LAWS 3046 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY I

MID-SESSION TAKE-HOME EXAMINATION 2

SESSION 1, 2012

BY: PANDELIS (PETER) TILIAKOS z3253182

TO: PROFESSOR CATHERINE BOND

WORD COUNT: 3272 (3000 LIMIT+10 %)

DUE: FRIDAY 15th JUNE 2012, 4pm

TP = Time Piece

MCA = Museum of Current Art

CA = Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)

1.1 Bauer v Museum of Current Art (2012)

1.1.1 Licence or Assignment of Rights

Bauer loaned TP to MCA in exchange for financial remuneration which represents an intention to licence the film. This act is not classified as an exclusive licence due to the fact that there was no written contractual arrangement. Due to lack of evidence for assignment or exclusive licence, MCA were required to showcase the work for the specific purpose of displaying the film and communicating it to the public. Bauer can therefore not claim infringement of copyright only breach of authors moral rights. 1.1.2 Authors Moral Rights Derogatory Treatment Under s195AL, MCAs failure to screen his work in accordance with his manual amounts to derogatory treatment of his work. This is attributed to the fact that MCA mutilated, materially altered or distorted the film to the extent where it is prejudicial to the owners honour or reputation. A reasonable perspective on the facts would reveal that MCA did not distort the film to such an extent intended by legislation and whilst his manual instructions formed an aspect of the initial licence, the museums decision not to present it in such a way does not constitute an action in a cinematographic film. 1.2 Clients Rights Against Direct Infringement: Bauer v Raines (2012)

1.2.1 Nature of Copyright and SubsistenceBauers article represents an aggregate of visual images capable of being shown as a moving picture and thus a cinematographic film under s10(1) CA. Bauer having published the article under s29(1)(b) CA as maker of the film, upholds complete ownership of copyright as director and producer. Under s90 CA, copyright would subsist in the film TP and would thus prevent unauthorised parties from copying or communicated the film to the public. 1.2.2 Direct Infringement

Raines production titled TP directly infringes the copyright of Bauers work satisfying: (i) Causal Connection In Larrikin Music Publishing v EMI Songs Australia, causal connection is identified from an objective perspective. It is clear to notice numerous directly analogous elements between the two texts including (i) identical choice of medium (film) and title, (ii) choice of genre/motif/plot: playing a series of seemingly randomly ordered clips and images of clocks and (iii) incorporation of parallel appropriations: The Hour & Why Does. (ii) Substantial Part In Network Ten v TCN Channel Nineit is clear that copying a substantial part relates not to quantity but quality. In this scenario it is clear that Raines has adopted a substantial portion of Bauers individualistic expression of the concept of time. This is further compounded by the exact appropriation of excerpts from video clips. As per Larrikin, these similarities qualitatively adopt the core features of Bauers article. 1.2.3 Infringement of Exclusive RightsUnder these circumstances, it is evident that infringement has occurred by doing acts comprised in copyright and namely those summarised under 86(1) CA including the copying/reproducing the film and its performance/ communication in public. Authors moral rights of attribution and integrity also breached. 1.3 Clients Rights Against Direct Infringement: Bauer v CTU (2012) 1.3.1 Indirect Infringement by causing a substantially similar film to be seen in public

Direct infringement had occurred because of the substantial similarities between the two cinematographic films. These qualitatively substantial comparisons may be utilised to initiate proceedings against CTU who have indirectly infringed copyright by causing the film to be seen and/or communicated to the public notwithstanding their apparent lack of knowledge of the infringing work. In accordance with TCN Channel Nine Pty v Network Tenit is clear that the material communicated to the public by CTU went to the heart of the copyrighted work and under s101(1) CA and 27(4) is an infringement by doing acts comprised in copyright where the occupier of the premises is deemed to have given the performance in public. Section 103(1)(b) also makes it an offence to exhibit a protected article by way of trade, and under the current circumstances, it may be assumed that CTU was engaging in trade activities by allowing paid entrants a licence to view their artwork.

