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HPGHumanitarianPolicy Group

Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: the role of business and the private sector

Kenya case studyJim Drummond and Nicholas Crawford

January 2014

About the authors

Jim Drummond is an independent consultant. Formerly he served in several senior leadership positions with the UK Department for International Development, including as its Director for UN, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs. He conducted this assignment in association with the Humanitarian Futures Programme at King’s College London.

Nicholas Crawford is an independent consultant and former Chief of Humanitarian Policy and Transitions at the World Food Programme. He conducted this study in association with the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge everyone who provided information and insights for this paper (see Annex 1 for a full list of interviewees). They are particularly grateful to the OCHA Country Office in Kenya, which provided support for the team in Nairobi, and to the World Food Programme’s offices in Lodwar and Isiolo for arranging and hosting the team’s field visits. Lastly, the authors would like to acknowledge several individuals at OCHA in New York and Geneva who provided guidance on the paper, including Helena Fraser, Karen Smith, Charlotta Benedek and Antoine Gerard.

Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute203 Blackfriars RoadLondon SE1 8NJUnited Kingdom

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Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce materials from this publication but, as copyright holders, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. This and other HPG Reports are available from www.odi.org.uk/hpg.

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Acronyms iii

Executive summary 1

Introduction 3

1.1 Outlineandmethodology 3

1.2 Contextualoverview:theeconomy,governanceandthe 4

humanitariancontext

The role of the private sector in humanitarian action 7

2.1 Theprivatesectorandtheemergencyresponsetothe2011drought 7

2.2 Privatesectorcontributionstoemergencypreparednessandresilience 12

2.3 Theprivatesectorandemergencypreparednessandresponse 14

aroundelectionviolence

Humanitarian–private sector engagement: opportunities and constraints 17

3.1 Growth,theprivatesectorandimplicationsforhumanitarianaction 17

3.2 Futureprospects 19

Opportunities and options 23

4.1 Takingadvantageofchangingmarkets 23

4.2 Procurementandtransport 23

4.3 Devolution 23

4.4 Makingthemostofpopularsupportincrises 24

4.5 Whatdoesthismeanforinternationalhumanitariancoordination? 24

References 27

Annex 1 Interviewees 29

Annex 2 Map of the arid and semi-arid lands in Kenya 31

1

2

3

4

Contents

�� Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study

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ASAL AridandSemi-AridLands

BBCMA BBCMediaAction

CSR CorporateSocialResponsibility

DFID UKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment

DRR DisasterRiskReduction

EAC EastAfricanCommunity

EDES EndingDroughtEmergenciesStrategy

GDP GrossDomesticProduct

GoK GovernmentofKenya

HSNP HungerSafetyNetsProgramme

IDP InternallyDisplacedPeople

IT InformationTechnology

K4K KenyaforKenyans

KAM KenyaAssociationofManufacturers

KCB KenyaCommercialBank

KEPSA KenyaPrivateSectorAlliance

KRCS KenyaRedCrossSociety

KSA KenyaShippers’Association

MMS MobileMoneyService

NDMA NationalDisasterManagementAuthority

NDOC NationalDisasterOperationsCentre

NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisation

OCHA UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumaniatarianAffairs

ODA OfficialDevelopmentAssistance

OECD OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment

TMEA TrademarkEastAfrica

Acronyms

�v Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study

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Executive summary

Kenyawasselectedasacasestudyforthisprojectontheroleoftheprivatesectorinhumanitarianresponsebecauseithasavibrantandinnovativeprivatesector,ahistoryofsevereandrepeatedhumanitariancrisesandatrackrecordofpublic–privatepartnershipsforhumanitarianaction.Thestudyfoundawiderangeofsuchpartnershipsandcontractualrelationships.Theseincludetraditionalemergencyresponserolessuchastransportandfoodandnon-foodprocurement;financialtransfersystems,includingthroughinnovativee-moneytransfersviamobilephonesorvillagebankingagents;effortstokeepmarketsfunctioningduringdroughts,includingdestockingbeforeanimalslosetheirvalueandpayingoutoninsurancepreviouslyboughtbypastoralists;andground-breakingcorporatecollaborationandfundraisinginsupportoftheKenyaRedCrossSociety(KRCS).

Opportunities and constraints

AlthoughhumanitarianinterventionsinKenyahavebeendominatedby‘classic’reliefoperations(e.g.foodaid),thereisamovetowardsmoremarket-sensitiveoptionsthatwillbroadenthebaseofprivatesectorengagement.Themostexcitingdevelopments,fromahumanitarianperspective,arewithintherapidlygrowingsectorsoffinanceandtelecommunications.PartnershipshavebeendevelopedwithKenyanmobilephonecompaniesandbankstofacilitatecashtransfers:theirrapidgrowthisdirectlytouchingcrisis-affectedpopulationsinKenya.ManyKenyanmobileoperatorsandbankshavebusinessmodelscommittedtoreachingthepoorest,crisis-proneareasofthecountry.

Duringthe2011droughtresponseinterventionsweremostlypilotsandrepresentedarelativelysmallproportionofoveralltransfers,andinsufficientmobilephonecoverageandinadequateruralmarketscontinuetoslowthespreadofthesepartnerships.Therearealsoquestionsabouthowsustainablesomeofthemwillbeifprofitsfortheprivatesector–independentofaidcontracts–donotfollow.Nevertheless,theswitchtocashfordroughtresponseandthenewpartnershipsforgedwithbanksandtelecomscompaniesrepresentaradicaldeparturefromthefoodaid-basedemergency

responsepracticeinKenya.Thepossibilitiesforotherhumanitarian(orhumanitarian-related)products,suchascropandlivestockinsurance,healthservicesandimprovedmarketinformation,haveonlyjustbeguntobeexplored.Anotherarearipeforincreasedhumanitarian–privatesectorpartnershipisinthecommercialisationofthelivestocksectorinKenya’saridlands,asenvisagedinKenya’sEndingDroughtEmergenciesStrategy(EDES).Atapracticalleveltherearenowissuesforthegovernment,donorsandtheprivatesectortoresolvearoundwhichinitiativesshouldbetakentoscalequickly,thepaceofchangefromfoodtocash,andtheneedfordonorsubsidiestopromotenewpartnerships.

Theprivatesectorhaslimitedconfidenceingovernmenttodeliverinhumanitariancrises.Ithasrespectforbutnodetailedknowledgeofhowtheinternationalhumanitariansystemworks.Kenyahasawell-developedsetofbusinessassociations,whichcurrentlyengagemostlyonhumanitarianissuessuchaspoliticalviolencethatimpactthemdirectly.Buttheycouldbecomeavaluablechannelforwideningtheprivatesectorengagementinotherhumanitariancrises.TheEDESandtheNationalDisasterManagementAuthority(NDMA)StrategicPlanenvisageengagingtheprivatesector.Thiswillworkbestifgovernmentanddonorscanarticulateacompelling,business-motivatingcaseforreducinghumanitariancrises–acasethatwouldexplainbottomlinebenefitsfrominvestmentsinthearidandsemi-aridlands(ASAL)andusingmarketmechanismstorespondtodroughts.Thiswillbealong-termprojectbutonethatrecentdevelopmentsinbanking,mobiletelephony,transportandminingsuggestisahighpriority.

ThereisagrowingawarenessofhumanitarianissuesamongsttheKenyanpopulationandKenyanfirms,whichincreasinglymatchdonationsmadebytheirstaff.TheKenyaRedCrossSociety(KRCS)annualfundraisinggalaistheplaceforseniorbusinessexecutivestobeseen.Thisispartofanencouragingtrendtowardswidercorporatesocialresponsibility.Severalofthelargerfirms,suchasSafaricomandEquityBank,havesetuptheirownfoundations,thoughmostlyforsmall-scale,longer-termdevelopmentwork.Thegovernment

� Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study

anddonorsshouldencouragethepublicandprivatemediatogiveouthumanitarianinformationtoeducatecitizensfurtheraboutrolesandresponsibilitiesinhumanitariancrisesinordertoenhanceaccountabilityandencouragefurthergiving.

KRCSiswidelyacceptedasthefirstresponderforsmallandmedium-scalehumanitariancrises,andpartneredwithmobilephonecompaniesandothernationalandinternationalfirmstoraisemoneyforboththedroughtresponseandintheaftermathoftheWestgatemallattackinNairobiinSeptember2013.KRCS’businessmodelincludesraisingfundsfrompropertyincludinghotels,anditsambulancefleetismanagedbyitsprivatesectorarm.

Whenaskedbythestudyteam,mostprivatesectoractors(aswellasmanyUN,NGOandgovernmentofficials)equatedpartnershiponhumanitarianactionwithfundraising,suggestingaquitestraightforwardinterpretationofprivatesectorengagementwithhumanitarianactionasopposedtothemorenuanceddiscussionsonprivate-publicpartnershipsintheinternationalhumanitarianworld.

Lookingahead,ifKenyaistocutdependenceonfoodassistanceandreduceandmanageitsownhumanitariancrises,anumberofchangesareneeded,includingamoreprominentrolefortheprivatesectorinpreparednessandresponse.Takinggreaternationalresponsibilityforhumanitarianchallengeswillrequireacapacitytoraisemoreresourcesdomesticallyorthroughborrowinginternationally;animprovedtransportsystemthatallowstheprivatesectortodeliverreliefitemsrapidly;moreintegratedandresilientmarketsindrought-proneareas;acapacitytotransfercashtocrisis-affectedpeoplesothattheycanmakeuseofthosemarkets;amiddleclasseducatedonhumanitarianissuesandwillingtocontributeandholdtheirgovernmenttoaccount;andagovernmentthatplanswiththeprivateandNGOsectors,takingadviceoninternationalbestpractice.SomeofthesepointsfeatureintheEDES.Overall,Kenyaismakinggoodprogressinsomeareas,butthereareuncertaintiesinothers,particularlyovertheroleofthegovernment.

IfKenyaistotakegreaterresponsibilityformanaginglargerhumanitariancrises,itwillbecrucialtoencouragemarketstofunctionduringdroughtsandtoexplorenewwaystotransferresourcestopeoplemadevulnerablebycrises.Donorsaresupportingawiderangeofexperimentsintheseareas,andtheseshouldcontinue,coordinatedbythegovernmentinclosecooperationwiththeprivatesectorandinternationaldonors.TechnologychangesmeanthatfirmslikeSafaricomaremakingcommercialdecisionstoinvestinpreviouslyunprofitableareas.Withthespreadofprivatesector-facilitatedcashtransfermechanismstoKenya’saridandsemi-aridlands(ASALs),theneedforfoodandnon-foodinputsfromaidagenciesshoulddecline.Morebroadly,significantnewinvestmentintheASALs(e.g.byforeignoilcompanies),andnewwaterandtransportlinks)meansthathumanitarianactorswillneedtoengagelargeprivatesectorinvestorstosensitisethemtohumanitarianissuesandbuildtherelationshipsthatwillbeneededinacrisis.LargeagenciessuchastheWorldFoodProgrammeshouldengagemorecloselywithtransportplannerstoensurethattheirconcernsaretakenintoaccountasnewinfrastructureisplanned.Astransportefficiencyimprovestherewillbemoreopportunitiesforthepurchaseofhumanitariansuppliesintheregion.Thismeritsseparatestudy.

Persuadingbusinessestoengagewiththehumanitariancommunitywillrequireaconvincingcasethatparticipationinpreparednessandresponsewillimprovetheirprofits.Thisstudysuggeststhattheelementsofsuchacasearethere.TheinternationalhumanitariancommunitywillbeabletobringbestpracticefromothercountriesandtheKRCShasthelocalstandingwiththeprivatesectorandtheKenyanpublictohelpthegovernmentandthebusinessassociationsinthistask.Staffinthefieldshouldbeconsultedonwhatpartnershipswillworkbestforthem,andbegivenaclearsteeronhowbesttotakeadvantageofexistingUNheadquarterspartnerships.WhiletherearemanyopportunitiesforlinkingupaidagenciesandthebusinesscommunityinKenya,thetimeandresourcesneededtobuildpartnershipsinthefieldshouldnotbeunderestimated.

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1 Introduction

ThispaperexplorestheroleoftheprivatesectorinhumanitarianactioninKenya.Kenyawasselectedasacasestudybecauseithasavibrantandinnovativeprivatesector,ahistoryofsevereandrepeatedhumanitariancrises,notablydroughtinthecountry’saridandsemi-aridlands(ASALs),andatrackrecordofpublic–privatepartnershipsforhumanitarianactionthathaveexploitednewtechnologiesandexperimentedwithnewmodelsoffundraising.Thestudyexplorestheprivatesector’scurrentandpotentialrolesinemergencypreparednessandresponse;analysestheperceivedbenefitsandnegativeimpactsofprivatesectoractivityinsupportofpeopleaffectedbycrisis;identifiesframeworks,structuresandmechanismsthroughwhichtheprivatesectorsupportsemergencypreparednessandresponse,andhowthesemightbeenhancedforbetterfuturecollaboration;andinvestigateshowhumanitarian–privatesectorpartnershipscanbeststimulateeconomicgrowthinKenya,whilealsoprotectinghumanitarianoutcomes.

