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Jurisprudence on Land Tiles and Registration; Cases: Land Titles, Torrens System

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G.R. No. 5246 September 16, 1910MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs.ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee.Ramon Salinas, for appellants. Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee.TRENT, J.:These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba, are the only heirs of Doa Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey, deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, was married on the 21st day of March, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of July, 1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband. The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to have registered the following-described property:A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, upon which are situated three houses and one camarin of light material, having a superficial area of 52 hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares; bounded on the north by the highway (calzada) of Talampas and the lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo, Hermenegildo Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on the south by the same stream and the lands of the capellania; and on the west by the stream called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de la Cruz, Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo.This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane and is assessed at $1,000 United States currency. The petition, which was filed on the 18th of December, 1906, was accompanied by a plan and technical description of the above-described parcel of land.After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of February, 1908, a decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the land described in the petitioner be registered in the names of the four petitioners, as coowners, subject to the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios Grey.On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of land which are described in said motion, and which, according to his allegations, are included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged that the decree of February 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said two parcels of land. He further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the two parcels of land, having inherited them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same. He therefore asked, under the provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its decision modifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed and now insist, first, that the trial court erred in reopening the case and modifying its decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the reason that said decree was not obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the court erred in holding that the two parcels of land described in the appellee's motion are not their property.It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma part of the land described in the petition and were included in the decree of February 12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the owners of the remainder of the land described in the said decree.The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the same, including the two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a public document dated the 26th of November, 1864, duly executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan.Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a state grant for several parcels of land, including the two parcels in question. This grant was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on the 6th of April of the same year.It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted that the name of the appellee does not appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that the appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason they did not include his name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends that he was occupying the said parcels as the absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance.The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of 1864.The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died prior to that time. Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years of age when their mother died. So these children were minors when the father of the appellee obtained the estate grant.On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the petitioners, who were then minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners' deceased parents to one Irineo Jose for a period of three years. On the 23d of March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, as the representative of the petitioners, rented the same land for a period of six years to Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This rental contract was duly executed in writing. This land was cultivated during these six years by Baldomero R. de la Cruz and his children, one of whom is the appellee. On the 14th of December, 1905, Jose Grey, for himself and the other petitioners, rented the same land to Estanislao R. de la Cruz for a period of two years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering into this rental contract with Jose Grey did so for himself and his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the appellee admits that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners' land, nevertheless he insists that the two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts. In the rental contract between the uncle of the petitioners and he father of the appellee the land is not described. In the rental contract between Jose Grey, one of the petitioners, and Estanislao R. de la Cruz, brother of the appellee, the two small parcels of land in question are included, according to the description given therein. This was found to be true by the court below, but the said court held that as this contract was made by Estanislao R. de la Cruz it was not binding upon Anacleto R. de la Cruz, the appellee.The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of the petitioners in 1864, as is evidenced by the public document of purchase and sale of that year. The same two parcels of land are included in the state grant issued in favor of Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was obtained after the death of the petitioners' parents and while they were minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their application the names of their tenants. Under these circumstances, did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered in February of the same year?The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain an accurate description of the land. It shall contain the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. In the form of notice given by statute, which shall be sworn to, the applicant is required to state and set forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting said land, if any, the rights and interests, legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder, reversion, or expectancy of all persons, with their names in full, together with their place of residence and post office addresses. Upon receipt of the application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be published twice in the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be directed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be registered and to the adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may concern." In addition to the notice in the Official Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days after said publication, cause a copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk to every person named in the application whose address is known; to cause a duly attested copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be posted in a conspicuous place on every parcel of land included in the application, and in a conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of the town in which the land is situated. The court may also cause other or further notice of the application to be given in such manner and to such persons as it may deem proper. The certificate of the clerk that he has served the notice as directed by the court by publication or mailing shall be conclusive proof of such service. Within the time allowed in the notices, if no person appears and answers, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default. By the description in the published notice "to all whom it may concern," and by express provisions of law "all the word are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default an order." If the court, after hearing, finds that the applicant has title, as stated in his application, a decree or registration shall be entered.Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "to all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 referred to above.It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the outstanding interest which he admits but also all claims of interest, though denied by him. By express provision of law the world are made parties defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom it may concern."Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question under the circumstances as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he was made a party defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree on the 12th of February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all persons, including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation.The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee was occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor when the original plan was made.Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud.The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian statutes has been frequently raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the Australian courts; the first is the distinction between the meaning of the word "fraud" in the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, and its meaning in the sections relating to the protection of bona fide purchasers from registered proprietors. The second is the distinction between "legal," "equitable," or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or "moral" fraud. In none of the groups of the sections of the Australian statutes relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, and in which fraud is referred to, is there any express indication of the meaning of "fraud," with the sole exception of that of the South Australian group. (Hogg on Australian Torrens System, p. 834.)With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, it has been held in some cases that the "fraud" there mentioned means actual or moral fraud, not merely constructive or legal fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to include constructive, legal, and every kind of fraud. In other cases, against, knowledge of other persons' right, and the deliberate acquisition of registered title in the face of such knowledge, has been held to be "fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of title so obtained; and voluntary ignorance is, for this purpose, the same as knowledge. But in none of these three classes of cases was there absent the element of intention to deprive another of just rights, which constitutes the essential characteristics of actual as distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in notes Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.)By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of Privy Council in Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi, decided in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his Supplementary Addendum to his work on Australian Torrens System, supra.) The same meaning should be given to the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our statutes (Act No. 496).The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within the meaning of the word as used in our statutes, will in each case be a question of fact. We will not attempt to say what acts would constitutes this kind of fraud in other cases. This must be determined from the fact an circumstances in each particular case. The only question we are called upon to determine, and have determined, is whether or not, under the facts and circumstances in this case, the petitioners did obtain the decree of February 12, 1908, by means of fraud.It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without due process of law, in violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no law shall be enacted in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication "to all whom it may concern." If this section of the Act is to be upheld this must be declared to be due process of law.Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note the history and purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System." This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in its practicable form.The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an application for the registration of the title to lands, under this system, the theory of the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have have a right to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the proceeding is against the whole word. This system was evidently considered by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No. 496. The interest of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that of private individuals.At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to registration of title to land, because immovable property is becoming more and more a matter of commercial dealing, and there can be no trade without security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.)The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he may evicted because his vendor had, unknown to him, already sold the and to a third person. . . The registered proprietor may feel himself protected against any defect in his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.)The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of titles, made by Sir Robert Torrens, has been fully justified in its use:First. It has substituted security for insecurity.Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from months to days.Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage.Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the "three R's" can transact his own conveyancing.Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to land was made by Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title by registrationtakes the place of "title by deeds" of the system under the "general" law. A sale of land, for example, is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is issued. The certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein. Under the old system the same sale would be effected by a conveyance, depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object of the Torrens system, them, is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing system. (Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer of Land Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of transactions with interest in land whose declared object . . . is, under governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on Australian Torrens system,supra, pp. 1, 2.)Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in which the Torrens system has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will always occur. The percentage of errors, as compared with the number of registered dealings in Australia, is very small. In New South Wales there were, in 1889, 209, 894 registered dealings, the average risk of error being only 2 cents for each dealing. In Queensland the risk of error was only 1 cents, the number of registered dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania and in Western Australia not a cent was paid for compensation for errors during the whole time of operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system has been adopted in various countries of the civilized world, including some of the States of the American Union, and practical experience has demonstrated that it has been successful as a public project.The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens system has been the subject of judicial decision in the courts of the United States. (People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration Act," was copied substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898.The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts of those States.It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we never heard of it before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110 U. S., 516.)Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceedingin rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The Mary (9 Cranch, 126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 606, 611.If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody, although the only notice of the proceedings given is by general notice to all persons interested.The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did not rest its judgment as to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground that the State has absolute power to determine the persons to whom a man's property shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the facts and circumstances, especially the absolute lack on the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process of law.As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner, vs. LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF SIMEON AYING, AND WENCESLAO SUMALINOG, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF ROBERTA AYING, respondents.