22) Republic vs Heirs of Abrille

Facts: The original owner of the Lot 379-B-2-B under OCT no 5609 was in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille, father of Luisa. Upon the death of Francisco, said property was inherited by Luisa which contains an area of 525,652 sq meters under TCT no T-1439. Luisa then caused the subdivision of said land into 2 lots under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner. Lot 379-B-2-B had an excess/enlarged area of 82,127 sq meters more than the original area covered by TCT no T-1439. Register of Deeds registered Lot 379-B-2-B-1 and issued TCT no 1886 and likewise registered Lot 379-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT no 1887. TCT no 1886 was cancelled by virtue of a deed of sale and TCT no T-19077 was issued to Gaudencio Consunji. Thereafter TCT no 1887 were also cancelled and in lieu thereof several TCT’s were issued. TCT 20725 was issued to Milagros Huang, TCT 20701 to Josefino Huang, TCT 20713 to Miguel Huang, TCT 20690 in the name of Huang Sin Sin. This is all based and upon the approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd 71236 which contained the increase of 82,127 sq meters. The Trial court ordered the cancellation of said TCT 20725, 20701, 20713 and TCT 20690. Appealed to CA which was denied. Then brought to the SC for petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of TCT 20725, 20701, 20713 and TCT 20690?

Discussion: No lower court did not err. To include the increased area which is not a registered land but formerly a river, a proceeding in registration of land title should be filed. The area of 82,127 sq meters should be brought under the operation of the Torrens system.

Ruling: Judgment appealed is hereby affirmed in toto

23) Grande vs Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 3.5032 hectares located at Barrio Ragan in the municipality of Magsaysay province of Isabela by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui. Said property is identified as Lot No 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration, its north eastern boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place by action of the current on the Cagayan River. There was a distance of about 19,964 sq meters. 1.9964 hectares more or less has been added to the registered area. Petitioners filed action against respondents to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion alleging that they were in peaceful and continuous possession of land until Sept 1948. Respondents on the other hand claimed ownership asserting that they had been in open and continuous possession of said portion prior to 1933. The Trial court rendered decision of ownership to petitioners. Respondents appealed to CA. CA affirmed decision. Hence petitioners brought action to SC.

Issue: Whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because said lot which receives it is covered by Torrens thereby making alluvial property imprescriptible?

Discussion: No, Ownership over the accretion received by land is governed by Civil Code and registration under Land Registration Act which does not give title to land but confirms and protects title already

possessed by owner and making it imprescriptible. To obtain said protection, the land must be registered. But petitioners never sought registration of land since 1934 until the present time. Hence it was not imprescriptible and therefore subject to acquisition by 3rd parties.

Ruling: Decision of CA is affirmed. Costs against petitioners.

24) Cureg vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts: Private respondents except Domingo Apostol are the legal and or the forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo who died in Feb 1944. Since time immemorial and or before July 1894, the late Francisco Gerardo together with his predecessors in interest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession under a bonafide claim of ownership of a parcel of land situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela containing 2.5000 hectares. It is bounded on the north by Cagayan River, east by a certain Domingo Guingab, south by Antonio Carniyan and west by Sabina Mola. Said land was then declared for taxation purposes. Upon death of Francisco, ownership and possession was succeded by his only heir, Domingo Gerardo together with 3 legal/forced heirs, Soledad, Primo and Salud Gerardo. Primo is survived by respondents Rosa, Nieves and Flordeliza. Salud is survived by respondent Lilia Maquinad. Respondents then sold land to co-respondent Domingo. Verbal sale and conveyance was reduced in writing. Executed a extra judicial partition. Land then showed signs of accretion of about 3 hectares on the north. Domingo declared land and accretion for tax purposes. Private respondents were then prevented by petitioners from cultivating land with accretion. They mentioned that Antonio Carniyan was the owner of the land as he revised tax declaration and increased the area to 4,584 sq meters thereby completely eliminating the original boundary in the north of Domingo Gerardo. Trial court in favor of Domingo Apostol as owner. Appealed to the IAC which affirmed decision of TC.