Thisstudyispartofabroaderprojecton‘HumanitarianCrises,EmergencyPreparednessandResponse:TheRolesofBusinessandthePrivateSector’,financedbytheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)withthecloseinvolvementoftheUnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA).TheprojectisjointlyimplementedbytheHumanitarianPolicyGroup(HPG)attheOverseasDevelopmentInstitute,theHumanitarianFuturesProgramme(HFP)atKing’sCollegeLondonandVantagePartners,aglobalconsultingfirmheadquarteredintheUnitedStates.ItisoverseenbyDrSaraPantuliano(HPG)andDrRandolphKent(HFP).Theprojectaddressesissuessuchashowhumanitarianassistanceandprivatesectorbusinessactivityaffecteachother,wherepotentialopportunitiesandsynergiescanbeachievedandnegativeinteractionsavoidedandhowrelevantactorscanlearnfrompastexperiencetodeveloporenhanceframeworksandmechanismsthatgovernmental,multilateralandprivatesectoractorscanjointlysubscribetoandimplementinordertobetterrespondtocrisesandreducethevulnerabilityofcrisis-affectedpeople.BuildingoncountrystudiesinJordan,KenyaandIndonesia,andastrategyandoptionsanalysisofHaiti,theoverarchinganalysisconsiderswhattheprivate

sectorcouldpotentiallycontributetohumanitarianaction,includingitsroleasanactorinitsownrightandthroughcollaborationwithhumanitarianactors.

Lookingattrendsandtransformationsinthehumanitariancontext,analysisbyKingsCollege/HFPsuggeststhattheestablishedsystemsofhumanitarianaction–wherebyahandfulof(mostlyWestern)donorsandaidagenciesmonopoliseinformationandaction,sometimesattheexpenseofnationalinvolvement–arechanging.Anumberoffactorsarecontributingtothischange,includingtheincreasingabilityandwillingnessofhostgovernmentstoassertcontroloveraiddeliveryontheirterritory,theincreasingnumber,scaleandintensityofcrisesrelativetodonorresourcesandtheconvergenceofhumanitariananddevelopmentinvestmentsindisasterriskreductionandresilience-building(KentandBurke,2011).Atthesametime,themushroomingoflow-costtechnologiesacrosscrisis-affectedareas–mostobviouslymobilephones–iscreatingrelationshipsbetweenlong-marginalisedcommunitiesandtheprivatesector(andbetweenpotential‘beneficiaries’andtheirgovernments)thatneverexistedbefore.Whilethepressureofthesechangesiserodingthemonopolyofthetraditional‘system’,itisalsoopeningupenormouspossibilitiesforpartneringwithnewactors,includingtheprivatesector,andenablingtheuseofnewtechnologiestodeliverassistance.Thisprocessis,however,justbeginning.

1.1 Outline and methodology

Followingthisintroduction,thepaperprovidesanoverviewoftheprivatesector’sroleinrecentemergencypreparednessandresponse,notablythe2011droughtandpoliticalviolencerelatedtoelections.Theanalysisdrawsfromtheseexperiencestoexploreopportunitiesandconstraintsforfuturehumanitarian–privatesectorengagement.Thefinalsectionslookatfutureprospectsandproposesomemodestrecommendations.

Thestudyteamwasguidedbytheoverallproject’sguidingquestions,whichseektounderstand(i)howhumanitarianassistanceandprivatesector


businessactivityaffecteachother,wherepotentialopportunitiesandsynergiescanbeachievedandnegativeinteractionsavoidedandhowgovernments,multilateralorganisationsandcivilsocietycanstimulatetheprivatesectortomoreeffectivelyengageinpreparednessandresponseandcontributetoresilienceoutcomes,nowandinthefuture;and(ii)howtouselearningfrompastexperiencetodeveloporenhanceframeworksandmechanismsthatgovernmental,multilateralandprivatesectoractorscanjointlysubscribetoandimplementinordertoreducepeople’svulnerabilitytoshocksandcrises,withtheultimateaimofimprovingtheeffectivenessofemergencypreparednessandresponseefforts.

Thestudyteambeganwithapre-missiondeskreviewofexistingdocumentation(annualreports,studies,programmereviews,evaluations,etc.)onglobalthinkingabouthumanitarian–privatesectorpartnerships,humanitarianactioninKenyabeginningwithpost-electionviolencein2008,trendsintheKenyaneconomyandthestructureoftheprivatesectorinKenya,andtheroleoftheprivatesectorinhumanitarianactioninKenya.Duringits14-daycountryvisit,theteamundertookdiscussionsandinterviewswithabroadrangeofactors(seeAnnex1foracompletelist),includinglocalandnationalauthorities,donorgovernments,privatesectorcompaniesandfoundations,localandnationalprivatesectorbusinessassociationsandlocalandinternationalhumanitariananddevelopmentagenciesandactors.Theteamtriedtomeetaswidearangeofstakeholdersaspossible.Discussionswereintheformoffocusgroupandone-to-oneinterviews/consultations,eachguidedbyasetofstandardquestionsadaptedaccordingtothetypeofactorbeinginterviewed.Althoughtheteam’stimewasconcentratedinNairobi,eachteammemberalsospenttwodaysconductinginterviewsandgatheringinformationinseparatedrought-proneareasofKenya:Isiolo(IsioloCounty)andLodwar(TurkanaCounty),respectively.

Limitedtimedidnotpermitin-depthfieldvisits,whichwouldhaveallowedfordiscussionswithdisaster-affectedpeople.Furthermore,theprivatesectorinKenya,aseverywhere,issprawlinginscopeandgeography,andmanyactorshaveadirectorindirectimpactonhumanitarianaction,fromportsandcerealstradersinMombasatolivestockherdersinGarissaandkioskownersinDaadab.Ratherthantryingtocaptureallofthiscomplexity,theresearch

teamconcentrateditsinterviewsandanalysisonthosepartsoftheprivatesectorthatpaststudiesandkeystakeholdersidentifiedashavingsignificant,orpotentiallysignificant,engagementwithhumanitarianactorsandwithhumanitarianchallengesinKenya.

1.2 Contextual overview: the economy, governance and the humanitarian context

Kenyahasamarketeconomyandforeignprivateinvestmentisencouraged.Theprivatesectoraccountsfor80%ofthecountry’sgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)andmorethanhalfofwageemployment,althoughtheinformalsectorcontributes75%ofemployment.Tea,tourismandhorticulturearetheleadingforeignexchangeearners,butKenya’sinternationalreputationisincreasinglybuiltoninformationtechnology(IT)andfinance.TheWorldBankcallsM-PESA‘themostdevelopedandsuccessfulmobilemoneypaymentsystemintheworld’,upfrom19,071subscribersin2007toover15min2012.ThenewEastAfricanSubmarineCablesystemreducedinternationalbandwidthpricesby90%.WithinAfricaKenyaissecondtoSouthAfricaininnovationandfinanceinthe2013‘DoingBusinessSurvey’,andNairobiisaregionalhubformultinationals.KenyaisthethirdmostpopulardestinationforprivateequityinAfricaandhasastrongnetworkofbusinessassociationsledbytheKenyaPrivateSectorAssociation(KEPSA)(IFC/WorldBank,2013;Deloitte,2012).However,businessgrowthisconstrainedbycorruptionandaweakregulatoryenvironment.

TheKenyangovernment’sVision2030strategy,launchedafternationalconsultationsin2008,envisagesreachingmiddle-incomestatus,helpedbyagrowthrateof10%perannumfrom2012andamodernisedeconomywithhigherdomesticsavings,foreigndirectinvestmentandaid(GoK,2008).Prioritywillbegiventoimprovingtransport,addingvaluetoagriculturalproduce,modernisingthefinancialsectorandmakingKenyaacentreforIT.TheVisionisimplementedthroughmedium-termplans,thesecondrunningfrom2013–17andincludingastrategytoenddroughtemergencies.TheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andWorldBank(WorldBank2012b)expectKenya’seconomytogrowbyabout6%in2013andthatitcouldsustainthatlevel,makingitaleaderamongst

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EastAfricaneconomies.Inflationandthecurrencyhavestabilisedaftertheeffectsofthe2011drought.GDPpercapitawas$850in2012.In2011OfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)was7.3%ofGDP;humanitarianassistanceaccountedfor16%ofODA.

Kenya’splaceonthenortherntransportcorridor,particularlyMombasaport,meansthatthefunctioningofitstransportinfrastructureiscriticaltotradeandthedeliveryofhumanitariansuppliesacrosstheregion.Transittimesareimprovingbutarestillwellshortofinternationalbestpractice.DwelltimesatMombasaportfellfrom24daysin2011tofivedaysin2012(SCEA,2013).Ninety-sixpercentoffreightleavestheportbyroad.AdealhasbeensignedwithChinatobuildanewraillinetotheUgandanborder.In2010ittook48hoursbylorrytotransportanimalsthe730kmtoNairobifromMoyaleatacostof$723foronelorry-loadof18cattle(Pavanello,2010).WorkisnowwellunderwaytotarmactheroadfromIsiolotoMoyale,completingthelinktoEthiopia.Effortsarebeingmadetoreducenon-tariffbarrierswithinEastAfricaundertheauspicesoftheEastAfricanCommunity.

Kenyarestrictsmaizeimportsmeaningthatdomesticpricesareoftensubstantiallyhigherthanworldmarketpricesintimesofdrought,althoughdutiesweretemporarilysuspendedduringtherecentdrought.Currentlyonly5%ofAfrica’sgrainimportscomefromAfrica,suggestingscopetomeetshortfallswithintheregioniftransportisimproved.

1.2.1 Politics and governance KenyaislistedbytheOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)asafragilestate.Thecountryhasalsoseenseriouspoliticalviolence,notablyaroundelectionsin2007,whensome1,200peoplewerekilledand664,000displaced.AnewConstitutionwasapprovedinareferendumin2010aimedatseparatingpowers,withanexecutivePresidency,aHouseofRepresentativesandaSenate.Regionalandlocalgovernmentisfocusedon47newcounties,eachwithanelectedGovernorandAssembly.Article43oftheConstitutionguaranteestherightofallKenyanstobefreefromhunger.ElectionsunderthenewconstitutionpassedrelativelypeacefullyinMarch2013,butthePresidentandVice-PresidentarenowbeingtriedbytheInternationalCriminalCourtfortheirallegedroleinviolenceafterthe2007election.Thenewgovernmenthasreducedthenumberofministriesfrom42to18andisconsideringreducingthenumberofparastatals.

Kenya’snewconstitutionprovidedfortheintroductionofcountygovernmentimmediatelyaftertheelection.Thecountiesabsorbthemunicipal,districtandprovincialauthorities(WorldBank,2012a).Theirresponsibilitiesincludeagriculture,health,tradeanddevelopmentanddisastermanagement.Countiescanraisesomeoftheirownrevenueandwillreceiverevenuefromthecentreaccordingtoaweightedformulaincludingpopulationandpoverty.Thisisanambitiousdevolutionplanbeingimplementedveryrapidly.Therearesomeprivatesectorconcernsthatlocalrevenueraisingwilldeterbusiness.

Kenya’spopulationwasabout9matindependenceand,accordingtoUNestimates,couldreach96mby2050(UNDESA,2010).Itiscurrently42mandgrowingby1mperyear.Thereare10mprimaryschoolagechildren.TheUNalsoestimatesthathalfofKenyanswillliveinurbanareasby2050.TheKenyaIntegratedHouseholdBudgetSurveyfor2005/6(GoK,2005)showsurbanpovertyfallingto34%from49%in1997,buttherearelargedisparitiesbetweenNorthProvince(74%)andCentral(30%).Morethanhalfofhouseholdsinthearidlandsreceivesomeformoftransfer,includingremittances.

1.2.2 Humanitarian crisesKenyaishighlysusceptibletonaturaldisasters,particularlydroughtinthearidandsemi-aridlands(ASALs),whichmakeupabout70%ofthecountry’sterritory.Themostrecentdrought,whichstrucknorthernandpartsofeasternKenyain2011,affected3.7mpeople.Sincethedrought,theUNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA)hasgraduallywounddownitsKenyacountryoffice,andmostotherhumanitarianagenciesarewindingdownorfocusingonresiliencework.

