KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: PART III THE THE MENACE

Intrigue in the Kremlin brings down the chief of secret police

Articles prepared for LIFE by Gene Farmer and Jerrold Scheoter

At Stalin's funeral on March 9, 1953 the leading pallbearers (Malenkov, left; Be-ria at extreme right) were in temporary command. Behind Malenkov: Stalin's son Vasili, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich and Nikolai Shvernik. then Chairman of the Presidium (President). Khrushchev. also a pallbearer. is hidden behind casket.

54

DEATH OF STALIN, OF BERIA

The most powerful personality during Sta-lin's last years was the secret police chief, La-vrenti P. Beria, who came to look more and more like the take-over man after Stalin's death. A fellow Georgian, Beria was about 32 when Stalin in 1931 named him head of the Party organization in Transcaucasia. Four years later Pravda prominently serialized a

_ .:kkistc.y" of prr-Revohni6rwry.Be-Ishevism, written by Beria; it was actually a prepos-terously fawning biography of Stalin. When Stalin wanted a new secret police chief to wind up the purges of the 1930s, he brought Beria to Moscow. In December 1938, Beria took full command of the police apparatus he was to control for nearly 15 years. It was Beria who institutionalized the terror and the concentration camps, and it was Beria who presided over the mass deportations. He was named to the Politburo in 1946—the only secret police chief ever admitted as a full member. Khrushchev's account of Be-ria's arrest, which is published in this is-sue, is likely to became the definitive one.

A last look at Beria: bidding for power, the infamous police chief is shown in a picture taken about the time Stalin died.

eria and I started to see each other frequently at Stalin's. At first liked him. We had friendly chats and even joked together quite a bit,

but gradually his political complexion came clearly into focus. I was shocked by his sinister, two-faced hypocrisy. Soon after Beria arrived in Moscow [in 1938], the atmosphere in Stalin's inner circle took on an entirely different char-acter. Stalin once confided to me his own unhappiness pith Beria's influence: "Before Beria arrived, dinner meetings used to be relaxed, productive affairs. Now he's always challenging people to drinking contests, and people are getting drunk all over the place."

Even though I agreed with Stalin, I knew I had to watch my step in an-swering him. One of Stalin's favorite tricks was to provoke you into making a statement—or even agreeing with a statement—which showed your true feel-ings about someone else. It was perfectly clear that Stalin and Beria were very close. Anyone who wanted to be sure of staying in Stalin's good graces had to fawn all over Beria too. I must say I never saw any of this debasing obse-quiousness on Molotov's part. Nor did I ever kowtow to Beria myself, and as

CONTINUED

This excerpt has been adapted for LIFE from the forthcoming book "Khrushcher Remembers," to be pub-lished in the United States and Canada by Lhtle, Brown and Company in December t970. The book was translotedand edited by Strobe Talbott and carries an introduction and commentary by Edward Crankshaw.

C.01,RIORT 0 100. LITTLE. •ROWN ANC COMPANY. ICC.

55

in direct proportion to his power'

Lying in state in Hall of Columns, Stalin's bier was flatdceclbyold_lieu, _ tenants already locked in a war of succession. Left to right: Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, Malenkov, Bul-pnin, Khrushchev, Kaganovich and Mikoyan. Conspicuously missing are Aleksei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev, present rulers.

On the day of Stalin's funeral Mus-covites turned out by the thou-sands to My/ spectacular gosal tributes piled on wall of the Krem-lin, where Soviet heroes are buried. The spire at left center is St. Basil's Cathedral, between GUM depart-ment store and Lenin Mausoleum.

CONTINUED

a result I often had to contend with Beria working against me. Beria was -fiercely-jealous of his power and influence over Sta-

lin. Stalin's brother-in-law, [Stanislav] Redens, had once been Beria's deputy in Georgia. Before Beria himself was transferred to Moscow, he decided to have Redens bounced out of Geor-gia. Why? So that Stalin would have no informer in Georgia other than Beria himself. He instructed his men to lure Redens into a café, where they got him drunk and threw him out into a gutter. Beria saw to it that Stalin found out Redens had dis-credited himself.

You see what sort of provocateur Beria was? Many years lat-er, after Beria's downfall, the Central Committee received a long letter from a Georgian ex-convict enumerating all the people in Georgia who had been victims of similar provocations.

Beria's arrogance and his treachery grew in direct proportion to his increasingly powerful position. A fravonte remark of his kept running through my mind: "Listen, let me have him for one night, and I'll have him confessing he's the King of England."

As Stalin lost control and even lost his will during the period of our retreat from the Germans [1941], Beria became the terror of the Party. His growing influence was obvious to me from the composition of Stalin's entourage. When I returned to Moscow from the Ukrainian front, 1 noticed that Stalin was surrounded by Georgians. There was a Caucasian chef who made shashlik for Stalin. He had been made a major general. Every time I came to Moscow I saw this chef had more and more ribbons and medals, apparently in recognition of his skill at cooking shashlik. Once Stalin caught me staring at the chef's ribbons and medals and scowled at me. He knew what I was thinking, and I knew what he was thinking, but neither of us said any-thing. Everyone felt that having this chef around in his uniform was downright offensive, but we never mentioned it because it wouldn't have done any good.

In addition to the major general chef there was a Georgian in charge of supplying wine, lamb for shashlik and various other provisions for Stalin's kitchen. He was made a lieutenant gen-eral. Whenever I came back from the front I noticed he too had been awarded one or more decorations in my absence. I remem-ber that once Stalin gave me a dressing down in front of this lieu-tenant general in charge of provisions. He had gotten drunk with Stalin and the rest of us. Nobody knew him, yet we were sup-posed to talk intimately and freely in his company.