Issue: Who owns the said subject land with accretion?

Discussion: The increase in the area of petitioner’s land being an accretion does not automatically become registered land. Said portion needs to be registered under the Torrens System for it to be imprescriptible and not subject to acquisition of 3rd parties.

Ruling: Petition Granted.

25) Fernandez vs Tanada

Facts: Respondent Borromeo filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land consisting of 5,897 hectares situated in Barrio Pook, Talisay Cebu which is bounded on the north by Lot 191 owned by said applicant, east by a lot belonging to Claudio Baller, south by the Bohol strait/seashore and west by lot 2586 owned by applicant. He based his claim of ownership under Art 457 alleging that the land sought to be registered was formed by accretion bordering lots which were owned by him. March1968, petitioners opposed application alleging that the disputed area was formed by the sea, it was the oppositors who occupied land openly and publicly and that respondent is an alien hence he cannot acquire property in the Philippines. The LRC ruled that petitioners have no interest over the said land and dismissed the opposition. Said order has set aside after a MR was filed. In an order issued on Dec

1969, aforementioned order was revived and order for demolition of the 11 huts in the premises built by petitioners. Appeal was made but was denied. Moved to reconsider but was also denied.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in ordering the demolition of houses?

Discussion: The dismissal of the oppositions did not warrant the court to order the demolition of the houses of petitioners. There is no decree of registration issued in favor of Borromeo. Only after a land is duly registered and a writ of possession is issued after due hearing can petitioners be dispossessed. In ordering said demolition, court acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling: Order is declared null and void. Preliminary injunction granted . Records are ordered to be remanded.

26) Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Co Inc vs Director of Lands

Facts: Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Co., Inc., filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land of 414.5144 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Panacan, municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan, and more particularly described in amended plan SC-4782-AMD. The application relies upon section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141. The Director of Lands opposed said application, alleging that it involves a public land covered by appellants sales application No. 4782 dated April 9, 1920; that the land was not awarded to appellant, it having refused to pay the value thereof as determined by an appraisal committee in July, 1950; and that appellant has no valid title to be confirmed, its possession being, not that of an owner, but, merely, that of a (sales) applicant of a position of the public domain. The Court of First Instance of Palawan rendered judgment sustaining the opposition of the Director of Lands and, accordingly, dismissing the application. Hence this appeal

Issue: Whether or not the CFI of Palawan erred in finding that the appellant has no valid title to the land as he is not the owner but merely a sales applicant?

Discussion: No, the application of the petitioner for a sales patent is an acknowledgment that they don’t own such land and such is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands. It was found that the petitioner filed Sales Application No. 4782 over a parcel of public land consisting of 1,024 hectares located at Panacan, Aborlan, Palawan. The application was given due course by the Bureau of Lands. In Dec 1930, the petitioner requested the Director of Lands that it be permitted to reduce the area applied for to 680 hectares because the portion it originally applied for were squatted and claimed by other. On Nov 1933, the Director of Lands wrote a letter to petitioner advising the latter that it had recommended to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce an appraisal of P18.00 per hectare for the land. Director of Lands issued Notice of Auction Sale over the land applied for consisting of 764.0683 hectares setting the date of bidding but auction sale set did not take place because of the request of the applicant for postponement. Applicant prayed that its Sales Application be not cancelled, in view of the demand of the Director of Lands that the sales application be cancelled for lack of interest and that the company may be given time to comply with the conditions required. The applicant declared land applied for taxation purposes and also paid for the necessary expenses for the survey and had cooperated with

the Bureau of Lands surveyor for the survey of the land. Applicant still refused to pay the price fixed as it wants to reduce appraisal value.