1.3.2 Defences by CTU with rebuttal

(i) Unconscious Copying Using Francis Day & Hunter Ltd v Bron, a defendant may rebut copying with evidence of independent creation or lack of familiarity. In this scenario, CTU has been authorised by Raines with a licence to play her article TP. CTU was not aware that Raines film was an infringed work and can argue for Raines representation that the work was an independent creation and the organisations lack of familiarity with Bauers work. CTU however must have had reasonable knowledge of Bauers work or at least would have had reasonable suspicion that an infringement had occurred. The fact that the work had appeared at the Sydney Arts Festival, was screening in a museum reasonably close to CTU and that Bauer had appeared in a conference and was quoted in a press report justifies this reasonable presumption. CTU was required to inspect the works before communicating them to the public.

(ii) Criticism or Review Under s103A, the film TP by Raines, although representing an infringed article may be presented at a museum for criticism or review. Using De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler despite sufficient acknowledgement to Raines work, the definitions of criticism and review are not adequately fulfilled as per s10(1) CA. The notion of fairnessis also debatable.

2.1 Infringement of Cinematographic and Sculptural works: Palmer v Bauer (2012)

2.1.1 Infringement of Cinematographic Article

(i) Nature of Copyright and Subsistence The minute long static shot of a grandfather clock taken from The Hour is categorised as cinematographic film. Under s29(4)(a)(b) CA, Palmer is assumed to be the maker/owner of copyright having published and exposed the article to the public. Under s86 CA the nature of copyright for cinematographic films allows for the protection of articles from copying and causing the film to be seen/ communicated in public. Copyright would therefore subsist in the film The Hour in accordance with s90(1)(2) through Palmers assumed qualified status as maker of a film produced in Australia.

(ii) Nature of Infringement From an objective perspective, causal connection exists between Bauer and Palmers articles through the clear adoption of 60 seconds worth of material. The test set out for substantial part must be answered in accordance with the clients representation as to how substantial the 60 excerpt was to the greater scheme of the film. From an objective perspective it would appear that the presentation of the single static shot of that grandfather clock for a predominant portion of the film would make it qualitatively substantial for presence and depiction as a motif. This would invoke infringement by doing acts comprised under copyright as well exhibiting a representation of the article by way of trade. This would have infringed Palmers rights by reproducing the work in material form and communicating the work to the publiicwithout authorisation or attribution.(iii) Defences Section 41 allows using subject matter other than works for fair dealings and specifically those relating to critique/review. In accordance with De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler Bauer could argue using Palmers excerpt as a social critique. 2.1.2 Infringement of Artistic work: sculpture

(i) Nature of Copyright Under s10(1) a sculpture is a cast or model. In Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth and Wham-O v Lincoln Industries a sculpture is anything requires process of carving a hard material to produce designs or figures in relief. The article must have some sort of intrinsic artistic/aesthetic value regardless of whether they are also functional for other purposes. Palmers clock is a three dimensional original model created by an artist for a reasonable artistic purpose despite its obvious function of being a clock. As an artistic work copyright would subsist in Palmer as a qualified person/owner and would prevent third parties to reproduce/public/communicate the work in public.

(ii) Nature of Infringement Causal connection and substantial similarity are manifested through the obvious reproduction/communication of the grandfather clock. This act of reproduction would act as an infringement by doing acts comprised under copyright. Further claim may be made under s38(1) by exhibiting a representation of the article by way of trade. This would have infringed Palmers rights by reproducing the work in material form and communicating the work to the public with no authorisation/attribution.

(iii) Defences to infringement:

Indirect Infringement Using Francis Day & Hunter Ltd v Bronto argue lack of familiarity. Lack of originality of Palmers clock would also make it difficult to differentiate. Sections 65 & 67 Could be incorporated if the sculpture was filmed in a public place or was not so intrinsically linked to the principal matters in the film.

