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33The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997

Mustafa Kibaroglu

Mustafa Kibaroglu received his Ph.D. in International Relations from Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey,in July 1996. He has subsequently held an International Atomic Energy Agency fellowship at the Programmefor Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) of the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies inSouthampton, England, and a postdoctoral fellowship at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of theMonterey Institute of International Studies.

TURKEY’S QUEST FOR PEACEFULNUCLEAR POWER

by Mustafa Kibaroglu1

Thirty years ago, Turkeylaunched the first feasibilitystudies for a nuclear power

plant with a view to benefit frompeaceful exploitation of nuclear en-ergy. However, neither that nor sub-sequent attempts have come tofruition for a variety of reasons,ranging in part from a lack of a well-defined national strategy in this areato domestic political problems. Butthe most significant hurdle has beenthe Western countries’ fear of a re-transfer of nuclear material and tech-nology from Turkey to third parties.Specifically, the United States hasfeared a Turkish-Pakistani connec-tion. India and Greece have furtherfueled these fears by disseminatingrumors about such a connection. Asa result, the United States has putpressure on supplier countries andfirms to deny transfers of nuclearreactors and related technology toTurkey.

Notwithstanding the allegations ofa Pakistani connection, Turkey be-came a state party to the Treaty onthe Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons (NPT) by signing it onJanuary 29, 1969, and ratifying it onApril 17, 1980. Turkey concluded a“full-scope” safeguards agreementwith the International Atomic En-ergy Agency (IAEA) in 1982. In ac-cordance with its foreign and securitypolicy,2 Turkey has also become astate party to international agree-ments that seek to prevent the spreadof all sorts of weapons of mass de-struction, such as the BiologicalWeapons Convention of 1972 and theChemical Weapons Convention of1993. At the NPT Review and Ex-tension Conference, held in NewYork in April/May 1995, Turkey gaveits full support to the “indefinite andunconditional extension” of theTreaty. Turkey also used its influenceon the Turkic republics of CentralAsia and the Caucasus to induce

them to behave the same way. Morerecently, Turkey assumed a full mem-ber status in the Conference on Dis-armament (CD) in Geneva after along period of attending the meetingsas an observer. As a country thatnever sought to acquire weapons ofmass destruction, Turkey has en-dorsed efforts to strengthen thenuclear nonproliferation regime andthe verification mechanisms of theIAEA. Therefore, Turkey pays closeattention to the proceedings of theIAEA’s “Programme 93+2,” in itsefforts to make IAEA safeguards in-spections more comprehensive.Above all, Turkey has been a“staunch ally” of the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) coun-tries since 1952 and has carried asignificant portion of the burden ofdefending the West against the So-viet Union.3 Thus, the opposition ofthe United States (as well as ofCanada and Germany) to Turkey’sattempts to benefit from peaceful

Mustafa Kibaroglu

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 199734

uses of nuclear energy is difficult tounderstand.

Turkey is a rapidly growing coun-try, and its present and forecasted en-ergy needs extend well beyond itscurrently installed power generatingcapacity. Despite outstanding suc-cess in completing power generationprojects in the 1970s and 1980s,Turkey now suffers from frequentpower outages that have caused se-rious losses, especially to its indus-trial output. Since the early 1990s,Turkey has not been able to financedozens of projects of different sizesthat would further exploit its powergenerating potential. But these ef-forts are likely only to postpone theenergy crisis it will soon face unlessit resorts to sources of energy otherthan those traditionally exploitedthus far. That is, Turkey’s hydro-power and thermal energy sourceswill not be sufficient to meet thesteady increase in its energy require-ments in the decades to come. Cur-rently, Turkey has a population ofapproximately 65 million, and anestimated population of 85 millionin 2010.4 Turkey has insignificant re-serves of oil and natural gas and thusis dependent on other countries. ButTurkey has other sources of energy,such as hydro power, coal, geother-mal, wind, and solar, as well as con-siderable reserves of uranium andthorium. Of all these, however, onlyhydro power and coal have beenproperly exploited over the past fewdecades.5 Research indicates thatdemand will again exceed domesticsupply in the early 2000s.6 Conse-quently, resorting to peaceful exploi-tation of nuclear power is currentlybeing discussed and will continue tocome to the fore as an alternativestrategy for Turkey to diversify itsprimary sources of energy.

This article will explore how andwhy Turkey has not succeeded in in-stalling a substantial nuclear powerinfrastructure, despite serious effortsover the last three decades. It willdiscuss the reasons behind the fail-ure of past attempts and make rec-ommendations for guiding furtherTurkish efforts to acquire nuclearpower and technology.7 It argues thatthe fear of Western supplier coun-tries of alleged Pakistani connec-tions has had a negative effect onTurkey’s initiatives in the past. Thus,it makes the case that Turkey’s cur-rent tender for nuclear reactors couldbe a timely opportunity for both theWest and Turkey to mend these re-lations.8 Finally, it concludes that ifWestern countries are to be expectedto assign a higher priority toTurkey’s energy requirements, Tur-key must be willing to take steps to-ward greater transparency in itsnuclear-related transactions and ac-tivities.

TURKEY’S ATTEMPTS TOEXPLOIT NUCLEARENERGY & ALLEGATIONSOF AN ILLICIT PAKISTANICONNECTION

Turkey’s attempts to exploitpeaceful nuclear power have beenshadowed by allegations of its illicitcooperation with Pakistan. Thus,these two developments will be dis-cussed together in chronological or-der. Turkey began thinking about thedevelopment of peaceful nuclearenergy after Eisenhower’s “Atomsfor Peace” initiative speech beforethe U.N. General Assembly in 1953,and the Geneva Conference of 1955.Many of the secrets in the nuclearfield were disclosed during the con-ference, particularly by the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union, to al-

low more countries to exploit nuclearenergy for peaceful purposes. In1956, the Turkish Atomic EnergyCommission (TAEC) was estab-lished under the auspices of thePrime Ministry to coordinate effortsto build nuclear research and train-ing centers, and to issue licenses fornuclear power plants.

First Phase: The 1960s & 1970s

In 1961, Cekmece Nuclear Re-search and Training Center(CNRTC), the first nuclear researchand training center in Turkey, wasestablished. That was followed bythe installation of a one megawattthermal (MWth) pool-type researchreactor TR-1 in CNRTC a yearlater.9 Then, in 1966, AnkaraNuclear Research and Training Cen-ter (ANRTC) was established in theenvirons of the capital, as the sec-ond major branch of TAEC, for car-rying out “fundamental and appliedresearch to use nuclear energy andtechnology for the benefit of thecountry and to support the nationaldevelopment.”10 With a view to ex-ploit Turkey’s natural uranium re-serves, the first feasibility studies forthe construction of a 300 to 400megawatt electric (MWe) pressur-ized heavy water reactor (PHWR)were launched in 1967 in order tostart generating electricity by theyear 1977. However, domestic eco-nomic and political developmentshalted that initiative.11 In a secondattempt, the Nuclear Power Plants(NPP) division of the Turkish Elec-tricity Authority (TEK)—which hadundergone a reorganization in 1970—carried out comprehensive feasibil-ity, site selection, and bid specifica-tion studies between 1972 and 1974for a 600 MWe nuclear powerplant.12 Surveys for the selection of


