keohane & nye realism and complex interdependence - pp 49-58

8/11/2019 Keohane & Nye Realism and Complex Interdependence - Pp 49-58

1/10

4

Realism

nd

Complex

nterdependence

RobertO.Keohane

ndlosePh

.

Nye

In this classic

work, Robert

Keohane

and Joseph

Nye offer

a

neoliberal

cri-

tique of

the

realist worldview.

They

assert hat

in the

post-Wot'ld

War II

era

countries

have

become

more

and

more intertwined

economically.

The

explosivegrowth in the size and numberof transnationalcorporationshas

blurred state

boundaries,

rendering

traditional

realist

assumptions

about

the centrality

of the

state

questionable.

Realists ontend

hat

the state

s the

dominant

actor

in

world

politics and that

military

force

and violence

are

the

primary means

by which

states

achieve

their

goals. Keohane

and

Nye

p

ro

p

os

e an al

t e nat v

e ideal

ty

p

e----c

mp e

x i nte

de

p

endence-t

hat

empha

-

sizes

cooperation

rather than

conflict.

While

the authors

caution

that

vio-

lence and

conflict

have

not

disappeared,

hey

point

to the

growing impor-

tance of

non-secur i ty-related

ssues

such

as internat ional

monetary

relations and

global

environmental

concerns.

To

them the

day-to-day

affairs of

states

have

more

to do

with

promoting

cooperative

economic

interactions

han

with

military

and security

matters.

One's assumptions

about

world

politics profoundly

affect

what one

sees

and how one constructs heories o explain events.We believe that the

assumptions

of

political realists,

whose theories

dominated

the

postwar

period,

are

often

an inadequate

basis

for analyzing

the

politics of

interde-

pendence.The

realist

assumptions

about

world

polit ics can

be seen

as

defining an

extreme

set

of conditions

or

ideal type.

One

could

also

magine

very

different

conditions.

In

this chapter,

we

shall

construct

another

deal

Reprinted

with

permission of

the

publ isher

from Power

and

Interdependence:

World Politics

inTr"ansition,2d

edition,

by

Robert O.

Keohane

and Joseph

S.

Nye

rGlenview,

L: Pearson

Education,

nc.).

Copyright

O 1989 by

Robert

O.

Keohane

andJoseph

.

Nye,

pp.23-25;29-37.

49


2/10

50

ContendingYiewsoflPE

type,

the

opposite

of

realism.

We

call

\t complex

interdependence'

After

esiablishing

h"

diff"."n"es

between

ealism

and

complex

interdependence,

we shall argue that complex interdependence ometimescomes closer to

reality

than

does

realism.

when

it

does,

raditional

explanations

of

change

in

iniernational

regimes

become

questionable

and

the

search

or

new

explanatory

models

becomes

more

urgent.

'

For

politlcal

realists,

nternational

politics,

like

all

other

politics,

is a

struggle

o.

po*".

but,

unlike

domestic

politics,

a

struggle

dominated

by

organlred

violence.

. . .

Three

assumptions

re

integral

to

the

realist

vision.

Fiist,

states

as coherent

units

are the

dominant

actors

n

world

politics.

This

is a

double

assumption:

statesare predominant;and they act as coherent

units.

Second,

ealists

assume

hat

force

is a usable

and

effective

nstrument

of

policy. Other

instruments

may

also

be

employed,

but

using

or

threaten-

ing

force

is the

most

effective

means

of

wielding

power'

Third'

partly

beiause

of

their

second

assumption,

ealists

assume

a hierarchy

of

issues

n

world

politics,

headed

by

questions

of

military

security:

he

"high politics"

of

military

security

dominates

he

"low politics"

of

economic

and

social

affairs.

These

realist

assumptions

define

an

ideal

type

of

world

politics.

They

allow

us

to

imagine

a world

in

which

politics

is

continually

characterized

by

active

or

potential

conflict

among

states,

with

the

use

of

force

possible

ai

a.ry

time.

-Each

state

attempts

to

defend

its

territory

and

interests

from

real or

perceived

threats.