Fair Dealing Criticism/Review or parody (s41&(A) CA): The sculptures incorporation would thus seem a reasonable appropriation in the context of the scenario. The critique could come in the form of satirical representation of the concept of time which was Bauers initial intention.2.2 Infringement of Cinematographic Film: Drazen v Bauer (2012)

2.2.1 Nature of Copyright and Subsistence

Drazens visual article is a cinematographic film. Under s90(1)(2) the maker of the film must be a qualified person. There no evidence to suggest Drazen is an Australian citizen or whether the film was made in Australia. His classification as a Serbian film pioneer would suggest he does not meet the requirements under s84(a). Despite this, Serbia is a participant of the BERNE Convention which will make him a qualified person under s84(a). Under these circumstances, copyright would subsist in the film and would allow the owner (Drazen) to exercise his rights under s86. 2.2.2 Nature of InfringementTP has directly copied a 43 second clip from Dresdens original work which is an offence under s101(1) and specifically s86(a). Bauer could be found liable for causing the film to be seen or communicated in public. In order to validate these claims there must be a causal connection and substantial part of the original film being copied. Causal connection is made out because of the clear objective similarities between the original and infringing texts which reveal exact duplication. The substantial criterion rests upon a qualitative approach and whether the 43 second clip represents the most valuable and pertinent part, an important ingredient of the film

and/or was central to the rest of the film. Facts are silent as to whether the scenario represents a central plot of the film it would be illogical to assume that two characters meeting up to debate an issue would be substantial enough to infringe copyright.

2.3 Infringement of Work of Artistic Craftsmanship: Estate of Cheng Zhi (CZ)v Bauer (2012)

2.3.1 Nature of Copyright

Under s10(1), CZs poster is an artistic work defined as a painting/drawing or work of artistic craftsmanship. The 2D nature of the poster can be said to have a visual rather than semiotic function and is in the form of a pattern, using shapes, colours and other elements to give aesthetic pleasure, attract attention or convey a visual impression. A work of artistic craftsmanship is classified through the creators use of skill, knowledge and/or workmanship and the articles objectively assumed aesthetic qualities of artistry. The posters inclusion in Drazens work implies it was reproduced, published and made available to the public. 2.3.2 Nature of Infringement & SubsistenceUnder s31(1)(b), CZ estate would be claiming the absolute right to reproduce the work and/or communicate it to the public as well as the authors moral right of attribution. These entitlements are alleged to have been breached by Bauers decision to include the poster in the film and subsequently communicate it to the public. Under the US Free Trade Act, artistic works created prior to the acts commencement do not receive protection apart from the natural 50 year right. CZ died in 1952 and his claim to copyright would last until 31st December 2002. This was a decade before Drazen included his work. Section 67 would permit the inclusion of an artistic work (poster) included incidentally within a film without breaching copyright. 2.4 Infringement of Broadcast: Channel 24 v Bauer (2012)

2.4.1 Nature of Copyright and SubsistenceUnder s10(1) a television broadcast is a communication to the public delivered by a broadcasting service within the meaning of the BSA which embodies a host of visual images/sounds broadcast by way of television. Channel 24s exhibiting of Drazens film falls under this definition. Channel 24s status as a free-to-air Australian network, assumedly operating under a broadcasting licence, allows for copyright to vest in television broadcasts within Australia. Section 87(a)(b) bestows the broadcaster with rights to make a cinematographic film, copy of the broadcast and to communicate the work to the public in any medium. 2.4.2 Nature of Infringement

Bauer is alleged to have infringed copyright by reproducing a part of the film and communicating it to the public via sales and loans to museums.TCN Channel Nine v Network Ten rejected that any period of broadcasting, no matter how brief, is a broadcast in which copyright subsists under s91 instead turning to the issue of substantiveness under s14(1) as a means of identifying infringement. In this sense, it is clear that the 43 second excerpt taken from Drazens clip objectively can not be found to form a substantive part of the original work due to the fact that no evidence is provided to suggest its role in the cinematographic portrayal. Channel 24 can not hold Bauer liable for infringement