Mustafa Kibaroglu

a nuclear site were conductedthroughout Turkey. Due to its stableseismic conditions, Akkuyu Bay onthe Mediterranean coast—about 43kilometers southwest of Silifke—wasselected.13 Next, TAEC issued a li-cense in 1976 for the site selectedby TEK. After the preparation of thenecessary paperwork for bidding,with the assistance of a consortiumof one French and three Swiss firms,negotiations on the construction ofa 600 MWe nuclear power plant, fuelservices, and the financing of theinvestment were begun in 1977 withtwo half-state-owned Swedish firms,namely Asea-Atom and Stal-Laval.14 These negotiations wereinterrupted by the military coup inTurkey in 1980.15

Second Phase: The 1980s

In 1979, the 250 kilowatts ther-mal (kWth) Triga Mark II researchreactor started operations, and in1981, the TR-1 research reactor,which was shut down in 1977, wasreplaced by a five MWth pool-typeresearch reactor TR-2. These tworesearch and training reactors are theonly reactors currently operating inTurkey. In early 1980, a site selec-tion survey for a second nuclearpower plant began. Then, Inceburun,the northernmost point of Turkey inthe central Black Sea region locatedsome 25 kilometers west of Sinop,was selected by the NPP division ofTEK. The early 1980s also markedthe beginning of allegations of illicitcooperation between Turkey and Pa-kistan. In 1981, the United Statesexpressed concerns about a Turkish-Pakistani alliance on the grounds ofalleged shipments from Turkey toPakistan of strategic material withpotential nuclear weapons implica-tions. The United States feared that

Turkey’s help would enable Pakistango ahead with its quest for uraniumenrichment technology. It was re-ported that Robert Strausz-Hupe, theU.S. ambassador to Ankara, dis-cussed the matter with Turkish Min-ister of Foreign Affairs IlterTurkmen. Ambassador Omer Ersun,who was then-Chief of the PolicyPlanning Staff at the Turkish Minis-try of Foreign Affairs, confirmed thatthe U.S. administration raised con-cerns about the $30,000 shipment ofinverters to Pakistan by a Turkishtextile firm. Ambassador Ersunstated that neither the Turkish Min-istry of Foreign Affairs nor the pri-vate textile manufacturer had anyspecific knowledge that the invert-ers were intended for Pakistan’s ura-nium enrichment program.16

Allegations of an illicit Turkish-Pa-kistani connection indeed owe muchto the unique characteristic of rela-tions between the two countries. Foralmost any Turkish citizen, Pakistanis believed to be the one and onlyreally friendly country to Turkey.17

Revolutionary thoughts and the prin-ciples of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in-spired the Pakistani people in theirfight for independence against theBritish. As an indication of the coun-tries’ ties, Ataturk’s name has beengiven to a variety of institutes, librar-ies, and to the most beautiful districtsin Pakistan’s big cities.18 Turkey’shistoric relations with Pakistan gainedmomentum with the 1964 Agreementof Regional Cooperation for Devel-opment (RCD) that brought togetherTurkey, Iran, and Pakistan.19 Thewarm and friendly relations werefurther intensified in many respectsin the aftermath of the military coupin Turkey on September 12, 1980.Military leaders of Turkey and Paki-stan, namely President General

Kenan Evren and President GeneralZia ul-Haq, respectively, paid a se-ries of visits to each other’s countryuntil the latter was killed in a planecrash on August 17, 1988. These cer-emonial visits increased the magni-tude of sympathy and of trade andcooperation in many fields, includingcivilian and military spheres. Therewas, therefore, fertile soil for rumorsto grow. Hence, when NATOblocked Pakistan’s enrichment pro-gram in early 1980s, President Ziaul-Haq reportedly opened talks withTurkey, taking advantage of his“brotherhood” with his Turkish coun-terpart Kenan Evren. At the sametime, Greek Prime MinisterPapandreou told U.S. Secretary ofState Alexander Haig about Turkey’swork on the nuclear bomb.Papandreou reportedly said that “Pa-kistan expected Turkey to act as atransshipper of material for a nuclearbomb and would reciprocate byproudly sharing the nuclear bombtechnology with Turkey.”20

In 1982, TAEC was abolished andsucceeded by the Turkish AtomicEnergy Authority (TAEA). TAEAwas established by law as a govern-mental organization under the directsupervision of the prime minister.21

In the fall of 1983, in order to rein-vigorate the interrupted efforts,seven major suppliers were invitedto submit bids to install nuclearpower plants in Turkey. Eventually,letters of intent for the supply ofthree power reactors in two siteswere issued to three firms: AtomicEnergy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL) fora 655 MWe CANDU reactor inAkkuyu; Kraftwerk Union (KWU)of Germany for a 990 MWe PWR inAkkuyu; and General Electric of theUnited States for one or two 1,185MWe boiled water reactors in Sinop.

Mustafa Kibaroglu


The total cost of these three unitswas estimated to be $3.4 billion.22

Talks with Canadian andGerman Firms

Preliminary results of the site sur-veys conducted in Sinop by an ex-pert team dispatched by GeneralElectric, as well as the team’s con-sultations with experts from theIAEA and from Turkey, who hadpreviously carried out similar stud-ies in the region, concluded that anuclear power plant was not feasible.They determined that, without con-ducting much more elaborate andcomprehensive studies to assess theimpact of the fault lines deep in theBlack Sea basin on the probabilityof an earthquake in the region, nofurther steps could be taken to con-struct a nuclear site. Hence, nego-tiations with General Electric cameto an end. However, negotiationswith AECL and KWU continuedthroughout 1984, and the partiesagreed to several points for thepreparation of contract documentsand the financing schemes for a turn-key approach. At that time, thenewly established government inTurkey suggested a so-called “built-operate-transfer” (BOT) model forthe supply of power reactors. TheBOT model was launched with aview to attracting foreign invest-ments to Turkey in many fields, andthe nuclear deal was also consideredin the same vein. With BOT, theTurkish government suggested thatAECL and KWU construct thenuclear sites by forming joint ven-ture utilities (JVU) with Turkey’sTEK; operate the reactors for 15years by selling the generated elec-tricity to TEK; and then hand overtheir share in the nuclear site to TEK.Both AECL and KWU were also

required to be responsible for agreater portion of financing of thepower plants that they would buildin the form of a JVU with TEK.23

While both firms agreed in principleto such a plan, KWU would laterdecline to undertake the supply ofthe reactor, reportedly due to a dis-agreement about the financing con-ditions imposed by the Turkishgovernment. Hence, AECL was leftas the sole potential supplier for allthree reactors. On January 3, 1985,Turkey reportedly invited AECL toconduct final negotiations for thesupply of reactors for its Akkuyu andSinop nuclear units.24 The Canadianfirm was said to have made seriousattempts to find loan guarantees tofinance the Akkuyu reactor and re-quested a $1 billion loan guaranteeboth from the Canadian governmentand banks.25 However, negotiationswith AECL ran into problems whenthe Canadian government failed toapprove the plan.26 The Canadiangovernment requested governmentguarantees from Turkey for the fi-nancing, and submitted a proposalcontaining a credit package and cer-tain conditions. But, the Turkishgovernment did not find the proposalconsistent with the requirements ofthe BOT scheme, and the deal wassuspended.27 Although the deal wasdeclared to be terminated by theTurkish Minister of Energy CahitAral, an AECL official stated thathis organization was still negotiat-ing with Turkey for a contract to buildand operate a CANDU reactor nearAkkuyu.28 But, another AECL offi-cial apparently admitted that “it [was]not possible for an agreement to bereached within the framework of abuild-own-run formula with the Turk-ish government.”29 Yet, in January1987, Prime Minister Turgut Ozalwas quoted as saying that Turkey

was ready to evaluate further pro-posals from AECL to go ahead withthe reactor deal.30 And, in June 1987,it was reported that negotiations withAECL continued after the Canadiangovernment failed to approve a planfor AECL to build the plant and runit for 15 years. It was also reportedthat talks with KWU were re-opened.31

