSIL with theUnited Nations Integrated PeacebuildingOffice in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) witha largely advisory role aimed at promotinghuman rights and strengthening demo-cratic institutions and the rule of law.

On the other hand, UNDP’s anti-corruption interventions in Iraq did notcommence until three years after the regime

change in 2003. By then, the anti-corruptioninstitutions established by the CoalitionProvisional Authority (CPA) had failed,and UNDP responded to the government’srequest to develop a comprehensive anti-corruption programme by partnering with UNODC to provide the expertisenecessary for the relevant Iraqi authoritiesat national, regional and governoratelevels to develop that programme them-selves. It did so by adopting UNCAC asthe benchmark. In Afghanistan, UNDPcommenced its Accountability and Trans-parency (ACT) project in January 2007,at a time when there was no clear govern-ment counterpart in the area of anti-corruption and few concrete steps hadbeen taken to address the widespreadproblem.45 The project is now based in the High Office of Oversight for theImplementation of the Anti-CorruptionStrategy (HOO), and seeks, throughcapacity development and skills transfer,to empower that office to undertake acomprehensive programme to combatcorruption. Furthermore, it containscomponents to embed anti-corruption intoother institutions — notably the Ministryof Education, Interior and Finance. It alsosupports civil society for concrete actionto address and deal with corruption.

In DRC, an anti-corruption programmehad just started its activities in 2009, when this report was being researched. It was designed to cut across UNDP’s

governance programme, which wasdeveloped in 2007, following the firstpost-conflict elections in 2006. Duringthe 2003–2006 transition period, UNDPmade a failed attempt to support the ethicscommission established in the transitionalgovernance framework.

In Timor-Leste, there is no anti-corrup-tion or transparency and accountabilityprogramme or project per se. However, asdescribed below, UNDP’s governance unit

supports a parliamentary strengtheningproject, among other relevant initiatives.

From looking across these five cases, it is clear that UNDP has associated anti-corruption with its governanceprogramming, but has yet to integrateacross its other practice areas. Anotherfinding is that in two of the cases, Iraq and(to a lesser extent) Afghanistan, UNDPhas used UNCAC as an entry point for itsanti-corruption programming.

Overall, UNDP’s governance programmingin the five countries studied supports thepolitical processes that legitimate thestate. These include constitutional reform,justice-sector reform, security sector

reform, mechanisms for peace and conflictprevention and mechanisms that promotesocial dialogue, especially involving civilsociety, the private sector and marginal-ized groups such as youth and women.

5.1. ANTI-CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE

UN Photo/A

lbert Gonzalez Farran

Among other priorities, UNDP also aimsto restore the capability and accountabilityof state institutions at the central and locallevels to maintain law and order, effectivelymanage the economy, protect human rights,and promote the rule of law.

Within the governance sector, UNDPhas implemented a variety of initiativesthat enhance transparency and accounta-bility and address corruption in the fivecountries under review. It is apparent fromthe following summary that the effortshave been selective or necessarily limited,due to political and funding constraints aswell as the presence on the ground ofother development partners engaged insimilar work.

It is also worth noting the fact thatUNDP, in many cases, has implicitlyaddressed corruption through governanceand other programmes without intention-ally aiming to do so. The subsections thatfollow do not attempt to be all-inclusive,and do not capture all UNDP programmesthat have some bearing on reducingopportunities for corruption. Rather, theyprovide examples to illustrate the range of

initiatives that UNDP has identified asanti-corruption or dealing with account-ability and transparency.

a) Elections

In Sierra Leone, UNDP supported theNational Electoral Commission inconducting the local elections in 2004 bymanaging the funds to finance them.Unfortunately, the elections were riddledwith irregularities, some of which involvedthe commission itself, and the turnout wasmuch lower than it had been two yearsearlier. The commission was subsequentlyclosed down and a new body establishedto conduct the 2007 presidential andparliamentary elections, with funds managedjointly by UNDP and the EuropeanUnion. In DRC, UNDP has planned tosupport the National Electoral Commis-sion to conduct a credible election processfree from corruption at both local andnational levels in the next five years. InTimor-Leste, UNDP has a projectdesigned to strengthen electoral laws.

b) Public sector reform

In Sierra Leone, UNDP provided supportfor the decentralization of line ministries,notably the Ministry of Local Govern-ment, and conducted a management andfunctional review of 15 governmentministries. In Timor-Leste, UNDP hashelped to create a national civil servicedatabase containing accurate primary data

UNDP has implemented

a variety of initiatives that

enhance transparency

and accountability and

address corruption.

on civil servants that aims to facilitatebetter human resource planning andmanagement of resources across the civilservice. It has other projects designed tostrengthen the capacity of local levelgovernments, the parliament, the presi-dency and the ombudsman.

In Afghanistan, UNDP supported theMinistry of Finance to establish aComplaints Office, which is now fullyoperational. UNDP, together with ADB,DFID and the World Bank, alsoconducted vulnerability to corruptionassessments (VCAs) in several ministriesand sectors and, based on the findings ofthese assessments, action plans have beendeveloped to strengthen processes andprocedures. Support was also provided todevelop a corruption monitoring systemand to establish a fraud investigation unitin the Internal Audit Department of theMinistry of Finance. In DRC, UNDP isseeking to build the capacity of theauditor general’s office to independentlyaudit and report on government accounts.

c) Justice sector reform

In Sierra Leone, UNDP endeavoured to expand access to justice by providingtraining to justices of the peace, magistrates,clerks and bailiffs, and supplementingtheir salaries. This was perhaps an urgentneed, but it has to be noted that this wasa country in which judges at all levels ofthe judicial hierarchy are chronically short

in number. In DRC, the governanceprogramme for 2009 includes providingtargeted support to the judicial system tobetter enforce anti-corruption legislationand prosecution of corruption cases.

In all the five countries reviewed, therewas a surprising failure to engage with the judiciary with a view to strengtheningits independence and integrity, withoutwhich its capacity to deal with corruptioncases makes little sense. In Afghanistan,UNDP had a large access to the justiceprogramme which initially did not considercorruption at all, although it was clear that corruption was one of the greatestproblems in this sector.

Moreover, the informal justice systems,which appear to be far more popular thanthe regular courts in both Afghanistan andSierra Leone, and which have to be reviewedand refashioned in accord with contem-porary human rights standards, need to beaddressed more in the UNDP programmesin the five countries reviewed here.

d) Drafting legislation

In Sierra Leone, UNDP supported thedrafting of some critical laws, such as theLocal Government Act, Public ProcurementAct, Education Act, Parliamentary ServiceAct and three gender-based laws — theCustomary Marriages Act, IntestateSuccession Act, and the MatrimonialCauses and Domestic Violence Act. InAfghanistan, UNDP provided support to

HOO to develop a new anti-corruptionlaw that would define its mandate accu-rately and comprehensively, and in SierraLeone assistance was also provided in thedrafting of a new anti-corruption law.

In Timor-Leste, UNDP providedtechnical assistance in the drafting ofthree media-related laws that will bepresented to the legislature as privatemember bills: the General Media Law, theMedia Council Law and the CommunityRadio Law. In Iraq, a key element of afive-year programme designed to build,consolidate and expand a political andtechnical leadership group is to increasethe capacity of Iraqi legislative-draftingofficials in modern drafting skills. Assis-tance will also be provided to the Iraqigovernment to develop anti-money laun-dering and counter terrorism-fundinglegislation. In DRC, UNDP will supportthe drafting of a public finance reform law.

e) Strengthening civil society and media

In Afghanistan, a ‘grants facility’ wasestablished to build the watchdog capacityof civil society actors and the media,strengthen CSOs to take action whenconfronted with corruption, and empowerthem through monitoring of governmentservices. Support was also provided toenable senior government officials involvedin anti-corruption work to develop strategicregional and international partnerships inorder to expose them to internationalexperience and provide them an opportu-nity for networking.

In DRC, UNDP proposes tostrengthen the capacity of civil society tomonitor budgets and make demands for transparency and accountability. InTimor-Leste, where radio is the primarysource of information for the Timoresepublic, UNDP has helped to strengthenmedia-related legal and regulatoryprocesses, increase the technical andmanagerial capacity for the sustainabilityof community radio, and improve theprofessional capacity of community radiojournalists and producers.

A new project in Timor-Leste isCommunication for Empowerment, orC4E. Its initial focus, on the establish-ment of government information houses,is based on an acknowledgement of thepivotal role of both civil society and themedia in mobilizing and empowering the

Civil society and the media play

a pivotal role in mobilizing and

empowering the poor to enable

them to engage with local

authorities, to make legitimate

demands of those authorities,

and to hold these public bodies

to account for their policies.

poor to enable them to engage with localauthorities, to make legitimate demandsof those authorities, and to hold thesepublic bodies to account for their policies.Based in districts across the country andemphasizing outreach to subdistricts andthe community level, these are placeswhere people can go to find out informa-tion. In the media sector, the project seeks

to inform vulnerable groups of issues thataffect them, provide opportunities forthem to voice their concerns in the publicarena, and provide a space for them todiscuss and debate these concerns amongthemselves and with others. The focus isprincipally on community radio, as this isby far the most accessible medium forcitizens at the community level.

In Iraq and to a lesser extent inAfghanistan, UNCAC was used as anentry point for intervention. UNCAC canbe used strategically as a tool for dialoguebetween government and potentially non-

state actors. This is because, for a countrythat has ratified the convention, a treatyobligation arises immediately to begintaking measures to implement it. As such,it helps to depoliticize dialogue around

5.2. USING UNCAC AS AN ENTRY POINT

UN Photo/Pau

lo Filg

ueiras

the problems of corruption. Another advantage is that UNCAC

prescribes a broad range of measures toenhance integrity, transparency andaccountability; therefore, its provisions arebound to appeal to any audience, engagingparticipants in the process of discussingthose most relevant to their interests and context. For example, its preventivemeasures require civil service reform;integrity in the electoral process, especiallyin regard to the funding of political parties and candidates; a commitment bypublic officials — both elected and non-elected — to ethical standards; access toinformation; the strengthening of judicialintegrity; the proper management ofpublic finances; accounting and auditingstandards in the private sector; and publicprocurement procedures.

In Afghanistan, UNDP used UNCACas a tool for dialogue. It commenced itsAccountability and Transparency (ACT)project with a series of initiatives, one of which was a gap analysis of nationallegislation against the requirements ofUNCAC. UNDP also undertook a studyof the existing institutional arrangementsfor combating corruption; in this study, it outlined different options for a clearer division of labour betweendifferent institutions that had mandates to address corruption.

In 2008, the government announcedthe establishment of a new anti-corrup-tion body to replace the existing discred-ited one. When the new institution,HOO, was launched, UNDP providedsupport to its senior management todevelop its organizational structure, facil-itating an exchange with the Governmentof Indonesia to provide an expert tosupport the oversight body in developingits strategic plan.

UNDP recognized that broad-basedholistic approaches do not bring aboutrequired change and that instead theholistic elements (prevention, enforce-ment, awareness and multi-stakeholderparticipation) should be focused on a fewsectors. In this light, the ACT project wasredesigned in 2009 and extended for afurther three years, taking into account (i)the need to engage international advisorson a long-term basis in order to secure

Another advantage is that

UNCAC prescribes a broad

range of measures to enhance

integrity, transparency and

accountability; therefore, its

provisions are bound to appeal

to any audience, engaging

participants in the process of

discussing those most relevant

to their interests and context.

capacity development, skills transfer,follow-up and sustainability of projectactivities; (ii) the importance of focusingon a more narrow set of outputs to allowfor developing the necessary partnershipsto achieve the desired results; (iii) the needto implement activities at the subnationallevel; and (iv) the importance of havingsufficient human resources in the projectto ensure timely implementation ofproject activities.

Accordingly, in the second phase, theproject has been based in HOO. Projectstaff provides advice and support to itssenior management on a day-to-day basis,including in the area of administrationand finance, human resources and infor-mation technology (IT). The emphasis ison capacity development and skillstransfer to enable the development of thenecessary national capacities to ensure thesustainability of outputs. The projectfocuses on the mainstreaming of corrup-tion in sectors, and aims to bring differentstakeholders in these sectors together.

UNDP has sought to create inAfghanistan a group of stakeholders,including civil society and the media,committed to implementing UNCAC.UNDP also has played a role in clarifyingthe mandate of HOO. Its mandate (if theproposed new law is enacted) will bebroad and comprehensive and will includeprevention, public awareness, propermanagement of public affairs and the

simplification of processes and proceduresin public bodies that deal with the publicon a regular basis. As of early 2010,however, it remained to seen if HOOwould have the support of PresidentKarzai and therefore the power to carrythis out.

In Iraq, the UNDP programme —which is being implemented at thenational and subnational levels in collab-oration with UNODC — is based on apartnership that integrates the functionsof the five principal anti-corruptionagencies, namely, the Commission onIntegrity, the inspectors general, the Boardof Supreme Audit and the ParliamentaryCommittee on Integrity and the Judiciary.Also participating in the project are repre-sents from the civil society and businesssectors; coordination is provided by theJoint Anti-Corruption Council.

UNDP has succeeded in involving allthese actors in a self-assessment and gapanalysis of UNCAC, as well as inpreparing an in-depth needs assessmenttool relating to several pivotal articles ofthe Convention. Guidance is also beingprovided on the conduct of a nationalintegrity survey and on the preparation ofa national anti-corruption strategy. Asignificant element of this programme isthat it seeks to build, consolidate andexpand a political and technical leadershipgroup at all levels of the Iraqi government,including the judiciary, and in the civil

society and private sectors, as well as tocreate a pool of anti-corruption facilitatorsor trainers. Two other significant innova-tions are that it seeks to (i) involve localcommunity, religious and business leaders,as well as print and electronic mediarepresentatives, and (ii) provide assistancein developing an anti-corruptioncurriculum for primary and secondarylevel schools.

Using UNCAC as a reference point,the UNDP anti-corruption programme inIraq encompasses measures such as codes

of conduct, witness and whistleblowerprotection laws, declarations of assets,access to information, anti-money laun-dering legislation and the recovery ofstolen assets. Involving Iraq’s highlyeducated and professional civil servants inall the processes is intended to ensuretheir ownership. Non-political officials atthe highest levels of government also needto be involved because political support atthe ministerial level for combatingcorruption appears to be minimal, despiteprotests to the contrary.

6

Curt Carnem

ark/Th

e World Ban

k

T he five countries that are the subjectof this report are among the poorestin the world, notwithstanding the

enormous mineral and other naturalresources they possess. While some of thecountries have never had nationwideinfrastructure or sufficient human capacityoutside their capitals, what they didpossess was largely destroyed during yearsof conflict. There was little experience inthese countries of real democracy, trans-parency or accountability; all are thusemerging from decades of authoritari-anism, repression and patronage. Andalthough levels of corruption varied beforethe start of each war — with DRC andSierra Leone arguably most affected — itis now rampant in all five countries.

There are four other challenges toanti-corruption interventions in these fivecountries that stand out. The first is thefragile nature of the post-conflict environ-ment in some, and the ongoing conflict inothers. For example, in Afghanistan thestate lacks the capacity to control nearly80 percent of its territory, and it has evenbeen claimed that the writ of the highlycentralized Afghan government does notextend beyond the limits of the capital cityof Kabul. The security situation in Iraq issuch that the UNDP Country Officeoperates from neighbouring Jordan. Somesee the hordes of unemployed andalienated youth in Sierra Leone, many ofwhom are former combatants, as a tinder

box waiting to explode. The second impediment is the apparent

lack of political support for combatingcorruption from the highest levels ofgovernment. For example, President Karzaiappointed an expatriate Afghan who hadbeen convicted of drug trafficking in theUnited States as the head of the principalanti-corruption body, and permitted him to remain in that office despite thefact that the international communityincluding UNDP had refused to deal withhim. The prioritization given by Karzai tothe process of political stability has led tothe occupation of crucial state positions by alleged war criminals. Among thepresident’s ministers are powerful provin-cial power holders and warlords who havelittle or no interest in reform, but areanxious to consolidate their positions andretain control of their fiefdoms under aveneer of democratic legitimacy. Onecommentator has described the symbol ofthe future Afghanistan as being not anenergized and legitimized governmentdispensing justice, but the garish ‘narco-tecture’ of drug lord homes standing amidthe poverty of Kabul.46

In Sierra Leone, in the early post-conflictyears, despite the government’s seekingfinancial support for an anti-corruptionsurvey and the parliament enacting anAnti-Corruption Act that established anAnti-Corruption Commission, there waslittle or no progress on either the survey

or the commission. In 2009, PresidentErnest Bai Koroma publicly pledgedsupport for the commission, but most civilsociety observers were sceptical of hiscommitment. In Iraq, political support forcombating corruption appears to beminimal. According to one high-levelofficial interviewed, the government is notcommitted to fighting corruption.

The third challenge is the ambivalentattitude of the international communityto tackling corruption in the immediateaftermath of the conflict. In DRC, theinternational community’s main priorityin 2003–2006 was to hold a credibleelection in a country that had not had onefor 46 years. Little effort was made torequire the transitional government toaddress the problem of corruption for fearthat that doing so might undermine thepolitical settlement. In Timor-Leste, thegovernment’s reluctance to focus oncorruption from 1999 until 2009 (whensigns of change first emerged) wasmirrored by donors. In Iraq in 2003, allearly governance initiatives were under-taken by the US embassy in Baghdad, and all institutions and programmes to improve accountability within the Iraqi government were establishedthrough orders issued by the CPA, leavingno room for other initiatives. InAfghanistan, the initial attitude of donorson corruption was, essentially, ‘don’tweaken what you try to strengthen’. The

Bonn Agreement of 2001 that marked theend of the US-led invasion referred toprinciples of Islam, democracy, pluralismand social justice as determining thefuture course of the country, but made nomention of corruption. The principal focuswas on stabilization and security, andcorruption was not raised publicly or inpolitical dialogue in the period thatfollowed. Although anti-corruptionprogramming was implemented early onin Iraq, corruption only really started toemerge as an issue in mid-to-late 2006,mostly because of pressure from donors.In Sierra Leone, in the early aftermath ofthe conflict, the international community’sefforts were focused on the DDR process,the return and resettlement of displacedpersons, and the extension of stateauthority throughout the country.

Fourth, and related to the point above,is that corruption is simply not consideredby the international community to be anissue that needs to be addressed early onand as an integral part of all programminginterventions. This laissez-faire attitudecontributes to making it far more difficultto tackle corruption at later stages. In part,the lack of focus stems from the belief thatgiven the long list of urgent needs, it ismore important to build institutions firstand then address corruption. Suchdecisions, however, focus on quick resultswith insufficient attention paid to means.

After conflict ends, government and devel-opment partners face a rapidly changingand complex environment. Even underthe best of circumstances, corruption is ahighly controversial issue with a largenumber of participants and decisions to bemade. These factors make it highlyunlikely, if not impossible, to implementand successfully sustain the radical reformsnecessary to minimize levels of corruptionin a post-conflict setting. The experienceof the five countries studied here suggestsa different approach: mainstreaming anti-corruption (including integrity, transparency

and accountability) into post-conflict statebuilding interventions, and embeddingmicro-measures as early as is practicablyfeasible after war ends.

In this report, ‘mainstreaming’ meanssystematically identifying corruption oppor-tunities and integrating anti-corruptionacross programme sectors. ‘Micro-measures’refers to technocratic interventions thatare small in scope but may take place atany level, national or subnational. Thesemay be explicitly or implicitly related tocorruption. Examples of micro-measuresinclude inserting a clause in the criminal

6.1. MAINSTREAMING AND ‘EMBEDDING’ ANTI-CORRUPTION

UNDP

code, carrying out a national survey, ortraining community health workers tofacilitate the formation self-help groupsthat organize to access existing governmentservices. And ‘embedding’ the changesrefers to strategically placing them ingovernment initiatives where they willenjoy some relative sustainability andpotentially create multiplier effects as theyinteract with other elements of reform. Ifsuccessful, micro-measures will potentiallyresult in significant change over time. Ifunsuccessful, the failures are relatively low profile and should allow other anti-corruption programming to continue.

To the extent that both micro- andmacro-reforms are feasible, they arecomplementary and may both be pursued.Macro-measures are sweeping in nature,make news headlines, and in the case ofcorruption, pose a profound threat to thestatus quo. Examples of macro-measuresinclude revamping the entire civil service,creating new institutions from scratch, orpassing a suite of laws. But success inmacro-reforms requires ensuring they arenot only politically feasible in terms ofgetting, say, a national anti-corruption

strategy or controversial anti-corruptionlaw passed, but also in terms of subse-quent implementation and enforcement.As the cases studied here show, UNDPand the international community caneffectively use their weight to get a policyor law passed or an institution founded.This step alone does not translate intoeffective reduction of corruption, however,in the absence of political weight behindit. Such vital backing requires aligningpolitical interests with those of the anti-corruption agenda, a task that may not beeasily accomplished on a macro scale.

UNDP and the international

community can effectively use

their weight to get a policy

or law passed or an institution

founded. This step alone does

not translate into effective

reduction of corruption,

however, in the absence of

political weight behind it.

As made evident in this report, corruptpractices on the part of a weak newgovernment may quickly become rampant,and in many cases be perceived as integralto the maintenance of the peace processitself. For example, where no warringfaction manages to gain the upper handthrough warfare and a power-sharingagreement is reached, the service ofpatronage networks may be embedded inthe peace agreement itself — a step thatmakes it difficult to address corruptionearly in a post-conflict setting. Similarly,harshly denouncing and condemning corruptpractices by new governments representing

either the old or a new regime mayweaken their control of the politicaleconomy of the country, and thus indi-rectly invite a reinitiation of warfare. Thesame potential negative impact applies,perhaps even more directly, in cases wherewarfare persists and caretaker govern-ments struggle to survive, day to day.

