Economic and Political Weekly March 1, 2003 879

Perspectives

D BANDYOPADHYAY

The old Bengal presidency and lateron West Bengal (since 1947) suf-fered from agricultural stagnation

for about a century from 1881 to 1981.In the pre-second world war days, cheaprice used to be imported from Burma(Myanmar) to meet the deficit. In 1943,there was a terrible famine, during whichbetween three and four million peopledied of starvation and hunger (AmartyaSen: Poverty and Famine, OUP, 1999,p 52). This horrendous event left an in-delible mark on the individual, commu-nity and administrative psyche regardingfood security in the state. Since 1944, thestate had some type of public distributionsystem on the ground. Statutory rationingwas abolished in the 1950s, but a modifiedrationing system continued all over thestate, including the Kolkata metropolitanarea. Though all political parties, particu-larly the Left, had always been very sen-sitive to the food issue, the entire attentionwas on public distribution of foodgrains(rice and wheat) rather than on productionof food. With the deteriorating food situ-ation in the mid-1960s in eastern India,statutory rationing was reintroduced inKolkata metropolitan area and in indus-trial towns. In the popular mind, it wasalways thought that it was the obligationof the centre to arrange supply of foodgrainsfor public distribution either by importingfood from abroad or by procurement from

other states. In fact, from the mid-to late-1960s the state lived from ‘ship to mouth’under the PL 480 regime. Exasperated bythe frequent threat of disruption of supplyto the rationing system, chief ministerP C Sen took drastic measures for com-pulsory levy and procurement of rice fromsurplus farmers and rice mills. In 1966-67,six lakh tonnes of rice was procured tobuild up a fall back stock position for thestatutory rationing system. This measuremade Sen and the ruling Congress Partyvery unpopular with the rural farming com-munities, which voted the Congress outof power in the 1967 general election. Thefirst non-Congress United Front (UF)government of 1967, which had someleftist parties in the coalition, took a softline on procurement and practically gaveit up to appease the middle and upperpeasantry.

The reason why no systematic effortwas made to raise production during theseyears, except implementing some all-India schemes of the central government,had to be found in the antiquated produc-tion relations in the agrarian sector.Zamindari and all forms of intermediarytenure were abolished in 1955. Those whowere recorded as settled or occupancytenants and their undertenants becameproprietors of land under the state. So farso good. But the erstwhile landed aristo-crats still continued to have control overhuge areas of agricultural land, which theyretained through various devious means,

particularly through ‘benami’ transactions.Though the Estates Acquisition Act of1953 (implemented from April 14, 1955)had individual ceiling provisions, the totalarea voluntarily surrendered by big land-owners was was only around 3 lakh acres.These lands were not fertile and some ofthem were disputed properties. The domi-nant force in the rural area was the rentierclass, which was not interested in produc-tion. So the land that they kept clandes-tinely beyond the ceiling was not used bythem for production by direct means. Thesewere all let out to tenants-at-will, thesharecroppers who had no formal rights.Some of them just kept lands fallow. Manyrecorded tenants also had vast areas undertheir possession. Though the intermediaryclass lost its intermediary rights, its socialand political position still remained high.It was a part of the ruling establishmentand its stranglehold on rural society con-tinued due to the absence of the emergenceof any other counterveiling social force.Under the circumstances, interventions forincreasing production did not and couldnot have any significant effect. That theprevailing agrarian situation was an im-pediment to the absorption of new techno-logy on a large scale became evident fromthe fact the impact of the green revolutionof the mid-late 1960s was felt in WestBengal over a decade later only afteragrarian relations underwent a massivechange through two phases of land re-form. Success has many claimants. I wouldnot assert that the upsurge in food pro-duction in West Bengal from 1983-84onwards was only due to land reforms. Inthe analysis that follows, an attempt ismade to show that limited land reformsin the state did create a favourable am-bience in which such an event couldhappen.

It is necessary to look at some quantitiesat this stage. Table 1, regarding riceproduction in West Bengal, tells its ownstory.

From the low of the decade of the 1970sto the spurt of the 1980s is not only sig-nificant but also amazing. In the 1990sthere was a deceleration. Yet the figureof 5.03 per cent for 1980-95 was wayabove the national average and also thatof high-performing states. Table 2 showsexponential rate of growth of foodgrain

Land Reforms andAgricultureThe West Bengal Experience

The spectacular growth in agricultural production in West Bengalin the 1980s was preceded by a programme of land reformslaunched by the state government. This redistributive operationcreated a favourable ambience that enabled agriculture to thrive.Productivity growth in the 1990s decelerated after that initialspurt. In order to reverse the decline, the state now needs tocomplete the process of agrarian reforms, and beef up itsagricultural infrastructure.