Nevertheless, none of these talkshave come to fruition, not only be-cause of financial problems, but alsobecause of political considerationsof the Canadian and German gov-ernments. The main reason behindthe withdrawal of KWU from thedeal was probably the reaction of theWest German government toTurkey’s improving relations withEast Germany. Although such a viewcannot be attributed to any officialcommunication or document, it wasperceived in Turkish diplomaticcircles. With regard to the Canadianfirm, it was reported that AECL hadwithdrawn its bid for a nuclear plant“in response to pressure from West-ern countries which [are] concernedthat Turkey may build a nuclear bombbased on CANDU technology.”32

Opposition from Greece, Israel, andFrance resulted in a deadlock in ef-forts to procure financing for theproject.33 Western countries fearedthat Turkey would do what Pakistandid—modify the technology to gainthe capability to build an atomicbomb.34 Allegations increased espe-cially in the aftermath of the inter-view of Abdel Qader Khan, a keyfigure in Pakistan’s nuclear program,with an Indian journalist in March1987. Thereafter, in a press confer-ence held on October 28, 1987,Ambassador Inal Batu, then-spokes-person of the Turkish Ministry ofForeign Affairs, explicitly denied re-


Mustafa Kibaroglu

ports that Turkey would sell materialfor nuclear arms production to Paki-stan. Ambassador Batu said that“Turkey fulfilled with great care itsobligations under the NPT.”35

Later, Indian sources reported thatthe Indian government was lookingover reports that Turkey was ille-gally selling nuclear weapons-re-lated materials to Pakistan. KapilVerma, a member of the Congress-IParty, was quoted as saying that “In-dia should try to persuade the Turk-ish government to give up theirstrategic nuclear equipment.”36 Inmid-1988, Leonard S. Spector, fromthe Carnegie Endowment for Inter-national Peace, reportedly indicatedthat “although the United States hadput an end to the smuggling of sen-sitive material by Pakistan, both In-dia and Pakistan had accumulatedthe nuclear materials necessary forbomb production.”37 Building uponSpector’s views, Indian authoritiesargued that “Turkey was used as anintermediary in many of Pakistan’sclandestine activities,” even thoughSpector did not cite any country’sname.38

Talks with Argentine Firms

When talks with Canadian andGerman firms for the constructionof nuclear power plants ran intotrouble, Turkey sought other part-ners in the nuclear field. Hence, Tur-key signed a 15-year nuclearcooperation agreement with Argen-tina on May 3, 1988. The agreementpaved the way for potential trans-fers from Argentina of technical as-sistance, including front-end nuclearfuel cycle research and develop-ment; and research on power andresearch reactor planning, construc-tion, quality assurance, operation,and regulation. IAEA safeguards

would apply to all nuclear materialdesigned for the use of nuclear tech-nology to be transferred under theaccord. Turkey and Argentina alsoagreed that safeguards on Argentinesupplies would continue even if theagreement expired. At the same time,Turkey became interested in the 380MWe Argos PWR design unveileda year earlier by Empresa NuclearArgentina de Centrales Electricas(ENACE).39 Argentina agreed tohelp Turkey study the feasibility ofa site for Argos in Turkey. As partof this agreement, Turkish scientistsand technicians would go toArgentina’s Bariloche Nuclear Cen-ter for training. The two countriesexplored other areas for cooperation,including uranium mining, nuclearfuel plants, industrial production ofradioisotopes, and safety require-ments.40

Turkey also sought an agreementwith Argentina for the constructionof an Argentine-made 25 MWenuclear reactor, the CAREM-25, inAnkara. Professor Atilla Ozmen,then-director of TAEA, stated that“the offer [would] include financialhelp, as well as technical person-nel.”41 The CAREM-25 reactor wasdeveloped by InvestigacionesAplicadas (INVAP) at Bariloche, tobe fueled with four percent enricheduranium. During a visit in late April1989, Professor Ozmen reportedlysaid that “Prime Minister Ozal [was]looking to follow the example of Ar-gentina in achieving independence incertain high technology fields suchas nuclear energy.”42 He said, “Turk-ish engineers, scientists and compa-nies would fully participate inconstruction of the Argentine reac-tor, and the eventual purchase of theArgentine [Argos] reactor [would]also help ease power shortages in

Turkey forecast for the mid1990s.”43 Argentine officials werehopeful Turkey would buy a 380MWe Argos PWR from ENACE,provided the CAREM-25 reactorproject worked out well.44

In October 1990, Turkey and Ar-gentina agreed to form a joint archi-tect-engineering firm to developArgentina’s modular low powerCAREM-25 reactor. Two Turkishfirms, Sezai Turkes-Fevzi Akkaya(STFA) and TEK, and two Argen-tine firms, Comision Nacional deEnergia Atomica, and INVAPformed the new firm. The agreementincluded a commitment to build two25 MWe CAREM-25 units, one ineach country. While Turkey agreedto provide most of financing for thework, Argentina agreed to providemost of the technology. Accordingly,Argentina would provide NuclearSteam Supply System (NSSS) tech-nology, basic and detailed engineer-ing for the balance of plant,construction management, and regu-latory expertise. If preparations forbuilding of two units had gone aheadas planned, work on the first unit inArgentina would have begun in1991, and construction of the sec-ond unit, in Turkey, would have be-gun in 1992.45 The long-term goalof the joint venture was to export thereactor to other nations in LatinAmerica, Africa, and the MiddleEast.46 Turkish Prime MinisterTurgut Ozal and the Argentine Presi-dent Carlos Menem had corre-sponded and met regarding theproject, and hence played a key rolein obtaining agreement.

