land+titles+remedies

LAND TITLES CASE DIGESTS | ATTY. CADIZ D2012 REMEDIES

Muli | Fajardo | Gran | Nograles | Fabia K | Zaragosa | Ang | Siron | Mendoza J | Cajucom | Raso | Hipolito

(1) FRANCISCO V. PUNO FACTS: On August 29, 1979, Lagar filed with CFI of Quezon a

complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land and damages alleging that her father caused the land in question titled in

his name alone in spite of the property being conjugal and

then sold it to the predecessor in interest of the Franciscos from whom they bought the same. Puno, Respondent judge rendered judgment finding the evidence insufficient to sustain the cause of action alleged

and therefore dismissing the complaint. Lagar filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration

alleging that the insufficiency of her evidence was due to the fault of her counsel who presented the same without her

being fully prepared. She claimed that she had newly discovered evidence that could prove her cause of action.

She wasn’t prepared to take the witness stand when she testified.

Puno denied the same for having been filed out of time

(more than 30 days had already elapsed – 32 to be exact) Lagar filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 claiming that

if she will be allowed to introduce evidence in her possession, which by excusable neglect and/or mistake were

not introduced, the same will necessarily alter and/or change the decision in her favor. Evidence in support of her

claim that it is a conjugal property consist of a deed of sale in favor of the conjugal partnership. The petition wherein

his father changed his civil status was not known personally to the Lagar, otherwise she could have made reservations in

that petition eventually protecting her right insofar as ½ of

the property is concerned. The Franciscos on the other hand claimed that the

petition for relied was filed out of time in the light of Sec 3 Rule 38 which provides that such a petition should e filed

within 60 days after the petitioner learns out of the judgment, order or proceeding to be set aside, and not more

than 6 months after such judgment or order was entered or such proceeding was taken.

CFI ruled in favor of Lagar, stating that the 60 day period should be counted from the time where she personally

learned of the said notice and not from the when notice was

served to her counsel.

ISSUE: (1) W/N motion for trial and petition for relief are

exclusive of each other (2) W/N notice to counsel of the decision is notice to

the party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38.

RULING: Yes to both. 1. Another remedy is available, as, in fact, private

respondent had filed motion for new trial and/or

reconsideration alleging practically the same main

ground of the petition for relied under discussion,

which was denied, what respondent should have

done was to take a higher court such denial.

2. The principle that notice to the party, when he is

represented by a counsel of record is not valid is

applicable here in the reverse for the very same

reason that it is the lawyer who is supposed to

know the next procedural steps or what ought to be

done in law henceforth for the protection of the

rights of the client, and not the latter

(2) NEYPES V. CA FACTS: Petitioners Neypes et.al filed for an action for

annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction

against Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands,

Land Bank and heirs of Bernardo del Mundo. Petitioner filed a motion to declare the respondents in

default while the respondents filed a motion to dismiss based on prescription. The motion to declare the

respondents in default were granted except for the heirs, while the motion to dismiss was denied. The respondent

heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. On February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed the petitioners’ complaint on

the ground that it has already prescribed which was allegedly received only on March 3, 1998. On March 18,

1998, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied July 1, 1998 which was received on July 22,

1998. On July 27, 1998 petitioners filed a notice of appeal

which was denied holding that it was filed 8 days late. Another motion for reconsideration was filed which was also

denied, hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus. The petitioners claimed that the 15 day reglementary

period started to run only on July 22 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their

motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: W/N the notice of appeal was filed within the 15 day reglementary period

HELD: YES. To standardize the appeal periods and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court

deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC counted from

the receipt of order dismissing a motion for new trial or reconsideration, hence this to should apply to MTC. The use

of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence from one thing to another. The use therefore

of “or” should mean that the notice of appeal may be filed 15 days from the notice of judgment or 15 days from the

notice of the “final order”. The fresh period of 15 days

becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner therefore filed it well

within the fresh appeal period of 15 days.

(3) CRUZ V. NAVARRO FACTS: Respondent spouses filed an application for registration of 5 parcels of land. Respondent judge declared

the spouses owners thereof and ordered the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration.

Thereafter, the petitioners filed a "Petition for Review of Decree of Registration" alleging that the spouses have

willfully and falsely made it appear that they are the

absolute owners and possessors of the parcels of land when, in truth, the petitioners herein are the real owners and

possessors thereof. Respondent judge denied said petition, as well as, the subsequent MR thus, this petition for

certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners, as grantees of public land, have legal personality to file the petition for review

independently of the Director of Lands.