Political

integration

among

states

s slight

and

lasts

only

as

long

as

it serves

he

national

interests

of

the

most

powerful

states.

Tiansnational

actors

either

do

not

exist

or

are

politically

unimpor-

tant. Only the adept exerciseof force or the threat of force permits states o

survive,

and

only

while

statesmen

ucceed

n adjusting

heir

interests'

as

n

a

well-functioning

balance

of

power'

is

the

system

stable'

Each

of the

realist

assumptions

can

be

challenged.

If

we challenge

them

all simultaneously,

we can

imagine

a

world

in which

actors

other

than

stares

participate

directly

in world

politics,

in

which

a

clear

hierarchy

of

issues

does

not

exist,

and

n

which

force

is an

ineffective

nstrument

of

pol-

icy.

Under

these

conditions-which

we

call

the characteristics

f

complex

inierdependence-one

would

expect

world

politics

to

be

very different than

under

realist

conditions.

The

Characteristics

of Complex

lnterdependence

Complex

interdependqnce

as

hree

main

characteristics:

1.

Mul t ipte

channels

connect

societ ies,

ncluding:

informal

t ies

between

governmental

elites

as

well as

formal

foreign

office

arrangements;

informal

ties

among

nongovernmental

el i tes

(face-to-face

and

through

telecommunications);

nd

transnational

organizations

such

as

multination-


3/10

Robert

O. Keohone&Joseph

S.

Nye

5 |

al

banks or corporations).These

channelscan be summarized

as

interstate,

Iransgovernmental,

nd transnational elations. nterstate

relations

are the

normal channelsassumedby realists.Transgovernmental pplies when we

relax

the realist assumption

hat statesact coherentlyas units; transnational

rpplies

when we relax

the assumption hat statesare the

only units.

2. The agenda

of

interstate

elationshipsconsists

of

multiple

issues

hat

.rre

not arranged n

a clear or consistenthierarchy.This

absence

of'hierar-

.-ht among

isszes means, among other

things, that

military

security

does

rot

consistently

dominate he agenda.Many issuesarise rom what

used

o

:e considered

domestic

policy,

and the distinction

between domestic

and

:oreign

ssues

becomesblurred. These ssuesare

considered

n

several

gov-

:rnment

departments

not

just

foreign

offices), and at several levels.

Inadequate olicy

coordination

on these

ssues

nvolves signif icant

costs.

Different

issues

generate

different coalitions, both

within

governments

and

icross

them, and nvolve

different degreesof conflict. Politics doesnot

stop

ii the

waters'edge.

3. Military force is not used

by

governments

oward other

governments

.i

thin

the region, or on the issues,when

complex nterdependence

revails.

-:

may,

however,be important n

these

govemments'relations

with

govern-

rents

outside

that

region,

or on other issues.Mil i tary force

could, for

:rstance,

e

irrelevant

to resolving disagreements

n economic issues

:rriong

members

of an alliance,

yet

at the

same ime be

very

important for

::at

alliance'spolitical

and military relations with

a

rival

bloc. For the for-

:er

relationships

his condition of complex interdependence ould

be met;

'rr

the latter, t would

not.

Tradit ional

theories

of

international

polit ics

implicit ly or

explicit ly

::ny

the accuracyof these

hree assumptions. raditionalistsare

therefore

':mpted

also to deny the relevance

of crit icisms basedon the

complex

:rerdependence

deal type. We believe, however,

hat our three conditions

:::

fairly well

approximatedon some

global

issues

of economic and

eco-

.,sical nterdependence

nd that they

come close to characteriz ing

he

::.tire

relationship

between some

countries.One of our

purposes

here is

to

::.x'e that contention. In fPower and Interdependence:World Politics in

-' tnsit ion

we] examine

complex

interdependence

n oceans

policy

and

-

rnetary policy

and n

the

relationships

of the United States o

Canadaand

:-::tralia.

In this chapter, however,

we shall try to convince

you

to take

.-:'e

criticisms of traditional

assumptions eriously. . .