Table 1: People affected by natural disasters D�saster Date Affected

Drought 1991 2,700,000

Epidemic 1994 6,500,000

Drought 1994 1,200,000

Drought 1997 1,600,000

Flood 1997 900,000

Drought 1999 23,000,000

Drought 2004 2,300,000

Drought 2005 3,500,000

Flood 2006 723,000

Drought 2008 3,800,000

Drought 2011 3,700,000

Source:PreventionWeb,2013.


Followingthe2008–2011droughtsthegovernmenthasreshapeditspolicyandstrategyforthenorthernareasandotheraridlands,focusingonintegratingthempoliticallyandeconomicallywiththerestofKenya.Theaimistoshifttheemphasisfromdroughtresponse,whichoftenarrivedlateandfocusedonfoodaid,toresilience,preparednessandtheuseofnewtechnology.ThenewpoliciesandstrategiesaresetoutintheNationalPolicyfortheSustainableDevelopmentofNorthernKenyaandotherAridLandsandtheDroughtRiskManagementandEndingDroughtEmergenciesStrategyfor2013–17,partofKenya’sMediumTermPlan.Thesespeakofthepublicsectorenablingtheprivatesectorthroughinvestmentininfrastructureandeducationandprovidingincentivesforinvestors.TheNationalDisasterManagementAuthority(NDMA),formedin2011andnowreportingtotheMinistryofPlanningandDevolution,hasaleadingroleinimplementation.

AnASALStakeholderForumincludingtheprivatesectorhasalsobeenestablished.UncertaintyremainsovertheimpactofdevolutiononhumanitariancrisesandthesettingupandbudgetaryprovisionforthenewNationalDroughtContingencyFund.

Thesecondrecentformofhumanitarianemergencyinvolvespoliticalviolenceandterrorism.Post-electionviolencein2007/8killedabout1,200peopleanddisplaced664,000;another192arereportedtohavediedduringthe2013elections.TheWestgateattackinSeptember2013,thefirstlarge-scaleterroristattackonaKenyanestablishment,left67peopledeadand175injured.KenyaisalsohometoalargeSomalirefugeepopulationasaresultofconflict,insecurity,terrorismanddroughtinSomalia;thecombinationofthesefactorsledthenumberofSomalirefugeesinKenyatoriserapidlytooverhalfamillion.

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Kenya’sprivatesectorisgrowingsteadily.However,whilesectorsthattraditionallymightserveemergencyresponseandpreparedness–suchasroadandportinfrastructure,transportandfoodandnon-foodsuppliers–continuetoshowsteadyprogress,itistheneweconomysectorscentredaroundfinancialinstitutionsandtelecommunications(includingsocialmedia)whoserapidgrowthisdirectlytouchingcrisis-affectedpopulationsinKenya.Fromanemergencyperspective,whatdistinguishestheboom-likeatmosphereevidentintheNairobiheadquartersofthemobileoperatorsandbanksisthesecompanies’insistence–motivatedpartlybybusinessandpartlybycorporatesocialresponsibility–ontheircommitmenttoreachingthepoorestandmostmarginalareasofthecountryand,inparticular,thedrought-pronearidandsemi-lands.

Forthemostpart,formalprivatesectorengagementwiththemachineryofhumanitarianpreparednessandresponseatthenationallevelhasbeenminimal.InterviewswithanumberofbusinessassociationsinNairobiaswellasareviewofthevariousgovernment-ledandUN-supportedcoordinationstructuresrevealedthattheprivatesectorisnotgenerallyrepresented.Fortheirpart,businessassociationsnotedthattheywerenotinvitedtoplayaroleingovernment-ledemergencyresponseandplanning.Instead,ininstanceswhenthebusinesscommunitydoesbecomedirectlyinvolvedwiththegovernment–forexamplefollowingthepost-electionviolencein2007–2008andaftertheWestgateattack–theyinterprettheirrolenotasapartner,butratherasareluctantsubstituteforineffectualgovernmentaction.

Atthelocallevel,formalprivatesectorinvolvementwithgovernment-ledemergencycoordinationmechanismshaslikewisebeenminimal.GovernmentofficialsnotedthattheroleandcompositionofthenewCountyandSub-CountySteeringCommittees(successorstotheformerDistrictSteeringCommittees),chargedwithdisasterpreparednessandresponse,isstillbeingdebated.OfficialsinLodwarwereespeciallykeentoincludelocaltransportersincountyplanningandcoordinationmechanismsinordertopre-emptthe

contractdisputesthatcreatedmajorproblemsduringthe2011droughtresponse.ThepictureissimilarinIsiolo,wheretheCountyDisasterManagementCommitteehasnotyetbeenformedandthelocalNDMAisonlyreceivingfundsforsalaries.Underthepreviousarrangementspredatingthe2010ConstitutiontheDistrictDisasterManagementCommitteeincludedthelocalchairoftheIsioloChamberofCommerce.

Amajorexceptiontotheprivatesector’sexclusionfromhumanitarianpreparednessandresponsestructures–anditsreluctancetotakealeadwhereitfeelsgovernmentshouldbeleading–isintheareaoffundraisingfortheKRCS,wheretheKenyansforKenya(K4K)initiativeistheprimeexample(seeBox1,nextpage).

2.1 The private sector and the emergency response to the 2011 drought

The2011droughtaffectedmorethan3.7mpeopleinKenyaandbroughtemergencyconditionstosevencountiesinnorthernandeasternKenya:Turkana,Mandera,Marsabit,Garissa,Wajir,IsioloandTanaRiver.Whiletheareaoftheaffectedregionsisproportionallylarge(58%ofKenya’stotalterritory),thetotalpopulationoftheseregionsisrelativelysmall(3.8m,orapproximately10%ofKenya’spopulation)andtheircontributiontoKenya’seconomy,atabout5%ofoveralleconomicactivity,isevensmaller(WorldBank,2011).Intheariddistricts,mobilepastoralismdominatestheeconomy;thesemi-aridareashaveamixofrain-fedandirrigatedagriculture,agro-pastoralism,bio-enterpriseandconservationortourism-relatedactivities(Fitzgibbon,2012).Theprivatesector’sstakeinthedrought-affectedregionsis,fromanationaleconomicpointofview,relativelysmall,atleastfornow.Thiswasreflectedinthestudyteam’sinterviewsandfocusgroupdiscussionsinLodwar(TurkanaCounty)andIsiolo(IsioloCounty),wherethe2011

2 The role of the private sector in humanitarian action


droughtresponsewasdescribedalmostexclusivelyasatraditionalpublicsector(government,UNandinternationalandnationalNGO)response,mainlyinvolvingdistributionsoffoodaidin-kindandlivestock/agricultureinputs.

Althoughtraditionalinterventionsdominatedthedroughtresponse,itisclearthattheseedsofmoremarket-sensitivehumanitarianresponseoptions–optionsthatbroadenthebaseofprivatesectorengagementbeyondcontractedtransportersandlocalsuppliers–hadbeguntotakerootduringthe2011response.Aspartofthewidelyembraced‘resilience’agendainthedrought-proneregionsofKenya,thesemarket-friendlyinnovationsandwideningprivatesectorpartnerships,somefirsttestedduringthe2011droughtresponse,havebecomefirmlyembeddedinpost-droughtresponsesandarecentraltoplanningforfuturedroughtpreparednessandresponse.

Duringthedrought,theprivatesectorpartneredwiththegovernmentandinternationalagenciesinanumberofnotableways.Inadditiontothemoretraditional(andstilldominant)contractingoftransportersandsuppliersfordeliveryoffoodandtheprocurementoffoodandnon-fooditems,banksandtelecomcompanieswerecontractedtodelivercashtransferstoregisteredbeneficiaries.Humanitarianagenciesandthegovernmentalsoprovidedsubsidiestotheprivatesector,especiallyinthelivestocktrade,inordertomaintainmarketstructures.Weather-basedinsuranceforlivestockwasalsopilotedduringthedrought.Finally,theKenyancorporatecommunity,inpartnershipwiththeKRCS,playedaground-breakingroleinfundraising,donatingtechnologyplatformsandensuringtransparencyandaccountability(e.g.probonofinanceandaccountingservices)throughtheKenyansforKenya(K4K)initiative(seeBox1).

2.1.1 Traditional contracting for drought responseUntanglingexpendituresoncontractstotheprivatesectorforthe2011droughtresponseisdifficultsincegovernmentandagencyprogrammesoftenspannedtheextended2008–2011droughtperiod,andbecausemanyagenciescontractoutgoodsandservicesindependently.Nevertheless,thegovernment’sdroughtresponseprioritiesgivesomeindicationofwheretheprivatesectorwasmostengaged.Accordingtothegovernment’spost-disasterneedsassessment,governmentexpendituresfocusedonwater(includingwatertruckingandfuelsubsidies),

livestock(includingoff-take),healthandnutrition(includingsupplementaryandtherapeuticfeeding),agriculture(inputssupply)andfoodaid(GoK,2012b).Theprocurementoffoodaid(includingnutritioninterventions),watertrucking,livestockoff-takeandagriculturalinputs,aswellasassociatedtransportandlogisticscosts,allreliedheavilyonlocalprivatesectorsuppliers.

Someindicationofthevolumeofthistypeoftraditionalprivatesectorengagementindroughtresponsecanbeseenfromtheactivitiesofoneofthemainplayers,WFP.InAugust2011,WFPreviseditsprogramme(roughly2009–2011)inthearidandsemi-aridlandsfrom800,000beneficiariestoatotalof1.7mthroughgeneralfooddistributionsandfood-orcash-for-assetsactivities.ThisbroughtWFP’soveralloperationalbudgetfortheperiodtoatotalof$527m,ofwhich$97.8mwasallocatedforlandsidetransportation,storageandhandling,mostofwhichisprocuredthroughtheprivatesector.Foodcostsbudgetedfortheperiodamountedto$271m,includinglocallyandregionallypurchasedfood(WFP,2011).In2011,WFPpurchasedatotalof$66mofcommoditiesfromtheEastAfricanCommunity,ofwhich$22.9mwasprocuredinKenya(WFP,2012).

TheKenyansforKenya(K4K)initiativeusedmobilebankingandsocialmediaplatformsprovidedprobonobytelecomsandmediacompanies–notablySafaricom,Kenya’slargestmobileprovider,butitscompetitorsaswell–toattractindividualdonorsandaggregatetheircontributionstowardstheKRCSemer-gencyresponse.Companiesalsomadecashcontributionsaspartoftheircorporatesocialresponsibilitycommitments.In-kindcontribu-tionswerecollectedbyparticipatingcompanies.Otherprivatesectorpartners,suchasKenyaCommercialBankandmajorauditingcompa-nies,offeredprobonofinancialandauditingservices.TheK4KinitiativefarexceededitsinitialfundraisingtargetofKsh500m,eventu-allyraisingoverKsh7.5billion(approximately$8.5m)aswellasdonationsin-kindvaluedatKsh278m(ZehraZidi,2012).Evenso,theoverallamountraisedwasasmallfractionofthehumanitarianaidreceivedinresponsetodroughtappeals($427.4m)(Fitzgibbon,2012).

Box 1: The Kenyans for Kenya initiative

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2.1.2 Private sector platforms for cash transfers Theuseofcashtransfersthroughfinancialinstitutionsandmobilemoneyservices(MMS)duringthe2011droughtresponsehasreceivedagreatdealofattention,althoughtheinterventionswerepilotinnatureandrepresentedarelativelysmallproportionofoveralltransfers.WFPestimatesthat10–15%ofits2011droughtresponsetransferswasintheformofcash.Likewise,itsongoingcashtransfersforsafetynetsandresilience-buildingindrought-proneareasremainsmallnexttoin-kindfoodtransfers.Nevertheless,theswitchtocashfordroughtresponseandthenewpartnershipsforgedwithbanksandtelecomcompaniesrepresentaradicaldeparturefromtraditionalemergencyresponsepracticeinKenya.Accordingtoonedonorrepresentative,the2011droughtresponseputtorestanyremainingdebateinKenyaaboutthemeritsoffoodin-kindversuscashorvouchertransfers:thedefaultthinkinginthehumanitariancommunitynowisthatcashispreferabletoin-kindtransfersaslongasadequatemarketstructuresareinplace.Thereverberationsofthistransformationhavebeenfeltbythoseintheprivatesectoratlocallevelwhotraditionallyhavebenefitedfromthehumanitarianaideconomy.Onesmall-scaletransporterinLodwar(TurkanaCounty)isrefittinghisvehiclestoseeknewclientsbecause‘weareawarethataidisover’.