Despite the fact that elaborate andhigh-level talks in the nuclear fieldhave been held between Argentinaand Turkey and have culminated ina formal document, no progress has

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been made. Reportedly, Argentina’sdecision in the early 1980s to appointAdolfo Saracho, a former head ofArgentina’s nuclear energy commis-sion, the new Ambassador to An-kara, made “the United States, theSoviet Union, and German diplomaticmissions in Buenos Aires uneasy.”47

When Turkey and Argentina agreedin October 1990 to set up a joint ven-ture company to build CAREM-25reactors in each country, “the UnitedStates, the Soviet Union, and Ger-many believed that Turkey’s acqui-sition of nuclear technology would bedisadvantageous.”48 Hence, theUnited States was said to have “wor-ried because of the fears that Tur-key might sell this technology toPakistan.”49 William Rope, firstundersecretary at the U.S. embassy,has reportedly made several calls try-ing to determine how nuclear coop-eration between Turkey andArgentina would affect other coun-tries in the region, particularly Paki-stan.50

Although the formal agreementfor nuclear cooperation with Argen-tina is still in force, the CAREM-25project was canceled a year later bya unilateral decision of executives atTAEA. Professor Yalcin Sanalan,then-director of TAEA, was espe-cially influential in the decision. Henotes that “[he] found the prospectsof the CAREM-25 deal ambiguous”on the grounds that “CAREM-25was too small for electricity genera-tion and too big for research or train-ing, however, very suitable forplutonium production” and thus a pro-liferation concern. Therefore, Pro-fessor Sanalan “concluded that suchan ambiguous project would de-crease the chances of Turkey in itscurrent and future quest for large-scale nuclear power plants which thecountry really needed.” In Profes-

sor Sanalan’s words, “when TAEAdeclared that it unilaterally canceledthe CAREM-25 project, [he] as thedirector of TAEA was then fre-quently invited to ‘inner circle’meetings and dinners of the OECD/NEA.” Professor Sanalan also notesthat “the OECD countries thenopenly expressed in these meetingstheir wishes to help Turkey acquirenuclear power plants, provided thelatter had well defined objectives inthat area.”51 By implication, theOECD countries prior to and afterthe unilateral cancellation of theCAREM-25 project by Turkey, wereconcerned about proliferation prob-lems if Turkey acquired advancednuclear technology and material.

Third Phase: The 1990s

Despite the concerns of Westernnuclear supplier countries aboutTurkey’s acquisition of nuclearpower plants and thus advancednuclear technology, Turkish expertscontinued to make estimates in theearly 1990s of the amount of nuclearenergy that Turkey will need in thenext decades. Figures provided byexperts indicate that, in order to meetTurkey’s ever growing energy needs,a 1,000 MWe capacity per annumshould become operational as of2005. Total installed nuclear powercapacity should reach 34,000 MWeby 2040. Experts came to this con-clusion by considering both the esti-mated population growth rate and theyearly increase in energy consump-tion in Turkey during the first half ofthe 21st century. Hence, an approxi-mate and rather stable 5,000 (kWh)per capita consumption (based on apopulation of 110 million in the year2040) will result in the need for 550(TWh) energy by then. But, sincetotal electricity production by domes-tic resources will barely attain the 320

TWh level, then the difference (i.e.,230 TWh) will have to be generatedby relying on various non-domesticsources. Given that a 1,000 MWenuclear reactor capacity can gener-ate 6,750 MWh electricity per an-num, operating on average at 70percent productivity, then 34,000MWe installed capacity would yieldan estimated energy generation of230 TWh in 2040.52 Although theabove scenario envisions a solutionto Turkey’s long-term energy needs,installation of some 35 large-scalenuclear power plants seems very un-likely, and not only because of tech-nical or financial constraints. Fearsof a Pakistani connection appear tostill exist in 1997 linked to the factthat Pakistan reportedly succeededin assembling one or more nuclearexplosive devices in the early 1990s,or will soon have the capability to doso. The disintegration of the SovietUnion and Turkey’s intensified rela-tions with the Turkic republics inCentral Asia and Caucasus, some ofwhich have nuclear installations, haveonly increased the West’s concerns.

One of the most significant accu-sations regarding Turkey’s allegedrole in Pakistan’s nuclear weaponsprogram in the 1990s came fromU.S. Senator John Glenn. In his ar-ticle published in The WashingtonPost on June 24, 1992, Senator Glennpointed to the history of the Reaganand Bush administrations in dealingwith the issue of nuclear prolifera-tion in regards to Pakistan. SenatorJohn Glenn and Senator StuartSymington had amended the ForeignAssistance Act in 1977 so that nocountry could receive U.S. aid if itimported or exported unsafeguardednuclear enrichment or reprocessingmaterials or equipment. In 1979, U.S.aid to Pakistan was cut off for viola-tions of this act. Senator Glenn


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claimed that “the credibility of theBush and Reagan administrations’commitment to nuclear nonprolifera-tion has been destroyed by their will-ful misinterpretation of the U.S.laws.”53 He said “U.S. assistanceallowed Pakistan to divert funds toits nuclear program, thus damagingthe nuclear nonproliferation effort.”54

In that context, Senator Glenn alsomentioned the “failure of the Glenn-Symington amendment to stop aid toTurkey, because of its involvementin aiding Pakistan in its acquisition ofuranium enrichment equipment.”55

As a reaction to Senator Glenn’s ac-cusations, Turkish officials promptlydenied that Turkey was supplyingPakistan with sensitive equipmentused in the production of nuclearweapons. Also in 1992, U.S. con-gressmen reportedly accused Turkeyof helping Pakistan with its nuclearprogram.56

A more recent concern about thepossibility of a Turkish-Pakistaniconnection and Turkey’s allegednuclear weapons ambitions, camefrom Greece. Thanos Dokos fromthe Greek Foreign Ministry statesthat “[a]lthough Turkey does notpossess the technological capabilityto develop nuclear weapons in thenear future, Greece is worried aboutthe alleged nuclear cooperation be-tween Ankara and Islamabad, therise of Islamic fundamentalism and(unconfirmed) reports that Turkeymight try to acquire nuclear weap-ons material and technology and re-cruit nuclear scientists from theMuslim republics of the former So-viet Union.”57 Other sources inGreece have disseminated informa-tion to the same effect. For instance,a Greek daily, I Kathimerini, allegedthat: “Turkey is attempting to acquirenuclear technology and nuclear war-heads from the Islamic republics of

the former Soviet Union, and is try-ing to acquire nuclear potential by co-operating with Pakistan in particular.The government of Greece is there-fore deeply concerned by the devel-opment.”58 In response, AmbassadorFiliz Dincmen, then-spokeswoman ofthe Turkish Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs, said that “no efforts had beenmade to obtain raw materials or tech-nology used in the manufacture ofnuclear weapons from the formerSoviet republics of Central Asia,”and reiterated that “Turkey [was] astate party to the NPT and [had] full-scope safeguards agreement with theIAEA in force.”59

Although, the veracity of these al-legations is highly suspicious,60 theirprobable role in Turkey’s failure toinstall nuclear power plants is worthserious consideration by the Turkishgovernment if it hopes to avoid an-other backlash against initiatives toinstall such plants. Turkey’s futureenergy production and consumptionprofiles indicate that peaceful exploi-tation of nuclear power may soonturn out to be a necessity for Turkey,although it should not be seen as apanacea.