With so much at stake, one mightthink that it makes sense to refrain fromaggressively addressing corruption untilthe government is in a better position toprocess criticism and act vigorously on it,without jeopardizing peace in the process.However, the findings of this study

6.2. STARTING EARLY TO REBUILD THE STATE’S PILLARS:LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS

Pedro Cote/U

NDP

reinforce the opposite conclusion:Corruption can and should be addressedearly after armed conflict ends. Even if nobroad social and political push for anti-corruption is initiated, there should bewell-placed, indirect support that preventscorruption and promotes the rule of law.

Postponing anti-corruption interven-tions echoes now-dated notions of‘sequencing’ of peace and development,where development activities should waituntil ‘proper’ pacification has beenachieved. As the experience of peace-keeping missions in DRC, Sierra Leoneand Timor-Leste have made evident, it isnot only possible but necessary to embeddevelopment thinking into peacekeepingoperations. This has been shown to notonly enhance the effectiveness of peace-keeping operations, but, where effectivelydone, also gives development a head startin the most difficult terrains. The activitiesof UNDP in Timor-Leste during the2003–2006 period offer a clear example ofthe benefits of that approach. Learningfrom such experiences, discussions aboutsequencing and trade-offs between devel-opment and peacekeeping operations havelargely been abandoned. There are simplytoo many synergies and complementari-ties between both activities to operatethem as separate, exclusive units.

At this stage it is necessary to draw aparallel regarding post-conflict and anti-corruption efforts. In post-conflict and

conflict situations, on the one hand,rampant corruption has the potential toerode public trust in political institutionsand undermine the legitimacy ofincumbent governments, including demo-cratically elected ones. The entrenchmentof corrupt practices in one sector of theeconomy — dominated by a faction — islikely to result in the entrenchment ofcorruption in other sectors that aredominated by different factions. Thisresults in a spiralling competition forscarce resources, without the means toeither adequately fund or constrain thebehaviour of this out-of-control faction-alism. Such entrenchment of corruptiondiverts funds that could be used to deliverbasic services, further eroding state legit-imacy and authority in the eyes of thepopulation. All of this, in turn, may leadto political instability.

Corruption can and should

be addressed early after

armed conflict ends. Even if

no broad social and political

push for anti-corruption is

initiated, there should be

well-placed, indirect support

that prevents corruption and

promotes the rule of law.

On the other hand, embedding ananti-corruption agenda in post-conflictinterventions may actually strengthen thegovernment’s position. This would workin two ways. First, the enforcement of‘proper procedures’ and ‘due process’ maystrengthen the government’s hand, givingit moral authority (and, with donorsupport, economic teeth) to effectively banextreme corrupt practices. Second, thegovernment’s adherence to ‘proper proce-dures’ and ‘due process’ will incrementallyincrease its policy expertise, help it nurturea core bureaucratic cadre, and allow forthe design and implementation of increas-ingly effective policies. The opposite istrue if post-conflict governments are notinduced to embed anti-corruption activi-ties and planning in their activities.

Evidence that these two factors are atwork is found across the board in the fivecase studies. On the positive side, forexample in DRC until at least 2007, thescope for servicing patronage networkswas being reduced. This was not a simpleand constant process, especially given theongoing conflict in North and South Kivu

and persistent intra-army unrest, butoverall movement was in the rightdirection. On the negative side, however,the escalation and entrenchment ofcorrupt practices is especially threateningin Iraq and Afghanistan. That is becauseit is combined with other factors, such asfeuds among competing factions andstrong insurgencies, and the fact that thenational governments are still perceived ashaving been imposed from outside.Combined, these realities and perceptionscontribute to alarming levels of publicoutrage and political instability.

It must be stressed that while it isevident that corruption may enable or fuelviolence during and after a civil war, or beused as a battle cry in the case of SierraLeone, the evidence from the fivecountries reviewed suggests that corrup-tion does not cause war in and of itself. Itdoes, however, help exacerbate and fundwarfare while open conflict is in place, andin post-conflict contexts it may indirectlyresult, if unconstrained, in a return toconflict by eroding the legality, legitimacyand effectiveness of the state. It is for thesereasons that anti-corruption effortscannot be sequenced off to a second phasein the post-conflict process. Anti-corrup-tion efforts should be an integral part ofthe post-conflict state building strategybecause they help governments strengthenthe state’s pillars: legality, legitimacy and effectiveness.

Embedding an anti-corruption

agenda in post-conflict interven-

tions may actually strengthen

the government’s position.

The case of DRC in 2001–2003 is anexample of the success of early interven-tion of development partners, before peaceand immediately after it is achieved.While many feared the death of PresidentLaurent Kabila would lead to furtherdestabilization, his replacement by his son,Joseph, in January 2001 actually jump-started the peace process. The newpresident immediately began to court theinternational community, and restartedpeace talks. In particular, he allowed thedeployment of MONUC (United NationsOrganization Mission in DR Congo)forces to oversee troop withdrawals. Opposingrebel forces decided to cooperate under

mounting diplomatic pressure. Rwandaand Uganda were also compelled to ceaseopen hostilities. This improvement in thesituation led to a rekindling of inter-Congolese dialogue, which eventuallyresulted in the 2003 Sun City Agreementand a transitional Congolese governmenton 30 June 2003.

Throughout this process, the UNDPCountry Office acted as a behind-the-scenes adviser to all parties involved, even-tually extending its influence from thecapital city of Kinshasa to areas as remoteas Ituri in the East. Especially importantat the time was the advisory role theCountry Office provided to the Kabila

6.3. ADDRESSING CORRUPTION: A PARALLEL TO PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT

Andrea Booke

r/UNDP

administration to recreate a nationalgovernment that had practically ceased toexist between 1998 and 2001. As a firststep, the government implemented theEnhanced Interim Programme (EIP),which was fundamental to ending years ofhyperinflation. Macroeconomic stabiliza-tion allowed the government to establishthe legal framework for the financialsystem, strengthening the central bank’sorganization and restructuring commer-cial banks. These reforms allowed DRC torecover voting rights in the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) and to receive IMFand World Bank assistance in June 2002.

During the transitional period ofgovernment, UNDP in DRC strategicallytook the security agenda and extended it to a development agenda. It did so by taking a community reintegrationapproach that went beyond the then-prevailing view of DDR as an individualentitlement to ex-combatants, empha-sizing the ‘R’. The DDR concept was usedas an entry point to progressively move

into other areas, including providingsupport to internally displaced persons,community recovery, governance, andsecurity sector reform. At the local level,UNDP saw partnerships with diverseCSOs as an opportunity to ‘thicken’, aswell as to strengthen, civil society.47

While any effects on corruption in thiscase would have been unintentional, itsuggests an entry point for accountabilityand transparency initiatives in DDR. For example, setting up committees to determine and monitor the use ofcommunity development funds has thepotential to identify and strengthenexisting community structures thatunderpin civil society and accountability.Much as peacekeeping and developmentactivities can and should be combined totake advantage of synergies and comple-mentarities, post-conflict state buildingrequires anti-corruption practices —broadly understood to include trans-parency and accountability — to be main-streamed from day one.

7

UN Photo/Evan Schneider

T his section identifies opportunitiesfor UNDP programming on anti-corruption in post-conflict and

recovery processes. It suggests politicaland institutional entry points, and makes recommendations on the timingand content of reform, ethics and trans-

parency, and social accountability. It also emphasizes the importance of theprocess of consultation, coordination, and evidence and learning. Overall, itrecommends that each UNDP CountryOffice strategically map out its anti-corruption approach.

Identify and ensure political commitment.The government’s commitment to fightcorruption or implement policy reforms isoften elusive but matters because, withoutit, reforms may be nominally adopted butbe blocked in practice. UNDP shouldpromote the development of linkagesbetween the highest political level in thenational government and the correspon-

ding level at which the UN and donorcommunity operate. UNDP should alsoseek to strategically influence the publicagenda through its interactions withMembers of Parliament (MPs), ministersand high-level bureaucrats, for example,and through support of CSOs, the mediaand research bodies, which in turn play arole in shaping the political agenda.

7.1. POLITICAL ENTRY POINTS

UN Photo/Eva

n Sch

neider

Carry out a political economy analysis ormapping. Moving beyond the ‘drivers ofchange’ analysis, DFID has a new politicaleconomy analysis concept that is appli-cable in the post-conflict setting. Using atool such as that developed by DFID48 ora simple mapping of key government actorsand their interests, UNDP programmestaff in the Country Office should identifypotential ‘champions’ of ACT at the nationaland subnational level, inside and outsidegovernment. Agency staff should workwith them individually or, if appropriate,bring them together and facilitate thedevelopment of ideas and a network forchange. Consideration needs to be givento what extent the ACT agenda is beingused for political purposes — for example,to victimize, immobilize or liquidateopponents while not applying the samerules to the incumbents. The problem isnot political motivation per se, but unevenapplication of the rules.

Be proactive and generate political demand.UNDP should strategically generate politicaldemand for reform, rather than waitpassively for conditions to be ripe for ACTafter conflict ends. It may be helpful inthis regard to leverage UNCAC as a legalinternational instrument that countriesare party to and have commitments under.However, the setting of priorities shouldbe a government-driven process (where agovernment exists), which UNDP may

facilitate. It may seem as if some politiciansand senior bureaucrats are only mentioningcorruption because they feel they must andhave no intention of actually addressing it.Nonetheless, if they make a publiccommitment to integrity, transparencyand accountability or corruption control,it is a potential entry point.

Prioritize politically feasible initiatives.Where only a few initiatives are practical,as is often the case in a post-conflictsituation, their selection should be guidedas much by consideration of politicalfeasibility as by what a technical assess-ment would suggest.

Seek win-win situations. To reduce thepotential resistance to anti-corruptionreform, as well as the potential of insta-bility and return to conflict that suchreform may generate, an effort should bemade to find where the interests of politi-cians and the reform agenda align. Doingso could help ensure that the effort is awin-win and not a zero-sum game.

Institutionalize reforms. Leadership iskey to making anti-corruption reformshappen, but UNDP should work with thebureaucracy to ensure the institutionaliza-tion of reforms so that they continue afterthe current political leadership moves on. This is particularly challenging butextremely important in a rapidly changingpost-conflict environment.

Consider opportunities and limitationsof the governance framework. Peaceaccords may be an opportunity for theinternational community to place corrup-tion on the agenda. However, beforesupporting the implementation of anti-corruption institutions that may emergefrom the deal or from the subsequent legaland constitutional frameworks, UNDPneeds to consider (i) whether the transi-tional and subsequent governance frameworkallows for or precludes accountability, and(ii) to what extent there is real support forthe institutions created on paper.

UNDP faces a dilemma when an insti-tution seems technically poorly designed orpoorly timed, but is launched nonetheless,

with or without donor backing. Supportingan institution that is doomed from thestart or embroiled in factionalism may domore harm than good in terms of reachinganti-corruption objectives, if its underper-formance undermines the institution’slegitimacy. Equally important — althoughdifficult to measure — is the possibilitythat such support could also undermineUNDP’s political capital. At the sametime, however, limited engagement maybe the preferred option in order forUNDP to drive other initiatives forward.

Support the development of a newgovernance framework. In the develop-ment of the new governance framework(i.e. a constitution), UNDP may seek the

7.2. INSTITUTIONAL ENTRY POINTS

UN Photo/Rick Bajornas

opportunity to work with reform-mindednationals to consider and propose initia-tives that lay the groundwork for trans-parency and accountability within the corestate institutions that are being built.

Facilitate a shared national under-standing of the rule of law and buildanti-corruption into justice reform andsecurity reform programmes. UNDPshould seek opportunities to facilitate ashared national understanding of the ruleof law, including but not limited to anti-corruption legal frameworks and policies.Efforts to control corruption are critical to ensuring access to justice and equaltreatment before the law. By ensuring thatno one is above the law, by enforcing thelaw and by making public their decisionsand operations, justice and security sectorinstitutions can guide their countries tothe path of better governance, and restorethe social contract. Efforts to strengthenthe rule of law, by challenging an environ-ment of impunity, are also critical tocontrolling corruption. The rule of law,and transparency and accountability in thepublic sector serve not only as means tocounter corruption but also as funda-mental conditions of good governance.

Embed access to information and socialaccountability. In the constitutional andlegal framework, as well as the nationalbudget in particular, it is necessary that

civil society and public access to informa-tion and social accountability mechanismsshould be embedded at the outset. Lawsand institutions are not directly fightingcorruption should also be designed withan eye to transparency and accounta-bility.49 Although ‘getting the rules right’on paper is no guarantee that corruptionwill be controlled in practice, it is anecessary pre-condition.

Indigenize models adopted fromoutside. Adopting, and then adapting,other Southern models (South-Southcooperation) is a potentially useful strategy.Care needs to be taken, however to indi-genize models adopted from abroad. In aninordinate hurry to establish every insti-tution after a conflict, this is often neglected.Indigenizing external models needs to bedone by or in close collaboration withnationals, preferably those who are inclose contact with local communities.Although there is a tendency to work withnationals who are fluent in UN languagesand have worked or studied abroad, indi-genization is a sensitive process that requiresclose contact and familiarity with localcultures and customs. Language and trans-lation issues may confound this process,since it is essential for UNDP to providethe necessary language support services.

Match advisers’ legal background with the system in-country. Legal

Start early after conflict ends. UNDPshould tackle corruption at an early stage,whether explicitly or not. Integrity, trans-parency and accountability safeguards shouldbe embedded from the peace process orcessation of hostilities onwards. While thereis no strict sequence or chronological order

to follow, some reform initiatives may helplay the groundwork for others. For example,(re)establishing the rule of law (as opposedto rule by force and complete lawlessness)and restoring basic service delivery arefundamental to the success of statebuilding and require immediate attention.

advisers tend to support the creation of systems familiar to them, and thus such systems may be superimposed onexisting systems. This is not usuallyadvisable. Particular attention needs to be paid to matching external legalexpertise with the legal system(s) in place in the country.

Recognize nation building withoutassuming citizenship. UNDP program-ming needs to recognize that nationbuilding is proceeding, without assumingthat the nation exists. Whereas somedevelopment partners get directly involvedin state building, nation building is generallyviewed as an indigenous process.

7.3. TIMING AND CONTENT OF REFORM

Jorgen

Sch

ytte/U

NDP

Build anti-corruption into electoralsupport. Elections will not be accepted aslegitimate if there is rampant corruptionin the form of vote buying, for example.Therefore, while remaining sensitive to theneed to maintain political stability,UNDP should consider building in ACTelectoral support programmes.

Integrate anti-corruption into DDR.UNDP should emphasize the ‘R’ (reinte-gration) and seek to develop sustainablecommunity groups with linkages to localand national government.

Ensure decent pay in the civil service.Attention to the civil service is a logicalearly step because there is likely to be amassive shortage of professionals. Animmediate recruitment exercise may result in cronies instead of qualified,ethical employees being appointed. If the opportunity is missed by UNDP inthe first instance, there is often a secondopportunity after the elections. Decentpay and merit-based hiring are funda-mental building blocks for an effectivepublic service. They are necessary for, but do not guarantee, clean government.Where leaders are underpaid, this toomust be addressed; raising their salariesmay facilitate effective tackling of thethornier issue of ethics and behaviour.

Make tax collection transparent. Domesticresource mobilization in the post-conflict

setting should also be supported, so as toensure it is transparent, accountable andeffective, and that the process hasintegrity. Mobilizing resources requirescollecting tax revenues from the popula-tion, which may not see itself as citizensyet. Due to lack of employment opportu-nities, they are also largely unlikely to havecash incomes. The possibility of inter-vening in this area as a part of an anti-corruption strategy is mentioned becauseresource mobilization is fundamental tothe provision of basic services that arelikely to have stopped during the conflict.If services continue not to be providedafter the end of the conflict, this may feedpublic discontent with the governmentand challenge state legitimacy, possiblyleading to further conflict.

Make small inroads to lead to biggerinitiatives. Police or judicial micro-projectsmay be necessary to begin with, but in thelonger term UNDP should not focus toonarrowly on those institutions’ anti-corruption investigation capacity withoutstrengthening the institutions overall.While building the capacity of judges toaddress cases of corruption may haveshort-term (albeit positive) results if thejudiciary itself is highly corrupt, it makesmore sense to address the broader issue ofjudicial integrity. However, it may be thatthe anti-corruption unit of the judiciaryor police is more receptive to UNDP

support and anti-corruption reform, andworking initially in this narrow area maypresent opportunities at a later stage forfurther anti-corruption programmingacross entire institutions.

Strengthen national ownership. Assuggested above, there are far moreoptions than can be implemented, giventhe constraints on resources, capacity andso on, in a post-conflict setting. In facili-

tating the setting of priorities by a govern-ment, UNDP should resist providingexamples of specific initiatives fromaround the world. Instead, it should beginby identifying national and context-specific priorities prior to consideringwhat has been done elsewhere. Thisstrategy is especially important becausemost of the successes have occurred innon-post-conflict situations.

Lead by example in transparency, ethicsand accountability. The main pointsraised in this research were to more

publicly disseminate UNDP’s programmebudget expenditures and results, andreduce unnecessary operational costs.

7.4. ETHICS, TRANSPARENCY AND REDUCTION OF FIDUCIARY RISK

Rina Sa

eed Khan

/UNDP

Build transparency into budget supportup front. Budget support should build intransparency mechanisms from the startby including detailed line items, publicaccess to information, and a monitoringsystem. The same applies to the aid systemin general.

Explore pooled funding and make ittransparent. Pooled-funding mechanismsshould be considered instead of directbudget support because governmentsystems are non-existent or weak at theend of the conflict. However, this shouldbe seen as an interim measure, with thegoal of building up and using governmentsystems of budgeting, procurement andmonitoring as soon as is feasible. Pooledfunds should be managed transparentlyand be accountable to the governmentand public as well as to donor constituen-cies. Regular information should be madereadily available about expenditures, notjust commitments.

Provide non-monetary aid to reducefiduciary risk. Non-monetary aid includesadvisers who are frequently provided ingreat numbers in post-conflict situations.Such support needs to be coordinated, so

that multiple advisers are not provided forthe same position. While advisers mayprovide essential expertise and experience,their presence in large numbers may raisemore questions in the public’s mind aboutaid effectiveness than they would in acountry where the UN does not have sucha high profile. UNDP therefore needs topay greater attention to ethics and trans-parency surrounding the placement ofadvisers in post-conflict situations, becauseit is under particular scrutiny there.

Coordinate with the government whencontracting out. Contracting out servicedelivery may be a quick way to restorebasic services immediately after the end ofthe conflict, and to build infrastructureand capacity. For UNDP, this may takethe form of contracting advisory services(as in Timor-Leste), or contracting NGOsand a private cash transfer company, aswas done in DRC. However, the govern-ment needs to manage or at least coordi-nate the contracting out with UNDP sothat service providers do not underminethe consolidation of the state, and thestate does not take for granted that theseservices are not its responsibility.

Strategically support the developmentof a variety of non-state groups (thatshare and accept the state’s authority), asa way to enhance accountability andstrengthen the state. The groups need not be oriented towards democratization,anti-corruption or governance per se.Support for new groups is as important asfor established groups. For example,UNDP could support a wide variety ofCSOs through projects that provideincentives and remove obstacles to theirgrowth at the grassroots, provincial andnational levels. To empower civil society,

this should also be designed to facilitatelinkages between CSOs and governmentfrom the local level to the national level.

Support the participation of civil societyand the media in advocacy, monitoring,investigation and reporting on trans-parency, accountability and corruption.

Link business councils and chambers ofcommerce with government on initia-tives such as removing impediments tobusiness and developing a monitoringsystem for the national budget.

7.5. SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

UN Photo/Eskinder Deb

ebe

Build in more time for the process ofconsultation, analysis, collaboration anddialogue. It is important to choose ‘good’or appropriate and feasible solutions andcontextualize them. But it is also useful torecognize that what our five case studieshighlight is that the process matters asmuch or more than the solution itself. The failure of hoped-for solutions such as national anti-corruption strategies orconstitutional provisions is not necessarilybecause a given solution is inherentlyflawed, unsuitable, maladapted or poorlysequenced. Failure may instead be wholly

or partly related to the way in which it wasdeveloped, adopted or imposed — allprocess-related issues. A national anti-corruption strategy should not be automat-ically dismissed, for example, if there is theopportunity to go through a meaningfulconsultation process. Such a process hasvalue in and of itself, and is also what createsan enabling environment for a range ofpotential solutions to work. Unfortunately,the potential benefits of process are oftenignored because donors and governmentsare under pressure to deliver resultsquickly in the post-conflict setting.

7.6. PROCESSUN Photo/A

lban

y Associates/Stuar

Improve and take the lead on coordina-tion. Coordination of anti-corruptionapproaches across both development aidand humanitarian aid is essential, mainlybecause of the potential for multipliereffects. Coordination also (i) allows devel-opment partners to more easily reach theminimum threshold at which interventioncan make a visible difference, and (ii) allowsdonors to take joint positions againstcorruption that they might not be boldenough to make alone. UNDP shouldseek opportunities to lead in this area,ideally in close partnership with the UNmission head and other relevant staff fromthe UN political section. For example,UNDP could encourage the establish-ment of a government dialogue forum or

platform allowing CSOs to participate. Itmay also initiate an informal donor coor-dination group. If UNDP is unable tofacilitate coordination among all foreigngovernments engaged in supporting thepost-conflict country, it should focusinstead on one-on-one engagement andengagement with the recipient country toensure that programming to addresscorruption is not undermined.

