LABOR RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS – SET 6

Collective Bargaining(Art 250-257)

65. UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU), et al. vs. DIR. BITONIO JR., et al. G.R. No. 131235 - November 16, 1999

FACTS:Herein Private Respondents-Appellees were the duly elected officers of the USTFU, which had a subsisting 5-year CBA with UST until May 1998. After the holding of a GA that culminated in the election of new union officers, which was actually issued with a TRO, they filed for injunctive reliefs seeking nullification of the results contending that it was a violation of the Constitution and By-Laws (CBL) of the union.

Following the TRO issued by the MA, the respondents filed a motion for another TRO, brought about by their receipt of a notice to vacate the union office. According to the appellants, however, the MA has no jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition including the ancillary remedies, which are merely incidental to it - Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.

In December 1996, appellees again moved for the issuance of a TRO to prevent appellants from making further representations especially with regard to a new agreement with UST and reiterated their earlier stand that appellants were usurping the their duties and functions. Over the appellants’ insistence that the issue of jurisdiction should first be resolved, the MA issued a TRO directing the respondents to cease and desist from performing any and all acts pertaining to the duties and functions of the officers and directors of USTFU.

Petitioners then appealed the Resolution to the SoL, who transmitted the records of the case to the BLR, which rejected their contention. Dir. Bitonio held that contrary to their claim, the CBL, which constituted the covenant between the union and its members, could not be suspended during the GA of all faculty members, since that assembly had not been convened or authorized by the union. He also said that the election could not be legitimized by the recognition of the newly “elected” set of officers by UST or by the alleged ratification of the new CBA by the general membership of the USTFU.

ISSUE:WON Dir. Bitonio committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the appeal of petitioners.

HELD:No. The Court upheld Dir. Bitonio's Decision and dismissed the petition.

As properly decided by Dir. Bitonio, the union’s CBL is the fundamental law that governs the relationship between and among the members of the union. It is where the rights, duties and obligations, powers, functions and authority of the officers as well as the members are defined. It is the organic law that determines the validity of acts done by any officer or member of the union. Without respect for the CBL, a union as a democratic institution degenerates into nothing more than a group of individuals governed by mob rule.

Furthermore, the privilege of determining who the union officers will be belongs exclusively to the members of the union. Said privilege is exercised in an election proceeding in accordance with the union's CBL and applicable law. To allow appellants to become union officers on the strength of management's recognition of them is to concede to the employer the power of determining who should be USTFU's leaders. This is a clear case of interference in the exercise by USTFU members of their right to self-organization.

The Petitioners’ frustration over the performance of private respondents, as well as their fears of a “fraudulent” election to be held under the latter’s supervision, could not justify the method they chose to impose their will on the union.

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The election held can neither be called a union election nor a certification election, because the procedure laid down in the USTFU’s CBL for the election of officers was not followed. The participation of non-union members in the election aggravated its irregularity.

66. R. TRANSPORTATION vs. HON. LAGUESMA G.R. No. 106830 November 16, 1993

67. CMC-ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES- UNIFIED FILIPINO SERVICE WORKERS (CMC-ACE- UFSW) vs. Undersecretary LAGUESMA, CMC-EA- ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (CMC-EA-AFW) and CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER INC. G.R. No. 118915 - February 4, 1997

FACTS:This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to reverse and set aside the Order of USec. Laguesma, which dismissed the petition filed by CMC-ACE for CE and further directed CMC to negotiate a CBA with respondent union CMC-AS-AFW.

Appellant union filed a petition for CE among the R&F EEs of the Capitol Medical Center (CMC), which was granted. After the election, it was held as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of such employees. It thereafter

invited CMC to the bargaining table by submitting its economic proposal for a CBA. The latter, however, refused to negotiate and instead challenged the union’s legal personality through a “petition for cancellation of the certificate of registration.” The union was left with no other recourse but to file a “notice of strike” against CMC for ULP, which eventually led to a strike.

In the meantime, the other union, CMC-AFW filed a “petition for certification election” among the R&F EEs of the CMC, arguing that it is the certified bargaining agent of the R&F EEs of the hospital. It stressed that it was not remiss in asserting its right for it continuously demanded the negotiation of a CBA despite the hospital‘s avoidance to bargain collectively. It was even constrained to strike in 1993 and that majority of the signatories who supported the petition were managerial and confidential employees and not members of the R&F, which was without invalid disaffiliation of its members, contrary to petitioner‘s allegations.