Turkey’s Recent Initiative forInstalling Nuclear Power Plants

In early 1995, it was reported thatrequest for bids to construct anuclear power plant at the Akkuyusite would be issued during the year.Later, the Turkish Electricity Gen-eration and Transmission Company(TEAS) considered bids for aconsultancy contract for the powerplant project. TEAS was reported tohave received bids from at least 14consortia, including Turkish partnercompanies. In March 1995, the Ko-rean Atomic Energy Research Insti-tute (KAERI), with a consortium of

Korean companies and Turkish en-gineering firms, was said to be posi-tioning itself as a contender in theupcoming bid to supply a nuclearplant to Turkey. KAERI had alreadybegun work in Turkey in December1994, along with Turkey’s Gamb.61

KAERI won the contract to evalu-ate the nuclear development pro-gram drawn up by TEAS. Thecontract’s main objectives included:investigation of internationally ac-cepted contemporary nuclear powerplant types and systems feasible forTurkey; review of bids solicited dur-ing previous attempts to set up anuclear program in Turkey; and con-sultation with TEAS during bidevaluations and contract negotia-tions.62 KAERI examined the feasi-bility of renewing Turkey’s projectat Akkuyu. A review process wasthen scheduled for completion bymid-1996. A contractor will be se-lected by 1998, with constructionscheduled to begin in late 1998.Atomic Energy of Canada is ex-pected to offer a 680 MWe CANDU-6 heavy water reactor, and Siemensof Germany is likely to offer a 1,400MWe pressurized water reactor.63

According to the Turkish media,in December 1996, the Turkish gov-ernment planned to accept bids forthe nuclear plant to be built either assingle unit with a capacity of 1,200MWe or two equal units each with acapacity of 600 MWe. The cost ofthe plant is estimated to be about $1.5billion. However, because of recentpolitical developments in Turkey thatresulted in the so called pro-Islamicgovernment coming to power, bid-ders were said to be reluctant to goahead with the nuclear power plantdeal. On January 20, 1997, at therequest of the companies, Turkeyextended the deadline for biddingwhich expired that day.64 Finally, the

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Minister of Energy Recai Kutanstated on April 28, 1997 that bidderswill be announced on June 30,1997.65

TECHNICAL & POLITICALPITFALLS OF NON-NUCLEAR ALTERNATIVES

Turkey has learned little from itsthe past failures and has not takenmeasures to alleviate fears of West-ern nuclear supplier countries. Thus,Turkey’s current attempt is likely tobe another failure and a waste of timeand resources. Why does Turkey stillinsist on installing nuclear powerplants, particularly in light of height-ened public awareness on nuclearand environmental issues in the af-termath of the Chernobyl disaster?Demonstrations against nuclearpower plants have been staged spo-radically both in big cities and theselected nuclear sites. Thus, conven-tional wisdom may suggest seekingalternative ways of generating elec-tricity. There are, however, techni-cal and political constraints onutilizing Turkey’s other domesticsources of energy. There has notbeen a significant coordinated effortin Turkey to make use of geother-mal, wind, or solar energy potentialof the country. Full-fledge feasibilitystudies as to how to exploit thesesources on a large-scale virtually donot exist. There has been plenty ofrhetoric by successive governmentprograms, but no concrete work hasbeen accomplished. In addition, train-ing a sufficient number of scientists,technicians, and administratorswithin the framework of master plansin these areas would take decades.66

Nevertheless, these alternativesshould be studied.

There are political implications,along with the financial and techni-

cal difficulties, if Turkey exploits itsfresh water resources in its south-ern and eastern regions.67 Construc-tion of dams on the Euphrates andTigris rivers in southeastern Anatoliahas always been a serious bone ofcontention between Turkey and itsdownstream neighbors, Syria andIraq, as well as the Arab world.68

Formal declarations of the ArabLeague summits accuse Turkey of“using water as a weapon” againstthe Arabs. A clear indication of thiscan be seen in their objections to theconstruction of the large-scaleKeban and Karakaya dams in the1960s and 1970s. Syria and Iraq havesuccessfully lobbied in the ArabLeague in order to induce the latterto put pressure on international finan-cial circles to block loans and assis-tance to Turkey’s projects on theEuphrates and Tigris rivers. Hence,Ataturk dam, the fourth largest in theworld, was constructed without anyforeign financial or engineering aid.As a result, it has suffered from sev-eral delays and a considerable in-creases in total cost.69

Against this background, it be-comes clear that unless Turkey in-stalls nuclear power plants as analternative primary source of energy,it will resort increasingly to foreignsources of energy such as importedoil and natural gas. Both of thesecommodities, however, are quite ex-pensive as well as less reliable be-cause their availability is highlydependent on several factors, includ-ing the nature of international poli-tics. Turkey has been using Russiannatural gas primarily for heating inheavily populated cities like Istanbul,Ankara, and Bursa. New projectsare said to be underway to expandthat network. However, as a resultof the recently strained relations be-tween the two countries, particularly

over Chechen and Kurdish (PKK)issues,70 negotiations for the renewalof the agreement that would alsodouble the amount delivered to Tur-key have been stalled for a consid-erable period. The strain has alsojeopardized the overall effectivenessof the agreement.71 Moreover, pipe-lines that will deliver natural gas andoil from Central Asia to the Westappear highly unlikely to traverse Tur-key because of the opposition ofRussia, which is eager to host thepipelines.72 Hence, with a view todiversify its sources of energy, Tur-key concluded a $20 billion long-termnatural gas agreement with Iran inAugust 1996. This new agreementprompted serious concerns in theWest. The U.S. administration, inparticular, considered such a moveby the Turkish government as incom-patible with its policy of containmentof Iran, and asked Turkey not to goahead with the deal.73

Therefore, because of the com-plex political implications of furtherexploitation of Turkey’s fresh waterresources or reliance on Russian andIranian natural gas, nuclear powerdevelopment prevails as a techni-cally and economically feasible, aswell as a politically more viable, al-ternative. Moreover, environmentalexperts consider nuclear energy tobe cleaner than thermal energy gen-erated by fossil fuels that cause car-bon dioxide emissions. With regardto nuclear infra- and superstructure,TAEC/TAEA and TEK/TEAS havegone through a learning process overthe past three decades during thedeliberations for nuclear technologytransfer. Likewise, Turkish scientists,technicians, and administrators haveaccumulated a good deal of knowl-edge and experience in the nuclearfield, and conducted studies, amongother issues, on recovery of uranium


Mustafa Kibaroglu

from various districts of the country.Design studies on uranium extrac-tors and uranium dioxide (UO2) pow-der production, as well as theoperation of a pilot plant, proved suc-cessful, and the first pilot plant startedto operate in late 1986 with 1.5 tonuranium concentrate imported fromCanada.74 Turkey’s natural uraniumand thorium deposits are said to be8,400 tons and 380,000 tons, respec-tively, of which the former may con-stitute a basis for three 650 MWepressurized heavy water reactors.75

Thorium reserves may also be usedfor nuclear energy generation, pro-vided the necessary technologicalsteps are taken. All in all, a fertilesoil exists in Turkey for peaceful ex-ploitation of nuclear energy.

CONCLUSIONS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

If successful, nuclear power gen-eration will still be expensive anddependent on foreign assistance inmany respects. However, Turkey’spartners will be mainly its long-termallies, such as the United States,Canada, Germany, France, and Bel-gium, as well as its emerging tradepartners, such as Japan, South Ko-rea, Argentina, and Brazil. The paceof relations is less likely be affectedby irrational political moves if bothsides take the measures necessaryto ensure that there are neither pos-sibilities for diversion of technologiesto Pakistan nor avenues for unsub-stantiated rumor-mongering.

