lary larson amicus brief
TRANSCRIPT
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Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574================================================================
In The
Supreme ourt of the United States
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
JAMES OBERGEFELL, et al., Petitioners,v.
RICHARD HODGES, Director,Ohio Department of Health, et al.,
Respondents.--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
VALERIA TANCO, et al., Petitioners,
v.
BILL HASLAM, Governor of Tennessee, et al.,
Respondents.--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
APRIL DEBOER, et al., Petitioners,
v.
RICK SNYDER, Governor of Michigan, et al., Respondents.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
GREGORY BOURKE, et al., Petitioners,
v.
STEVE BESHEAR, Governor of Kentucky, et al., Respondents.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
On Writs Of Certiorari To The United StatesCourt Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE LARY S. LARSONIN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
SEAN J. COLETTI, Counsel of RecordHOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT
H ANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC
428 Park AvenueIdaho Falls, Idaho 83402(208) [email protected]
================================================================COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
mailto:[email protected]:///reader/full/WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COMmailto:[email protected]:///reader/full/WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
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TABLEOFCONTENTS–Continued
Page
B. ThereisnoFundamentalRighttoEn- joytheReputationalValueofMarriageSeparate from all its Legal and Eco-
nomicAdvantages.................................. 20
C. PromotingthePublicWelfarebyDefend-ingtheValuesofTraditionalMarriageand Sexual Morality is a LegitimateStateInterest......................................... 24
D. LimitingMarriagetoOppositeSexCou-plesPromotestheValuesofTraditionalMarriageandSexualMorality.............. 33
IV. States with “Everything but Marriage”
Laws Do Not Violate the Fourteenth Amendment by Refusing to Recognize theMaritalStatusofSameSexCouplesMar-riedinOtherStates..................................... 38
Conclusion............................................................... 39
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TABLEOFAUTHORITIES
Page
FEDERALC ASES
Baker v. Nelson,409U.S.810,93S.Ct.37,34
L.Ed.2d65(1972)..............................................10,13 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct.
2841,92L.Ed.2d140(1986)...................................29
Brown v. Board of Education,347U.S.483,74S.Ct.686,98L.Ed.2d873(1954)......................36,37
Carey v. Population Services Int’l,431U.S.678,97S.Ct.2010,52L.Ed.2d675(1977).....................28
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,62S.Ct.766,86L.Ed.1031(1942)...................26,27
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct.1029,31L.Ed.2d349(1972)...................................28
Griswald v. Connecticut,381U.S.479,85S.Ct.1678,14L.Ed.2d510(1965).......................22,25,28
Hollingsworth v. Perry,570U.S.___,133S.Ct.2652,186L.Ed.2d768(2013).................................13
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 265, 190L.Ed.2d138(2014)..................................................20
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct.2472,156L.Ed.2d508(2003).........19,23,29,30,33
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct.1817,18L.Ed.2d1010(1967)...........................................37
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Hu-man Services,682F.3d1(1stCir.2012)................13
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TABLEOFAUTHORITIES–Continued
Page
Meyer v. Nebraska,262U.S.390,43S.Ct.625,67L.Ed.1042(1923).........................................20,28
Miller v. California,413U.S.15,93S.Ct.2607,37L.Ed.2d419(1965).......................................28,32
Nevada v. Hall,440U.S.410,99S.Ct.1182,59L.Ed.2d416(1929)..................................................39
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct.149,82L.Ed.288(1937).........................................22
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,413U.S.49,93S.Ct.2628,37L.Ed.2d446(1973)..........................27
Pennoyer v. Neff , 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565(1878).......................................................................25
Perry v. Brown, 671F.3d1052(9thCir.2012),vacated on jurisdictional grounds, Hollingsworthv. Perry, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 186L.Ed.2d768(2013).......................................... passim
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45S.Ct.571,69L.Ed.1070(1925)..............................28
Poe v. Ullman, 367U.S.497,81S.Ct.1752,6L.Ed.2d989(1961)............................................24,25
Powell v. Alabama,287U.S.45,53S.Ct.55,77
L.Ed.158(1932)......................................................22
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35L.Ed.2d147(1973)..................................................28
Romer v. Evans,517U.S.620,116S.Ct.1620,134L.Ed.2d855(1996)...........................................29
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TABLEOFAUTHORITIES–Continued
Page
Roth v. U.S. ( Alberts v. California), 354 U.S.476,77S.Ct.1304,1L.Ed.2d1498(1957).......26,27
SmithKline Beecham Corporation v. Abbott Laboratories,740F.3d471(9thCir.2014)....18,19,20
United States v. Windsor,133S.Ct.2675, 186L.Ed.2d808(2013).......................................... passim
Zablocki v. Redhail,434U.S.374,98S.Ct.673,54L.Ed.2d618(1978).......................................21,25
STATEC ASES
Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d185(1971)................................................................11
In re Marriage Cases,183P.3d384(Cal.2008)....9,14
Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 908 A.2d 196(2006).................................................................11,12
CONSTITUTIONALANDSTATUTORY PROVISIONS
1U.S.C.§7..........................................13,15,16,17,19
Cal.Fam.Code§297(a)..............................................14
Cal.Fam.Code§308.5..........................................14,15
U.S.Constitution,art.IV,section1...........................38
U.S.Constitution,amend.XIV.......................... passim
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TABLEOFAUTHORITIES–Continued
Page
OTHERA UTHORITIES
Gaylin, Book Review,77YaleL.J.579,592594
(1968).......................................................................28Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 77 Mich. L.Rev. 981, at10421043................................................................31
NationalConferenceofStateLegislatures,7700EastFirstPlace, Denver,CO80230.Onlineat http://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices /civilunionsanddomesticpartnershipstatutes.aspx........................................................................3,4
ProCon.org ,233WilshireBlvd.,Suite200,Santa
Monica,CA.Onlineathttp://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857..............3
Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 928929(1978).......................................................................31
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-serviceshttp:///reader/full/ProCon.orghttp://gaymarriage.procon/http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-serviceshttp:///reader/full/ProCon.orghttp://gaymarriage.procon/
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Amicus, Lary S. Larson, is a practicing lawyer
and anactive participant in localand statepolitics.
His interestin filing thisbriefstemsfroma compel-
ling desire to contribute something helpful to this
importantnationaldebate.Asaformerordainedmin-isterandapastcandidatefortheIdahoLegislature,
he took a sincere interest in the issue of samesex
marriage and wrote extensively on that subject. He
continues to believe that his insights on this issue
willbehelpfultotheCourt.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Therearefivestatesthatarenotpartiestothiscasebutthathaveauniqueinterestinitsoutcome.
Theyarestatesthat,priortoUnited States v. Wind-
sor,133S.Ct.2675,186L.Ed.2d808(2013),adopted
civil union or domestic partnership statutes giving
samesex couples “everything but marriage,” but
denying them its special reputational value. After
Windsor their samesex marriage prohibitions were
declaredunconstitutional.
1
By a letter on file with the Clerk, all Petitioners have jointlyconsentedtothefilingofthisBrief.AllRespondentsfiled
ablanketconsenttothefilingofallamicusbriefs.Pursuantto
SupremeCourtRule37.6,nocounselforanypartyauthoredthis
briefinwholeorinpart;nocounselorpartymadeanymonetary
contributionintendedtofundthepreparationorsubmissionof
thisbrief;andnootherpersonotherthanAmicusandhiscoun-
selmadeanysuchmonetarycontribution.
