G.R. No. 198501 January 30, 2013

KESTREL SHIPPING CO., INC. / CAPT. AMADOR P. SERVILLON and ATLANTIC MANNING LTD., Petitioners, vs.FRANCISCO D. MUNAR, Respondent.

FACTS:

Francisco D. Munar, entered into a 6-month contract with Kestrel Shipping Co., in behalf of its principal Atlantic Mannin, Ltd., as pump man for MV Southern Unity. While in his employment he suffered an injury which prevented him to work for more than 120 days which qualifies him for disability benefits. Pursuant POEA-SEC provisions he was offered by Krestel Shipping Co. disability benefits for Grade 8 disability as assessed by the company designated doctor, contrary to the Grade 1 assessment of Dr. Chiu, an independent orthopedic hired by Munar. The LA awarded him with total and permanent disability benefits. This was affirmed by the NLRC and later by the CA with modification as to the attorney’s fee, lowering it from 10% to 2%.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the award of total and permanent disability to Munar was proper.

HELD:

Yes. Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work for more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent.

Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.

Consequently, after the expiration of the 120-day period, Dr. Chua had not yet made any declaration as to Munar’s fitness to work and Munar had not yet fully recovered and was still incapacitated to work sufficed to entitle the latter to total and permanent disability benefits.

G.R. No. 168703 February 26, 2013

RAMON G. NAZARENO, Petitioner, vs.MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING INC., and ELITE SHIPPING A/S, Respondents.

FACTS:

Ramon G. Nazareno was hired by Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc. as Chief Officer for and in behalf of its foreign principal Elite Shipping A/S (Elite) on board its vessel M/V Artkis Hope for a period of six (6) months. He was injured while in his employment. He was advised to undergo physical therapy and was declared unfit to work and was recommended to be signed off from duty. After almost 2 months of treatment, the company physician issued a Medical Certificate stating that Nazareno was fit for work. During this period, however, petitioner did not notice any improvement in his medical condition and informed his attending physician but was ignored.

He then consulted a neurologist of his choice and based on his physician’s prognosis his condition would hamper him from operating as chief officer of a ship. Petitioner was also examined by certain Dr. Vicaldo who issued a Medical Certificate stating that petitioner is suffering from Parkinson’s disease and a frozen right shoulder (secondary), with an "Impediment Grade VII (41.8%). He concluded that petitioner is unfit to work as a seafarer. Nazareno sought payment of his disability benefits and medical allowance. The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and ordered respondents to pay his disability claims, sickness allowance, and attorney’s fees. NLRC affirmed the decision but with modification as to the sickness allowance as it was already been availed. But CA reversed said decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nazareno is entitled to disability benefits based on the evaluation and assessment made by the physician chosen by him.

HELD:

Yes, he is entitled to his disability benefits. In the present case, the petitioner timely questioned the competence of the company-designated physician by immediately consulting two independent doctors. Neither did he sign nor execute any document agreeing with the findings of the company physician that he is already fit for work.

The certification of the company-designated physician would defeat petitioner’s claim while the opinion of the independent physicians would uphold such claim. In such a situation, the Court adopts the findings favorable to petitioner. The law looks tenderly on the laborer. Where the evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways, one prejudicial and the other favorable to him, the balance must be tilted in his favor consistent with the principle of social justice.

Anent the question of whether or not petitioner is indeed entitled to disability benefits based on the findings and conclusions, not only of his personal doctors, but also on the findings of the doctors whom he consulted abroad, the Court rules in the affirmative.

G.R. No. 198783 April 15, 2013

ROYAL PLANT WORKERS UNION, Petitioner, vs.COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.-CEBU PLANT, Respondent.