After the war, when Beria became a member of the Polit-buro, Stalin himself started to fear him. I didn't know at the time what the roots of this fear were, but later, when Beria's ma-chinery for eliminating people was uncovered, it all became clear. Stalin realized that if Beria could eliminate anyone at whom Stalin pointed his finger, then Beria could also eliminate

someone of his own choosing. I first began to realize the intensity of Stalin's fear one day

when I was at Stalin's for dinner. All of a sudden he looked around him and asked angrily, "Why am I surrounded by Georgians?"

Beria was immediately on his guard and said, "Comrade CONTINUED

57

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KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

CONTINUED Stalin, these people are your faithful servants; they're all devoted to you."

Stalin became indignant: "Does that mean Russians are un-faithful? Does that mean Russians aren't devoted to me?"

"No," answered Beria, "I didn't say that. But the people who have been selected here are all loyal servants."

Stalin shouted, "I don't need their loyalty! Clear these people out of here!" The Georgians—including the shashlik cook and the provisions officer—were immediately whisked away, and Beria shuffled out of the room like a man who had been beaten up.

Once he had thrown out all the Georgian help and replaced them with Russians, Stalin probably believed he had closed off Be-ria's access to his kitchen through his entourage. However, Stalin was getting old. He didn't understand what was happening. Beria still did control Stalin's entourage, even after the Georgian service personnel had been thrown out. Berta had worked in the Clicks [se-cret police] for a long time, and all the Chekists were known to him. They were all trying to get in Beria's good graces, and it was easy for him to use these people for his own aims. Therefore Stalin couldn't even trust his Chekist bodyguard.

Beria's arrogance grew and grew. He was able—and I was as-tonished that Stalin stood for it—to make some point over dinner

The Leningrad Affair: 'Kosygin's

Until Khrushchev's 20th Party Congress secret speech in 1956, the Len-ingrad Affair was never mentioned officially in the Soviet Union. All the outer world knew was that after the sudden death in 1948 of Andrei Zhda-nor, the former Party chieftain in Leningrad and once Stalin's likeliest heir, there was a vicious purge of Zhdanov's supporters in Leningrad and elsewhere. Malenkor and Beria, working in tandem and supported by Sta• lin, sought to destroy their rivals in the Leningrad Party apparatus. At the end of 1949, Stalin brought Khrushchev back from the Ukraine and in-stalled him in Moscow in his old job as First Secretary of the Moscow City and Regional Party Committees.

After taking up my job in Moscow I could see that my arrival on the scene got in the way of Beria'sand Malenkov's plans. I even began to sus-

- pricrfhill OW& the reifflffs'Stifl irtfiff Called rna biakIff•Mesdow was -- to influence the balance of power and to put a check on Berk and Ma-lenkov. It seemed that Stalin would have been glad to get rid of Beria but didn't know how to do it. Stalin never told me this, but I could sense it.

Stalin certainly treated me well. Even though he frequently criticized me, he gave me support when I needed it. I was constantly running up against Beria and Malenkov. Malenkov had become a member of the Po-litburo after the war. Essentially he was a typical office clerk and paper-pusher. Such men can be the most dangerous of all if given any power. They'll freeze and kill anything that's alive if it oversteps its boundaries.

Meanwhile the hunt was on in Leningrad. I don't know how Stalin real-ly felt about the Leningrad case. He never spoke to me about it except when he touched on the matter of the "Moscow conspirators" in con-nection with my transfer from the Ukraine. By the time I started work-ing as the Central Committee Secretary responsible for the Moscow organization, A. A. Kuznetsov [Zhdanov's top man in Leningrad] had already beerrarreated, arid the-Leningad-Party organized.. was being torn to shreds. The campaign was concentrated against a troika of prom-ising young men—Kuznetsov, Voznesensky and Kosygin.

Before the whole Leningrad Affair started, Stalin had nourished high hopes for that troika of bright young men and in fact had been systematically promoting them. Voznesensky was often entrusted with the job of presiding over the Council of Ministers. Kosygin [Aleksei Kosygin, now Soviet Premier] had been given a responsible

58

and then, if Stalin rejected it, Beria would slap down someone else

who tried to make the same point later in the meal. "I've already

told you," Beria would say. "This question needn't be raised." Sta-

lin wouldn't say anything. even though lied heard_with his own

ears that it had been Berle himself who had raised the question in

the first place. You couldn't even report to Stalin without getting Beria's sup-

port in advance; if you made a report to Stalin in Beria's presence

and if you hadn't cleared it with him beforehand, he would be

sure to tear your report down in Stalin's eyes with all sorts of ques-

tions and contradictions.

Stalin used to joke over dinner about Beria and [Georgi] Ma-

lenkov as "those two rogues." I watched with great interest as

their "friendship" developed. I could see Berta neither liked nor re-

spected Malenkov [who in the Politburo appeared to rank second

only to Stalin]. Buie once said to me something like the follow-

ing: "Listen, about this spineless fellow Malenkov. He's nothing

but a billygoat. He'll bolt if you don't hold him on a leash. But he

may come in handy:'

Once Malenkov and I were together at Stalin's vacation home

in Sochi. We went for a walk together and I said to him, "I'm sur-

prised you don't realize what Beria's attitude is toward you. Don't CONTINUED

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post in charge of trade and finance. I more or less knew Kuznetsov, and I knew Yoznesensky wry welt

Vozneaensky still hadn't been arrested when I arrived in Moscow, but he was out of work and was expecting them to come for him any day. [This was the state planner N. A. Yoznesensky, not the well-known poet.]