2.5 Infringement of Musical Works: RCA Records/the Strokes v Bauer (2012)

2.5.1 Infringement of Musical Works

(i) Nature of Copyright and Subsistence Under s31(1)(a), copyright in relation to a musical work prevents third parties from publishing/adapting, communicating and performing the work in public. Assuming that the work was published/communicated to the public in 2003, the presumed joint-ownership of copyright of the song would subsist in both parties as tenants in common. (ii) Nature of Infringement/ Rights Infringed Bauer directly copied a 10 second clip from the Strokes musical work 12:51 with no authorisation/attribution which represents causal connection criterion. Coffey v Warner/Chappell Music explores the requisite substantial part (s14(1) CA) aspect by stating that substantial part is quality of the work as a whole. The notion of cherry picking will not suffice substantial part. Before substantial part can be determined questions must be asked to the client as to what excerpt from the song was chosen to include in his film TP. Looking at the facts, the Strokes song was played at precisely 12:51:01 and, with no distinct chorus in the song, it would be assumed that Bauer would include the stanza 12:51 is the time my voice found the words I sought which would correspond with his work. In accordance with CBS Record Australia v Grossand Larrikin this would be deemed a reproduction of the original works general hook not to mention its melodic and vocal value. These acts infringement by doing acts comprised in copyright and specifically those relating to infringing the authors rights to reproduce the work, publish the work and perform/communicate the work in public.

(iii) Defences to Infringement Fair dealing for purpose of parody or satire could provide Bauer with an opportunity to escape liability. Bauer appropriated the Strokes musical work from Masons youtube clip which may be argued to be a parody. Furthermore, his own appropriation of the clip may be seen as complimenting his overriding purpose for making TP, that being to provide a social critique on our obsession with time.

2.5.2 Infringement of Literary Works or Sound RecordingIt is clear that Bauer would in turn be found liable for infringing the literary value of the Strokes song 12:51 by incorporating their lyrics into his film which would similarly be found to hold causal connection and substantial similarity. Infringement would be analysed in accordance with s31,32 & 36 CA. In addition to this, the work may also be considered a sound recording as per the definition in s10(1). For this reason copyright would subsist in the work and prevent others, apart from the owner, from infringing copyright by doing acts comprised in copyright. RCA would more specifically be looking to categorise Bauers infringement as a sound recording of which they have greater rights to as opposed to the musical value of the work. 2.6 Mason v Bauer (2012)

2.6.1 Nature of Copyright and Subsistence

Masons user generated video is an aggregate of visual images forming a moving picture. Ownership of the film is said to vest in the maker who is Mason as sole producer/director. Copyright would subsist in the film due to Mason being considered a qualified person and his decision to produce the article in Australia. Mason would be entitled to protect his rights under s86 and prevent third parties from copying his work and communicating it in public. 2.6.2 Nature of Infringement

Bauer is alleged to have infringed Masons exclusive rights by doing acts otherwise not permitted under copyright including breaches under s86(a)(b)(c). Bauer also infringed by allowing the film to be traded commercially and exhibiting the article in public. In addition to this, the authors natural right of attribution of authorship and to not have authorship falsely attributed have also been breached. Bauers film TP contained a 10 second excerpt from Masons article which constituted a direct reproduction of images and sounds and constitutes causal connection. Bauers intentional copying of Masons work must represent a substantial part of the film and go to the heart of the makers work. Masons user-generated video depicts a woman striding purposefully down a streetlip synching to 12:51. It can be reasonably assumed from an objective perspective that Bauers has copied a central foundation of the makers original expression. 2.6.3 Defences to Infringement