FACTS:

Under the employ of CCBPI-Cebu are 20 bottling operators who are male and they are members of herein respondent Royal Plant Workers Union. Said bottling operators work for 8 hour shift with 15-30 minutes breaks every after 2 ½ hours. It has been a practice of the CCBPI to provide the operators with chairs in their bottling line for more than 30 years. However, when CCBPI implemented its “I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program said chairs were removed but their rest period was fixed to 30 minutes every after 1 ½ hours to optimize their efficiency and CCBPI’s machineries and equipment. The bottling operators took issue with the removal of the chairs. Through the representation of herein respondent, they initiated the grievance machinery of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), but failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. The Arbitration Committee rendered a decision in favor of the RPWU, but later reversed and set aside by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the removal of the chairs in the bottling line under the “I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program of the CCBPI is a valid exercise of management prerogative and does not run contrary to Article 100 of the Labor Code.

HELD:

Yes, it is a valid exercise of management prerogative. The Court has held that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place, and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.

In the present controversy, it cannot be denied that CCBPI removed the operators’ chairs pursuant to a national directive and in line with its "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program, launched to enable the Union to perform their duties and responsibilities more efficiently. The chairs were not removed indiscriminately. They were carefully studied with due regard to the welfare of the members of the Union. The removal of the chairs was compensated by: a) a reduction of the operating hours of the bottling operators from a two-and-one-half (2 ½)-hour rotation period to a one-and-a-half (1 ½) hour rotation period; and b) an increase of the break period from 15 to 30 minutes between rotations.

Apparently, the decision to remove the chairs was done with good intentions as CCBPI wanted to avoid instances of operators sleeping on the job while in the performance of their duties and responsibilities and because of the fact that the chairs were not necessary considering that the operators constantly move about while working. In short, the removal of the chairs was designed to increase work efficiency.

Hence, CCBPI’s exercise of its management prerogative was made in good faith without doing any harm to the workers’ rights.

G.R. No. 201701 June 3, 2013

UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs.MARIA RUBY M. RIVERA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Maria Ruby M. Rivera was the Area Activation Executive of Unilever Philippines, Inc. for the cities of Cotabato and Davao for 14 years. She was dismissed pursuant to company policy after she was found responsible for the deviation of funds by Ventureslink, Unilever’s third party service provider for the company’s activation projects. Her retirement benefits were forfeited as a legal consequence of her dismissal from work. Rivera filed a case of illegal dismissal and money claims against Unilever.

The LA dismissed her case for lack of merit and denied her monetary claim for lack of basis. The NLRC however, partly grant her appeal by granting her nominal damages for violation of her right to procedural due process, and retirement benefits. CA affirmed the NLRC decision with modification by deleting the award on retirement benefits and awarded separation pay in favor of Rivera as measure of social justice.

ISSUE(S):

(1) Whether or not a validly dismissed employee, like Rivera, is entitled to an award of separation pay.(2) Whether or not the award for nominal damage to Rivera was proper.

HELD:

(1) No. As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay, pursuant to Section 7, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of "social justice" or on "equitable grounds." In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee as in the case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. NLRC. In this case, Rivera was dismissed from work because she intentionally circumvented a strict company policy, manipulated another entity to carry out her instructions without the company’s knowledge and approval, and directed the diversion of funds, which she even admitted doing under the guise of shortening the laborious process of securing funds for promotional activities from the head office. These transgressions were serious offenses that warranted her dismissal from employment and proved that her termination from work was for a just cause. Hence, she is not entitled to a separation pay.

(2) Yes. In all cases of termination of employment, due process shall be substantially observed as provided in Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. In this case, Unilever was not direct and specific in its first notice to Rivera. The words it used were couched in general terms and were in no way informative of the charges against her that may result in her dismissal from employment. Evidently, there was a violation of her right to statutory due process warranting the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.

G.R. No. 191877 June 18, 2013PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Petitioner,

vs.ARIEL R. MARQUEZ, Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xG.R. No. 192287IRENEO M. VERDILLO, Petitioner,

vs.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Respondent.