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking the modification of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 7, 2000 which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 2930-L; and the Resolution dated August 2, 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.The antecedent facts are as follows:The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of land. After her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy-ons eight children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was, however, lost during the war.Subsequently, all the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1964, conveying the subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Company. Said deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on March 6, 1964 under Act No. 3344 (the law governing registration for unregistered land), and since then, petitioner had been religiously paying real property taxes on said property.In 1988, herein petitioner filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title as the original title over the subject property had been lost during the war. On April 12, 1988, the court granted said petition, thereby directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to issue a reconstituted title in the name of the abovementioned Aying siblings. Thus, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2856 was issued.In 1991, petitioner, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject property, sent out notices to vacate, addressed to persons occupying the property. Unheeded, petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Lapu-Lapu City.On February 1, 1994, the MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the property. The case eventually reached this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 128102, entitled Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. Court of Appeals, Luis Aying, Demetrio Sida, Felomino Augusto, Federico Abing, and Romeo Augusto.[2] On March 7, 2000, a Decision was promulgated in favor of herein petitioner, declaring it as the rightful possessor of the parcel of land in question.Meanwhile, herein respondents, along with other persons claiming to be descendants of the eight Aying siblings, all in all numbering around 220 persons, had filed a complaint for cancellation of the Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sale, recovery of ownership, injunction and damages with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. The complaint was dismissed twice without prejudice. Said complaint was re-filed on August 19, 1993, docketed as Civil Case No. 2930-L.In their amended complaint, herein respondents (plaintiffs before the RTC) alleged that: they are co-owners of subject property, being descendants of the registered owners thereof under OCT No. RO-2856; they had been in actual, peaceful, physical, open, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession in concept of owner of subject parcel of land since time immemorial; their possession was disturbed only in the last quarter of 1991 when some of them received notices to vacate from petitioner and several weeks thereafter, earthmoving equipment entered the disputed land, bulldozing the same and destroying plants, trees and concrete monuments (mohon); respondents discovered that such activities were being undertaken by petitioner together with Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.; petitioner claimed to be the owner of subject property by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute sale executed in petitioners favor by the alleged heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on; the aforementioned extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute sale is a fraud and is null and void ab initio because not all the co-owners of subject property affixed their signature on said document and some of the co-owners who supposedly signed said document had been dead at the time of the execution thereof; petitioner entered subject land in bad faith, knowing fully well that it did not have any right to the land and used force, threat and intimidation against respondents; and they suffered moral damages.[3]Petitioner (defendant before the RTC) filed its Answer, denying that respondents are the lawful owners of subject parcel of land by virtue of their being descendants or heirs of the registered owners of subject property. Instead, petitioner alleged that it had been in actual possession of subject land as owner thereof by virtue of the extra-judicial partition of real property and deed of absolute sale executed in its favor; that in fact, it had been paying taxes thereon religiously; that it tolerated about 6 persons to live on said land but said persons were eventually ejected by court order. Petitioner then raised the affirmative defenses of failure to state cause of action and prescription, as it took respondents 27 years, 10 months and 27 days to file the action to recover subject property, when an action to recover property based on an implied trust should be instituted within 4 years from discovery of the fraud.[4]In the Pre-Trial Order dated January 30, 1995 of the RTC, the issues were narrowed down to the following:1. Whether or not the plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the heirs of the registered owners of Lot No. 4399.2. Whether or not plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 4399.3. Whether or not the defendant Aznar [herein petitioner] is estopped to make any claim on Lot No. 4399.4. Whether or not the defendant Aznar is a builder in bad faith.5. Whether or not the defendants are liable for damages and attorneys fees in favor of the plaintiffs.6. Whether or not the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and had, in effect, validly conveyed to defendant Aznar Lot No. 4399.7. Whether or not the plaintiffs action has prescribed.[5]After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated July 4, 1997, ruling that respondents evidence failed to prove that the extra-judicial partition with deed of absolute sale was a totally simulated or fictitious contract and concluded that said document is valid, thus, effectively conveying to petitioner the property in question. It further held that respondents action had prescribed in that the action is considered as one for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, it prescribed in 10 years from the registration of the deed on March 6, 1964; and if the action is considered as one for annulment of contract on the ground of fraud, it should have been filed within 4 years from discovery of the fraud. The trial court also ruled that respondents failed to present any admissible proof of filiation, hence, they were not able to prove that they are indeed heirs of the eight Aying siblings who appear as the registered owners under OCT No. RO-2856.The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the amended complaint on the ground of prescription, and declaring the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1964 as valid and binding, adjudging that Lot 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at Dapdap, Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City had been validly conveyed to and in favor of Aznar Brothers Realty Company, and directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to register the above-mentioned deed in accordance with law and to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2856, and to issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of Aznar Brothers Realty Company upon payment of the necessary registration fees pursuant thereto.The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued in this case is hereby ordered dissolved.The Motion for Contempt filed by the plaintiffs against defendants is dismissed for want of factual and legal basis.Costs against the plaintiffs.SO ORDERED.