10. ACTI ',\J .ITY .\"'D PClTl'.;\TI,\Un

the action is not necessitated by the agent alone but through itsagency as well as that of the remaining factors which make up thecomplete cause together. However, an agent whose efficiency iscomplete is a complete cause, as in the case of the exalted Neces-sary Being. Hence it is meaningless to characterize with contin-gency such an agent and its action or omission of action (i.e. tosay that an agent that is a complete cause of its action mayor maynot carry out the action).

The necessary character of its action does not imply that theagen t is compelled to carry it out and that it has no power over itsown action; for this necessity, which inheres in the action, derivesfrom the agent itself. The action is the agent's effect and cannotcompel it to action, nor is there any other agent that may influ-ence it and compel it to carry out the action.

(ii) It makes evident the invalidity of the view advanced by sometheologians that the contingency of an action depends on its beingpreceded by temporal non-existence (a1- 'adalll al-:"((/l11iini); hence anaction that is not preceded by temporal non-existence is irnpossi-hie. This view is based on the belief that the reason for a thing'sneed for a cause is its coming into existence (!J!idt7t!J), not its con-tingency (illlkt/!2). Wc have refuted this belief earlier' and provedthat the reason for the need for a cause is contingency, not bndutb.Moreover, their theory is invalidated by the instance of time itself(which is not (hMi/b).

(iii) It discloses the invalidity of the view advanced by [hosetheologians who have held that 'power' emerges along with actionand that there is no jJO\ver for an action prior to it. The inconsis-tency of this view is made evident by the fact that they themselvesdefine 'power' as 'the capacity to act or not to act.' Now, if theagent ceases the action for some time to resume it, it would beright to ascribe to it the capacity to act or not to act before theresumptIon of action. This is what 'power' is according to theirdefinition.

, See 4.8.

114

~

CHAPTER ELEVENKnowledge, Knower, and the Known

10: the last chapter we saw that existence is divided into thatwhich has potentiality and that which has (absolute) actuality, andthat the former consists of matter and material things and the lat-ter of immaterial (llllfjtlITad) existents, Of the primary (i.e. essential)accidents of immaterial being is to be knowledge, known, andknown. For knowledge, as will be explained later on, consists ofthe presence ((.1!I~i!IJ] of an immaterial existent for another immate-rial existent. Accordingly, it is proper to discuss it in metaphysics.

11.1. DFFlXtT10l\< OF KNO\VLEDGE Al':D ITS FIRST DIVISIO;\S

That we acquire a 'knowledge' of things is self-evident, and so isthe concept of it. In this section our purpose is to identify its sali-ent properties in order to differentiate between its various formsand their characteristics.

It was stated in the discussion on mental existence that we pos-sess a certain knowledge of external things, in the sense that wecognii:e them and they are present for us with their quiddities,though not with their external existence and its accompanyingexternal properties. This is one of the kinds of knowledge, called'mediated knowledge' Ci/m ~l!p7Ii)lit. acquired knowledge).

Another kind of knowledge is the knowledge that each of us hasof his own self, to which he refers as his '1.' One cannot fail to beconscious of his own self in any circumstance, in solitude or incompany, in sleep or in wakefulness, or in any other state.

This consciousness is not by virtue of the presence of the quid-ditv of the self for us; it is not present as a concept, or knownthrough mediated knowledge. That is because a mental concept,of whatever kind, is always capable of corresponding to a multi-plicity of objects, and [when considered as referring to a particularobject] its individuality IS only due to the external existent [to

115

11. K,-« )WI.I:I)C;I:, J(~()\XiER, .\1',11]'111'. K~,OWN 11. K'-<C>WU:DGE, KNOWI'!\, ,\!\j) Till,. J(,-<OW!\

which it corresponds]. Now what we cognize in relation to our-selves-i.e., what we refer to as 'l'-is something essentially indi-viduatcd, incapable of corresponding to multiple things. Individu-ality is a property of existence; hence our knowledge of our selvesis by virtue of their presence for us with their very external exis-tence, which is the ground of individuarion and external proper-ties. This is another kind of knowledge, called 'immediate' knowl-edge Cl/m (JI/(It7ri, lit., 'knowledge hy presence').

These two divisions of knowledge are exhaustive, for the cogni-tion of the known by the knower is either through the former'squiddiry or by its existence. The first is 'mediated' and the secondis 'immediate' knowledge.

Furthermore, attainment of knowledge means apprehension(!11I.[fil) of the known by the knower; for knowledge is identicalwith that which is known by itself, because we do not mean any-thing by knowledge except the apprehcnsion of the known by us.The apprehension of a thing and its presence is nothing except itsexistence, and its existence is itself.