It can be shown that appellant's posession of the land in question was merely that of a sales applicant thereof, to whom it had not been awarded because of its refusal to pay the price fixed therefor by the Bureau of Lands. As such sales applicant, appellant manifestly acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands.. It is essential that the applicant hold the land "under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership," All of its acts prior thereto, including its real estate tax declarations, characterized its possession of the land as that of a "sales applicant," and, consequently, as one who expects to buy it, but has not as yet done so, and is not, therefore, its owner.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

27) Director of Land Management vs Court of Appeals 205 scra 486

The Land Investigator/Bureau of Lands verified that a certain Feliciano Juco, his grandparents or predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, exclusive, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the 16 hectare land in the concept of owners of said land for a period of twenty (20) years. Juco built a house on Lot 3 where his family lived. He had carabaos grazing in his pasture. His brother-in-law, Gelacio de la Cruz, owned and lived on the adjacent Lot 4. On March 1957, Nieves Naval de Roldan caused the whole tract of land to be resurveyed as PSU-l6438. Her children filed an application to purchase the property through the Bureau of Lands. Lot 4 was placed in the name of Desiderio Roldan. A sales application was filed by Mariano Roldan for Lot 3. Feliciano Juco was informed of the posting in the Municipality of Tanay, Rizal, of Mariano Roldan's sales application for Lot 3. But having no money, he failed to participate in the bidding. Lot 3 was purchased by Bernardina Manalaysay. In 1963, with the help of Quirino D. Villena's , Juco was able to obtain financial assistance from the spouses Leon and Loreta R. Lina to protest against Mariano Roldan's acquisition of Lot 3. He promised to sell the lot to Lina later. On July 23, 1963, a "Conditional Sale and Transfer of Right to Land" was executed by Juco in favor of the Lina spouses. The Lina spouses fenced Lots 3 and 4 and planted fruit trees thereon. Two years later, a Bilihang Tuluyan was executed by Juco, with his wife's consent, in favor of Lina spouses. The document was notarized and it was thereafter registered under Act No. 3344. Juco upon appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, he was adjudged to have the preferential right to buy the property . He was given sixty (60) days from the finality of the decision to file his own application to purchase it which he did. Shortly thereafter, Feliciano Juco died. Juco's wife, Pacita and their children offered to sell the property to Pompeyo Maliwat who was told about the proceedings in the Bureau of Lands but not about the earlier sale of the land to the Lina spouses. He verified from the records that Feliciano Juco did have a preferential right to the property, so he bought it. He had the deed of sale registered and he declared the land for tax purposes in his name. He placed men on the land to take care of it.

The Maliwats then filed an application for the registration of the land in their names under the Torrens system as they claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lot 3, PSU-164381, with an area of 169.301 square meters, situated at Barrio Cayambay, Tanay, Rizal. The Director of Lands opposed the said application on the ground that the land is public land.The Minister of Agrarian Reform also opposed it on the ground that the land is reserved for agrarian reform.

On November 8, 1972, the Lina spouses filed a motion to dismiss Maliwat's application for registration of title on the ground that the land is covered by a homestead application of Loreto R. Lina duly filed and recorded and that it is public land under the administration and disposition of the Director of Lands. On April 5, 1973, they amended their opposition. They claimed that they had purchased the land from Feliciano Juco, and that hence, the title should be registered in their names.

Another opposition was filed by a certain Cesar N. Roldan, claiming to be the actual occupant of the land, that the possession was given to him by the heirs of Feliciano Juco who died while awaiting the action of the Director of Lands on his application for a free patent; and that he filed an application for free patent in substitution of the deceased, Feliciano Juco.Trial court rendered judgment as follows: The Court orders and decrees the registration of the parcel of land and the registration of title thereto in favor of the the Maliwat spouses .The Director of Lands appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals . CA affirmed decision of the trial court. Motion to reconsider was filed by petitioners but it was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Lot No 3 as private land by virtue of the open, continuous and exclusive occupation and cultivation of Feliciano Juco ?

Discussion: Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Lot 3, had become private land by virtue of the Feliciano Juco's open, continuous, and exclusive occupation and cultivation of the land since 1939 which when transferred to Maliwat's possession after February 1972 far exceeds the statutory thirty-year period for the conversion of alienable public agricultural land into private property. Hence it is ruled that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or thru his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.