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Thereputationalvalueofmarriageisapersonal
interestseparateanddistinctfromallotherlegalin-
cidents of marriage. It means having the State ap-
proveandcondoneacouple’ssexualrelationshipand
lifestyle.Whenthereputationalvalueofmarriageis
correctlyunderstoodinthatmanner,itprovesnottobea fundamental right. Rather, States with “every-
thingbutmarriage”lawsmaydenysamesexcouples
therighttomarryifthatpolicypromotesalegitimate
stateinterest.
Thepromotionofmoralvalues insocietyisa le-
gitimate State interest, and the traditional institu-
tion of marriage has been a powerful force in that
effort. But it is reasonable to believe that allowing
samesexcouplestomarrywouldlessentheeffective-ness of marriage as a means of promoting moral
values.
Therefore, if a State adopts an “everything but
marriage” law that gives samesex couples all other
benefits of marriage, the Fourteenth Amendment
does not require the State to allow such couples to
marry.
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ARGUMENT
I. Introduction.
AsofFebruary19,2015,samesexmarriagehad
beenlegalizedin37states–in26byjudicialdecree,
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in8bylegislativeaction,and in3bypopularvote.2
Samesexmarriageprohibitions(eitherbystatuteor
by constitution) were still in place in 13 states, al-
thoughin7ofthosethelawsbanningsamesexmar-
riagehadbeenstruckdownbyjudicialdecisionsthat
arestillunderappeal.3
While the national debate over this issue has
usually treated samesex marriage as an “allor-
nothing” proposition, 15 states took a different ap-
proach.Theychosetorecognizelegallythecommitted
relationships of samesex couples by adopting civil
unionordomesticpartnershiplawsthatformallyle-
gitimizesamesexrelationshipswithoutcallingthem
“married.”4
Inten of thosestates, the domesticpartnershiporcivilunionlawsactuallygavesamesexcouplesthe
identicallegalandeconomicbenefitsaffordedtomar-
riedcouples.5Thoselawswereeuphemisticallycalled
“everythingbutmarriage”laws.
2ProCon.org ,233WilshireBlvd.,Suite200,SantaMonica,
CA. Online at http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?
resourceID=004857.3
Ibid.4Colorado,Hawaii,Illinois,NewJersey,California,Maine,
Nevada,Oregon,Washington,Wisconsin,Connecticut,Delaware,
NewHampshire,RhodeIsland,andVermont.5
Colorado, New Jersey, California, Nevada, Oregon,
Hawaii, Washington, Delaware, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island. National Conference of State Legislatures, 7700 East
First Place, Denver, CO 80230, Online at http://www.ncsl.org /
(Continuedonfollowingpage)
http:///reader/full/ProCon.orghttp://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.phphttp:///reader/full/http://www.ncsl.orghttp:///reader/full/ProCon.orghttp://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.phphttp:///reader/full/http://www.ncsl.org
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Underan “everythingbut marriage” regime,al-
thoughsamesexcouplesenjoyallthesametangible
advantages that married couples enjoy, they lack
theuniquesocietalveneration(i.e.,the“reputational
value”) that the status of traditional marriage con-
fers. Whether such couples in an “everything butmarriage” state have a constitutional right to enjoy
that reputational value is the narrow focus of this
amicusbrief.
Inall15statesthatpassedcivilunionordomes-
ticpartnershipstatutes,samesexmarriagehassub-
sequentlybeenlegalizedeitherbystatuteorbycourt
ruling.6Ofthe10thathad“everythingbutmarriage”
statutes,samesexmarriagewaslegalizedbyjudicial
decreein5ofthem:Colorado,NewJersey,California,
Nevada, and Oregon (where almost 19% of the na-
tionalpopulationresides).Thosedecisionsallbecame
final between June 28, 2013, and October, 2014,
following the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808
(2013).
Although none of the states whose laws are at
issue in this case are orwere “everything but mar-
riage” states,thedecisionin thiscase,like thedeci-
sion inWindsor,willmost likely beseen assettlingthe question whether the Fourteenth Amendment
research/humanservices/civilunionsanddomesticpartnership
statutes.aspx.6
NationalConferenceof StateLegislatures, 7700 EastFirst
Place,Denver,CO80230. Ibid.
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allowsastatetoenactan“everythingbutmarriage”
law but still prohibit samesex marriage, per se.
Affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision would an-
swer that question in the affirmative. Reversing it
entirelywouldnodoubtbeinterpretedasprecluding
thatopportunity.
That is meaningful to the five abovementioned
states where “everything but marriage” laws were
democratically adopted but judicially revoked. With
anappropriateoutcomeinthiscase,thosestates,as
well as many others, would have a renewed oppor-
tunity to democratically enact “everything but mar-
riage”lawsforthebenefitofsamesexcouples,while
atthesametimepreservingthetraditionaldefinition
of“marriage”foraslongastheybelievethatdoingsopromotesthepublicwelfare.Thekeyistoresolvethe
currentcontroversyinawaythatcomportswiththe
Constitutionandleavesthatdooropen.
Tothatend,wesubmitthefollowingpartialan-
swers to the questions posed by the Court in this
case:
(1) Ifastate’slawsallowasamesexcoupletoenterintoalegalunionbywhichtheyenjoythesamelegalandeconomicrightsthat married couples enjoy, then theFourteenthAmendmentdoesnotrequirethat state to issue them a marriage li-cense.
(2) Ifastate’slawsallowasamesexcouplelawfullymarriedinanotherstatetoen-
joy the same legal and economic rights
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that other married couples enjoy, thentheFourteenthAmendmentdoesnotre-quire that state to recognize them asmarried.
We limit our argument to those narrow propo-
sitions, recognizing that there will be many otherpartieswhothoroughlyandexpertlycoverthebroad-
erissuesraisedbythiscase.
II. In States with “Everything but Marriage”
Laws, the Issue is Whether the States May
Deny SameSex Couples the Reputational
Value of Marriage.
A. There are Constitutionally Significant
Differences Between the Legal Inci-dents of Marriage and its Reputational
Value.
Inthesamesexmarriagedebate,how theques-
tionispresentedcanmakeallthedifference.Forex-
ample, “Shall marriage continue to be defined as a
committed unionbetweenone man and one woman,
orshallithenceforthincludesamesexcouples?”The
query itself implies that the right to marry is an
indivisible,allornothingconcept.
Intruth,“the”righttomarryisacombinationof
many related but separable rights, privileges, and
benefits.Stateswithcivilunionordomesticpartner-
ship laws, and some courts, have drawn a line be-
tween the legal and economic privileges of married
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couplesononehand,andtheintangible,reputational
valueofmarriageontheother.
Manyofthelegalandeconomicadvantagesinci-
dentaltomarriagehavebeencreatedforthepurpose
ofencouragingtheformationofstrongfamilies.They
include special treatment for married couples in con-
nectionwith adoptions,entitlementprograms, eviden-
tiary privileges, guardianships, insurance programs,
probateproceedings,propertyrights,retirementpro-
gramsandtaxes,tonameonlyafew.
Butthelegalandeconomicincidentsofmarriage
caneasilybeconferredonunmarriedcouplesaswell
forthesamepurpose–tosupportlongterm,commit-
ted, loving relationships.When a State permits un-
marriedcouplestosolemnizetheirmutuallongtermcommitments in ways other than marriage, it has
essentiallybifurcatedtherightofmarriage,separat-
ingitspracticalincidentsfromitsreputationalvalue.