Petitioner CMC-ACE, however, opposed the petition and moved for its dismissal. It claimed that there is no legal impediment to the conduct of a certification election as more than 12 months have lapsed since CMC-AFW was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent and no CBA was concluded thereafter. It contended that since there is no evidence on record that there exists a CBA deadlock, the law allowing the conduct of a CE after twelve months must be given effect in the interest of the right of the workers to freely choose their sole and exclusive bargaining agent.

CMC-AFW answered that the petition to conduct a CE was immoral and in manifest disregard of the decisions rendered by the SoL and by the Court. It claimed that CMC employed “legal obstructionism‘s“ in order to let 12 pass without a CBA having been concluded between them so as to pave the way for the entry of petitioner union.

MA Fadrigon issued an Order granting the petition for CE among the R&F EEs. Since no CE was held within one year from the date of issuance of a final CE result and there was no bargaining deadlock between CMC-AFW and the employees that had been submitted to conciliation or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout, there is no bar to the holding of a CE.

CMC-AFW appealed from the said Order, to which CMC-ACE did not file any opposition to. But when USec. Laguesma rendered a Resolution granting the appeal and directed CMC to negotiate a CBA with respondent union CMC-AFW, both unions separately filed motions for reconsideration while the hospital contended that it cannot be ordered to bargain collectively with a union since the only issue involved is the determination of the bargaining agent of the employees. USec. Laguesma dismissed both petitions.

ISSUE:

WON USec. Laguesma committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certification election of CMC-ACE, and in directing the hospital to negotiate a CBA with the said respondent union.

HELD: No. The errors pointed to by petitioner can be classified as mere typographical errors. Such errors do indicate that the assailed resolution was prepared with “indecent haste,“ as the petitioner claims. It cannot materially alter the substance and merit of the assailed resolution.

It was not even denied due process as it was given an opportunity to be heard but lost it when it refused to file an appellee‘s memorandum the record shows and it failed to file its opposition. And for CMC-ACE to capitalize on the ensuing delay which was caused by the hospital and which resulted in the non-conclusion of a CBA within the certification year, would be to negate and render a mockery of the proceedings undertaken before the DOLE and would put an unjustified premium on the failure of the respondent hospital to perform its duty to bargain collectively.

If the law proscribes the conduct of a certification election when there is a bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration, with more reason should it not be conducted if, despite attempts to bring an employer to the negotiation table by the "no reasonable effort in good faith" on the employer certified bargaining agent, there was to bargain collectively. It is only just and equitable that the circumstances in this case should be considered as similar in nature to a "bargaining deadlock" when no certification election could be held.

A "deadlock" is the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed forces. The word is synonymous with the word "impasse," which presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between the parties.

68. PAGKAKAISA NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL-UNITED LUMBER AND GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILS. vs. FERRER-CALLEJA and TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL G.R. No. 85915 – January 17, 1990

FACTS:The petitioner is the recognized CB agent of the R&F employees of Triumph International with which the latter has a valid and existing CBA effective up to September 1989.

In 1987, a petition for CE was filed by the respondent union with the DOLE. A motion to dismiss the petition for certification election was filed by Triumph International on the grounds that the respondent union cannot lawfully

represent managerial employees and that the petition cannot prosper by virtue of the contract-bar rule.

The LA, however, issued an order granting the petition for CE and directed the holding of it to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all monthly-paid administrative, technical, confidential and supervisory employees of Triumph International.

ISSUE:WON the LA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate holding of a certification election among the workers sought to be represented by the respondent union.

HELD:Where the supervisory employees sought to be represented by the union are actually not involved in policy making, and their recommendatory powers are not even instantly effective since they are subject to review by at least three 3 managers (department, personnel and general manager), then it is evident that these employees does not possess managerial status.

The fact that their work designations are either managerial or supervisory is of no moment, considering that it is the nature of their functions and NOT SAID NOMENCLATURES which determines their respective status.

A careful examination of the records of this case reveals no evidence that rules out the commonality or community of interest among the rank-and-file members of the petitioners, and the herein declared rank-and-file members of the respondent union. Instead of forming another bargaining unit, the law requires them to be members of the existing one.

The ends of unionism are better served if all the rank-and-file members with substantially the same interests and who invoke their right to self-organization are part of a single unit so they can deal with their ER with just one and yet potent voice. The EEs bargaining power with management is strengthened thereby.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the petitioner is the exclusive bargaining representative of R&F EEs of Triumph International.