The mandate of the law itself is that the possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and by legal fiction, the land ceases to be public and thus becomes private land.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 12601 is affirmed in toto.

28) Kidpales vs Baguio Mining Co 14 SCRA 913

FACTS: Petitioners sued the Baguio Gold Mining Company and the Director of Mines in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, praying for judgment to declare said plaintiffs to be the owners of certain parcels of land situated in Sitio Binanga, Barrio of Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, Mt. Province, to annul the

declarations of location of certain mineral claims of the Baguio Gold Mining Company, overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs, and to recover damages from the company. The complaint also sought to enjoin the director of Mines from proceeding with the lode patent applications of the Mining Company, and to have the mine buildings erected on the land in question demolished at the latter’s expense. The defendant Baguio Gold mining Company, claiming title by virtue of valid locations of the claims since 1925 to 1930 asked for dismissal of the action and damages.

The Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs Cayapa et al failed to substantiate their claims of ownership and dismissed the suits. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals , it rendered judgment finding that the land lay within the Cordillera Forest Reservation which was proclaimed by Governor General Stimson and hence it formed part of the Public domain; that from 1927 to 1933, George Icard and his son, Joseph had entered and located therein certain mining claims then subsequently sold and transferred it to the Baguio Gold Mining Company; that the latter had occupied the land, worked the claims, and performed the acts required by the mining laws to entitle it to mineral patents therefor until the recent World War II; that after the war, the claims were validated by Act No. 4268 of the Philippine Legislature; that the Mining Company had acquired beneficial title to the claims by its locations, although the corresponding patents were still in process at the Bureau of Mines; that the Baguio Gold Mining Company has acquired a superior title to that of the plaintiffs-appellants over the mineral claims under litigation. Appeal was made to the CA which affirmed dismissal of action by the CFI. With this the plaintiffs-appellants went to the SC to have their petition reviewed which the SC declined.

ISSUE: Whether or not an applicant who was previously denied claims of ownership in reinvindicatory action cannot file for registration of same land involved?

Discussion: Yes, If the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. Since there can be no registration of land without applicant being its owner, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in the previous litigation declaring that the mining company’s title is superior to that of appellants should be conclusive on the question in the present case. SC ruled that the findings in the former judgment that the mining claims were validly located and that the title of the mining company is superior to that of appellant being the basis of the sentence of dismissal, conclude the previous adjudication being final and rendered on the merits, and there being an identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action in all the cases. Hence, the dismissal of these land registration proceeding by the CFI of Baguio was in order and conformable to law.

Ruling: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal of these proceedings on the ground of res judicata is affirmed. Appellants shall pay the costs.