It has separated the “rights of marriage” from the
“righttomarry.”
Forexample,inCalifornia,Proposition8sought
toaccomplishthatbifurcationbyamendingthestate
constitution:
“Proposition 8 worked a singular andlimited change to the California Constitu-tion:itstrippedsamesexcouplesoftherighttohavetheircommittedrelationshipsrecog-nized by the State with the designation of‘marriage,’ which the state constitution hadpreviouslyguaranteedthem,whileleavingin
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placealloftheirotherrightsandresponsibil-itiesaspartners–rightsandresponsibilitiesthatareidenticaltothoseofmarriedspousesandformanintegralpartofthemarriagere-lationship.***
“The official, cherished status of ‘mar-riage’ is distinct from the incidents of mar-riage, such as those listed in the CaliforniaFamilyCode.”
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1076, 1078 (9th Cir.
2012),vacated on jurisdictional grounds, Hollingsworth
v. Perry,570U.S.___,133S.Ct.2652(2013).
The traditionalinstitutionofmarriagecarries a
universally understood symbolism that has little to
do with its legal and economic incidents. Grantinga marriage license to a couple bestows an honor on
them.Itrecognizesthattheyareeligibletoestablish
ahomeandafamily,andtobringchildrenintoit.It
assures them that they may engage in sexual rela-
tionswithoutthemoralopprobriumthatsocialnorms
attachtoextramaritalsex.Itcommunicatestothem
society’s approval of their relationship and their
conduct.Itcondonestheirlifestyleasappropriateand
consistentwithgoodmorals.
Without the designation of “marriage,” all the
otherlegalandeconomicincidentsofmarriagedonot
carrythesamereputationalvalue. “Theincidentsof
marriage,standingalone,donot,however,conveythe
same governmental and societal recognition as does
thedesignationof‘marriage’itself.” Id.,at10781079.
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Thepowerful symbolismin traditional marriage
hasbeen one oftheprimaryincentives for samesex
marriage litigation. In Perry v. Brown, supra, the
NinthCircuitCourtofAppealsobservedthat,“‘mar-
riage’ signifies the unique recognition that society
gives to harmonious, loyal, enduring, and intimaterelationships.” Id.,at1078.“Itistheprincipalmanner
inwhichtheStateattachesrespectanddignitytothe
highest formofa committed relationship and tothe
individuals who have entered into it.” Id., at 1079.
“[W]eemphasizetheextraordinarysignificanceofthe
officialdesignationof‘marriage’.Thatdesignationis
importantbecause‘marriage’isthenamethatsociety
givestothe relationship thatmattersmostbetween
twoadults.” Id.,at1078.The designation “married”
symbolizes“statelegitimizationandsocietalrecogni-tionoftheircommittedrelationships.” Id.,at1063.
Domestic partnerships andcivil unions by com-
parisondonotsatisfy“allofthepersonalanddignity
intereststhathavetraditionallyinformedtherightto
marry....” Id., at 1066. “‘[P]roviding only a novel,
alternative institution for samesex couples’ consti-
tuted ‘an officialstatement that the family relation-
shipofsamesexcouplesisnotofcomparablestature
orequaldignitytothefamilyrelationshipofoppositesex couples.’” Id., at 1067 (quoting In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008)). “[D]omestic
partnershipslackthesocialmeaningassociatedwith
marriage.” Id.,at1075(quotingthelowercourt).Do-
mestic partnership“stigmatizes samesexcouples as
havingrelationships inferiortothoseofoppositesex
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couples” ( Id.,n.4). “[T]here isa significant symbolic
disparity between domestic partnership and mar-
riage. It is the designation of ‘marriage’ itself that
expressesvalidation,bythestateandthecommunity,
andthatservesasasymbol,likeaweddingceremony
or a wedding ring, of something profoundly impor-tant.” Id.,at1078.
A samesex couple’s interest in the reputational
value of marriage is therefore of a much different
natureandofamuchdifferentdegreeofimportance
than their interest in the legal and economic inci-
dentsofmarriage.Thesameistruefromtheperspec-
tiveofthestate,althoughfordifferentreasons.Those
significant differences in nature, importance, and
perspective mean that the Fourteenth Amendmentmust have a different impact on a state’s power to
denysamesexcouplesthestatusofmarriagethanit
hasonthestate’spowertodenythemthelegaland
economic privileges of marriage. Courts that have
overturnedsamesexmarriagebanswithoutconsider-
ing the meaningful differences between those two
separateaspectsoftherightto marryhave“thrown
outthebabywiththebathwater.”
B. A Bifurcated Approach to MarriageRights is Evident in the Development of
Marriage Jurisprudence over the Last
Four Decades.
IntheU.S.SupremeCourt’sinitialforayintothis
subject, Baker v. Nelson,409U.S.810,93S.Ct.37,34
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L.Ed.2d65(1972), the Court left standingaMinne-
sota Supreme Court decision that upheld a state
statutedefining“marriage” asaunionbetweenper-
sonsoftheoppositesex.Theappellants’onlyconten-
tionwas that the rejectionoftheirapplicationfor a
marriagelicensepatentlydeniedthemafundamentalright, deprived them of property or liberty without
dueprocess,anddeniedthemequalprotection. Baker
v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
Therewasnocontentionin Bakerthattheprohibition
againstsamesexmarriagedeprivedsamesexcouples
ofanylegaloreconomicbenefitsthatwereenjoyedby
oppositesexcouples.
The Supreme Court’s decision that that case
presentedno substantial federal questioncan there-forebereadasconfirmationthat,at leastwhenthe
legal and economic benefits of marriage are not at
issue, the state is free to determine whether ornot
the reputational valueofmarriagewill bebestowed
on samesex couples. It appears to accommodate a
bifurcatedapproachtoanalyzingthosetwoseparate
aspectsoftherighttomarry.
Agoodearlyexampleofastatecourtapplyinga
bifurcated approach to marriage rights is Lewis v.
Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 908A.2d 196 (2006). In that
case,theNewJerseySupremeCourtheldthestate’s
banonsamesexmarriagetobeunconstitutional(un-
der the New Jersey state constitution) insofar as it
denied the legaland economic incidents ofmarriage
tosamesexcouples.However, the Courtdid not re-
jectthestate’srighttodenythestatusofmarriageto
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samesexcouples.Ratherthanorderingcountyclerks
to begin issuing marriage licenses to samesex cou-
ples,thecourtgavethelegislature180daystoadopt
acivilunionstatutegivingsamesexcouplestheiden-
ticallegalandeconomicbenefitsasmarriedcouples.
OnthefailureoftheStatetodoso,thesamesexmar-riagebanwouldbestrickenin toto.Thus,theCourt
recognized that the state had the power to deny
samesexcouplesthereputationalvalueofmarriage,
but not the legalandeconomicbenefitsof marriage.
TheCourtexplained:
“Thelegalbattleinthiscasehasbeenwagedover one overarching issue – the right tomarry.Acivilmarriagelicenseentitlesthosewedded to avast arrayof economicandso-
cial benefits and privileges – the rights ofmarriage.Plaintiffshavepursuedthesingu-lar goal of obtaining the right to marry,knowing that, if successful, the rights ofmarriage automatically follow. We do nothave to take that allornothing approach.Weperceiveplaintiffs’equalprotectionclaimtohavetwocomponents:whethercommittedsamesexcoupleshaveaconstitutionalrightto the benefits and privileges afforded tomarried heterosexual couples, and, if so,
whethertheyhavetheconstitutionalrighttohave their ‘permanent committed relation-ship’recognizedbythenameofmarriage.”