The

Polit ical Processes

of Complex lnterdependence

--3

threemain

characteristics f complex interdependence

ive

rise to dis-

:tive political processes,

which translate

power

resources nto power

as

-

:.trol

of outcomes.As we

arguedearl ier, something s usually

lost or


4/10

52

ContendingViewsoflpE

added

in

the

translation.

Under

condidor

translation

will

be

different

than

under

l::|":"^T'Px

interdependence

the

rions boururcomeslrneed,";;;d",:,j'#:1fiff;:, and urpredi

In

the

real isr

worrd,.r iur". t . . . i r i ty

wir t

be

the

dominant

oal

of

;fi?

:::ffJr?

"rrect

ssues

'r'"i"'"

'",

directlv

nuoru'J

i,h

mlitary

dinared

o

,n'iruJl

tt"lt::

Nonmilitary.probrems

will

not

onry

be

subor_

imprications.

;;i"31i;:lflJliffJ,'

*il:',r'"i''

p"iiiil"-mlit

at

east

as

much

n *'. ruii'^i;::: i:i::'

Ior

rnstance,

ill

be

considered

u,

-

tn"i,

;;;l;'r'ff":i"1';l',?ijl;Tfji"u'ion"io,'Lro;;J

ener

In

a

world

of

orricia,s,d;;;;Ti:nli"."H:lJl"l'Ji;,1,J,;:

that

must

be

pursued'

n

the

"or"rr*

"t'"

crear

hierarct

y

or

ir*"r,

gout,

;JllJffi:lil::,

and

mav

'o,

b;

;;;

rerated.

ach

ureaucracy

'r

mjseson,,,"",-*,,"#i.?

fl

"Tr":ilHHi,;i:ffi

J*i,"ffiH

f

policy

is

difficult.to,nuinruin.ilo;;"r,

rransnarionalactorswill inrro_uce differenr goals into uuri

r'

g;;

;;"r;;

r,

""r.

Linkage

Strategies

Goals

will

therefore

vary

by

issue

area

unde

so

will

the

distribution

or

o";;;;'ilrcomplex

interdependence,

but

rradirionaraf,i,.ro"u,",n ; il#illi:XiH: Tt,H::T:1:

::d"ffLi,rl',fl

:[::l'ff

ffi

";J:::r.;l;*oi,i,o

;l*,ilffi'J;;

i:'*:g;'$"";'1"""1i'i'J'"1#'

':T:lf

":

h

ir,

"

J

;;

,:"1iiT'i'",:':':lf,

iT,

::fl#H:ffi

l

*ki

nsure

a

congruence

between

the

overat

structure

of

military

and

economic

il3ryifi:,HlT'i3:i#i::ffin ' *" ,,u","ui",'i"",i.",,-

_

Under

complex

interdependence,

such

occur.

s

mlitary

orce

s

a"uaru"o,,_il;;j,T:**

il:j"T,ii-r:lr.

i:

ore

difficuh

to

use

heir

overall

o"-ir""""

a

control

outcomes

n

ssues

n

which

rhey

are

weak.

And

ri"*

ii"'o#ibution

of

power

esources

n

rade,

hipping,

r

ol,_fo,"-;;;i;;;"rii'o'r,"

differenr,

aterns

of

out_

,"r"rT""JTij;il,ff,ile

olitical

-""G

".""i,*o, "".v.lnion".r",r

weehhgh,

";;'

i.ilrffi

i

1'#i:llll,11i;,T

lIl

'#iff

,ll'g

f

power

would

not

'iutt",

very

much.

The

tinkages

drawn

from

them

ro

ilitary

issues

would

ensure

consistent

dominance

by

the

overalr

strongest


5/10

Robert

O.

Keohone

&/oseph

S.

Nye

53

' : ' l res.

But

when

miritary-Jorce

s

largery

mmobil ized,

strong

states

wil l

r

rd

rhat

inkage

s

less

effective.

They

may

sti i l

artempr

uchlinks,

but

in

e

absence

f

a hierarchy

f issues,

heir

success

ii l

be

problematic..