29) Divina vs Court of Appeals

Facts: Lot No. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Antonio Berosa. On July 22, 1960, he sold it to Teotimo Berosa. The portion has an area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square meters. Berosa spouses sold the same Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos. Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix Arimado, a boundary owner of Lot 1893, a 20,687 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot 1466, also in Gubat. It adjoins Lot 1893. Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax Declaration No. 13237 and declared it had a total area of 4.0867 hectares. He also had the property resurveyed by private land surveyor Antonio Tiotangco. Tax Declaration No. 13237 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 9032 in Gamos name.The re-survey plan (AP-9021), of Lots 1466 and 1893 conducted on June 16, 1961 for Gamos, showed that the consolidated properties contained a total area of 100,034 sq. m. This plan was approved on July 12, 1961 by the Acting Director of Lands. Tax Declaration No. 12927 which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 9032 was secured by Gamos and declared therein that the area of the consolidated property was 10.0034 hectares with 2500 sq. m. planted to coconut, 3.8187 irrigated for rice planting and 5.9347 were thickets. Teotimo Berosa then conveyed to Vicente G. Divina, herein petitioner, a portion of Lot 1893 referred to as Lot 1893-B. Two years from the date of said sale and five (5) days after November 23, 1968, when Gamos secured Tax Declaration No. 12927 declaring the consolidated property as containing 100,034 sq. m., the deed of sale was registered. An undated Subdivision PLAN of Lot 1893, was prepared for petitioner. The plan, without Bureau of Lands approval, showed that Lot 1893 was divided into two, Lot 1893-A and Lot 1893-B.Gamos sold the consolidated property to private respondent Vilma Gajo-Sy, for P20,000.00. Tax Declaration No. 13768 secured by private respondent, was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 12509. Private respondent filed an application for registration of title to the property at the CFI of Sorsogon. The application was amended to include therein the postal address of Inocencio Erpe, adjoining owner of Lot No. 1893 described in Plan AP-9021.The land registration court ordered the registration of private respondent’s title over Lots Nos. 1466 and 1893.Pending issuance of the final decree of registration, petitioner filed before the same court a petition for review. He alleged that he is the owner of a portion of Lot 1893 consisting of 54,818 sq. m. conveyed to him by Teotimo Berosa ; that he was unaware of the registration proceedings on Lot 1893 due to private respondents failure to give him notice and post any notice in the subject lot; and that private respondent fraudulently misrepresented herself as the owner of the disputed portion despite her knowledge that another person had acquired the same.Private respondent opposed the petition alleging that the registration case had long become final and the court no longer had any jurisdiction thereon; and that lack of personal notice to the petitioner of the registration proceedings did not constitute actual fraud.

The trial court in its ruled that the failure of private respondent to include a known claimant in her application for registration constituted deliberate misrepresentation that the lot subject of her application is not contested when in fact it was and that it amounted to fraud within the contemplation of Section 38 of Act 496. Private respondent appealed decision before the CA. The CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the petition. It ruled: that petitioner-appellee did not indeed appear in the survey plan as an adjoining owner of the subject property. Neither was he a known claimant or possessor of the questioned portion of Lot 1893 which was found by the court a quo to be untouched and thickly planted

with bigaho. There was no need to mention in the application for registration the apprehension or claim of at least petitioner-appellees cousin Evelyn Domalaon in the application for registration, nor to personally notify Elena about registration proceeding. There could, therefore, have been no misrepresentation in any form on the part of respondent-appellee. Petioner now seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in entertaining the petition for review pending issuance of the decree of registration?

Whether or not, there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting actual fraud on private respondents part when she failed to give or post notice to petitioner of her application for registration of the contested land?

Discussion: The adjudication in a registration of a cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of then final decree. As long as the final decree is not issued, and the one year within which it may be revised had not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing may set aside the decision or decree or adjudicate the land to another party. In the present case, a certification was issued by the Land Registration Commission that no final decree of registration had yet been issued and by the order of the trial court dated September 28, 1977, it restrained the Commission from issuing such a decree. Clearly, the tolling of the one year period has not even began. Thus, the trial court did not err when it entertained the petition.

In the second issue, petitioners name did not appear in the survey plan as an adjacent owner, nor claimant nor possessor. However, the trial and appellate courts differed in their conclusion on whether or not there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud in private respondents part when it failed to give notice or post notice to potential claimant and include their names in the application for registration.

As provided by Section 15 of P.D. 1529 it requires that in the application for registration of land titles, the application shall also state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it shall state the extent of the search made to find them. A mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining owners is not sufficient but what search has been made to find them is necessary. The trial court was correct when it took notice that respondents sister Lydia Gajo-Anonuevo admitted that she had a conversation with petitioners cousin Elena Dumalaon about the latter’s apprehension that their land may have been included in respondents application for registration of the disputed land. The omission of respondent with regards to this material information prevented petitioner from having his day in court. The trial court hence supported its conclusion that it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. Such omission is a deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud, a basis for allowing a petition for review of judgment under Section 38 of Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 24, 1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment in LRC Case No. N-147 of the then Court of First Instance, Branch II in Gubat, Sorsogon is REINSTATED. Costs against private respondent.