188N.J.415,433.
TheCourtconcludedthatequalprotectionunder
the New Jersey constitution required that samesex
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couples be given the opportunity to enjoy all of the
legalandeconomicincidentsofmarriage,butnotnec-
essarilythestatusofmarriage.
The bifurcated perspective of marriage is also
evidentin Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services,682F.3d1(1stCir.2012).There,the
First Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether
Section3oftheDefenseofMarriageAct(“DOMA”),1
U.S.C.§7,violatedeithertheEqualProtectionClause
oftheFourteenthAmendmentorthefederalismprin-
ciplesoftheTenthAmendment.
TheCourtreliedon Baker v. Nelsontoholdthat
samesex couples have no constitutional right to
marry,perse.However,whenitfocusedonthelegal
and economic burdens imposed by DOMA on samesexcouples,andthelackofpracticaljustificationfor
DOMA on the part of the federal government, the
Court found that DOMA imposed an impermissible
burden in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, the Court’s treatment of the incidents of mar-
riagewasconstitutionallydifferentthanitstreatment
ofthestatusandreputationalvalueofmarriage.
The same approach is found in Perry v. Brown,
671F.3d1052(9thCir.2012)whichbecamethecom-panioncasetoWindsorunderthename Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 570 U.S. ___, 133S.Ct.2652,186 L.Ed.2d768
(2013).Althoughtheappealin Perrywasdismissedon
jurisdictional grounds and thedecision was vacated,
the Ninth Circuit’s observations regarding the dual
natureofmarriagerightsarestillpersuasive.
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To give them context, California adopted a Do-
mesticPartnershipActin1999,7whichwasan“every-
thing butmarriage”law. Thenin2000,Californians
passed an initiative, Proposition 22,8 which specif-
ically denied marital status to samesex couples. In
early 2008, Proposition 22 was struck down by theCaliforniaSupremeCourt.( In re Marriage Cases,183
P.3d 384 (Cal.2008)). However, that same year, the
votersrespondedbypassingProposition8,amending
theCaliforniaConstitutionitselftoprohibitsamesex
marriage.InMay2009,Proposition8waschallenged
in Federal District Court on the basis of the Four-
teenthAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitution.TheDis-
trictCourtruledthattherewasinsufficientreasonto
justifydenyingsamesexcouplestherighttomarry.
Onappeal,athreejudgepaneloftheNinthCircuit
CourtofAppeals affirmed the District Court.9 How-
ever, itnarrowly limited its decision to the unusual
situationinCalifornia,wheresamesexcoupleswere
firstdeniedtherighttomarry(Proposition22),then
granted the right to marry ( In re Marriage Cases,
supra),thendeprivedofthatrightagain(Proposition
8). Throughout those transitions, samesex couples
had all the practical rights of oppositesex married
couples. The only thing affected by the seesawing
7Cal.Fam.Code§297(a).
8Cal.Fam.Code§308.5.
9 Perry v. Brown, 671F.3d1052(9thCir.2012), vacated on
jurisdictional grounds, Hollingsworth v. Perry,570U.S.___,133
S.Ct.2652(2013).
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politics was their right to enjoy the reputational
valueofmarriage,perse.
“AllthatProposition8accomplishedwastotakeawayfromsamesexcouplestherighttobegrantedmarriagelicensesandthusle-
gally to use the designation of ‘marriage,’which symbolizes state legitimization andsocietalrecognitionof theircommitted rela-tionships.”
671F.3d1052,1063.
In effect, the Court concluded that when the
CaliforniaSupremeCourtstruckdownProposition22
in2008 because therewas nosufficient justification
todenysamesexcouplestherighttomarry,theState
essentially abandoned whatever argument it mightotherwisehavehadtojustifytheenactmentofPropo-
sition 8. The Court emphasized that it was not de-
ciding the questionwhetherCalifornia,or anyother
state, could ever prohibit samesex marriage, but
rather only whether “Proposition 8’s elimination of
the rights of samesex couples to marry ... ” was
constitutional. Id., at 1064. (Emphasis in original.)
TheCourt’sreasoningwasentirelydependentonthe
unique character of the reputational value of mar-
riage, distinct from the nature of its practical inci-dents–abifurcatedapproachtotheissue.
InUnited States v. Windsor,133S.Ct.2675,186
L.Ed.2d808(2013),thatsamedistinctionwasdrawn
from a slightlydifferent perspective. There, the Su-
premeCourtdeclaredSection3ofDOMAunconstitu-
tional as an abuse of federal power under the Fifth
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Amendment. But its reasoning was the same as in
Perry v. Brown.Whereasin Perry v. Brownthesame
sexmarriageban(Proposition8)wasrevokedbecause
Californiahadpreviouslydecidedthatsamesexcou-
pleswereentitledtomarry,inWindsorthesamesex
marriageban (Section3 ofDOMA)was revoked be-causeNewYorkhadpreviouslydecidedthatsamesex
coupleswereentitledtomarry.
More importantly, the Windsor decision was to-
tallydependentonthefactthattheStateofNewYork
hadchosen,inafreeanddemocraticprocessthrough
itslawfullyelectedrepresentatives,todignifyanden-
noblesamesexrelationshipsbypermittingsuchcou-
ples to enter into statesanctioned marriages. That
was the public policy ofthe StateofNewYork, and
the Court’s decision confirmed New York’s exclusive
righttoexercisethatpower.Indeed, itwasthe very
voluntarinessofNewYork’sdecisiontopermitsame
sexmarriagesthatimpartedthoserelationshipswith
honor, dignity, and legitimization equal to that of
oppositesexmarriedcouples.TheCourtexplained:
“The avowed purpose and practicaleffect ofthe law here in question are to impose adisadvantage, a separate status, and so astigma upon all who enter into samesexmarriages made lawful bythe unquestionedauthority of the States.
“The history of DOMA’s enactment andits own text demonstrate that interferencewith the equal dignity of samesex mar-riages, a dignity conferred by the States inthe exercise of their sovereign power, was
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morethananincidentaleffectofthefederalstatute. It was its essence.” Id., at 2693.(Emphasisadded.)
“TheState’s powerindefiningthemari-tal relation is of central relevance in this
case quite apart from principles of federal-ism. Here, the State’s decision to give thisclassofpersonstherighttomarryconferreduponthemadignityandstatusofimmenseimport.When the State used its historic and
essential authority to define the marital rela-tion in this way, its role and its power inmaking the decision enhanced the recogni-tion, dignity, and protection of the class intheir own community.DOMA,becauseofitsreach and extent, departs from this history
and tradition ofreliance on state law to de- fine marriage....” Id., at 2692. (Emphasisadded.)
“The congressional goal was ‘to put athumbon the scales and influence a state’sdecisionastohowtoshapeitsownmarriagelaws.’...ThatraisesamostseriousquestionundertheConstitution’s FifthAmendment.”
Id.,at2693.
ThesepassagesindicatethattheCourtconsiders
the definition of marriage, or in other words the
question of who is allowed to marry, to be a matter
reservedtotheStates,andthatit istheState’s free
exerciseofthatpowerthatendowstheinstitutionof
marriage with its unique reputational value. If the
Constitution forces States togrant samesexcouples
the status of marriage so that they can enjoy its
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reputationalvalue,thenthepresenceoffederalcom-
pulsion negates and emasculates the very societal
recognitionandhonorthatsamesexcouplesaretry-
ingtoachieve.