Bauer could attempt to negate liability by invoking s103A or s103AA and classifying his taking of the film as a fair act to criticise or parody Masons work. Bauer could argue his work as a social critique on the notion of time.2.7 Schaeffar v Bauer (2012)2.7.1 Nature of Cause of ActionUnder s10(1), the maker of a film upholds ownership of copyright and for this reason Schaeffar cannot maintain an action for infringement because she is neither the writer, producer and/or director. Schaeffers claims are further diminished due to the fact that her work cannot be considered original. Differences resulting from mere representations, particularly if those differences are done to suit the singers voice do not constitute an original work. This is particularly crucial as Schaeffar lip-synched an existing song. Can only claim performers moral rights. 2.7.2 Nature of Infringement

Under s189(1), a performer of a performance will be entitled to moral rights for the period of the works copyright. Bauer incorporated Schaeffers performance into his cinematographic work and would have a right of attribution as he then communicated her performance to the public. The identification of the performer must be clear and reasonably prominentand the fact that Bauer was considered sole owner she may yet have a claim under s195AHA for false attribution. Furthermore, considering Bauer created the article as a social critique this could have diminished the integrity of her performance if criticism or review was not Schaeffars intention for performing the work. Schaeffars rights were also infringed by sale and other dealings where Bauer sold copies of his work to museums for financial remuneration. 2.7.3 Defences to Infringement Under s189(1), Schaeffar participated in a performance in the youtube clip which was represented as a performance consisting of sound. Nonetheless, she can not be considered a performer as per the definition due to the fact that she did not contribute to the sound as she was lip-synching. Under s195AXD, no infringement of right of attribution of performership will occur if it was reasonable not to identify the performer. The fact that Mason merely mentioned his cousin in the comment as opposed to making a clear and reasonably prominent attribution in the credits would mean Bauer would not have to either. Questions could also be asked as whether Schaeffar was a qualified person as she was Canadian, not a resident but visiting /residing in Australia. Under BERNE she is qualified. 2.8 Potential Breach of Rights: Almeida & Others v Bauer (2012)

2.8.1 Introduction

Almeida will attempt to highlight Bauers detrimental conduct in an attempt to solidify their rights under s98 and Part IX CA. In order to uphold their entitlements, Almeida must provide evidence that they are joint owners or acting under a contract of service. Almeida & Co are not author or maker and thus have no entitlement to ownership/copyright for the film.

2.8.2 Joint Ownership

Under s22(4)(a)(b) the maker of a cinematographic film is the individual makes arrangements necessary for the making of the film. This is reemphasised in s98(2)(3) which protect the individual that made initial arrangements for the production of the film. Whilst in certain circumstances substantial contributions to a work may accompany claims to joint-authorship, it is clear that original contributors who provided the significant creative output from the onset should uphold complete ownership. Almeida were hired to source clips for Bauer so that he could combine to form the article which represented his own individualistic expression of the concept of time. Claimants provided minimal creative input and objectively can not be identified as arranging any aspect of the cinematographic film. No contract was created to establish joint authorship. 2.8.3 Contract of Service

Using Beloff v Pressdram,it is clear that Almeidas work of sourcing clipsetc was controlled by a higher authority, namely Bauer, and may be considered as work produced in the course of that employment and therefore under a contract of service. Whilst the control element was disputed in Redrock Holdings v Hinkley, particularly in cases such as this were greater skill is required to perform such computer based editing functions, it is clear that these employees had been integrated into the business. Evidence in the current scenario would suggest Almeida & Co were employed under a contract of service: fixed salary, provided with equipment and programs to assist them in sourcing the clips and would attend Bauers studio to fulfil their tasks. Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 144 at [36], Messager v British Broadcating Co [1927] 2 KB 543 at 550

s10(1) CA.

s10(1) CA.

s86(b),(c) CA.

s195AL(a) CA.