HELD: YES, having alleged compliance with all conditions essential to grant of government land, petitioners have

amply alleged such real, legally protected interest over the



parcels in question sufficient to clothe them with the

necessary personality to question, independently of the Director of Lands, the validity of the grant of title over the

said properties to the private respondents. Once a homestead applicant has complied with all the

conditions essential to a Government grant he is deemed to

have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government. Thus, even without

a patent actually issued, he has unquestionably acquired a vested right in the land and is to be regarded as the

equitable owner thereof. A review of the decree of registration is warranted when

the following conditions concur (sec 38 of Act 496): (a) the petitioner has a real or dominical interest or right

(he is the owner of the land ordered registered in the name of the respondent) or the petitioner's lien or interest in the

land does not appear in the decree or title issued in the name of the applicant;

(b) the petitioner has been deprived thereof or his lien or

interest thereon was omitted, through fraud; (c) the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent

purchaser for value; and (d) the petition is filed within 1 year from the issuance of

the decree. The nature of fraud required to justify re-opening or

review of decree of registration must be: • ACTUAL—there must have been an intentional

concealment or omission of a fact required by law to be stated in the application or a willful

statement of a claim against the truth, either of

which is calculated to deceive or deprive another of his legal rights.

• EXTRINSIC—it is employed to deprive a party of his day in court, thereby preventing him from asserting

his right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.

Here, this fraud consists of the allegedly intentional omission by the spouses to properly inform the court that

there were persons (the petitioners) in actual possession and cultivation of the parcels in question. Thus, denying the

court and the Chief of the Land Reg Commission the exercise

of their authority to require the sending of specific individual notices of the pendency of the questioned

application. The "Notice of Initial Hearing," did not contain a specific mention of the names of the petitioners, but only

those of public official and private individuals who evidently were not interested in the outcome of the questioned

application.

(4) REXLON REALTY V. CA FACTS: Respondent Alex L. David is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite

covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-72537

and T-72538. On August 17, 1989, petitioner Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. (Rexlon, for brevity) entered into an agreement

with respondent David for the purchase of the said two (2) parcels of land as evidenced by a document denominated as

"Absolute Deed of Sale". On February 18, 1994, David filed with the Regional Trial

Court of Cavite City, Branch 16, a petition for the issuance of owner’s duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-72537 and T-

72538 to replace the owner’s duplicate copies which were allegedly lost. On March 1, 1994, the RTC granted the said

petition in a decision. Petitioner Rexlon then filed with the Court of Appeals a

petition for annulment of the said Decision of the trial court

on the ground that respondent David allegedly employed

fraud and deception in securing the replacement owner’s duplicate copies of the subject TCTs; The petition was later

amended, with leave of court, to include as respondent Paramount Development Corporation of the Philippines

(Paramount, for brevity) upon discovering that respondent

David had executed on September 20, 1994, a deed of sale of the subject parcels of land in favor of Paramount. As a

result of that sale, new certificates of title designated as TCT Nos. T-525664 and T-525665 were issued in the name of

respondent Paramount in lieu of TCT Nos. T-72537 and T-72538 in the name of Alex L. David.

On November 19, 1996, public respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition of

petitioner Rexlon.

ISSUE: Whether the Court can rule on the validity or nullity of the titles issued in the name of respondent Paramount in

the light of the facts of this case?

HELD: YES

Firstly, it must be remembered that, in the amended petition of Rexlon for annulment of judgment, respondent

Paramount was impleaded for the reason that the prayer therein sought the nullification of the new titles issued in

the name of respondent Paramount. Inasmuch as a petition for annulment of judgment is classified as an original action

that can be filed before the Court of Appeals,17 the said court can admit, by way of an amendment to the petition,

new causes of action intimately related to the resolution of

the original petition. Hence, respondent Paramount became a necessary party in the petitioner’s original cause of action

seeking a declaration of the existence and validity of the owner’s duplicate copy of the subject certificate of title in

the possession of the latter, and an indispensable party in the action for the declaration of nullity of the titles in the

name of respondent Paramount. Secondly, respondent Paramount has duly consented to

put in issue the validity of its titles by invoking in this appeal the reasons espoused by the appellate court and

respondent David for the dismissal of the petition to annul

the decision of the trial court. Thirdly, in order for a just, speedy and inexpensive

disposition of the case, we must decide on the effect of void duplicate copies of a certificate of title that served as a

basis for the sale of the property it represents and the eventual issuance of titles in the name of respondent

Paramount. To require another proceeding only for the purpose of annulling the said new titles when the same

could be decided in this very petition would promote judicial bureaucracy.

(5) RIVERA V. MORAN FACTS: In a cadastral case, the CFI ordered several lots registered in the names of Garcia and Llorente.