The apprehension of the known by the knower does not meananything except its union (ittdJiid) with the knowcr, whether theknown is immediate or mediated. Thus if the immediately knownis a substance subsisting by itself, its existence is for-itself (lI'I!J/7d linafrilJ) while at the same time it is for-thc-knower, and hence theknower is united with it. If the immediately known is somethingexistent-for-its-subject, as the known's existence is existence-for-rhe-knower, the knower is united with its subject. Moreover, anaccident is one of the planes of the existence of its subject, notsomething extraneous to it. Hence it is likewise in relation tosomething united with its subject. Similarly, the mediated knownis existenr-for-the-knower, irrespective of whether it is a sub-stance existing-for-itself or something existent-for-other-than-itself. An implication of its existence for the knower is theknower's union with it.

Th is is because, as will be explained later on,' mediated knowl-edge in fact involves immediate knowledge.

Accordingly, apprehension (!J!I!1(~ by the knower is a property

of knowledge, though not every kind of apprehension, but an ap-prehension of something that is in pure actuality and absolutelydevoid of all potentiality, That is because we know intuitively thatthe known qlia known has no potentiality to become anotherthing; it is not susceptible to change, nor can it become somethingother than what it is. Accordingly, it involves the apprehension ofsomething that is immaterial and free from all traces of potential-ity. This we call 'immediacy' (~!lr!17r, lit. 'presence').

The immediacy of the known requires it to be something pos-sessing complete actuality, free from any association with matterand potentiality that may make it deficient and incomplete in rela-tion to its potential perfections.

Further, the immediacy of the known requires that the knoweracquiring its knowledge should also possess complete actuality,not being deficient m <lny respect arising from association withmatter. Hence, the knower is also immaterial and free frompotentiality.

From the above discussion it becomes clear that knowledge isthe 'presence' of an immaterial existent for an immaterial existent,whether what is apprehended is the same as that which appre-hends-as in the case of a thing's knowledge of itself-c-or issomething else, as in the case of thing's knowledge of quidditicsexternal to it.

It also becomes clear, in the first place, that the known, towhich knowledge pertains, must necessarily be something imma-terial. The meaning of knowledge of material things shall be ex-plained below.

Second, the knower, through whom knowledge subsists, mustalso necessarily be immaterial.

11.2. THE DIVlSION OF MEDIATED KNO\'.VLEDGEINTO TJNIVERS1\l, AND PARTICULi\R

116

A universal (klllll) is that which is capable of corresponding to amultiplicity of instances, such as the knowledge of the quiddiry ofman. This kind of knowledge is called 'aqlor ta'aqqu! (intellection).A particular (/UZ'I) is that which is incapable of corresponding to amultiplicity of things, such as the knowledge of a particular per

117

i Sec 11.1 () below.

11. K".( )WI.I.l)C;I'., KV)\VEI(,\i'<IlTIII, KM)\V'.,

son with some kind of association with a present matter, whieh iscalled 'sensory' knowledge (a/- 'i/;J! al-ih(iJi), or the knowledge of ahuman individual without there heing any present matter. Thelime!" kind is called 'imaginary' knowledge ((//-'1/1Jl ti/-kIJtly/i/i). Thesetwo kinds arc considered incapable of corresponding to a multi-pLicity of referents only from the aspcct of connection betweenthe sense organs and the external object of knowledge, in the caseof semory knowledgc, and for the reason of dependence of'imaginary' knowledge on sensory knowledge. Otherwise, themental impression itself (a/-J!lI'C/f i//-dhi/JII{'[)'Clh), of whatever kind, isnot incapable of corresponding 10 a multiplicity of objects.

On the basis of that which has been said above, both kinds arcimmaterial due to the essential actuality of the cognitive formp7mt iI/- and its being unsusceptible to change.

Also, the cognitive form, of whatever kind, is not incapable ofcorresponding to a multiplicity of objects; anything that is materialand individuated is incapable of corresponding to more than oneindividual.

Furthermore, hac! the sensory or the imaginal form been some-thing material, impressed in some manner in a part of the body, itwould have been divisible due to the divisibilitv of its location andwuuld have been in space and time. However, such is not thecase. 1 lence knowledge is neither susceptible to division nor ea-pablc of attribution to a physical location. Also, it is not subject totime, for a sensory form cognized at a certain time remains validand unchanged even after the passage of a long period of time,and had it been time- bound it would change with the passage oftime.

There has been a misconception arising from the contiguity ofthe acquisition of blOwleclge to time. This contiguity (!JJI/{F/rilllali)

merely relates to the conditions for the attainment of the potential(isti'd{/(0 for receiving knowledge, not to knowledge itself.