69. LA SUERTE CIGAR COMPANY vs. DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, ET AL. G.R. No. L-55674 July 25, 1983

FACTS:The La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory Provincial and Metro Manila Sales Force Association applied for and was granted chapter status by the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU). Sometime later, 31 local union

members signed a joint letter withdrawing their membership in NATU. The local union and NATU filed a petition for certification election.

The company opposed on the ground that it was not supported by at least 30% (now 25%) of the proposed bargaining unit because:(a) of the alleged 48 members of the local union, 31 had withdrawn prior to the filing of the petition, and (b) 14 of the alleged members of the union were not employees of the company but were independent contractors.

The BLR director denied the company’s objection.

ISSUE: WON the withdrawal of 31 union-members affected the petition for certification election insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned.

HELD: Yes. The SC reversed decision of the BLR, it appearing that the 31 union members have withdrawn their support to the petition BEFORE the filing of said petition. It would be otherwise if the withdrawal was made AFTER the filing of the petition for it would then be presumed that the withdrawal was not free and voluntary.

The presumption would arise that the withdrawal was procured through duress, coercion or for valuable consideration. In other words, the distinction must be that withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the contrary, whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary.

The reason for such distinction is that if the withdrawal or retraction is made before the filing of the petition, the names of employees supporting the petition are supposed to be held secret to the opposite party. Logically, any such withdrawal or retraction shows voluntariness in the absence of proof to the contrary. Moreover, it becomes apparent that such employees had not given consent to the filing of the petition; hence the subscription requirement has not been met.

We hold and rule that the 14 members of respondent local union are dealers or independent contractors. They are not employees of petitioner company. They are independent contractors and not employees of the company based on the dealership contracts stating that the terms and stipulations. Such were clear and left no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties. They voluntarily executed with La Suerte a formal dealership agreement which signifies that they were acting as independent businessmen.

With the withdrawal by 31 members of their support to the petition prior to or before the filing thereof, making a total of 45, the remainder of 3 out of the 48 alleged to have

supported the petition can hardly be said to represent the union.

70. TOYOTA

71. ALEXANDER REYES vs. CRESENCIO TRAJANO G.R. No. 84433 – June 2, 1992

FACTS:BLR authorized the conduct of CE among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation. The competing unions were the TUEU-OLALIA and TUPAS.

Of the 384 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the election. Among the 240 who cast their votes, 141 were members of the Iglesia ni Kristo (INK)

The ballots provided for 2 choices: (a) TUPAS; (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and (c) NO UNION.

The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from the final count because the competing unions agreed earlier that the INK members should not be allowed to vote “because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous certification election.”

The INK employees protested the exclusion of their votes. They filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it “was not fair” and the result thereof did “not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees.”

TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that petitioners “do not have legal personality to protest the results of the election because they are not members of either the contending unions, but of the INK which prohibits its followers to, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization.

The MA, seeing no merit in the INK employees’ petition, certified the TUEU-OLALIA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. And upon appeal, BLR denied their petition.

ISSUE: WON the INK members may vote in a CE.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign from

a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to maintain membership therein.

The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such membership.

In a Certification Election, all members of the unit, whether union members or not, have the right to vote. Union membership is not prerequisite. If majority of the unit members do not want a union, as expressed in the certification election, such majority decision must be respected.

72. LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES 249 SCRA 162 (1995)

FACTS: LDB and the Association submitted to arbitration to resolve WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on the promotion of employees.The parties agreed to submit their respective Position Papers in December1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper in January 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper.

In May of the same year, without LDB's Position Paper, VA Garcia rendered a decision finding that the Bank has not adhered to the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON the decision of a VA may be directly be appealed to the SC.

HELD:The Court referred the case to the CA stating that elevating a decision or award of a VA to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari is in effect equating the VA with NLRC or the Court of Appeals, which in its view is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.

Obiter as regards the issue on VA:In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.

Art. 260. Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration. The parties to a CBA shall include provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.

All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery which are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from the date of its submission shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in the CBA. For this purpose, the parties shall name and designate in advance a VA or panel of VAs, or include in the agreement a procedure for the selection of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, preferably from the listing of qualified voluntary arbitrators duly accredited by the Board. In case the parties fail to select a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, the Board shall designate the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, as may be necessary.

Arbitration may either be compulsory or voluntary. Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and binding resolution.

Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator's decision.

73.  SANYO PHILIPPINES WORKERS UNION- PSSLU vs. LA CANIZARES, et al. G.R. No. 101619 - July 8, 1992

FACTS:PSSLU signed a CBA with Sanyo Philippines Inc. which was to run from July 1989 to June 1994. The same CBA contained a union security clause which required that all union members retain their membership in good standing with the union as condition for their continued employment with the company.

In February 1990, PSSLU informed the management of the

cancellation of the membership of several employees due to anti-union activities and for joining another union, KAMAO. Following their continuous exercise of the violations even after executing a pledge of cooperation with PSSLU, they were recommended for dismissal. Such recommendation provided that the dismissal of the members is without prejudice to their right to receive termination pay should the management decide to grant them, and suggested a dialogue before the Grievance machinery before their actual dismissal.

The company did not receive any information on whether or not said employees appealed to PSSLU, and so it considered them dismissed as of March 1991. Two months after, the dismissed employees filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal, to which PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the LA was without jurisdiction over the case. (Basis: Art 217 (c) - cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreements shall be disposed of by the labor arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.)

The employees opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that the LA had jurisdiction over the case which was a termination dispute, and that there was nothing in the CBA needs interpretation or implementation.

LA, 7 August 1991: resolution suspended until both parties fully presented their position papers, and the issue of jurisdiction shall be covered in the final determination.

Following the said Order, PSSLU filed another motion to resolve motion to dismiss complaint with a prayer for the resolution of the issue of jurisdiction.

LA, 4 September 1991: assumed jurisdiction over the complaint, hence this petition.

ISSUE:WON the LA has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:Yes. The Court held that the LA and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents, as the case involves "termination," not "interpretation or implementation" of a collective bargaining agreement or "interpretation or enforcement" of company policies. Acordingly, the case was dismissed.

The Court reiterated the view of the SolGen, with him distinguishing that where the dispute lies in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA or by voluntary arbitration; but where there was already actual termination or violation of rights, it is cognizable by the LA.

It ruled that while it appears that the dismissal was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union

security clause provided in the CBA, such fact does not come within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of a CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.

The Labor Code provides that a GM shall be established to ensure the mutual observance of the terms and conditions of the CBA, and for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the same. It also requires that the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators. Obviously, the parties to a CBA are the union and the company thus, only disputes involving them shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

In the instant case, both the union and the company have agreed on the dismissal of private respondents. There is no grievance between them which could be brought to GM.

And as the problem or dispute is between the union and the company on the one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand; it has to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. Due process demands that the dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has already been an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

74. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., vs. NLRC and URBANO SUÑIGA G.R. No. 95940 July 24, 1996

FACTS:Private respondent was hired by petitioner in 1964 as a bus conductor and eventually joined the Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO. At the age of 52, after having rendered twenty five years' service, he retired with a retirement fee given to him. The basis of his retirement was the compulsory retirement provision of the collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner and the union.

Unexpectedly, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. 2 other cases of similar facts and issues was consolidated to case with the Labor Arbiter deciding in favor of the complainant and ordered PANTRANCO for their reinstatement.

Petitioner appealed to public respondent, which issued the questioned Resolution affirming the labor arbiter's decision in toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:WON the CBA stipulation on compulsory retirement after twenty-five years of service is legal and enforceable?

RULING:Yes. We agree with petitioner and the Solicitor General. Art. 287 of the Labor Code as worded permits employers and employees to fix the applicable retirement age at below 60 years. Moreover, providing for early retirement does not constitute diminution of benefits. In almost all countries today, early retirement, i.e., before age 60, is considered a reward for services rendered since it enables an employee to reap the fruits of his labor — particularly retirement benefits, whether lump-sum or otherwise — at an earlier age, when said employee, in presumably better physical and mental condition, can enjoy them better and longer. As a matter of fact, one of the advantages of early retirement is that the corresponding retirement benefits, usually consisting of a substantial cash windfall, can early on be put to productive and profitable uses by way of income-generating investments, thereby affording a more significant measure of financial security and independence for the retiree who, up till then, had to contend with life's vicissitudes within the parameters of his fortnightly or weekly wages. Thus we are now seeing many CBA's with such early retirement provisions. And the same cannot be considered a diminution of employment benefits.

It is also further argued that, being a union member, private respondent is bound by the CBA because its terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties. 11

The parties are bound not only to the fulfilment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. It binds not only the union but also its members.