The primary duty to take correc-tive steps certainly rests on the sideof Turkey. First and the foremost, theTurkish government should commis-sion comprehensive studies with aview to work out a master plan re-garding: the possible role of nuclearenergy in Turkey’s overall energy

needs; the country’s uranium, tho-rium, and other nuclear-related natu-ral resource reserves; the selectionof nuclear reactor types; and theidentification of sites for the reac-tors that will be needed in the de-cades to come.76 The master planshould be worked out fully using allof the necessary scientific and eco-nomic criteria. It should then be codi-fied by law so as to make it immuneto changes in the domestic politicalclimate. The relevant cadres of sci-entists and technicians, whose insti-tutes have been either abolished orhurt by bureaucratic transitions overthe years, should again be gatheredtogether and oriented towards a well-defined, civilian nuclear energy pro-gram. To complement this, Turkeyshould express its eagerness to ac-cede to the Nuclear Suppliers Groupand to abide by its guidelines by pass-ing the necessary export controllaws.77 These new laws could hurtTurkey’s industrial exports.78 How-ever, the benefits of the peaceful ap-plication of nuclear energy, such asplentiful and relatively cheap elec-tricity, may offset these costs. In-formed cadres in the nuclear fieldshould take steps to create and thendevelop a proper nuclear culture inall respects (e.g., nuclear safety, non-proliferation, and environmental pro-tection). Above all, Turkishpoliticians, public servants, and otherofficials must be briefed about inter-national concerns pertaining espe-cially to nuclear nonproliferation.Before putting the blame on exter-nal actors for Turkey’s difficulties todate in acquiring nuclear technology,Turkey must adopt the necessary do-mestic measures to silence thoseconcerns.

As for the corrective actions sug-gested for the Western nuclear sup-

plier countries, some new thinkingshould be applied regarding the treat-ment of Turkey. Western countriesshould assign a much higher priorityto Turkey’s energy requirements.They should consider the socio-po-litical as well as the foreign policyimplications of the possible deterio-ration of Turkey’s economy in caseof a serious energy crisis. Such a cri-sis might have unanticipated and un-precedented consequences not onlyfor Turkey, but for the broader re-gion. A few Turkish politicians havemade irresponsible and recklessstatements in the past that haveadded impetus to rumors about pos-sible misuses of a would-be nuclearcapability of Turkey. However, theirsignificance should not be exagger-ated. Turkey is a democratic coun-try and, although they might be lessdeveloped than those in advancedcountries in the West, checks and bal-ances do exist. Moreover, Turkey, asa state party to the NPT, is and willbe subject to the IAEA’s scrutinyaccording to its obligations under the“full-scope” safeguards agreementin force since 1982. Furthermore,cadres of Turkish scientists, schol-ars, and technicians with solid back-grounds and advanced education inthe fields of nuclear engineering andnuclear physics from the world’sbest institutes are well aware of thepolitical implications of improper useof nuclear technologies. If theseguidelines are followed by the rel-evant parties, thre should be nogrounds for Turkey to be neglectedby the West any longer.

Mustafa Kibaroglu


1 This study is based in part on views expressedto the author, in personal interviews or viacorrespondence, by individuals from the Turk-ish state bureaucracy and academia (some ofwhom wish to remain anonymous). The au-thor would like to express his deep gratitude toProfessor Yalcin Sanalan, Head of the NuclearEngineering Department, Hacettepe Univer-sity, Ankara (former Director of TurkishAtomic Energy Authority, and Vice-Chairmanof the Board of Governors of the Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency) for his invalu-able contributions at every stage of this study.2 The guiding principle of Turkish foreign andsecurity policy as laid down by Mustafa KemalAtaturk, the founder and the first President of theRepublic of Turkey, is “peace at home and peacein the world.”3 For a comprehensive discussion on these mat-ters, see Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey,” in HaraldMuller, ed., Europe and Nuclear Disarmament(Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt -PRIF, 1997), forthcoming.4 Growth rate of population in Turkey is 2.1 per-cent per annum.5 The overall installed capacity reached 21 giga-watts electric (GWe) by 1996, of which 10 GWecame from hydroelectric, and 11 GWe from ther-mal plants fueled with both domestic and importedcoal, natural gas, and oil. In terms of electricityproduction, the total capacity reached 104 tril-lion watts hour (TWh) (hydro 36 TWh; ther-mal 68 TWh) with a net production of 84.5TWh (hydro 32 TWh; thermal 52.5 Twh).Average productivity of hydroelectric plantsis 88 percent, while productivity of plants fu-eled with coal, oil and natural gas is 78 percentin the average. Gross electricity productionwas 8.6 TWh in 1970; 25 TWh in 1980; and57 TWh in 1990. There is an almost steady15 percent loss in the electricity network dueto a variety of reasons which rendered the netproduction figure available for consumptionto 66 TWh in 1996. The net per capita elec-tricity consumption is recorded to be 1050kilowatts hour (kWh) in that year. Source: Lec-ture notes of Ozden Bilen, former Director ofState Hydraulic Works (DSI) of Turkey,Hydropolitics and Strategical Research and De-velopment Centre, Hacettepe University, An-kara, spring 1996.6 Taking into consideration the seven percent in-crease per annum in electricity consumption alongwith a high population growth, demand for elec-tricity is predicted to be 310 TWh in the year 2010.Turkey’s main domestic energy sources, namelyfresh water and coal have potentials of 125 TWh/year and 105 TWh/y, respectively. Source: Lec-ture notes of Ozden Bilen.7 For an expert view on these matters, see DoganOner (Vice-Chairman of Turkish Atomic EnergyAuthority-TAEA), “Nukleer Guc ReaktorlerindeTeknoloji Transferi ve Uretimi” (TechnologyTransfer and Production in Nuclear Power Reac-tors), Uluslararasi Nukleer Teknoloji Kurultayi

(International Nuclear Technology Forum),October 12-15, 1993, Ankara MakineMuhendisleri Odasi (Chamber of MechanicalEngineers), Ankara, Publication No: 168(March 1994), pp. 269-273.8 The negative effect of the fear of especiallythe U.S. administrations of a Pakistani con-nection is confirmed by authorities from theTurkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and theTurkish Atomic Energy Authority. Moreover,Professor Steven Cohen, an expert on India’sand Pakistan’s nuclear programs at the Uni-versity of Illinois, also confirmed the con-cerns of the U.S. administrations in that regard,and the possibility of a negative effect onTurkey’s quest for nuclear power plants.Author’s conversations with Professor Cohenduring his visit to the Center for Nonprolif-eration Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Insti-tute of International Studies, Monterey,California. March 24, 1997.9 CNRTC was founded on a 3,200 acres besidethe Kucuk Cekmece lake in the outskirts ofIstanbul. Nuclear research and training are beingconducted in its 10 departments. See the websiteof the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEA)(http://www.nukleer.gov.tr).10 The number of staff in ANRTC currently is 161,including 75 scientists, 36 technicians, and 50administrative personnel. ANRTC began with 12staff persons. See the website of TAEA (http://www.nukleer.gov.tr).11 The intervention of the military in domesticpolitics, on March 12, 1971, with the so-called“Generals’ Memorandum” resulted in drasticchanges in the government. Turkey was thenadministered for a couple of years by a seriesof short-lived ministerial cabinets.12 See Kenan Unlu, “Turks Take Steps to ReviveTheir Nuclear Programme,” Nuclear Engineer-ing International (January 1995), pp. 16-17.13 Ibid.14 Ibid. Also see Ahmet Kutukcuoglu (former Di-rector of Nuclear Power Plants Division of TEK),“Turkiye’nin Gecmisteki Nukleer EnerjiDeneyimleri” (Past Experiences of Turkey in theNuclear Field), Uluslararasi Nukleer TeknolojiKurultayi (International Nuclear Technology Fo-rum), October 12-15, 1993, Ankara MakineMuhendisleri Odasi (Chamber of MechanicalEngineers), Ankara, Publication No: 168 (March1994), pp. 40-44.15 The third of the so-called once-every-ten-year intermissions in Turkish democracy tookplace on September 12, 1980 (previously onMay 27, 1960 and March 12, 1971) as a resultof the military coup of the then-Joint Chiefsof Staff. The democratic regime was re-estab-lished with the country-wide elections held inNovember 1983.16 Author’s telephone conversation with OmerErsun, Turkish ambassador to Ottawa, March 24,1997.17 A very common belief in the public domain inTurkey can be translated as “there are no friendsof Turks but the Turks” which is quickly followedup with “except the Pakistanis.”