It's my opinion that the downfall of these three men was determined by precisely this fact: Stalin had been preparing them as successors to the Kremlin old guard—Beria first and foremost, then Malenkov, Mo-lotov and Mikoyan.

It's difficult for me to say exactly how the old guard managed to un-dermine Stalin's confidence in these young men and how he was, to put it crudely, sicced on them. I can only offer the conclusions which I reached on the basis of my own observations: that Berk and Malenkov were doing everything they could to wreck the troika of Kuznetsov, Yon-nesensky and Kosygin, and that Beria was the most accomplished at un-dermining Stalin's confidence in others. Beria had Malenkov to use as a battering ram.

1 assume that the charges against Kuznetsov's group were Russian na-tionalism and opposition to the Central Committee. The investigation began. And who directed the investigation? Stalin himself did. But if Sta-lin was the conductor, then Beria was the first violinist

I was never really in on the cue myself, but I admit that I may have signed the sentencing order. In those days when a case was dosed—and if Stalin thought it necessary—he would sign the sentencing order at a Po-litburo session and then pass it around for the rest of us to sign. We would put our signatures on it without even looking at it. That's what was meant by "collective sentencing."

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KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

Cronies in the 1930s, Voroshilov (left) and Beria are shown in a previously unpublished picture. When Khrushchev began lining up the votes to "eliminate" Se-rie after Stalin's death in 1953, Voroshilov was Chairman of the Presidium. At first he seemed to hesitate, but then he cast a vote that was absolutely neces-sary if others were to go along.

`Our world turned into an asylum'

CONTINUED

you see what it is?" He was silent. "You think he respects you? I think he mocks you."

Finally Malenkov answered, "Yes, of course, I see. But what can I do?"

"What can yotrOir I wtiUld insl. like you to-understand. ICs true, right now you can't do anything. But the time will come."

In late 1952 Stalin had only a few months to live, but he still had one monstrous judicial fabrication left: the weird "Doctors' Plot." It led to arrest of the Kremlin doctors in January 1953 for mis-handling the illness of Andrei Zhdanov, who had died in 1948, and it is sometimes confused with the Leningrad Affair (see box), since the ghost of Zhdanov was in the background of both. The larger purposes of the Doctors' Plot are still obscure, but it appears to have been a preliminary move in what was intended to become Sta-lin's last great purge, aimed at Malenkov, Beria and many others —including, possibly, Khrushchev himself.

One day Stalin read us a letter from a woman doctor named Ti-mashuk. She claimed that Zhdanov died because the doctors pur-posely administered improper treatment. If Stalin had been a nor-mal person, he wouldn't have given Timashuk's letter a second thought. But Stalin was more than receptive to this sort of liter-ature. Stalin had instilled in the consciousness of us all the sus-picion that we were surrounded by enemies and that we should try

to find an unexposed traitor or saboteur in everyone. Stalin called this "vigilance" and used to say that if there were 10% truth in a report, we should regard the entire report as fact. Stalin's version of vigilance turned our world into an insane asylum in which ev-eryone was eneburaged to search for nonexistent facts about ev-eryone else. Son was turned against father, father against son, and comrade against comrade. The irrational policies of a sick man ter-rorized us all.

I should mention that Zhdanov had been treated by Kremlin phy-sicians. Before his death, Zhdanov had been in poor health for some time. One of his ailments was that he had lost his willpower and wasn't able to control himself when it came to drinking. In the last days of Zhdanov's life Stalin used to shout at him to stop drinking. This was an astounding thing because Stalin usually encouraged people to get drunk. But he compelled Zhdanov to drink fruit juice while the rest of us were drinking wine or something stronger.

Anyway, the doctors connected with Zhdanov's case were ar-rested. Among them was V. N. Vinogradov. He had once treated Stalin, which was a rare distinction because Stalin almost never let doctors treat him. But Stalin had Vinogradov arrested and beaten. They also arrested V. K. Vasilenko, a reputable physician and pro-fessor. Vasilenko was in China when the arrests started. He was called home, and the minute he stepped across the Soviet border he was thrown in chains.

I remember after I made try :" -7: on the Party Statutes to the CONTINUED ON PACE 59F 508

ICHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

`Something has happened to Stalin'

Marshal Voroshilov, shown bending Khrushchev's ear in 1949, is described by Khrushehev as an incompetent war ad-

, ministrator (Live, Dec. 4) but a most use-ful ally in the plot to overthrow Baia.

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19th Party Congress [1952], I fell ill. I couldn't leave home when my report was being discussed at the Congress. An elderly doctor came to examine me. I was touched by his thoughtfulness and care. I felt terrible, but not because I was sick. I was tormented be-cause I had already read the testimonies against this old doctor, whose concern for my health I found so touching, and I knew that

no matter what I said Stalin wouldn't spare him. Stalin circulated copies of Timashuk's letter with his own post-

script in which he invoked the anger of the masses against the doc-

tors who had "committed such villainry" by doing away with Zhda-nov. More letters started pouring in branding the doctors as trai-

tors. [Marshal Ivan] Konev, himself a sick man at the time, sent a long letter to Stalin in which he claimed that he too was being poi-

soned with the same medicines which had allegedly been used to do in Zhdanov. Apparently all the members of the Presidium sensed

the lack of substance in Konev's accusation, but we never dis-cussed it openly. Once Stalin had made up his mind, there wasn't

anything to do. The interrogations began. I myself heard how Stalin talked to

S. D. Ignatiev, who was then Minister of State Security. I knew Ig-

natiev personally, and I knew that he was a very sick man. Stalin

used to berate him viciously over the phone. Stalin was crazy with rage, yelling at Ignatiev and threatening him, demanding that he

throw the doctors in chains, beat them to a pulp and grind them into powder. It was no surprise when almost all the doctors con-

fessed to their crimes. It was a shameful business. After the crushing of the enemy in

World War II, suddenly our intelligentsia—or at least the doctors in its midst—fell subject to Stalin's suspicion. The doctors' case

was a cruel and contemptible thing.