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Table 1: Rice Production in West Bengal

Period Compound AnnualRate of Growth

1950-60 1.011960-70 2.281970-80 1.221980-90 6.411980-95 5.03

Source: Madhura Swaminathan: EPW, October 3,1998.

and rice production using a three-yearmoving average in percentage.

West Bengal’s unqiue achievement in-dicates what an appropriate mix of tech-nology, proper changes in agrarian rela-tions and institutional reforms can accom-plish. “West Bengal, with a growth rateof over 7 per cent per annum in agriculturalvalue added – more than two-and-a-halftimes the national average – can be de-scribed as the agricultural success story ofthe 1980s” [Sen 1992]. It also shows thatthere is no contradiction between somemeasure of egalitarianism and efficiency.

Of course, there is a controversy regard-ing the correct rate of growth. Some schol-ars doubt government claims of over 6 percent rate of growth per annum. There isalso the issue of methodology of collectionof data by government of West Bengal(GoWB). Till the early 1980s, the Bureauof Applied Economics and Statistics(BAES) used to conduct independentsample surveys for average estimation andcrop cuts for yield estimation based on thestatistical methodology developed underthe direction of professor P C Mahalanobis.The figures given by the directorate ofagriculture (DOA) used to be checkedagainst the data given by BAES. Gener-ally, the latter figure used to be taken asthe correct estimate by official sources. Inthe early 1980s, BAES gave up acreageestimates and DoA’s figures were takenas the official figures. Obviously, onecannot rule out the possibility of institu-tional bias in favour of a higher productionfigure to give credit to itself (Rogaly, Ben,et al: Sonar Bangla? Sage Publication,1999, p 19). This point has to be bornein mind while discussing the issue of rateof growth.

According to Sen and Sengupta (1995)foodgrain output grew at the rate of 6.9per cent per annum in West Bengal be-tween 1981-82 and 1991-92, against 3.3per cent per annum in Bihar and 4.7 percent per annum in Orissa during the sameperiod. There was a statistically significantbreak in the trend growth between the twodecades of the 1970s and 1980s. Somescholars observed that even if the DoA’sproduction figures were assumed to bereliable, there was a serious problem re-garding the choice of the base year. In1981-82 and 1982-83 harvests in WestBengal were low. Choosing the base yearas 1983-84 with the same productionfigures the annual rate of growth wouldbe 4.3 per cent per annum [Rogaly1999:18-19].

This is not the occasion to get into anelaborate discussion on statistical method-ology of data collection. Assuming forarguments save the growth rate figure of4.3 per cent per annum, the fact remainsthat even this figure, though not as spec-tacular, indicates that the performance hadbeen highly impressive, “far surpassingprior growth rates in the state and com-paring quite favourably with agriculturalgrowth elsewhere in India. The fact thatthis growth occurred during a period ofmodest but significant agrarian reform isnoteworthy, suggesting that greater equityis compatible with efficiency and growth”[ibid: 19].

There are many claimants for success.Technocrats look at this episode as theresult of application of HYV seeds for themain aman paddy crop, extensive cultiva-tion of ‘boro’ (spring summer crop), useof groundwater on a large scale and in-creased use of chemical fertilisers. Allthese factors undoubtedly contributed tothe acceleration of rate of growth offoodgrain production in West Bengal. Theneighbouring states of Bihar and Orissaalso experienced moderate increase in therate of growth. John Harriss (1993) triedto explain the story of agricultural take-off by the availability of newer varietiesof rice, wider use of fertiliser and groundwater.

This explanation is generally true for theentire eastern region of India but it leavesunanswered a particularly better perfor-mance sustained over a longer period inWest Bengal compared with its neighbours.

The Left parties in West Bengal tried toexplain this phenomenon in a very sim-plistic manner through moderate landreform measures undertaken in the statein the late 1970s and early 1980s, particu-larly, ‘Operation Barga’. There is somemerit in this line of argument. Withoutrepeating the well-known arguments forland reform for higher growth, we maybriefly note the following points. Redis-tributive land reform, which allows landpoor and landless households to accessland results in small family-holding agri-culture which is generally more productivethan large-scale farming through hiredlabour. There is ample evidence in Indiaand other countries about higher produc-tivity per unit of land in small-scale familyfarming. The efficiency and growth casefor tenancy reforms is also well known.