As for the mediating role of the sense organs in the apprehen-sion of the sensible form and the dependence of the imaginaryform on it, that merely pertains to the attainment of a specificcapacity in the soul enabling it to evoke the cognitive form. Therelated details are to be found in works on traditional psychologyCl/m aI-nafr)·

118

11. KM )WI.LIlC E, l(",()WER, }\Nll TilE l(".()w",

There is a theory according to which the formation of conceptsoccurs through a process in which the known object is divested ofmatter and its characteristic material accidents, until there remainsnothing except a quiddity stripped of its material shell (e.g. theconcept of man stripped of all physical matter and its accompany-ing characteristics relating to time, space, position, and so on).This process is different from sense perception, wherein matterand its accompanying accidents and individuating features are pre-sent. It is also different from imagination, wherein the accidentsassociated with matter and its individuating features survive with-out the presence of matter itself. However, from the above dis-cussion it becomes clear that such a theory can be justified only asa metaphorical aiel to understanding. Otherwise, the perceivedform is also immaterial; the requirement of the presence of matterand its accompanying individuating accidents is in order to pre-pare the soul for perception. The same applies to the requirementof accompanying particular features in imagination, as well as therequirement of 'divesting' in conception, wherein the imaginationof more than an individual prepares the soul for conceiving theuniversal quidditv-s-a process referred to as 'the abstraction of theun ivcrsal from individuals.'

From what has been said it also becomes clear that existence isdivisible into three realms in respect of freedom from nutter andits absence, One of them is the world of matter and potentiality.The second realm is the one in which matter is absent, though notsome of its properties such as shape, quantity, position, etc. Itcontains physical forms and their accidents and features of perfec-tion without the presence of any matter possessing potentialityand passivity. It is called the 'imaginal' or the 'intermediate' world(,CI/(it!i a/-mit/Jal, or aI-!;arZilkb), which lies between the world of theIntellect (,{l/all! a/- 'aql) and the world of matter C{llam aI-mtlddah).The third is the immaterial world ('[llam tl!-tajartll(~, which is abso-lutely free from matter and its properties. It is called the world ofthe In tellcct ('d/am al- '(/ql).

The metaphysicians have further divided the imaginal worldinto the 'macrocosmic' (or objective) imaginal world ((/!-JJlitbiil aj-

a'?:tlm), which is a self-subsisting realm by itself, and the 'micro-cosmic' (or subjective) imaginal world (al-mitbal a!-a!J!,btir), which

119

11. KI\;()WJ.EDCE, KNOWER, i\[\;!l TJ Jj, Kl\;o\\l!'- 1 J. i(]\iOWLEl)(; 1'., Ki'oo\XibR, f\ND TJ IF. Kr-;O\Xfl'\

subsists through the soul and governs it in any manner it wishesaccording to its motives, rightful or extravagant, producing attimes real and healthy forms and at other times fantastic forms,which the soul creates for the sake of diversion.

These three worlds constitute a hierarchy. Amongst them thehighest of them in rank and, existentially, the strongest and theprior-most, as well as nearest to the First Source, is the world ofthe immaterial Intellects ('II/alll al- 'lfQI7! al-lIlfljarradob), due to thecompleteness of their actuality and freedom of their essencesfrom all traces of matter and potentiality. Below it lies the (macro-cosmic or objective) imaginal world, which is free from matter,though not some of its properties. Further below is the world ofmatter, the abode of all deficiency and evil. Knowledge does notpertain to that which is in it except through what corresponds toit in the imaginal world and the world of the Intellect.

pression changes from motion to rest. This kind of knowledge iscalled 'knowledge posterior to multiplicity' ('i/m 111a ha 'd a/-katbrah).

Here someone may say that change cloes not occur withoutprior potentiality, which is borne bv matter, and that requires thatthe object of particular knowledge be material, not Immaterial.The answer is that knowledge of change is not change of knowl-edge. The changing object undergoes a fixed course of change,which does not change itself. The knowledge of it-that is, itspresence before the !mower-is from the aspect of its fixity notits change, for otherwise it would not be present and knowledgewould not be the presence of an entity [or another entity. Thisinvolves a contradiction.

11.4. KINDS OF INTI':LLECTION

The metaphysicians mention three kinds of intellection (ta'aqq!I~.One of them is potential intellection (a/- 'aq! bi al-qIlJI'J}/(lb),

wherein the 'intellect' neither actually cognizes the intelligibles,nor does it apprehend any 'inrelligibles in act' due to the soul'sbeing devoid of all in telligibles:

The second is wherein the intellect intellects one or many intel-ligibles in act differentiating them from one another and conceiv-ing them in an orderly manner. This is called 'detailed intellection'(al- 'aq! al-tC/fii/lj.