[6]Herein respondents appealed the foregoing decision to the CA and on March 7, 2000, said court promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which is reproduced hereunder:THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested Decision while AFFIRMED is hereby MODIFIED. The heirs of Emiliano Aying, Simeon Aying and Roberta Aying are hereby declared as the lawful owners of the contested property but equivalent only to 3/8.SO ORDERED.In modifying the RTC judgment, the CA ratiocinated that an action for recovery of possession of registered land never prescribes in view of the provision of Section 44, Act No. 496 (now Sec. 47, PD 1520), to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation to that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription. The CA further ruled that even if the action is deemed to be based on implied trust, prescription did not begin to run since there is no evidence that positive acts of repudiation were made known to the heirs who did not participate in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, striking down the RTCs ruling that the respondents complaint is dismissible on the ground of prescription, the CA held instead that herein respondents action had not prescribed but upheld the validity of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale, except as to the shares of the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta, who did not participate in the execution of said document.Herein petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CA decision was denied per Resolution dated August 2, 2000.Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision on the following grounds:ITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT AN HEIR OF THE ORIGINAL REGISTERED OWNER MAY LOSE HIS RIGHT TO RECOVER A TITLED PROPERTY BY REASON OF LACHES;IITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT THE ACT OF REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF PARTITION WITH SALE MAY BE CONSIDERED AN UNEQUIVOCAL REPUDIATION OF THE TRUST GIVING RISE TO PRESCRIPTION;IIITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1104 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO THE EFFECT THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF BAD FAITH OR FRAUD, THE PARTITION WITH PRETERITION OF ANY COMPULSORY HEIR SHALL NOT BE RESCINDED.[7]In their Comment, respondents argue that this case is an action to declare as null and void the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale, hence, under Article 1410 of the Civil Code, an action for declaration of an inexistent contract does not prescribe. Respondents further posit that the principle of laches should be applied against petitioner and not against them, as they (respondents) had been in actual possession of the subject property, while petitioner merely brought action to eject them more than 29 years after the alleged execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. They also refuted petitioners arguments regarding the application of the principles of implied and constructive trusts in this case.At the outset, it should be stressed that not all the plaintiffs who filed the amended complaint before the trial court had been impleaded as respondents in the present petition. The only parties impleaded are the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying, whom the CA adjudged as owners of a 3/8 portion of the land in dispute for not having participated in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.It is significant to note that herein petitioner does not question the CA conclusion that respondents are heirs of the aforementioned three Aying siblings. Hence, the trial court and appellate courts findings that the Extra- Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was not forged nor simulated and that the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying did not participate in the execution thereof, are now beyond cavil.The issues raised by petitioner for the Courts resolution are (1) whether or not respondents cause of action is imprescriptible; and (2) if their right to bring action is indeed imprescriptible, may the principle of laches apply.Respondents alleged in their amended complaint that not all the co-owners of the land in question signed or executed the document conveying ownership thereof to petitioner and made the conclusion that said document is null and void. We agree with the ruling of the RTC and the CA that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and binding only as to the heirs who participated in the execution thereof, hence, the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying, who undisputedly did not participate therein, cannot be bound by said document.However, the facts on record show that petitioner acquired the entire parcel of land with the mistaken belief that all the heirs have executed the subject document. Thus, the trial court is correct that the provision of law applicable to this case is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.In Vda. De Esconde vs. Court of Appeals,[8] the Court expounded thus:Construing this provision of the Civil Code, in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated:A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.[9]The concept of constructive trusts was further elucidated in the same case, as follows:. . . implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from each other as follows:Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature of circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.[10] (Emphasis supplied)Based on such concept of constructive trusts, the Court ruled in said case that:The rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted to him until and unless he repudiates the trust, applies to express trusts and resulting implied trusts. However, in constructive implied trusts, prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.[11]The next question is, what is the applicable prescriptive period?In Amerol vs. Bagumbaran,[12] the Court expounded on the prescriptive period within which to bring an action for reconveyance of property based on implied or constructive trust, to wit:. . . under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis--vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:(1) Upon a written contract;(2) Upon an obligation created by law;(3) Upon a judgment.xxx xxx xxxAn action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.[13]It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but if the person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.[14]In the present case, respondents Wenceslao Sumalinog, an heir of Roberta Aying; Laurencio Aying, an heir of Emiliano Aying; and Paulino Aying, an heir of Simeon Aying, all testified that they had never occupied or been in possession of the land in dispute.[15] Hence, the prescriptive period of ten years would apply to herein respondents.The question then arises as to the date from which the ten-year period should be reckoned, considering that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), despite the fact the land in dispute was already titled under Act No. 496 in the names of the Aying siblings at the time the subject document was executed.In Spouses Abrigo vs. De Vera,[16] it was held that registration of instruments must be done in the proper registry, in order to affect and bind the land and, thus, operate as constructive notice to the world.[17] Therein, the Court ruled:x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED x x x .[18]In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496, said document is deemed not registered. Accordingly, the ten-year prescriptive period cannot be reckoned from March 6, 1964, the date of registration of the subject document under Act No. 3344. The prescriptive period only began to run from the time respondents had actual notice of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.The only evidence on record as to when such prescriptive period commenced as to each of the respondents are Wenceslao Sumalinogs (heir of Roberta Aying) testimony that about three years after 1964, they already learned of the existence of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale;[19] and Laurencio Ayings (heir of Emiliano Aying) admission that he found out about the sale of the land in dispute a long time ago and can only estimate that it must be after martial law.[20] Paulino Aying (heir of Simeon Aying) gave no testimony whatsoever as to when the children of Simeon Aying actually learned of the existence of the document of sale. On the other hand, petitioner did not present any other evidence to prove the date when respondents were notified of the execution of the subject document.In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying discovered the existence of the document of sale, it must be determined which party had the burden of proof to establish such fact.The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain.[21] Moreover, one alleging a fact that is denied has the burden of proving it and unless the party asserting the affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof of that issue by a preponderance of the evidence, his cause will not succeed.