Breach of contract.

s 24 CA.

s 10(1) CA cinematographic film: means the aggregate of the visual images embodied in an HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s115.html" \l "article" articleor thing so as to be capable by the use of that HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s115.html" \l "article" articleor thing: (a) of being shown as a moving picture; or (b) of being embodied in another HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s115.html" \l "article" articleor thing by the use of which it can be so shown; and includes the aggregate of the sounds embodied in a sound-track associated with such visual images.

s 29 (1)(b) CA.

s 22(4) For the purposes of this Act:(a) a reference to the making of a HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s189.html" \l "cinematograph_film" cinematograph filmshall be read as a reference to the doing of the things necessary for the production of the first HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s10.html" \l "copy" copyof the film; and (b) the HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s189.html" \l "maker" makerof the HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s189.html" \l "cinematograph_film" cinematograph HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s189.html" \l "cinematograph_film" filmis the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the making of the film were undertaken.

& s 189(1) CA maker: , in relation to a HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s189.html" \l "cinematograph_film" cinematograph film, means the HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s189.html" \l "director" directorof the film, the HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s189.html" \l "producer" producerof the film and the HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s189.html" \l "screenwriter" screenwriterof the film.

s 98 CA (1)-(3).

s 86 CA.

s 101(1) CA.

[2010] FCA 29.

by comparing the original work to the potentially infringing work and identifying the similarities from an ordinary persons perspective: Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty lTd [2010] FCA 29; EMI Songs Australia Pty ltd v Larrikin Music Publishing [2011] FCAFC 47; Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 49.

s 14(1) CA.

[2004] HCA 13; (2004) 218 CLR 273.

Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty lTd [2010] FCA 29;

s 21.

s 27-8 CA & Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Tolbush Pty Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 521.

s 22(6)(6A) & Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australasian Performing Right Association (1997) 191 CLR 140.

s 193-195AB CA.

s 195 AI-AL

s 14(1) CA.

s 86 & 90 CA.

Bauer v Raines (2012) see above explanation of substantial part and causal connection

s 86(b)(c) CA

s 22(6)(6A) CA; Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 140.

[2005] FCAFC 53.

University of New South Wales v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1.

APRA Jain (1990) 26 FCR 53; APRA v Metro on George Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1123.

[1963]

s 101(1)-(A)

Larrikin Music Publishing v EMI Songs Australia [2010] FCA 29.

(1990) 18 IPR 292.

s 103A, 103B(1)(a).

S103C(2)-(7)

Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84; Pro Siben Media AG v Carlton UK Television Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 605; Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] HCA 44 & TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 417.

s 24 CA References to sounds and visual images embodied in an article: For the purposes of this Act, sounds or visual images shall be taken to have been embodied in an HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s115.html" \l "article" articleor thing if the HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s115.html" \l "article" articleor thing has been so treated in relation to those sounds or visual images that those sounds or visual images are capable, with or without the aid of some other HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s10.html" \l "device" device, of being reproduced from the HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s115.html" \l "article" articleor thing.

s 10(1) CA Cinematographic film.

s 98(2) CA.

s 29(1)(b) CA.

by comparing the original work to the potentially infringing work and identifying the similarities from an ordinary persons perspective: Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty lTd [2010] FCA 29; EMI Songs Australia Pty ltd v Larrikin Music Publishing [2011] FCAFC 47; Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 49.

[2004] HCA 13; (2004) 218 CLR 273.

Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Reed International Books Australia Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 984; Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECR 1-6569.

s 36 CA.

S38(1)

s31(b)(i)CA s 21 CA; Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964 1 WLR 273

s31(b)(iii)CA s 22(6)&(6)(A); Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 140.

s 13(2) CA (Generally) & s36(1)(1A).

s 193-195AB CA.

(199) 18 IPR 292.

[2009] EWCA Civ 1328.

[1985] RPC 127.

Greenfield Products Pty Ltd v Rover-Scott Bonnar Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 275 at 284.