WorkingwithitsNGOpartners,WFPhasbeenexploringinnovativemechanisms–withtheprivatesector–todeliverrelieftransfers,incash,tofood-insecurehouseholds.Inbothitsresilience-buildingactivitiesandinitsdroughtresponse,WFPhastestedtwomodels:abankingmodel,wherecashtransfersaremadeelectronicallytobeneficiaries’personalaccounts(inWFP’scasewithEquityBank);andthroughthemobilemoneyservicesofmobilenetworkoperatorsSafaricom(M-PESA),thegiantintheKenyamarket,andOrange(OrangeMoney).OthermobilenetworkoperatorsinKenya(YuandAirtel)alsooffermobilemoneyservices,thoughtheirmarketshareismuchlessthanSafaricom’s.

Underthebankingmodel,beneficiariesopenaccountswithEquityBankandareissuedATMcardstowithdrawcashatvillagebankagents.Equityalsoprovidesfinancialliteracytrainingtobeneficiaries.NGOsinTurkanadescribedsimilararrangementsfortheiractivitiesinpartnershipwithotherbanks(KenyaCommercialBank(KCB),PostbankandtheCo-operativeBankofKenya).EquityBankandKCBalsoprovidefinancialliteracytraininginIsioloCounty.

Amajoradvantageofthebankingmodelisthatthefullservicesofabank–savings,loans,insuranceetc.–areavailabletoabeneficiaryonceheorshehasopenedanaccount.Amajordisadvantage,fromahumanitarianpointofview,isthelengthyprocessingtimeforopeningaccountsandissuingATMcards.AsaWFPself-assessmentnotes,inthe‘emergencysettingthelimitationsofthebankaccountmodelbecameclear:openingbankaccountsanddistributingcardsisalengthyprocessnotsuitedtoashort-term,large-scaleemergencyresponse’(WFP,2013).Furthermore,withoutthelabour-intensiveworkofcommunity-basedtargetingandsensitisation(includingfinancialliteracytraining),‘mosthouseholdsstoppedusingtheiraccountswhentheprogrammeended’.Ontheotherhand,settingupaccountsduringnon-emergencyperiods,astheKenyaHungerSafetyNetProgramme(HSNP)isdoing,isgooddroughtpreparationandacontributiontolonger-termdevelopment.

Usingmobilemoneyservicesisasimpler,lesstime-consumingandcheaperprocess.Initspilotemergencyresponseprogramme,whichtargetedthreeharder-hitaridcounties(Isiolo,TurkanaandWajir)thatpreviouslyhadreceivedonlyfoodaid,WFPwasabletoregisterbeneficiaries(includingissuingtheirSIMcards)inasingledayforthoseunderM-PESA,andin2–3daysforthoseunderOrangeMoney(forwhomanEquityBankaccountwasalsosimultaneouslyopened).Beneficiaryverificationandpaymentprocessingtookmoretime,buttheaveragewaitforbeneficiariesbetweenverificationandreceivingtheirmoneywasjust23days.

Amajorimpedimenttoenlargingboththebankingmodeland,toalesserextent,theMMSmodeliscoverage.Bothrequirecellphonenetworkcoverageandthepresenceofagentswhocandisbursecashondemandclosetobeneficiaries.TheSafaricom/M-PESAnetworkislarge(15msubscribersin2012,upfrombelow20,000in2007)expandingquicklyandwellacceptedbyconsumers.Theothermobileoperatorsarelikewiseexpandingtheirnetworkcoverage,andmorecost-efficientmodelsforerectingandsharingtheuseofnewcellphonetowersamongoperatorsarenowbeingexplored.Inaddition,newregulationsspearheadedbytheCentralBankofKenyamayresultinSafaricomhavingtoopenupitsM-PESAplatformtoothermobilefirms,whichwouldallowcashtransfersfromanyprovidertoreachasdeeplyastheexistingM-PESAnetwork(Wokabi,2013).Thebanks,ledbyEquity,arelikewiseexpandingtheirbranchandagentnetworktomoremarginalareas,thoughataslowerpaceandwithaviewtowardsgrowinglonger-termclientrelationships.

�0 Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study

DespitethefeverishpaceofgrowthofM-PESAanditscompetitorsintomoremarginalareasandthepositiveexperienceofWFPandothersinpilotingrelativelysmall-scaleemergencycashtransfers,therearestillsignificantobstaclestousingtheseinnovativeprivatesectorplatformstotransfercashtobeneficiariesonalargescale.Anumberofhumanitarianactorspointedtoinsufficientgeographicalcoveragebythebanksandmobileproviders.OneNGO,anearlyhumanitarianagencytopartnerwithM-PESAfollowingthepost-electionviolencein2008,andwhichcontinuestoworksuccessfullywithitoncashtransfersinslums,dismissedthepossibilityofusingmobilemoneyforitscashtransferoperationsinMarsabitCountyduetopoormobilephonecoverage.TheNGOinsteadoptedforalternativepartnershipswithprivatesectoractors,subsidisingsmallkioskownerstoserveascashdistributionagents.1HumanitarianactorsinTurkanaandIsioloCountyalsonotedthatcellcoveragewaslimitedtolargertownsandalongsomestretchesofmainroads.AnumberofhumanitarianactorsalsovoicedconcernsaboutM-PESA’sreluctancetoadjustitsbusinesspracticestomeettheauditingandaccountabilityneedsofNGOsorUNagencies.ReferringtoMandera,WajirandGarissacounties,anotherinternationalNGOemphasisedagenerallackofprivatesectorinterestintheseareasduebothtothesparsenessofthepopulationandtoinsecurity.ThisNGOisnowhopefulthatitsrecentnine-monthnegotiationwithSharia-compliantFirstCommunityBanktoopenabranchinManderawillallowittotransferthemanagementandrisksofitsmicro-lendingschemestoacommercialentity.ThiswillbethefirsttimeinthisNGO’sextensiveglobalmicro-lendingoperationsthatamicro-lendingprogrammehasbeentakencommercial.2

Afurtherimpedimenttogrowingthehumanitarian–privatesectorrelationshipforemergencycashtransfersistheshortageofcashdonationsfromdonorsandthecontinuingsupply-sideavailabilityoffoodcommodities.TheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),which,alongwithDFID,theEuropeanCommunityHumanitarianOffice(ECHO)andtheSwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation(SDC),hasbeenleadingdonoreffortstoenhancetheuseofcashandvouchersinKenya–andwhichitselfwasamajorcashcontributorduringthe

2011droughtresponse–notedthatcashdonationscontinuedtolagwellbehindin-kinddonations.3TheWFPofficeinLodwar,citingitsstrongerfoodcommoditypipeline,notedthatitwasalackofcashresourcesratherthanoperationalortechnicalissueswiththeprivatesectorthatwashamperingeffortstoexpanditscashtransfersintheregion.

ArecentWFPstudy,fundedbyECHO,onmarketsandfinancialservicesinKenya’saridlandsisoptimisticabouttheprospectsforexpandedcash-basedinterventions,butiscautiousaboutthepaceofthatexpansion(WFP/ECHO/GoK,2013).Notingmarketconstraintssuchasfluctuatingfoodavailability(andvolatileprices)inlocalmarketsasaresultofseasonalproductioncyclesandpoortransportation,thestudyrecommendstargetingcash-basedinterventionstolargermarkets(e.g.districtheadquarters-sizedtowns)andonlygraduallyexpandingtolocalmarketsastheroadinfrastructureimproves.Thestudynotesthat,whileconnectivityformobilemoneyandbankingservicesisrapidlyexpandinginandaroundtradingcentres,geographicalexpansiontomoreremoteareasisslower.Theextensionofcashorvoucherprogrammes,accordingtothestudy,willbeconstrainedbythepaceofthatexpansion:thestudyrecommendslimitingcashandvoucherprogrammestobeneficiarieslivingnomorethan30kilometresfromdistrictheadquartersandafewotherselectedmarketsonthemaintransportcorridors.Otherssuggestedthatthestudywasover-cautiousontheroll-outofcashprogrammes,notingthatdecades-oldinstitutionalpracticesandincentivesforfoodaidin-kind–fordonors,thegovernment,agenciesandcontractors–wereprobablyslowing,unconsciouslyornot,thepaceofchange.Theavailabilityofmobileagentscouldtakethecoverageofserviceswellbeyondtheproposed30kmradiusinpartsoftheASALs.

Irrespectiveofthepaceofimplementationofnewfinancialtransfermodels,therewillcontinuetobequestionsabouttherelativevalueformoneyofthevariousmodels(cash,vouchers,bankagent,mobilemoney,etc.)indifferentsettings.

ThemarchofmobilecoverageinKenyaisexpandingrapidly,augmentedbytechnologicalinnovationssuchassoon-to-be-introducedsatellite-linkedSIMcards.4Many

1 Interview,internationalNGO,Nairobi.

2 Interview,internationalNGO,Nairobi.

3 Interview,donorrepresentative,Nairobi.

4 InterviewswithEquityBank,LodwarandCaLP,Nairobi.

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informantsinterviewedbythestudyteamreferredtocompletemobilecoverageinKenyaasinevitableandevenimminent.Othersweremorecautiousaboutthepaceofexpansion,butinvestmentssuchasthe$298msetasidebySafaricomin2012toexpanditsnetworkacrossthecountryconfirmthetrend(DailyKenya,2012).Thatsaid,forsomeofthereasonsoutlinedabovetheabilityofhumanitarianactorstopartnerwiththeprivatesectorinKenyatodeliverbasicdroughtreliefintheformofseamlesselectroniccashtransfersmayremainconstrained,atleastforthetimebeing.OneexpertoncashandvouchertransfersinKenyaextolledthedegreeoflearningaboutmarketsandpotentialprivatesectorpartnersinaridandsemi-aridlandsthatthe2011cashandvoucherexperimentshadprompted.Inhisview,aparadigmshiftinthinkingtowardsmarket-sensitiveapproacheshastakenplaceamonghumanitarians,thoughheechoedconcernsaboutdeliverycapacity.ShouldKenyabefacedwithadroughtofsimilardimensionsintheshortterm,heestimatedthatcashtransferswouldonlycomprise5%to10%moreoftheresponsethanduring2011.5

2.1.3 Subsidising the livestock market for emergency preparedness and responseAnothersignificantprivatesectorpartnershipduringthe2011droughtresponseinvolvedsupportingprivatesectorlivestockactorsandmarkets.Aswithcashandvouchersforfood-insecurehouseholds,thestudyteamfoundastrongawarenessofmarket-sensitiveinterventions.Humanitarians,localprivatesectoractorsandgovernmentofficialsallpointedtotheimportanceofdroughtresponseactivitiesbuiltonpartnershipswiththeprivatesector.Theseactorscontrastedmorerecenthumanitarianinterventionsthatprotectedlivestock-basedlivelihoodswitholderinterventionsthatcircumventedtheprivatesectorandunderminedordistortedmarkets.

EmergencyprogrammessupportedbytheFoodandAgricultureOrganisation(FAO)inresponsetothreatstolivestockin2009and2011werebasedonnewlyadoptedguidelinesforprotectingandrebuildinglivestockassets(FAO,2013)andexplicitlysoughttoavoidpast(andinsomecasesstillcontinuing)practicesofpoorlytimed,market-distortingdestocking.Inthepast,astandardpracticehadbeentoslaughterweakanimalsanddistributethemeatforfreetopoorhouseholds–aninefficientfoodtransfer(lackofrefrigerationmeansthatitneedstobeconsumedimmediately)thatalsodoeslittletoprotectlivelihoodsorthelivestocktrade.Instead,

livestockdealerswereprovidedwithsubsidiestocarryontheirnormaltradeevenastheirbusinessrisksincreasedbecauseofuncertaintiesaboutthequalityandquantityoflivestockavailableforpurchase.Thiskeptthewheelsofcommercerolling–withlivestocktraderstransportingingoodstodrought-affectedcommunitiesandtransportingouthealthyanimalsbeforedroughtconditions(ortheperceptionofdroughtconditionsamongtraders)madelivestockunmarketable.Anumberofothermarket-friendly,private-sectorpartnershipprogrammes–aimingtoprotectlivestocklivelihoods–wereimplementedduringthe2011droughtresponse.OnesupportedbySavetheChildrenandOxfamhelpedbutchersandothersmallvendorsinWajirandManderatosourcemeat,milkandfishlocallyanddistributethemtoupto80,000drought-affectedpeoplemonthlythroughvoucherprogrammes.6

PrivatesectorlivestocktradersinTurkanaandIsiolocounties,ontheotherhand,emphasisedtheoverallweakintegrationofthelivestockmarketinnorthernKenya.Theypointedtoineffectualgovernmentdestockinginterventionsduringthe2011droughtthroughtheKenyaMeatCommission,aswellasunfinishedorunder-performinggovernment-financedabattoirsinbothcounties.InTurkana,only2.6%ofthecountybudgetisallocatedtothelivestocksector,whichnonethelessaccountsforsome60%ofthecounty’seconomy.Thismaybepartofthereasonwhytheprivatesectortakesadimviewofthegovernment’sabilitytocontributetoimprovingconditionsforlivestockmarketing.