III. States with “Everything but Marriage” Laws
Do Not Violate the Fourteenth Amendment
by Denying SameSex Couples the Reputa-
tional Value of Marriage.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Requires a
Heightened Level of Scrutiny for Laws
Discriminating on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation.
Alawdenyingsamesexcouplesthereputational
valueofmarriagediscriminatesagainstthemonthebasis of their sexual orientation. Whether such dis-
crimination isprohibited bythe FourteenthAmend-
ment depends on what level of scrutiny must be
appliedbytheCourt.Onthatquestion,weagreewith
thereasoningoftheNinthCircuitCourtofAppealsin
SmithKline Beecham Corporation v. Abbott Laborato-
ries,740F.3d471(9thCir.2014).
In that case, the court considered whether it is
constitutionallypermissibletoperemptorilystrikepo-tential jurors from a jury panel based solely upon
theirsexualorientation.BasedonWindsor,thecourt
held that it is not. In doing so, the court examined
Windsor to determine what it says about the level
of scrutiny required by the Fourteenth Amendment
when considering discrimination based on sexual
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orientation. The court concluded that Windsor re-
quiresaheightenedlevelofscrutiny,demandingthat
the government establish that the discriminatory
legislationwasmotivatedbyalegitimatestateinter-
est.Thecourtstated:
“Windsor, of course, did not expresslyannounce the level of scrutiny itapplied tothe equal protection claim at issue in thatcase,butanexpressdeclarationisnotneces-sary.... When the Supreme Court has re-frained from identifying its method ofanalysis, we have analyzed the SupremeCourt precedent ‘by considering what theCourtactuallydid,ratherthanbydissectingisolated pieces of text.’ (Citation omitted)”740F.3d471,480.
The court then proceeded to observe that the
analysisinWindsordidnotmeettheusualstandards
ofarationalbasisreview.Itdidnotconsiderpossible
rationalesforDOMA.Itappearedtorequirea“legit-
imate state interest” to justify the harm caused by
DOMA.Anditrelieduponseveralprecedents,mostof
which required a heightened level of scrutiny. The
courtconcluded:
[W]e conclude that Windsor compels thesameresultwithrespecttoequalprotectionthat Lawrence compelled with respect tosubstantive due process: Windsor review isnotrationalbasisreview.Initswordsanditsdeed,Windsorestablishedalevelofscrutinyfor classifications based on sexual orien-tation that is unquestionably higher than
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rationalbasisreview.Inotherwords,Wind- sorrequiresthatheightenedscrutinybeap-plied to equal protection claims involvingsexualorientation.740F.3d471,481.
TheFourteenthAmendmentthereforerequiresa
heightenedlevelofscrutinyinthiscase.Discrimina-tionagainstsamesexcouplesintheenjoymentofthe
reputational value of marriage is a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment unless it promotes a legiti-
matestateinterest.
B. There is no Fundamental Right to En-
joy the Reputational Value of Marriage
Separate from all its Legal and Economic
Advantages.
Beforeproceeding,weshouldrebuttheargument
that the right to enjoy the reputational value of
marriage is a fundamental right and therefore the
strictscrutinytestshouldapply.
Cases that have found a fundamental right in
marriagehavegenerallyfocusedonthelegalandeco-
nomic benefits that are appurtenant to marriage.
Those benefits include such things as the right “to
chooseone’sspouse,todecidewhethertoconceiveor
adopta child, topubliclyproclaimanenduringcom-
mitment to remain together through thick and
thin....” ( Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1212-
1213(10thCir.2014),cert. denied,135S.Ct.265,190
L.Ed.2d138(2014); Meyer v. Nebraska,262U.S.390,
43S.Ct.625,67L.Ed.1042(1923)).
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Collectively, those privileges may indeed consti-
tuteafundamentalrightunderthelaw.Butaspre-
viouslydiscussed, marriageper se isnot a sine qua
nonforthebenefitsthatmarriageentails.Thechar-
acteristicsthatgivemarriageitspracticalvalueand
make it a fundamental right can all be conferreduponsamesexcouplesthroughcivilunionordomes-
tic partnership statutes without granting them the
reputationalvalueofmarriage,perse.
Thereforetheissueisasfollows:Isthereafun-
damental right to enjoy the reputational value of
marriageonthepartofsamesexcoupleswhoalready
enjoylegalandeconomicbenefitsidenticaltothoseof
marriedcouplesinallotherrespects?
There is not. Not all privileges associated withthestatusofmarriageenjoythesameconstitutional
protection. “By reaffirming the fundamental charac-
teroftherighttomarry,wedonotmeantosuggest
that every state regulation which relates in any
waytotheincidentsoforprerequisitesformarriage
must be subjected to vigorous scrutiny.” Zablocki v.
Redhail,434U.S.374,386,98S.Ct.673,54L.Ed.2d
618 (1978). “[I]t is fair to say that there is a right
of marital and familial privacy which places some
substantive limits on the regulatorypowerofgovern-
ment.Butthecourthasyettoholdthatallregulations
touching upon marriage implicate a ‘fundamental
right’ triggeringthemostexacting judicialscrutiny.”
Id.,at397(Powell,J.,concurringinthejudgment).
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The reputational value of marriage consists of
having the State condone, honor, and dignify one’s
sexualconductandlifestyle.Forsamesexcouples,it
would mean having the State publicly acknowledge
thathomosexualbehaviorsandlifestylesarenormal
and consistent with conventional community stan-dards.Isthatafundamentalright?
Thelistof“fundamentalrights”isveryselect.In
Griswald v. Connecticut,381U.S.479,85S.Ct.1678,
14L.Ed.2d510(1965),theCourtstated:“Theinquiry
iswhetherarightinvolvedisofsuchacharacterthat
it cannot be denied without violating those ‘funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
thebaseofallourcivilandpoliticalinstitutions....’”
85 S.Ct. at 16861687, quoting Powell v. Alabama,287 U.S. 45, 67, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932).
When considering whether an asserted right is a
fundamental right, thecourtmustconsiderwhether
the right is one of those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in the
nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
norjusticewouldexistwithoutit. Palko v. Connecti-
cut,302U.S.319,58S.Ct.149,82L.Ed.288(1937).
Among the recognized fundamental rights are
those rights which were considered “natural rights”
by the founding fathers, including life, liberty, the
pursuitofhappiness,thefreedomsofreligion,assem-
bly, and association, and the right to ownership of
property.Alsoincludedarethoserightswhichhaveas
theirsource,andareguaranteedby,stateorFederal
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constitutions,such asfreedom ofspeech, freedomof
the press, and the rightto beararms.Finally,those
rightsarefundamentalwhicharenecessarilyimplied
bytheexistenceofotherconstitutionalrights,suchas
therightofprivacy.
The most obvious difference between those fun-
damental rights and the alleged right to have the
state approve or dignify one’s spousal choices or
sexual preferencesis that fundamental rights relate
totheautonomyofpersonstomaketheirownchoices
withoutundueinterferencefromthestate.Thestate’s
responsetotheexerciseoffundamentalrightsshould
bebenignindifference.Ontheotherhand,thealleged
right asserted by samesex couples is one that de-
mands specific action onthe part of the state– the
adoptionofapublic policy placingthe state’s impri-matur of approval on the couple’s relationship, con-
duct,orlifestyle.