There are many beneficial offshoots ofland reform which are not generallystressed. If poor peasants were allowed to

cultivate their own parcel of land theywould not compete with full time landlessagricultural workers in the rural labourmarket. That would help in raising ruralwages. Moreover, owning a piece of landwould enable the family to have a homeof their own, thereby releasing the house-hold from various restrictive practicesimposed by the landowner. It would in-crease its creditworthiness and bargainingpower. It would provide freedom of choiceto operate in the market [Ghimire 2001].

Resource reform relates primarily tochanging relationships. First, it aims atchanging access and tenure relationships.Second, it seeks to change the current ofexclusion so that the poor gain access tocredit, technology, markets and otherproductive sources. Third, it aims for thepoor to be active participants in the devel-opment of government policies andprogrammes affecting their communitiesand livelihoods [Moore 2001]. Thus it isthe combination of three factors, namely,redistributive and tenurial reforms, accessto non-farm inputs and services necessaryfor farming, and institutional reformsenabling peasantry to exercise some de-gree of governmental functions and influ-ence policies, which are essential forsuccessful resource reform to enhance poorpeasants’ capacity to increase productionand reduce poverty.

Against this background let us examinebriefly West Bengal’s land reformprogramme. Land reforms in the state tookplace in two phases. Each phase had dis-tinct characteristics of its own. The firstphase was in 1967-70 under the two UFgovernments.

When the first UF government came topower in February 1967, the countrysidein West Bengal was seething with agrariandiscontent. The first arrow of the militantNaxalbari movement was shot in thatvillage soon after the new governmentassumed power. Hare Krishna Konar, thecharismatic peasant leader who becamerevenue minister, tried to dissuade thebreakaway group of the CPI(M) from taking

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Table 2: Exponential Rate of Growth of Foodgrain and RiceProduction Using a Three Year Moving Average

(Per cent)

Foodgrain RiceRate of Growth t-stat Adj-R2 Rate of Growth t-stat Adj-R2

1951-52 to 1960-61 (0.15) 0.24 -0.12 (0.52) 0.88 -0.031960-61 to 1970-71 3.44 7.90 0.86 2.93 4.68 0.671970-71 to 1980-81 1.38 3.88 0.58 1.28 5.35 0.731951-52 to 1980-81 2.65 18.4 0.92 2.29 17.60 0.911980-81 to 1990-91 5.15 8.01 0.86 5.75 8.78 0.881990-91 to 1999-2000 2.39 21.16 0.98 2.36 17.87 0.971980-81 to 1999-2000 4.02 16.20 0.93 4.45 16.15 0.931951-52 to 1999-2000 2.65 30.88 0.95 2.66 27.51 0.94

Note: All estimates other than for 1951-52 to 1960-61 were significant at the 1 per cent level; the estimatefor 1951-52 to 1960-61 was not significant (even at the 10 per cent level) and the Adj-R2 wasvery low.

Source: Rawal, Vikas, Madhura Swaminathan and V K Ramchandran, (2002): ‘Agriculture in West Bengal:Current Trends and Directions for Future Growth’, a printed paper not yet published.

Table 3: Increase in Net Area Irrigatedby Different Sources of Irrigation

West Bengal and India (1976-77 to 1985-86)

Source of Percentage IncreaseIrrigation West Bengal All-India

Canals 12.9 14.4Tubewells 575.4 59.7Tanks/ponds 44.0 (-) 22.0Wells (-) 34.0 13.7Other sources 201.0 13.6All sources 74 19.7

Source: CMIE quoted from EPW, October 3, 1998.

to violence. He failed. To contain themovement politically in addition to theadministrative and police actions beingundertaken, he said that he would act onMao Zedong’s famous thesis of ‘fish inwater’. Militants (fish) could roam aboutfreely in the ‘water’ of peasants’ discon-tent. If the restlessness of the poor peas-antry could be reduced, the fish wouldvanish. Though ceiling provisions wereintroduced in 1955, by 1967 only 300,000acres (appr) of land had vested. This wasall surrendered land of big landlords. Itwas common knowledge that the landedgentry still controlled huge chunks ofagricultural land, way beyond the ceilingthrough various devious means. They hadwell crafted documents to show that nomi-nally they did not possess any land abovethe ceiling. These documents could bedisproved only by overwhelming oralevidence of direct witnesses like share-croppers, agricultural workers and othercategories of rural workers who directlyworked under the real owners and notunder the nominal title holders. A massivequasi-judicial campaign was launched tounearth the clandestinely held land strictlyaccording to law and established proce-dures. By 1970 (in less than three years),about a million acres of good agriculturalland vested in the state.