2.1.4 Private sector partnerships for livestock and agriculture insuranceThehumanitarianresponsetothe2011droughtincludedpayoutsforindex-basedlivestockinsurancepoliciesbeingpilotedinaridareas.ThroughapartnershipbetweentheInternationalLivestockResearchInstitute(ILRI)basedinNairobiandtheprivateinsurancecompanyUAPanditspartnerinsurers(APAandTakafulInsuranceofAfrica),livestockholdersinMarsabitCountywhopurchasedinsurancein2010receivedpayoutsofapproximatelyKsh10,000(roughly$150perfamily)inOctober2011andagaininMarch2012asaresultofthedroughtconditions.Arecentreviewoftheimpactoftheinsuranceschemereportedsubstantialimmediatebenefitsforinsuredfamilies–includingonhouseholdfoodsecurity–aswellaspositivespill-overeffectsforthenon-insuredinthecommunity(Janzen,2012).TheschemeisnowbeingexpandedintoIsioloandWajircounties.

5 Interview,internationalexpert,Nairobi. 6 Interview,donorrepresentative,Nairobi,andFitzgibbon(2012).


Anothermicro-insuranceweatherindexinitiative,KilimoSalama(‘SafeAgriculture’),isapartnershipbetweentheSyngentaFoundationforSustainableAgriculture(oftheSwissagribusinessSyngenta),UAPinsuranceandSafaricom(payoutsaremadethroughM-PESA).KilimoSalamareportedpayoutsofKsh9m(roughly$105,000)during2011,withitsoperationscentredinLaikipiaCounty.Althoughsmallinscopeandwithunevenresults(accordingtoNGOsworkinginthesameareas),thesepublic–privatepartnershipsforinsuranceofferapotentiallypowerfulandcost-efficientalternativetopost-disasterhumanitarianaid.

2.1.5 Private sector fundraising for drought responseAspreviouslymentioned,the2011droughtresponseincludedunprecedentedparticipationfromtheKenyancorporatecommunityandfromordinarycitizensraisingfundstosupportKRCSemergencyandpost-emergencydroughtresponses.WhenaskedbythestudyteamaboutprivatesectorengagementwithhumanitarianactioninKenya,mostprivatesectoractors(aswellasmanyUN,NGOandgovernmentofficials)focusedalmostexclusivelyontheK4KmodelandonfundraisingfortheKRCS.Privatesectorpartnershipwasusuallyequatedwithfundraisingopportunities,suggestingaquitestraightforwardinterpretationofprivatesectorengagementwithhumanitarianaction,asopposedtothemorenuanceddiscussionsonprivate–publicpartnershipsintheinternationalhumanitarianworld.OnerepresentativeofaUNhumanitarianagencysuggestedthatthispointedtotheneedforhumanitariansinKenyatodoabetterjobofeducatingthepublicandthecorporatesectoronthecomplexitiesofhumanitarianaction,perhapsthroughconcertedeffortswiththemedia.BothBBCMediaAction(BBCMA)andtheNationGrouphighlightedalackofmediainterestinhumanitarianmessaging,whichinsteadrelieslargelyonhumanitarians(ororganisationssuchastheBBCMA)producingprogrammingorpayingforspotsonlocalradio.

2.2 Private sector contributions to emergency preparedness and resilience

Thisstudyfoundlittleevidenceofstructuredprivatesectorengagementinemergencypreparednessactivitiespriortothe2011drought.Accordingtogovernment

officialsfromtheNDMAandtheNationalDisasterOperationsCenter(NDOC),theprivatesectorisnotaformalmemberofgovernmentemergencypreparednessstructuressuchastheKenyaFoodSecuritySteeringGroup,thoughthegovernmentiscurrentlyrevisingitsdisastermanagementpolicywiththeaimofstreamliningandclarifyingnationalgovernmentroles.Oncethispolicyisapproved,thenewdisastermanagementstructureswillbebetterabletoincludeprivatesectorparticipants–aprospectthatwaswelcomedbytheofficialsinterviewed.

Anumberofcompaniesofferedsomeanecdotalevidenceoftheirownbusinesscontinuityanddisasterpreparednessactivities.EastAfricaBreweries,forexample,citedtheeffectofdroughtsonitssupplychain,notingthatitprocured30%ofitsstarchfromsorghumgrownindryerareasofKenya,andthatstockpilinggrainwasabusinessnecessity.Suppliesfallduringdroughtand,whenWFPentersthemarket,accordingtotheBreweries,pricesforcerealsarefurtherinflated.TheprivatesectorwasmoreheavilyengagedinpreparednessexercisesledbyOCHAforthe2013elections,asdiscussedbelow.Safaricomandothercompaniesalludedtoextensive,andconfidential,disastermanagementandcontinuityplansfortheirownbusinesses.

2.2.1 Cementing ongoing humanitarian and the private sector partnerships around resilienceInthepost-droughtperiod,manyoftheprivatesectorpartnershipsdescribedabovehavebeenmaintainedandcontinuetogrow,particularlyinthecontextofresilienceprogrammingthatincorporatesdisasterpreparednessandriskreductionelements.Clearly,theresilienceagenda(confirmedintheKenyangovernment’sPost-DisasterNeedsAssessment(PDNA)),hastakenholdasacommonvisionamongallcategoriesofactorinterviewedbythestudyteam,andthemoremarket-sensitiveapproachesemployedinthe2011drought(manywithdirectprivatesectorpartnerships)havebeeneasilytransferabletoactivitiesnowbeingimplementedbydual-mandatedagenciesandNGOs.Asonelong-servinglocalgovernmentofficialinLodwarputit,‘everybody’stalkingDRRnow…somethingthatwasnotseeninthepast.Theissueisthatwehadbecomedependentonemergencies;theNGOswouldcomeandsay“take,take”andthenleaveinsixmonths’.TheofficialdescribedagrowingconsensusacrossthecountyanddowntothevillagelevelaroundtheneedforeffectiveDRRactivities.

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TheEquityBankmanagerinLodwarechoedthesesentiments–‘wewantlong-termsolutions,notshort;IknowsomeoftheNGOswouldnotwanttohearthat’.

Oneofthemostextensiveongoingprivate–publicpartnershipsrelatedtoresilienceanddroughtresponseistheKenyaHungerSafetyNetProgramme(HSNP),whichtargetsimpoverishedhouseholdsinfourcounties,Mandera,Wajir,MarsabitandTurkana.Phase1oftheHSNP,from2008–12,fundedcashtransfersto69,000households(approximately500,000people).EquityBankmanagedthetransfersthroughitsbanksandagents.Phase2aimstoregisterandprovidefullbankaccountsto400,000householdsacrossthefourcounties.InternationalNGOsareorganisingtheregistrationprocess,whiletheprogrammepaysEquityBanktoopentheaccounts.TheHSNPwillmakeregulartransfersto100,000ofthepooresthouseholdsaspartofitsongoingsocialsafetynetprogramme,andtheremainingaccountscanbeusedforcashtransfersintimesofdrought.Itshouldbenoted,though,thatHSNPpaymentsarecurrentlynotbeingproposedasanalternativetofoodaid,norcouldtheysubstituteatthisstageforin-kinddeliverieswheremarketsarenotfunctioning.Nevertheless,aspointedoutinarecentanalysis,amajorobjectiveoftheHSNPishungerreductionand‘itwouldclearlybepracticalandefficientifWFP’s(foodassistance)pipelinecouldbedistributedusingthesamecard(andalsousingprivatedistributionagentsandtradersinthemodeoftheHSNP)’(Fitzgibbon,2012).ThisHSNP-EquitypartnershipisapotentialgamechangerforaddressingfuturedroughtneedsinthearidareasofKenya.

Similarly,themajorUNagenciesandinternationalNGOscontinuetogrowandexpandtheirpartnershipswithmobilemoneyoperatorsandbanksinthecontextoftheirpost-droughtresilience-buildingefforts.Forexample,ajointWFP–EquityBank–MasterCard‘cash-lite’pilotwasrolledoutinAugust2013withtheaimofovercomingtheshortageofphysicalcashinremoteandinsecureareas.TheexperimentallowsbeneficiariestoreceivecashonaMasterCard-brandedbankcardandthenspendthatcashelectronicallyatnearbyretailshopsequippedbyEquityBanktoacceptbanktransactions.

2.2.2 Opportunities for new public–private partnerships around resilienceInsomeofthearidareasofKenya–andalmostcertainlyinpartsofTurkanaCounty–thepost-

2011droughtperiodappearstobecharacterisedbyagrowingconvergenceofinterestsamongimportantprivatesectoractorsandthehumanitarian/developmentcommunity.OnebankinLodwar,forexample,describeditseffortsto‘bank’alargeproportionofthepopulationofTurkanaCountyaspartofitsroleasaleadpartneronphase2oftheHSNP.ThebankisbeingsubsidisedbytheHSNPtoexpanditsclientbaseintheregion(atpresentonly2%ofTurkana’spopulationofabout850,000hasabankaccount).Phase2oftheHSNPwillincreasethenumberofbeneficiaryhouseholdsinTurkanafrom30,000familiesinPhase1toover40,000andmakethemall,forthefirsttime,fullholdersofbankaccounts.TheaveragehouseholdfamilysizeacrossthefouraridregionscoveredbytheHSNPis7.2(HSNP,2013),meaningthataroundone-thirdofthepopulationormoreofTurkanaalonewillbecomebankingclientsunderPhase2.Theplanisforthisnumbertobeincreasedifwarrantedbydroughtconditions.

Clearly,thebankseescommercialpossibilitiesbeyondtheHSNPthatmakeitspartnershipwiththeprogrammesoattractive.Thebank’sbranchmanagerdescribedtheregionasthecountry’snextbigeconomicfrontier,citingagrowinglevelofinterestintheregionfromhisbank’smanagementaswellastheimminentopeningofanumberofotherbankbranchesinLodwar.Discoveriesofmajorwaterandoilresourcesintheregionareanimportantdriverofthisinterest.Arangeofactorsinterviewedfullyexpectedthetransportandcommunicationinfrastructureintheregiontobeupgradedsoontoenableexploitationoftheseresources

Kenya’srefugeecampspresentaparticularopportunityfortheprivatesector.ResearchfortheUNHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)in2010reportedthat5,000busi-nesses,rangingfromindividualtraderstolargeshops,wereoperatingintheDadaabcamp,withanannualturnoverof$25m(DANIDA,2010).Around30%ofUNHCR’sfundingforDadaabin2011camefromtheprivatesector,althoughalmostallwasfromoutsideKenya.Somelocalandinternationalprivatesectorpartnershipsarefundingprogrammesinthecamp,includingacollaborationbetweenSafaricomandMicrosoftone-learningprogrammes.

Box 2: Refugees and the private sector


–investmentsthatwouldbenefittheresilienceobjectivesofdonorsandagencies,aswellasfuturehumanitarianresponses.Similartrendsinprivatesectorengagementweredescribedbyactorsoperatinginotherdrought-proneregions,thoughthepaceofchangeisunlikelytobeasquickwithoutthepullofsuchlargeextractiveandnaturalresourceopportunities.

2.3 The private sector and emergency preparedness and response around election violence

PoliticalviolencebrokeoutinKenyaaroundthe2007election,afterarelativelypeacefulelectionin2002,andonanunprecedentedscaleandbreadthacrossthecountry.Inallabout1,200peoplewerekilledand664,000displaced,thousandsofwhomstillare.Privatelyownedvernacularradiostations,setupfollowingcommercialpressureonthegovernmenttoliberalisetheairwavestoserveandselltoparticularethnicandlinguisticcommunities,hadplayedapartinincitingviolencebybroadcastinghatemessages,asdidviralhatetextmessaging(Deane,2013).

ThelevelsofviolenceshockedtheinternationalcommunityandmuchoftheKenyanprivatesector.Transportroutesweredisruptedforthefirst2–3monthsof2008,withfuelpricesrisingsharplyasfarafieldaseasternDRC.TheKenyaShippersAssociation(KSA)7liaisedwiththepolicetoadviseitsmembersonhowbesttosecuretheirsupplychains.Thiswasthefirsttimethatpoliticalviolencehadseriouslydamagedbusiness,andaftertheviolencewasovertheprivatesectoruseditsnetworkofbusinessassociationstoapplypressureonthegovernmenttotackletherootcausesoftheviolence(usuallyjudgedtolieinthewinner-takes-allConstitution,post-coloniallanddistributionandacultureofimpunity)andavoidarepeat.

