Case Study:

How Fuel Treatment Areas Affect Wildland Urban Interface Fires

Saskatchewan.ca/fire

Lake e

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the following individuals for supplying the information that was vital for

the completion of this case study:

Air Attack Officers Working the Fire: Dan Bast, Eric Braaten, Kevin Frey, for supplying; air tanker drop

information, time lines, fire observations, and pictures of the incident.

Fire Investigators: Conservation Officers; Ken Ness, Brendon Smith, Evan Maxwell and Al Hrynkiw who

provided pictures and fire details for the case study.

GIS Specialist: Dana Jones for running the Prometheus fire growth projection and preparing maps

suitable for the case study.

Prevention & Mitigation Specialists: Camille Harris and Owen Price for providing technical advice and

reviewing the document.

Meteorologists: Henri Dagenais, Daniel Poirier and James Schofield for providing historical weather

and fire indices.

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Contents INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................ 1 FIRE CHRONOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT......................................................................................................... 1 DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRE ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................................................... 6

Fuels ............................................................................................................................................................. 6 WEATHER ......................................................................................................................................................... 7

Antecedent Climatic Conditions ................................................................................................................... 7

Fire Indices ................................................................................................................................................... 8

Surface Weather Observations .................................................................................................................... 8

Topography ................................................................................................................................................14 FIRE BEHAVIOUR ............................................................................................................................................15

Observed Rates of Spread ..........................................................................................................................15

Projected Rates of Spread ..........................................................................................................................15

Fire Behaviour ............................................................................................................................................15

Map of Fire Projection................................................................................................................................15 FUEL BREAK AND FIRE INTERACTION .............................................................................................................16 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................20

Figure 1 - Picture showing fire origin indicated as a circle and burn patterns showing initial fire runs.

Note that roads and trails in this picture were not created as part of suppression effort ………………………2

Figure 2- Picture looking from fire origin to the east toward Black Lake along what used to be the north

flank of the fire. Smoke shows 90 degree wind switch from initial run, Camp Grayling was just catching

on fire……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..3

Figure 3 – Picture showing Camp Grayling burning as Air Tankers lay down a retardant line along the fire

guard between the fire and the community …………………………………………………………………………………………..4

Figure 4 – Overview of Blib fire looking in a westerly direction ………………………………………………………………5

Figure 5 – Picture of the upper sized trees that the post cutters were harvesting within the stand where

the fire originated ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….6

Figure 6 – Construction of the fire guard at Black Lake in 2006 …………………………………………………………….7

Figure 7 – Map of Saskatchewan showing percent normal precipitation for April 1, 2015 to June 15, 2015

compared to stats from 1971 – 2000. The circle at the top indicates Black Lake area …………………………..8

Figure 8 – 18Z (1200 local) surface analysis …………………………………………………………………………………………..11

Figure 9 – 1800 local surface prognosis May 15 2015 ……………………………………………………………………………12

Figure 10 – 0000 local surface prognosis May 16 2015 ………………………………………………………………………...13

Figure 11 – 12Z (0600 local) May 16 2015 surface analysis …………………………………………………………………..14

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Figure 12 - Prometheus wildfire projection showing the projected advancement of the fire from 2100 hrs

to 0000 hrs …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..16

Figure 13 – Picture showing burn scar indicating a full crown fire as fire hit the fire guard. Note the

retardant line on the community side of the guard and the splash pile in the middle of the guard ……..17

Figure 14 – Close up of fire guard showing some spark Black Spruce and Jack Pine regen coming up on

the cleared site …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………........………....18

Figure 15 – Left, an aerial picture of the tanker drops along the community side of the fire guard .……..19

Figure 16 – Picture of the fire approaching the fire guard when the tankers left the fire at 2030 hrs …...19

Table 1: Fire Weather Indices for the fire area taken from two nearby weather stations on the day of the

fire. Weather readings are noon actuals (Central Standard Time) and are used to forecast for burning

conditions at 1600 hrs based on the normal diurnal curve. ......................................................................... 8

Table 2: Surface Weather Observations from the Stony Rapids Weather Station for May 15th from 1500

hrs – 2300 hrs. ............................................................................................................................................... 9

Table 3: Surface Weather Observations from the Beatrice Weather Station for May 15th from 1500 hrs –