S32(1)-(3); Sands & McDouggal Pty Ltd v Robinson (1917) 23 CLR 49.

S29 & s 35(2) CA: Publication/creation and Ownership of artistic work vesting with Palmer.

s 10(1)(a) CA: sculpture

s 32 CA.

s 32(2) CA.

s31(1)(b) s 21 CA.

s 36(a) CA.

s31(b)(i)CA s 21 CA; Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964 1 WLR 273

s31(b)(iii)CA s 22(6)&(6)(A); Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 140.

s 13(2) CA (Generally) & s36(1)(1A).

s 193-195AB CA.

[1963]

s 32(1)-(3) CA.

Pro Sieban Media AG v Carlton UK Television [1999] FSR 610.

Dr Seuss Enterprises v Penguin Books (1997) 109 F 3d 1394.

s 10(1) CA.

s 189: director, producer and/or screenwriter of the film

s 90 CA.

s 98 CA.

CBS Records v Telmark Teleproducts [1987] FCA

s 86(b)(c)

s14(1) CA: TCN Channel Nine v Network Ten [2001] FCA 108 (Panel 1); Network Ten v TCN Channel Nine[2004] HCA 13; (2004) 218 CLR 273.; Larrikin Music Publishing v EMI Songs Australia[2010] FCA 29.

The Panel Case [No 2] 2005 FCA

The Panel Case [No 2] 2005 FCA, Salinger v Random House

The Panel Case [No 2] 2005 FCA, Los Angeles News Service v CBS Broadcasting Inc.

The Panel Case [No 2] 2005 FCA, Roy Expert Co Establishment of Vaduz Liechtenstein

Miller & Lang, Limited v Polak [1908] 1 CH433 (Christmas cards considered a drawing).

Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 197.

s 35(1)(2) CA.

Coogi Australia Pty ltd v Hysport International Pty Ltd FCA [1998]

Ibid.

s29(1)(a) CA.

s 194(2)(a)(d); communicating a work without attribution.

Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act2004 (Cth)

Copyright Council Information Sheet G023v14 Table 1, Duration of Copyright, TB pg 188.

Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth)

s 91 CA.

S101(1); s31(1)(b)(i)(ii)(iii)

[2001] FCA 108 (Panel 1).

s 29 CA.

s 22(2) CA.

s 35(2)&(4)(a) CA: If the author is the song writer, namely The Strokes or presuming the band was under a contract for services and engaged in contractual negotiations to make their recording company (RCA Records) join-owners of the copyright then s35(3).

s 32(1)(a)(b) CA.

s 35(3) CA.

s 13(2) CA (Generally) & s36(1)(1A).

s 193-195AB CA.

Larrikin Music Publishing v EMI Songs Australia[2010] FCA 29.

[2005] EWHC 449 (Ch).

Ibid

(1989) 15 IPR 385.

Larrikin Music Publishing v EMI Songs Australia[2010] FCA 29.

s 36(1) CA.

s31(1)(a)(i) CA.

s 31(1)(a)(ii)

s31(1)(a)(iii)(iv) CA.

S41A CA.

Dr Seuss Enterprises, LP v Penguin Books USA, Inc (1997) 109 F 3d 1394.

Pro Sieban Media AG v Carlton UK Television [1999] FSR 610.

s 85(1) CA.

s 89(1) CA.

s 97(1) CA.

S101(1) CA.

s 98(2) CA.

s 10(1) CA.

s 90(1)-(3) CA.

s 101(1) CA.

s 103 CA.

s 193 CA.

s 195AC CA.

CBS Records Australia Ltd v Telmark Teleproducts (Aust) Pty Ltd [1987] FCA

Larrikin Music Publishing v EMI Songs Australia[2010] FCA 29.

Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s14(1), The panel decisions number one.

The Panel Case [No 2] 2005 FCA, Los Angeles News Service v CBS Broadcasting Inc.

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