Dominant statesmay try to securemuch the ,un-'"."rult by usingover-

'"

economic

power

to

affect

results

on

other

issues.

f

only

".ono,ni.

tectives

are

at

stake,

hey

may

succeed:

money,

after

all ,

is

fungible.

But

:: 'rnomic

objectives

ave

polit ical

imprications,

nd

economic

inkage

by

l

strong

s

limited

by

domestic,

ransnational,

nd

transgovernmental

--:ors

who

resist

having

their

interests

raded

off.

Furthermor-e.

he

interna-

. nal

actors

may

be

different

on

different

issues,

and

the

internatronar

::anizations

n

which

negotiations

ake

prace

are

often

quite

separate.

-.-rsit is diff icult, for example, o imaginea

mil i tari ly

or

economically

':rn-g

state

inking

concessions

n

monetary

policy

to

reciprocal

conces-

rs

in

oceans

olicy.

on

the

other

hand,

poo.*.ui

states

re

not

similar_

rnhibited

rom

linking

unrerated

ssues,

partry

because

heir

domestrc

-:3rests

are

ess

complex.

Linkage

of unrelated

ssues

s

often

a

means

of

:

::rcting

concessions

r

side payments

rom

rich

and powerful

states.

And

"-.:ke

powerful

states

whose

nstrument

or

l inkage

(mil i tary

force)

is

'

3n

too

costly

to

use,

he

linkage instrumentusedby poo., ,"uk states_-

:national

organization_is

available

and

nexpensive.

Thus

as

the

utility

of

force

declines,

and

as issues

become

more

equal

-

-:xportance,

he

distribution

of

power

within

each

ssue

wil l

become

:3

lmportant.

f

linkages

become

ess

effective

on

the

whole,

outcomes

: rl i t ical

bargaining

wil l

increasingly

ary

by

issue

area.

The

differentiation

among

issue

areas

n

complex

interdependence

--::rs

thot

inkages

among

ssues

wil l

become

more

problematic

nd

wil l

: - r ro reduce ather than reinforce nternationalhieraichy.Linkage strate_

-: ' '

and

defense

against

hem,

wi l l

pose

cr i t ical

stra iegic

chJices

or

-'"

Should

ssues

e.considered

eparately

r

as

a

package?

f

l inkages

-

-:

r

be

drawn,

which

issues

hould

be l inked,

and

on

which

of

the

inked

-:'

should

concessions

e

made?

How

far

can

one push

a linkage

befbre

-:-trrres

counterproductive?

or

instance,

should

one

seek

orm-al

agree_

":-r '

or

informal,

but

less

porit ically

sensit ive,

nderstandings?

he

fact

"-"' iorld

polit ics

under

complex

nterdependence

s not a sJamlessweb

--'us

to expect

hat

efforts

o

stitch

seams

ogether

advantageously,

s

:::ed

in

l inkage

strategies,

i l l ,

very

often,

determine

he

siape

of

the

leenda

Setting

'- ':--ondassumption f comprex nterdependence,he lack of clearhier-

-.

:rron-g

multiple

ssues,

eads

us

to

expect

hat

the polit ics

of

agenda


6/10

54

ContendingViews

f IPE

formation

and control

will

become more important.

Traditional

analyses

lead

statesmeno focus

on

politico-military

issues

and to

pay

little

attention

to the broader politics of agenda formation. Statesmenassume hat the

agendawill

be set by

shifts in the balance

of

power,

actual or

anticipated,

and by

perceived

hreats

o the security

of states.

Other issueswill

only be

very

important

when

they seem to

affect security

and military

power.

In

these cases,

agendas

will be influenced

strongly

by considerations

of the

overall balance

of

power.

Yet, today,

some

nonmilitary issues

are emphasized

n interstate

ela-

tions at one

time, whereas

othersof seemingly equal importanceare neg-

lected

or

quietly

handled

at a

technical evel. Intemational

monetary poli-

tics,

problems

of

commodity

terms of trade,

oil, food, and multinational

corporations

have

all been important

during

the last decade;

but not all

have been high

on interstate

agendas

hroughout

that

period.