[22] Thus, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiffs claim or cause of action; he being the party who asserts the truth of the matter he has alleged, the burden is upon him to establish the facts on which that matter is predicated and if he fails to do so, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor.[23]In the case at bar, it was petitioner, as the defendant before the RTC, which set up in its Answer the affirmative defense of prescription. It was, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to prove the date from which the prescriptive period began to run. Evidence as to the date when the ten-year prescriptive period began exists only as to the heirs of Roberta Aying, as Wenceslao Sumalinog admitted that they learned of the existence of the document of sale in the year 1967. As to the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, there is no clear evidence of the date when they discovered the document conveying the subject land to petitioner. Petitioner miserably failed to adduce proof of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying were notified of the subject document. Hence, with regard to said heirs, the Court may consider the admission in the amended complaint that they learned of the conveyance of the disputed land only in 1991 when petitioner sent notices to vacate to the occupants of the subject land, as the date from which the ten-year prescriptive period should be reckoned.Respondents filed their Amended Complaint on December 6, 1993.[24] Thus, with regard to respondent heirs of Roberta Aying who had knowledge of the conveyance as far back as 1967, their cause of action is already barred by prescription when said amended complaint was filed as they only had until 1977 within which to bring action. As to the respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, they were able to initiate their action for reconveyance of property based on implied or constructive trust well within the ten-year prescriptive period reckoned from 1991 when they were sent by petitioner a notice to vacate the subject property.Evidently, laches cannot be applied against respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, as they took action to protect their interest well within the period accorded them by law.With regard to petitioners argument that the provision of Article 1104 of the Civil Code, stating that a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, should be applied, suffice it to say that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is not being rescinded. In fact, its validity had been upheld but only as to the parties who participated in the execution of the same. As discussed above, what was conveyed to petitioner was ownership over the shares of the heirs who executed the subject document. Thus, the law, particularly, Article 1456 of the Civil Code, imposed the obligation upon petitioner to act as a trustee for the benefit of respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying who, having brought their action within the prescriptive period, are now entitled to the reconveyance of their share in the land in dispute.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2000 is MODIFIED, as follows: The amended complaint of the heirs of Roberta Aying is DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. However, the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, having instituted the action for reconveyance within the prescriptive period, are hereby DECLARED as the LAWFUL OWNERS of a 2/8 portion of the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2856.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.ANDREA M. MOSCOSO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMINA L. MORON, Respondents. GUERRERO, J.:Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the defunct Court of Appeals 1 (now the Intermediate Appellate Court) in CAGR No. 52187-B entitled "Application for Land Registration Under Act No. 496-Andrea M. Moscoso, applicant-appellant versus Maximina L. Moron, et al., oppositors-appellees" which affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tacloban City in Land Registration Case No. N 134.virtualawlibrary virtual law librarySometime on March 22, 1966, petitioner applied for land registration of a 1,147 square meters residential lot situated in the poblacion of the municipality of Palo, province of Leyte, bounded and described in Survey Plan Psu-54699 of the then General Land Registration Office as verified and approved under date June 16, 1927. Her application substantially stated that petitioner is the owner in fee simple of the land and improvements thereon as her acquisition by inheritance from her father, the late Pascual Monge y Vigera who died on June 9, 1950, and that the same parcel of land is her share in a partial partition of estate she and her brothers and sisters executed on May 22, 1964 at Palo, Leyte (Exhibit "K"); that she and her predecessors in interest have been in continuous, public, actual and adverse possession of the land applied for since time immemorial until the present; that at the last assessment for taxation, said lot was assessed in her name under Tax Declaration No. 28260 dated May 24, 1964 (Exhibit H and that the taxes are fully paid up to the current year; that to the best of her knowledge and belief, there is no incumbrance or any kind whatsoever affecting said land nor any other person having interest therein, legal or equitable, in posession, remainder, reversion or expectancy; and that the land is now being rented by lessees of the applicant, namely, Angel Encenares, Olanda Bribe, Timoteo Noblejas, Felisa Adre, Celestina Solana, Baltazar Collado, all of Palo, Leyte.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryAfter due publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing of the petition in the Official Gazette, Vol. 62, Nos. 46 and 47, issues dated November 14 and 21, 1966 (Exhibit "C"), only the Highway District Engineer of Leyte as public oppositors, and Concordia Lanuncia, Flaviano L. Marchadesch, Jr., and herein private respondent Maximina L. Moron as private oppositors appeared for the initial hearing before the trial court.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryThe trial court summarily dismissed the opposition of the Highway District Engineer who merely sought to secure a reservation for a road right-of-way in favor of the national government in view of petitioner's willingness to annotate the same on the certificate of title which might issue. The opposition of the private parties thus remained.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryThe written opposition substantially allege that they, including one Mrs. Apolonia L. Marchadesch who died in 1963 and survived by her only issue, oppositor Flaviano L. Marchadesch, are the illegitimate children of the late Zenona Lanuncia and the recognized natural children of the late Pascual Monge who died in 1950 and father of applicant Andrea M. Moscoso; that the late Zenona Lanuncia, from the age of three, became a protegee of the late spouses, Saturnino Monge and Isidra Vigera Monge, letigimate parents of Pascual Monge and Juan Monge, now deceased; that Isidra Vigera Monge was the original owner of the parcel of land applied for; that Isidra Monge, long before she died on April 15, 1915, and after Pascual Monge legally got married to the mother of the applicant and brother and sisters, and in order to provide a home and subsistence to the oppositors, their sister and mother, all of which are girls, effected a verbal partition of her lands with her sons, Pascual, Juan and with the herein oppositor, who were already at their teens, which, by virtue of said partition, the land herein applied for registration passed to the hands of the oppositors for their home; that the oppositors have no knowledge that this parcel of land forms part of the inheritance of the applicant and of a partial partition among the applicant and her brother and sisters; that the oppositors have, if not legal, an equitable title to the land as judged from the circumstances surrounding the oppositors' case; they deny the allegation that applicant and her predecessors in interest have been in continuous, public, actual and adverse possession of the land from time immemorial, the truth being that the oppositors exercised exclusive dominion over the land and are in actual and continuous possession over it from time immemorial to the present and that should the verbal partition effected before the death of Isidra Vigera Monge in 1915 being insufficient to pass title to the oppositor, then by virtue of acquisitive prescription caused by the open, continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in favor of oppositors, they are entitled to the land invoking the benefits of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141. 