TheState’srefusaltoofficiallyapproveaspecific
personallifestylethatitshouldotherwisetreatwith
benign indifference (e.g., asrequiredby Lawrence v.
Texas,539U.S.558,123S.Ct.2472,156L.Ed.2d508
(2003),)can hardly becharacterized asviolating the
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political in-stitutions.”Norisarighttoobtainsuchapprovalso
“deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition”
thatitsrefusalwouldthreatentheexistenceofjustice
orliberty.
Byanalogy,thefreedomsofspeech,religion,and
privacydonot includea fundamentalrightto insist
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that the State officially and publicly approve what-
everonechoosestosay,believe,ordointheprivacyof
one’s home.Similarly, the right to select a mate, to
makelongtermandlasting commitmentsofmutual
loveandsupport,toformahouseholdandestablisha
family, and to bear and raise children, does not in-cludetherighttoinsistthatthestateovertlyapprove
one’schoicesinthatregard.Nocitizenhastheright
topreemptthestate’sfreeexerciseofitspolicepower
by insisting onpersonal endorsements of their indi-
vidualbehaviorsandlifestylechoices.
Consequently,thereputationalvalueofmarriage
doesnotmeetthetestofafundamentalright.States
with “everything but marriage” laws may therefore
refusetoletsamesexcouplesmarryifthatpolicy issupportedbyalegitimatestateinterest.
C. Promoting the Public Welfare by Defend-
ing the Values of Traditional Marriage
and Sexual Morality is a Legitimate
State Interest.
Until the last halfcentury or so, our societal
normsheldthatsexualrelationsoutside thebounds
ofa marriage, including homosexual relations, were
immoralandindecentandthereforewithinthepolice
poweroftheStatestoprohibitintheinterestofpub-
licwelfare.AsstatedbyJusticeHarlaninhisdissent
in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6
L.Ed.2d989(1961):
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“[T]he very inclusion of the category ofmoralityamongstateconcernsindicatesthatsocietyisnotlimitedinitsobjectsonlytothephysical wellbeing of the community, buthas traditionally concerned itself with themoral soundness of its people as well....
Thelaws... forbiddingadultery,fornicationandhomosexualpracticeswhichexpressthenegativeoftheproposition,confiningsexual-ity to lawful marriage, form a pattern sodeeplypressedintothesubstanceofourso-cial life that any constitutional doctrine inthisareamustbuilduponthatbasis.”
367U.S.497,545546.
Seealso, Griswald v. Connecticutt,381U.S.479,85
S.Ct.1678,14L.Ed.2d510(1965),Goldberg,J.,con-curring,381 U.S.479,498499; Pennoyer v. Neff ,95
U.S.714, 24L.Ed.565 (1878),quotedin Zablocki v.
Redhail,434U.S.374,399,98S.Ct.673,54L.Ed.2d
618(1978).
Society’sinterestinsexualmoralityismorethan
asectarianobsession.Sexualmoresarepracticaland
utilitarian,andvaluabletosocietyinmanyways.For
evidenceofthat,itsufficestopointtothesocietalgoal
ofreducingtheincidenceofoutofwedlockbirths.Itis
reasonabletobelievethatchildrenbornoutofwedlock
are much less likely toenjoythe samebenefits that
areprovidedbyafamilywhereamotherandfather
fulfill their traditional roles. Further, the statistical
frequency of childrenborn outofwedlock isdirectly
relatedtotheprevalenceofextramaritalsexualrela-
tions.Thatphenomenon,inturn,isdirectlyrelatedto
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how seriously a society treats sexual morality as a
culturalexpectation.
The promotion of sexual morality as a social
norm and a proper object of government actionhas
beenmanifestinotherareasofthelaw.Forexample,
thejurisprudencesurroundingobscenityandpornog-
raphyinstructsusthattheStatemayregulatesexual
expression ordepictions ofsexual conduct according
tocommunitystandardsforthepurposeofpromoting
goodmorals,particularlywherethesexualexpression
or conduct is in public view or where undesirable
expressions or conduct are represented as being of-
ficiallysanctioned.“[A]nybenefitthatmaybederived
from [lewd and obscene utterances] is clearly out-
weighedbythesocialinterestinorderandmorality.”
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,315U.S.568,572,62
S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). In Roth v. U.S.
( Alberts v. California),354U.S.476,77S.Ct.1304,1
L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), Justice Harlan, in his concur-
ringopinionin Alberts,stated:
“[I]tisnotirrational,inourpresentstateofknowledge,toconsiderthatpornographycaninduce a type of sexual conduct which aStatemaydeemobnoxioustothemoralfab-
ric of society. In fact, the very division ofopiniononthesubjectcounselsustorespectthechoicemadebytheState....
“The State can reasonably draw the infer-ence that over a long period of time the in-discriminatedisseminationofmaterials,theessential character of which is to degrade
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sex, will have an eroding effect on moralstandards.”
354U.S.476,501502.
Seealso, Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,413U.S.49,
93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973), where theCourtheld that “there arelegitimatestate interests
atstakeinstemmingthe tideofcommercializedob-
scenity....Theseincludetheinterestofthepublicin
the quality of life and the totalcommunity environ-
ment,thetoneofcommerceinthegreatcitycenters,
and,possibly,thepublicsafetyitself.”Thecourtrea-
sonedthateventhough “there areno scientificdata
whichconclusivelydemonstratethat exposure toob-
scenematerialadversely affects men and womenor
theirsociety”and“noconclusiveproofofaconnectionbetween antisocial behavior and obscene material,”
the legislature of Georgia “could quite reasonably
determinethatsuchaconnectiondoesormightexist”
and “could legitimately act on such a conclusion to
protect ‘the social interest in order and morality.’”
413U.S.49,5763,quoting Roth v. U.S.,354U.S.at
485, and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568,572(1942).
The interest of the State inrefusingtopublicly
condoneconductthatisdetrimentaltopublicwelfare
canbeevengreaterthantheState’sinterestinreg-
ulatingtheconductitself.
“[Psychiatrists] made a distinction betweenthereadingofpornography,asunlikelytobeper se harmful, and the permitting of the
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S.Ct.2010,52L.Ed.2d675(1977); Bowers v. Hardwick,
478U.S.186,106S.Ct.2841,92L.Ed.2d140(1986).
Incourseoftime,two cases illuminatedthe ex-
panding freedom of samesex couples: Romer v.
Evans,517U.S.620,116S.Ct.1620,134L.Ed.2d855
(1996)and Lawrence v. Texas,539U.S.558,123S.Ct.
2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003). However, neither of
thosedecisionsquestionedwhetherthepromotionof
sexualmoralityisalegitimategovernmentinterest.
In Lawrence,theCourtoverturnedaTexasstat-
ute that made certain sexual conduct between two
personsofthesamesexacrime.However,theCourt
recognized that although States cannot classify pri-
vate, consensual, homosexual acts as crimes, same
sex relationships may stillnot be entitled to formallegalrecognition.
“[F]or centuries there have been powerfulvoices to condemn homosexual conduct asimmoral.Thecondemnationhasbeenshapedbyreligiousbeliefs,conceptionsofrightandacceptablebehavior,andrespectforthetra-ditional family.... These considerations donotanswerthe questionbeforeus,however.The issue is whether the majority may usethepoweroftheStatetoenforcetheseviewsonthewholesocietythroughoperationofthecriminallaw.”
Id., at571.