30) Fewkes vs Vasquez 39 SCRA 514 (1971)

Facts: On 2 March 1967, Eldred Fewkes, an American citizen, applied in the CFI of Albay an application for the registration of 2 lots and the improvements thereon. It was alleged that Fewkes acquired by purchase from Juan G. Velasco, Jr., Brigida C. Velasco and Trinidad G. Velasco, 2 parcels of land, referred to as Lot No. 21-A of Psu-61470 with an area of 223, 241 square meters more or less, and Lot with an area of 11,283 square meters, situated in barrio Bubulusan (Bulusan), municipality of Libon, province of Albay; that applicant was in actual possession of the lots, and that said properties were free from any encumbrance. Attached to the application were the tracing cloth and blue print of plans Psu-61470 and the corresponding technical descriptions of Lots 21-A and 21-B of Psu-61470, the certified copies of the tax declarations on said land, and the two deeds of absolute sale dated 20 June 1966 and 27 January 1967, executed by the Velasco’s in favor of applicant. On March 1967, it was found that the application did not contain the plans and technical description of the parcels of land sought to be registered and the surveyor's certificate hence the court required the applicant to submit the same. Upon compliance, the applicant then submitted a motion praying the court that the Director of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission be directed to approve subdivision plan Psu-61470, wherein it appeared that the lots sought to be registered are parts of a bigger lot identified in said subdivision plan as Lot No. 21.In its order, the court denied the motion reasoning that the application being for registration of land, it had nothing to do with the approval of the subdivision plan. The court issued another order, this time for amendment of the application in order to include the respective postal addresses of the adjoining owners named therein. On Feb 1968, after the initial hearing of case, the court issued an order dismissing the application for warrant of jurisdiction, based on the finding that the properties sought to be registered only formed part of a bigger tract, of land which was described in the plan attached to the application, and that the notice of initial hearing did not delineate accurately the portions of the land involved in the registration proceeding. Motion to reconsider was filed which was denied hence the present appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in dismissing the application?

Discussion: No,. Here the notice of hearing as published in the Official Gazette did not contain the technical description of the 2 lots subject of proceedings but that of the bigger lot hence the notice of hearing is defective and did not confer jurisdiction on the Court.

Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act, an application for registration of land is required to contain: a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an

interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court

Ruling: WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. The dismissal of the application here is understood to be without, prejudice to the filing of a proper application in conformity with the legal requirements.

31) Benin v. Tuason

Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands located in the barrio of La Loma in the municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933, Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.

Issue: Whether or not the failure to notify persons concerned in the registration proceedings would constitute fraud and hence invalidate the decree?

Discussion: No, The decision of this Court, which affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against the heirs but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin. The mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's

predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law. In addition, there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.

Ruling: The joint decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

32) Director of Lands vs Benitez et al

Facts: Emilio Benitez and Eulalia Brillo were declared owners of a parcel of land situated in the City of Tacloban known as Lot No. 2157 for which Original Certificate of Title No. 17507 of the Register of Deeds of Leyte was issued to them in the cadastral proceedings done by the Director of Lands before the CFI of Leyte during the period of May 1925-April 1928. Said lot was bounded on the NE by a road and contains an area of 14,548 sq.m. The decision of adjudication was rendered on December 1932. 26 years after the adjudication of Lot 2157, Emilio Benitez and Eulalia Brillo filed a petition for reopening of the cadastral proceedings under RA 931 claiming that through oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect, a portion of said Lot No. 2157 containing an area of 1,805 sq. m. has not been included in the original survey for which reason they prayed that said portion be designated as Lot No. 1 of the proposed subdivision plan, and that, after notice and hearing, it be adjudicated to them pursuant to Republic Act No. 931.The court issued an order admitting the amended petition and in a subsequent order , it ordered that copies of the original as well as of the amended petition be furnished to the OSG, the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, the City Fiscal of Tacloban City, and the Register of Deeds of the province, setting the case for hearing on October 1958. The court issued an order granting to Emilio Benitez and Eulalia Brillo the right to claim the portion which allegedly was not included in their original title while authorizing at the same time a licensed surveyor to make a survey of the portion that was then being claimed and submit a report to the Director of Lands for his approval. Court rendered judgment declaring Emilio Benitez and his wife as the owners of the additional portion which they claimed to be their own in their petition which this time was declared to contain an area of 3,745 sq.m. Spouses then moved for a writ of execution of the judgment and of possession of the additional portion of land that had been adjudicated to them but claimants who were then occupying the portion claimed by virtue of permits granted by the Director of lands opposed. OSG, on behalf of the Director of Lands, filed a motion to set aside the same judgment on the ground that said decision was a nullity for the reason that the court did not acquire jurisdiction to act on the petition for lack of the requisite publication and notice as required by law. Opposition and motion to set aside the judgment were denied. The OSG as well as the counsel for the 62 oppositors who had adverse claims over the portion in controversy filed their MR but was denied. Hence, the present petition for review filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte on behalf of the Director of Lands and of the 62 adverse claimants.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in allowing the Benitez spouses to amend their petition to claim the additional portions of the land in which they failed to mention in their previous petition?