DuringtheviolencenewprivatelyownedwebsitessuchasUshahidistartedtousecrowdsourcingtorecordandmapincidentsofviolenceandhumanrightsabuses.TheprivatesectorcontributedtotheNationalHumanitarianFundfortheMitigationofEffectsandResettlementofVictimsofthepost2007ElectionViolence,butbeyondthemediadidnotfeaturesignificantlyamongthe

witnessestotheWakiCommission,whichinvestigatedtheviolence.Theinternationalhumanitariancommunitywasinvolvedinfundingreliefeffortsforthedisplaced,butlikeotherswascaughtlargelyunpreparedforthescaleoftheviolence.

Between2008andthe2013electionsmajorchangesweremadetotheConstitution,hatespeechwasmadeacrimeandallmobilephoneuserswererequiredtoregisterbeforegettingaSIMcard.Averythoroughpreparednessprocesswasputinplaceinvolvingthegovernment,theKRCSandinternationalhumanitarianagenciesanddonors,ledbyOCHA.Hubsweresetupinregionalcentrestohelpreducetherisksofviolenceandmakecontingencyplans.Somehubs,suchasKisumu,activelyinvolvedtheprivatesector;somebusinessleaderswerereportedtohaveinfluencedpoliticalleaderstoshowrestraint,andthepublicandprivatemediamoderatedtheirtonetotheextentthattheywereaccusedbypartsofthemediaofbeingsupine.KRCSleda‘votepeace’campaignusingtextmessaging,andpersuadedpoliticalleaderstosignapubliccommitmenttohonourtheelectionresultsandtakeanycomplaintsthroughthecourts.Ushahidiandothersiteswereprimedtomonitorelectionviolence.Intheend,although192peoplearereportedtohavediedduringtheelections,thepollwaswidelyjudgedasuccessandmanyofthecontingencyplansthathadbeendrawnupdidnothavetobeused.Theprivatesectorhadplayedapartinthis,albeitnotinasystematicway.

PoliticallydrivenviolencereturnedwiththeAl-ShabaabattackattheWestgateCentreinNairobion21September2013,whichleft67peopledeadand175injured.HerethefirstrespondersweretheKRCSandthelocalbusinesscommunity,whichwasdirectlyaffectedintheattack.Westgateisasignificantbusinesscentre–thesupermarketchainNakumatt,forexample,took14%ofitsrevenuethroughitsWestgatestore.Inresponsetotheattack,onemobilenetworkoperatorsetuphotspotsprobonoaroundWestgatetoenablecommunications;itandothertelecomsproviderscoordinatedbyKRCSsetupafundforthevictimswhichhadraised$1mwithinaweekfromindividualandcorporatedonations,manymadebymobilephone.Bymid-October,totaldonationsamountedtoKsh123m(closeto$1.5m)(Njagi,2013).Accountancyfirmsagreedtoaudittheuseoffundsprobono,andtwitteruserswerequicktoquestiontheuseofthefunds,halfofwhichwenttopaymedicalbillsatlocalprivatehospitals.SecurityaspectsoftheWestgatecrisiswerehandledbytheKenyanpoliceandarmy,with7 Interview,KSA.

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someinitialinvolvementfromlocalprivatesecuritycompanies,butmuchoftherestoftheresponsewasledbyKRCSandtheprivatesector,fillinginforaperceivedlackofgovernmentaction.

Westgatewasthefirstdirect,large-scaleattackonNairobi’sbusinesscommunityandtheirfamilies.Whentheirbusinessinterestsaredirectlythreatened

orharmed,aswiththeblockageofroadsduringthepost-electionviolenceortheattackatWestgate,thebusinesscommunitydoesreact.KEPSAandtheKenyaAssociationofManufacturers(KAM)bothcitedadvocacyandlobbyingeffortswiththegovernmentforsecuritysectorreformandimprovedsecurityenforcementinresponsetoboththepost-electionviolenceandtheWestgateattack.

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Ifhumanitarian–privatesectorengagementinKenyaistocontributefurthertonationalresponsestofuturehumanitariancrises,anumberoftheexamplesandtrendsdescribedabovecouldbebuiltupon.Inmostcases,though,existinghumanitarian–privatesectorengagementcouldbemorestrategicandmoreefficient–possibly,asastart,throughamorestructureddialoguebetweenemergencyandpreparednessleadersingovernmentandthehumanitariancommunityandrepresentativesoftheprivatesector.

3.1 Growth, the private sector and implications for humanitarian action

OneofthemorepromisingopportunitiesforprivatesectorengagementinhumanitarianactionovercomingyearsissimplythewidespreadandgrowingawarenessamonghumanitarianactorsinKenya(aswellaswithintheKenyangovernment)oftheneedtoworkwithintheslipstreamofprivatesectoractivitiesandmarkets.Asthe2011droughtresponseactivitiesandthepost-droughtresilienceworkdemonstrate,thisisnotaboutcedinghumanitarianresponsibilitytothemarket,butinsteadaboutrecognisingthatfunctioningmarketswill,formanywhoarecurrentlyperennialrecipientsofhumanitarianaid,bringopportunitiesthatwillreducetheneedforhumanitarianassistanceand–whenitisneeded–makethatassistancemoreefficientandcost-effective.Thesemarket-friendlyapproachesandexperimentscouldbenefitfromthesortofin-depthunderstandingoftheprivatesectorthatcomeswithworksuchastheECHO-WFP-governmentstudyonmarketsinthearidlands(citedabove).

3.1.1 Partnering with the private sector for transport and logisticsTheKenyanprivatesectorisstronglyengagedineffortstoimproveKenya’spositionasaregional

transporthub,includingbyimprovingtradelinksandport,railandroadinfrastructure.Theprivatesector,forexample,partnerscloselywithTrademarkEastAfrica(TMEA),adonor-supportedmechanismthatworkstoincreasetrade,marketaccessandcompetitivenessintheEastAfricanCommunity.ThegoalsofTMEAcoincidesquarelywithhumanitarianprocurementandlogisticsneedsintheregion,includingmaintainingefficientandopencorridorstoSouthSudan,SomaliaandnorthernKenya.Butwhilehumanitariansareawareofdiscussionsandaresometimesinvolvedinmeetings,thereappearstobelimitedstructuredengagementofhumanitariansinthedebatebetweentheprivatesectorandthegovernmentabouttransportandinfrastructurepriorities.

3.1.2 Private sector platforms for delivering humanitarian aid in cashCashtransferplatformsprovideanopportunityforrevolutionisinghumanitarianresponseinKenyaandforbringinglong-marginalisedpopulationsintomoreintegratedmarketsandtheorbitofbankingandfinancialservices.TheresilienceagendainKenyaiscontributingtorealisingthesepossibilities.However,thesehumanitarianresponsesarelargelystillattheexperimentalstageandtherearereasonsforcaution:switchingtotheseplatformswillbeaslowprocess,especiallyastheyarerolledouttodistantareas;thesustainabilitywithwhichbankandtelecomsystemscandeliveraidrestsonunprovenbusinessmodels;anddialoguebetweentheprivatesectorandhumanitarianactorsonsharedandrespectiveobjectivesisadhocanddispersed.

Theremarkablespreadofmobilemoneytransfersandvillage-levelbankinginKenya–nowextendingintomoredistantanddrought-affectedareas–bringsapotentialconvergenceofbusinessandhumanitarianintereststoplaceswherepastemergencyresponseshadfewoptionsforutilisingprivatemarketsanddeliverychannels.EquityBankandSafaricomarewayoutinfrontofthecompetition,thoughnewfinancialplayers,

3 Humanitarian–private sector engagement: opportunities and constraints


suchastheFirstCommunityBankinMandera,arearriving.OngoingresilienceinvestmentssuchastheHSNPorWFP’sworkoncashforassetssuggestthattheseplatformsmaybemovingclosertothepointwherehumanitarianresponsesusingcashtransferscouldbedoneonalargescale.

Buttheremaybereasonstoavoidcomplacencyinthinkingthatthespreadofmobilebanking–whetherthebankagentormobilemoneymodel–willmeettheimmediateneedsofhumanitarianagenciesor,moreimportantly,helptoaddresstheunderlyingcausesofthoseneeds.Mostnotably,therearelegitimatequestionsabouttheincentivesandbusinessmodelsofthetelecomcompaniesandthebanks,andtowhatextentthesecoincidewithindependentandimpartialhumanitarianaction.Atthemoment,anumberofexperimentsareunderway:onthehumanitariansidetoreplacetrucksandbagsoffoodwithM-PESAorEquityBankdigitaltransfers;andontheprivatesectorsidetotestoutwhetherthepooranddispersedpopulationsofthearidandsemi-aridregionsofKenyaareapotentiallyprofitableclientbase.Forthemostpartrelationsbetweenthetwosidesarecontractual,andinthatsensenotmuchdifferentfromanaidagencycontractingalocaltransportertocarryfoodtoadistributionsite.Theexistenceofathrivingprivatesector(e.g.thegrowingcoverageofmobilemoney)insomedisaster-hitareashasspurredthehumanitariancommunitytoinnovate,andcontractswiththeseprovidersarehelpingtosubsidisetheexpansionoftheprivatesectorfurtherintoremoteareas.Butitisnotclearhowsustainablethatexpansionwillbeifprofits–independentofaidcontracts–donotfollow.

Therearealsoreasonstobeoptimistic.Changingtechnologyandinnovationssuchasthebankagentmodelmeanthatthepriceofestablishingabusinesspresenceandexecutingtransactionsisfalling.Thereisalsoafairdegreeofbullishthinkingabouttheeconomyofthearidandsemi-aridregions,basedonmineraldiscoveries,improvingtransportandopportunitiestofurthercommercialiselivestockowningasthedemandformeatinKenyagrows,meaningaprofitableclientbasemaybeontheway.Nevertheless,thoughbothEquityandSafaricom,totakethetwomainplayersasanexample,havemadecontributionsin-kindtotheongoingexperiments,thereisstillaneedtoclarifysharedandunsharedobjectivesbetweenthetwocommunitiesinordertoensurethebestpossibleoutcomesforfuturecrisis-affectedpeople.Atthemoment,fromwhatthestudy

teamheard,thedialogueinthisareaismostlyadhocanddispersedamongmanydifferenthumanitarianactorsandmanydifferentprivatesectoractors.

3.1.3 Keeping abreast of technological advances – and not just conceptuallyOnthefinancialservicesandinformationtechnologyside,thepotentialforotherhumanitarian(orhumanitarian-related)productstoreachdisaster-affectedpopulations,suchascropandlivestockinsurance,healthservicesandimprovedmarketinformation,hasonlyjustbeguntobeexplored.Theseareotherareaswhereadeeperdialoguebetweenthehumanitarianandtheprivatesectors–apartnershipthatgoesbeyondadhoccontractualarrangements–maybevaluable.OnelessonfromtheregionalCashLearningPartnership(CaLP)teamandechoedinotherinterviewsistheimportanceofhavingthe‘backoffices’ofhumanitarianagencies–thefinance,logistics,accountingandITdivisions–fullyengagedindialoguewithprivatesectorpartners.Accordingtoexperts,thereisnoshortageofhumanitarianprogrammestaffwhocanconceptualiseatechnologicalsolutiontoaproblem,butbottlenecksareovercomeandrealprogressismadewhentherespective‘backoffices’aretalkingtoeachother.3.1.4 Livestock as a business – linking humanitarian action with the livestock marketInterventionsduringthedroughtperiodthatattemptedtoadapttoandsupportthelivestockmarketdemonstratedthepotentialforfuturehumanitarianresponsestrategies.Inthefuture,pastoralistswouldseetheweatherforecast(ontheirmobilephones),destockandselltheirstill-healthyanimals,banktheirmoneywithamobilebankingagentandbuymoreanimalswhenconditionsimprove.LivestockassociationsandtradersconfirmedwhatFAOdescribedasagrowingunderstandingoftheneedtotransformlivestockrearingfromatraditionalculturalpracticeintomoreofabusiness.Accordingtothesestakeholders,pastoralistsunderstandtheeffectsofchangingclimateandareincreasinglytakingstepstoprotecttheirlivelihoodsbymanagingtheirherdstomitigatetherisksofmorefrequentandseveredroughts,investinginpasture,destockinginatimelywayandsoon.Thegovernmentismakinginvestmentsthatwillhelp,suchasabattoirsinLokichokio(completed)andIsiolo(underconstruction)thatwillallowforslaughterandpreservationclosertopastoralists.Improvedtransportroutesareessentialtointegratingthelivestocktradewithgrowingnational

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andglobalmarkets,suchasSaudiArabiaandYemen,wheredemandisstrong.Thecombinedeffectsoftheseinvestmentscouldtransformhowpastoralists,tradersandhumanitarianagenciesrespondtofuturedroughts.