On Wednisday, March 4, /953, Radio Moscow announced that Sta-lin had been stricken with a cerebral hemorrhage. Two days later, about four o'clock in the morning, came the announcement that Stalin was dead. Khrushchev's account of this momentous event and its aftermath is probably the most detailed that we will ever read.

Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin and I had been at the dacha with Sta-

lin on a Saturday night [Feb. 28] after watching a movie at the Kremlin. As usual, dinner lasted until five or six o'clock in the morning. Stalin was pretty drunk. He was jabbing me playfully in the stomach and calling me "Nikita" with a Ukritinian accent, which he always did when he was in a good mood. Dinners at Sta-

ditin't always intro% Such a plettianfitati. On Sunday evening, expecting his call at any moment, I delayed

dinner at home. Finally I had something to eat. It was very late

when I undressed and got into bed. Suddenly the telephone rang. It was Malenkov: "Listen, the

Cheka boys have just called from Stalin's dacha. They think some-thing has happened to him. We'd better get over there. I've al-ready notified Berta and Bulganin."

It took 15 minutes to get there. We stopped to see the duty of-ficers. They explained: "Comrade Stalin almost always calls some-one and asks for tea or something to eat at 11 o'clock. Tonight he

didn't." The Chekists sent Matryona Petrovna to check up. An aging maid, she wasn't very bright, but she was honest and de-

voted to Stalin. She came back and told the Chekists that Stalin

was lying.asleep on the *Mettle large room where he usually slept. Apparently Stalin had gotten out of bed and fallen. The Chek-ists lifted him off the floor and laid him on a sofa in the small din-

ing room next door. We separated and all went home. Later that night there was an-

other call from Malenkov. "The boys have called again," he said. "They say that something is definitely wrong with him. We'd bet-

ter go back." We arranged for Malenkov to call Voroshilov and CONTINUED

CONTINUED

Kaganovich, who hadn't been at dinner the night before. [All were members of the "inner Presidium" of nine men.] We arranged for doctors to come too. Among them I remember Professor [P. E.] Lu-komsky. Shaking nervously, he touched Stalin's hand as though it were a hot iron. Beria said gruffly, "You're a doctor, aren't you? Go ahead and take hold of his hand properly."

Lukomsky said Stalin's right arm wouldn't move. His left leg was also paralyzed. His condition was grave. They undressed him and moved him back into the large room where be usually slept.

We arranged our own round-the-clock vigil among the Presid-

ium bureau members. Beria and Malenkov were on together; Ka-ganovich and Voroshilov; and Bulganin and I. The doctors told us that Stalin might live, but he wouldn't be able to work again, that usually illnesses like this don't last long and end fatally.

While the doctors were taking a urine sample, I noticed Stalin tried to cover himself. He must have felt the discomfort. Once he ac-tually returned to consciousness. His face started to move. They had been spoon-feeding him soup and sweet tea. He raised his left hand and started to point to something on the wall. There was a pic-ture hanging on the wall, a clipping from the magazine Ogonyok. It was a reproduction of a painting of a little girl feeding a lamb from a horn. Stalin was trying to say, "I'm in the same position as that lamb."

He began to shake hands with us one by one—with his left hand, because his right wouldn't move.

Beria had started spewing hatred against Stalin and mocking him. It was simply unbearable to listen to Beria. But as soon as Sta-lin showed these signs of consciousness and made us think he might recover, Beds threw himself on his knees, seized Stalin's hand and started kissing it. When Stalin lost consciousness again and closed his eyes, Beria stood up and spat.

I was more candid with Bulganin than with the others. I told him, "Stalin's not going to pull through. You know what kind of situation we're going to find ourselves in when Stalin passes away? You know what post Berle will take for himself? He'll try to make himself Minister of State Security. We can't let him do this. It will be the beginning of the end for us."

Bulganin said he agreed with me. I said, "I'll talk to Malenkov. I think he will see it our way. If we don't do something and do it right away, it will mean disaster for the Party. Beria could turn back the clock to 1937-38--and he could do worse."

Our watch ended and I went home. No sooner had I lain down CONTINUED

KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

Berk and Maknkov tried to take over after Stalin died. Mikoyan (right) was person-ally close to Beria and, ac-cording to Khrushchev, was lone voice raised in Beria's de-fense when he was arrested.

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KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

`Stop it! Can't you see the man is dead?'

CONTINUED

than the telephone rang. It was Malenkov: "Come quickly. Stalin has had a setback."

I found that Stalin was indeed in a very bad way. The doctors told us that he was dying and that we were watching his death throes. Suddenly he stopped breathing. A huge man came from somewhere and started giving him artificial respiration, massaging him to get him breathing again. It was painful for me to watch. I said, "Listen! Stop it, please! Can't you see the man is dead?" They gave up. It was true—Stalin was dead.

The moment Stalin died, Beria got in his car and drove off.