Discussion: No, the right of the Benitez spouses is gleaned from RA 931 grants to a person claiming title to a parcel of land that has been the subject of a cadastral proceeding who at the time of the survey was in actual possession thereof but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file his claim in the proper court during the time limit established by law, the right to claim such land within a period of 10 years by filing the necessary petition for reopening under the provisions of the Cadastral Act. Besides filing the petition for reopening, it is necessary that notice thereof be given to those persons who claim an adverse interest in the land sought to be registered, as well as the general public, by publishing such notice in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, which shall likewise be posted in a conspicuous place on the new land to be surveyed, as well as in the municipal building of the city or municipality in which the same is situated.

An order of a court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to make it include land not previously included therein is a nullity unless new publication is made as a preliminary to such step. Publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration and cadastral cases, and additional territory cannot be included by amendment of the plan without new publication (Philippines Manufacturing Company vs. Imperial, 49 Phil. 122). Also the right of the claimant to have an additional portion of land registered in their name can only be entertained if it does not refer to such land which has not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or aiuthorized provisionally or permanently disposed of government.

In the case at bar, it appears that the additional portion of land claimed by respondents is actually occupied by persons who claim to be entitled to it by virtue of lease applications or permits granted to them by the Bureau of Lands. Lot 1 which was not included in the cadastral survey of Tacloban are now occupied by squatters, who claimed that they have applied under lease applications and some under Revocable Permits which they have been paying for many years to the Bureau of Lands. Because of these adverse claimants there is a need that the matter be threshed out in an appropriate action with due notice to said claimants and to the Director of Lands from whom their title thereto is said to have emanated under the Public Land Act.

Ruling: Wherefore, petition is hereby granted. The decision rendered by respondent court on April 14, 1962, as well as its orders issued to implement said decision, are hereby declared null and void and without effect. No costs.

33) Republic vs CA

Facts: On June 21,1989, PNB filed a verified petition for judicial reconstitution of OCT No P-6666 and TCT No T-22487 on the basis of the existing owner’s duplicate copies in its custody and possession as mortgagee because the originals on file in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro had been destroyed in the fire. In an order dated June 1989, lower court set petition for hearing and directed that the publication of the order in 2 successive issues of the OG, sending of notice to adjoining owners and the posting thereof in the court premises and in the municipal building of

Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro where the registered prop are located. OSG then entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Fiscal of Oriental Mindoro to appear in the case. Hearing set on Oct 30,1989 was cancelled on motion of the PNB because it did not have yet the certificate of publication to be presented at said hearing. The hearing was reset and was again reset on which date the PNB presented a certificate of publication issued by Luis Avecilla, director of the National Printing Office. But Neither the OSG nor provincial fiscal appeared at the hearing. Lower court issued an order authorizing the branch clerk of court to receive evidence. OSG and or provincial fiscal were again absent at the scheduled hearing before the Commissioner. The reception of evidence proceeded nonetheless. Trial court granted the petition for reconstitution. OSG in behalf of RP appealed to the CA that the TC erred in proceeding & rendering judgment in the reconstitution case despite patent lack of jurisdiction and in granting the petition despite the non-compliance of the requirements needed. CA affirmed court’s order on the ground that there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of publication to confer jurisdiction upon the court. CA held that the certification of publication issued by the director of the national printing office certifying that the notice of petition was actually published in the Official Gazette on Aug 21 and Aug 28,1989 constitute prima facie evidence of the publication for purposes of conferring upon the Court jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition. OSG however argues & maintains that a mere certificate of publication is utterly inadequate as proof of the jurisdictional fact of publication.