Ensure staffing for effective coordina-tion. UNDP should, with other donors,address staffing needs to coordinate in thearea of anti-corruption. The practice ofplacing full-time gender advisers inCountry Offices offers a good example.An anti-corruption or accountability and

7.7. COORDINATION

UN Photo/Eskinder Deb

ebe

transparency adviser should be madeavailable to work across programmes,sectors and government agencies.

Identify and use natural advantages. Asin DRC and Sierra Leone, a CountryOffice may have been present before orduring the conflict, whereas many otheragencies operated from Headquarters andonly located to the country after the war’send. In these instances, UNDP has anatural advantage in establishing andtaking the lead on tackling corruption,from the peace process onwards. Where

UNDP is able to maintain impartialityamong different warring factions, this is aparticular advantage in addressing corrup-tion because in the long run, effectivenessand sustainability hinge on engagingdiverse societal groups.

Cooperate with UNODC. UNODCbeing the secretariat of UNCAC, andconsidering its expertise in enforcementapproaches, it is crucial for UNDP tocooperate with UNODC, in particular tocombine the prevention approaches withwell-conceived enforcement.

Support the identification, generationand use of evidence and disseminate it widely. UNDP is widely regarded in

this area, and plays an important role inpost-conflict situations where much aid isdelivered through private contractors

7.8. EVIDENCE AND LEARNING

Bill Lyo

n/U

NDP

whose business is not to develop anddisseminate institutional memory. UNDPmay carry out the following:

n Develop post-conflict indicators,assessment checklists, and flexibletemplates to guide discussions aboutthe rules of anti-corruption institu-tions (since state building is aboutcoming to an agreement on the rules).The goal should be to facilitate anindigenous process.

n Conduct surveys and research, part-nering where possible with nationals.In some cases this is a matter of identifying and analysing existingknowledge; in other cases new data iscollected. The lack of empiricalevidence should not be permitted to delay ACT/AC programming.Collecting evidence is slow, particu-larly when challenged by inadequatepost-conflict research capacity and

poor physical infrastructure to get to the provinces. Data should becollected with a view to sharing it withother post-conflict countries as well.

n Consult widely and repeatedly to gainregular stakeholder feedback on studies,to improve quality and to ensure that the results will be put to use.UNDP should include anti-corrup-tion supporters as well as stakeholderswho benefit from the status quo andmay therefore resist anti-corruptionreform. Interested individuals shouldbe sought from within resistantagencies. CSOs and the private sectorshould be included at all levels, inaddition to the government.

n Utilize networks to disseminate bestpractices, case studies and surveyresults to other development partners,advisers and indigenous stakeholders.

Finally, it is recommended that each CountryOffice team define and strategically mapout its anti-corruption approach. This couldbe accomplished through a facilitatedworkshop and consultations, resulting ina brief write-up. The process of developingthe tool will facilitate a shared under-standing and commitment to addressanti-corruption across UNDP programmes.The tool itself may serve as a guide forpublic relations and programming, amongother purposes. While useful in anysetting, it could be particularly helpful inpost-conflict contexts where stability islacking and adequate staffing is a constantchallenge. (For example, staff turnovermay be high, and those on the job may not

have worked previously in a post-conflictsituation — or if they have, not on post-conflict anti-corruption programming.)

For UNDP to have the impact it seeksin the area of anti-corruption in post-conflictand recovery setting, identifying andgenerating political support at differentlevels of government, and at differentlevels of UNDP, UN Country Team andthe UN mission, is required. Implicit or explicit anti-corruption programmingshould start early after conflict ends. It should be sectorally cross-cutting,embedded in government reforms, andflexible enough to adapt to shifting post-conflict political realities, policiesand procedures.

7.9. STRATEGIC ROAD MAPUNICEF

/ HQ02

-044

0/Giaco

mo Piroz

zi

8

UN Photo/Helen

a Mulkerns

G overnments in countries that haveexperienced violent conflict areparticularly vulnerable to corrup-

tion. Corruption threatens not only governance in general but also the establishment and stability of democra-cies. When the corrupt excesses ofpolitical leaders lead to a lack of basicservices and economic opportunities, thismay generate public frustration, whicherodes state legitimacy at a time when itis most needed. In the post-conflict envi-ronment, including where democracies arefragile, this may fuel renewed violentconflict. There are many cases where thepeace process may rely on servicing thepatronage networks of previously warringfactions, making it difficult to address theissue of corruption in a direct way withoutunravelling the peace process itself, jeopardizing the elections and provokinga return to violence. For that reason, it isof utmost importance to understand how

and why conflict and post-conflict situa-tions lead to corruption, and to identifyways to deal with the situation withoutjeopardizing peace. Public perceptionsmatter because the risk of political insta-bility is predicated on them. There is asense of injustice created by a lack ofdistribution of wealth that can create frustration because the state is not satis-fying people’s basic needs. Therefore, in post-conflict conditions, the priority of delivering basic social services isparamount to rebuilding the trust ofcitizens and the rule of law.

An important finding of this researchis that few existing anti-corruption inter-ventions have had significant success storiesand some have failed altogether. Technicalsolutions that have worked in normaldevelopment situations have been appliedin post-conflict situations and have notsucceeded. Most of the anti-corruptioninterventions have been implemented onan ad hoc basis rather than being integratedin other development processes or imple-mented holistically. Anti-corruptioninterventions during the peace processand explicit, large-scale anti-corruptioninterventions during the transitional periodhave often resulted in toothless, symbolicacts if not accompanied by implicit, small-scale, embedded interventions.

Sequencing in priorities with othercompeting and more urgent humanitarianneeds is a crucial challenge, which makes it

It is of utmost importance

to understand how and why

conflict and post-conflict

situations lead to corruption,

and to identify ways to deal

with the situation without

jeopardizing peace.

more pertinent to embed anti-corruptionin rule of law and security interventionswhich are fundamental in enablingpolitical legitimacy, democratic stabilityand peace. Analysis of rule of law andnation building, and how these integratein larger political reforms and valueformation, including citizen participation,local service delivery and accountabilitymechanisms, should be considered anintegral point of programming anti-corruption interventions.

Nation building, particularly in post-conflict situations, is highly relevant toanti-corruption programming, as it allowsshaping of common values (usually inconstitution-drafting processes) that aimto go beyond identity politics or thenarrow vested interests of specific classes.Rather, processes of nation buildingpromote values universally agreed uponby the society itself, where accountability,transparency and integrity can form thebedrock of the non-threatening notion of a ‘nation’.

Finally, donor intervention, if coor-dinated, may be fundamental in helpingall the national stakeholders to realizethe extent to which corruption causesgovernance to deteriorate and weakens

the state’s ability to deliver services. Byincreasing social accountability the popu-lation can understand better the impact offighting corruption, which in turn is likelyto result in growing pressure on politiciansto act on corruption, and in deeper andlonger term engagement by non-govern-mental actors. As a result, while limited inscope, the outcome of such interventionsis likely to be robust, reflecting strongconsensus across diverse participants’interests or their perception of the benefitsto them. This contributes to sustainabilityin the long term.

For UNDP to have the impact it seeks,implicit or explicit anti-corruption program-ming should start early after conflict ends.Its anti-corruption programmes should be sectorally cross-cutting, embedded ingovernment reforms, and able to adapt toshifting post-conflict political realities,policies and procedures.

For UNDP to have the impact

it seeks, implicit or explicit

anti-corruption programming

should start early after

conflict ends.

9

UNICEF/ H

Q03-0554/Roger LeM

oyn

e

i. Background

Afghanistan is a country in conflict, andhas been for more than three decades. In1973, King Zahir Shah was deposed in apalace coup by his cousin, MohammedDaoud Khan, who then declared a repub-lican regime and established the rule ofthe Communist party. That event alsomarked the departure from the country ofIslamist elites; they subsequently initiatedarmed insurrection from Pakistan. Fiveyears later, in 1978, Soviet troops invadedto support a communist regime, an inter-vention that launched more than a decadeof mujahidin resistance backed by the

United States and other anti-communistallies. The period from 1992 to 1996 sawa civil war between different mujahidingroups, which was followed by five yearsof conflict between the ruling Taliban andthe Northern Alliance of other formermujahidin groups. The United States invadedthe country in October 2001; two monthslater, the Taliban regime collapsed.

The Bonn Agreement on ProvisionalArrangements in Afghanistan Pending theRe-establishment of Permanent Govern-ment Institutions, signed in December2001, was designed to “end the tragicconflict in Afghanistan and promote

9.1. AFGHANISTAN

UNDP

national reconciliation, lasting peace,stability and respect for human rights inthe country.” For reasons that are notedlater in this case study, the Bonn accorddid not achieve any of these objectives.While the international armed conflictwas considered to have ended in June2002 with the establishment of the tran-sitional Afghan government, the armedconflict against the Taliban and a range ofother armed anti-government elementscontinues throughout the country withinternational forces fighting in support ofthe government.

The Bonn accord designated anAfghan Interim Administration (AIA)and prescribed a timetable for the reestab-lishment of permanent Afghan institutions.A gathering of traditional representativeassemblies (known as a loya jirga), calledby authorities to deal with issuesimportant to the Afghan nation, was usedin June 2002 as a political nominationprocess in order to replace the AIA withthe Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA)and to designate Hamid Karzai as head ofstate. The duties of the ATA were (i) tohold a constitutional loya jirga to draft a new constitution in December 2003, (ii) to elect the president through directuniversal suffrage in October 2004, and(iii) to hold elections for the NationalAssembly in September 2005 (laterpostponed until March 2006). During thetransitional period, the Constitution of

1963 was retained except for the provi-sions relating to the monarchy, as was theexisting legal system.

The decision taken at the 2001 BonnConference to preserve the existingadministrative structures, rules and proce-dures meant adopting the administrativeheritage of the Soviet regime as well asthat of mujahidin rule as the basis forpublic administration. The transitionaladministration was therefore characterizedby multiple procedures, uncoordinatedstructures and outdated laws. The lack ofrationalization and reform transformedthe new administration into an opaquesystem that was easily exploited by officials.For example, in order to obtain a drivinglicence, an individual had to go throughmore than 15 steps and make facilitationpayments at each step. For obtaining anidentity card, a citizen had to go throughthe same number of administrative steps,but spread over many institutions.50

ii. Corruption in Afghanistan

Afghanistan was for many years reputedto be a smugglers’ gateway for goodsranging from illicit drugs heading forWestern markets to proscribed Westernproducts entering the former Soviet Union.The large opium economy is widely consid-ered to be the most important source ofcorruption in the country.51 Yet, corruptionwas not the cause of, nor a contributory

factor to, the conflict in Afghanistan.Under the pre-2001 Taliban regime, theprevalence of corruption is reported tohave been low. This has been attributed tothat regime’s high-profile punishment ofpetty corruption and the limited opportu-nities for corruption at that time due tosmall resource flows and to the de factoquasi-legal status of the opium economy.A ban on opium poppy cultivation wasimposed by the Taliban in 2000 and waseffectively implemented. However, the bandid not apply to trade in opium products.

Corruption now constitutes one of themain obstacles to state building and anyprogramme of political normalization,reconstruction or development. The basicforms of corruption in Afghanistan appearto be broadly similar to those found inother countries. These include pettycorruption, bribery, extortion, theft ofgovernment assets, patronage, and corrup-tion in government procurement.

Corruption is reported to havemultiple and deeply rooted causes inAfghanistan. Three principal causes havebeen suggested. The first is the boomingof the opium economy, a developmentencouraged by the lack of security and theweakness of the state; it is now estimatedto account for close to one-third of grossdomestic product (GDP). Counter-narcoticefforts provide opportunities for corruptofficials within the security and justicesectors, particularly at the provincial and

local levels, to extort enormous bribesfrom drug traffickers. A second cause isthe large inflows of international assis-tance combined with the pressure tospend these funds quickly; these funds areprovided for development and humani-tarian purposes, as well as for sustainingthe military in the country. The latterincludes large inflows and contractsrelated to international military forces andtheir activities, as well as international anddomestic security firms and aid to Afghansecurity forces. The third cause is relatedto issues and developments that haveseriously compromised the detection,prosecution and punishment of corruptpractices. They include the non-func-tioning institutions, the limited capacityof government, and reported corruptionin the justice sector.52

The fragmentation of society duringthe conflict, in particular along ethniclines, also resulted in more reliance ontraditional and especially conflict-generatedpatronage networks, with associatedcorruption. The Afghan tradition ofkinships, whereby those in privilegedpositions (from senior officials to lowerlevel civil servants in the districts) areunder pressure to support their kin (familyor ethnic group) further exacerbates theproblem. In this culture of kinship, patronsexert considerable social and politicalcontrol on formal power structures, usingtheir influence on public decision-making

and services in order to reinforce theirpower base or to extract profits. Benefitsderived from these relationships rangefrom gaining access to preferential services,forgery of legal papers, nepotism inobtaining employment, and securingbusiness contracts. Kinships thus reinforcethe notion that personal loyalties are moreimportant than the rule of law.53

A survey conducted in 2006 by IntegrityWatch Afghanistan in 13 provinces foundthat around 60 percent of Afghansconsidered the Karzai government to bethe most corrupt the country had experi-enced in 50 years. A large majority ofrespondents indicated that 50 to 100percent of government services commonlysought require some sort of corruptpractice. The majority of respondents alsoindicated that they tolerate this kind ofcorruption since they attributed it to thelow pay of civil servants. The most commonpractice of corrupt behaviour of civilservants is to delay service delivery until abribe is paid. Half of the respondents saidthey had paid bribes within the precedingsix months. Reasons cited for doing soincluded fast-tracking the delivery ofservices, the absence of relations who wereneeded to obtain services by means otherthan bribing, and lack of access to higherauthorities. More than 90 percent ofrespondents believed that connectionsdetermined the recruitment of civilservants, with only 8 percent citing meritas the main factor for obtaining a govern-

ment position. Control of governmentoffices that issue official documents isreported to be one that is most coveted.These include the registration of cars anddistribution of number plates, issuing ofdriving licences and identity cards, buyingof marriage certificates from family courts,as well as passport trafficking.54

According to a report cited in theAfghanistan Human Development Report2007, the Afghan judiciary lacks inde-pendence. In many ways, this is notsurprising. Three decades of war andpolitical upheaval have taken an enormoustoll on the judicial system. There are fewbuildings to house judges, prosecutors andattorneys, police or prisoners. There areequally few skilled professionals to fill the buildings. Until recently, few Afghanjudges had copies of the country’s laws, and most had not been trained inthose laws. The judiciary does not haveany communications infrastructure, filemanagement system or libraries. Funda-mentally, a political culture that respectsthe rule of law is also missing; for example,Afghan judges and prosecutors fromaround the country complain that govern-ment officials and militia commandersinterfere with their decisions. At the sametime, the level of corruption within thejudicial system is reportedly quite high aswell. As a result, citizens who want justiceoften cannot find it, and those who wantto evade justice can do so easily.

Integrity Watch Afghanistan attrib-utes the multiple forms of corruption tothe social and political realities and thechoices made when reconstructing thestate and political system. Although thetext of the Bonn Agreement insisted onthe accountability of state institutions, thepolitical process focused mainly on itsrepresentative character.

Integrity Watch also documents howthe participation of regional commandersin the political process has enabled themto retain most of the customs duescollected in the periphery, which amountto over $1 billion annually, by sending lessthan 10 percent to the central govern-ment. Today, no goods can be releasedfrom customs offices without bribingcustoms employees from top to bottom.The pillage of natural resources is also causedby the lack of authority of government inthe periphery and the opportunities itoffers for corruption. This has taken theform of local commanders dealing directlywith timber mafia and gem smugglers.

In the Corruption Perception Index ofTransparency International, Afghanistanfell from a ranking of 117 out of 159countries in 2005, to 172 out of 180 in2007, to 176 out of 180 in 2008. In its mostrecent index published in 2009, Afghanistanis ranked as the second most corruptcountry in the world. In internationalcorruption perception surveys, Afghanistanis ranked among the countries whosepublic sectors are perceived to be the most

vulnerable to corruption. While the giving and taking of

baksheesh (small gifts) is generally consid-ered to be acceptable, grand corruption ismorally rejected as being against the basicprinciples of Islam. In fact, a large majority(81 percent) of respondents in a recentsurvey considered that the application ofthe Sharia would be an effective tool tocombat corruption, while only a quarterbelieved that administrative reform couldreduce it. The media and provincial councilswere considered important mechanisms inthe fight against corruption.55 Corruptionis an issue that is discussed widely onradio and television by political figures,intellectuals and opinion leaders. However,the coverage of corruption in the fivemain Afghan newspapers is reported to be limited.

The public perception of widespreadcorruption has resulted in disenchantmentwith the government. This applies partic-ularly to corruption faced by people intheir daily lives, e.g., corruption in gainingaccess to and paying for water and powerservices; paying more than the mandatedfees for licenses and certificates; payingteachers for extra school time or for gradepromotions; and paying doctors for extracare. These perceptions undermine thegovernment’s credibility and legitimacy,and more generally the state buildingagenda. This has been exacerbated by thepopular perception that internationalassistance is being squandered.

iii. The institutional and legal framework

The Constitution of Afghanistan (whichcame into force in 2004) states that thegovernment is “responsible for main-taining public law and order and the elim-ination of administrative corruption”(Article 75). The Constitution was draftedby a joint panel of Afghan and interna-tional scholars. The term ‘administrativecorruption’, as distinct from ‘moral corrup-tion’, refers to the misuse of their publicposition by government employees forprivate gain.

Almost simultaneously, on 14 December2003, President Karzai established bydecree the General Independent Admin-istration for Anti-Corruption (GIAAC).The Law on the Campaign against Briberyand Official Corruption designatedGIAAC as the principal body to ‘investi-gate’ bribery and corruption offences and‘introduce suspects to face judicial prose-cution’. These were powers vested by theConstitution in the attorney general andcould therefore not have been exercised by GIAAC. GIAAC did not have thecapacity to carry out its mandate. In 2006,following concerns over the leadership ofGIAAC, donors ceased providing supportto the organization.

Before the establishment of the GIACC,there existed a complicated network offragmented and overlapping mechanismsand responsibilities. Several complaint

mechanisms existed without any clearlegal direction as to how complaints on corruption should be addressed anddealt with and by whom. This confusingsituation was compounded by conflict andtension among some of the institutionsmandated to fight corruption. As a result,scarce resources were not used in a cost-effective manner and corruption casesremained unsolved. The institutions that were either mandated to combatcorruption or were actually engaged incombating corruption included:

n The Parliamentary ComplaintsCommission to receive complaintsfrom citizens, inter alia, on corruptionwithin the executive, legislature or thejudiciary. Its function in respect ofsuch complaints appeared to be that ofa conduit, in that the complaints areusually referred to the relevant agencyfor investigation.

n The Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corrup-tion Office in the Ministry of Interior(ABACO) to investigate complaints ofcorruption within the police and otherunits directly under the supervision ofthe Ministry of Interior (including theoffices of provincial governors anddistrict chiefs). On completion of itsinvestigations, ABACO reported tothe interior minister, who decided onfurther action, including whether torefer the matter to GIAAC or to theattorney general’s office.

n Within the national police, its CriminalInvestigation Department (CID), witha staff of approximately 4,000 acrossthe country, is responsible for thedetection of corruption. The CIDcoordinated its efforts with GIAAC(until its abolition) and ABACOwhen a direct request was made forsupport. The Department for EconomicCrimes within the national police,with a staff of 24 at the central leveland with a presence in the provinces,is also reported to be playing a role indetecting corruption-related crime,while its Detection Department isinvolved in surveillance to detect suchcrimes. The police establishment isconsidered to be highly corrupt andlinked to narcotic and other organizedcrime, and other agencies reportedlyhave little confidence in the ability ofthe police to conduct unbiased andprofessional investigations.

n The National Directorate of Security(NDS), established by the NationalSecurity Decree of February 2004, isresponsible for countering organizedcrime, a mandate that also extends tothe area of corruption. However, withregard to corruption, the NDS confinesitself to information gathering andreferring the relevant information tothe attorney general’s office or thepolice. If such information relates to a

high-level official, the information sissubmitted to the president, whodecides on further action.

n The Afghanistan Human RightsCommission (AIHRC) may notinvestigate a complaint that relates tocorruption, but if it receives such acomplaint it may compile informationand forward such information to theattorney general’s office.

n The attorney general’s office, under itsnew head appointed in August 2006,began focusing primarily on narcoticsand corruption. It has a special anti-corruption unit responsible for inves-tigation and prosecution.

In 2004, the government proceeded tosign UNCAC but took no action toimplement any of its provisions. In 2006,President Karzai established by decree aHigh Level Inter-Institutional Commis-sion on Corruption chaired by ChiefJustice Abdul Salam Azimi and composedof several high-ranking officials, toexamine the problem of administrativecorruption in the several sectors andrecommend short-, medium- and long-term remedies. The Azimi Report wasreleased in mid-2008 and contains manyrecommendations and is considered bythe government to be the current nationalanti-corruption strategy.

iv. Donor attitudes and political dialogue

The Bonn Agreement of December 2001referred to the principles of Islam,democracy, pluralism and social justice,but made no mention of corruption. The principal focus was on stabilizationand security, and corruption was notraised publicly or in political dialogue in the period that followed. In the firstthree years of reconstruction, combatingcorruption was not a priority for the inter-national community and donors. Duringthe presidential election of October 2004,the donors’ initial attitude on corruptionwas that fighting corruption might jeop-ardize the country’s stability.

Beginning in December 2005, a seriesof donor meetings were held to forge acommon understanding on corruption (aswell as on drug production and trafficking,which were seen as integral to any strategyagainst corruption despite an IntegrityWatch survey indicating that Afghanperceptions were that the issue of drugswas a secondary problem). The mainparticipants were UNDP, UNODC, theWorld Bank, USAID, U4 and DFID. In2006, UNAMA organized a ‘tea club’ oncorruption, a political donor platformmainly for ambassadors of the majordonors. However, there was little or nofollow-up and corruption did not there-after figure as a prominent issue inUNAMA’s political coordination efforts.