18 The same applies to Pakistani leaders such asMohammed Ali Cinnah and Zulfikar Ali Buttowhose names have been given to institutes, librar-ies, and districts in Ankara and Istanbul. In March1997, Humayun Han Banghash, the Pakistaniambassador to Ankara, confirmed this friend-ship during the reception of celebration of the50th anniversary of the foundation of Paki-stan. In his speech, Ambassador Banghash said“the Pakistani people have once more dem-onstrated how much they admire Ataturk [byhanging everywhere posters of Ataturk andCinnah].” Hurriyet (Istanbul), March 21, 1997,p. 1.19 The RCD remained in existence until 1979. In1985, the RCD, by then dormant, was resusci-tated as the Economic Cooperation Organization(ECO). After the disintegration of the SovietUnion, Turkey attempted to enlarge the ECO toinclude Azerbaijan, the Central Asian Republics,and Afghanistan. See the website of the TurkishMinistry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.tr).20 See “Turkey’s Role in Pakistan’s Nuclear Pro-gram,” Worldwide Report, March 20, 1987, pp.1-4. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.21 The basic undertakings of TAEA are “to deter-mine and progress the basis of the national policyand the related plans and programs and to submitthem to be approved by the Prime Minister; toexecute and to support scientific, technical andadministrative studies; to give approval, permis-sion and license to the nuclear installations; toenlighten the public in nuclear matters; to estab-lish research and educate the personnel in thenuclear field.” See Yalcin Sanalan, “Turkiye AtomEnerjisi Kurumu’nun Nukleer EnerjiUretimindeki Yeri” (The Role of TAEA in theDevelopment Nuclear Energy), UluslararasiNukleer Teknoloji Kurultayi (InternationalNuclear Technology Forum), October 12-15,1993, Ankara Makina Muhendisleri Odasi(Chamber of Mechanical Engineers), Ankara,Publication No: 168 (March 1994), pp. 128-134.22 See “The Chosen Three,” Nuclear Engineer-ing International (December 1983), p. 4.23 For a precise account on this matter, see AhmetKutukcuoglu, “Turkey’s Joint Venture Scheme,”Nuclear Engineering International (March 1986),p. 29.24 “Turkey: AECL Close, KWU Still Running, W-MHI Out,” Nuclear News (February 1985), p. 102.25 Diane Francis, “Bank Risk Share Asked inTurkish Reactor Deal,” The Toronto Star(Toronto), November 13, 1985, p. G1. Source:CNS Nuclear Databases.26 “Candu Sales Hit Problems,” Nuclear Engineer-ing International (October 1986), p. 14.27 Kenan Unlu, “Turks Take Steps to Revive theirNuclear Programme,” p. 16.28 AECL’s statement was made in response to aReuter’s report on October 15, 1986, in whichthe Turkish Minister reportedly said that the dealwas suspended. See “AECL Says That it is StillNegotiating With Turkey,” Nuclear News (No-vember 1986), p. 21.29 Ray Silver, “Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.


Mustafa Kibaroglu

(AECL) is not Conceding Either Turkish orArgentinian Prospects for CANDU Sales,”Nucleonics Week, January 22, 1987, pp. 8-9.30 Ibid.31 “Still Negotiating,” Nuclear Engineering In-ternational (June 1987), p. 38.32 “Canadian Firm Drops Bid to Build NuclearPlant,” Nuclear Developments, February 25,1988, p. 39. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.33 Ibid.34 Ibid.35 “Spokesman Denies Nuclear Sales to Pakistan,”Nuclear Developments, January 28, 1988, p. 95.Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.36 “MP Notes Turkish Nuclear Equipment to Pa-kistan,” Nuclear Developments, April 1, 1988,p. 5. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.37 “U.S. Expert Interviewed in South AsianNuclear Arming,” Nuclear Developments, Sep-tember 2, 1988, pp. 17-19. Source: CNS NuclearDatabases.38 Ibid.39 ENACE is 75 percent owned by ArgentineComision Nacional De Energia Atomica (CNEA)and 25 percent owned by KWU of Germany. SeeRichard Kessler, “Argentina Says Nuclear AccordWith Turkey Sets Stage for Exports,” NucleonicsWeek, May 12, 1988, pp. 8-9.40 “Argentina and U.S. in Co-operation Talks,”Nuclear Engineering International (November1988), p. 3.41 “More Argentine Sales?” Nuclear EngineeringInternational (July 1989), p. 5.42 Richard Kessler, “Argentina Says Nuclear Ac-cord With Turkey ...,” pp. 8-9.43 Ibid.44 Ibid.45 “Agreement Signed to Build Carem,” NuclearEngineering International (December 1990), p.8. Also see Richard Kessler, “Argentina and Tur-key to Form Nuclear A/E to Build a Small PWRs,”Nucleonics Week, October 25, 1990, pp. 12-13.For more on this issue see “Nuclear Pact WithArgentina ‘Secretly Signed’,” Nuclear Develop-ments, November 15, 1990, pp. 29-30. Source:CNS Nuclear Databases.46 “Reactor Venture Entered With Turkey,”Nuclear News (December 1990), p. 46.47 It was reported that Saracho made a significantcontribution to the signing on May 3, 1988 of anuclear technology cooperation agreement.Saracho was quoted as saying that “Argentina’sobjective [was] to help Turkey develop itsnuclear technology without depending on anycountry or bloc, and hope[d] to help Turkeybuild reactors and nuclear power plants in thefuture.” See “Argentina to Help Acquire‘Nuclear Technology’,” Nuclear Develop-ments, June 21, 1988, p. 39. Source: CNSNuclear Databases.48 Ibid.49 “Nuclear Pact With Argentina ‘SecretlySigned’,” Nuclear Developments, November 15,1990, pp. 29-30. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.50 “‘Secret Talks’ With Argentina on NuclearPlant,” Nuclear Developments, October 6, 1989,pp. 31-32. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.