2300 hrs

...................................................................................................................................................................... 9

Table 4: Hourly FFMC, ISI and FWI from the Beatrice Weather Station for May 15th from 1500 hrs – 2300

hrs……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..............10

Table 5: The weather data used to run the Prometheus fire growth projection .......................................15

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INTRODUCTION The Blib Fire (Black Lake Indian Band - Blib) was reported on Friday, May 15, 2015. The fire’s origin was

3.8 km north of the First Nation community of Black Lake in northern Saskatchewan. The fire was

responsible for burning out an Outfitting Camp and directly threatened the community of Black Lake,

prompting the evacuation of the community. The fire was a one day incident, growing to 668 ha in size,

burning 20 structures within the outfitting camp, and coming within 750 m of Black Lake where it

stopped when it ran into a fire guard that had been constructed 9 years earlier to protect the

community from another wildfire.

This case study looks at the fire behaviour in relation to the fuel, weather and topography with a focus

on the role the fireguard played in protecting the community from the wildfire.

The community of Black Lake is located on the northwest shore of Black Lake in Northern Saskatchewan,

453 km north of the town of La Ronge.

FIRE CHRONOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT The Blib Fire was reported at 1537 hrs Central Standard Time on May 15, 2015 and started at

approximately 1515 hrs. The fire was ignited when post cutters left a campfire going while they worked

nearby. When they noticed that the campfire had burned out of the fire pit they tried to put it out with

some water but were unsuccessful in doing so.

Hot, dry, and windy conditions allowed the surface fire to quickly transition into a full crown fire in the

dense C 31 Jack Pine (Pinus banksiana) stands that dominate this area. Burn patterns indicate that the

fire took some significant runs within a short period of time after ignition.

1 Canadian Forest Fire Behaviour Prediction System Fuel Model Type.

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Figure 1 - Fire origin indicated as a circle and burn patterns showing initial fire runs. Note that roads and trails in picture were not created as part of suppression effort.

By 1637 hrs, the Air Attack Officer working the fire reported that the fire was running in an easterly

direction at an intensity class 52. The fire was reported to be 150 ha at the time and had already jumped the Fond du Lac River. The southern flank of the fire followed an existing road and an old burn. The northern flank of the fire cut the edge of another old burn along the Fond du Lac River. The old burns acted as a bit of a fuel break, the sparse fuels within the old burns significantly slowed fire spread.

The Air Attack Officer provided another report at 1654 hrs. The fire was still burning at an intensity class 5 and had exceeded 200 ha in size. Retardant lines had been dropped to try to protect Camp Grayling. The fire continued to run in an east / southeasterly direction where it jumped onto Fir Island on Black Lake, a distance of over 700 m, see Figure 2. The Fire Weather Forecasters out of the Provincial Fire Centre in Prince Albert forecasted the passing of a cold front that would result in a 90 degree wind switch for the fire and at 1722 hours the ground crews confirmed that the wind had shifted and it was now coming out of the north / northwest so that the south flank of the fire now became the head of the fire. With the wind shift came new threats to values at risk; Camp Grayling along the shore of Black Lake was approximately 1 km away, and the community of Black Lake was 2.4 km away. Both values were now downwind of the fire. By 1741 hrs, the fire was reported to be only 300 m from Camp Grayling and had started to burn towards the community of Black Lake.

2 Measure of Fire Intensity Class as established by the Canadian Forest Fire Behaviour Prediction System

Fond du Lac River

Old Burn 1

Old Burn

2

Fire Origin

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Crews working to protect Camp Grayling had to pull out for safety reasons at 1753 hrs and by 1754 hrs

the fire was reported to be at Camp Grayling. The fire burned over the retardant lines and Camp

Grayling itself at 1800 hrs where 20 buildings were burnt, leaving only one main building standing.

Figure 2 - View from fire origin to the east toward Black Lake along what used to be the north flank of the fire. Smoke shows 90 degree wind switch from initial run, Camp Grayling was just catching on fire.