In January 2006, the London Confer-ence on Afghanistan was expected toagree on a series of anti-corruptionmeasures. However, the only concrete stepto emerge was an agreement to ratifyUNCAC. Any further commitments weredeemed either too politically sensitive orunrealistic. Accordingly, the AfghanistanCompact (2006–2010), agreed uponbetween the government and the interna-tional community, included the followingbenchmarks under the title Governance,Rule of Law and Human Rights:

n UNCAC will be ratified by the end of 2008;56

n national legislation will be adoptedaccordingly by the end of 2007; and

n a monitoring mechanism to overseeimplementation will be in place by theend of 2008.

In April 2007, the Anti-Corruption RoadMap prepared by the World Bank,UNDP, UNODC and DFID provided acomprehensive assessment and recom-mendations on how to more effectivelyfight corruption.

v. Anti-corruption approaches andprogrammes in Afghanistan

No serious anti-corruption interventionappears to have been made until theAfghanistan Compact of January 2006.57

In August 2006, President Karzai author-ized Attorney General Abdul JabbarSabbit to take widespread and decisiveaction against corruption and bribery andto fight all types of corruption in govern-ment offices. He was directed to crackdown, arrest and prosecute the perpetra-tors of corruption, even if its tentaclesreached high levels of the government.Mr. Sabbit reportedly responded enthusi-astically to his mandate but has since beenremoved from office.

In August 2007, the National Assemblyratified UNCAC. In May 2008, PresidentKarzai issued a decree establishing theHigh Level Monitoring Administrationon Implementation of Anti-CorruptionStrategy, and instructed the justiceministry to draft ‘the organizationalstructure law’. Another decree broughtinto force the Law on Monitoring theImplementation of the Anti-Administra-tive Corruption Strategy. This law wasdefective in many respects and inadequateto sustain the new institution. In June2008, the Afghan National DevelopmentStrategy was finalized, and presented atthe Paris conference. It contains an anti-corruption strategy that appears to be amodification (or simplification) of thestrategy contained in the Azimi Report. Italso defines the priorities of development.Its usefulness is in question, however,because it has been criticised by the inter-national community for its complexity.

In August 2008, HOO was establishedwith a respected former senior adminis-trator as its head. It is mandated withoverseeing the implementation of thenational anti-corruption strategy, takingthe lead on corruption prevention andawareness-raising, and coordinatinggovernment-wide efforts to fight corrup-tion. A new law was needed for the HOOto fulfil its mandate. This law was passedby decree after President Karzai was re-elected in August 2009.

Some donors, especially the UnitedKingdom and the United States, wantedthe new law to expressly state that HOOwould be responsible to the NationalAssembly and not to the president, andthat the director-general of HOO wouldbe appointed by the president with theapproval of the National Assembly.

Other areas of governance were addressedwith new legislation. For example, in2005, three new laws were enacted. A new Civil Service Law established thefollowing: (i) the principle of opencompetition and merit for all civil serviceappointments; (ii) the IndependentAdministrative Reform and Civil ServiceCommission and independent appoint-ment and appeal boards; and (iii) theAdministrative Reform Secretariat as thefocal point for public administrationreform. A new Public Finance andExpenditure Management Law estab-lished (i) a sound budget preparation

framework with comprehensive andtransparent documentation; (ii) require-ments for accounting and regularreporting in line with internationalstandards; and (iii) an independent reviewof the annual financial statements forpresentation to the National Assembly.Finally, a new Law on Procurement estab-lished (i) transparent and competitiveprocurement procedures with contestablemechanisms based on objective and veri-fiable selection and award criteria; and (ii)the responsibilities of government officialsinvolved in procurement.

The World Bank, ADB, UNDP andDFID have also conducted six vulnera-bility to corruption assessments (VCAs),addressing the types, causes, impact andextent of corruption. The assessmentsdetail specific vulnerabilities to corruptionin the following areas:

n public financial management andprocurement (World Bank);

n the revenue department of theMinistry of Finance (DFID);

n the budget department of the Ministryof Finance (UNDP and DFID);

n merit-based appointments in the civilservice (World Bank);

n the road sector (ADB);

n the energy sector (ADB).

vi. UNDP anti-corruption interventions

In 2006, on the initiative of UNDP, a firstinformal donor group on anti-corruptionwas established, bringing together theWorld Bank, ADB, Norway, the EuropeanUnion, Sweden and UNODC. This groupworked at the technical level to achievethe following: (i) coordinate to the extentpossible their agencies’ inputs on anti-corruption issues into the policy dialogueat the national level; (ii) produce a discus-sion paper on anti-corruption reform (the Anti-Corruption Road Map of early2007); and (iii) send a joint letter —together with a broader group of donors —to the government’s chairman of the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board inSeptember 2007 to express its unease withthe leadership of GIACC.

UNDP launched its ACT project inJanuary 2007. It was designed at a timewhen there were no clear governmentcounterparts in the area of anti-corrup-tion, and few concrete steps had been takento address corruption. The 18-monthPhase One of the project was thereforedesigned to lay the foundations for awider and more comprehensive approachonce the right conditions were in place.Anchored in the Ministry of Finance, itaimed to assist governing institutions inAfghanistan in preparing the groundworkfor a comprehensive and long-term

strategic anti-corruption programme. Ittook as its starting point UNCAC, whichthe government had undertaken to ratify.

A gap analysis of national legislationin comparison with the requirements ofUNCAC was prepared and presented toa three-day stakeholder workshop thatbrought together some one hundredparticipants from the relevant governmentinstitutions and the internationalcommunity. UNDP also undertook astudy of the existing institutional arrange-ments for combating corruption, followingwhich the government announced theestablishment of a new anti-corruptionbody to replace the existing discreditedone. When the new institution, HOO,was established, UNDP provided supportto its senior management to develop itsorganizational structure, facilitating anexchange with the Indonesian govern-ment to provide an expert to supportHOO in developing its strategic plan.

Support was also provided to developa corruption monitoring system and toestablish a fraud investigation unit in theMinistry of Finance’s Internal AuditDepartment. A ‘grants facility’ was estab-lished to build the watchdog capacity ofcivil society actors and the media, and threeorganizations were supported. Of them,the Saba Media Organization providedtraining in investigative journalism. The other two were Integrity WatchAfghanistan and Integrated Approach to

Community Development. Support wasprovided to enable senior governmentofficials involved in anti-corruption workto develop strategic regional and interna-tional partnerships in order to exposethem to international experience andprovide them opportunities for networking.The project also collaborated with theCivil Service Commission to integrateethics and anti-corruption training in theleadership training being provided tohigh-level Afghan civil servants.

In 2009, the ACT project wasredesigned on the basis of the AfghanistanNational Development Strategy, theNational Anti-Corruption Strategy andUNCAC, and extended for a further threeyears. In so doing, UNDP took account oflessons learned from the earlier phase ofthe project. These were: (i) the need toengage international advisers on a long-term basis in order to secure capacitydevelopment, skills transfer, follow-up andsustainability of project activities; (ii) theimportance of focusing on a more narrowset of outputs to allow for developing thenecessary partnerships to achieve the desiredresults; (iii) the need to implement activ-ities at the subnational level; and (iv) theimportance of having sufficient humanresources in the project to ensure timelyimplementation of project activities.

Accordingly, in the second phase, theproject has been based in HOO, withproject staff providing advice and support

to its senior management on a day-to-daybasis including in the areas of administra-tion and finance, human resources andinformation technology. The emphasis ison capacity development and skillstransfer to enable the development of thenecessary national capacities to ensure thesustainability of outputs. The project willnow focus on a holistic approach thatincludes prevention and awareness-raisingas well as enforcement. It will also engagewith and support a broad range of actorsoutside of government, with particularemphasis placed on increasing theinvolvement of civil society, media and thepublic in combating corruption.

In the first two quarters of 2009,UNDP provided support to HOO todevelop a new Anti-Corruption Law thatwould define its mandate accurately andcomprehensively. UNDP also supportedthe Ministry of Finance to establish aComplaints Office that is now fully oper-ational. Following the VCAs conducted inseveral ministries and sectors together withthe ADB, DFID and the World Bank, andbased on the findings of these assess-ments, action plans have been developedto strengthen processes and procedures.

The ACT project has been working inclose collaboration with the ADB, DFID,UNODC and the World Bank in supportingthe government in awareness-raising andprevention of corruption.

vii. UNDP and internal integrity

A report for the World Bank in 2009noted that the structure of aid paymentswas often seen as corrupt in itself.58

Among its findings: “Many Afghansconsider high pay and overheads for NGOs,contractors, consultants, and advisers to be a form of corruption, irrespective ofwhether or not the relevant rules werefollowed in their contracting.” In 2008,UNDP/ACT, in consultation with bilateraland multilateral development partners,developed terms of reference for a surveyon transparency and integrity in aidagencies. Five agencies took part in thestudy (UNDP and the bilateral develop-ment agencies from Canada, the Nether-lands, Norway and the United Kingdom),and meetings were also held with theWorld Bank and the Danish and Germangovernment development agencies.

viii. Lessons learned in Afghanistan

The issue of corruption in the stateapparatus has now become the main focusof some of the militant groups inAfghanistan. Corruption has the potentialto damage the legitimacy of the Afghanstate and the international community’spresence in the country.

Despite the efforts of donors andinternational agencies, the state institu-tions remain weak, uncoordinated and ill-

equipped to supervise the mammoth taskof rebuilding the country. The new powerstructure is over-centralized and unable tooperate across large portions of thecountry due to the unstable security envi-ronment. In fact, it is claimed that the writof the central government does not runbeyond the borders of Kabul or, perhapsmore accurately, over not more than 20percent of the territory of Afghanistan.The illicit drugs trade continues. Warlordsand local chieftains still control manyparts of the country and the influence ofthe Taliban movement remains strong.Many of those running state institutionshave no incentive to become moreefficient or transparent in their activities,while the policy of rewarding regionalwarlords with influential governmentposts in return for a more acquiescentrelationship with the central administra-tion has merely opened up further oppor-tunities for corrupt practices. For Afghancitizens, corruption and bribery are nowan inevitable part of everyday life, fromobtaining domestic electricity supply or adriving license to expediting a courthearing or winning a business contract.59

Integrity Watch Afghanistan claims that‘a bazaar economy’ has developed whereevery position, favour and service can bebought and sold. One corrupt practice canbe a cause and/or consequence of anothercorrupt practice, leading to a vicious cycleof self-perpetuation.

Government officials candidly acknowl-edge that corruption is routine among thepolice, prosecutors and judges. During theinterviews conducted for this research,senior government officials describedcorruption as being incredibly widespread.In the justice sector, it is commonplace fora person approaching a courthouse to beintercepted by persons with some link tothe judge who will inquire as to theproblem and then solicit a bribe. Withrespect to the police, one senior policetrainer noted that while individual policecould be properly trained, the entirepolicing system was so corrupt thatputting a new officer into the system waslike “throwing people into a cesspool andexpecting them to stay clean.”60

It is in this context that UNDP has launched a UNCAC-based targetedapproach to combating corruption. Doingso appears to have two distinct advantages.The first is that Afghanistan has ratifiedthe convention, and is therefore under a treaty obligation to begin takingmeasures to implement its provisions. Thesecond is that UNCAC covers a broadrange of issues and priorities, includingcivil service reform, a commitment toethical standards, the integrity of theelectoral process, access to information,judicial integrity, management of publicfinances, accounting and auditingstandards in the private sector, and publicprocurement procedures.

Through the ACT project, and usingUNCAC as the benchmark, UNDP hassought to create a core group of stake-holders, including civil society and themedia, which are committed to theproject’s implementation. UNDP alsoappears to have succeeded in influencingthe relevant authorities, including asomewhat intractable president, that it isnecessary to replace crony institutionswith other more independent and credibleones. Its principal focus is the newlycreated HOO, within which the ACTproject is now located and whose capacityit seeks to strengthen through intensiveand long-term training and technicalassistance. The mandate of HOO (if theproposed new law is enacted) will bebroad and comprehensive and will includeprevention, public awareness, propermanagement of public affairs, and thesimplification of processes and proceduresin public bodies that deal with the publicon a regular basis. If HOO, which appearsto enjoy a degree of public credibilitybecause of its founding chairperson, issuccessful in its mission, the basicframework that is necessary to beginstrengthening integrity in the countrywould have been established.

There is, however, another area, besidesthose that have engaged the attention ofUNDP so far, that needs to be addressed.It is unfortunate that, for the internationalcommunity, the justice sector does not

appear to have been a priority. As such,relatively little attention has been paid tothe establishment of the rule of lawbeyond police training and reform and therevision of criminal law and procedure.This neglect is worrisome. In 2007, only11.6 percent of judges had a universitydegree, and only 56.7 percent had completedany judicial training prior to theirappointment. The judiciary is reportedlyperceived to be the most dysfunctionaland corrupt institution in Afghanistan.With most judges in the provincesearning $35 to $50 per month — less thanthe average police officer — corruption inthe court system has been described asbeing “endemic.”61 In the circumstances,it is necessary to engage the SupremeCourt and assist it to formulate a nationalplan of action to strengthen integrity inthe judiciary, including training in judicialethics, and to take the initiative in insti-tuting the necessary reform measures.

A programme of judicial reform couldalso extend to the traditional non-stateinstitutions — loya jirgas or shuras, which operate as mechanism of disputesettlement across the country. Empiricaldata show that these institutions oftenresolve local disputes in a manner more trusted, considered fairer and lesscorrupt, and are deemed more accessiblethan state courts. These institutionsreportedly deliver justice more effectively(and cost effectively) and are more in line

with local norms and traditions than statejustice institutions.

However, at least two negative aspectsof these institutions have also been noted.One is that they are highly patriarchalinstitutions where women are rarelyallowed to participate in decision-making.The other is the exceptional remedy ofoffering a woman or girl into marriage asa means of dispute settlement — apractice that violates the Constitution,Islamic law and human rights principles.Any reform programme should, therefore,seek to create a more accountable andstandardized traditional justice system.Reform of the justice sector requires inno-vative approaches grounded in localrealities such as finding constructive waysin which to improve informal justice whileresponding to the constraints of theformal system.

Some specific lessons learned were the following:

n Political will is of critical importancein moving the anti-corruption agenda forward.

n Know the context. If a project isdeveloped without fully taking intoaccount the political context UNDP’sefforts will never succeed.

n Projects need to be realistic; it is easy to be overambitious with anti-corruption projects. When formu-lating projects one should considerwhat is feasible to achieve given thecircumstances of the country, andbuild in sufficient buffers to allow for delays.

n The projects need to be focused. Thereis so much that need to be invested inmoving one activity forward that if aproject has too wide a focus and toomany partners it will be difficult tomanage the reform process.

n Donors and agencies need to worktogether in a coordinated manner. Inpost-conflict situations with a heavydonor presence, it is also important tolink the political and technical levels.Unless there is also a push at thepolitical level for anti-corruption,those working at the technical levelwill not be successful.

n A single anti-corruption project is notsufficient. UNDP (and the UN family)should build in anti-corruption compo-nents and leverage other existing projectsand programmes, where relevant, inthe fight against corruption.

i. Background

DRC has a long history of predation,economic exploitation by brutal authori-tarian regimes, and impunity for crimessince the 19th Century. The independencemovement of the 1950s led to a popularuprising in 1959 and independence fromBelgium in 1960. The newly elected rulingcoalition was ousted in a coup by armychief Mobutu Sese Seko, who let thepresident remain until a second coup in1965. Mobutu ruled for 32 years until1997, when the country (then known asZaire) was invaded by Rwandan, Ugandanand Angolan troops.

Corruption today is a defining charac-teristic of state-society relations and hasits roots in Mobutu’s neo-patrimonialregime. Through the links that Congoleseelite networks had with internationalcriminal networks, the country’s resourceswere plundered, the army was depleted,and conflict was fuelled.

Mobutu initially set up a centralized,horizontal system of patronage to allowthe state to capture rents and keep wealthholders under control. Following economicdecline, by 1980, Mobutu’s strategy shiftedto supporting regional power brokersorganized in vertical networks based

9.2. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGOUN Photo/A

Burridge

mainly on ethnic ties. Public resourceswere treated as personal property byregime insiders, and vast amounts ofmoney were stolen from the state. Verticalnetworks of power in the provinces beganto operate on their own, effectivelycapturing the state.

To keep the armed forces from posinga threat to his power, Mobutu let themweaken. He also encouraged tribal andethnic rivalries in an attempt to win alliesand disarm his detractors. Both of thesefactors contributed to wars in the 1990s.In the Kivus, local violent ethnic conflictover land access became a full-scale warby 1993. And with its weak army, Congowas an easy target for the disciplinedRwandan troops when they invaded a fewyears later.

A peace and reunification process,called the Inter-Congolese Dialogue,culminated in the signing of the Globaland Inclusive Peace Agreement of SunCity in December 2002. This power-sharing agreement established the institu-tional framework for DRC’s politicalorganization during the transition periodleading to general elections in 2006.

ii. Corruption in DRC

Corruption is pervasive and systematic atall levels, and impunity is engrained in thesystem. The line between public andprivate resources has long been blurred,

with high-ranking officials and bureau-crats alike using their position to extractrents through every form of corruptionimaginable. Petty corruption, or tracasseries,is an everyday occurrence whereby mostpeople are required to make side paymentsto receive virtually any public service towhich they are entitled. Bribes are alsocommonly paid to gain illicit benefits, ordemanded by police to avoid problemswith law enforcement. Civil servants areextremely poorly paid, if at all.

There is no comprehensive assessmentor survey of households, public officials,firms and CSOs in DRC. Following thepublication of the 2005 Corruption Percep-tion Index by Transparency International,the Observatory of the Code of Ethics forPublic Officials carried out a survey oncorruption in DRC which found thepresident and four vice-presidents to beperceived as the most corrupt officials.

According to the Chamber of Commerce,no business deals can be discussed withoutputting money on the table first. Thechamber reported that its members saythey would be willing to pay 100 percentmore in taxes to the government if theydid not have to pay under the table.

Corruption is widely accepted as a norm,and social structures favour it. People feelhelpless and everyone participates incorruption. That said, efforts by InnovativeResources Management to reduce systemicpetty corruption in waterways in two

provinces challenged this culture oftolerance. While it did not prove to besustainable in the long run, the project’sresults showed it is possible to change thepublic’s view, and to organize people tofight corruption at the local level.62

Some interviews carried out as a part ofthis study suggest that ordinary Congolesedo not judge other ordinary Congolesenegatively for paying bribes because it isseen as unavoidable. They do, however,view politicians negatively for their excesses.The general public is antagonistic towardsthe leadership that squanders resources forpersonal gain. There is a negative percep-tion of the ‘political class’, not justministers but anyone in power (the police,army, etc.). There is also a sense of injusticecreated by a lack of distribution of wealththat creates frustration because the stateis not satisfying the basic needs of people.

Public participation in governance ischaracterized by strong ignorance of stateorganization and by tribal rivalry. Manypeople do not judge candidates on whatthey promise during their campaigns.Instead, they vote on a tribal basis, orbecause someone gave them money or aT-shirt. Other major corruption-relatedchallenges are that politicians can easilymanipulate the population and thegovernment is hard for the public to access.

While corruption was not the root causeof the 1990s conflict in DRC, warringfactions, like everyone else, engaged in it

to their advantage. An example of this isthe traffic in ‘blood’ diamonds, which wereused to fund combat operations. Indeed,those interviewed in this study citedexploitation of mineral resources as asignificant contributor to past and currentconflict. Inequitable distribution of resourcesis seen as causing public discontent withthe incumbent government today.

A distinction between stabilizing anddestabilizing forms of corruption was notmade by interviewees; the view was thatall forms of corruption are politicallydestabilizing and threaten the govern-ment’s legitimacy, as well as the legitimacyof state institutions. Despite the publicdiscontent, there was no indication thatcorruption is a threat to the (democratic)regime as of the latter part of 2009.

iii. The institutional and legal framework

Corruption came to the fore whenpolitical opposition crystallized in theearly 1990s. Development partners putanti-corruption on the agenda in 2002,before the transition, but without nationalownership. Anti-corruption has re-emergedon the national political agenda since the2006 elections.

In 2002, during the consultationprocess for the Interim Poverty ReductionStrategy Paper (which was signed laterthat year), corruption was cited as the main

cause of poverty in the four provincessurveyed. One immediate result was thecreation of a national anti-corruptionstrategy (in November 2002), which wasdrafted by an inter-ministerial committee.It attributed corruption to clientelism,impunity and lack of political will, andrecommended controls, reduction offavouritism and better management ofstate enterprises. However, while partici-patory, the development of the nationalanti-corruption strategy was Kinshasa-based and donor-driven.

As part of the 2002 Sun CityAgreement, five ‘citizen committees’ wereestablished, one being an Ethics andAnti-Corruption Commission. The penalcode was not modified until March 2005and the commission took a while to set upand was not functioning until June 2005.Despite significant World Bank andUNDP support, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission was largely ineffective in its operations. The casesreferred to the previous anti-corruptionbody were not passed on to the newcommission, which did not give the publicreason to expect that the latter would beany different. The Anti-CorruptionCommission was filled with politicalappointees, was riddled with infightingand used for political purposes, andcarried out ad hoc projects.

In 2005, the transitional parliament’sLutundula Commission submitted areport documenting the illegality of many

mining and other contracts signed by therebels and government authorities duringthe wars of 1996–1997 and 1998–2003.The report recommended their abrogationor their renegotiation and the indictmentof a certain number of high political andbusinesses actors involved in these opera-tions. However, these recommendationswere ignored.