Most importantly, the Court was careful to dis-
claimanyintentionthatitsdecisionwouldcastdoubt
uponthepoweroftheStatestoprotectthetraditional
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institutionofmarriage.Inthemajorityopinion,Jus-
tice Kennedy distinguished this decision from other
circumstances:
“The present case does not involve mi-nors.... It does not involve public conduct
or prostitution. It does not involve whetherthegovernmentmustgiveformalrecognitiontoanyrelationshipthathomosexualpersonsseektoenter.” Id.,at578.
JusticeSandraDayO’Connor, inherconcurring
opinion,alsoemphasizedthatpoint:
“Thatthislawasappliedtoprivate,consen-sual conduct is unconstitutional under theEqualProtectionClausedoesnotmeanthat
other laws distinguishing between hetero-sexualsandhomosexualswouldsimilarlyfailunderrationalbasisreview.Texascannotas-sertanylegitimatestateinteresthere,suchasnationalsecurityorpreservingthe tradi-tional institution of marriage. Unlike themoraldisapprovalofsamesexrelations–theassertedstateinterestinthiscase–otherrea-sonsexisttopromotetheinstitutionofmar-riage beyond mere moral disapproval of anexcludedgroup.” Id.,at585.
Casesdecidedover the last130 yearshave con-
sistentlyaffirmedthatthepromotionofsexualmoral-
ityisalegitimatestateinterest,andthatthereisa
secular morality that is central to the fabric of our
society totally apart from religious notions. As ob-
servedbyProf.LaurenceTribe:“Ithasbeenproposed
thatrestrictionsonthewoman’sdecisiontoterminate
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a pregnancy are unconstitutional when they reflect
merelyamoral,asopposedtoaninstrumentalorutil-
itarian,justification.Butallnormativejudgmentsare
rooted in moral premises....” Tribe, American Con-
stitutional Law, 928929 (1978). “For what is the
Constitution itself, if not a collection of ‘[enduring]valuejudgmentsofthemajority,’ interpretedandap-
pliedbythecourtssoastobe‘thevehicleforprotect-
ingminoritiesfromthe[momentary]valuejudgments
ofthemajority’?TheentirebodyoftheConstitution,
amendmentsand all, isa series of judgments byan
extraordinarymajoritythatlimitthepoweroffuture
politicalmajorities.”Lupu,Untangling the Strands of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 77Mich. L.Rev. 981, at
10421043.
Inotherwords,moralityisconcernedwithjudg-ing between right and wrong. The state is right
fullyconcernedabout the practical impactsofmoral
choices on society, particularly in regard to sexual
conduct. Good behaviors, choices, and lifestyles in
regardtosexualconductcanleadtotheimprovement
ofhumanity,andtothebettermentofallpeople.
Samesexcouplesclaimthatthestatecannotrely
uponmoralvalues todenythemthe righttomarry.
Buttheirownargumentcontradictstheirclaim.They
contendthatsamesexmarriagebansarenothingbut
avaluejudgmentabouthomosexuality.Butthevery
reason why they demand the right to marry is
because they want that value judgment made, and
they want it made in their favor. Marriage implies
moral approval by society, and that is what they
pursue – moralapproval,acceptance,normalization,
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andlegitimizationoftheirlifestyleandconduct.The
stigma they suffer if they are denied the right to
marryisthe stigma ofnot having theirrelationship
viewedasmorallyacceptable.
“Approval”requirestheexerciseofjudgmentand
discretion.Andjudgmentsarebaseduponconsidera-
tions of right and wrong, good and bad, which by
definition are moral comparisons. Official state ap-
provaloffamilialorsexualrelationshipscanonlybe
baseduponmoralvaluesofsomekind.
Consequently, to win their argument, samesex
coupleshavetoembraceone orthe otheroftwo po-
sitions.OnepositionwouldbetoadmitthattheState
doeshavethepowertoconsidersecularmoralvalues
in defining marriage, in which case secular moralvaluesexistandarealegitimatestateinterest.Based
onthatpremise,theissuebecomeswhethertheharm
that would be inflicted on society by the State’s
official approval and condoning of homosexuality is
somehowoutweighedbytheharmthatsamesexcou-
ples would suffer if such approval were withheld.
That judgmentis the State’stomake.(See Miller v.
California,413U.S.15,93S.Ct.2607,37L.Ed.2d419
(1965).)
Or, their only other viable argument would bethatthetraditionalinstitutionofmarriagehasnoth-
ing to do with morality, moral approval, or moral
values. If that is the case, then there is no moral
advantageorreputationalvaluetobegainedbybeing
married. In states with “everything but marriage”
laws,samesexmarriagebanswouldbesupportedby
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33
no legitimate state interest, but would also deny
samesexcouplesnothingofvalue.
Ifbysome reasoning that latter result prevails,
thenwewillhavecometotheconclusionthattradi-
tional marriage means nothing morally, in spite of
hundreds,ifnotthousandsofyearsoftradition;and
thetraditionalinstitutionofmarriageasweknowit,
asanhonoredmoralstatus,willbedead.
Therefore, to summarize the impact of all the
jurisprudence leading up through Lawrence,Amicus
submits that although samesex couples cannot be
criminally punished for homosexual acts, defending
thevaluesoftraditionalmarriageandsexualmoral-
ityisstillalegitimatestateinterest.AStatemaystill
deny samesex couples the right to enter into thestatusofmarriageifthatpolicypromotestheState’s
valuesoftraditionalmarriageandsexualmorality.
D. Limiting Marriage to OppositeSex Cou-
ples Promotes the Values of Traditional
Marriage and Sexual Morality.
The narrow question addressed by Amicus is
whetheraStatethatalreadyhasan“everythingbut
marriage”lawisrequiredbytheConstitutiontocon-done homosexuality by giving samesex couples li-
cense to marry. That makes the central issue not
whether a private act between two citizens can be
prohibited, as in Lawrence, but rather whether a
publicactoftheStatecanbecompelled.
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Thepracticalsocietalimplicationsofgivingsame
sexmarriagestheofficialsanctionofpublicpolicyare
vastly more significant than the societal impact of
onecouple’sconsensualsexualconductintheprivacy
of their bedroom. Amicus submits that a State’s of-
ficialapprovalofsamesexmarriageswouldsubstan-tiallyundermineitslegitimateinterestinpromoting
thebenefitsoftraditionalmarriageandsexualmoral-
ity.
Those benefits are apparent from our cultural
experience. From experience, it is reasonable to be-
lieve that the institution of traditionalheterosexual
marriage is critical to society. Through heterosexual
marriage,societyregeneratesitselfbytheprocreation
ofchildreninanenvironmentwherechildrenofbothsexeshavegenderappropriaterolemodelstoprepare
themfor life.Extramaritalsex isreasonablyconsid-
ered irresponsible and inappropriate and is almost
universally discouraged byordered societiesbecause
itisreasonablyunderstoodtoincreasethelikelihood
ofchildrenbeingborn without the benefit ofsuch a
longtermnurturingenvironment.
Traditionalmarriage iswellunderstoodasasym-
bol ofsociety’sapprovalandacceptanceofacouple’s
sexual relations. Within marriage, couples enjoy in-
timate sexual relations without the stigma, disap-
proval, and often punishment that would otherwise
accompanyimmoral,illicitsexualrelations.Theideal
of marriage therefore promotes the virtues of self
control, discipline, responsibility, and accountability
among couples who are preparing to assume the
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obligations of marriage and parenthood, thereby re-
ducingtheincidenceofunwantedunwedmotherhood.