Subsequently, Llotente transferred his interest over the said lots to Garcia, who mortgaged the land to Rivera.

Later on, the Attorney General presented a petition for review under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act,

alleging that the adjudication of the land to Garcia and Llorente had been obtained by fraud consisting in the

fraudulent alterations of the stenographic notes taken in the cadastral case.

Llorente filed a petition in Court saying that the CFI was without jurisdiction to reopen the case because of the

following reasons:



1) No sufficient notice was given of the hearing of the

petition for review filed on February 15, 1923, and 2) That the Director of Lands was precluded from

alleging fraud since in when his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, he failed to appeal.

Therefore, the matter is res judicata.

3) That since there was no final decree was issued, the petition for review was presented prematurely,

and 4) The parties are innocent mortgagors.

ISSUE: Is the petition for review valid?

HELD:

1) It was proven through preponderance of evidence that notice of hearing was served upon Francisco,

the attorney for Garcia and Llorente. In addition thereto, Garcia and Llorente appeared in Court

without questioning the jurisdiction of the court,

and hereby impliedly waived their objections to such defects as there might have been in the

service of notice. 2) The petition for a review is separate and distinct

from a motion for a new trial. Therefore, the right is a to the remedy is not affected by the denial of

such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it may have been presented.

3) It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and the law provides that a petition

for review of decree on the grounds of fraud must

be filed within one year after entry of the decree. At first blush, it may seem that a petition for

review could not be filed in court. However, this could not be the intention of the parties. The SC

held that a petition for review under Section 38 may be field at any time after the rendition of the

court’s decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of

registration. 4) The parties are not innocent purchasers for value.

They acquired interest over the land even before a

decree of registration was given

RULING: Petition for certiorari was denied.

(6) RUFLOE, ET AL V. BURGOS, ET AL

FACTS: During the marriage of Adoracion and Angel, they acquired a 371- square meter parcel of land at Muntinlupa

subject of the present controversy. Respondent Delos Reyes forged the signatures of Adoracion and Angel in a Deed of

Sale to make it appear that the subject property was sold to her by the petitioner spouses. Because of this, she

succeeded in obtaining a certificate of title in her name.

The Rufloes then filed a complaint for damages against De los Reyes contending that the Deed of Sale was falsified as

the signatures were forged because Angel Rufloe died in 1974, four (4) years before the alleged sale in favor of De los

Reyes. Along with this, they filed a notice of adverse claim. During the pendency of the case, De los Reyes sold the

property to respondent Burgos siblings thus a new title was issued in their names. The Burgos siblings sold the same

property to their aunt, Leonarda Burgos. Since the sale in favor of the aunt was not registered, no title was issued in

her name. The said parcel of land remained in the name of Burgos siblings who continued paying real estate taxes.

The RTC ruled in favor of Rufloe saying that the Deed of

Sale was falsified because of the forged signatures. Rufloes then filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contract

and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles against the respondents. Alleging that since Deed of Sale was falsified,

then no valid title was ever given to the Burgos siblings.

The RTC ruled in favor of Rufloes averring that the respondents were not innocent purchasers for value and did

not have a better right to the property in question than the true and legal owners, the Rufloes. In addition, the sale bet

Burgos siblings and their aunt was simulated to make it appear that the aunt was a buyer in good faith. On the other

hand, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES: (1) W/N the sale of the parcel of land by Delos Reyes

to the respondents were valid and binding (2) W/N the respondents are buyers in good faith and

for value despite the forged deed of sale of their

transferor Delos Reyes.

RULING: NO to both Since the Deed of Sale executed by De los Reyes in favor

of the Burgos siblings and the subsequent sale to their aunt was simulated based on forged signatures, no certificate of

title was ever issued in their name. Thus, it is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one does not have. One

can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can

transfer legally. The respondents could not be considered

buyers in good faith. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the

property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair

price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim. The burden of proving the

status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon one who asserts that status.

The Rufloes, by filing an adverse claim, were more protected of their interest over their property and served as

a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said

property that someone is claiming an interest on the same and may have a better right than the registered owner.

Clearly, the respondent siblings and their aunt were not innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, every person dealing with

registered land, as in this case, may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore and

will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

However, this rule admits of an unchallenged exception: when the party has actual knowledge of facts and

circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man

to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient

facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The

presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the

certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the

exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and,

hence, does not merit the protection of the law.

(7) ADRIANO V. PANGILINAN



FACTS: The petitioner Adriano is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.

337942. Sometime on 1990, petitioner entrusted the original owner's copy of the TCT to Salvador, a distant relative, for

the purpose of securing a mortgage loan.