It had some important side effects whichshould be mentioned. The poor peasantryparticipated in the quasi-judicial proceed-ings in large numbers as witnesses. Theyfound that it yielded results. Violence hadcreated terror but produced no land forredistribution. They reposed faith in peace-ful collective action, eschewing the pathof militancy. The Naxal movement in ruralareas faded away. There was some spurtin urban violence but that also eventuallydied a natural death. The second importanteffect was the atrophy of the class of rentier,landed gentry. It broke the backbone ofthis parasitic class, who lost their social,economic and political dominance overrural Bengal. The space they vacated wasgradually occupied by middle and upperpeasantry who were productive agents.This shift of power equation had a ben-eficial impact later on.

During the Congress regime of 1972-77,some efforts were made to get back theland lost by the landed aristocracy. Butthey failed as proper legal procedures werefollowed while vesting. But they took theirrevenge on sharecroppers and agriculturalworkers who tendered evidence againstthem. Many sharecroppers were evicted.

Social ostracism and even physicalpunishment was meted out to many.

Operation Barga

Thus, when the Left Front(LF) govern-ment came to power in 1977 they had tourgently give attention to the plight ofsharecroppers who had suffered badlyduring the previous regime. BenoyChoudhury, another famous peasant leader,became land reforms minister. On advicehe agreed to accept Paulo Ireiri’s processof conscientisation followed by action. Inone such conscientisation camp, SambuTudu, a tribal sharecropper activist whosuffered imprisonment of four- and-a- halfyears without trial, gave the ingredients ofthe methodology of ‘Operation Barga’. Hestated that sharecropping did not involveany point of law. It was a verifiable fact.Hence, instead of a sharecropper, who didnot have scrap of paper, going to the revenuetribunal, why did not the revenue tribunalgo to the field and verify facts in thepresence of all sharecroppers and land-owners? He suggested the reversal of theprocess followed for about 100 years. Thisprocedure was followed with appropriatemodification during ‘Operation Barga;1978-81, with startling results of the re-cording of 1.2 million sharecroppers inthree years.

Taking advantage of a law passed duringthe internal emergency (1975-77), whichallowed free title to homestead plots upto five cents for a homeless family, 500,000such cases were also recorded in tandemwith ‘Operation Barga’, giving title to suchactual occupiers.

In quantitative terms over 1.6 millionsharecroppers were recorded giving themhereditary right of cultivation, and a fairdeal in crop sharing with a certificate of

sharecropping which could be used as adocument to establish one’s identity andalso for securing crop loans from institu-tions. About a million acres of vested landwere distributed among 2.5 million ben-eficiaries who were landless or land-poorpeasants. Half a million households weregiven title to homestead plots. Land reformthus directly benefited a little over fourmillion rural households – a significantproportion of the rural population.

There is a controversy regarding thepercentage of arable land covered by landreforms. About a million acres of landredistributed would constitute 7-8 per centof the total cultivable land. Scholar com-puting from NSSO figures suggest that thepercentage of area under ‘operation barga’would be around 7 per cent [Gazdar andSengupta 1995]. Whatever the source thisfigure of 7 per cent seems to be wrong (agross underestimation). An authoritativeestimate of area under barga cultivation isto be found in the report of the LandRevenue Commission, Bengal, 1940. Itestimated that about a fifth of the land inBengal was under barga cultivation (para142, p 67). There was no reason to inferthat the incidence of barga cultivation hadgone down in the western part of Bengal(West Bengal), with the top 20 per centof landowners owning 71.60 per cent of

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land in 1981-82 (NSS 37th round). Chanceswere that it would be higher because ofwider prevelance of absentee landlordismdue to proximity of the metropolis ofKolkata. Without casting any aspersion onthe NSS, it is well known that in mattersof property relations there is a wider marginerror in such figures because of the inher-ent apprehension of respondents to tell thetruth in this regard to any governmentagency. Therefore, I would argue that theLand Revenue Commission’s estimatewould be nearer to the actual ground situ-ation than that of the NSS.