The auditor general’s office lackedindependence from the president (it wassupposed to report to the NationalAssembly but was, in practice, controlledby the president), lacked information, andoperated and submitted reports that were not disseminated or acted on. Theinspector general’s office was not givenaccess to funds or to the bodies it wassupposed to audit.

A new constitution was passed byreferendum in 2005. It is based on a semi-presidential system with a prime ministerselected from the parliament. It providesfor an independent justice system, a processof decentralization with a significanttransfer of powers to provinces, and athree-year transition period to a new terri-torial organization comprising 26 provinces.

Since the 2006 elections, the newgovernment has expressed interest infighting corruption. In a ‘zero tolerance’speech on 30 June 2009, President JosephKabila acknowledged that he had ignoredthe issue during the transition, but wouldnow make the fight against corruption apriority. In particular, Minister of Justice

Luzolo Bambi Lessa said he would seekto use the courts to fight corruption andcited the support of Kabila and PrimeMinister Adolphe Muzito. Also, theMinister of Education has actively opposedthe purchase of diplomas, a longstandingcorrupt practice. These ‘champions’ arepotential entry points for UNDP.

iv. Donor attitudes and political dialogue

On the whole, development partners didnot take a firm stand against corruptionduring the 2003–2006 post-conflicttran-sition period; the main priority waselections, and partners did not want tojeopardize them. Development partners in2004 did pressure the president to directthe auditor general’s office to audit stateenterprises. The plundering of state enter-prises documented in the audit reportcaused a public outcry. To the public’sdisappointment, none of the implicatedofficials were prosecuted. In March 2005,Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bembaannounced DRC would participate in theExtractive Industries Transparency Initia-tive (EITI) which aims to strengthengovernance by improving transparencyand accountability in the extractivessector. In September 2005, a commissionwas established and members wereappointed in May 2006. Given the timing,however, the initiative was put on hold.

Since the 2006 elections, with new

institutions in place, there has been achange in the position of developmentpartners. The United Kingdom has report-edly made a $180 million grant condi-tional on fighting corruption. Through theCountry Assistance Framework process, anumber of donors have developed acommon strategic approach for economicassistance to DRC in the post-electionsperiod (2007 through 2010). In it, there isa consensus to take ‘decisive action’ in thearea of corruption.

Development partners have not madejoint statements about corruption inDRC. DFID said in its Anti-CorruptionStrategy (2007) that it will “seek andmaintain coherence of the internationaldonor response regarding zero toleranceof corruption.63 This is potentially difficultin DRC given the range of donorsworking here, including China and SouthKorea, South Africa and Angola and ourmore established partners. A donorcommon position should include a jointdonor position on providing budgetsupport because if some donors providebudget support to a seriously corruptgovernment this could undermine theincentives to reduce corruption.”

As compared to the relatively effectivecoordination of humanitarian aid by theOffice for the Coordination of Humani-tarian Affairs (OCHA) in DRC, there isroom for improvement of coordination ofdevelopment aid in DRC today, acrossdonors and especially donor-government.

v. Anti-corruption approaches andprogrammes in DRC

The international community’s main priorityduring the transition was to ensure thelegitimacy of elections in a country thathad not had them for 46 years. Littleeffort was made to push the transitionalgovernment itself to reduce corruption,because that might have undermined thepolitical settlement. The strategy was, as afirst step, to establish credible elections asthe only means to power. With the inter-national community’s support, this featwas pulled off.

It could be said that elections weresupported at the expense of strengtheninggovernance in other areas, particularlyanti-corruption. However, it is importantto note that the peace agreement itself(which reflected the political will of thedifferent factions) precluded effectivereduction of corruption, by design. Forexample, the Ethics and Anti-CorruptionCommission was set up with politicalappointees, distributed across the fourfactions. Although an anti-corruptionlegal framework was imposed by develop-ment partners during the transition, mostof its provisions were not disseminated orenforced. Also, some of the necessaryimplementation laws (which were neededfor the various anti-corruption laws totake effect) were not passed.

Civil society was part of the power-sharing agreement, with slots reserved

for its representatives on the Ethics andAnti-Corruption Commission, the otherfour ‘citizen committees’, and parts ofgovernment. The representatives retainedtheir roles in their CSOs as well, thusarguably undermining their credibilityand ability to operate effectively in either role. Many ran for office in the2006 elections, maintaining linkages andfurther compromising the independenceof civil society as well as creating a gap incivil society leadership.

Embezzlement of soldiers’ salariescontributed to massive human rightsviolations against the population and wassaid to threaten the elections, but theEuropean Union mission tasked to addressthis was not able to do so. The new taxadministration did not effectively collectrevenue during the transition period; thisproblem continues today. Public adminis-tration reform was supported by develop-ment partners during the transition, butcorruption was considered too sensitive toaddress directly.

In June and July 2006, donors putforward a development plan drafted by World Bank consultants, entitled‘Towards Governance Compact in DRC';it was adopted by the government inMarch 2007. With regard to anti-corrup-tion it prioritized the following: (i) publicdecisions that have significant financialimpact; (ii) key sectors such as mining,forestry, public finance management,public enterprises management, and

procurement; and (iii) capacity-buildingof the auditor general’s office and thegeneral inspectorate of finance.

Development partners readily acknowl-edge that there is a real risk that corrup-tion in the use of government funds willcontinue at a high level for a long timeforward. Aid is especially at risk wherefunds go through the government, androads projects are particularly subject toproblems with corruption. Donors areattempting to ensure that the levels offiduciary risk are minimized to acceptablylow levels by putting in place additionalsafeguards based on lessons learnedaround the world.

vi. UNDP anti-corruption interventions

Following the 2002 Sun City Agreement,UNDP faced challenges in implementinggovernance projects during the transitionperiod. With regard to anti-corruption, itdid not succeed in activating the Ethicsand Anti-Corruption Commission. Thiswas in large part due to lack of politicalwill, as well as politicization of thecommission. Both of these issues existedfrom the outset.

After the 2006 elections, UNDP, in2007, designed a new anti-corruptioninitiative with funding from DFID. Thiswas part of a broader governanceprogramme for 2008–2012 that aims toenhance ‘citizen access and participation’

in the political system, improve adminis-trative governance, consolidate nationalunity and reconciliation and ensuresecurity, ensure transparency in publicaccounts, and enhance access and qualityof public services. This governanceprogramme as well as the United NationsDevelopment Assistance Framework(UNDAF) is aligned with the CountryAssistance Framework. It was designedwith the assistance of BDP, BCPR andthe Dakar regional centre.

The anti-corruption programme hasbuilt the capacity of the auditor-general’soffice to independently audit and reporton government accounts; supported thedrafting of public finance reform law;provided targeted support to the judicialsystem to better enforce anti-corruptionlegislation and prosecution of corruptioncases; and strengthened the capacity ofcivil society to monitor budgets anddemand for transparency and accounta-bility. UNDP’s programme has also raisedawareness among public servants on thecode of conduct for civil servants, andsupported the development of a nationalstrategy for improving government trans-parency and accountability.

Other activities in the UNDP gover-nance programme that relate to anti-corruption include supporting the nationalelectoral commission for a credibleelection process free from corruption inlocal elections as well as general electionsin 2011.

In implementing its anti-corruptioninitiatives in DRC, UNDP has noted alack of political will, persistence of a cultureof impunity, lack of national strategic visionon anti-corruption, fragility and dispersionof national institutions, and weaknesses inthe capacity and financial resources ofCSOs. In monitoring, UNDP has noteda lack of national capacity to carry outbaseline assessments. It is not clear howthese are being, or will be, addressed.

vii. UNDP and internal integrity

UNDP was on the ground during theconflict, unlike most other agencies. It wasregarded as politically neutral, and notassociated with or biased towards anyparticular faction. During the transitionperiod, UNDP DRC established a servicecentre, which was a model for humanresources, procurement and other logistics.To respond quickly and transparently toemerging needs, it created and imple-mented the Rapid Response Mechanism(a pooled donor funding mechanism) sothat funds could be accessed within a fewdays. This was a highly successfulendeavour, in terms of UNDP’s integrityand transparency.

‘Do no harm’ principles are notaddressed in the donors’ joint CountryAssistance Framework or DFID’s anti-corruption strategy; however, UNDPprogramme staff interviewed for this

report were familiar with them. There isawareness, for example, that new infra-structure projects in DRC will poseopportunities for corruption.

viii. Lessons learned in DRC

The following are lessons learned fromanti-corruption efforts over the pastseveral years in DRC:

n In DRC, the governance and anti-corruption agenda has been pushed bydevelopment partners, with little localownership apparent. Inclusive partici-pation of all stakeholders, includinggovernment, is needed in the develop-ment of the governance compact. Thegovernment of DRC has copied andpasted the donor-designed framework;while this may satisfy formal require-ments of development practice, it willnot result in real change.

n Political support is necessary to reducecorruption; development partners(working with/through civil societyand the private sector) should identifyand seek to align anti-corruptionefforts with the interests of politicianswhere possible. With political support,anti-corruption institutions such asthe auditor general’s office and theinspector general’s office, both ofwhich were set up in 1987, have thepotential to control corruption in the

long run if they are properly resourcedand monitored. During the transitionperiod, power-sharing arrangementsprecluded effective anti-corruptionresults. The agreement removed orignored institutional controls andfacilitated looting of the country. Thelack of checks and balances inherent inthe agreement guaranteed impunityduring the transition period. Duringthe transition period DRC was a failedstate characterized by lack of politicalwill, a fragile settlement amongwarring factions, and dominated by anagreement with no checks andbalances. Insisting that the transitionalgovernment be clean would not onlyhave been unsuccessful, it also couldhave undermined the effectiveness ofinternational actors and raised the riskof their being kicked out. The DRCcase suggests that UNDP and otherdevelopment partners may, in othercontexts, prefer not attempt to insiston (much less prop up) institutionslike the Ethics and Anti-CorruptionCommission which, in hindsight at least, was an impossible mission.Perhaps having a poorly working, inef-fective discredited anti-corruptioninstitution is worse (for the future ofdemocracy) than having none at all.

n The same could be said of the laws thatdevelopment partners insisted on

passing following the 2002 peaceagreement, but which ultimately werenot implemented. At least in the caseof these laws, it seems the public andmost of government was not aware ofthem, so the damage caused by havinglaws that are essentially toothless anduseless may have been minimal. Duringthe peace process, development partnersshould anticipate how to engage withand support the development of civilsociety (generating new leadership,nurturing new organizations, formal-izing and networking grassroots groups),particularly if civil society must be partof a power-sharing agreement, andwhen many of its representatives mayrun for office, leaving gaps in civilsociety. If a new anti-corruption agencyis created in the future in DNC, itshould be financially autonomous tothe extent possible.

n With regard to coordination on anti-corruption, there is much room forimprovement and UNDP could seek to enhance this among develop-ment partners.

n Anti-corruption is a cross-cutting issuethat needs to be integrated in all gover-nance reform programmes. Further-more, it could be integrated across all country programmes. DDR andpoverty reduction are examples of areasthat could incorporate anti-corruption.

i. Background

Until the commencement of its war withIran in 1980, Iraq was by many measuresan economically viable and increasinglywealthy society. The government providedfree schooling up to and including thetertiary level, gave subsidies to farmers,and its hospitals (which provided care freeof charge) were amongst the most modernin the Middle East. A national infrastruc-ture campaign had resulted in greatprogress in building roads, promotingmining and developing other industries.Development occurred at such a rapidpace that two million people from other

Arab countries worked in Iraq to meet thegrowing demand for labour. Womenenjoyed considerable freedom and heldhigh-level jobs in government andindustry. The adoption of a Western-stylelegal system and the abolition of Shariacourts made Iraq the only country in thePersian Gulf region not ruled accordingto traditional Islamic law.

In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iranand began a bloody eight-year war withthe support of the United States, theSoviet Union and European states, andheavily financed by many other Arabstates. That war ended in a stalemate, withhundreds of thousands of casualties and

9.3. IRAQ

Lois Jen

sen/U

NDP

an estimated one million dead. Iraq’s oilindustry suffered severely. Not only was itspreviously expanding economy left inruins, but the country was also burdenedwith a war debt of over $75 billion. InAugust 1990, Iraq invaded and occupiedKuwait, but on this occasion faced aUnited Nations coalition led by theUnited States. In February 1991, Iraqitroops were driven out of Kuwait after thecoalition launched missile attacks on Iraqfor several weeks. In the invasion andannexation of Kuwait and in the GulfWar that ensued, over 175,000 Iraqis weretaken prisoner and casualties wereestimated at over 85,000.

In the years that followed, the countrywas subjected to regular and intensivemissile attacks by the United States andBritish forces. What was left of the Iraqieconomy and the state infrastructure wasvirtually destroyed by those attacks andUN sanctions, which blocked Iraqi oilexports and most other forms of externaltrade after it invaded Kuwait. InDecember 1996, the UN allowed Iraq tobegin selling limited amounts of oil forfood and medicine. Finally, United States-led forces invaded Iraq on 20 March 2003.

The invasion of Iraq was not followedby a peace agreement. Instead, after thecapture of Baghdad and the collapse ofthe Saddam Hussein regime in April2003, the CPA was established with aUnited States army lieutenant general aschief executive. He was replaced within a

month by a US diplomat with the title ofadministrator. The CPA, which was adivision of the US Department ofDefense, formed an Iraqi GoverningCouncil (IGC) consisting mainly of Iraqiexpatriates who had fled the countryduring the previous regime and formerdissidents. The IGC agreed on an interimconstitution and sovereignty was passedto the Iraqi Interim Government in June2004 with a 100-member ConsultativeAssembly set up in August 2004. However,ongoing sectarian violence, which hadsurged since mid-2003, left entire parts ofthe country only marginally under thecontrol of the interim government.

Elections for the Transitional NationalAssembly in January 2005 resulted in aShiite prime minister and a Kurdishpresident, while Sunni voters remainedunrepresented due to their boycott of theelections. The transitional governmentdrafted a new constitution, which wasapproved by national referendum inOctober 2005. In the election for the newfour-year parliamentary assembly at theend of 2005, the Shiite-led United IraqiAlliance (UIA) received the most votesbut did not achieve a majority. UIA PrimeMinister Ibrahim al-Jaafari struggled toform a coalition government as the violencecontinued. Since then, a series of tenuousarrangements have been established betweenthe Iraqi State, the US military and localmilitias controlling difficult-to-governareas, presenting a series of interstitial

spaces between different forms ofauthority where corrupt power brokersand go-betweens have flourished.

ii. Corruption in Iraq

The conflict in Iraq was not related to, orcaused by, corruption. Anecdotal evidencesuggests that corruption in public admin-istration and service delivery firstappeared following the imposition of UNtrade sanctions after the conclusion of theGulf War. With no income from oil andno resources to purchase food or medicine,government-sanctioned ‘self-funding’ wasextensively practised. Public officers began‘charging’ the public for their services, andthis phenomenon spread to immigrationofficers at border posts and doctors andother medical personnel in hospitals.

Today, corruption is reported to bewidespread in Iraq, second only to thecontinuing insurgency as a threat tosuccess in forging Iraqi democracy. Theministries of oil, electricity, defence andinterior are said to be the most vulnerable.In May 2009, Iraq’s Commission onPublic Integrity, now the Commission ofIntegrity (CoI), reported that as a resultof the committee’s investigation into some12,000 complaints of government corrup-tion, among the worst offenders were —in no particular order — the ministries ofdefence, interior, finance, education andhealth. One of the cases involved tens ofthousands of dollars made by illegally

charging young recruits up to $500 eachto join the army. According to theCommission on Public Integrity, of thenearly 1,000 arrest warrants issued againstofficials under suspicion, 53 were atdirector-general level or above.

The 2008 Corruption PerceptionIndex of Transparency International ratedIraq as the third most corrupt country inthe world (only Somalia and Myanmarwere seen as more corrupt) out of a totalof 180 countries. The principal impedi-ment to anti-corruption activity is the lackof law enforcement, and political interfer-ence. Several ministers are perceived to becorrupt. Earlier this year, after severalfailed attempts, corruption charges werefiled against the former Minister of Tradein connection with Iraq’s food rationsprogramme. It has been alleged that Iraqi courts frequently bow to politicalpressure in cases against officials accusedof corruption.

iii. The institutional and legal framework

The Board of Supreme Audit (BSA),established in 1927, was one of the mostfirmly established bodies in Iraq andprovided external auditing and oversightto all the institutions of the Iraqiexecutive. BSA had units within eachministry and department. Following the2003 invasion, the CPA supplementedthis body with two other institutions.

CPA Order No.55 (2004) establishedthe Committee on Public Integrity(COPI) as the principal anti-corruptionbody, with the mandate to prevent andfight corruption. It was tasked to detectand investigate cases of corruption,including cases forwarded to it by theBoard of Supreme Audit and the inspec-tors general for further criminal investiga-tion, and to be responsible for receivingand validating financial disclosures fromhigh-ranking public officials, as well aspromoting public sector integrity throughthe development of codes of conduct.COPI was also mandated to enhancepublic awareness and understanding ofcorruption and to promote ethics andintegrity in the public and private sectorsthrough educational programmes andmeasures. The committee experiencedconsiderable difficulty in being acceptedby the Iraqi public sector, however. Thestaff was quite inexperienced, and mana-gerial structures, workflow managementand individual staff members’ functionswere not clearly defined. Repeatedchanges in the institutional leadership did not allow the committee to addresssome of these weaknesses in a consistent,coherent and timely manner. Moreover,the committee also lacked the necessaryinfrastructure, including a central office,and staff was distributed across a widerange of different locations.

CPA Order 57 (2004) introduced anentirely new concept of inspector general,

based on the system in the United States, into all government ministries. The inspector general was intended as an internal, yet independent, oversightbody responsible for promoting integrityand transparency within each ministry;monitoring the proper management of allpublic resources and public expenditures;and evaluating the overall performance ofthe ministry. The inspector general wasalso tasked to conduct administrativeinvestigations of the ministry, train staffon the prevention of corruption andprofessional ethics, and provide theminister with reports and recommenda-tions on proposed improvements with aview to enhancing integrity, accountabilityand transparency in all operations of theministry. The inspectors general faced amultitude of challenges at the policy andtechnical levels. There was no agreedmethodology on how they would conductthe management performance evaluation,or how they would measure the efficiency,effectiveness, integrity and governance ofthe ministries. There was a lack of clarityabout their functions, and they wereviewed and treated in a hostile mannerwithin their ministries.

CPA Order 77 then amended theBoard of Supreme Audit Law No.6 of1990 to require it to report to the Councilof Representatives. BSA is mandated tocontrol and audit the proper managementof public resources and expenditures aswell as to evaluate the performance of all

ministries and other bodies and agenciesof the executive branch. It is also tasked todetect, through audits and performanceevaluations, incidences of malfunctioning,mismanagement and corruption; to furtherinvestigate those incidences; and to report,as appropriate, its findings and recom-mendations to the entity responsible foreither taking remedial action (ministries)or for further investigating the matter (theCommittee on Public Integrity or therelevant inspector general).

iv. Anti-corruption approaches andprogrammes in Iraq

All early governance initiatives in Iraqwere taken by the US Embassy in Baghdad.The CPA issued several orders and estab-lished organizations and programmes toimprove accountability within the Iraqigovernment. Following growing dissatis-faction within the US government withthe efforts of the anti-corruption campaignin Iraq, the US ambassador in Iraqconvened an anti-corruption summit inNovember 2005. Participants includedhigh-ranking American and Iraqi officialswith direct responsibilities for anti-corruption efforts in Iraq. Although theUS Embassy’s efforts to promote anti-corruption predate that event, the summitresulted in rejuvenating a previouslyinactive embassy initiative, the Anti-Corruption Working Group. Its aim was

to establish an anti-corruption strategyand ensure that project activity accordedwith that strategy and took place in acollaborative manner that maximized thebenefit of each dollar spent. The summitalso envisaged a joint United States-Iraqworking group.

The National Development Strategylaunched by the transitional governmentin June 2005 articulated strengtheninggood governance and improving securityas one of its four pillars. It recognized thatcorruption was arguably the most criticalcomponent of governance in a countryrich in natural resources like Iraq, andidentified broad external accountabilitymeasures, including asset declarations,transparency surveys, disclosure of parlia-mentary votes, investigative journalismand citizen oversight as essential innova-tions. In May 2006, Iraqi Prime MinisterNouri al-Maliki, who had taken office just one month before, identified specificchallenges facing the government thatincluded tackling administrative andfinancial corruption. The InternationalCompact with Iraq that was launched in2007 reaffirmed the commitment of thegovernment to fight corruption. It recog-nized the government’s responsibility toits citizens ‘to establish transparent insti-tutions and practices through whichpublic servants will be held accountablefor their actions’. The compact specified asa distinct goal the development of a legal

framework and the building of institu-tional capacity to deter corruption at all levels of government. The compactoutlined specific actions, such as theformulation of a national anti-corruptionstrategy, strengthening anti-corruptionagencies, and implementing UNCAC.