Thereafter without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, Salvador mortgaged the property to Respondent

Pangilinan. Subsequently when petitioner verified the status of his title with the RD of Marikina, he was surprised to

discover that there was already annotation for REM in the title, purportedly executed by one Adriano, in favor of the

Respondent, in consideration of P60,000.00, petitioner then denied that he executed deed.

After repeated demand by the petitioner that respondent return or reconvey to him his title to the said property and

when these demands were ignored or disregarded, he instituted the present suit.

Respondent stated that he was a businessman engaged in

the buying and selling as well as in the mortgage of real estate properties; that sometime in December, 1990

Salvador, together with Macanaya and a person who introduced himself as Adriano, came to his house inquiring

on how they could secure a loan over a parcel of land; that he asked them to submit the necessary documents, such as

the owner's duplicate of the transfer certificate of title to the property, the real estate tax declaration, its vicinity

location plan, a photograph of the property to be mortgaged, and the owner's residence certificate; that when

he conducted an ocular inspection of the property to be

mortgaged, he was there met by a person who had earlier introduced himself as Adriano, and the latter gave him all

the original copies of the required documents to be submitted; that after he (defendant) had verified from the

RD that the title to the property to be mortgaged was indeed genuine, he and that person Adriano executed the

REM, and then had it notarized and registered with the RD. After that, the alleged owner, Adriano, together with

Macanaya and another person signed the promissory note in the amount of P60,000.00 representing the appraised value

of the mortgage property. This done, he defendant gave

them the aforesaid amount in cash. Respondent claimed that petitioner voluntarily entrusted

his title Salvador for the purpose of securing a loan, thereby creating a principal-agent relationship between the plaintiff

and Salvador for the aforesaid purpose. Thus, according to respondent, the execution of the REM was within the scope

of the authority granted to Salvador; that in any event that since the said TCT has remained with petitioner, the latter

has no cause of action for reconveyance against him." The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, and the CA

reversed the said decision.

ISSUES: W/N consent is an issue in determining who must

bear the loss if a mortgage contract is sought to be declared a nullity.

RULING: The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, setting

aside the decision of the CA, and reinstating the Ruling of the RTC.

The court ruled that the mortgage is null and void, for being entered into by a person who is not the absolute

owner of the thing. The court also found that the petitioner is a not a

purchaser for value, that his negligence is the proximate

cause to the property being registered REM. According to the court the respondent is a businessman and that while it

is true that when dealing with Torrens title one may rely on the face of the title, the court held that the negligence of

the respondent to ascertain the identity of the imposter is

critical that it is due to this mistake that the property is now encumbered by a REM. The court in granting that the

respondent is negligent finds that if there was any negligence eon the party of Salvador, then such is

inconsequential. The court therefore ruled in favor of the

petitioner due to the negligence of the respondent.

(8) SANDOVAL V. CA FACTS: This is another dispute over land ownership. The subject property is a parcel of land on which a five-door

apartment building stands, located at No. 88 Halcon Street, Quezon City, for which a TCT was issued in the name of

private respondent Lorenzo Tan, Jr. In October 1984, Tan was asked to present his owner’s

copy of the TCT to the RD of QC in connection with an adverse claim. He explained however that he was still

looking for his copy of the TCT. A month after, he

discovered that the adverse claim of one Godofredo Valmeo had been annotated on his title. Apparently, a Lorenzo Tan,

Jr., obviously an impostor, had mortgaged the property to Valmeo to secure a loan. Thereafter, the real Tan sued for

the cancellation of the annotation of mortgage and damages against Almeda and Valmeo.

In 1985, Tan met with petitioner Juan Sandoval who claimed to be the new owner of the site of the property. It

was discovered that as early as September 1984, someone purporting to be Tan sod the property to Almeda in a Deed

of Sale of Registered Land with Pacto de Retro. Said person also apparently executed a waiver in favor of Almeda, which

caused the cancellation of the TCT in Tan’s name and its

issuance in Almeda’s. Later on, Almeda sold the property to petitioner for Php230, 000; a TCT was issued in Sandoval’s

name. Tan alleged that petitioner had prior knowledge of the

legal flaws, which tainted Almeda’s title. Petitioner countered that he was a purchaser in good faith and for

valuable consideration. He bought the land through real estate brokers whom he contacted after seeing the property

advertised in an issue of the Manila Bulletin. Upon guarantees of the brokers and his lawyer’s go-signal, he

proceeded to purchase the land, and paid in two

installments.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner Sandoval is a purchaser in good faith, hence, shouldn’t be held accountable for the fraud

committed against respondent Tan.