Traditional

analysts

of international politics

have

paid

little

attention

to agenda ormation:

to how issues

come to receive

sustained

attention by

high

officials. The

traditional

orientation toward

military

and security

affairs implies that the crucial problems of foreign policy are imposed on

states

by the actions

or

threats of other

states.These are high politics

as

opposed

o the low politics

of economic affairs.

Yet, as the

complexity

of

actors

and issues n

world

politics

increases,

he utility

of

force

declines

and the

line between

domestic policy

and foreign policy

becomesblurred:

as

the conditions

of complex interdependence

re more

closely approxi-

mated,

he

politics

of

agenda ormation

becomesmore

subtle and differen-

tiated.

Under

complex

interdependence

we can

expect the agenda

to be

affected by

the international

and domestic problems

created

by economic

growth

and increasing

sensitivity interdependence.

. Discontented

domesticgroups

wil l

polit icize

ssuesand force

more ssues

once consid-

ered

domestic

onto the interstate

agenda.

Shifts in the

distribution

of

power

resources

within

setsof issueswill

also affect

agendas.During

the

early 1970s

he increasedpower

of

oil-producing

governments

over the

transnat ional

corporat ions

and the

consumer countr ies

dramatical ly

altered the

policy

agenda.

Moreover,

agendas or

one

group

of issues

may

change

as a result

of linkages from

other

groups

in which

power

resources

are

changing; for

example, the

broader agenda

of North-South

trade

issues changed

after

the OPEC

price

rises and

the oil embargo

of

1973-74.

Even

if capabil i t ies

among

statesdo not

change,agendas

may

be affected

by shifts

in the importance

of transnational

actors. The pub-

licity surrounding multinational corporations n the early 1970s,coupled

with their

rapiil

growth

over the

past

twenty

years,

put

the regulation

of

such corporations

higher

on both

the United Nations

agenda

and national

agendas.


7/10

Robert .

Keohone

Joseph.Nye

55

Tran

snational

and Tran sgove

rn

m ental Relati on s

.'-: :hird condition of complex interdependence, ultiple channelsof con-

,,-:

rmong

societies, urther blurs the distinction betweendomestic

and

-:::rational

politics.

The availability of

partners

n

political

coalitions is

'

. recessar i ly

imi ted

by

nat ional

boundar ies

as t radi t ional

analysis

-'-

-:nes.

The nearera

situation

s to

complex

interdependence,he

more we

:

':e--t

the outcomes

of

political

bargaining o be affectedby transnational

-:

:tit1rlS.

Multinational corporationsmay be significantboth as ndependent

;ui r,ri

&fld as instrumentsmanipulatedby

governments.

The attitudes

and

:,

--\

standsof domesticgroupsare likely to be affected by communica-

:

.--.

organized

or

not,

between hem

and heir counterparts broad.

Thus

the existenceof multiple channelsof contact

leads

us to expect

-.:..

beyond

those

normally found in

domestic

politics,

on the ability of

::ri:rnn

to calculate he manipulationof

interdependence

r

follow

a con-

.::rt

strategyof linkage.

Statesmen

must considerdifferential

as

well

as

--::3gate

effects

of

interdependence

trategies

nd their likely implications

-

:r-rliticization

and agendacontrol.

Transactionsamong

societies-eco-

-, .:-i,-

and

social transactions

more

than security ones-affect

groups

differ-

:-:. ' ..

Qppeltunitiesand costs rom increased ransnational ies may be

:-::i3r

for

certain

groups-for

instance,American workers n the textile or

,-,

e industries-than

for others.Some organizations r

groups

may interact

:

:::tlv with

actors n other societiesor with other

governments

o increase

:,..: benefits

rom a network of interaction.Some actorsmay thereforebe

.:'-

rulnerable

as well as ess sensitive o changes lsewhere n the network

r;r .lrothers,and his will affectpatternsof political action.

The multiple

channels of

contact found in complex interdependence

:i: rr-rt

imited to nongovernmental ctors.