FACTS:

Ariel R. Marquez and Ireneo M. Vedillo were both employed as dealers in the game of Craps at the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) at the Casino Filipino Heritage. They were dismissed from their employment after the PAGCOR’s Board of Directors adopted the recommendations of the Adjudication Committee finding Marquez and Verdillo guilty of "Dishonesty, Grave violation of company rules and regulations, Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the company, and Loss of trust and confidence" for conspiring with a co-dealer and a customer in defrauding the house on numerous occasions. CSC affirmed the decision of the board but with modification by enforcing all accessory penalties to wit: forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service and cancellation of all eligibilities. The CA reversed and set aside the CSC decision against Marquez and ordered his reinstatement and payment of his backwages, however the CSC decision against Verdillo was affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Marquez and Verdillo are guilty of dishonesty, violation of office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service to justify their dismissal from service.

HELD:

Yes. The circumstances in this case all point to the conclusion that Verdillo conspired with Marquez and Cheng. Verdillo declared several dice throws of Cheng as "good dice" even if they were void. The anomalous transactions were not only witnessed by Acting Pit Supervisor Yang, but were also confirmed by the CCTV footage.

Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness. Under the Civil Service Rules, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal which carries the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits (except leave credits), and disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

As regards Marquez, evidence shows that on eight occasions, Marquez paid customer Cheng despite the fact that the latter’s throws were void. He admitted that he knew that on several occasions the throws made should have been declared void and that it was incumbent upon him to make sure that the calls were in order. This duty could not have escaped him as he had been a dealer for five years. Hence, it is our view that the conduct of Marquez amounts to serious dishonesty, and not merely negligence, since his dishonest act was committed not just a few times but repeatedly or eight times over a very short period of seven minutes, a statistical improbability.

All told, we find that there was substantial evidence for the charges against Marquez and Verdillo, warranting their dismissal from service.

G.R. No. 199932 July 3, 2013

CAMILO A. ESGUERRA, Petitioner, vs.UNITED PHILIPPINES LINES, INC., BELSHIPS MANAGEMENT (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD., and/or FERNANDO T. LISING, Respondents.

FACTS:

Camilo Esguerra entered into an employment contract with United Philippines Lines, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Belships Management Pte Ltd., as a fitter on board the vessel ‘M/V Jaco Triumph’ for a period of 9 months subject to a 1 month extension upon mutual agreement of the parties which was approved by the POEA. While working, he met an accident and was injured causing neck and back pains. He was medically repatriated in the Philippines where the company physician examined and treated his condition which later assessed as Grade 8 disability, contrary to the medical certification issued by an independent physician who, after examination, diagnosed him to be suffering from Compression fracture vertebrae, which is classified as Grade 1 disability which renders him permanently unfit for sea-faring duty. He was paid by UPLI his disability benefits pursuant to the prognosis of the company physician.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the total and permanent disability benefits following the findings and assessment made by an independent physician.

HELD:

Yes, he is entitled. The findings of the NLRC on the degree of the petitioner’s disability are most in accord with the evidence on record. As ardently observed by the Labor Commission, the orthopedic surgeon designated by the respondents and the petitioner’s independent specialist were one in declaring that the petitioner is permanently unfit for sea duty as supported by the latter’s medical certificate and the former’s report. The uncertain effect of further treatment intimates nothing more but that the injury sustained by the petitioner bars him from performing his customary and strenuous work as a seafarer/fitter. As such, he is considered permanently and totally disabled.

Permanent and total disability means "disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of a similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment can do."

G.R. No. 189686 July 10, 2013

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION and LANCE Y. GOKONGWEI, Petitioners, vs.WILFREDO Z. CASTILLO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Wilfredo Z. Castillo was the Regional Sales Manager of Universal Robina Corporation. He was separated from employment after he was found guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the Company and for breach of trust & confidence after he signed 2 blank charge invoices and after entering into an unauthorized contract. He filed a case of illegal dismissal against URC. The LA ruled in favor of Castillo, but reversed by the NLRC. The CA sustained Castillo’s dismissal but granted him separation pay as “equitable relief”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a validly dismissed employee, such as Castillo, is entitled to separation pay.

HELD:

NO, he is not entitled. An employee who has been dismissed for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to separation pay. Applying that rule to the instant case, we here hold that respondent is not entitled to separation pay.