After burning through the outfitting camp the fire continued to spread as a full crown fire towards the

community of Black Lake. The Air Attack Officer with the air tankers now focused their attention on the

protection of the community. The fire guard that was established nine years earlier stood between the

fire and the community. The Air Attack Officer targeted the community side of the fire guard to drop

retardant. Four CV 580 drops were made starting at the lake and working up the fire guard. The Air

Attack Officer working the fire reported that the fire was still burning at an intensity class 4 with no

visible spotting when they left the fire at 2030 hrs. At this time, the Air Attack Officer reported the fire to

be approximately 1 -2 km away from the fire guard and burning towards the community.

Fir Island

Black Lake

Camp Grayling

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Figure 3 - Camp Grayling burning as Air Tankers lay down a retardant line along the fire guard between the fire and the community.

The Fire Centre Duty Officer log book documents the ground crew efforts to protect the community of

Black Lake, an edited recall of events is provided below:

17:59 hrs: Helicopter 26, a Bell 205 & Helicopter 70, a Bell 407 are both inbound to the fire.

19:03 hrs: Ground crews assisted by heavy equipment are working to create a fire guard between the fire’s east flank and Black Lake (close to the community).

20:42 hrs: Southern part of fire is a fire intensity class 5. Plan to put Helicopter 70 with bucket out to secure a portion of fire that is of concern.

20:48 hrs: Fire staff in helicopter who are monitoring the fire recommend the evacuation of Black Lake. 20:52 hrs: Fire staff in helicopter reports that the fire is still burning at a fire intensity class 5. 21:04 hrs: Fire is reported to have hit the Black Lake fire guard. 21:09 hrs: Fire staff looking to see if they can back burn from fire guard. 21:33 hrs: Report that the fire has started to jump the fire guard. 21:36 hrs: Ground crews are actioning the jump fires. 22:22 hrs: Crews stopped working fire for the night. Fire has calmed down but there is still some open flame.

Black Lake

Air Tanker

Camp Grayling

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The author notes that the Air Attack Officer estimated the fire to be burning at an intensity class 4 while

the ground crews were calling it an intensity class 5, well after the Air Tankers were off the fire.

Two spot fires were found the next day across the fire guard close to the community itself. The spot

fires were approximately 15 square meters (m2) in size and only 200 m from homes on the north side of

the community.

Figure 4 - Overview of Blib fire looking in a westerly direction.

Community of Black Lake

Fire Origin

Camp Grayling

Ice on Black Lake

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DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRE ENVIRONMENT

Fuels Black Lake falls within the Taiga Shield Ecozone and the Tazin Lake Ecoregion3 in an area where sandy

soils dominate along with scattered rock outcroppings. The fire started in a mature Jack Pine stand

where the trees are 10 to 15 m in height and 15 – 20 cm Diameter Breast Height (DBH). The dry sandy

soil in the area makes for a very shallow duff layer.

Figure 5 - Picture of the upper sized trees that the post cutters were harvesting within the stand where the fire originated.

The forest stands from Camp Grayling to the community of Black Lake are mostly younger and very

dense, the result of a 1977 fire. Next to Camp Grayling itself there were some small Trembling Aspen

(Populus tremuloides) stands and along the lake there are some stands dominated by 10 m high White

Birch (Betula papyrifera) with a Black Spruce (Picea mariana) understory. The picture shown in Figure 6

was taken when the fire guard was being constructed and shows the type of forest that the fire burnt

through when it ran to the south towards the community.

3 Units of the Canadian Ecological Land Classification System

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Figure 6 - Construction of the fire guard at Black Lake in 2006.

WEATHER

Antecedent Climatic Conditions The Athabasca region reported lower than normal snowfall over the winter season, from November

2014 to May of 2015. Cumulative precipitation over this period was somewhere between 40 – 80 mm

of precipitation compared to 80 – 100 mm that this area normally receives.

Weather observations taken at each weather station are used to generate Fuel Moisture Codes and Fire

Behaviour Indices as part of the Canadian Forest Fire Weather Index (FWI) System. The May 1st Drought

Code for this area reflected the dry fall and winter, with levels in the 300 - 400 range that indicate a High

fire hazard level. These levels indicated a drought code percentile of “Dry Conditions, 1 in 10 years”.

Drought Codes are a rating of the average moisture content in deep, compact, organic layers. The code

indicates seasonal drought effects of forest fuels, and the ability of fire to burn in deep duff layers and

large logs. High levels indicate that fires will be difficult to control.