Thus around 25-28 per cent of the arableland in West Bengal went in favour of thedirect beneficiaries of land reforms. Thisis a sizeable area. One can reasonablypresume that these lands, which were eitherindifferently cultivated or kept fallow,started being cultivated at least at the sub-optimal level to the extent labour cansubstitute capital. The impact of it on totalproduction must have been significant.

Independent studies indicate that ‘Op-eration Barga did have a beneficial effecton production and productivity of landunder cultivation by registered sharecrop-pers. Banerjee and Ghatak (1996, 1999)conducted field surveys in the mid-1990sand found that there was 17-18 per centincrease in productivity in the fields op-erated by registered sharecroppers. Thisfinding validates the hypothesis that withsecurity of tenure and fair crop sharingsharecroppers would have incentive toincrease production. They might be usingmore labour per unit of land than necessarybut such efforts would certainly enhanceproduction.

After several decades of violence andturmoil during each harvesting season,Operation Barga brought peace to thecountryside. This tranquillity in the ruralareas induced and encouraged privateinvestment in agriculture for long-termbenefit. Those who had the capacity couldnow think on a long-term basis and makeinvestment decisions for increasing pro-duction on their own land.

It was pointed out earlier that the firstphase of land reform successfully brokethe stranglehold of the landed aristocracyon the society and politics of rural WestBengal. How significant this factor wasbecame evident in the first election tothree-tier panchayats in 1978. For impor-tant political reasons, the LF governmentdecided to revive the panchayats, whichhad been lying dormant for almost twodecades without a single election being

held. This institutional revitalisation hada far-reaching and enduring effect on therural society and economy.

In 1978, elections were held for thethree-tier panchayat system in West Bengal.The CPI(M) the major constituent of theLF, had at that time a total membershipof around 30,000 in West Bengal concen-trated in the Kolkata metropolis and a fewother industrial centres. This party alongwith its minor partners, had to put uparound 80,000 candidates. Where wouldthey get so many candidates when they hadhardly any base in the rural areas? Themiddle and upper peasantry, now free fromthe social and economic yoke of the landedgentry, seized the opportunity. En massethey moved in to offer themselves ascandidates of the LF. They came in not forany ideological consideration but to pro-tect their own interests. So long as CPI(M)was against the zamindars and aristocracy,they had nothing to fear. In fact, theysupported the party’s moves. Now that thatclass had gone, no one knew what theLeftists would do. So better join them aslong as the going was good. The party alsowelcomed them because they formed themuch needed rural base which it did nothave. It was a win-win situation for bothsides.

Rural Investment

The class that came to power in thepanchayats were productive agents and sowere interested in production. They weretasting power for the first time in genera-tions after the political demise of the rentierlanded gentry. From 1980 onwards in theSixth Five-Year Plan, a massive transferof Plan funds started for rural developmentand poverty alleviation schemes. Themiddle peasantry, now in the power in thepanchayats, started using public funds(particularly wage employment funds) forcreating public works in support of agri-cultural production. Money for wageemployment was extensively used for thesepurposes. Small and temporary bunds orweirs for impounding water for irrigation,and rain water harvesting structures, werecreated to support agriculture. How mas-sive had been these efforts were wouldevident from Table 3.

While public investment in irrigation (asreflected in canals) was not significanteither in West Bengal or in the all-Indiacontext, the state surpassed strikingly theall-India figures of ‘Tubewells’ and ‘Othersources’. These other sources were created

by panchayats under the control of theascendant middle peasantry. Tubewellswere sunk mainly through private sources.Panchayats also in some places played arole. Investment of wage employment funds(such as NRER, RLEGP) by panchayatsfor ‘other sources’ acted as a catalyst formobilising private funds for shallow/smallpower tubewells. The rise of the middlepeasantry was the direct result of the successof the first phase of land reform for vestingof ceiling surplus land. This ascendantproductive class spearheaded the agricul-tural surge in the state.