Following the launching of the Inter-national Compact with Iraq, the govern-ment convened an internal workshop inJanuary 2008 at which it adopted an 18-point agenda of actions to be taken tocombat corruption. Two months later, inMarch 2008, the Iraqi government ratifiedUNCAC. Also in March 2008, the headsof the main anti-corruption entities —COI, formerly the Commission on PublicIntegrity; BSA; the Inspectors General; andthe Parliamentary Committee on Integritythrough the Joint Anti-CorruptionCouncil — declared their intention todevelop a comprehensive national anti-corruption strategy. They vowed, amongother things, to review and streamline theexisting legal and institutional framework;establish effective preventive measuressuch as codes of conduct, an asset decla-ration system, and effective inspection andauditing standards; promote ethical conduct,transparency and accountability throughoutsociety; to ensure enforcement of the law; design a public complaints andwhistleblower protection system; andbuild domestic capacities to recover theproceeds of corruption.

v. UNDP anti-corruption interventions

UNDP’s anti-corruption interventionscommenced three years after the regimechange. By then, the institutions estab-lished by the CPA had failed. UNDPresponded to the government’s request todevelop a comprehensive anti-corruptionprogramme by partnering with UNODCto provide the expertise necessary for therelevant Iraqi authorities at national,regional and governorate levels to developthat programme themselves. AdoptingUNCAC as the benchmark, the UNDP/UNODC programme, which is beingimplemented at the national, regional andgovernorate levels, is based on a partner-ship that integrates the functions of thefive principal anti-corruption institutions,namely, COI, BSA, the inspectors general,the Parliamentary Committee on Integrity(PCI) and the Judiciary. Also participatingare representatives from the civil societyand business sectors.64

A self assessment and gap analysis ofUNCAC was conducted by an Iraqi groupof governmental and civil society expertsunder the guidance of UNDP andUNODC. The group came up with 29recommendations — six of these areaswere identified for an in-depth needsassessment and committees were established for this purpose. An in-depthneeds assessment tool relating to Articles

5, 6, 7, 8, 32, 33 and 43 of UNCAC was developed under the guidance ofUNDP and UNODC by an Iraqi groupof governmental experts. These werediscussed in detail at a workshop.

Work has commenced on a nationalintegrity survey under the guidance ofUNDP and UNODC. The scope andmethodology of the survey and othertechnical issues pertaining to the surveywere discussed at a workshop. The surveywill be conducted in three phases. PhaseOne will be a mini-pilot of 300 persons totest the survey instrument to be used forthe pilot survey. Phase Two will have asample of 4,000 with a coverage of fourministries: education, trade, labour andindustry. This will be a pilot phase and theresults will not be publicly announced.Phase Three will be conducted in allministries countrywide and the results willbe published. It will be conducted by theCentral Organization for Statistical andInformation Technology.

Work has also commenced on thepreparation of a national anti-corruptionstrategy. This is being headed by the JointAnti-Corruption Council which reviewednational anti-corruption strategies from25 countries. UNDP also provided guidanceand direction. The proposed strategy hasbeen redrafted several times and circulatedto all the ministries, governorates andprovinces; as of January 2009, feedbackhad been sought from 56 bodies. The head

of the Council of The Joint Anti-Corrup-tion Council will finalize the draft andcirculate it again for additional feedback.

The following are among the other keyelements to be provided during the five-year anti-corruption programme developedwith support from UNDP/UNODC:

n a supportive role in implementing thenational anti-corruption strategy, trainthe trainers, and monitor performance;

n assistance to the government in devel-oping anti-money-laundering andcounter-terrorism funding legislation;

n assistance in increasing the capacity ofIraqi legislators in modern draftingskills as part of the process of reformof Iraqi anti-corruption laws;

n assistance in developing legislation onwitness and whistle-blower protection;

n training Iraqi governmental and keyprivate-sector stakeholders onUNCAC and its ethics responsibilitiesand ‘training the trainers’ to eventuallyconduct 20 of their own follow-uptraining sessions on UNCAC;

n assistance in capacity-building of Iraqigovernmental and private-sectorstakeholders at both national andgovernorate levels on UNCAC ethicsresponsibilities and obligations and onhow to practise and promote trans-parency and integrity;

n training of governorate-level publicofficials, local community, religiousand business leaders, as well as printand electronic media representatives to understand the causes, costs andconsequences of corruption and enablethem to design and carry out localaccountability and integrity campaigns;

n conducting of anti-corruption trainingfor newly elected officials;

n training to enable mid-level and seniorlocal administrators to understand thelegal framework governing their rightsand responsibilities related to account-ability and integrity, as well as theirpublic administration tools;

n assistance in developing standardoperating procedures for BSA audits,inspector-general inspections andCOI investigations for regional andgovernorate level institutions;

n assistance in developing a pilot anti-corruption curriculum forprimary and secondary level schools in three governorates.

vi. Lessons learned from Iraq

The UNDP/UNODC programme seeksto build, consolidate and expand apolitical and technical leadership group atall levels of government in Iraq, in thejudiciary, and in civil society and business,as well as to create a pool of anti-corrup-

tion facilitators or trainers who cancommunicate new messages, introducenew activities and plan new strategies instrengthening integrity. In a context wherepolitical support at the ministerial level forcombating corruption is reportedlyminimal, despite protestations to thecontrary, the UNDP/UNODC initiativeto involve non-political officials at thehighest levels of government makes senseand appears to have been productive so far.Iraq, unlike Afghanistan where nearly 80 percent of public servants are reportednot to have received a secondary education,has highly educated and professional civilservants. Consequently, their intimateinvolvement in all the processes is notonly a learning exercise for them, but alsoa mechanism through which they will beable to acquire ownership.

The UNDP/UNODC programme,being based on UNCAC, involves notonly the formulation of an anti-corruptionstrategy for implementation at the nationaland local levels, but also the establishmentof other measures such as codes ofconduct, witness and whistleblowerprotection laws, declarations of assets,access to information, anti-money-laun-dering legislation and the recovery ofstolen assets. As the head of the Councilof Ministers observed, the emphasisshould not merely be on combatingcorruption, but on a rebuilding process,requiring reforms at every level.

i. Background

The armed conflict in Sierra Leone began in March 1991 when forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led byCorporal Foday Sankoh crossed the borderfrom Liberia. Sankoh was supported byLiberian warlord Charles Taylor, who hadseized power in that country just one yearbefore. Sankoh declared that the objectiveof the incursion was to overthrow thecorrupt and tyrannical government ofJoseph Saidu Momoh and the All People’sCongress, which had ruled the countrysince 1968. Thus began a decade ofviolence that devastated the country.

During colonial rule, Sierra Leone wasdivided into two separate parts: the ‘crowncolony’ of Freetown, the capital, and the‘protectorate’ — the hinterland that wasgoverned indirectly through traditionalrulers. The Temne-speaking peopledominated the northern and western partsof the country, while the Mende-speakingpeople dominated the east and the south.The colony and the protectorate weredeveloped separately but unequally. Thecolony and its predominantly Creole eliteenjoyed vastly superior social, political andeconomic development and access to vitalresources such as education. The divide

9.4. SIERRA LEONE

UN Photo/Eric Kan

alstein

between the two entities bred deep ethnicand regional resentment and destabilizedthe traditional system of chieftaincy. Thesedivisions along ethnic and regional linesalso characterized the post-colonialperiod. They were reflected in the twoprincipal political parties that wereregionally based, with little or no nationalagenda. Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore,successive governments favoured certainethnic groups over others. Consequently,Sierra Leoneans placed greater priorityand emphasis on their ethnicity than ontheir nationality, and political, social andeconomic mobility was dependent on alle-giance to a traditional chief or benefactor.

Many observers, especially from abroad,assumed the conflict was initiated andperpetuated in order to seize control ofdiamonds, which were first discovered in1932 and had become the country’s mostimportant natural resource. According tothis version, RUF initiated an armedrebellion to gain control of the diamondresources. In the view of the Truth andReconciliation Commission establishedafter the conflict, that analysis is simplistic;it and other observers agreed that therewere multiple causes of the conflict andreasons for the involvement of Liberianand other foreign actors. Diamonds were,however, both an indirect cause of the warand a fuelling factor. As an indirect cause,the misapplication of revenues from thesales of diamonds had created huge socio-

economic disparities. Successive govern-ments had mismanaged the diamondindustry and placed its effective control inthe hands of foreigners and a culture ofdiamond smuggling and embezzlementhad been entrenched among key membersof the political elite. While the elitesenjoyed tremendous affluence, labourconditions in the mines were appallingand a growing number of Sierra Leoneanswere angered by how the collectivecommon wealth had been appropriated bya few in the name of the many. During theconflict, diamonds were highly covetedbecause they yielded enormous revenuesthat enabled armed forces to procure armsand ammunition. The desire to capturemore territory for diamond extraction andexploitation subsequently became a majormotivating factor for the armed groupsand their commanders.65

The Truth and Reconciliation Commis-sion found that the central cause of thewar was endemic greed, corruption andnepotism that had reduced most people toa state of poverty. Many Sierra Leoneans,particularly the youth, had lost all sense ofhope in the future. The commission tracedthe seeds of discontent to the colonialstrategy of divide and rule and the subver-sion of traditional systems by the colonialpower and successive governments. Thecreation, after independence, of a one-party state under President Siaka Stevensand the All People’s Congress had effec-

tively neutralized all checks and balanceson the exercise of executive power, andclosed down avenues for open debate anddemocratic activity. By the early 1990s,greed, corruption and bad governance hadled to institutional collapse through theweakening of the army, the police, thejudiciary and the civil service. The nationalparliament was ineffective and beholdento the executive. Elections were riggedand preceded by campaigns of intimida-tion and violence. For many years, therewere no significant acts of resistance tothe excesses of the system because civilsociety too was largely co-opted into thesame system. The entire economy wasundermined by gross mismanagement.Sierra Leone had become a deeply frag-mented country, marked by an almosttotal lack of national identity; notions ofcitizenship and patriotism had becomemeaningless concepts.

Following several abortive attemptssince 1996, a negotiated peace agreementwas signed in Lomé (Togo) in July 1999.It had two components: a military resolu-tion through the disarmament of combat-ants, and a political settlement byimplementing a power-sharing arrange-ment. The Lomé Agreement called forRUF to transform itself into a politicalparty in preparation for elections, andestablished a role for 12,000 UN observersto oversee disarmament of all factions in

the country. It also made RUF leaderSankoh the head of the Commission forthe Management of Strategic Resources,National Reconstruction and Develop-ment, with the status of vice-president,and gave other RUF members positionsin the government. Sankoh used hisposition to protect RUF’s diamond dealswith Charles Taylor and other externalplayers. RUF fighters refused to report todisarmament sites, and then robbed UNconvoys and kidnapped several hundredUN observers. Sankoh was finally capturedand arrested in May 2000. In January2002, after two further peace agreementswere signed in Abuja (Nigeria) in 2000and 2001, the war was finally declared tohave ended. In May 2002, PresidentKabbah was re-elected to a five-year termin a landslide victory for the Sierra LeonePeople’s Party. The RUF political wingfailed to win a single seat in parliament.Later that same year, Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commissionand the Special Court for Sierra Leonebegan operations.

ii. Corruption in Sierra Leone

A DFID survey conducted in 2000 usingfocus groups and perception-basedhousehold interviews highlighted thewidespread and long-standing prevalenceof corruption at all levels of society inSierra Leone. Bribery was regarded as the

most common corrupt practice. The highestrate of corruption was said to exist in theMinistry of Youth, Education and Sport,followed by the Ministries of the Judiciaryand Marine Resources. In 2002, a secondDFID-funded survey of 1,800 households,600 managers in the private sector and590 public officials found that corruptioncontinued to be a pervasive and institu-tional problem that hampered the potentialfor the growth and development of SierraLeone. Corruption manifested itself inmany forms, from bribes to obtain basicpublic services to misappropriation offunds. The use of bribes to obtain a jobwithin the public sector was common,with more than a third of the publicofficials reporting such practice. Bribeswere also necessary to obtain publiccontracts and bribery was widely resortedto by foreign investors to obtain licencesand permits. About two-thirds (66 percent)of households agreed that the mostimportant obstacle to accessing the courtswas corruption, with bribes being necessaryto advance legal proceedings or to alterjudicial decisions. Among the entitiesrated as most corrupt were the customs,the traffic police, the Surveys and LandsDepartment, the Income Tax Depart-ment; rated least dishonest were staff fromcommercial banks and the Sierra LeoneWater Company.

A Service Delivery and PerceptionSurvey conducted in 2006 focused on the

efficiency and effectiveness of publicservice delivery in education and health.It found that in the education sector,illegal charges for extra lessons and oblig-atory gifts were widespread. Half of therespondents could not afford these andother charges they were burdened with. Inthe health sector, where the governmentstipulates free consultations, drugs andessential vaccines for disadvantaged groups,with common drugs provided at an afford-able cost recovery basis to the public, 21percent of those surveyed reported payingfor basic vaccines, while over 50 percentfound the cost of health care for theirhouseholds to be unaffordable. In 2006,the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey,which reflects private-sector perceptions,ranked Sierra Leone at the eighth positionfrom the bottom from among 175 countries.It identified the bureaucracy surroundingemployment, property registration, licensing,trading across borders and enforcingcontracts as especially lengthy. Theseprocedures created opportunities for publicofficials to demand bribes when dealingwith companies. In the 2008 CorruptionPerception Index, Transparency Interna-tional ranked Sierra Leone 158 out of 180 countries.

The National Anti-Corruption Strategy(NACS 2008–2013),66 which is theproduct of a Technical Working Groupwith a diverse membership drawn fromCSOs, private- and public-sector institu-

tions and the international community,attributed corruption in Sierra Leone topolitical, economic, sociological and struc-tural/institutional circumstances over thepast two decades. It concluded that thecurrent situation is the result of multiplefactors. During colonial rule, traditionalvalues of mutual cooperation were replacedby those of individualism, and during theera of one-party and military rule bydecree it had become commonplace tobypass regulatory legislation to accesspublic assets, and to mismanage andembezzle public funds and property withimpunity. The implementation of theStructural Adjustment Programme in the1990s had resulted in a drop in the valueof public servants’ wages and real income.As retrenchment and unemploymentescalated in the public sector, the moraleand commitment of public servantsdiminished significantly and many beganto resort to illegal coping mechanisms,including bribery, selling of governmentinformation and over-invoicing, thus rein-forcing a culture of corruption.

Factors in the political system thatoffer significant opportunities for corrup-tion include the lack of accountability andtransparency in campaign funding. Thewinning party becomes obliged to offercompensatory privileges to contributingindividuals through appointments asministers, ambassadors and directors ofparastatals, and other benefits such as

contracts and allocations of social serviceprojects. The recovery of the investmentthen takes precedence. The misuse ofpublic resources such as vehicles, fuel, themedia and the working hours of publicservants to conduct political campaigns,has been widespread, regardless of whichparty is in power. The over-centralizedpolitical and administrative system resultsin the use of unchecked discretionary powersby public officials. Moreover, ministries,departments and agencies are created toaccommodate party supporters, and theappointment, removal and transfer of staffare made on the basis of political affilia-tion rather than any objective assessment.

The economic causes of corruptioninclude the exceedingly low wages, espe-cially in the public service; this, coupledwith the high cost of living, makes it aformidable struggle to make ends meet formost people. These problems encouragethe adoption of survival strategies such asaccepting bribes in exchange for favours,selling government information and prof-iteering. The cost of doing business is alsohigh because business registration processesare complex and numerous and tax ratesare relatively high. This has resulted inentrepreneurs going underground to avoidofficial taxes and to reduce the burden of bureaucracy.

Among the structural or institutionalcauses of corruption are the complex,cumbersome and obsolete procedures and

regulations in the public sector. Thisresults in basic functions being performedinefficiently and ineffectively. Ordinarycitizens who are constantly frustrated anddelayed as they seek to access basic socialservices and entitlements are compelled tofind other means, which results in thecorrupt extorting financial and otherresources from the public.

iii. The institutional and legal framework

To a limited extent, corruption was on thepolitical agenda before the conflict. ThePrevention of Corruption Decree waspassed in 1992, and the Beccles-DaviesCommission of Inquiry was appointed toexamine the assets and other related mattersof all persons who were presidents, vice-presidents and ministers during the period1 June 1986 to 22 September 1991, andto investigate whether such assets wereacquired lawfully or unlawfully. In thesame year (1992), the Justice LyntonNylander Commission of Inquiry wasappointed to investigate the financialactivities of parastatals, departments andcorporations during the same period.

As a result of the household surveyheld by DFID, the parliament enacted theAnti-Corruption Act in February 2000,that established the Anti-CorruptionCommission “to investigate instances ofalleged or suspected corruption referred toit by any person or authority or which

has come to its attention, whether bycomplaint or otherwise and to take suchsteps as may be necessary for the eradica-tion or suppression of corrupt practices.”Based on DFID-funded survey resultsand following the formation of thecommission, a governance and corruptionstudy was undertaken. The study aimed atproviding objective and experiential infor-mation to the government for the designof a holistic and integrated reform policyto improve governance, accountability andtransparency and to reduce corruption.

The study, eventually released inAugust 2000, was titled National Percep-tions and Attitudes Towards Corruptionin Sierra Leone. It made the followingpreliminary recommendations:

n implement a nationwide awarenesscampaign to inform and educatepeople about their rights and dutiesrelated to corruption and on theexisting mechanisms to protect them-selves from corrupt practices;

n strengthen the Anti-CorruptionCommission and the judiciary interms of staffing and resources, toimprove their ability to handle andprosecute corruption cases;

n promote the decentralization of theAnti-Corruption Commission outsidethe capital and the main cities;

n continue to regularly monitor thequality of governance.

A steering committee headed by the then-finance minister began work in 2000, withthe assistance of foreign consultants, toformulate a national anti-corruptionstrategy; that strategy was eventuallylaunched on 5 February 2005. It adoptedtwo main approaches: prevention throughcommunity relations and education, and enforcement through investigationand prosecution.

Fundamental flaws were discovered inthe strategy when its implementationcommenced, however. For example, therewas no budgetary provision for many ofthe activities, and no effort was made toobtain objective data on corruption. So-called integrity officers — who wereexpected to lead the implementation inministries, departments and agencies —found that they were unable to influencepolicy decisions at their respective placesof engagement. The implementation alsoappeared to be slow, ad hoc and incapableof addressing real corruption issues. Noimpact assessment was undertaken of itslimited community mobilization campaignsthat usually took the form of integrityclubs in schools and radio programmes.There was little or no engagement withthe private sector, which regarded corrup-tion to be such a serious impediment thatmany businesses were moving out ofSierra Leone into neighbouring countries.

The Anti-Corruption Commissionfailed to deliver on its second approach

too. The abysmal lack of prosecutions wasquite problematic. The management styleof the commission was also regarded asanything but dynamic, and the credibilityof the institution was seriously under-mined when the then-president appointedhis brother-in-law as its head. Theproblems were further compounded bythe fact that the commission operated inan environment in which other vital insti-tutions such as the attorney general’s office,the judiciary, the auditor general’s office,parliament, the police, the media and civilsociety were either uncooperative, non-functional, dysfunctional or corrupt.

At a national forum held in November2006, a technical working group consistingof representatives of CSOs, private- andpublic-sector institutions and the interna-tional community was constituted toformulate a new national anti-corruptionstrategy. Its report, published in 2008,inter alia, identified in detail the political,economic, sociological, structural/institu-tional and judicial/legal causes of corrup-tion in the country. The strategy recognizedthe need for a diversity of players in thefight against corruption and thereforespread the burden of its implementationacross all of the pillars of integrity and theAnti-Corruption Commission itself. Atelections conducted in late 2007, a newpresident, Ernest Bai Koroma, was electedon a platform of change. He pledged tocombat corruption, which he described as

an ‘epidemic’. In 2008, the parliamentenacted a new Anti-Corruption Law,expanding the mandate of the Anti-Corruption Commission by granting itindependent powers to investigate andprosecute on its own, rather than throughthe attorney general. The new law alsoauthorized the investigation and publica-tion of declarations of assets, and containedprovisions for mutual legal assistance andthe freezing and forfeiture of the proceedsof crime, and for the protection of inform-ants and witnesses. The reconstitutedAnti-Corruption Commission has sinceidentified key corruption issues in everyministry and government agency andbegun to address them.

President Koroma became the firsthead of state to declare his assets to theAnti-Corruption Commission. However,the National Accountability Group (NAG),a Freetown-based NGO, thought heshould go further and make his declara-tion public. NAG also noted that govern-ment ministers and parliamentarians had failed to declare their assets by 30 November 2008 as stipulated by thecommission. Nevertheless, there are positivesigns. The commission subpoenaed thepermanent secretary to the Ministry ofEducation, Youth and Sports, the generalmanager of the Sierra Leone AirportAuthority, and the commissioner generalof the National Revenue Authority for

their failure to submit to the commissiontheir institutions’ performance-trackingreports. The indicting of a formerombudsman and a minister and severallow- and mid-level officials from ministrieswas followed up with charges being servedrecently on the former executive director ofthe Sierra Leone Road Transport Authorityon several corruption-related offences.

Currently, the Anti-Corruption Commis-sion has a committed chairperson and anequally motivated deputy. The presidentpublicly pledged support for the commis-sion in 2009, but in the interviewsconducted it appeared that most civilsociety observers were sceptical of thepresident’s commitment despite othersteps he had taken to contain corruption,such as a temporary ban on logging andthe exploitation of timber, and addressingthe lack of competitive bidding forcontracts. There is also some uncertaintyover the future of the commission that hasso far been donor-funded. It remainsunclear whether the Anti-CorruptionCommission will have the necessary fundsto be sustained in the long run.

iv. Donor attitudes and political dialogue

Donors, including UNDP, appear to havebeen serving as watchdogs, withholdingaid and assistance whenever dubious situ-ations arose.67

v. Anti-corruption approaches andprogrammes in Sierra Leone

Until January 2002, when the war wasfinally declared over, the main focus of theinternational community’s efforts was theDDR process; the return and resettlementof displaced persons; and the extension ofstate authority throughout the country,including line ministries and traditionalauthorities (the paramount chiefs).Following the end of the war, DFIDbegan providing budget support to thegovernment; this budget support wasdesigned to achieve a stable macro-economic environment, improved servicedelivery, a more effective, responsive andaccountable government, and to maintainpeace and security — in other words, toallow the government fiscal space todeliver basic services to the people.