2 virtual law libraryUpon the termination of the hearing on the merits, the Hon. Jesus N. Borromeo, then Presiding Judge of the CFI, Tacloban City, rendered his decision dated December 22, 1971, directing that the title over the land should not be registered exclusively in the name of the applicant since "it has been overwhelmingly established by them (the private oppositors) that they and their sister Apolonia, who died in 1963, are the children of Zenona Lanuncia and Pascual Monge resulting from the relations between the two prior to the marriage of the latter with Guadalupe Oliver, mother of herein petitioner and her brothers, Elpidio, Salvador, Remedios, Ruperto, and Abelardo (deceased), all surnamed Monge. 3 Hence, the judgment decreed:IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the registration of title over the parcel of land situated in the poblacion of the municipality of Palo, Province of Leyte, as described in the Plan Psu-54699, Exhibit "E", and the technical description Exhibit "F", in the name of the co-ownership of: (1) Andrea M. Moscoso, Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Salvador Moscoso, with postal address at Bupsong, Antique for three-fourth (3/4) share; (2) Concordia Lanuncia, Filipino citizen, of legal age, single, and a resident of Palo, Leyte, for one-twelfth (1/12) share; (3) Maximina L. Moron, Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, and a resident of Palo, Leyte, for (1/12) share; and, (4) Flaviano L. Marchadesch, Jr., son of the late Apolonia L. Marchadesch, for one-twelfth (1/12) share, subject to a reservation of a road right-of-way in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryAfter this judgment shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.virtualawlibrary virtual law librarySO ORDERED. 4 virtual law libraryThe trial court ruled that the verbal donation made by Isidra Vigera Vda, de Monge in favor of Zenona Lanuncia and the latter's daughters by Pascual Monge because they are of weaker sex, was ineffectual to transmit title of ownership over the land in question and that their adverse claim of ownership even under extraordinary prescription of over thirty years could not favor them because such claim is disputable due to their failure to declare the property for tax purposes in their name after the death of Isidra Monge. The trial court, however, gave significant weight to the carbon copy of a power of attorney executed and signed by the late Pascual Monge on February 11, 1945 (Exhibit "2", "2-A" to "2-C" in favor of Maximina L. Moron, wherein he stated that Maximins is his daughter and appointed her as his Attorney-in-Fact to transact with the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines in his behalf for the collection of rentals and other war damage claims due and payable to him. The court ruled that the power of attorney was an authentic writing wherein Maximina Lanuncia was voluntarily recognized as the daughter of Pascual Monge. As found by the trial court thus,Precisely, it would appear that, in his power of attorney executed on February 11, 1945 in favor of Maximina L. Moron, Exhibit "2", Pascual Monge stated that Maximina is his daughter. The contention of petitioner that said power of attorney was fraudulently altered in order to inse therein the words "my daughter . . ." does not seem to be well-taken because, from an examination of the document, the Court does not notice concrete indications of alteration having been made in order to suit the ends of the herein oppositors.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryThus, the Court is of the view that the late Pascual Monge, who had no impediment to marry Zenona Lanuncia when Maximina was conceived (Art. 119, Old Civil Code; Art, 269, New Civil Code) had voluntarily recognized Maximina Lanuncia Moron as his child when in his power of attorney executed on February 11, 1945, he mentioned her as his daughter. ... 5 virtual law libraryPetitioner assailed the Court's decision in his motion for reconsideration, contending that the disposition of the estate should be governed by the Old Civil Code (Spanish Civil Code of 1889) since he died on June 9, 1950 while the New Civil Code took effect only on August, 1950; that assuming that the New Civil Code applies in the case at bar the power of attorney (Exhibit "2") is not an authentic document to support voluntary recognition because the words "my daughter" reveals a clear sign of erasure and is a product of falsification as presented in the rebuttal testimony of her brother Elpidio Monge and that said document is not even a public document because it was merely acknowledged by the Municipal Mayor of Palo, Leyte who had no authority to authenticate writings as public documents which could be done only by a notary public.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryActing upon the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the Court modified its decision in the Order dated May 25, 1972 with the following dispositive portion:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of December 22, 1971 is hereby amended in the sense that the Court hereby orders the registration of title over the parcel of land situated in the poblacion of the municipality of Palo, Province of Leyte, as described in the Plan Psu-54699, Exhibit "E", and the technical description Exhibit "F" in the name of the co- ownership of (1) Andrea M. Moscoso, Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Salvador Moscoso, with postal address at Bugasong, Antique, for 13/14 share; and (2) Maximina L. Moron for for share, subject to the reservation of a road right-of-way in favor of the government of the Philippines.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryAfter this judgment shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.virtualawlibrary virtual law librarySO ORDERED.Not satisfied with the amended judgment, petitioner elevated the case to the defunct Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Hence, the instant petition before Us.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryPetitioner assigns practically the same errors allegedly committed by the trial court which were presented before the respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:I. The lower court erred in holding that Pascual Monge voluntarily recognized Maximina Lanuncia Moron as his natural child by virtue of the power of attorney (Exhibit "2") executed by him in favor of the latter.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryII. The lower court erred in holding that said power of attorney (Exhibit "2") is not materially altered when in fact it was erased to suit the ends of the oppositors.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryIII. The lower court erred in appreciating said power of attorney (Exhibit "2") as a public document.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryIV. The lower court erred in making judicial pronouncements that Maximina Lanuncia Moron as the acknowledged natural child of Pascual Monge conferring upon her legal right to inherit from the whole estate of the late Pascual Monge who died on June 9, 1950 when her claim over the land subject of this land registration proceeding is that it was given to their mother Zenona Lanuncia by Isidra Vigera and for their long continuous possession acquired the same by acquisitive prescription.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryV. The lower court erred in making judicial pronouncement of recognition without a formal complaint, hearing on the merit and neither has Maximina Lanuncia Moron the status of a continuous possession of a natural child.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryVI. The lower court erred in ordering the registration of the land applied for registration in favor of the applicant, Andrea M. Moscoso, only 13/14 share and to oppositor Maximina Lanuncia Moron 1/14 share in co-ownership.The principal or decisive issue to be resolved herein is whether or not oppositor-appellee Maximina L. Moron had been acknowledged by her illegitimate father, Pascual Monge (now deceased) in view of which, as held by the trial court and affirmed by the respondent appellate court, being an acknowledged natural daughter, she would be entitled to 1/14 share in the land in question as her inheritance. In resolving this issue, We are guided and must comply with the well-established rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court in an appeal by certiorari where such findings are ably supported by substantial evidence on record, the same being binding, final and conclusive. 