Homosexual relationships, on the other hand,
canreasonablybeviewedasapotentialimpediment
to the purposes sought to beachieved by the tradi-
tional institution of marriage. Homosexual relation-
ships can reasonably be perceived as violating the
cultural convention against sexual relations outside
of a traditional marriage. They can reasonably be
perceived as being less likely to result in the pro-
creation of children by the persons involved. Even
when samesexcouples dohave children, theirrela-
tionship can reasonably be perceived as being less
likely toprovide childrenofbothsexeswithgender
appropriaterolemodels.Furthermore,a Statecouldreasonablyconclude
that public approval and acceptance of homosexual
relationships, in spite of those drawbacks, will con-
tributetoanatmosphereorcultureofgeneralsexual
freedom and promiscuity, including heterosexual re-
lationships,therebyincreasingtheprevalenceofun-
wantedoutofwedlockbirths.
It could well be argued that private consensual
sexualconductshouldbeofnoconcernwhatsoevertothe government. But when we take the sexual cus-
toms of entire populations of people in our society,
theircombinedimpactisnoticeableandmeasurable.
Inthatway,sexualmoralityitselfhaspracticalsocial
valuetotallyasidefromitsreligioussignificance.
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36
Theactofthestateindenyingsamesexcouples
thereputationalvalueofmarriagecannotbeviewed
inisolationofthestate’soverallapproachtosamesex
marriage. Ina state thatadoptsan“everythingbut
marriage”law, thatoverallapproach includesgiving
samesex couples “everything else” that would en-courage and support the creation of longterm,com-
mitted, loving family relationships. That approach
seekstoprotectthegoodmoralsofsocietywhilestill
treatingsamesexcouplesequallyforallotherpracti-
calpurposes,whereanynegativeimpactofsamesex
relationshipsonsocialnormsmaybelesspredictable.
For those reasons, a State can reasonably con-
clude that it should place a higher value on tradi-
tional marriage and sexual morality than on otherforms ofcommittedrelationships.Forcing aState to
officially condone samesexrelationships in a highly
prominentandconspicuousway,i.e.,byissuingmar-
riage licenses to samesex couples – placing the
State’s imprimatur of approval on the couple’s rela-
tionship – would work in direct opposition to that
policy.
Amicusrecognizestheinevitablecomparisonsbe-
tweenthisargumentandtheargumentofthesegre-
gationists in Brown v. Board of Education,347 U.S.
483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed.2d 873 (1954). In states
that adopt, or have adopted, “everything but mar-
riage” laws, this argument looks very much like
“separate but equal.” But there are compelling dis-
tinctionsbetweenthiscaseand Brown.
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37
In Brown the issue was, all other things being
equal, does the Fourteenth Amendment allow the
Statestoprovidetwoseparateeducationsystemsfor
thetwoseparateraces?347U.S.483,492.Inruling
thatitdoesnot,theCourtemphasizedtheintangible
differences between the two races’ experiences inschool, as opposed to the tangible similarities. The
Court found that separating school children based
solelyontheirrace“generatesafeelingofinferiority
astotheirstatus inthe community thatmay affect
theirheartsandmindsinawayunlikelyevertobe
undone.... The impact is greater when it has the
sanctionofthelaw....” Id.,at494.“Separateeduca-
tionalfacilitiesareinherentlyunequal.” Id.,at495.
Thiscaseisdistinguishablefrom Brown,forthreereasons. First, in Brown, there was no legitimate
stateinterestadvancedinfavorofthesegregationof
schools, as there is here. Second, as in the case of
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18
L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967), race played the crucial role in
Brown, demonstrating that the discriminatory law
was simply invidious under the doctrine of strict
scrutiny.Thatisnotthecasehere.Third,therewas
nocontentionin Brownthatthestigmaofinferiority
sufferedbyblackchildrenforcedtoattendsegregatedschools was the result of anything but their segre-
gation.Thatisnotthecasehere.
Specifically, in Brown,theCourthadthebenefit
ofacenturyofblackexperienceinsegregatedschools.
The causal connection between segregation and a
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38
feelingofinferiorityamongblackchildrenwasunde-
niable.
Inthiscase,however,theexperienceofsamesex
familiesislesswelldocumented.Achildofasamesex
couple may be stigmatized more by the unusual
appearanceofhaving“twofathers”or“twomothers”
thanbywhatevertheirlegalstatushappenstobe.As
fortheparentsthemselves,thedisadvantageofbeing
deniedthereputationalvalueofmarriageisnotsuf-
ficient tooverride the State’s power tocontrolwhat
lifestylesand behaviors itdoesordoesnot condone,
asisthoroughlydiscussedabove.
IV. States with “Everything but Marriage” Laws
Do Not Violate the Fourteenth Amendmentby Refusing to Recognize the Marital Sta-
tus of SameSex Couples Married in Other
States.
Although the legal principles that apply under
theFullFaithandCreditClause10
aredifferentthan
undertheFourteenthAmendment,theoutcomeshould
bethesame.Instatesthathave“everythingbutmar-
riage”laws,theFourteenthAmendmentdoesnotre-
quire the State to recognize the married status of
couplesmarried inotherstates ifit doesnot permit
samesexmarriageswithininitsownborders.
10U.S.Constitution,art.IV,section1.
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39
InWindsor,itwasfoundthatbecauseofthepri-
macy of State law regarding the definition of mar-
riage, the Federal government could not refuse to
recognize the marital status of New Yorkmarried
samesexcouples.However,whenthe issuebecomes
whetheraStatemustrecognizethemarriedstatusofsamesexcouplesmarriedinotherStates,thereisno
rankorprecedencebetweenthepoliciesofoneState
andthepoliciesoftheother. Nevada v. Hall,440U.S.
410, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1929). If New
York has a strong public policy in favor of samesex
marriage, thenwhywouldIdaho’sstrong publicpol-
icy against samesexmarriage(assuming Idahohad
an“everythingbut marriage” civilunionstatute)be
entitledtoanylessrespect,constitutionally?Thereis
no constitutionally valid reason why the decision ofNewYork to allow samesex marriages would be of
anygreaterconstitutionalstrengththanthedecision
ofIdahonottoalloworrecognizethem,aslongasthe
New Yorkmarried couple was not deprived of any
other legaloreconomic rights,privileges orbenefits
thatmarriedcouplesinIdahoenjoy.
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CONCLUSIONEachStateshouldhavetheopportunitytoevalu-
ate whether, in its own communities, the growing
spiritoftoleranceandequalityjustifiesanevolution
in their societalviewsof morality. The Constitution
should not deprive the States (at least those that
haveadoptedorwilladopt“everythingbutmarriage”
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40
laws) of the power to decide whether or not to em-
brace samesex relationships by clothing them with
thegarmentsofmarriageandallthesymbolicsignifi-
cancethatentails.
ThedecisionoftheSixthCircuitCourtofAppeals
should be affirmed.At the worst, the Court should
declare that if a state allows a samesex couple to
enter into a legal union that entitles them to the
identicallysamelegalandeconomicrights,privileges,
and benefits that married couples enjoy, then the
FourteenthAmendmentdoesnotrequirethatstateto
issuethemamarriagelicense.
Respectfullysubmitted,
SEANJ.COLETTI,Counsel of Record
HOPKINSRODENCROCKETTH ANSEN&HOOPES,PLLC
428ParkAvenueIdahoFalls,Idaho83402(208)[email protected]
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]