Since the end of the war, the govern-ment has initiated several reform andreconstruction programmes with theassistance of donor agencies, notably theWorld Bank and DFID. The governmentestablished the Governance Reform Secre-tariat to be the focal point for public sectorreform, local government reform anddecentralization. Governance programmesundertaken since then include, with regardto public service, the creation of a SeniorExecutive Service and the establishmentof a Human Resource Management Office.Improvements were made in record

management and a comprehensive trainingprogramme for public officers was prepared.A National Social Security and InsuranceTrust was established, as were threeimportant new commissions (law reform,human rights and electoral reform). Thedecentralization of political power and thedevolution of governance responsibilitiesfrom central government agencies to localgovernment structures commenced.

In the area of economic governance,measures taken include the establishmentof budget oversight and monitoringcommittees at national and district levels;the adoption of a medium-term expendi-ture framework to promote better planningand budgeting and improved publicexpenditure; the introduction of a humancapital accountability system to help clearthe public payroll of ghost workers; a newauthority to regulate public procurement;and the introduction of public expendituretracking surveys to monitor the transfer of public resources from the centre toprovinces, districts and chiefdoms. Thepassage of the Investment Protection Act and the rationalization of the taxregime have helped empower the privatesector to embark on economic growth andjob creation.

DFID, as the largest contributor togovernance reform in Sierra Leone,supported the national elections in 2007and local elections in 2008, and the estab-lishment of democratically elected district

councils and their capacity to deliver basic services. DFID has also supportedtraining and mentoring programmes forcivil society and is currently providingsupport to the auditor general and theAnti-Corruption Commission, and forreform of public financial managementand the civil service. Its new programmeof support (2010–2013) focuses on thedeepening of democracy, in particularthrough supporting the electoral process.

The World Bank Institutional Reformand Capacity Building Project ($25 million)aims at establishing a functioning localgovernment system and improving theinclusiveness, transparency and accounta-bility of public financial management atall levels of government. Its ProgrammaticGovernance Reform and Growth Project($10 million) aims, inter alia, to supportmeasures to pursue procurement reformsand strengthen the implementation of decentralization.

vi. UNDP anti-corruption interventions

UNDP was in Sierra Leone both beforeand during the war, and was involved indifferent peace processes. In 1999, whenthe Security Council authorized theestablishment of the United NationsMission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) toassist in the implementation of the flawedLomé Agreement, UNDP was embedded

in the mission from the very beginningand its activities were incorporated in UNDAF. In 2005, UNAMSIL wasreplaced by the United Nations IntegratedOffice for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) witha broad mandate that included assistingthe government to build the capacity ofstate institutions; enhancing good gover-nance, transparency and accountability ofpublic institutions; and strengthening therule of law. In October 2008, the SecurityCouncil replaced UNIOSIL with theUnited Nations Integrated PeacebuildingOffice in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) witha largely advisory role aimed at promotinghuman rights and strengthening demo-cratic institutions and the rule of law.

In the first two post-conflict years,UNDP took the lead in helping thegovernment to formulate the NationalRecovery Strategy and to prioritize theextension of state authority, including the deployment of administrative officesin all the districts and the return of thetraditional authorities. UNDP also playeda key role in the final phase of DDR andsupported the repatriation and resettle-ment of internally displaced persons andrefugees. From 2002, when the war wasfinally declared over, UNDP began tofocus on three practice areas: recovery andpeacebuilding, governance and democraticdevelopment, and poverty and humandevelopment. Its activities have, perhapsof necessity, been confined to areas that

other donors or agencies have not focusedon. For example, there does not appear tohave been a specific, targeted interventionagainst corruption, probably because thatfield was already occupied by DFID fromas far back as the signing of the LoméAgreement. However, UNDP’s gap-fillingrole has been described as having beenrather effective “because it has been demanddriven rather than donor driven.”68

As part of UNIOSIL (2005–2008),UNDP projects included public sectorreform in the form of providing supportfor the decentralization of line ministries,notably the Ministry of Local Govern-ment; the establishment of a Strategy andPolicy Unit in the office of the president;a management and functional review of15 government ministries; and a capacity-development facility. Notwithstandingthese initiatives, the capacity of state insti-tutions to deliver basic services remainsweak. UNDP supported the electoralcommission in conducting the localelections in 2004 by managing the fundsto finance the vote. Unfortunately, theelections were riddled with irregularities,some of which involved the commissionitself, and in which the turnout was muchlower than it had been two years earlier.The commission was subsequently closeddown and a new body established to conductthe 2007 presidential and parliamentaryelections, with funds managed jointly byUNDP and the European Union.

In the justice sector, UNDP endeav-oured to expand access to justice byproviding training to justices of the peace,magistrates, clerks and bailiffs and supple-menting their salaries. This was perhapsan urgent need, but it has to be noted that this was a country in which judges atall levels of the judicial hierarchy werechronically short in number. UNDP alsosupported the drafting of some criticallaws, such as the Local Government Act,Public Procurement Act, Education Act, Parliamentary Service Act and threegender-based laws — the CustomaryMarriages Act, the Intestate SuccessionAct, and the Matrimonial Causes andDomestic Violence Act. In 2008, directsupport was provided to the re-consti-tuted Anti-Corruption Commission forthe preparation of a National Anti-Corruption Strategy, including thedrafting of a new anti-corruption law.

vii. Lessons learned in Sierra Leone

Despite major efforts to improve thesituation, the findings of researchers forthis report suggest that corruptionremains endemic in Sierra Leone. Thestate still lacks the capacity to deliver basicservices; it is still possible to ‘negotiate’with judges; the ‘brown envelope’ is stilldemanded by public officials from shop-keepers at festival time, etc. Public officials

are known to yearn for official missionsand workshops in order to supplementtheir salaries. The misuse of publicresources by heads of schools andmanagement committees is a matter ofcommon knowledge. The problem ofextremely low salaries paid to publicofficers was identified by many as thebiggest challenge to the success of anyanti-corruption strategy.

Donors and international agencies,including UNDP, appear to have failed toengage with the judiciary with a view to strengthening its independence andintegrity (not merely its capacity to dealwith corruption cases). Deficiencies in thejudicial system persist, including extortionand bribe-taking by officials; insufficientnumbers of judges, magistrates and pros-ecuting attorneys; absenteeism by courtpersonnel; inadequate remuneration forjudiciary personnel; and extended periodsof pre-trial detention. The only legalsystem accessible to 70 percent of thepopulation is one based on customarycourts controlled by traditional leadersand applying customary law that is oftendiscriminatory, particularly against women.Local court officials frequently abuse theirpowers by illegally detaining persons,charging high fines for minor offencesand adjudicating criminal cases beyondtheir jurisdiction. The informal justicesystem needs to be reviewed and refash-

ioned in accord with contemporaryhuman rights standards.

In 2004, the Truth and ReconciliationCommission reported that many of thecauses of the conflict that promptedthousands of young people to join the warhad not yet been adequately addressed.High among these factors were elitistpolitics, rampant corruption and nepotismand bad governance in general. These were potential causes of conflict, if theyremained unaddressed. The Truth andReconciliation Commission concluded,however, that Sierra Leoneans yearn for aprincipled system of governance: “Theywant a system that upholds the rule of law over the rule of strong patrons andprotects the people from the abuse ofrulers through a system of checks andbalances. They wish to see horizontal and vertical accountability through theeffective operation of such institutions asthe judiciary, the auditor general’s office,the electoral commission, the media andcivil society.”69

Despite the efforts of donors andinternational agencies, the legitimacy ofthe government remains weak. Endemiccorruption, lack of justice, poor servicedelivery (especially in vital sectors such aswater, electricity, transport and health),and a lack of transparency, continue to be the predominant characteristics ofSierra Leone today, even as they werethree years ago.70

i. Background

Timor-Leste was colonized by thePortuguese but annexed forcibly byIndonesia in 1975. After Indonesianpresident Suharto was deposed in May1998, the international communitybacked Timorese leaders’ demand for areferendum on the status of Timor-Leste.Following a decisive vote in favour ofindependence the following year, theIndonesian army and Indonesian-backedmilitias retaliated violently, and theensuing conflict left more than 1,300people dead. International peacekeeperswere sent to Timor-Leste and the United

Nations Transitional Administration inTimor-Leste assumed control on atemporary basis.

In 2000, a Constituent Assembly wasestablished with elected members, draftedand ratified the Constitution for an inde-pendent Timor-Leste and laying out thepolitical framework establishing the fourpillars of sovereignty. Assembly membersalso took the lead in establishing electoralprocedures and standards to guide theelection of a president. Xanana Gusmãowas the clear winner (with 83 percent ofthe vote) of the first presidential poll, in April 2002. A month later the

9.5. TIMOR-LESTE

UN Photo/M

artine Pe

rret

Constituent Assembly was rechristenedthe Legislative Assembly of Timor-Leste.According to the Constitution, Timor-Leste is a semi-presidential republic.

Four years later, in April 2006,tensions in the military erupted intoviolence with many soldiers demandingthe resignation of Prime Minister MariAlkatiri. As violence escalated, a multi-country International Stabilization Forceand a contingent of UN peacekeeperswere sent to Timor-Leste to restore peace.Alkatiri resigned in June and PresidentGusmão appointed José Ramos-Horta asprime minister. Following elections inJune 2007, Mr. Ramos-Horta becamepresident and Mr. Gusmão was appointedprime minister, leading a coalition of parties.

Since independence 10 years ago, therehas been an influx of Timorese who previ-ously lived abroad, most of whom areproperly considered in the elite class. Theyhave filled positions in the government aswell as the UN system and other interna-tional agencies. The elite were educatedmainly in Portugal (many of whomformed part of the first government) andIndonesia (many of whom are part of thecurrent government) and to a lesserextent, Australia.

ii. Corruption in Timor-Leste

Generally speaking, the current level ofcorruption in Timor-Leste is consideredto be quite moderate, or not very corrupt.

However, many people interviewed saidthey sense that the frequency and the scaleof corruption may be increasing.71 Onereason cited for the increase is the surgein government budget revenues since oilrevenues began flowing in 2007. Corrup-tion today is a result of weak governance,especially the lack of accountability. Forexample, there are limited checks on theprime minister’s office; parliament couldbe more vigorous in its financial oversightrole; and the opposition could be moreeffective within the legislature. Civilsociety is relatively healthy but there areimpediments to its free association andexpression, and the media is not yetoperating as an effective watchdog. Civilservants do not feel they are beingwatched. The most significant oversightdeficiency is the absence of an externalaudit agency (as in external to theExecutive) This is a major limitation onthe ability of parliament, civil society andcitizens to know how public funds andassets are used. The Constitution statesthat this audit agency will be establishedas a court in the judiciary but it has neverbeen established.72 According to manyinterviewees, some in the government,there is widespread acceptance of thebelief that if you are in power, theresources are yours, and you can do whatyou want with them. Under this view,public servants do not see themselves asholding public patrimony in trust; instead,

they consider their allegiance to party,clique, family or former political resistancegroup to be greater and more important.Some see the benefits of office as a justreward. Examples often cited includeparliamentarians (legally) buying them-selves large and expensive cars andbuilding government-sponsored housingfor themselves.

Corruption is considered to have thepotential for contributing to instability inthe future. The main source of instabilitygiven by interviewees is youth martial artsgangs, which are linked to and may beused by political figures. The military hasbeen quite disciplined since deserter-turned-rebel leader Alfredo Reinado waskilled in early 2008; the army is nowsubordinate to the state. There are somesigns of improvement among the policewith the gradual transfer of executivepolicing responsibilities from UNPOL(United Nations Police) to the nationalpolice from May 2009.

With 50 percent of the populationbelow the age of 18, combined with rapidpopulation growth (fertility rate of 7),73

unemployment will remain a pressingchallenge in the near future if not accom-panied by a significant progress in invest-ment. It is estimated that annually around15,000 young people enter the labourmarket, while only 400 formal jobs arecreated. While 56 percent of youth areemployed in the agricultural sector,74

many migrate to Dili and other urbanareas in search of opportunities that oftendo not exist. Dili has the highest rate ofpopulation growth in Timor.

This can be linked to corruption inthat infrastructure projects (as employers)are failing to generate employment oppor-tunities because funds are being misusedand many companies are opting to useforeign workers instead of locals. The lackof employment options for young peopleheightens the likelihood for further esca-lation of the gang and crime problems.

Public sentiment is that corruptionneeds to stop for two main reasons: (i)because people have to pay for govern-ment services that should be available forfree, or (ii) because they are paying morethan they feel they should. At the sametime, however, it is important to note thatthe Timorese people do not feel oppressedby taxes. The government currentlyreceives substantial revenue from oil andforeign aid, and therefore does not have torely on taxing its own people for revenue.So the public does not put many demandson government.

iii. The institutional and legal framework

Corruption was not a particular issueduring the 1999 conflict. The transitionalgovernment (UNTAET) set up the officeof the inspector general in 2000. This was

by instruction letter from the head ofUNTAET, who was concerned about thepublic perception of the rule of law. It hascontinued under succeeding governments.

Corruption is not specificallymentioned in the Timor-Leste Constitu-tion, but ‘clean and effective government’is a national priority (according to thedocument). In 2004, a law was passed thatlays out the ombudsman’s responsibilitiesin receiving and acting on complaints ofmaladministration, corruption and humanrights violations.75 This law does notclearly define corruption, however. Since2005 the ombudsman’s office has receivedabout 100 corruption cases; of these, it hasreferred 28 to the prosecutor general’soffice. That office has been reluctant toproceed, however. The 28 cases that havebeen referred are yet to be investigated. Anumber of interviewees pointed to thisoffice as a major obstacle to efforts toeffectively respond to corruption.

Although the ombudsman’s office hasreportedly been slow to respond, thegovernment in general has focused more intently on corruption since 2007.In August 2007, for example, the parlia-ment established a subcommittee oncorruption that pushed successfully for theratification of UNCAC in November2008. This committee conducts annualhearings on the budget. Budget executionreports can be accessed on the financeministry’s website.

In May 2008, Prime Minister Gusmãoannounced his vision for an independentAnti-Corruption Commission. The lawtook a year to be passed by the parliament,and the commission became operationalin February 2010 with the appointmentof Aderito de Jesus Soares as its firstcommissioner. The Anti-CorruptionCommission law repealed theombudsman’s anti-corruption preroga-tives. However the Provedor did not, norwill the Anti-Corruption Commission,have the legal entitlement to collect legallyadmissible evidence or prepare cases forprosecution as these roles are the exclusiveprerogative of the prosecutor general.76

The anti-corruption commissioner willtherefore be dependent on the goodwill ofthe prosecutor general to exercise hiscommission’s investigative responsibilities.Nevertheless, when the governmentthinks of anti-corruption, it is usuallyreferring to the Anti-Corruption Commis-sion. The perception is that through theestablishment of this commission, allcorruption will be addressed.

However, strengthened or new stateinstitutions are not predominantly viewedas new opportunities for corruption inTimor-Leste. New institutions are viewedas competing and depleting resources,especially skilled people with anti-corrup-tion skills, of whom there are very few.Multiple institutions exaggerate theproblem, by causing jurisdictional

confusion and allowing institutions tocompete to avoid dealing with complex ordifficult cases, which means casesinvolving individuals from Timor-Leste’ssmall power elite.

iv. Donor attitudes and political dialogue

There is sometimes a perceived reluctanceon the part of government to take actionagainst corruption, and donors havefollowed suit. Donors are trying to corralgovernment into a structured network ofinstitutions that in its entirety would becoherent. However, some donors havequestioned the point of trying to get acoherent system to work. They note,referring to the prosecutor general’s poorperformance that it seems futile to buildthe capacity of anti-corruption institu-tions if all efforts to get people charged arein vain. As noted above, the prosecutorgeneral has exclusive responsibility for thecollection of legally admissible evidence,even in investigations undertaken by otherinstitutions, including the police and theAnti-Corruption Commission, and it hasthe exclusive right to conduct criminalprosecutions in court.77

Regarding political dialogue betweengovernment and donors, sources from thegovernment say that donors complain orlecture to them on corruption. Severalinterviewees expressed that they do not

appreciate being told they are not fullyfulfilling policies when donor countriesthemselves are not free from corruption.

Observers criticize donors and the UNfor failing to hold the line on issues thatmatter. They say, for example, that donorsare reluctant to have direct conversationsabout political issues and that they insteadtend to withdraw assistance, often unilat-erally. Donors reportedly avoid addressingthe lack of political will and the lack of anational anti-corruption strategy, anomission that could limit the effectivenessof the new Anti-Corruption Commission.

v. Anti-corruption approaches andprogrammes in Timor-Leste

One of the major characteristics of anti-corruption activities in Timor-Leste is thealmost complete lack of coordinationbetween national institutions and betweendonors and development partners. Thesame is true within government. As aresult, there has been no mechanism toestablish jurisdictional boundaries todistinguish between minor administrativebreaches and more significant corruption,or to share information and coordinateinvestigations and ensure that prose-cutable cases are prepared with input andsupport from a variety of institutions.There is often a real fear of engagementwith counterparts from different institu-tions, which is driven in part by the strong

personalities of institutional leaders. Thisextends beyond investigative agencies tonearly all agencies and is an enduringcharacteristic of Timorese society.

Before the first elections, the transi-tional government set up the Office of theInspector-General (OIG), which focusedon inspection and audit investigations.This office was established by a memo-randum of understanding and not law; inthe immediate post-conflict environmentit was possible to act without a law. Caseswere referred to court for prosecution. TheOIG performed this function until 2005,when the ombudsman’s office was estab-lished.

There does not appear to be a coherentanti-corruption programming strategy oreffective coordination on anti-corruptionby development partners in Timor-Leste.The World Bank has funded two consult-ants to develop practical anti-corruptionstrategies in Timor-Leste. The firstproduced the ‘World Bank Transparencyand Integrity Sourcebook’ of 2002 forTimor-Leste, a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy with a set of practicalmeasures that could be implemented tocombat corruption. The document waswritten in English and translated intoBahasa Indonesian and Portuguese, allthree versions of which were distributedto agencies that could use the strategy. Noaction has yet been taken in response tothe document, however.

In 2005, a consultant was engaged byOIG to develop an anti-corruptionframework for that office. The positionwas funded by the World Bank, whichsupported OIG in hiring a consultant.When the adviser joined OIG, no one inthat office knew of the comprehensivedocument referred to above, although acomplete edition was on the shelves of themain office.

AusAID has provided substantialsupport to the prosecutor general’s officeto try to improve its professionalism andwork flow, including through theprovision of advisers. AusAID has alsoprovided a large number of advisers to theprime minister and the Council ofMinisters, which has, among otherfunctions, provided input to anti-corrup-tion legislation.

The UN missions to Timor, such asUNOTIL and UNMIT, have providedadvisers to OIG to assist in developingboth its auditing and general investigativefunctions. This has seen only limitedimprovement in OIG’s performance asmost staff lack the basic education neededfor both auditing and administrativeinvestigations. UNMIT currently has atransparency adviser with an anti-corrup-tion focus working with a deputy primeminister. USAID has also helped supportanti-corruption efforts by providingadvisers to various offices and agencies.

Such assistance may sound useful, but

by providing advisers, donors have aggra-vated existing institutional problems.Individual advisers often have no sense ofhow institutions overlap. The constitu-tional framework and much of the legalframework is continental/Portuguese,with many advisers from Mozambiqueand Portugal. Advisers from other systemstry to tack on elements from their systemsas well.

Moreover, it is rare to obtain assistancefrom an adviser who is equally competentin civil and common law. For example, adonor agency funded a judge with onlycommon law experience to draft the lawestablishing the anti-corruption commis-sion. Another common problem — theAnti-Corruption Commission notwith-standing — is that donors tend to placeadvisers in existing institutions with littleinterest in developing new ones that aremandated by the Constitution and areneeded, such as the High Administrative,Tax and Audit Court.77

vi. UNDP anti-corruption interventions

UNDP does not have a specific anti-corruption programme in Timor-Leste,but its democratic governance programmeaims to strengthen horizontal and verticalaccountability through capacity-building.Its objectives are to (i) foster inclusiveparticipation, (ii) strengthen responsive

governing institutions, and (iii) supportimplementation of democratic practicesgrounded in human rights, genderequality and anti-corruption. Specifically,the governance programme aims toincrease the capacity of local level govern-ments, the parliament, the justice system,the national executive branch and theombudsman. UNDP also has projects tostrengthen the civil service, civic engage-ment and electoral laws. Although they donot seem to have been explicitly designedas anti-corruption interventions, suchgovernance-strengthening efforts could inturn reduce corruption. These efforts arediscussed below.

n Elections: To help build the demo-cratic system of Timor-Leste andstrengthen the capacity of the nationalelectoral institutions, an integratedUNMIT-UNDP United NationsElectoral Support Team (UN EST) inTimor-Leste was established tosupport an electoral cycle approach,including support for local levelelections in October 2009, plannedmunicipal elections in late 2010 andgeneral elections in 2012. UN ESTwas created to present a united frontto the national stakeholders as well asdonors and to enhance the effective-ness of the UN assistance. Althoughanti-corruption was not explicitlysingled out as a priority or objective,

civil and voter education activitiesinformed people of their rights andelectoral processes, including countingand complaints procedures.

n Access to justice: UNDP’s JusticeSystem Programme was launched inJanuary 2009 to strengthen institu-tional capacity to uphold the rule oflaw and improve access to justicethrough legal empowerment of the poor and disadvantaged. Theprogramme has set up and imple-mented a legal training centre formagistrates, public defenders, lawyers,clerks, translators and other justicesector actors.

n Local governance: The joint UNDP-UNCDF Local Government SupportProgramme (LGSP) is supporting theTimor-Leste government in (i) theestablishment of a comprehensiveinstitutional, legal and regulatoryframework; (ii) the establishment offull-fledged and effective local govern-ments; and (iii) the implementation oflocal government reforms. In 2009,LGSP supported the drafting of legis-lation and regulation defining theframework for the functioning offuture municipalities. In addition,LGSP supported enhancing capacitiesof local authorities in planning,budgeting, and procurement of infra-structure to prepare districts to meet

responsibilities in the context ofdecentralization. Among other activi-ties, it also supported civic educationactivities launched in various districtsto raise awareness among citizensabout their roles and responsibilities inthe context of local governance anddecentralization reforms.

n Parliamentary strengthening: TheUNDP Parliament project has beenthe umbrella project for strengtheningthe institutional capacity of parlia-mentary democracy in Timor-Lestesince 2003. The project has providedtechnical assistance in key areas suchas legislation and oversight, strength-ening of the Secretariat, parliamentaryrepresentation and gender main-streaming, both by supporting criticalline functions and developing acapacity-building strategy across thedifferent areas. With support from the project, in 2009 Parliament draftedits first Strategic Plan outlining aframework for systematic developmentover the next five years (2010–2014).Another important parliamentaryachievement has been the revision of the Standing Orders to facilitategreater parliamentary efficiency and an improved workflow while at thesame time strengthening Parliament’soversight function, notably throughprovision of regular Q&A sessions

with members of the government,including the prime minister (therevised Standing Orders were adoptedin October 2009).

n Media: Throughout 2008 and 2009,UNDP supported the implementationof the following three outputs throughthe Independent Media Developmentproject: (i) strengthened media-relatedlegal and regulatory process, (ii) increasedtechnical and managerial capacity forsustainability of community radio; and(iii) improved professional capacity ofprint and community radio journalistsand community radio producers. Atthe request of the national parliament,UNDP provided technical assistancein the drafting of a set of media laws,including (i) General Media Law(with a statute protecting journalistsappended), (ii) the Media CouncilLaw, and (iii) the Community RadiosLaw. These laws will be sponsored asprivate member’s bills.

n Civil service reform: UNDP supportto civil service reform in Timor-Lestehas focused on ensuring accurateprimary data on civil servants so thatwork planning and budgeting is basedon up-to-date information. Thisnational civil service database is basedwithin the Civil Service Commission,and once current data is validated itwill be directly linked with payroll.