In the third kind of intellection, rhe mind intellects many intelli-gibles in act without differentiating them from one another. It is asimple, undifferentiated form of intellection wherein all the detailsare contained. An example that has been given of it is when one isasked concerning several issues of which one has knowledge. Theanswer immediately comes to one's mind. At the very first mo-ment one has the answer wherein one actually knows all of themfor certain without sorting them out or their details from one an-other. The sorting out and the details come only in the process ofanswering, as if one had a store from which the details flow ontoThis kind of intellection is called 'non-differentiated intellection'(1/1-'aq! al-ijmii/z).

1 I ..'? r\0:0TJIER DIVJSION or KNO\xfLEDGE JNTO

lJNIVERSAL l\1\D PARTICULAR

That which is meant by 'universal' knowledge here is the knowl-edge that does not change with the accidental object of knowledge(1I1-t1la'/;{lll bi t//- 'ame!). An instance of it is the form of a structureconceived hy an architect in order to build an actual one similar toit. The conceived form remains as it was before, during, and afterthe structure's construction, even though the actual structureshould collapse or be razed to the ground. This kind of knowl-edge is called 'knowleclge prior to multiplicity' Ci/Ill met !Jab! ai-kC/Ibm/i) The knowledge acquired through the means of universalcauses is of this kir.d, such as an astronomer's knowledge that alunar eclipse would occur on a certain day at a certain time for acertain period during which there would occur an astronomicalconfiguration in which the earth will intervene between the sunami the moon. In this case, his knowledge remains unchangedbefore, during, and after the eclipse.

By 'particular' knowledge here is meant the knowledge thatchanges with the change in the accidental object of k.nowledge.An example of it is our knowledge obtained through eyesight ofZavd's movements: when Zayc.l SLOpS moving, the perceived im-

]20 121

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11.5. PLANES Of THE INTELLECT

of matter is conditioned by a particular [physical] configurationand an immaterial entity does not have a [physical] position

or location.This Immaterial source is not the soul itself, which intellects

these immaterial cognitive forms, for it is still in potentiality inrelation to these forms and its mode is passive, not active; it isimpossible tbat something in potentiality should by itself make thetransition from potentiality to actuality.

Therefore, the source of the intelligible form is an immaterialintelligent substance that possesses all the universal intelligibleforms in the manner of non-differentiated knowledge. The soulpossessing potential unites with it in order to intellect in accor-dance with its particular potential, whcrcunon the source of ema-nation creates in it the intelligible form for whose reception itpossesses the potential.

j\ similar explanation in relation to particular intelligible formswou.d make clear that their source is an imaginal immaterial sub-stance which possesses all the particular imaginal forms in themanner of non-differentiated knowledge, and that the soul uniteswith them in accordance with its potential.

The metaphysicians mention four planes of the intellect.Onc of them is that which is in a state of potentiality in relation

to all mtelligibles. It is called the material intellect (al- 'aq! al-!Jc!yiiliini) on account of its similarity to prime matter (!JqY17/d) inbeing devoid of intelligibles and with respect to its potentiality inrelation to all forms.

The second is the 'intellect by proficiency' (al- (aql bi al-ma/akclb)which is the plane wherein it intellects self-evident COnCer)[S(tdSc/J}'JlJIIl'iit) and judgements (ta!'dlq{lt); for the knowledge of self-evident matters (bddi/J;.j:ycit) precedes the knowledge of 'specula-tive' matters (nazm!yyclt).

The third is the 'intellect in act' which intellects speculative mat-ters through the mediation of self-evident concepts and judge-ments, though some of them are based on the others.

The fourth is the intellect that partakes of all self-evident andspeculative intelligibles corresponding to the realities of the higherand lower realms of existence by virtue of having all of them pre-sent before it and its actual consciousness of them. Thus it is a'knowing world' similar to the external world, and is called the'acquired intellect' (al- ~Iql al-tm/Jtafcld).

11.6. TflE EiVl!\Ni\TING SOURCE OF TIlE INIELLlGlBLE FURMS

11.7. THE DIVISION Of MEDIATED KNO\XTLEDGE

INTO CONCEPTION i\ND JUDGEMENT

The mere knowledge of the form Crllm!)) of the known object,whether one or multiple, regardless of affirmation or negation, iscalled conception (tclfOJJ))J'tl!'), such as the concepts of 'man,' 'body'and 'substance.' If the form of the known is accompanied by anaffirmation or negation of something concerning something, suchas in the sentence, 'Man is risible' or 'Man is not stone,' it is an'assertion' (taJdiq; lit. affirmation), and in consideration of thejudgement that it contains is called 'qacj!)I)I{Ih' (proposition).