51 Author’s e-mail correspondences with Pro-fessor Yalcin Sanalan, Department of NuclearEngineering, Hacettepe University, Ankara,February/March 1997.52 For details, see Dogan Oner (former DeputyDirector of Turkish Atomic Energy Author-ity), “Turkiye’nin Nukleer Enerji SantralleriKonusunda Ileriye Donuk Politikalari NeOlmalidir” (What Should be Turkey’s ForwardLooking Policies About Nuclear Power Plants?),Karayollari Vakfi Dergisi (Journal of HighwayFoundation) (April 1991), p. 19.53 John Glenn, “This Country Encouraged theSpread of Nuclear Weapons,” The WashingtonPost, June 24, 1992, p. A19.54 Ibid.55 Ibid.56 “Turkey: Reports of Nuclear Transfer to Paki-stan Denied,” Proliferation Issues, July 10, 1992,p. 29. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.57 Unlike many other Greek-origin publications,Dr. Thanos Dokos was kind enough to use thewords “alleged” and “unconfirmed” regardinga Turkish-Pakistani connection. But still, thefear of such a connection apparently is keenlyfelt in Athens. Dr. Dokos expressed his viewsnot in his official capacity but in a recent schol-arly work. See, Thanos Dokos, “Greece,” inHarald Muller, ed., Nuclear Export Controls inEurope (Brussels: European InteruniversityPress, 1995), p. 208.58 See I Kathimerini (Athens), December, 29,1991, p. 1. Cited in “Turkey Reportedly SeekingSoviet Nuclear Warheads,” Proliferation Issues,January 31, 1992, p. 61. Source: CNS NuclearDatabases.59 “Ministry Denies Trying to Get Nuclear Tech-nology,” Proliferation Issues, January 31,1992, p. 67. Source: CNS Nuclear Databases.60 It is interesting but not surprising to notethat, behind the allegations about a Turkish-Pakistani connection are, in most cases,sources from Greece and India, both of whichare adversaries of one of the parties accusedfor being in illicit collaboration.61 “Turkish Plant: Bids in 1995,” Nuclear Engi-neering International (January 1995), pp. 6-7.62 TEAS said KAERI’s bid was the most compre-hensive and, at $350,000, the lowest it received.“Korea Prepares for Turkish Bid,” Nuclear Engi-neering International (March 1995), p. 5.63 Mark Hibbs, “Turkey Expected to Request Bidsfor PWR Project in Coming Weeks,” Nucle-onics Week, March 21, 1996, pp. 1-2.64 “Turkey Extends Nuclear Bid Enquiry Pe-riod,” Anatolia News Agency (Ankara), Janu-ary 21, 1997.65 Suna Erdem, “Turkey Signs $13.5 Billion DealWith Gazprom,” Reuter, April 28, 1997.66 Importing expertise in these areas which areless controversial than nuclear technology can bea feasible short-term measure.67 Turkey has other fresh water resources in theBlack Sea region. However, the mountainous to-pography of the region hardly allows construc-tion of hydroelectric plants.68 Whereas Turkey suggests “allocation” of the

waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, to-tal of 1,000 cubic meters per second (m3/sec)originating mainly (approximately 95 percent)from its territory, Syria and Iraq insist on a“sharing” agreement for at least a “guaran-teed” 500 m3/sec amount per country. For ascholarly assessment of the stance of the par-ties to the water dispute, as well as prospectsfor peaceful solutions that are rarely mentionedin international political sphere, see AysegulKibaroglu, “Prospects for Co-operation in theEuphrates-Tigris River Basin,” in PeterHowsam and Richard C. Carter, eds., WaterPolicy: Allocation and Management in Prac-tice (London: E & FN Spon, 1996), pp. 31-38.For more comprehensive studies on this topicsee John F. Kolars and William A. Mitchell,The Euphrates River and the SoutheastAnatolia Development Project, Water: TheMiddle East Imperative (Carbondale: South-ern Illinois University Press, 1991); NuritKliot, Water Resources and Conflict in theMiddle East (London: Routledge Press, 1994);Thomas Naff and Ruth C. Matson, Water inthe Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984);Natasha Beschorner, “Water and Instability inthe Middle East,” Adelphi Paper, No. 273(1993); Pritt J. Vesilind, “Water: the MiddleEast’s Critical Resource,” National Geographic(May 1993).69 The two downstream riparians followed a simi-lar strategy against the 672 MW Birecik damproject near Gaziantep on the Euphrates whichwill generate 2.5 TWh electricity. Moreover, theIraqi embassy in Ankara gave a note to theTurkish Foreign Ministry on March 17, 1993,and Syria also gave a note to this effect to theTurkish embassy in Damascus on July 18, 1993.See, the website of Turkish Ministry of For-eign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.tr). Despiteall contentious efforts, a consortium of firmsfrom Turkey, Austria, Belgium, and France thatundertook the construction of the dam hasreportedly secured a $1.3 billion syndicatedloan from 44 banks of 10 countries signed inNovember 1995, after a decade of delibera-tions. See “Turkish BOT Projects EmergeDespite Political Uncertainties,” InternationalTrade Finance, January 19, 1996, via NewsNet(http://www.newsnet.com).70 For an account on this issue, see Robert Olson,“The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkeyversus Russia Since the Gulf War,” Middle EastPolicy 4 (March 1996), pp. 106-118.71 Finally, on April 28,1997, Turkey signed alandmark agreement with Russia’s gas giantGazprom for $13.5 billion worth of naturalgas over 25 years, starting in 1997. Ministerof Energy Recai Kutan told attendees at thesigning ceremony that Turkey’s gas need wouldshoot up to 27 billion cubic meters (bcm) an-nually by the year 2000, and to 60 bcm by2010. See Suna Erdem, “Turkey Signs $13.5Billion Deal With Gazprom,” Reuter, April28, 1997.72 See Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Impact of the North-

Mustafa Kibaroglu


ern Tier on the Middle East: A Rejoinder,”Security Dialogue 27 (September 1996), pp.319-324.73 In May 1993, the Clinton administrationadopted the policy of “dual containment” to iso-late Iran together with Iraq from the world, as itdid towards the latter for five years, in order tocurb their ambitions to develop weapons ofmass destruction. Accordingly, the United Statesuses its political weight to persuade Russia,China, and its Western allies to refrain fromgetting into relationships with these “rogue”states that would help them acquire the weap-ons-related know-how and economic power toenable them finance weapons programs. TheU.S.-Iran confrontation has its roots in the“hostage crisis” in the U.S. embassy in Tehranin 1979. Iran’s support of international ter-rorism and its efforts to revitalize the Bushehrnuclear reactors site with Russian assistancefurther exacerbated tensions.74 See the website of TAEA (http://www.nukleer.gov.tr).75 See Dogan Oner, “Turkiye’nin Nukleer EnerjiSantralleri Konusunda Ileriye Donuk PolitikalariNe Olmalidir,” pp. 18-24.76 Presumably KAERI is hired by TEAS to con-duct such a study, at least in part. Turkish sci-entists, scholars, engineers, and technicians aswell as politicians should become much moreheavily involved in such studies.77 Membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) requires a unanimous “yes” vote of its ex-isting members, including Greece. Ironically,Greece may warmly welcome Turkey’s applica-tion to NSG, unlike its robust opposition toTurkey’s European Union membership.78 Export control laws cover a long list of dual-use materials which are used in civilian goodsmanufacturing. Restrictions (or at least delayscaused by intrusive inspections) on the import orexport of these materials may have uneconomiceffects on the manufacturing process.

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