Issue: Whether or not a mere certificate of publication is sufficient proof of the jurisdictional fact of publication?

Discussion: No, The jurisdiction or authority of the Regional Trial Court to hear and decide a petition for reconstitution of title is conferred by Republic Act No. 26. The Act prescribes a special mode of procedure that must be followed in order that the court may act on the petition and grant the remedy sought. These requirements and procedure are mandatory and must strictly be complied with, otherwise, the proceedings will be utterly void .

The jurisdictional requirement of publication of a petition for reconstitution of title, refers to the actual publication of the notice of initial hearing of the petition in two successive issues of the Official Gazette with the required posting and notice by registered mail or otherwise to specified persons and its release for circulation at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled hearing (Zuniga vs. Hon. Vecencio 153 SCRA 720). The purpose of such publication is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in whole world as party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it (Register of Deeds of Malabon vs. RTC of Malabon, M.M. Branch 170, 181 SCRA 788).

In the case at bar, there had been no publication of the notice of the (actual) hearing of the petition on February 21, 1990 for the notice that was published in the Official Gazette was of the hearing that was set on October 30, 1989. Also the notice of hearing was published less that 30 days prior to the date of hearing fixed in the notice as required by law but the hearing was held on a different date which has not been published at all. The purpose of publishing the date of hearing of the petition for reconstitution of title is to enable interested parties, who read the notice, to appear at the hearing either to oppose the

petition or assert a claim to the property in question. The purpose will be defeated if the court may actually hear the petition on a different date from that which appeared in the published notice of hearing. Hence in view of this defect in the petition for reconstitution, the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear such petition.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED, the impugned decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 30036 and the order for the reconstitution of OCT No. P-6666 and TCT No. T-22487 of the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, are hereby SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction. Costs against the private respondent.

34) Director of Lands vs Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME

FACTS: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corporation. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe five parcels of land measuring 481,390 square meters. The possession of the Infiels over the land dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan. The land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain. Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements. CFI held that the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela. CFI’s decision was upheld by Intermediate Appellate Court. Director of Lands appealed judgment of the IAC which affirmed the decision of CFI of Isabela .

Issue: Whether or not the said land is a private land pursuant to the grant of the government under RA 3872?

Whether or not the provision barring private companies and associations from purchasing public alienable lands in 1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively?

Ruling: It was held in the case of Meralco vs Castro-Bartolome that a possession is said to be prescriptively acquired by the operation of the Public Lands Act, upon conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the necessary conditions for a Government Grant. Thus, the land in question effectively ceased to be of the public domain and was therefore classified as private property at the moment of the sale through the continuous and unchallenged possession of the bona fide right to ownership from Meralco’s predecessors-interest.

In the case at bar, yes the land is private pursuant to the grant of the government under RA 3872. The land held by the Infiels since time immemorial was effectively deemed as private land, by the operation of the law, ipso jure. As it already acquired by operation of law a grant of the Government hence it already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption.

Thus, at the moment of the sale, ACME Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., Etc. therefore, purchased private property which was valid.

The provision barring private companies and associations from purchasing public alienable lands in the 1973 Constitution cannot be applied retroactively. In this case, ACME had already obtained vested rights under the 1935 Constitution when it purchased the land from the Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution prohibiting the purchase of alienable public lands by private corporations or associations cannot be retroactively applied

Ruling: WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.