Further, a proposition comprises more than one part as it con-tains the affirmation or negation of something concerning some-thing.

According to the prevalent vicw among metaphysicians, an af-firmative proposition comprises a subject (JJlclJlJcjtlj, a predicate(JJla/m!!/!) and the 'relation of Judgement' (ai-niJ/;rlt al'!l!Ikl1/~)')'aj;),

123

As to the universal intelligible forms, which bring man, for in-stance, from potentiality to actuality, its source of emanation(muJlr.!) is an immaterial Intellect which possesses all the universalintelligible forms. That is because, as we have seen, these formsconstitute knowledge and are immaterial. Moreover, by virtue oftheir universality they are capable of corresponding to a multiplic-ity of objects, whereas everything impressed in matter is an indi-vidual incapable of such correspondence. Therefore, the intelligi-ble forms are immaterial, created by an agent that is an immaterialsource, for a material entity is existentially weak and incapable ofprorlucing something existentially stronger. In addition, the action

122

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ent notions and combines them into a unity with a single exis-tence, This is judgement, which we have described as the act ofthe soul, by means of which it represents external reality as it is,

Hence, judgement is an act of the soul and, at the same time, amental form that represent something beyond itself Were judge-ment a conception abstracted from outside, the propositionwould not make a complete statement to which nothing needs tobe added, as in the case of each part of a hypothetical proposition.Also, were judgement a concept formulated by the soul withoutrecourse to external reality, it would not represent external reality.

which is the predicate's relation to the subject and the judgement(tIHkm) of the subject's oneness with the predicate, This is the casein 'composite statements' (al-bal!!yyiit a!-tmtrakkabafJ) wherein thepredicate is not the existence of the subject. But in 'simple state-ments' ((/I-~(/lli}'yi7t al-basi!a/)), in which the predicate is the exis-tence of the subject-such as in the statement 'Man is existent'-there are three parts: the subject, the predicate and the judgement;there is no sense in a relation-which is a copulative existent-intervening between a thing and itself.

Furthermore, a negative proposition is made up of a subject, apredicate and an affirmative relation of judgement ({d-nisbaIJ al-~lIk111i)!)I(/b(/1-iJ{lb~jJ'{/IJ), There is no judgement in it, and no negativejudgement, for a judgement consists of affirming something ofsomething; the withholding of judgement is the absence of it, notthe positing of its absence,

The truth is that the need for conceiving the relation of judge-ment is only from the aspect of the judgement being an act of thesoul, not because it is part of the proposition. For a propositionconsists only of the subject, the predicate, and the judgement, andthe formation of a proposition as such does not require the con-ception of the relation of judgement. The need for conceiving itarises for the formation of judgement by the soul in identifyingthe subject with the predicate. This is also confirmed by the for-mation of the proposition in simple statements without the rela-tion of judgement that relates the predicate to the subject.

It becomes clear from this discussion that, first, an affirmativeproposition (al-qal!1!J1clh f/I-lJliijibab) consists of three parts: subject,predicate, and judgcment. A negative proposition consists of t\VO

p~lrtS: subject and predicate, and the relation of judgement isneeded by the soul in making the judgement, not for the forma-tion of the proposition as such,

Second, judgement is an act of the soul in the context of mentalcognition, not a passive act of conception. When we say 'Zayd isstanding,' for instance, the soul cognizes through sensory means asingle entity which is 'the standing Zayd.' Then it analyzes it intorwo concepts ':I.ayd' and 'standing' and stores them, Thereafter,when it wants to describe what it finds in external reality, it takesthe forms of 'Zayd' and 'standing' from its memory as two differ,

124

11.8, DIVISION OF MEDIATED KNOWLEDGEINTO SELF-EvIDENT AND SPECULi\T1VE

Something is said to be 'self-evident' (hac/ib) that does not standin need of reflection and speculative reasoning (ntlZtilJ for theformation of its conception or for the making of a judgementconcerning it, e,g. the concepts of 'thing,' 'unity' and so on, orsuch assertions as 'The whole is greater than any of its parts' or'Four is an even number' .A 'speculative' conception or judge-ment is one which depends on reflective effort, e.g. the concep-tion of the quiddity of man and horse, or such assertions as, 'Thethree angles of a triangle equal two right angles,' or 'Man has animmaterial soul.'