Contacts

between

governmental

-'-::rucracies

chargedwith similar tasks may not only alter their

perspec-

::

but lead to transgovernmentalcoalitions on

particular policy ques-

r.'. To improve

their chancesof success,

ovemment

agenciesattempt o

' -

: - i actors

rom other

governments

nto thei r own decision -making

:r.rsrses

as allies. Agencies of

powerful

statessuch as the

United States

:;. i used such coalitions to penetrateweaker governments n such coun-

:-:i irs

Turkey and

Chile.

They have

also been

used

to

help

agenciesof

r--":f

governments

enetrate

he United States

bureaucracy.l

.

.

The existence

of transgovernmental

olicy

networks leads

o a differ-

:- :nterpretation

of one of

the standard

propositions

about international

:,

-:1 -s-that

states

act in

their own

interest.

Under

complex interdepend-

:--:.

this conventionalwisdom

begs wo

important

questions:

which

self

.- :

'*

hich interest?A

government

agency

may

pursue

ts

own

interests

--:rr the guise of the national interest; and recurrent nteractionscan

--.1S

official

perceptions

ftheir

interests.

. .


8/10

56 ContendingViewsoflPE

The ambiguity

of the national

interest raises serious

problems

for the

top

political leaders

of

governments.As

bureaucracies

ontact each

other

directly acrossnational borders

(without

going

through

foreign

offices),

centralized

control becomes

more difficult.

There is less assurance hat the

state

will be united

when

dealing

with foreign

governments

or that

its

com-

ponents

will interpret national

interests similarly

when negotiating

with

foreigners.

The state may

prove

to

be multifaceted,

even schizophrenic.

National

interests will be defined

differently on different

issues,at different

times,

and by different

governmental

units. States that

are better

placed

to

maintain

their coherence

(because

of a

centralized

political

tradition such

as France's) will be better able to manipulate uneven interdependence han

fragmented states

that at first

glance

seem

to have more

resources in an

issuearea.

Role of lnternational Organizations

Finally, the existence

of multiple channels

leads one to

predict a different

and significant

role for international organizations

n world

polit ics.

Realists in the

tradition

of

Hans J. Morgenthau

have

portrayed

a

world in

which states,

acting from self-interest, struggle

for "power and

peace."

Security issues are

dominant; war threatens.

In such a world, one

may

assume hat

international institutions will

have a minor role,

limited

by

the

rare congruence of such

interests. International

organizations are then

clearly

peripheral

to world

politics. But in a world of

multiple issues mper-

fectly linked, in which coalitions are formed transnationally and transgov-

emmentally,

the

potential role

of

intemational

institutions in

political

bar-

gaining

is

greatly increased. In

particular,

they

help set the international

agenda, and act as

catalysts for coalition-formation

and as arenas

or

politi-

cal initiatives and

linkage by weak states.

Governments

must

organize

themselves o cope

with the flow of busi-

ness

generated

by international organizations.

By defining

the salient issues,

and

deciding which issues can be

grouped

together, organizations

may help

to determine

governmental priorities and the nature of

interdepartmental

committees and other arrangements

within

governments.

The 1972

Stockholm

Environment

Conference

strengthened

he

position

of environ-

mental agencies

n various

governments

The

1974 World Food Conference

focused the attention of important

parts

of the United States

govemment

on

prevention

of food shortages.

The

September

1975 United

Nations special

sessionon

proposa]s

or a New

International Economic Order

generated

an

intragovernmental debate about policies toward the Third World in general.

The Intemational Monetary

Fund and the General Agreement

on Tariffs and

Trade have

focused

govemmental

activity on money

and trade instead of on


9/10

Robert O.

Keohane&JosePh

S.

NYe 57

Table

4. I Political

Processes

Under

Conditions

of Realism

and Complex

Interdependence

Realism Complex Interdependence

Goals of

actors

Instruments

of

state

policy

Asenda

formation

Linkages

of

issues

Roles

of

intemational

organizations

Military

security

will be

the

dominant

goal.

Military

force

will be

most

effective,

although

economic

and other instruments will also

be used.

Potentialshifts

n the balance

of

power and security

threats

will set he

agenda

n high

politics and

will stronglY

influence

other

agendas.