RULING: NO, he wasn’t. True, a forged deed can be the basis of a valid title, but

only if the certificate of title has already been transferred from the true owner’s name indicated by the forger and

while it remained as such, the land was subsequently sold to

an innocent purchaser. Unquestionably, the vendee had the right to rely upon the certificate of title.

It is well-settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go

beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title; he is charged with notice only of such burdens as are annotated

on the title. This admits of an exception though: a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the

Torrens certificate and dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts

and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has

knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of



sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to

inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.

This case falls under the exception. Firstly, since Sandoval’s lawyer apparently verified with

the RD, it was inevitable for him to come across the TWO

copies of the TCT. Sandoval was thus aware in fact of the irregularity attending the original TCT and its derivative

certificates. Secondly, Sandoval’s testimony that he actually met with

Almeda at the latter’s residence in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila prior to the execution of the deed of sale is found to

be unconvincing and improbable on the ground of that the deed contained the erroneous address of Almeda. It wasn’t

likely that Sandoval could have been mistaken about the residence of his vendor when the transaction was an

important one, involving as it does substantial consideration.

Thirdly, the lack of consistency in his enumeration and

recollection of his alleged meetings with Almeda warrants disbelief and inspires doubt.

Fourthly, the several but varying addresses of Almeda should have alerted Sandoval of the questionability of

Almeda’s title. Thus, he is deemed to have actual notice of the defects in Almeda’s title, which is contrary to his claim

of good faith. Lastly, the certification on the deed that the property was

not tenanted was untrue. As parties interested in the transaction, they should not have permitted such falsehood

to taint the instrument.

Sandoval, however, must be paid back by Almeda the sum of Php230, 000.

(9) DURAN V. IAC FACTS: Petitioner, Circe Duran originally owned two parcels

of land covered by TCT 1647 registered in the Registry of Deeds in Caloocan City. Allegedly, she left the Philippines on

1954 and returned only on 1966. Allegedly while she was still out of the country, on 13 May 1963, a Deed of Absolute Sale

of the two lots was executed in favor of Fe Duran, petitioner’s mother. By virtue of the sale, TCT 1647 was

cancelled and was replaced by TCT 2418 and 2419.

Subsequently on 3 December 1965, Fe executed a Real Estate Mortgage of the two lots in favor of private

respondent Erlinda B. Marcelo Tiangco. Upon learning of the REM, petitioner wrote the Registry of

Deeds to inform the latter that her mother has no authority to mortgaged the land. Petitioner received no reply, which

prompted her to return to the Philippines in 1966. Meanwhile, the lots were foreclosed due to Fe’s

(petitioner’s mother) failure to redeem the properties and a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of private respondent

Tiangco.

Petitioner assailed the validity of the foreclosure proceedings and the sale arguing that her signature was

forged in the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of her mother since it was impossible for her to sign the documents

while she was out of the country during that time.

ISSUE: W/N private respondent Tianco is a purchaser in good faith and for value?

HELD: YES. Good faith consists in the possessor's belief that

the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same and could convey his title. Good faith, while it

is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to the

contrary, requires a well-founded belief that the person

from whom title was received was himself the owner of the land, with the right to convey it. There is good faith where

there is an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage from another. In the case at bar,

private respondents, in good faith relied on the certificate

of title in the name of Fe S. Duran and as aptly stated by respondent appellate court "[e]ven on the supposition that

the sale was void, the general rule that the direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory that

the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply here for the court is confronted with the functionings of the

Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger."

(10) PINEDA V. CA | GONZALES

FACTS: In 1982, Spouses Benitez mortgaged their house and lot (TCT 8361) to Pineda and Sayoc as security for P243,000

loan with 1 year maturity period. In 1983, with the consent of Pineda, Benitezes sold the house to Mojica, where the

latter filed a petition for the issuance of 2nd owner’s duplicate TCT 8361. Mojica claimed that she “purchased a

parcel of land” and that the owner’s duplicate TCT 8361 was lost. 2nd owner’s duplicate TCT 8361 was issued in favor of

Mojica. A month after, she was able to purchase the lot on which the house stood and upon registration with the RD,

TCT 8361 (2nd) was cancelled and TCT 13138 was issued in

favor of Mojica. In Feb 1985, Mojica obtained a P290,000 loan from

Gonzales, secured with a PN and a mortgage of the house and lot. Gonzales registered this deed of mortgage with the

RD, who annotated the mortgage on TCT 13138 as Entry No. 33209.