The speculative sciences derive from self-evident knowledgeeffort, and their elaboration rests on the basis of what is self-evident. Otherwise the matter would lead to an indefinite regress,and no knowledge would be possible, as explained in logic.

Sc1f-evident assertions, as explained in logic, are many, and theforemost of them are the so-called the basic self-evident proposi-tions (mIJJlJtlli)ytlt), which are propositions for whose confirmationthe mere conception of the subject and the predicate is sufficient,e.g, such statements as 'The whole is greater than any of its parts'and 'A thing cannot be divested from itself.'

The foremost of the primarily self-evident propositions is theprinciple of contradiction, which is a proper disjunctive proposi-tion: 'Either the affirmation or negation of a proposition is true.'No self-evident or speculative proposition, even the primarily

125

11. Ki';(lwUJ )C;I:, K!\()WER, :\NI) Till: K:-':(lWl'<

self-evident propositions, can do without contradiction in orderto bring knowledge. Thus the statement, 'The whole is greaterthan any of its parts' brings knowledge only if its contradictory, 'Itis not the case that the whole IS greater than any of its parts,' isfalse.

Hence this principle is the most primary proposition to be af-firmed, and no sane person can dou bt it. All sciences are basedupon it and were any doubt cast upon it, it would pervade to allsciences and judgements.

A ComplelJle!1tm}' Note

The sophist, who denies the possihility of knowledge, does notaffirm the validity of the principle of contradiction; for his acccp-ranee of it would amount to all admission that one out of everypair of contradictory propositions is true.

However, should the sophist who denies the possibility ofknowledge and is skcptical of everything admit to be a skepric, itmeans that he admits the possibility of at least some kind ofknowledge and thereby affirms the principle of contradiction.Then it becomes possible to make him admit the possibility ofknowledge of many things similar to his knowledge of being askcptic, such as his knowledge that he secs, hears, has sensationsof touch, taste and smell, that when he feels hungry he looks forsomething that would satisfy his hunger, or quench his thirstwhen he feels thirsty. \,\'hen he accepts these, he can be led toadmit that he possesses the knowledge of other things as well, forall knowledge, as said earlier,' terminates in sense-experience (01-(ii.rJ) .

However, should he refuse to admit that he knows that he is askcptic and declare that he is skeptical of everything, even of hisown skcpticism, and knows nothing, there can be no debate withhim and no argument will work upon him. This kind of personeither suffers from a disease affecting his mental faculty, in whichcase he should see a physician, or he is one hostile to the truth,seeking to refute it. The latter should be chastened, made to feelpain, kept from what he desires and seeks and compelled to ex-

1 See 11.2 above.

12(,

11 K0:C>Wl.I'.I)(;I'., KM )\,,"1(, .\:-';1)Till': K'\;c>\'V'\

penence what he dislikes and detests, for he does not considerany of these to have reality.

Yes, often some persons of this kir:d who turn to the rationalsciences without the necess~ry training in the principles of logicand the techniques of reasoning, on observing the contradictoryopinions of thinkers on various problems and the arguments theyadvance in support of each of their mutually exclusive positions,cannot make a distinction between the true and the false due tothe inadequacy of their intellectual means. Such a person concedesto each of the contradictory opinions on one issue after another,ann thereafter becomes suspecr of all logic, claiming that the sci-ences are relative, not absolute, and the truth for every thinker iswhat his arguments lead him to.

The remedy for this kind of skeptic is to fully clarify for him theprinciples of logic and [0 demonstrate for him the self-evidentprinciples which arc beyond doubt 111 all circumstances, such asthe principle of identity and so on. Utmost effort should be madeto explain to him the elements of a proposition, and he should bedirected to study the mathematical sciences.

There are two other groups of skcptics. One of them acceptsman's perceptions but doubts what lies beyond them. "We canknow only what we perceive, and that which lies beyond our per-ceptions is uncertain," they declare. There is another group,which, having noticed that the statement, "L~e can know onlywhat JI'e perceive" implies the admission of many other truths-namely, the existence of other persons and their experiences,which are external facts-re-state their position and say, "1 can hecertain only of lID! perceptions. Anything that lies beyond them isuncertain."

In refuting such a position it may be said that occasionally theredo occur errors of cognition-as in cases of errors of vision andtactual sense and errors of reasonl11g-but if there were no exter-nal realities beyond one's self and one's perceptions, realitieswhich either correspond to these perceptions or do 110t, therewould obviously be no room for error.

It may be said that the opinion of this group is not a total nega-tion of knowledge. \'V'hat they mean 1S that the forms presented tothe senses may not exactly conform to external facts as they are.