Beria was hurrying to take control of the security forces and put him-self in the strongest possible position. He was bidding for supreme power. So was Malenkov, who emerged for a time as Stalin's nom-inal successor with Beria second in the hierarchy. But Khrushchev by now had also set his sights very high.

As soon as Stalin died, Beria was radiant. To put it crudely, he had a housewarming over Stalin's corpse before it was even put in its coffin. Beria was sure that no power on earth could hold him back now. You could see these triumphant thoughts in his face as he drove off to the city, leaving us at the dacha.

I knew that Malenkov was just an errand boy. Stalin used to say, "This Malenkov is a good clerk. He can write out a reso-lution quickly, but he has no capacity for independent thought." Malenkov was sure to "come in handy" for Beria's plans.

Malenkov paced up and down nervously. I decided to have a talk with him then and there. I went over and said, "I want to talk to you."

"What about?" he asked coldly. "Now that Stalin is dead, we have something to discuss. What

do we do now?" "What's there to talk about? We'll all get together and then

we'll talk-7.140°k this to mean that Malenkov-had already talked things over with Beria. I already sensed that Beria would start boss-ing everyone around. He was a butcher and an assassin.

When the meeting was convened, Beria immediately proposed Malenkov for Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Malenkov proposed that Beria be appointed his first deputy. He also pro-posed the merger of two ministries into a single Ministry of In-ternal Affairs with Beria as Minister. I was silent. Bulganin was silent, too. If Bulganin and I had objected, we would have been ac-cused of starting a fight before the corpse was cold. Things were moving in the direction I had feared.

Molotov and Kaganovich were nominated to be First Deputy Prime Ministers. Voroshilov was nominated to be Chairman of the Presidium. Beria was trying to make Voroshilov into someone whom he could rely on when he started his next round of butch-

- cry. Then Bella proposed thati be released from my duties as Sec- retary of the Moscow [Party] Committee so that I could concen-trate on my work in the Central Committee secretariat. Then we decided on how best to announce Stalin's death.

During and right after the funeral Beria was attentive and re-spectful to Me, which surprised me. Beria and Malenkov start-ed including me in their strolls around the Kremlin grounds. It was Beria's Asiatic cunning coming into play. I knew that

CONTINUED

CONTINUED

Beria was toying with me and trying to put me off my guard.

We had liquidated the large Presidium and the small [inner] bu-

reau which Stalin had set up. We had reverted to a narrow circle

of about II people. Then came the first clash. Beria made the fol-

lowing proposal: "Since many prison and exile terms are coming

to an end and all these former convicts and exiles will be returning

to their homes, I propose that we pass a resolution not allowing

any of them to return without special permission from the Min-

istry of Internal Affairs." —

I got angry and spoke against him: "I categorically object. We've

already had this sort of thing in the past. These convicts and exiles

you're talking about were arrested, interrogated, tried and sen-

tenced by State Security troikas. They were never given the benefit

of witnesses, prosecutors or judge. You're saying that those peo-

ple should again be deprived of all their rights. This is totally

unacceptable." The others supported me. Beria shrewdly withdrew his propos-

al, and since Malenkov was taking the minutes, the motion was

never recorded. Later Beria introduced what seemed to be a lib-

eral motion; he suggested lowering the maximum prison term from

20 to 10 years. I said, "I'm categorically opposed to this too. You

can always sentence someone to 10 years and then another 10 years,

right up until he dies." Once again Beria withdrew his motion.

And what was this scoundrel Beria's next move? One day we

were walking together—Beria, Malenkov and I--and Beria began

to develop the following idea: "We're not getting any younger.

AnYthirig could happen to any one of us, and we would leave our

families behind. I'd like to propose that the government build da-

chas which it would then turn over to the leaders of the country

for their personal use. I propose building these dachas in Sukhumi

[on the Black Sea coast]. We could clear the center of the city and

turn it into a park with peach trees." We returned to our cars. Once we were alone I said to Ma-

lenkov, "Listen, what do you think about this idea of Beria's? It's

the most blatant provocation." "Why do you think so?"

CONTINUED

The secret- speech: Khrushchev's version When Khrushchev denounced Stalin in his sensational

secret speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956, he had great poser but had not yet emerged supreme in

his struggle to eclipse Malenkov. The speech was a

20,000-word document, packed with detail. Its sub-

stance apparently was drawn from a report on Stalin-

ist repressions prepared—at Khrushchev's urging, ac-

cording to him—by P. N. Pospelov, a dogmatic Party

ideologist and a former editor of Pravda. But Khru-

shchev's decision to deliver the speech was a highly personal one. Ile had been forced into an exposed position

by hostile colleagues, especially Malenkov, and he must

have determined to turn the tables on them by sheer

boldness. ft was a gamble that paid off brilliantly.

Frr three years we were unable to break with the past, unable to muster the courage to lift the curtain

and see what had been hidden from us. We couldn't imagine that all those executions during the purges were, from a legal standpoint, crimes themselves. But it was true. Criminal acts had been committed by Sta-lin, acts which would be punishable in any state ex-cept fascist states like Hitler's.

I first sensed the falsity of our position when we went to Yugoslavia and talked with Tito in 1955. When we mentioned Berk as the culprit behind the crimes of the Stalin period, the Yugoslav comrades smiled scornfully and made sarcastic remarks. We launched into a long argument in defense of Stalin. It's now clear that my position was wrong.

I didn't want to give the general report at the 20th Party Congress. As the senior member among us, Molotov had the best credentials. But he and every-one else agreed that I should give the report. I pre-pared a draft and submitted it for approval.