In May 1985, Pineda and Sayoc filed a complaint before the RTC against Benitez and Mojica, praying for the

cancellation of 2nd owner’s duplicate TCT 8361. During the pendency of the case, Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated

on the original TCT 8361 with the RD. In 1987, the court

granted the petition. Mojica eventually defaulted on her obligation to Gonzales,

which led to the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged house and lot. Gonzales purchased the house and lot at the

public auction; Mojica failed to redeem the property. Because of Gonzales’ purchase, the RD cancelled TCT 13138

(Mojica) and issued TCT 16084 (Gonzales), which contained Entry No. 35520 (Notice of Lis Pendens).

Dissatisfied, Benitez and Mojica appealed to CA, which affirmed RTC’s decision. On motion of Pineda and Sayoc,

RTC issued a WRIT OF EXECUTION to enforce the judgment.

The Sheriff’s Return declared that the RD could NOT implement the writ of execution because it had already

cancelled TCT 8361 and issued TCT 16084 (Gonzales). Pineda and Sayoc, then, filed a motion with the RTC for the

issuance of an order requiring Gonzales to surrender the owner’s duplicate TCT 16084 to the RD.

There were 3 orders, which the RTC rendered: FIRST ORDER: declared Gonzales in default for having failed

to appear at hearing and oppose the motion to surrender his TCT.

SECOND ORDER: declared TCT 16084 (Gonzales) void and reinstated TCT 8361 (Benitez).



THIRD ORDER: denied Gonzales’ motion to lift 1st order and

to reconsider 2nd order. Gonzales then filed with the CA, petition for Writ of

Prohibitory Injunction. CA declared 1st, 2nd and 3rd orders of the RTC null and void, and Writ of PI permanent.

ISSUES: (1) W/N a notice of lis pendens binds a subsequent

purchaser of the property (Gonzales) to the outcome of the pending case

(2) W/N TCT 13138 and TCT 16084, being derived from the void 2nd owner’s duplicate TCT 8361, are also

void (3) W/N a separate action should be filed to cancel

TCT 16084, in accordance with Sec. 108, PD 1529 (4) W/N Gonzales was an innocent purchaser for value

RULING: Petition DENIED, CA’s decision AFFIRMED.

(1) The effect of the Notice of Lis Pendens was to

subject Gonzales to the outcome of the case. But such could not defeat Gonzales’ right under the

foreclosure sale because: a. Gonzales registered the mortgage before

annotation of lis pendens in good faith, making her mortgage valid despite

invalidity of TCT 13138. b. Gonzales’ mortgage was valid, with the

auction sale retroacting to the date of the registration of her mortgage.

(2) 2nd owner’s duplicate TCT 8361: VOID

a. It was in Pineda’s possession and not lost, as Mojica contended.

b. Mojica also obtained this through misrepresentation by saying that she has

“purchased a parcel of land” when she only bought the house.

c. What is void is the TCT, not Mojica’s title over it. TCT and Title are 2 different

things; TITLEownership of a property while TCTevidence of ownership

TCT 13138 (Mojica): VOID

a. It was derived from the 2nd owner’s duplicate TCT 8361, which is void.

TCT 16084 (Gonzales): VALID a. It was obtained from the public auction.

b. Mortgage annotated on a void title is VALID if mortgagee registered such in good faith.

c. Gonzales was in good faith because he had no actual notice of prior unregistered

mortgage in favor of Pineda and Sayoc. Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated after

Gonzales purchased property from the public auction.

(3) YES. Under Sec. 108, PD 1529, Pineda and Sayoc

should have filed the petition to surrender TCT 16084 in the original case where decree of

registration of such TCT was entered and not in case where they prayed for cancellation of 2nd

owner’s duplicate TCT 8361. (4) YES, for having no actual notice of prior

unregistered mortgage in favor of Pineda and Sayoc. Moreover, Gonzales was vigilant in

exercising her right to foreclose the property, while Pineda and Sayoc were negligent in not registering

their mortgage. Rule is that whoever registers their

mortgage first would have better rights.

(11) HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA V. CA FACTS: Angelita Glor and her children filed for reconveyance

of a parcel of land with the RTC of Caluag, Quezon against

the heirs of Jose Olviga. The RTC ruled in favor of the Glors which led to the Olvigas to appeal with the CA arguing that

the action for reconveyance has already prescribed and that they were purchasers in good faith. The CA affirmed the RTC

decision. A summary of events follows because it is much easier that way:

1950 - Lot in question was still forestland when Eutiquio

Pureza and his father cultivated it by introducing fruit bearing trees such as coconuts, jackfruits, mangoes,

avocado and bananas.

1956 – The Bureau of Lands surveyed the land in the name of

Pureza but Godofredo Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga, protested and claims that they’re entitled to ½ of the lot.

1960 – Pureza filed for homestead application over the lot.