127

11. KNOW'LEDC I:, Kl\llWFR, ,\ND THE K)\;OWN

For instance, it has been pointed out that sound as it appears tohearing does not exist in external reality. Rather, when it reaches acertain frequency it becomes audible to hearing in the form ofaudible sound. Similarly, when the frequency of electromagneticwaves reaches a certain number it appears to vision in the form ofvisible light and colours. Hence the senses, which are the sourceof perception, do not reveal the realities transcending them, andall other contents of cognition terminate in the senses.

However, if perception is assumed to be incapable of revealingthe reality transcending it, where does this knowledge come fromthat there does exist such a reality beyond perception, a realitywhich perception fails to reveal? Who has cognized that externalsound consists of vibrations of a certain frequency and visiblelight has such and such a frequency in external reality? Does mandiscover the real external facts except through the faculties ofperception, the same external facts in perceiving which the sensesmake errors?

In view of what has been said above, the suggestion that per-ception may not conform absolutely to what lies beyond it onlyamounts to a denial of the possibility of knowledge. Then, eventhe statement, "Our perceptions may not conform to anything inexternal reality" will not be secure from failing to reveal anythingin respect of the individual concepts and the judgement involved111It.

11.9. DIVISION Of !vIEDlATED KNOWiLEDGE INTOHl\QIQI AND I'TlBARI

The term 'real' (i?aqlqt) refers to concepts which [that is, whosereferents], when existing externally, exist with their external prop-erties, and which exists in the mind without those external prop-erties. Such concepts pertain to quiddity (mahl)!)'Clb). Opposed tothem are concepts that are denoted by the termed 'derivative'(i'ti/7({I7). It refers either to concepts the mode (i?ayb!J!)'ab) of whosereferent is externality only, such as 'existence' and its real charac-teristics, such as 'unity,' 'actualiry' and so on. That which is de-noted by such concepts does not enter the mind, for otherwise itwould involve a violation of the law of identity (inqilab). Or it re-

12R

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fers La concepts the mode of whose referent is mental, such as theconcepts of 'universal,' 'genus' and 'species,' which are not to befound externally, for otherwise that will involve a violation of thelaw of identity.

The so-called i'tibdri concepts are formulated by the mindthrough a kind of contemplative effort and applied to their refer-ents, though not in the way quiddity is applied to and predicatedof its individuals and taken within their confines,

From what has been said it first becomes clear that the conceptswhich are predicated of the Necessary Being and contingent exis-tents, such as existence and life, are i'tibari; for otherwise the Nec-essary Being would have quiddity.

Second, the concepts which are predicated of more than onecategory, such as motion, are i'tibdri; for otherwise they wouldbelong to two or more genera, and that is inadmissible.

Third, the i'tihc7rl concepts do not have any definitions (i.e. ge-nus and species), nor are they confined to any particular quiddity.

It is important to note that there are other meanings of the termi'tibdtj which are not relevant to our discussion. (i) One of these isthe sense of i'tibdri as opposed to 'fundamentally real' (tlfil), suchas quiddity in opposition to existence. (ii) Another sense of it ismeant when i'tibiiri is used for something which does not have anindependent existence of its own, as opposed to something whichexists independently, as in the case of a relation, which existsthrough the existence of its two sides as opposed to substance,which exists by itself. (ill) Another meaning of i'tibdri is that whichis applied to and predicated of subjects in a figurative and meta-phorical sense with a practical end in view, such as the applicationof the word 'head' to Zayd as someone whose relation to his peo-ple is like the relation of the head to the body because he managestheir affairs, solves their problems and assigns to everyone hisparticular duties and tasks.

11.10. SOME MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

That which is known through mediated knowledge is divisibleinto that which is known by itself (ma'lt/m bi al-cl/;at) and thatwhich is known by accident (mo'lt/m bi aI- 'arad]. The known-by-

129

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itself is the form apprehended by the knowcr. The known-by-accident IS the external object represented by the cognitive form;it is called the 'accidentally known' (ma'll/m bi a!-,mlcj) or the 'figu-ratively known' (ma'!t7m bi a/-Jl1C1j(7:j) due to its association with theknown -by-i rscl f.

Another issue is that, as said earlier, every intelligible is imrnarc-rial in the same way as every intelligence is Immaterial. Hence theconcepts presented to the intellectual faculty, by apprehendingwhich it acquires actuality, being immaterial, are existentiallystronger than the intelligent soul, which develops through theirmeans and IS affected by them. Hence they are, in fact, immaterialexistents that manifest themselves to the knowing soul throughtheir external existence, and the soul unites with them when theyare the forms of substances and with their substrata if the), arcaccidents. However, due to our contact with matter through themeans of the sensory organs, we imagine that the substratum ofthese forms is matter and that we abstract them from matter andthe material properties possessed by them in their material stare,whereupon they become mental cxistcnts representing externalthings without hearing their external properties.