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Figure 7 - Map of Saskatchewan showing percent normal precipitation for April 01, 2015 to June 15, 2015 compared to stats from 1971 – 2000. The circle at the top indicates the Black Lake area

Fire Indices Other components of the FWI System collected from the two nearby weather stations show burning

conditions to be at extreme levels on the day of the fire. The Stony Rapids weather station is an

Environment Canada weather station located 30 km northwest of the fire and the Beatrice weather

station is a provincial weather station located 37 Km southeast of the fire.

FWI components that indicate Extreme burning conditions are indicated in red font within Table 1.

Table 1: Fire Weather Indices for the fire area taken from two nearby weather stations on the day of the fire. Weather readings are noon actuals (Central Standard Time) and are used to forecast for burning conditions at 1600 hrs based on the normal diurnal curve.

Wx Stn. Temp. RH W Dir W Spd Rn 24 FFMC DMC DC ISI BUI FWI

Stony R 23 C 18 WSW 28 0 94 48 379 32 72 57

Beatrice 24 C 15 WSW 21 0 95 55 392 25 82 52

Surface Weather Observations Weather for the day of the fire run comes from the Stony Rapids weather station which is located 30 km

to the north west of the fire. Crossover conditions were in effect for the first two hours of the fire run

where temperatures were higher than the relative humidity levels. The crossover conditions combined

with relatively high wind speeds during the first four hours of the fire resulted in strong fire runs. The

humidity sharply rises towards midnight and the temperature drops significantly.

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The fire area received a couple hours of snow starting in the early morning hours of May 16 2015 which

effectively prevented any further spread.

Table 2: Surface Weather Observations from the Stony Rapids Weather Station for May 15th from 1500 hrs – 2300 hrs.

Wx Station

Date Time Temp Dew RH Wind Dir. Wind Speed

Wind Gust

STNYR 15-May-15 2300 7 3.92464 81 0 N 4 NULL

STNYR 15-May-15 2200 8 3.00459 71 90 E 13 NULL

STNYR 15-May-15 2100 10 2.98149 62 10 N 9 NULL

STNYR 15-May-15 2000 12 2.89663 54 10 N 9 NULL

STNYR 15-May-15 1900 14 2.77839 47 350 N 11 NULL

STNYR 15-May-15 1800 18 0.981306 32 350 N 17 37

STNYR 15-May-15 1700 22 -1.35917 21 260 W 24 43

STNYR 15-May-15 1600 22 -2.01852 20 280 W 41 59

STNYR 15-May-15 1500 23 -1.87608 19 280 W 35 54

Table 3: Surface Weather Observations from the Beatrice Weather Station for May 15th from 1500 hrs – 2300 hrs.

Wx Station

Date Time Temp Dew RH Wind Dir. Wind Speed

Wind Gust

BEATR 15-May-15 2300 6.5 0.321862 65 36 NE 8.3 25.4

BEATR 15-May-15 2200 8.4 1.23633.00459

61 2 N 11.4 19

BEATR 15-May-15 2100 10.6 1.84843 55 6 N 16 25.1

BEATR 15-May-15 2000 13.9 1.75623 44 14 NNE 17.8 26.1

BEATR 15-May-15 1900 18.2 -0.68555 28 350 N 19.9 35.7

BEATR 15-May-15 1800 23 -2.60234 18 300 NW 22.8 34.8

BEATR 15-May-15 1700 24.4 -3.88152 15 288 W 20.4 35.8

BEATR 15-May-15 1600 24.9 -6.39325 12 267 W 23.8 38

BEATR 15-May-15 1500 24.8 -6.47229 12 250 W 25.2 34.9

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Table 4 below shows the hourly adjusted Fine Fuel Moisture Conditions, Initial Spread Index and Fire Weather Indices. Red numbers indicate extreme burning conditions.

Table 4: Hourly FFMC, ISI and FWI from the Beatrice weather Station for May 15th from 1500 hrs – 2300 hrs.