The ruling that separation pay "as a measure of social justice" is allowed in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character, which is not available in the present case.

The evidence on record negates petitioner Castillo’s claim of good faith and furnishes sufficient basis for the breach of trust and loss of confidence reposed on him by URC. Castillo’s receipt of the gift certificates is categorically confirmed by the Vice President of Marketing of Liana’s Supermarket. This piece of evidence, coming from a disinterested party, speaks eloquently of Castillo’s perfidy. Such an affirmative statement coupled with petitioner Castillo's signatures on the charge invoices convincingly established the fact that he indeed received the gift certificates.

Assuming that he did not receive the gift certificates, petitioner Castillo’s ready admission that he signed the charge invoices even if these were blank clearly shows his negligence and utter lack or care in the interests of URC. As a Regional Sales Manager, Castillo occupied a position or responsibility and as such, he should have known that he placed the interests of the company at a disadvantage by signing the blank charge invoices. Because of such act, URC was prejudiced. This alone is sufficient cause for breach of trust and loss of confidence.

G.R. No. 192571 July 23, 2013

ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A. TERRIBLE, EDWIN D. FEIST, MARIA OLIVIA T. YABUTMISA, TERESITA C. BERNARDO, AND ALLAN G. ALMAZAR, Petitioners, vs.PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ, Respondent.

FACTS:

On June 27, 2004, Abbott Laboratories, Philippines published in major broadsheet that it is in need of Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager stating therein the responsibilities and qualifications of said position.

On December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the abovementioned position which was an item under the company’s Hospira Affiliate Local Surveillance Unit (ALSU) department.

On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract which stated, inter alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months beginning February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005.

She underwent pre-employment orientation where she was briefed on her duties and responsibilities. On March 3, 2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from the HR Director explaining the procedure for

evaluating the performance of probationary employees and further indicated that Abbott had only one evaluation system for all of its employees. Alcaraz was also given copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Probationary Performance Standards and Evaluation and Performance Excellence Orientation Modules which she had to apply in line with her task of evaluating the Hospira ALSU staff.

On April 12, 2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from Misa requesting immediate action on the staff’s performance evaluation as their probationary periods were about to end. This Alcaraz eventually submitted.

On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz was called to a meeting with her immediate supervisor and the former HR Director where she was informed that she failed to meet the regularization standards for the position of Regulatory Affairs Manager. Thereafter she was asked to tender her resignation, else they be forced to terminate her services.

She filed a case of illegal dismissal against Abott and its officers. LA dismissed her complaint for lack of merit. NLRC reversed and set aside the LA’s ruling and ordered Abott to reinstate and pay Alcaraz moral and

exemplary damages. CA affirmed NLRC decision.

ISSUE(S):

(1) Whether or not Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable standards to qualify her as a regular employee; and

(2) Whether or not Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment.

HELD:

(1) Yes, Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable standards. The employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements when dealing with a probationary employee: first, the employer must communicate the regularization standards to the probationary employee; and second, the employer must make such communication at the time of the probationary employee’s engagement. If the employer fails to comply with either, the employee is deemed as a regular and not a probationary employee.

A punctilious examination of the records reveals that Abbott had indeed complied with the above-stated requirements. This conclusion is largely impelled by the fact that Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to, during the time of her engagement, and the incipient stages of her employment.

(2) A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 295 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement.

A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary employee; the usual two-notice rule does not govern. Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states that "if the termination is brought about by the failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination."

As the records show, Alcaraz's dismissal was effected through a letter dated May 19, 2005 which she received on May 23, 2005 and again on May 27, 2005. Stated therein were the reasons for her termination, i.e., that after proper evaluation, Abbott determined that she failed to meet the reasonable standards for her regularization considering her lack of time and people management and decision-making skills, which are necessary in the performance of her functions as Regulatory Affairs Manager. Undeniably, this written notice sufficiently meets the criteria set forth above, thereby legitimizing the cause and manner of Alcaraz’s dismissal as a probationary employee under the parameters set by the Labor Code.