From this discussion it becomes clear that mediated knowledge,in fact, involves immediate knowledge.

It also becomes clear that immaterial Intellects do not possessany mediated knowledge clue to their total separation from matter-a separation which is essential as well as actual.

intellected; and for an immaterial existent that which is possible isactual. Hence it intellects in actuality every immaterial existent, inthe same way as every immaterial being is i.ntelligible in actuality aswell as intelligent in actuality.

If it is said that this implies that the human soul, being immate-rial, intellects every intclligible, which is obviously not admissible.The answer is that the soul is immaterial essentially, not in actual-ity; by virtue of its essential immateriality it intellects its own es-sence in act, but its actual association lwith matter] necessitates itsgradual transition from potentiality to act in accordance with dif-ferent degrees of preparedness. i\nd when it attains to completeimmateriality and is no more preoccupied with the regulation ofthe body's functions, it apprehends all knowables in the mannerof non-differentiated knowledge, becoming an acquired intellectin act ('aq! Jl?listafad bi a!ji(~.

It is evident that this argument applies to immaterial essenceswhich are substances and are existent-tor-themselves, not to acci-dents, whose existence is for-other-than-themselves; that whichintellects them is their su bstrarurn.

11.12. l.MJvlEDli\ TI-:KNo\VLEDGE 1S

NOT LIMITED TO SELf'-KNOWLEDGE

11.11. EVERY IMMATERIAL BEING 1S INTELLIGENT

It was said earlier that immaterial substances are in themselvespresent-for-themselves by virtue of their immateriality and actual-ity. However, is immediate knowledge confined to an entity'sknowledge of itself? Or does it include a cause's knowledge of itseffect and vice versa, when both of them are immaterial? The Pe-ripatetics subscribe to the former position and the Emanationistssubscribe to the latter view, which is the correct one.

That is so because the existence of the effect is dependent, asmentioned earlier,' on the existence of the cause, which sustains it.It is not independent of the cause. Hence when the cause and ef-feet are immaterial, the effect is present with all its being for thecause, without there being any barrier between them. It is knownwith immediacy to the cause through its existence itself.

That is because anything that is essentially and completely imma-terial (!11I!JrtrTr:ld te/lll d!J(7tatz) has no association with potentiality.Therefore, its immaterial essence (d/Jelt) is present and existent foritself. That is so because by knowledge we do not mean anythingexcept a thing's presence for a thing in the aforementioned sense.'This pertains to its knowledge of itself. As to its knowledge ofentities other than itself, it is possible for it, by virtue of its essen-tial immateriality, to intellect every immaterial being that can be

i See 11.1 above.I See 7.3.

130 131

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Similarly, when the cause and effect are immaterial, the cause ispresent with its existence for its effect, which is sustained by it,being independent through the independence of the cause, andthere is no barrier separating them. Hence it is known to its effectwith an immediate knowledge. CHAPTER TWELVE

The Necessary Being,the Proofs of Its Existence,

Its Attributes and Acts

12.1. THE PROOFS OF ITS EXISTENCE

THE reality of existence is necessarily existent, for it is fundamen-tal (there being nothing fundamental except it) and absolute (JitfJ(for it is not mingled with anything other than itself, as it has noother or second, as mentioned in Chapter One).' This is so be-cause it is necessary for a thing to be what it is and impossible forit to be its own contradictory, which is non-existence in this case,Further, this necessity (wl!jt7b) derives either from itself Cbi a/-dIJal)or from something else (bi a/-gb0yr). However, it is self-contrad.ictory to regard this necessity as deriving from somethingelse, for, in this case, there is no 'other,' nor a second. Hence it isnecessarily existent-by-itself (J/Jtijib al-JlJt!jlid bi al-dhat).

Anotbel" Proof

The quiddities, which are caused (tlla'!t7~ and contingent (tlltltllkin)cxistenrs, also exist by necessity, for a thing does not come intobeing unless it is necessitated. However, their necessity is by vir-tue of something else; because were they necessary-by-themselves,they would not stand in need of a cause. Now the cause that ne-cessitates their existence is also existent by necessity. This neces-sity is either by-itself or by-something-else, and this line of rea-soning leads to that which is necessarily existent by-itself, becauseof the inadmissibility of a vicious circle or an indefinite regress.

'See 1.4 and 1.7.132 133