In this context, one cannot ignore thepioneering role played by a segment of theremnants of the old aristocracy left behindin the rural areas after the vesting operationwas over. Most of them were absenteelandlords. But someone or other in thefamily used to be there in the rural ‘manor’house to look after the property, particu-larly to manage the ‘benami’ lands. Withthat gone, many from among the leftoversmigrated to towns. But those few amongthe ex-zamindars and big tenure holderswho still remained in the rural areas playeda crucial role in initiating capitalist farm-ing in the state. The trauma of vesting of‘benami’ land was fresh. They could nolonger trust their own bargadars who had‘betrayed’ them, severing their generationalloyalty. So some of them started selfcultivation through wage labour. They hadmoney. They had some education. Theycould absorb the new technology. Theycould take risk. From the mid-1970s, theystarted experimenting with capitalist farm-ing with HYV wheat. The wheat boom ofBirbhum and early ‘boro’ cultivation werelargely their contribution. This aspect hasnot been well researched. A serious studyis required to find out their real contribu-tion towards introduction of new agricul-tural practices from the mid-1970s. Hav-ing watched with interest their success, themiddle peasantry adopted them on a largescale from the late 1970s and early 1980s.A lesser known impact of redistributiveland reforms was to make a segment ofthe rentier class into entrepreneurial pro-ductive agents in agriculture.

Thus these segments of rural societyseparately and not in concert played a rolein causing this agricultural upturn. Thedirect beneficiaries of land reform, con-trolling 25-28 per cent of land, startedoperating sub-optimally. The ascendantmiddle peasantry, always eager to increaseproduction, took to modern cultivation ona large scale which was initiated rather

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hesitantly by the rural rump of the oldlanded aristocracy. Change in the socialorder coupled with the new technologybrought about this amazing surge in thehitherto moribund agriculture sector.

Those who try to explain this strikinggrowth in agriculture only in technologicalterms tend to ignore the other social,economic and political factors that con-tributed to it. After all, use of HYV andother biochemical inputs with irrigationhad been in vogue from the mid-1960s inPunjab and Haryana. Groundwater hadbeen there forever. How would one ex-plain the non-congruence of these factorsbefore the early 1980s in West Bengal?While hardware agricultural technology isundoubtedly important, software socialengineering in agrarian and social relation-ships is no less valuable. To explain theWest Bengal phenomenon correctly onehas to look into both the socio-politicaland technological factors together. Themiddle peasantry consolidated its positionin panchayats between 1978 and 1983.The Sixth Five-Year Plan, with a dominantslant on rural development, started in 1980.By 1982-83, all the contributory factorsstarted getting together to create the swellin production and productivity in agricul-ture in the state. This surge continued tillthe early 1990s, when it started deceler-ating.

The rate of growth of foodgrains in WestBengal slackened in the 1990s to 2.39 percent from 5.15 per cent in 1980-90. Riceis the most important foodgrain in thestate. There was a decline in the annualgrowth rate of rice production, from 6.28per cent in the 1980s to 2.19 per cent inthe 1990s. The average yield of rice inWest Bengal in 1999-2000, of 2,259 kgper hectare, was higher than the nationalaverage of 1,928 kg per hectare, but lowerthan the better performing states of TamilNadu (3,278 kg/hec) and Punjab (3,346kg/hec). The decline in growth of totalrice production was primarily due to adecline in the growth of yield. “Indeedone might expect, in the absence of furtherinnovations, agricultural growth in WestBengal is heading where other successfulstates like Punjab and Haryana haveended up – in a plateau of close to zerogrowth” [Banerjee 2002]. Not a very brightprospect!

There could be various factors for thisslowdown. A major technological break-through in seeds with higher yields andlow water and energy intensity might bringabout a higher growth rate given the other

attending circumstances. That might be apossibility in future, but there is nothingof the sort on the board now.

In this context, three issues that mightarrest the decline and, perhaps, reverse itmay be pointed out. In the first place,around 20 per cent of arable land nowunder barga cultivation has reached aplateau in production and productivity.These lands are being cultivated sub-optimally, or even less than sub-optimally,because of the inability of registered share-croppers to access other necessary non-land inputs. One of the major reasons forthis is their lack of title to land. If they weregiven title to the land they cultivate andmade raiyats directly under the state, theircreditworthiness would immediately im-prove and they might be able to accessother non-land inputs important to raiseproduction from the stage of sub-optimalityto optimality. Therefore, I would urgemaking the 1.6 million or so recordedbargadars full owners of the land theycultivate. Erstwhile owners may be paidcompensation by the sharecroppers throughbank finance to be arranged by state in-tervention without budgetary support. Thechange of status from secure leaseholderto owner would open up various possibili-ties for enhancing production. Will the LFgovernment, which failed to take such astep in spite of earlier commitments duringthe past two decades or so, agree to doit now?