6 virtual law libraryHence, the finding of the appellate court that the power of attorney, Exhibit "2", was not materially altered before the same was presented to the court below; that it is "more likely that a mistake was committed in the preparation thereof; that the person who typed the document had to make a slight erasure and correction in typing correctly the word "daughter" and that t e power of attorney, as corrected, was then given to Pascual Monge and Maximina L. Moron for their signature. As such, the correction cannot be considered a deliberate alteration or falsification as depicted by appellant", is a finding of fact which cannot be disturbed. We agree with the court that said power of attorney is an authentic writing wherein the father, Pascual Monge, voluntarily recognized Maximina L. Moron as his daughter, and since Pascual Monge had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of the conception, Maximina is a natural child, entitled to share in the inheritance of the property in question.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryIt may be so as argued by the petitioner that where the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order and resort to the duly proven evidence becomes necessary, citing Gonlalez vs. CA, G.R. No. 37453, May 25, 1979, 90 SCRA 183 and cases cited therein. We have in fact noted that the trial court found no alteration in the power of attorney, Exhibit "2", when it ruled that "from an examination of the document, the court does not notice concrete indication of alteration having been made therein in order to suit the ends of the herein oppositor." (Decision, pp. 21-22, Record on Appeal), whereas respondent appellate court held that "(w)e find it more likely that a mistake was committed in the preparation of the power of attorney that the person who typed the document had to make a slight erasure and correction in typing correctly the word "daughter" and that the power of attorney, as corrected was then given to Pascual Monge and Maximina L. Moron for their signature. As such, correction cannot be considered a deliberate falsification, as depicted by appellant. "(CA Decision, p. 8) virtual law libraryWe have indeed scrutinized minutely the documentary evidence in question, Exhibit "2", as We have ordered the elevation of the original records before Us. We affirm the holding of the appellate court that "What clearly appears to be the case, upon clear examination, is that there is no erasure of the portion whereon "my" was typed. If, really, such 14-letter word was erased and in lieu thereof the word "daughter" was typed or superimposed, the erasure would be very noticeable and visible as the word "daughter", which is shorter by six letters, cannot fully cover the space occupied by 1, administratrix". This could be easily seen by the naked eye when the document, as in the instant case, was executed more than 25 years ago and has turned yellow with age. But this is not the case." There is no inconsistency between the two findings of the trial and appellate courts. Both support the authenticity of the document in ruling that there was no deliberate falsification, which We uphold.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryPetitioner's contention that the Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether the oppositor is the acknowledged natural child of Pascual Monge, is untenable. We have a number of cases that answer petitioner's position. Thus, in the case of Florentino vs. Encarnacion, G.R. No. L-27697, Sept. 30,1977, 79 SCRA 193, 204-205, We ruled:Petitioner-appellants' third assignment of error is not well taken. Firstly, the otherwise rigid rule that the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, being special and limited in character and proceedings thereon summary in nature, does not extend to cases involving issues properly litigable in other independent suits or ordinary civil actions, has time and again been relaxed in special and exceptional circumstances, (See Government of P.I. vs. Serafica, 61 Phil. 93 (1934); Caoibes vs. Sison, 102 Phil. 19 (1957); Luna vs. Santos, 102 Phil. 588 (1957); Cruz vs. Tan, 93 Phil. 348 (1953); Gurbax Singh Pabla and Co. vs. Reyes, 92 Phil. 117 (1952)). From these cases, it may be gleaned and gathered that the peculiarity of the exceptions is based not alone on the fact that the Land Registration Courts are likewise the same Courts of First Instance, but also the following premises: (1) Mutual consent of the parties or their acquiescence in submitting the aforesaid issues for the determination by the court in the registration proceedings; (2) Full opportunity given to the parties in the presentation of their respective sides of the issues and of the evidence in support thereto; (3) Consideration by the court that the evidence already of record is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon these issues. (Aglipay vs. De Los Reyes, L-12776, March 23, 1960) ...Upon a scrutiny of the proceedings in the trial court, We find that petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration wherein she assailed the ruling of the trial court that based upon Exhibit "2", the power of attorney, the oppositor was an acknowledged natural child of the late Pascual Monge and entitled to a portion of the land subject of the land registration proceedings. She claimed that the document was not authentic and not a public document. In effect, petitioner acquiesced in submitting the issue as to the status of the oppositor as an acknowledged natural child entitled to successional rights and had the full opportunity to dispute the authenticity of the document in question as in fact, applicant's brother, Elpidio Monge, gave rebuttal testimony to support petitioner's theory that the document was a product of a falsification, which the trial court did not believe. Moreover, the court considered and deemed the evidence already of record sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon the issue thus raised. In doing so, We find no abuse of discretion committed by the trial court.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryIn addition, considerations of speedy justice and avoidance of multiplicity of suits impel Us to hold and rule that under the facts of the case at bar, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, may adjudicate the land sought to be registered to either or both of the applicant and oppositor, in whole or in part, based on evidence submitted to the court showing that the party has proper title for registration. (Section 37, Act 496.) virtual law libraryIn any event, as the Supreme Court said in Nicanor T. Santos vs. Rosa Ganayo, L-31854, Sept. 9. 1972, 116 SCRA 431, "Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (Probate, Land Registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question involving a mode of p- practice which may be waived." In meeting the issue raised by the oppositor as to her status as an acknowledged natural child as a result of her voluntary recognition appearing in Exhibit "2", the oppositor (now the petitioner herein) had waived the procedural question and she may not be allowed to raise the same in the present petition.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryThe proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens system is an action in rem not in personam hence, personal notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary to give the court jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res, and neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or in the nature of a proceeding in rem which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown. (City of Manila vs. Lack et al., 19 Phil. 324, 337; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120; Aguilar vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661).virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryUnder the above doctrine, petitioner's assailment that "(t)he judicial pronouncement (referring to the holding that the oppositor Maximins L. Moron is the acknowledged natural child of Pascual Monge) which will become conclusive and far-reaching and in effect binds the other heirs of Pascual Monge consisting of the brothers and sisters as well as the nephews and nieces of the petitioner who are not parties in this prayer proceedings " is untenable.