Wx Station

Date Time FFMC_h ISI_h FWI_h

BEATR 15-May-15 2300 92 8 25

BEATR 15-May-15 2200 92 11 31

BEATR 15-May-15 2100 93 16 38

BEATR 15-May-15 2000 95 20 44

BEATR 15-May-15 1900 95 24 50

BEATR 15-May-15 1800 96 29 56

BEATR 15-May-15 1700 95 26 52

BEATR 15-May-15 1600 95 30 57

BEATR 15-May-15 1500 95 31 59

The May 15th 18Z (1200 local) surface analysis (Figure 8) shows a surface ridge influencing the fire area bringing sunny and dry weather. In the North West Territories a cold front is moving southward. The 1800 local surface prognosis (Figure 9) shows the front just north of the fire location, but in reality the front was slightly faster than forecasted and passed over the fire area around 1800 local. We can see from the isobars a strong wind shift with the frontal passage from Southwest/West to Northwest/North. The 0000 local surface prognostic (Figure 10) shows the cold front south of the fire area. The high pressure in the NWT is an artic high, which will account for the couple of hours of snow during the early morning of May 16 2015. The surface analysis for 12Z (0600 local) (Figure 11) verified the prognosis chart for a frontal passage over the fire on May 15 2015.

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Figure 8 – 18Z (1200Local) surface analysis.

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Figure 9 – 1800 local surface prognosis May 15 2015

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Figure 10 – 0000 local surface prognosis May 16 2015

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Figure 11 – 12Z (0600 local) May 16 2015 surface analysis

Topography The fire started in a relatively flat area at approximately 250 m in elevation and burned into some small

hills with 10 to 20 m rise of elevation before dropping down 40 m where it crossed the Fond du Lac

River. On the other side of the river there is a quick rise in elevation to a top of a ridge along the edge of

the lake that tops out at 350 m before sharply dropping down to the lake edge.

When the fire ran back to the west it immediately crossed a 1 km ridge of sharp hills that rise

approximately 40 m in elevation. Once over the hills, the fire spread in relatively flat terrain up to the

fire guard.

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FIRE BEHAVIOUR

Observed Rates of Spread Documentation to determine exact rates of spread on this fire are limited. Based on comments and

timelines from the Air Attack Officer working the fire, the documented rate of spread from when wind

switched to when it hit Camp Grayling was 31 m/min.

Projected Rates of Spread The observed rate of spread falls within the lower threshold of the projected rate of spread which was determined to be 31 – 51 m/min based on weather from the two closest weather stations and using the C 3 fuel type. Once the fire burnt through the mature forest stand and hit the younger, thicker stands that were closer to the lake, the rates of spread are projected to be between 40 – 54 m/min when using the C- 4 fuel type.

Fire Behaviour The resulting fire scar clearly shows the extreme burning conditions that were present. Once ignited,

the fire quickly transitioned from a surface fire to a full crown fire. A brief period when the wind

switched direction resulted in reduced rates of spread but the fire quickly moved into a full crown fire

once the winds stabilized. The fire continued to run as a full crown fire right up to when the fire reached

the fire guard at 2104 hrs.

The fire was able to spot across onto Fir Island, a distance of at least 700 m. Other spotting that was

documented occurred when the fire hit the fire guard where it was able to jump the guard to ignite the

forest on the far edge of the break, a distance of 90 m. The fire spotted approximately 450 m when it

jumped the break and ignited two small spot fires within 200 m of the community itself.

Map of Fire Projection A Prometheus4 fire growth projection was completed to determine how far the fire would have travelled

if the fire guard would not have been in place. A 3 hour projection was completed using line ignition

along the 1.25 Km front where the fire burnt up to the fire guard. The projection starts when the fire

was observed reaching the fire guard at 2100 hrs.

Table 5: The weather data used to run the Prometheus fire growth projection.

4 Prometheus is a Fire Growth Model

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Figure 12 - Prometheus wildfire projection showing the projected advancement of the fire from 2100 hrs to 0000 hrs.

FUEL BREAK AND FIRE INTERACTION The community of Black Lake had a fire guard constructed around the perimeter of the community in

2006 when it was threatened by another wildfire. The fire guard was constructed using dozers where

the trees were windrowed in the middle of the break.

The fire guard is approximately 90 m in width where the fire hit it at the west end and is 60 m wide

closer to the lake where the fire guard makes a corner around a wet drainage. See Figure 13 for more

detail. Note that the sewage lagoon seen in the above picture has been filled in and is actually an open

grass area between the fire guard and the community.