1961 – Pureza transferred his rights to Cornelio Glor, the

husband of Angelita. Neither the homestead application nor the transfer was acted upon by the Director of Lands for

unknown reasons.

1967 – Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a

cadastral proceeding, in fraud of the rights of Pureza and his transferee, Cornelio Glor and family. The lot was split and

transferred to the Olilas.

1988 – Glors learned of the Olvigas title

April 10, 1989 – The Glors filed an action for reconveyance

ISSUE: W/N the action for reconveyance has already prescribed?

Held: NO. The SC has ruled in a number of cases that action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or

constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed of the

date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. However such rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to property doesn’t prescribe.

In the case at bar, the Glors were in actual possession since 1950 hence their undisturbed possession gave them the

continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to

determine the nature of the claim of the Olvigas who, upon their discovery in 1988 of the adverse title, disturbed their

possession. Added factual note: What must’ve happened was that the

Glors were not notified of the registration proceedings with Angelita testifying that there’s been neither notice nor

posting. Jose Olvigas falsely ommitted the fact that other persons were in possession of the land he sought to be

registered.

(11) HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA V. CA



FACTS: The land in question was still considered a forestland

when Eutiquic Pureza and his father entered and cultivated the land on 1950. On 1956 the land was released for

disposition and the Bureau of Lands surveyed the same and was named in favor of Pureza. The lot was labeled as lot 13.

Godofredo Olviga, the father of Jose Olviga protested only

to the ½ share of lot 13 claiming ownership over it, which was included in the public records of the Bureau of Lands.

On 1960, Pureza applied for a homestead patent over lot 13 and while it was pending, he transferred all of his rights

to Cornelio Glor on 1961. Neither the patent application nor the transfer of rights were acted upon by the Director of

Lands for some undisclosed reasons. On 1967, in fraud of the Pureza and Glor, Jose Olviga

obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral proceeding. It appeared that Glor was not aware of the

proceedings because due notice of the proceedings were not given although Glor was in actual possession of the land.

Olviga, omitted to mention in the proceedings that other

persons were in actual possession of lot 13. On 1988, Glor found out that the land was registered

already in the name of Olviga and subsequently filed an action for reconveyance the following year.

ISSUE: W/N the action for reconveyance has already

prescribed?

HELD: NO, although the Court has ruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of lands

based on implied or constructive trust prescribed in ten

years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of

title over the property, it provides for an exception. This rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of

the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to

seek reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.

(12) CABRERA V. CA FACTS: The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in

Cainta, Rizal. It was originally owned by the Spouses

Gonzaga, presumably with conjugal funds. Their grandchildren, the private respondents claim the property

by right of succession. On the other hand, Cabrera, the petitioner, claim the property by virtue of an alleged sale of

the uncle of the grandchildren in their favor. The records show that the tax declaration on the land had

since 1921 been in the name of the spouses Gonzaga until 1944, when it was made in the name of Eliseo Gonzaga, the

petitioners’ uncle. In 1953, the tax declaration was again changed in the name of Cabrera.

The grandchildren filed a complaint for recovery of the

property in the CFI of Rizal. Both parties adverted in their respective pleadings to Cabrera’s application for registration

o the land under the Torrens system which was then pending in another court.

At the trial, the counsel of the grandchildren asked for the amendment of the complaint so as to make it read that they

discovered the change in the name of the tax declaration in 1969 instead of 1960 as erroneously writen. This was granted

without objection from the defense. TC sustained the plaintiffs (grandchildren) after finding

that their evidence remained unrebutted and held that Cabrera ailed to prove the alleged sale to them by Eliseo

(the uncle)

CA affirmed the decision but with modification that, as

recognized by plaintiffs, the 1/5 share pertaining to Eliseo Gonzaga should be retained by Cabrera.

Cabrera came to the SC on certiorari. They claim that CA erred in considering and allowing the complaint as an action

for reconveyance.

ISSUE: W/N action for reconveyance may be filed even

before the issuance of the decree of registration.

RULING: Action for reconveyance may be filed even before the issuance of the decree of registration.

In Agreda v Agreda, SC held that an action for reconveyance may be filed even before the issuance of the

decree of registration. There is no reason, indeed, why one has to wait until the land is actually registered before he

can sue for reconveyance. The grandchildren filed their complaint because they were unwilling to recognize the

registration proceedings for lack of compliance with the

notification requirements. They did not have to await its termination. As it happened, providentially, the registration

was granted during the trial of the plaintiffs’ complaint for recovery of the property. Hence, their pending action could

conveniently and properly be deemed an action for reconveyance filed within the 1- year reglementary period.