Secondly, acute fragmentation of hold-ing, has become a major constraint tointensive use of electro-mechanical appli-ances, and even biochemical technologyin some cases. Without consolidation oflandholding, a major breakthrough inproduction can hardly be made. Somehow,Left parties in the state are averse, nayallergic, to this concept. Their apprehen-sion is that by this process of consolidationof landholding small and marginal farmerswould lose out to medium and big farmers.There is a point in this fear. To obviateit, the current land reform law in the stateprovides for consolidation of landhold-ings of owners upto 1 hectare. If properlyimplemented, the interests of small andmarginal farmers could be largely pro-tected. It was Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon(the then chief minister of Punjab) wholaid the foundation of the green revolutionin that state by consolidating landholdingsprior to the introduction of the miracleMexican wheat in the mid-1960s. Will theLF government in West Bengal take cour-age in both hands and do it?

Thirdly, insufficiency of institutionalcredit in rural areas is seriously impedinggrowth of agriculture in the state. “Thepresent rural credit needs of the state havebeen estimated at Rs 10,000 crore. Theactual credit disbursement in 2001-02 was,by contrast, only Rs 863 crore (Rs 549crore from cooperative banks and Rs 414crore from commercial banks).” (Thisstatement is ascribed to Asim Das Gupta,finance minister of West Bengal in thepaper by Rawal et al, 2002 pp 47-48).Compared with the requirement, credit fromthe institutional sources is too insignifi-cant. Here one notices a colossal failureof the LF government in organising acooperative credit supply system in thepast two decades. Apart from traditionalsources, this void is filled up by two newcategories of lenders. First, there are sup-pliers and vendors of agricultural appli-ances, machinery and agricultural inputslike seeds, fertilisers and pesticides. Theyextend credit to push their sales. Theysupply commodities at marked-up pricesand often buy produce at a price whichmight not be remunerative to farmers. Theyalso act as extension agencies as the state’sown extension system has collapsed. Tosell their products they sometimes giveimproper advice, to the detriment of farm-ers’ interest. The second category of lend-ers are salaried persons who lend out ofaccumulated money (or even borrow frombanks to re-lend to cultivators). The com-mon rate of interest on such loans is 5 perRs 100 per month, or 60 per cent perannum. In some cases it goes up to Rs 7per month or 84 per cent per annum. Anew breed of unlicenced ‘shahukars’ hascome into being, whose proximity to rul-ing parties through employees’ unions orassociations give them the protection theyrequire. With vested interests controllingthe informal credit market having ties withvarious tiers of the ruling establishment,will the LF government take the initiativein organising a cooperative credit systemto supply a significant proportion of ruralcredit at proper rates of interest? This doubtarises because of the casual manner inwhich this issue has been dealt with in thestate’s draft agriculture policy statement.The policy statement has not yet beenfinalised. So it may change. But the draftas it stands makes a bland statement. “Inthis context, cooperatives, cooperativebanks and cooperative credit societies willplay a key role in financing growth inagriculture, horticulture, food-processing,animal resource development, social

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forestry, fisheries and irrigation” (p 12).Such a general statement does not indicateany serious commitment on the part of thegovernment to go ahead with vigour.

There are various other factors like properuse of irrigation potential, appropriatecropping pattern, pricing of agriculturalproduce, marketing facilities, and the like.These are all important factors taken jointlyor severally. But we are not entering intothese issues here.

Since the agricultural policy of GoWBhas not yet been finalised, it may not beproper to comment on the draft paper incirculation. The paper had undergone afew revisions. In one of the latest versions,one finds that the basic thrust of the policyis to release a significant proportion ofcropped area under rice “for diversifica-tion of crop production and, in particular,the production of oilseeds, pulses, fruits,vegetables, flowers and other non-foodcrops”. One can anticipate that this em-phasis on crop diversification from rice toother food and non-food crops for thepurpose of value addition is not going tochange, since it seems to be in consonancewith the policy prescriptions of dominantmultilateral agencies.

In a predominantly subsistence agrariansystem, with the overwhelming majorityof farmers being small and marginal, “re-leasing a significant proportion of croppedarea” from paddy might adversely affectthem. Subsistence paddy cultivation en-sures full or partial household food secu-rity to farming families. Moving to non-food crops would expose such farmers tothe vagaries of harsh market forces whichwould increase their vulnerability. Thisaspect has to be kept in mind in consid-ering this policy shift.