3.1.5 Expanding the scope and understanding of corporate social responsibilityDialoguewithbanksandtelecomscompaniesontheirworkinhumanitarianactioncouldbepartofalargerdiscussionabouthowcompaniesdeploytheircorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)resources,andhowtheymightbeusedintheserviceofhumanitarianneeds.Thereisagrowingawarenessof,andcommitmentto,CSRamongprivatesectoractorsinKenya.Thepracticeofestablishingcorporatefoundationsalsoseemstobetakinghold.Mostofthediscussionisaboutrespondingwithcashorin-kinddonationsinreactiontoaparticularevent.TheSafaricom–KRCSpartnershipbegunwithK4Kisagoodmodelforhowanestablishedpartnershipcanbeputintoactionquicklywhenanewdisasterstrikes.FollowingtheWestgateattack,themodelwasre-establishedwithin48hours,allowingsubstantialfundstoberaisedbutalsoshowinghowcorporateexpertisecouldbedeployedinacrisis.Nevertheless,seniornationalandinternationalhumanitarianactorscomplainedthatthereislittleappetiteforpartnershipsinwhichtheprivatesectorinvestsitsskillsorresourcesinpreparednessactivities,orinmorelaboriousandlonger-termpost-disasterrecoveryandresilience-building.

ConfirmingthefindingsofmanystudiesonglobalCSRincentives,Nielsen,theglobalinformationandmeasurementcompany,describedhowitscommitmenttocontributingtoKenya’ssocialanddevelopmentneedswasamajorincentiveforKenyansreturningfromthediasporatojointhecompany.WFPandNielsen,whichhavenegotiatedaglobalcorporatepartnership,havebeenexploringhowNielsen’sexpertiseincollectingandanalysingsurveydatamightbeusedinKenyainconjunctionwithvulnerabilityassessmentmappingandbeneficiarytargeting.Buildingthistypeofmorein-depthpartnership,whilealsocontinuingtogrowcorporatesectorgiving,couldhelpKenyabettermanageandfunditshumanitarianchallengesinthefuture.3.1.6 Connecting global private sector partnerships to national humanitarian effortsThereareanumberofglobalprivatesectorpartnershipswithhumanitarianagencies,butveryfewappeartohavereachedKenya.Manylocalstaffwere

onlypassinglyaware,ifatall,oftheiragencies’globalpartnerships,andmosthumanitarianintervieweeshadlittleornoknowledgeofexistinginitiativesforpublic–privatepartnerships,suchastheWorldEconomicForum’sDisasterResourcePartnershiportheFritzInstitute’sworkthroughGlobalHand.OthersexpressedtheviewthatthepartnershipsservedHQinterestsanddidnotproviderealaddedvalue–orresources–atthenationallevel.Anothercomplaintwasthatthetermsofthepartnershipsnegotiatedatthegloballevelweretooinflexibletobeusefulinalocalcontext(e.g.ratesforconsultancyservices),andthatHQunitswerecontrollingthepartnershipswithaviewtomaintaininggoodrelationswithpartners,butwerenotprovidingsupportfortheverylabour-intensiveworkofbuildingmeaningfulpartnershipsatthenationallevel.Wheresimple,transferablediscountshadbeennegotiated(forexamplewithMaerskshipping),agencieswereabletotakeadvantageatthelocallevel.

ThereisgrowingmultinationalinterestandpresenceinKenya,andthestudyteamdidfindsomegoodexampleswhereglobalpartnershipshadpaidlocaldividends,suchasWFP’sMasterCardpartnershipsettingupcashtransferpaymentsystemsusingdebitcards.Asahumanitarianandregionalhubwithagrowingmultinationalpresence,Nairobimaybeagoodplaceformakingaconcertedeffortonthepartofhumanitarianagenciesandtheirglobalpartnerstotranslatethesepartnershipsintomeaningfulactioninthefield.

KenyahasaGlobalCompactNetwork(GCN)withover65members.TheCEOofSafaricom,BobCollymore,isontheUNGlobalCompactBoard.TheKenyanNationalAssociationofManufacturers(KAM)providesthesecretariat.TheKenyaGCNhasfocusedonbusinessethicsandaddressingcorruption.Ithasnotsofarhadaparticularfocusonhumanitarianissues,butmembersoftheinternationalcommunitycoulduseKAMasastartingpointforengagingbusinessassociations.

3.2 Future prospects

KRCS,asfirstresponder,anditsprivatesectorpartnersgiveKenyaastrengththatmanycountriesatasimilarstageofdevelopmentdonothave,suggestingthatKenyawillbeabletohandlesmalltomediumcriseswithlittleoutsidesupport.Ifthereisafurtherseriousdroughtinthenextthreeyears,thereisagoodchancethatimprovedweatherforecasting,


mostlyfromprivatesectorsources,willprovidebetterwarning,andmobilephonenetworkswillbeusedtorelaymoreaccuratemessagesingoodtimetothosewhoarevulnerable.Buttheexpansionofcashtransfersandexperimentstokeepmarketsopenwillhaveonlylimitedextracoverage,andtheinternationalcommunitywillstillneedtoprovideamajorfinancialcontribution.WhetherKenyangovernmentsystemswillbebetterthanin2011dependsinpartonwhetherthenewplanningsystemsunderpreparationaremoreinclusivethantheirpredecessors.

Inthelongerterm,Kenya’shumanitarianfutureishardertogauge.TheVision2030aspirationisforthecountrytoreachmiddle-incomestatusand,asseveralintervieweestoldtheresearchers,nottorelyonexternalassistance,especiallyforfood.TheKenyaneconomyhasthepotentialtogrowquickly,boostedbyoilrevenues.TullowOilhassofardiscoveredreservesof300mbarrels,andthereistheprospectofmore.Thedevelopmentoftransportcorridorsthroughdrought-proneareas,particularlytheLamu–SouthSudan–EthiopiaTransportCorridor,andthespreadof

Thepillarsofhumanitariansuccessformiddle-incomecountrieswithstrongprivatesectorengage-ment,scoredfrom1(littleprogress)to5(achieved)withtrendsteady(=),positive(+),ornegative(–)

�.Government-ledpreparednessplann�ngsystemthatincludetheprivatesector,supportedbybestavailableforecastsandstockpiles/calldowncontractswithsuppliersatpre-agreedratesScore:�=Newambitiouspoliciesareinplacebutcurrentsystemsareunder-developedandtherearefurthermanagementandbudgetuncertaintiesasaresultoftheunfinished/untestedgovernmentdevo-lutionprocess.Privatesectorconfidenceingovern-mentdeliveryislow.

�.Capac�tytof�nanceacr�s�sresponseeitherthroughincreasedtaxrevenuesorborrowingScore:�=ThereisareasonableprospectthatKenyawillbeabletoborrowonthefinancialmarketsinthenextfewyearsandtoraisemoretaxorborrowlargesumsdomesticallyincrisis.

�.Transportsystemthatsupportshumanitarianresponseincrisis-proneareasScore:�+Transittimeshaveimprovedinthelast3yearsbutthereisalongwaytogoontheroadsandport(andabarelyfunctioningrailway).However,therearegoodprospectsoffurtherimprovement.

�.Platformsforprov�d�ngcr�s�ssupportpaymentstovulnerablepeoplewheretheyliveScore:�+KenyaisaleaderinAfricaonthemovementofmoneyandbankingforthepoor.

ThereisencouragingprogressthroughM-PESA,EquityBankandothers,thoughtheroll-outofcoverageisslowingasitmovestowardspoorer,moreremoteareas.

�.Res�l�entmarkets,includingamarketculture,incrisis-proneareasScore:�=Thereareencouragingexperimentsunderwayindrought-affectedareasforbothlive-stockandagriculturemarkets,buttheseareonasmallscale.Greaterattentionisneededtotransportsystemsandtothelonger-termcommercialisationoflivestockinpastoralistareas.

�.Agrow�ng,educatedm�ddleclasswillingtocontributetocrisisresponseandholdhumanitarianactorstoaccountScore:�+Thepublicisincreasinglyeducatedabouthumanitariancrisesandhasdemonstratedawillingnesstogivegenerously.KRCSistrustedbythepublicasthefirstresponderforsmalltomediumcrisesandisheldtoaccountbythepublicandthemedia;nosimilartrustandaccountabilityexistsbetweenthepublicandthegovernmentwhenitcomestocrisisresponse.

�.Popularcommun�cat�onsystemsthateducateand�nformonhuman�tar�an�ssuesinadditiontocrisisreportingScore:�=Largemediaconcentrateoncrisisreporting,withtheprovisionofhumanitarianeducationandcrisisinformationlimitedtosmaller-scale,subsidisedinitiativesofagencieslikeUNICEFandBBCMediaAction.

Box 3: Outline assessment of Kenya’s current progress towards managing its own large-scale humanitarian crises

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bankingwillbringopportunitiesforamoremarket-basedarableandlivestockeconomy.Asdroughtsbecomemorefrequentpastoralists’viewoftheirherdsassymbolsofprestigeratherthanaswealthtobemanagedisgraduallychanging.Whereasnowthearidandsemi-aridareascontributemarginallytoKenya’sGDP,inthefuturethatshouldchange,andwithitthepoliticalattentiontheseregionsreceive.

Asamiddle-incomecountry,Kenyashouldbeabletoraiseresourcesdomesticallyoroninternationalmarketstomeetthecostsofdroughts.Increasingaccesstocashtransfersdeliveredthroughtheprivatesectorwillfurtherreducetheneedforfoodaid.Inthisscenario,theprivatesectoristhesourceofextrawealthandresilience,forexamplethroughcommercialisationofthelivestocksectorinthearidandsemi-aridlands,reducingoravoidinghumanitariandisastersandprovidingthedeliverymechanismforthemainreliefeffort,with

internationalhumanitarianagenciesincreasinglyplayinganadvisoryrole.Forthistransitiontoworksmoothly,thegovernmentwillneedtoplayaguidingrole,helpedbytheinternationalhumanitariancommunityandinvolvingtheprivatesectorinplanninginamuchmoresystematicway.Butthereisamoredifficultscenario,wheredroughtsbecomemorefrequent,pastoralistscommercialiseonlyveryslowly,thegovernmentisnotabletoprovideleadershipondroughtmanagement,rapidpopulationgrowthcontinuesandextrawealthinthearidlands,particularlyoilrevenues,fuelsconflict,leadingtoachangedbutnotimprovedhumanitariansituation.

Box3(opposite)providesaroughassessmentbythestudyteamofwhereKenyacurrentlyisonthepathtomanagingitsownlarger-scalecriseswithmorelimitedexternalhelp,andsuggeststhecurrentdirectionoftravel.Itisnotcomprehensiveandisintendedtostimulatedebate.

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4 Opportunities and options

Thisstudyhastackledabroadsubjectinarelativelyshortperiodoftime.Thefollowingsuggestionsandrecommendationsarethereforemadewithacommensuratedegreeofcircumspection.TheyarealsomadeagainstabackgroundwhereKenyanswanttotakemoreresponsibilityformanagingtheirownhumanitariancrises.Thisshouldmeanagrowingrolefortheprivatesector.

4.1 Taking advantage of changing markets

Takinggreaterresponsibilityformanaginglargerhumanitariancriseswillrequireencouragingmarketstofunctionduringdroughtsandexploringnewwaystotransferresourcestopeoplemadevulnerablebycrises.Currentlydonorsaresupportingawiderangeofexperimentsintheseareas.Theseshouldcontinue,butwithstrongercoordinationtoensurethatthebestaretakentoscalequickly.Thisprocesscanbestbecoordinatedbythegovernment,workingcloselywiththeprivatesectorandinternationaldonors.

Atpresentdonorsaresubsidisingtheprivatesectortoconductsomeoftheseinitiatives,suchastheHSNP.Itwasbeyondthescopeofthisstudytomakerecommendationsonthescaleofsubsidiesjustified(e.g.forincreasinggeographicandpopulationcoverageorforcreatinginsuranceproducts)totakethebestoftheexperimentstoscale,butthiswarrantscarefulassessment.TechnologychangesmeanthatfirmslikeSafaricomaremakingcommercialdecisionstoinvestinpreviouslyunprofitableareas,sosubsidieswillnotalwaysbenecessary.