Linkages

will reduce

differences

in outcomes

among

issue

areasand

reinforce

intemational

hierarchy.

Roles are

minor, limited

by

state

power and

the importance

of

military

force.

Goals

of states

will vary bY

issue

area.

Transgovemmental

politics will

make

goals difficult

to

define.

Transnational

actors

will

pursue heir own

goals.

Power

resources

pecific

to

issueareas

will

be

most

relevant.Manipulation

of

interdependence.

ntemational

organizations.

nd

transnational

actors

will

be

major

instruments.

Agenda

will be affected

by

changes

n the

distribution

of

power

resources

within issue

areas;

he status

of intemational

regimes;

changes

n

the

importance

of transnational

actors; inkages rom other

issuesand

politicization

as a

result of

rising sensitivity

interdependence.

Linkages

by strong

states

will

be more

difficult

to make

since

force

will be

ineffective.

Linkages

by weak

states

through

intemational

organizations

will

erode rather

than

reinforce

hierarchy.

Organizations

will set

agendas,

induce

coalition-formation,

and

act

as arenas

or

political action

by weak

states.

bility to

choose

the organizational

forum for an

issue and

to

mobilize

votes

will be

an

important

political resource.

private

direct

investment,

which

has

no comparable

international

orgailza-

tion.

By bringing

officials

together,

international

organizations

help to

acti-

vate

potential coalitions

in world

politics. It is

quite

obvious

that

interna-

tional organizations

have

been

very

impofiant

in bringing

together

repre-

sentativesof less developedcountries,most of which do not maintain


10/10

58

ContendingViewsoflPE

embassies

n one another's

capitals.

Third

World strategies

of

solidarity

among

poor countries

have been developed

in and for a

series of

interna-

tional conferences,mostly under the auspicesof the United Nations.2

International

organizations

also allow

agencies

of

governments,

which

might

not otherwise

come

into contact,

to tum

potential

or

tacit coalitions

into explicit

transgovernmental

coalitions

characterized

by

direct commu-

nications.

In some

cases,

nternational secretariats

deliberately

promote this

process by forming

coalitions

with

groups

of

governments, or with

units

of

governments,

as well as

with nongovemmental

organizations

having simi-

lar interests.3

International

organizations

are frequently

congenial

institutions

for

weak states.

The one-state-one-vote

orm

of the United

Nations

system

favors

coalitions of

the small and

powerless. Secretariats

are often

respon-

sive to

Third

World demands.

Furthermore,

the substantive

norms of

most

international

organizations,

as they

have developed

over

the

years, stress

social

and economic

equity

as well as

the equality

of states.

Past

resolu-

tions expressing

Third World

positions,

sometimes

agreed to

with

reserva-

tions by industrialized countries, are used to legitimize other demands.

These agreements

are

rarely binding,

but up

to a

point

the

norms of the

institution

make opposition

look more

harshly self-interested

and

less

defensible.

. . .

Complex

interdependence

therefore

yields

different

political

pattems

than does

the realist

conception of

the world.

(Table

4.1 summarizes

these

differences.)

Thus, one

would expect

traditional

theories

to fail

to explain

international regime change n situations of complex interdependence.

But,

for a situation

that approximates

realist conditions,

traditional

theories

should

be appropriate.

. .

.

Notes

I .

For a moredetailed

discussion,

eeRobert

O. Keohane

nd Joseph

S. Nye'

Jr.,"Transgovernmentalelationsand ntemationalOrganizati ns,"Word Polit cs

27,

no. |

(October

197 ): 39-62.

2. Branislav

Gosovic

and JohnGerard

Ruggie,

On the

Creation

of a New

International

Economic

Order:

IssueLinkage

and the Seventh

Special

Session

f

the

UN General

Assembly,"

nternationalOrganization

0,

no. 2

(Spring

1976):

30946.

3.

RobertW. Cox,

"The

ExecutiveHead,"

nternationalOrganization

3,

no'

2

(Spring

1969):

205-30.

keohane & nye realism and complex interdependence - pp 49-58

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