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Figure 13 - Picture looking in a southerly direction showing the burn scar indicating a full crown fire as fire hit the fire guard. Note the retardant line on the community side of the guard and the slash pile in the middle of the guard.

The fire guard was constructed approximately 0.75 Km from the community of Black Lake and ties into

the lake on both sides of the community. Note the new cat line on the west flank of the fire.

The fire guard had grown up somewhat from when it was constructed; there was a moss / lichen layer

along with some scattered Black Spruce and Jack Pine seedlings that were less than 1 m in height. Very

little to no other slash was present as the area had been stripped to mineral soil by the dozers to build

the guard. See Figure 14 to see a close up of the vegetation on the fire guard.

1.25 Km fire front

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Figure 14 - Close up of fire guard showing some sparse Black Spruce and Jack Pine regen coming up on the cleared site.

The fuel break was utilized tactically in the suppression of the fire. Air tankers were called in to try to

prevent the fire from running into the community of Black Lake. CV 580 air tankers dropped four loads

of retardant, working up from the shoreline on the community side of the fire guard. The tankers

started dropping at 1940 hours and left at 2030 hrs. The Air Attack Officer reported the fire to be 1 – 2

km back from the fuel break and burning at an intensity class 4 with no visible spotting when they left.

A vehicle trail along the edge of the fire guard provided safe access to the head of the fire for the fire

crews. The crews utilized the guard to start a small scale backfire of the fuels before the fire reached the

fire guard. When the fire did reach the guard, ground crews and helicopter support were able to see the

spot fires that crossed the guard and were able to safely and successfully suppress them before they built

up any intensity. The crews also used the break as an anchor point to build a cat guard up the west flank

of the fire line.

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Figure 15 - Left, an aerial picture of the tanker drops along the community side of the fire guard and Figure 16 showing the fire approaching the fire guard when the tankers left the fire at 2030 hrs.

Burn patterns show that the fire was still burning as a full crown fire when it hit the fuel break in

multiple locations over a 1.25 km front. The fire burnt through the guard in a couple locations but wet

areas combined with the retardant drops helped to limit further spread. The fire crews were able to

safely access and suppress the spot fires where the fire started on the community side of the break. The

brush pile in the centre of the fire guard caught on fire but there was enough cleared area to limit any

further spread from the piles. Fire crews stationed themselves within the community of Black Lake and

patrolled the area for spot fires from 2200 hrs to 2300 hrs. Two spot fires, both approximately 15 m2 in

size were located the next morning, approximately 200 m north of the community edge.

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CONCLUSION May 15, 2015 saw some extreme burning conditions in the Black Lake area and an ignition source

combined with continuous fuels resulted in a fast moving and destructive wildfire. The 90 degree wind

switch compounded the difficulty factor in suppressing this fire and significantly added to the size and

force of it.

It is important to note that there was no fuel management work completed around the outfitting camp

and extreme fire behaviour resulted in the fire burning through the camp area destroying all but one

building.

Air Attack Officers working the fire were able to utilize the fire guard to effectively lay a retardant line

along the community edge of the fire guard. Photo evidence shows locations where the fire burnt into

the retardant line in some locations but not through it. The lineal fire guard served as an ideal location

for the air tankers to build upon to make an effective retardant line.

The guard provided a safe access for the firefighters where they were able to locate and focus on the

spot fires that came up across the break. The ground crews also used the break to start a backfire along

a portion of the fire guard which would have limited the spotting that occurred over the break when the

fire front hit the backfire.

The fire guard played a significant role in the protection of the community of Black Lake itself. Although

burning conditions were quickly deteriorating by the time the fire hit the break the fire was still burning

as a full crown fire and there would have been no way that the available suppression resources would

have been able to slow the fire if it were not present. Fire modelling puts the fire into the north edge of

the community by midnight if the fire guard was not in place, even with the deteriorating burning

conditions.

Considering the extreme fire behaviour and the distance of the spot fires that were observed on this fire,

the fire guard would not have been as effective if the fire would have hit it a couple hours earlier. A

consideration to make the fire break more effective would have been to thin the community side of the

break so that any spot fires that start across the break would be slow to build up intensity and therefore

be easier suppressed by air and ground crews.