Withthespreadofprivatesector-facilitatedcashtransfermechanismstothearidandsemi-aridlands,theneedforfoodandnon-foodinputsfromdonorsshoulddecline.FoodtransporterswillworkincreasinglyforshopownersinsteadofNGOs.Preparednessplanningforthenextdrought,however,needstobeintensified,especiallyforthearidlandscoveredbyphase2oftheHSNP.Thegovernment,

WFPandtheHSNPdonorswillneedtoreachanagreementsoononthelevelsoffoodandcashinputslikelytobeneededduringthenextdrought.

Astheeconomyofatleastpartofthearidandsemi-aridlandschangeswithsignificantnewinvestments(e.g.byforeignoilcompanies,butalsowithnewwaterandtransportlinks),itwillbeimportantforthehumanitariancommunitytoengagethelargerprivatesectorinvestorstosensitisethemtohumanitarianissuesandbuildtherelationshipsthatwouldbeneededinacrisis.TullowOilandWorldVisionarealreadydoingsomeworktogetheraroundLodwar.

4.2 Procurement and transport

Thedonoragencies,whichprovidelarge-scalefoodandnon-foodinputsduringadrought,mostlyhaveestablishedcontractsthatcanbescaledupintimesofcrisisatpre-agreedrates.ThestudyfoundlessevidenceoftheKenyangovernmentoperatinginthisway(e.g.tosetuparrangementsforwaterbowseringtoavoidbeingoverchargedinacrisis).Thereisscopetotightenthisuptodeliverbettervalueformoney.

AmajoreffortisbeingmadetoimprovetransportthroughoutEastAfrica,whichshouldspeedupthetransittimesforreliefitemsandreducecosts.ThebiggeragencieslikeWFP,whichaccountsfor4%ofthetrafficthroughMombasaport,arenotcurrentlymuchengagedwithplannersoftransportinvestmentinEastAfrica,andshouldensurethattheirvoicesareheard.Wedidnothaveachancetostudyindetailtheopportunitiesforsupplyingmorereliefitemsfromwithintheregion,butwithtransportlinksimprovingtheopportunitiestopurchasefoodandhigher-valuenutritionalsupplementswillgrow.

4.3 Devolution

DevolutioninKenyaisamajorchangebeingimplementedquickly.Authorityandresources


–includingforimportantaspectsofemergencypreparednessandresponse–arebeingdevolvedfromthenationalgovernmenttocountyauthorities.Thecomplexityoftheprocessanditspotentialimpactonhumanitarianactionshouldnotbeunderestimated.Withresponsibilitiesstillunclearandlocalsystemsuntested,Kenyarisksbeinglesspreparedifthenextdroughtcomessoon.Thatsaid,devolutionandthecreationofcountyandsub-countystructuresisanopportunitytoreshapedroughtmanagementtoincludetheprivatesectorinplanning,particularlythemobilephonecompanies,banksandtransporterswhichwillbeincreasinglyinvolvedinresponse.Thisinteractionmightalsohelptoaverttheintroductionofnewcounty-levelpermitsorfeesthatcouldmakethemovementofreliefitemsmoredifficult.TherewillbeausefulrolefordonorstoplayinsupportingthenewCountyDisasterManagementCommitteesastheytakeshape,andencouragingprivatesectorinvolvement.

4.4 Making the most of popular support in crises

Kenyahasseenveryencouragingresponsestoappealsforhumanitarianassistancefromboththeprivatesectorandprivateindividuals.Thiswillhelpasittakesmoreresponsibilityformanagingitsowncrises,butthereisscopetoraisemorefromthepublicandprivatesectorusingthenetworksthatKRCS,Safaricomandothershavedeveloped.TheKenyanprivatemediacoulddomoretohelpthesecampaigns.AtpresentsomeoftheKenyanmediaseesitselfasresponsibleonlyforreportinghumanitariancrises.Otherpartsofthemediaaretransmittinghumanitarianinformationtohelppeopleaffectedbycrises.Betterhumanitarianinformation–onwhatisneededtoavertandrespondtocrisesandwhoisresponsibleforwhatinthehumanitariansystem–willalsoprovidetheinformationKenyansneedtoholdtheirgovernmentandhumanitarianagenciestoaccount.

Forthelongerterm,ifKenyaistomanageitsownhumanitariancrisesanddevelopthearidandsemi-aridlandsinwaysthatreducetheriskofhumanitariancrises,theprivatesectorwillhavetoplayalargerroleindeliveringeconomicgrowthandsustainingmarkets,anddeliveringreliefsuppliesandcashwhendroughtsoccur.Thegovernment

hassetoutagoodvisionandstrategy,butwithalotforthepublicsectortodeliver.ThegrowingeconomicpotentialoftheASALsandthedynamismofpartsoftheKenyanandinternationalprivatesectorneedtobeexploitedfullytodeliveronthisvision.Partsofthebusinesscommunityarealreadyengaged,butothersareunlikelytogetinvolvedwithoutaconvincingcasethattheirparticipationinpreparednessandresponsewillimprovetheirprofits.Thisstudysuggeststhattheelementsofsuchacasearethere.Theinternationalhumanitariancommunitywillbeabletobringbestpracticefromothercountries,andKRCShasthelocalstandingwiththeprivatesectorandthepublictohelpgovernmentandbusinessassociationsinthistask.

4.5 What does this mean for international humanitarian coordination?

Excellentpreparednessworkwasundertakenbeforethe2013election,includingsomewithinputfromtheprivatesector.Ethnicproblemssurfacemostlyduringelections,buttherisksremainsubstantialevenwhenelectionsarenotnear.Resourcesforsomeinternationalhumanitarianorganisationshavedeclinedsubstantially,butagenciessuchasOCHAshouldretainthekeypoliticalrelationshipsthattheyhavedevelopedandencouragethebusinessandNGOcommunitiestocontinuetheirmonitoringofethnicviolenceandhumanrightsabuses.

Thegovernment’sagendafortheASALsismovingtolonger-termdevelopmentasameansofavertinghumanitariancrises.SotherewillbeaneedfortheUNhumanitarianagenciesandotherstoworkevenmorecloselywiththeWorldBankandothersengagedonthatagenda,aswellasbusinessassociations,perhapsstartingwithKAM,whichalsoleadsontheGlobalCompact.Theseeffortsshouldbuildontheprivatesectorengagementstrategiesandprocessesbeingundertakenbymajorhumanitarianagenciesattheheadquarterslevel.Asthisproceeds,staffinthefieldshouldbeconsultedonwhatpartnershipswillworkbestforthem,andgivenaclearsteeronhowbesttotakeadvantageofthesepartnerships.Thatis,international,nationalandlocaleffortstobuildpartnershipsshouldtakeplacesimultaneouslybutnotinparallel;theymust

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continuouslyreturntotheneedsofcrisis-affectedpeopleandaidagenciesservingthemontheground.Whiletherearemanyopportunitiesforlinkingupaidagenciesandbusinesses,thetimeandresources

neededtobuildpartnershipsinthefieldshouldnotbeunderestimated,particularlyincountriessuchasKenyawherethetraditionalhumanitariansectorisbeingsubstantiallyreduced.

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GovernmentofKenya(2011)Kenya County Fact Sheets.Nairobi:CommissiononRevenueAllocation.

GovernmentofKenya(2012a)Key Facts and Figures 2012.Nairobi:KenyaNationalBureauofStatistics.

GovernmentofKenya(2012b) Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) 2008–2011 Drought.Nairobi:RepublicofKenya.

GovernmentofKenya(2012)Ending Drought Emergencies in Kenya. CountryProgrammePaper.

GovernmentofKenyaPrimeMinister’sOffice(2012)National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands.SessionalPaperNo.8of2012.

GovernmentofKenya(2013)Drought Risk Management and Ending Drought Emergencies: Medium Term plan 2013–17.

Hansen,T.O.(2009)Political Violence in Kenya: A Study of Causes, Responses and a Framework for Discussing Prevention,ISSPaper205.Pretoria:InstituteforSecurityStudies.

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Annex 1IntervieweesAbdallaRashidAgolla HeadofProgrammes,IslamicReliefWorldwide

RobertAllport AssistantFAORepresentative

TitoArunga NationalAgricultureValueChainOfficer,FAO

NicholasCox RegionalAdvisor,USAID/OFDA

SimonDenhere RegionalProcurementOfficer,WFP

IsabelleD’Haudt ECHO

EJEsekon‘psc’(K) ManagingDirector,LodwarWaterandSanitationCompanyLtd.

AhmedAbdelgadirGalal CountryDirector,IslamicReliefWorldwide

MeganGilgan RegionalEmergencyAdviser,UNICEF

AbdiGodana BusinessGrowthandDevelopmentManager,EquityBankIsiolo

NoorGodana DeputyNDMACoordinator,Isiolo

AbbasGullet SecretaryGeneral,KenyaRedCrossSociety

EmmanuelGunei TurkanaRehabilitationProgramme

DuncanHarvey KenyaCountryDirector,SavetheChildren

CherylHarrison Coordinator,ProgrammeInnovations,WFPKenya

GlenHughson CALPFocalPoint,CashLearningPartnership

DavidKamau HeadofSub-Office,WFPLodwar

LisaKaranja RegionalDirectorPrivateSectorandCivilSociety,TradeMarkEastAfrica

DavidKipkamei DeputyCountyCommissionerIsiolo

EmmanuelKisangauand NDMA,TurkanaCounty

MarkEkaiLokaito

HumphreyKisembe Economist,ShippersCouncilofEasternAfrica

GabrielKitenga GroupHeadofTaxandPublicPolicy,EastAfricanBreweriesLtd

MfainaKibala FAO,Lodwar

PatrickLavandhomme DeputyHeadofOffice,OCHA

PeterLochuch Childfund,Turkana

BensonLong’or Oxfam,Turkana

JosephLosuru Chair,DistrictLivestockMarketingAssociation,Lodwar

RaoufMazou Representative,UNHCR

ValerianMicheni DroughtInformationManager,NationalDroughtManagementAuthority

KennedyMohochi ChiefOperationsOfficer,KenyaAssociationofManufacturers,KAM

CharlesMukunya KenyaCommercialBank,Isiolo

NelsonMunyi ACP,NationalDisastersOperationsCentre(NDOC)

EsterMuriuri GeneralManagerAgribusiness,EquityBank

OnesmusMutio BusinessDevelopmentManager,YuCash

JudyNemaisa HeadofAdvocacyandCommunications,KenyaPrivateSectorAlliance(KEPSA)

JosephNg’ang’a KenyaProgrammeOfficer,IFAD

VictorNgei ManagingDirectorSpecialProjects,NationMediaGroup

MaguNgumo GeneralManagerQTV,NationBroadcastingDivision

SteveNsubuga RegionalLogisticsOfficer,WFP


JoyceNyabogaand BBCMediaAction

CarolMorgan

BernardNyatuga ProgrammeOfficer,WFPKenya

JobKNyorsok BusinessGrowthandDevelopmentManager,EquityBank,Lodwar

AnneO’Mahoney CountryDirector,CONCERNWorldwide

PaulOmanga CropsProductionOfficer,FAO

ByronOnyango Safaricom

ImmaculateOtieno Manager,SafaricomFoundations

KarenPeachey BritishRedCross,EastAfricaRegionalDirector

ChrisPorter,DFID

MarcelRudasingwa HumanitarianCoordinatorandUNICEFRepresentative

DeborahSaidy DeputyRegionalDirector,WFP

DavidStanton DeputyHeadTMEA

PhilipK.Tarus DeputySecretary,MinistryofDevolutionandPlanning

AllanM.Waititu Director–ICT,ProjectsandInnovations,EquityBank

DwightWatson ManagingDirector,SouthAfrica&SubSahara,Nielsen

GabriellaWaaijman DeputyHeadofOffice,OCHAEastAfrica

NicholasWasunna DirectorProgrammeDevelopment,WorldVision

AnthonyWeru SeniorProgrammesOfficer,KEPSA

Director MinistryofLivestock,Turkana

Focus Group DiscussionMembers,PrivateTransporters’Association,Lodwar

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Map of the arid and semi-arid lands in Kenya

Annex 2

Source:TheWorldBank,2012.

The Humanitarian Policy Group is one of the world’s leading teams of independent researchers and information professionals working on humanitarian issues. It is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice through a combination of high-quality analysis, dialogue and debate.

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce materials from this publication but, as copyright holders, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. This and other HPG reports are available from www.odi.org.uk/hpg.

© Overseas Development Institute, 2014ISBN: 978 1 909464 58 2

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