Once validated, the data will provideinformation on (i) access to trainingand development activities (e.g., schol-arships), (ii) leave taken by staff, (iii) qualifications of staff, (iv) perform-ance evaluations, and (v) salary andentitlements. This access to manage-ment information, when combinedwith appropriate training for seniormanagers, will enable better humanresources planning and management ofresources across the civil service.

n Communication for empowerment:This is a new project which willcommence in 2010. The projectstrategy draws upon C4E, anemerging concept in UNDP’s globaland regional work on inclusive partic-ipation. Its initial focus, on the estab-lishment of government informationhouses in three districts (see below), isbased on an acknowledgement of thepivotal role of both civil society andthe media in mobilizing and empow-ering the poor to enable them toengage with local authorities, to makelegitimate demands of those authori-ties, and to hold them to account fortheir policies. The project therefore,seeks to harness and leverage thesynergy between civil society and themedia in one integrated initiative. Thespecific outputs and activities outlinedin the project document are based on

the lessons learned from two previousprojects on civil society strengtheningand independent media development.

vii. UNDP and internal integrity

It is not apparent that the ‘do no harm’approach was specifically considered withregard to corruption; or that UNDPweighed its aid modalities with regard tovulnerabilities to and impact on corrup-tion; or that UNDP is visibly and effec-tively promoting transparency andaccountability towards partner countryconstituencies. It was noted by at least oneNGO respondent that while UNDPengages civil society on governance issues,its approach is not strategic and seems tobe initiated based on when UNDP hasfunds it must use by a certain date.

Looking more broadly at the issue oftransparency of aid in general, the Timor-Leste Institute for Development Moni-toring and Analysis (La’o Hamutuk)stated that it is difficult to obtain consis-tent, complete or accurate data on howmuch international donors have spent onand in Timor-Leste. Over the past 10years, bilateral and multilateral agencieshave spent approximately $5,200 million,with only 10 percent entering the localeconomy. Many, including the currentprime minister, question aid effectivenessin a way that calls into question theintegrity and transparency of donors.

viii. Lessons learned in Timor-Leste

The following are lessons learned fromanti-corruption efforts over the pastseveral years in Timor-Leste:

n UNDP has an opportunity to take aleadership role in coordinating anti-corruption. The lack of consistent andcoherent engagement amongTimorese institutions is, in part,mirrored by similar lack of coordina-tion among donors in anti-corruption.Donors show considerable enthusiasmfor assisting in the fight againstcorruption. This has caused consider-able overlap of donor support for anti-corruption institutions and initiativesand risks even more overlap with theadvent of new institutions in the nearfuture (including the Anti-CorruptionCommission).

n UNDP might focus on adding valuein the area of anti-corruptionprogramme design and policy, ratherthan implementing large projects witha large number of advisers. UNDP hasstrength in developing and dissemi-nating concepts, tools, case studies,best practices and lessons learned.

n In Timor-Leste it could be useful forUNDP to bring stakeholders togetherand lead or carry out debate or a seriesof consensus-building exercises on

standards that apply to the rule of law.For example, what does it take to builda good justice system? At the strategiclevel, it is essential to really talk aboutthe linkages among corruption-relatedinstitutions, and what the root causesare of the human resources deficiency.

n One of the most pervasive andintractable obstacles to the develop-ment of anti-corruption capacity inTimor-Leste, with which donororganizations are grappling, is the lackof any widely used working language.Advisers with different languagesbring different legal, political andinstitutional cultures with them,causing some chaos in the develop-ment of any coherent institutionalframework, systems, procedures orculture. This has produced odd hybridssuch as the initial draft Anti-Corrup-tion Commission legislation, whichdid not fit smoothly into the Timoreselegal system.

n Timor-Leste is a young nation and isalso fundamentally engaged in nationbuilding. Reconciliation and unity,holding the nation together, areessential, and the past East-Westconflict cannot be ignored. While it is

not a donor’s role to engage in nationbuilding, state building will be moreeffective if it takes into account relatednation building processes. Forexample, a project that targets citizenspre-supposes that the notion of citizenexists, and if it does not, then theproject may need to be reconsidered.

n In strengthening accountability,UNDP could seek not only to buildcapacity of existing CSOs to delivercivic education, but also to nurture thedevelopment of new CSOs that areinterested in a range of issues, not justcivic education or governance.

n Government partners, includingparliamentarians, would like to bebetter informed about the impact orresults of development support.

n UNDP is reducing the number ofadvisers it places in Timor-Leste andthis is a positive move. Governmentcounterparts appreciate training,capacity-building and opportunities topursue graduate education. But it isthought that there are too manyadvisers, that many are not effective,that some step beyond the boundariesof their role, and that their input is notalways sustainable in the long run.

1. Karen Hussmann and Martin Tisné, ‘Integrity inState Building – Anti-Corruption with a State BuildingLens’, OECD, 2009. This onvertreport draws in part onfield research carried out by TIRI over a two-year pe-riod, and analysed in Fredrik Galtung and MartinTisné, ‘A New Approach to Postwar Reconstruction’,Journal of Democracy 20, 4 (October 2009).

2. The Global Rule of Law Programme priority coun-tries are: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Repub-lic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of theCongo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia,Nepal, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Sierra Leone,Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor-Leste and Uganda.

3. In a democratic setting, the political legitimacy ofa state derives in good part from the effectiveness ofthe institutions and practices that allow the public tohold state office holders accountable; the extent towhich state institutions and customs guarantee thatthe rule of law will apply consistently to all of society;the state’s ability to foster democratic participationin governance; and from its commitment and effortsto ensure that the inhabitants enjoy the fundamentalcivil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, in-cluding the rights to freedom of expression and as-sociation, within its borders.

4. State legitimacy is also related to the legitimacy ofthe incumbent government and the democraticregime. A regime is sustained by its legitimacy, legal-ity and effectiveness. It is possible for a regime to sur-vive without democratic legitimacy, as witnessed bymany cases of authoritarianism. See for example JuanJ. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, ‘Toward ConsolidatedDemocracies’, Journal of Democracy 7, 2 (1996), 14-33,and Andreas Schedler, ‘What is Democratic Consoli-dation?’, Journal of Democracy 9, 2 (1998), 91-107.

5. While this section examines how conflict and post-conflict contribute to corruption, we note that thecausality can go in both directions. As later sectionsshow, this report on the whole is broadly concernedwith the linkages among post-conflict corruption, theprior conflict, the peace agreement and potential re-turn to violent conflict.

6. The cases were pre-selected by UNDP to cover arange of regions and types of anti-corruption inter-ventions. The factors discussed here are suggested inpart by Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Corruption in theWake of Domestic Conflict’, in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.),

Corruption, Global Security, and World Order, BrookingsInstitution Press, 2009.

7. Wartime corruption refers to corruption and cor-ruption networks that operated during the conflict,for example those surrounding activities to smugglediamonds or guns to support war, or citizens’ need tobribe officials to gain access to services and goodsthat previously existed but were cut off or severelyconstrained by war. This factor may be related to butis distinct from pre-war corruption and corruptionnetworks that were widespread in countries likeAfghanistan, DRC and Sierra Leone.

8. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Corruption and Gov-ernment’, Journal of International Peacekeeping 15, 3(June 2008), 328-343.

9. Counting conflicts in which at least 1,000 peoplewere killed per year on average, there have been over90 civil wars since 1945. These are violent conflictswithin a country fought by organized groups that aimto take power of central government or a region, orchange government policies. See James Fearon,‘Iraq’s Civil War’, Foreign Affairs (March/April 2007).

10. Other examples of power-sharing agreements in-clude Angola in 1991, El Salvador in 1992, South Africain 1994 and Tajikistan in 1997. Sierra Leone also sawa power-sharing agreement in 1999; it failed. See alsoKarl Derouen Jr, Jenna Lea and Peter Wallensteen,‘The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements’, ConflictManagement and Peace Science 26, 4 (2009), 367-387.

11. Other factors that have contributed to corruptionin Afghanistan include the power and money of thedrug trafficking industry, and a massive foreign aid in-flux with pressure to deliver on it.

12. To the extent that government officials are notpart of the networks, this may be an incentive forthem to engage in anti-corruption, transparency andaccountability initiatives.

13. Gita Welch and Zahra Nuru (eds)., Governance forthe Future: Democracy and Development in the LeastDeveloped Countries, UNDP, 2006, p. 67.

14. Note that aside from the four scenarios given,there are a multitude of other scenarios that may playout and by themselves be unpredictable. It shouldalso note that the scenarios given are the most likelyscenarios that take place in a post-conflict situation.

Endnotes

15. In Afghanistan, and arguably DRC, the state didnot have much of a presence before the war, particu-larly in rural areas, which account for the vast majorityof the territory. But to whatever extent there wassome ‘state’ before the war, conflict destroyed it.

16. This is not to overlook the fact that before theforceful ousting of the respective authoritarianregimes, Afghanistan and Iraq differed greatly fromeach other, in terms of their state structure, reach ofstate institutions, and human capital, among others.However, in both cases the conflict created a periodof weak state control that enhanced opportunities forcorruption.

17. Kevin Savage, Lorenzo Delesgues, Ellen Martin andGul Pacha Ulfat, ‘Corruption Perceptions and Risks inHumanitarian Assistance: An Afghanistan Case Study’,Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, July 2007.

18. There is a distinction between resource-depen-dent and resource-rich countries. The latter are thosewith abundant resources that make up a relativelylow percent of gross domestic product, e.g., Bolivia,Botswana, Chile and Ecuador.

19. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘On EconomicCauses of Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers, OxfordUniversity Press, 50, 4 (1998), pp.563-73.

20. Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani, ‘Diamonds,Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework forExplaining Political Order’, Journal of Conflict Resolu-tion 49 (August 2005), pp. 563-597.

21. Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy, Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 2005, pp. 6, 52.

22. Among the five countries studied here, there wasno case of a foreign aid–wealthy country that was notalso natural resource–wealthy.

23. Kirin Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth, Cornell Univer-sity Press, 1997.

24. Deborah Brautigam, Odd-Helge Fieldstad, andMick Moore (eds.), Taxation and State-Building in De-veloping Countries: Capacity and Consent, CambridgeUniversity Press, 2008.

25. See Robert Rotberg’s work on this in Africa, as wellas DFID, ‘Building the State and Securing the Peace’,Emerging Policy Paper, UK Department for Interna-tional Development (DFID), London, 2009.

26. See for example Joel Migdal’s work, includingBoundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in theStruggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices (ed.),New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004; State-in-Society: Studying How States and Societies Transformand Constitute One Another, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001; and the foundational StrongSocieties and Weak States: State-Society Relations andState Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1988. See also FrancesFukuyama, State-Building: Governance and WorldOrder in the 21st Century, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 2004, and Theda Skocpol, Peter Evans and Diet-rich Rueschemeyer (eds.), Bringing the State Back In,New York and Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1985.

27. Brookings Institution and Center for Global Devel-opment, ‘Index of State Weakness in the DevelopingWorld’, 2008, available at www.brookings.edu/re-ports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx.

28. A number of scholars have analysed public poli-cymaking and reform in developing countries; how-ever, these analyses do not consider the post-conflictcontext. See, for example, Merilee Grindle and JohnThomas,Public Choices and Policy Change, Johns Hop-kins University Press, 1991; Gerald Meier, (ed.) Politicsand Policy Making in Developing Countries, San Fran-cisco: ICS Press, 1991; Anne Krueger and Robert Bates,(eds.), Political and Economic Interactions in EconomicPolicy Reform, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993; AndreasSchedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, (eds.),The Self Restraining State, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,1999; Merilee Grindle, Audacious Reforms, Baltimore,MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000; SteveKayizzi-Mugerwa, (ed.), Reforming Africa’s Institutions,Helsinki: United Nations University Press, 2003; AtulKohli, State-Directed Development, Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 2004; and Elias Ayuk and Mohamed AliMarouani (eds),The Policy Paradox in Africa, AfricaWorld Press, 2007.

29. This is also seen in countries that undergo coupsand experience regime changes.

30. See also Fredrik Galtung and Martin Tisné, ‘A NewApproach to Postwar Reconstruction’, Journal ofDemocracy 20, 4 (October 2009), pp. 95–100, whichproposes two phases of reconstruction after the land-mark agreement or cessation of hostilities.

31. ‘Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconcilia-tion Commission’, Vol. 2, 2004, p.7.

32. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, ‘Afghan Perceptionsof Corruption - A Survey Across Thirteen Provinces’,January 2007, p. 25.

33. Karen Hussmann and Martin Tisné, ‘Integrity inState Building – Anti-Corruption with a State BuildingLens’, OECD 2009. This report draws in part on fieldresearch carried out by TIRI over a two-year period,and analysed in Fredrik Galtung and Martin Tisné, ‘ANew Approach to Postwar Reconstruction’, Journal ofDemocracy 20, 4 (October 2009).

34. Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States,Princeton University Press, 1988.

35. Herbert F. Weiss and Tatiana Carayannis, ‘Recon-structing the Congo’, Journal of International Affairs58, 1 (2004), pp. 115–142.

36. On the post-conflict rule of law approach and anti-corruption, see Richard Sannerholm, ‘Legal, Judicialand Administrative Reforms in Post-Conflict Situa-tions: Beyond the Rule of Law Template’, Journal ofConflict & Security Law 12 (2007), pp. 65–94.

37. UNDP, ‘Mainstreaming Corruption in Develop-ment’, Anti-Corruption Practice Note, 2008.

38. The concept of DDR vis-à-vis DRC is discussed ingreater detail in section 6.3.

39. Karen Hussmann and Martin Tisné, ‘Integrity inState Building – Anti-Corruption with a State BuildingLens’, OECD, 2009.

40. See for example, Aslak Jangård Orre and Harald W.Mathisen, ‘Corruption in Fragile States’, DIIS PolicyBrief - Fragile Situations, Copenhagen: Danish Insti-tute for International Affairs (2008), pp. 1–4.

41. Lorenzo Delesgues and Yama Torabi, IntegrityWatch Afghanistan, ‘Reconstruction National IntegritySystem. Survey Afghanistan’, 2007.

42. Exceptions to this are, for example, the Institutefor Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) andthe American Bar Association, both of which devoteconsiderable effort to research and learning and thusbring institutional memory.

43. On government ownership, see Nipa Banerjee,‘Role of NGOs in Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Missed Op-portunities But Way Forward, Asia Policy Briefs, March2009, available at http://exed.maxwell.syr.edu/exed/sites/policy/.

44. Philippe Le Billon, ‘Buying Peace or Fueling War:The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts’, Journal ofInternational Development 15 (2003), p. 413.

45. UNDP started working on corruption in 2005, car-rying out a study to define its approach and contract-ing a full time anti-corruption specialist to develop aprogramme and coordinate donor-government dia-logue. The programme did not start until 2007 due todifficulty in finding appropriate staff and lack of aclear government counterpart.

46. Ben Heineman, ‘Corruption – The Afghan WildCard’, The Atlantic Monthly, 2 October 2009.

47. Civil society ‘thickening’ refers to increasing thesector’s size, breadth and depth (i.e., new CSOsemerging at different levels), as well as strength (i.e.,the capacity of existing CSOs).

48. DFID practice paper, ‘Political Analysis How ToNote’, July 2009, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/howto-pol-econ-analysis.pdf.

49. The UN is not necessarily part of this, but couldcontribute by developing checklists of options. Dif-ferent options may be applicable to different consti-tutional and legal systems (i.e., federal/unitary andcivil/common law), as the case of Timor-Leste shows.

50. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, ‘Afghan Perceptionsof Corruption - A Survey Across Thirteen Provinces’,January 2007, p. 24.

51. ‘Anti-Corruption Roadmap for the Islamic Repub-lic of Afghanistan’, Draft, April 2007, Islamic Republicof Afghanistan, available at www.ands.gov.af underdocuments for JCMB 5th meeting.

52. Ibid. See also, ‘Tackling Judicial Corruption inAfghanistan’, Expert Answer, U4 Anti-Corruption Re-source Centre, 12 September 2007.

53. See Accountability and Transparency Project, Sub-stantive Revision Number 1, March 2009.

54. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, ‘Afghan Perceptionsof Corruption – A Survey Across Thirteen Provinces’,January 2007.

55. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, ‘Afghan Perceptionsof Corruption - A Survey Across Thirteen Provinces’,January 2007.

56. UNCAC was ratified by Afghanistan on 25 August 2008.

57. The Afghanistan Compact was the outcome of theLondon Conference on Afghanistan in 2006. It wasthe result of consultations of the government ofAfghanistan with the United Nations and the interna-tional community and established the framework forinternational cooperation with Afghanistan.

58.The World Bank, ‘Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan,Summaries of Vulnerabilities to Corruption Assess-ments’, 2009, p.4.

59. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, ‘Integrity in Recon-struction’, January 2007.

60. ‘Mission to Afghanistan’, report of the UN SpecialRapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 6 May 2009, A/HRC/11/2/Add.4, para-graph 58.

61. Laura Barnett, ‘Afghanistan: The Rule of Law’, Parliament of Canada, Law and Government Division,24 October 2007.

62. Michael Brown, ‘Combating Low-level Corruptionon Waterways in the Democratic Republic of Congo:Approaches from Bandundu and Equateur Provinces’,GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 116,October 2004.

63. DFID Anti-Corruption Strategy for DRC, Kinshasa,October 2007.

64. Civil society was mostly non-existent under theprevious regime, except for those who agitated forgender equality. A new civil society network, theCoalition for Integrity, was established in August2009. It includes 26 NGOs.

65. ‘Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-sion’ (2004). This commission was established by theTruth and Reconciliation Act 2000 enacted in pur-suance of the Lomé Peace Agreement, Article XXVI.

66. ‘Together in Fighting Corruption For The FutureOf The People And The Nation’, the National Anti-

Corruption Strategy 2008-2013. This document con-tains 44 pages of narrative and 67 pages of a detailedstrategic action plan matrix.

67. For example, an investigation into the activities of the electoral commission and the InternationalFund for Electoral Systems following the local elections in May 2004 found evidence of widespreadmanipulation of results by electoral staff. This led tothe withholding of funds allocated for 2004–2005and was intended as a clear signal to the governmentthat such practices would not be tolerated.

68. Mary Kaldor with James Vincent, ‘Case Study:Sierra Leone’, UNDP Evaluation Office, 2006, p.5.

69. ‘Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-sion, Vol.2, 2004, p.7.

70. See Mary Kaldor with James Vincent, ‘Case Study:Sierra Leone’, UNDP Evaluation Office, 2006, p.11.

71. Interviewees were not aware of any comprehen-sive diagnosis or assessment of corruption. Relevantreports include one by Shane Cave in 2005 for theWorld Bank, and one by Patrick Megher in 2003. Alsoof relevance are a International Republican Institute(IRI) perception survey, the Transparency Interna-tional (TI) index and work by TIRI.

72. The Constitution refers to the establishment of aHigh Administrative, Tax and Audit Court.

73. 2009 Millennium Development Goals, Timor-Leste report.

74. ‘Review of Development Co-operation’, Embassyof Norway (Scanteam), August 2007, p. 62.

75. Provedoria for Human Rights and Justice.

76. Article 3.1.f. of Law no. 14/2005 ‘The Statue of thePublic Prosecution Service’, September 2005.

77. The Constitution refers to the establishment of aHigh Administrative, Tax and Audit Court.

United Nations Development ProgrammeDemocratic Governance GroupBureau for Development Policy304 East 45th Street, 10th FloorNew York, NY 10017, USAwww.undp.org