There were valid grounds too. The private respondents were able to establish that the transfer of the land had been

made under fraudulent circumstances. No evidence was adduced that their uncle who allegedly purchased the land

from their grandfather had informed them of this fact

although he was living with them at that time.

(13) PINO V. CA FACTS: A parcel of land in Echague, Isabela was bought by spouses Juan and Rafaela Gaffud in 1924. On 1936 Juan

died. The land was registered on 1938 and an OCT was issued in favor of Rafaela and his 2 sons Raymundo and

Cicero as co-owners. The lot was sold to Rafaela through a Deed of Transfer which cancelled the OCT and in lieu

thereof a TCT was issued in the name of Rafaela. On 1967, Rafaela sold a portion of the lot to Pascua which caused the

subdivision of the lot to Lot-A and Lot-B which was issued its

corresponding TCTs. On 1970, Rafaela sold the Lot-B to Felicisima Pino evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute

Sale. It was registered and the corresponding TCT was issued. On 1980 Cicero died and his wife Demetria and sons

Romualdo and Adolfo filed a complaint for nullity of sale and reconveyance against petitioner, the portion sold to Pascua

however was not questioned. During the pendency of the case Rafaela died. In 1988 the trial court held that she was

not a purchaser in good faith and that the action to annul the deed of sale has not yet prescribed (4 years). This was

affirmed by CA.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is a purchaser in good faith

HELD: YES. A vendee for value has a right to rely on what

appears on the face of the certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the

party concerned had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man

to make such further inquiry. In the case at bar the TCT was in the name of Rafaela Donato alone.

The non-production of the extra-judicial statement does not prove that there was fraud committed. The respondents



should have presented it. No allegations much less any

evidence was given by the respondents. The petitioner is therefore a purchaser in good faith. An

action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot reach an innocent purchaser for value. The remedy of such

defrauded party is to file an action for damages within 10

years from the issuance of the Torrens Title. The action has already prescribed since the date from the OCT and even on

the TCT was over 10 years.

(14) DE GUZMAN JR. V. NATIONAL TREASURER FACTS: Spouses Milambiling bought a parcel of land and before they left for abroad to work, they entrusted the Deed

of Sale and the Certificate of Title (still in the name of Sta. Lucia Realty) to Belgica, a long-time friend, who

volunteered to register the sale and transfer the title in their names

When Belgica arrived in Saudi Arabia to deliver the title,

she forgot to bring the title with her. This infuriated the husband who then asked relatives to investigate. They

discovered that the title had indeed been transferred in their names but was subsequently cancelled and transferred

in the names of the de Guzman spouses. What happened was an impostor-couple, having obtained possession of the

owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title, sold the property to the petitioners.

Thus, the Milambilings filed an action for declaration of nullity of sale and title with damages. RTC, CA and SC ruled

in favor of them thus, spouses De Guzman filed action for damages against the Assurance Fund.

ISSUE: W/N the Assurance Fund is liable for the losses allegedly sustained by petitioners.

HELD: NO, According to Sec 95 of the Property Registration

Decree, the persons who may recover from the Assurance Fund are as follows:

1) Any person who sustains loss or damage under the

following conditions: a) there was no negligence on his part; and

b) the loss or damage sustained was through any omission,

mistake or malfeasance of the court personnel, or the Registrar of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the

Registry in the performance of their respective duties under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, now, the

Property Registration Decree; or

2) Any person who has been deprived of any land or interest therein under the following conditions:

a) there was no negligence on his part; b) he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his

land or interest therein under the provisions of the PRD; or

by the registration by any other person as owner of such land; or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any

certificate of owner’s duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book or by any

cancellation; and c) he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an

action for the recovery of such land or interest therein, or claim upon the same.

Petitioners have not alleged that the loss or damage they

sustained falls in either of the 2. Moreover, they were negligent in not ascertaining whether the impostors were

really the owners of the property.

The purpose for which the Assurance Fund was established

does not support the petitioner’s claim. The Assurance Fund was intended to relieve innocent

persons from the harshness of the doctrine that a certificate is conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land.

Petitioners did not suffer any prejudice because of the

operation of this doctrine. On the contrary, petitioners sought to avail of the benefits of the Torrens System by

registering the property in their name. Unfortunately for petitioners, the original owners were able to judicially

recover the property from them. However, the fact that the petitioners eventually lost the property to the original

owners does not entitle them to compensation under the Assurance Fund. The Court cannot sanction compensation

that is not within the law's contemplation. The Government is not an insurer of the unwary citizen’s

property against the trickery of scoundrels. Petitioners’ recourse is not against the Assurance Fund but against the

rogues who duped them.

land+titles+remedies

Documents