The Congress opened. I delivered the report and discussion started. I would say the Congress was go-ing well.

I wasn't satisfied. I was tormented by the thought: "The Congress will end, but then what? Hundreds of thousands of people shot will stay on our conscienc-es." Finally, when only the members of the Presid-ium were in the room, I brought the whole matter up: "What are we going to do about Comrade Pos-pelov's findings? The Congress is coming to a close, and we'll all disperse without having said a single word about the abuses under Stalin. We can't keep people in exile or in the camps any longer."

Everyone started attacking me, especially Voroshi-

lov: "What's the matter with you? You think you can bring all this out and get away with it? What will we be able to say about our own roles under Stalin?" Kaganovich chimed in. He was arguing against me out of a selfish fear for his own hide.

I answered as calmly as I could: "I still think it's im-possible to cover everything up. Sooner or later peo-ple will return to the cities. They'll tell their relatives and everyone back home what happened—end all for what? For nothing! How can we pretend not to know what happened?"

Once again the reaction was stormy. Voroshilov and Kaganovich repeated as though in one voice, "We'll be taken to task! Even if we didn't know what was happening, we'll still be made to pay!"

I mplied, "Some of us didn't know many things be-cause we were part of a regime in which you were told what you were supposed to know and you kept your nose out of everything else. I'm prepared, as a member of the Central Committee since the 17th Con-gress [in 1934], to bear my share of the responsibility —even if the Party should see fit to bring to task all those who were in the leadership under Stalin."

This time Molotov objected. Voroahilov kept say-ing, "Who's asking us to do this? Who says we have to tell the Congress these things?"

I saw that it would be impossible to get the Pre-sidium to reach a decision. I decided to try the fol-lowing device: "Now that the general report has been given, I remind you that every Presidium member has the right to speak at the Congress and to express his own point of view." I didn't need to tell them that I was prepared to make a speech myself. I added: "If we are going to make a clean breast of the abuses com-mitted by Stalin, then we must do so now. The 21st Congress will be too late, even if we get that far with-out being brought to task."

Someone took the initiative and said, "All right, if that's where we stand, someone had better make a speech about Stalin's abuses."

That left the question of who should deliver the speech. I suggested Pospelov. The others objected. They said I should make the speech: "If Pospelov do-livers the speech it will make people wonder, 'Why didn't Khrushchev say anything about this business in his general report?' It could contribute to the im-pression of dissension in the leadership."

Finally I gave in. Pospelov was instructed to adapt his report into a speech. We arranged for a

special closed session, and I delivered my speech. The delegates listened in absolute silence. It was so

quiet in the huge hall you could hear a fly buzzing. You must try to imagine how shocked people were by the revelations of the atrocities to which Party members had been subjected. This was the first thing that most of them had heard of the tragedy which our Party had undergone—a tragedy stemming from the sickness in Stalin'TWrie—ter which Lenin had warned us against in his Testament.

And so the 20th Party Congress speech on Stalin's abuses was born. It was supposed to have been so-cret, but in fact it was far from secret. We took mea-sures to make sure that copies of the speech circu-lated to the fraternal Communist Parties. Our doc-ument fell into the hands of some Polish comrades who were hostile toward the Soviet Union. They used my speech for their own purposes and made copies. I was told that it was being sold for very little. So Khru-shchev's speech wasn't worth much!

It would have been easier, perhaps, to continue blaming Sere and to have left the illusion unchal-lenged that Stalin was "the people's father and friend." But one thing is elementary: Beria didn't cre-ate Stalin; Stalin created Beria.

Just before the Congress I summoned Rudenko [the state prosecutor] andasked him: "I'm interest-ed in the open trials [of the 193051. How much basis in actual fact was there for the accusations made against Bukharin, Rykov, Lominadze and many, many other people well known to the Central Com-mittee?" Rudenko answered that from the standpoint ofjudicial norms, there was no evidence for condemn-ing or even trying those men. The case against them had been based on confessions beaten out of them under 0*s-teal and Psychological torture.

Nevertheless, we decided not to say anything about the open trials in my speech. The reason was that there had been representatives of the fraternal Com-munist Parties present when Rykov, Bukharin and other leaders were tried and sentenced. These rep-resentatives had gone home and testified to the jus-tice of the sentences. We didn't want to discredit them, so we indefinitely postponed the rehabilitation of Bu-kharin, Zinoviev, Rykov and the rest.

The decision wr s a mistake. It would have been bet-ter to tell everything. Murder will always out. But do-spite that one mistake, the 20th Party Congress still accomplished a great deal.

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`At last Malenkov agreed: Yes, we must act'

CONTINUED

"Beria's a provocateur. He wants to build these dachas as a prov-ocation and nothing else. Let's not object for a while. He'll think no one knows what he's up to."

So Beria began to put his idea into effect. He ordered plans. He said that the site for Malenkov's dacha had been chosen so that Ma-lenkov would be able to keep an eye on the Turks. Berle joked, "Yegor, you'll be able to see Turkey. You see what a nice house this will be?"

I stayed behind with Malenkov. I said to him, "This is no joke. You still don't see the point? Beria wants to start a sort of po-grom, to throw people out of their homes and tear down their hous-es to build you some kind of palace. Hatred against you will spread. Don't you see? Sere says he's going to have plans drawn up for a dacha of his own, but he won't have it built. He'll build one for you and then use it to discredit you."