While value addition is welcome forenhancing income, in a highly competitivemarket economy only corporate bodieswhether national or transnational could beeffective players. Thus corporate entitieswould enter into the agrarian sector.Everyone who is anyone is now singingpraises of the penetration of corporationsin the agrarian sector and commercialisationof agriculture, including the controversial‘contract farming’ – which had a dubioushistory in eastern India including WestBengal. One felt a bit disturbed by thestrident advocacy of contract farming bynine well known non-resident Bengalieconomists in a recent article in EPW(already referred to).

Their argument is that “consumers inrich countries are increasingly reluctant to

eat anything that is not guaranteed ‘safe’meaning that their production has takenplace in a highly monitored environment.Lobbyists and spokespersons from importcompeting industries in these countries arealways happy to push for even tighterregulations of imports of edible substancesfor obvious cynical reasons. This makesthe multinationals a vital intermediary inthese industries. They are the ones that candeal with the regulatory machinery andhave the requisite credibility with consum-ers for being quality and safetyconscious...This we think is the main reasonto take the recent proposals for contractfarming seriously” [Banerjee 2002:4214].

In levity one might argue that wildlifewould be best protected if poachers weremade gamekeepers. To allay the apprehen-sions of those who fear ruthless exploita-tion of farmers through contract farmingby TNCs, they observe, “The discussionof contract farming has brought up thespectre of the ‘neelkuthis’ reborn in somequarters. It is worth recalling that the‘neelkuthis’ became what they became withthe active connivance of the colonial state”[ibid: 4215]. The authors feel that the“avowedly pro-people governments”would not allow this to happen. Their hopeis likely to be belied because state govern-ments are competing with one another insoliciting TNCs to invest in their respec-tive states. In such a situation, it is not onlydifficult, but almost impossible for “avow-edly pro-people” governments to place anysevere restrictions on the operations ofTNCs in this regard. TNCs would go tothe state which would allow them freedomof operation. Moreover compared with themoney power of TNCs, near-bankrupt stategovernments would hardly have any bar-gaining power. The plight of ‘campesinos’and the peculiar operations of these enti-ties in the ‘banana republics’ do not evokeconfidence on their standards of fair playand ethics.

West Bengal had chalked out a uniquepath of its own in causing a resurgence inagricultural production in the 1980s and1990s. Now there are clear signs of de-celeration. To check it, let the state com-plete the process of agrarian reforms, whichwere halted mid-way. Let it develop thenecessary infrastructure by getting loansfrom multilateral agencies. The awakenedpeasantry of the state which had had a tasteof good life would carry forward the secondsurge with their inherent resilience.

Address for correspondence:bandyopadhyayd@rediffmail.com

ReferencesBanerjee, Abhijit et al (2002): ‘Strategy for

Economic Reform in West Bengal’, EPW,October 12, p 4213.

Banerjee, Abhijit and Maitreesh Ghatak (1996):‘Empowerment and Efficiency: The Economicsof Tenancy Reform’ working paper, MITDepartment of Economics.

Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (1999):‘Empowerment and Efficiency: The Economyof Agrarian Reform’, working paper, MIT,Department of Economics.

Gazdar and Sengupta in Rogaly, Ben (1995):Sonar Bangla? p 67.

Ghimire, K B (2001): ‘Regional Perspective onLand Reforms’, Chapter I, Whose Land? IFADUNIRSD – The Popular Coalition: Rome,pp 18-19.

Harriss, J (1993): ‘What is Happening in RuralBengal? Agrarian Reform Growth andDistribution’, EPW, 28 (24): 1237-47.

Moore, B H (2001): ‘Introduction’, Whose Land?p 7.

Rawal, Vikas, Madhra Swaminathan and V KRamchandran: (2002): ‘Agriculture in WestBengal: Current Trends and Directions forFuture Growth’, a printed paper not yetpublished.

Sen, Abhijit (1992): ‘Economic Liberalisation andAgriculture in India’, Social Scientist 20(4).

Sen, Abhijit and Ranja Sengupta (1995): ‘TheRecent Growth in Agricultural Output inEastern India with a Special Reference to theCase of West Bengal’, January, quoted fromSen and Gazdar’s paper in Ben Rogaly’s SonarBengla?

EPW

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