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryEarlier, We have affirmed the ruling of the appellate court that Exhibit "2" which is the power of attorney is an authentic writing wherein the father, Pascual Monge, voluntarily recognized Maximina L. Moron as his daughter, applying the provisions of Article 278, New Civil Code, which provides that recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. We apply Article 278, New Civil Code retroactively to the case of Maximina L. Moron although she was born before the effectivity of the New Civil Code in view of the provisions of Article 2260 of the New Civil Code, which states:Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws.The reason for giving retroactive effect to Article 2260 is indicated in the Report of the Code Commission, page 169, thus: "The liberalized mode of recognition is in harmony with the aim of the proposed code to do justice to illegitimate children. Hence, its retroactive effect." (See Civil Code Annotated by Padilla, Vol. VII, 1975 Ed., p. 709).virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryIn Caridad Cruz Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals and Jose Pedro Reynaldo Sy-Quia, G.R. No. 62283, Nov. 25, 1983, the Supreme Court squarely held:... Article 2260 of (the Civil Code of the Philippines) provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect (p. 169, Report of the Code Commission, 7 Padilla, Civil Code, 1975 Ed., p. 709).Under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, an acknowledged natural child is entitled to ... "3. To receive the hereditary portion determined by this Code." (Article 134). This hereditary portion is fixed under Article 840 which states:Art. 840. When the testator leaves legitimate children or descendants, and also natural children, legally acknowledged, each of the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the portion pertaining to each of the legitimate children who have not received any betterment, provided that it may be included within the freely disposable portion, from which it must be taken after the burial and funeral expenses have been paid.The same share which is one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants is given to each of the acknowledged natural children under Article 895 of the New Civil Code, which reads:Art. 895. The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants.The final adjudication made by the trial court in its Order dated May 25, 1975 (affirmed by the Court of Appeals) directed the registration of the land in question in the name of the co-ownership of petitioner Andrea M. Moscoso for 13/14 share and Maximina L. Moron, the oppositor, for 1/14 share in view of the court's realization that no documentary evidence was presented to prove that the other oppositors, Concordia Lanuncia and Apolonia Lanuncia (decease) and mother of oppositor Flaviano Marchadesch, Jr. were acknowledged by Pascual Monge, In the interest of justice, We must modify the above sharing in order to give the legal share of the oppositor as an acknowledged natural child.virtualawlibrary virtual law librarySince there are six (6) legitimate children including the petitioner Andrea M. Moscoso who had previously acquired the shares of her five (5) co-heirs, and one (1) acknowledged natural child, the oppositor Maximina L. Moron, herein private respondent who is entitled to one-half (1/2) the share of each of the legitimate children (Article 840, Spanish Civil Code; Article 895, New Civil Code), the proper sharing should be 12/13 to Andrea M. Moscoso and 1/13 to Maximina L. Moron.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryWHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that the adjudication of the land subject of the land registration proceedings shall be in the co-ownership of petitioner-applicant Andrea M. Moscoso for 12/13 share and to oppositor-private respondent Maximina L. Moron for 1/13 share. In all other aspects, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.virtualawlibrary virtual law librarySO ORDERED.Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryAbad Santos J., took no part.virtualawlibrary virtual law libraryAURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners, vs.REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.Vicente Llanes for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.MAKALINTAL, J.: Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC Consulta No. 366. On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (/) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers. The pertinent entries read:Entry No. 5658. Sales. Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu thereof, the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in interest of the vendor. ...Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ...x x x x x x x x xEntry No. 5659. Sale of portion. Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ...Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion. Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ... The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation. Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in controversy, the Commissioner observed: (1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided portions thereof on three different occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's duplicates which are presumably in the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are presumed to have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.et Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument." Under this provision, according to petitioners, the presentation of the other copies of the title is not required, first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor was illegal or unauthorized. We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable. One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its implications, for without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein subject of course to the result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of the property is assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of said property which he donated was more than his one-half share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to three other parties. It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.Capistrano, J., took no part.Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee, vs.RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., objectors-appellants.Southworth and Faison for appellants.D. R. Williams for appellee. JOHNSON, J.:It appears from the record that on the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system, four parcels of land, known as Parcel A, Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D, all of which were located in the city of Manila. The only one of said parcels to which attention need be given in the present appeal is Parcel A.From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described generally and technically.I. General description. It is a parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River; bounded on the north by Calle Escolta for 31.08 meters, on the south by the Pasig River for 25.19 meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P. Roxas for 66.48 meters, and on the west by the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez for 62.10 meters; with an area of 1,817.03 square meters as set forth in the attached plan.II. Technical description. The undersigned on the 26th of the present month proceeded to survey and fix the boundaries for preparing the topographical plan of a lot occupied by buildings of strong materials one and two stories high belonging to Maria del Consuelo Roxas y Chuidian, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River. The point marked on the plan with the letter "X," located at the vertex of the angle formed by the northeastern side of Calle Escolta and the corner of the Pasaje de Perez was selected as the basic point, whence S. 49 40' W., 27.75 meters is located Point A, chosen as the point of beginning for the topographical operations, the result whereof is as follows:1awphil.net | Points or | Directions in | Distances | Boundaries || stations. | degrees. | in meters. | || A to B | S. 44 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. || B to C | S. 46 15' E | 16.15 | Heirs of Antonio || C to D | S. 42 00' E | 32.75 | } Enriquez. || D to E | S. 40 50' E | 13.20 | || E to F | N. 49 45' E | 14.25 | } Pasig River. || F to G | N. 52 00' E | 10.94 | || G to H | N. 37 10' W | 24.90 | || H to I | N. 35 45' W | 6.56 | || I to J | N. 50 30' E | 1.92 | } Pedro P. Roxas. || J to K | N. 35 00' W | 7.60 | || K to A | N. 42 05' W | 25.50 | | The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the points specified are marked on the attached plan, the bearings are magnetic, and its boundaries are: on the north, Calle Escolta; on the south, the Pasig River; on the east, the estate of Pedro P. Roxas; and on the west, the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez.The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and which accompanied the petition is as follows and is marked