This conversation started Malenkov thinking. One day when Beria was showing me the plans, he said again,

"Won't these be lovely houses?" "Yes, very. It's a great idea." "Why don't you take the plans home with you?" So I took them home. Nina Petrovna LKhrushchev's wife] came

across them and asked, "What's this here" I told her and she was furious: "That's a disgraceful idea!"

I couldn't explain, so I said, "We'll talk about it later." I took Malenkov aside and said, "We're heading for disaster.

Beria is sharpening his knives." "Well, what can we do?" "The time has come to resist." "You want me to oppose him all by myself'?" "What makes you think you'll be alone? There's you and me

—that's two. I'm sure Bulganin will agree. I'm sure the others will join us if we put forward our argument from a firm position. The

trouble is that you never give anyone a chance to speak. As soon as Beria introduces a motion, you always jump immediately to sup-port hint. Control yourself. Don't be so jumpy. You'll see you're not the only one who thinks the way you do."

Malenkov finally agreed. I was surprised and delighted. We wrote up the agenda for the next Presidium session and included some is-sues on which the others supported us, and Beria was defeated. This pattern was repeated, and only then did Malenkov become confident that we could use Party methods against Berle. When Beria realized that the others were overriding him, he tried to speed things up. I felt it was time to force a confrontation. At last Ma-lenkov agreed: "Yes, we must act."

To begin with, I would talk to Voroshilov. I went to Voroshilov's of-fice, but I didn't accomplish what I'd come for. I was barely inside when Voroshilov started singing Beria's praises: "What a remark-able man we have! What a remarkable man!" I answered, "Maybe not. Maybe you overestimate him." If I'd said what I wanted to say, I would have puf Voroshilov in a very awkward position. I quickly left to have dinner, as I'd arranged, with Malenkov.

Malenkov and I agreed that I should talk to Molotov, who as Minister of Foreign Affairs had called me earlier asking if we could meet to discuss some matter concerning Foreign Ministry person-nel. I phoned him back: "If you can come over here right away, we'll talk about personnel." He arrived shortly and I said, "Let's talk about personnel, but not Foreign Ministry personnel." 1 gave him my views about Beria's role.

Apparently Molotov had been thinking a lot about this himself. He couldn't help but think about it, since he knew about every-thing that had happened during Stalin's rule.

"Yes," he said, "I agree with you fully. But what is Malenkov's position?"

KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

CONTINUED

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`Beria could easily order our arrest'

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"I am discussing this with you on Malenkov's and Bulganin's behalf."

"You'll have my complete support," Molotov said. "But tell me something else: what do you want to do exactly?"

"First, we have to relieve Beria of his duties." Molotov said that wasn't enough: "Beria's very dangerous. I

think we must, so to say, resort to more extreme measures." "You think we should detain him for investigation?" I said "de-

tain" rather than "arrest" because there were still no criminal charges against Beria. We had only our intuition to go on, and you can't arrest a man on intuition. Molotov and I agreed.

We decided that we'd better speed things up because we might be overheard by "Beria's ears" or someone might let the cat out of the bag. Beria could easily have as all arrested.

Everyone I talked to asked the same question: "What about Ma-lenkov?" At that time Kaganovich was making an inspection tour of the lumber industry. When he returned to Moscow I asked him to stop in at the Central Committee office. I didn't try to interrupt him, althoUgh I had other things than sawmills on my mind. When he finished I said, "What you've told me is all very well. Now I want to tell you about what's going on here."

I told him what conclusions we had reached. Kaganovich pricked up his ears and asked, "Who is 'we'?" I said that Malenkov, Bul-ganin, Molotov, [Maxim] Saburov and I were of one mind, and that without him we had a majority. Kaganovich declared, "I'm with you, too. I was only asking." Then he asked me, "And what about Voroshilov?" I told him about my awkward meeting and how Voroshilov had praised Beria. "He really said that?" Ka-ganovich exclaimed. He was incredulous.

Kaganovich cursed Voroshilov, but not maliciously: "That sly old bastard! He's told me himself that he can't stand Beria, that Beria's dangerous and likely to be the ruin of us all. What

he said doesn't mean a thing." "Then we'll have to try talking to him one last time. Perhaps Ma

lenkov will talk to him." Then Kaganovich said, "And what about Mikoyan?" "1 haven't talked to Mikoyan yet. His case is a bit more com-

plicated." Everyone knew that Mikoyan was on the best of terms with Beria.

In this way we made the rounds of all the Presidium members ex-cept Voroshilov and Mikoyan. We arranged for me to speak to M i-koyan and for Malenkov to speak to Voroshilov. Later I went by to see Malenkov: "Well, what happened? Was he [Voroshilov] still singing Beria's praises?"

"As soon as I told him about our plan," said Malenkov, "Voro-shilov embraced me and started crying."

Still another question arose. Once we had formally resolved to strip Beria of his posts, who would actually detain him? The Pre-sidium bodyguard was obedient to him. His Chekists would be sit-ting in the next room, and Beria could easily order them to arrest us all. We would have been quite helpless because there was a siz-able armed guard in the Kremlin.

Therefore we decided to enlist the military. First we entrusted the detention of Beria to Comrade Moskalenko, the air defense commander, and five generals. This was my idea. Then on the eve of the session Malenkov widened our circle to include Marshal Zhu-kov and some others. That meant II marshals and generals in all.

In those days all military personnel were required to check their weapons when coming into the Kremlin, so Bulganin was instruct-ed to see that the marshals and generals were allowed to bring their guns with them. We arranged for Moskalenko's group to wait for a summons in a separate room. When Malenkov gave a sig-nal, they were to come into the room where we were meeting and take Beria into custody.

KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

CONTINUED

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Beria wrote, `Khrushehev put you up to this'

CONTINUED

vent him from grabbing a weapon from the briefcase. We checked

later and found that he had no gun. either in his briefcase or in his

pockets. His quick movement had simply been a reflex action.

Beria was immediately put under armed guard in the Council of

Ministers building next to Malenkov's office. At this point a new

question arose. Now that we had detained Beria, where could we

put him? We couldn't hand him over to the Ministry of Internal Af-

fairs because those were all his own men. Finally we agreed to en-

trust him to Comrade Moskalenko. who had his men transfer Beria

to a bunker at his headquarters. I could sec that Comrade Mos-

kalenko would do what was necessary for the Party cause. [This

event took place in June 1953. In December. Beria was shot.]

After it was all over. Malenkov took me aside and said. "Listen

to what my chief bodyguard has to say." The man came over to

me and said, "I have only just heard that Beria has been arrested.

I want to inform you that he raped my stepdaughter, a seventh-

grader. A year or so ago her grandmother died and my wife had to

go to the hospital, leaving the girl at home alone. One evening she

went out to buy some bread near the building where Beria lives.

There she came across an old man who watched her intently. She

was frightened. Someone came and took her to Beria's home. Be-

ria had her sit down with him for supper. She drank something.

fell asleep, and he raped her."

I told this man. "I want you to tell the prosecutor during the in-

vestigation everything you've told me." Later we were given a list

of more than a hundred girls and women who had been raped by

Beria. He had used the same routine on all of them. He gave them

some dinner and offered them wine with a sleeping potion in it.

When Beria was put in solitary confinement he asked for pencil

and paper. Some of as were doubtful, but we decided to give him

what he wanted in case an urge had come over him to tell us can-

didly what he knew about the things we had charged him with. He

started writing notes. The first was to Malenkov: "Yegor, don't

wryotr ktuaw me?-Aren't -trieride-Why did you trust Khrushchev?

He's the one who put you up to this, out he?" •

NEXT WEEK: PART IV

KHRUSHCHEV PLAYS FOR

HIGH STAKES • When the Communists thought

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We arranged to convene a session of the Presidium of the Conn-KIIRUSIICHEV cil of Ministers but invited all the members of the Presidium of the

Central Committee as well. Malenkov opened the meeting as a Cen-tral Committee Presidium session rather than a Council of Min-isters Presidium session so that we could discuss the situation in the Party. Voroshilov had to be especially invited, since he was Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and therefore didn't regularly attend sessions of either the Council of Ministers or the Party Presidium.

As soon as Malenkov opened the session he said, "Let us dis-cuss Party questions. There are some matters which we must deal with right away." Everyone agreed. As had been arranged in ad-vance, I requested the floor and proposed that we discuss the mat-ter of Beria. Berth was sitting on my right. He gave a start, grabbed me by the hand, looked at me with a startled expression and said, "What's going on, Nikita? What's this you're mumbling about?"

I said, "Just pay attention. You'll find out soon enough." And here is what I said. I recalled the Central Committee plenum of Feb-ruary 1939 at which Comrade Grisha Kaminsky had accused Berle of having worked for the English intelligence service when he was Secretary of the Baku Party organization. I then recalled how im-mediately after that meeting Grisha Kaminsky had dropped out of sight like a stone in the water: "I've always wondered about Ka-minsky's statement and why no one made any attempt to explain what he said." Then I reviewed the moves Berk had made since Sta-lin's death, his interference in the Party organizations of the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic states. I described how Berk was relying on nationalist antagonisms to undermine Soviet unity. I mentioned his latest proposal concerning policy toward people in exile and in prison camps, stressing that Beria was trying to le-galize arbitrary rule. I concluded by saying, "I have formed the im-pression that he is no Communist. He is a careeristswho has wormed

REMEMBERS

Marshal Zhukov, the most famous Soviet soldier of World War II, was the one who physically arrested La-vrenti Beria in the Kremlin.

his way into the Party for self-seeking reasons. His arrogance is in-tolerable. No honest Communist would ever behave the way he does in the Party."

Bulganin asked for the floor and said something very much along the same lines. Then the others spoke in turn. Molotov expressed the proper Party position on the matter. The other comrades stressed the same principles, with the exception of Mikoyan, who spoke last. He repeated what he had told me before the session when we had our talk: namely, that Beria would take our crit-icisms to heart, that he wasn't a hopeless case and that he could All be useful in the collective leadership.

When everyone had spoken, Malenkov, as chairman, was sup-posed to sum things up and to formulate a consensus, but at the last moment he lost his nerve. After the final speech, the session was hanging. There was a long pause. I saw we were in trouble, so I asked Comrade Malenkov for the floor in order to propose a mo-tion. As we had arranged in advance, I proposed that the Central Committee Presidium should release Beria from his duties as Dep-uty Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs and from all other government posts he held.

Malenkov was still in a state of panic. As I recall, he didn't even put my motion to a vote. He pressed a secret button which gave the signal to the generals who were waiting in the next room. Zhu-kov was the first to appear. Then Moskalenko and the others came in. Malenkov said in a faint voice to Comrade Zhukov, "As Chair-man of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., I request that you take Berth into custody pending investigation of charges made against him."

"Hands up!" Zhukov commanded Beria. Moskalenko and the others unbuckled their holsters in case

Beria tried anything. Berth seemed to reach for his briefcase, which was lying behind him on the windowsill. I seized his arm to pre-

CONTINUED

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