kellner heresy and the nature of faith in medieval jewish philosophy

8/14/2019 Kellner Heresy and the Nature of Faith in Medieval Jewish Philosophy

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Heresy and the Nature of Faith in Medieval Jewish PhilosophyAuthor(s): Menachem KellnerSource: The Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Apr., 1987), pp. 299-318Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1454369

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THEJEWISHQUARTERLYREVIEW, LXXVII, No. 4 (April, 1987) 299-318

HERESY AND THE NATURE OF FAITH IN MEDIEVALJEWISH PHILOSOPHY*

By MENACHEMKELLNER, University of HaifaTwo VERY DIFFERENTconceptions of the nature of heresy and thequestion of who is a heretic are to be found in medieval Jewishtexts.1 I wish to suggest here that these different conceptionsreflect(not surprisingly)different answers to the question "Who isa Jew?", and that these different answers reflect in turn differentconceptions of the nature of religious faith. In other words, thecontroversy over the nature of heresy was a dispute not over whatJews were expected to believe (the content of faith) so much asover what it means to say that a person is a believer (the natureof faith). We may say that the question is less one of theologythan of epistemology.Maimonides, as is well known, laid down thirteen specificdoctrines2 which every Jew qua Jew had to accept.3 Failure toaccept even one of these doctrines caused a person to be excluded

* This article is based upon my book Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought(Oxford, 1986). Here I focus on one issue, drawing together material treated inthe book in a variety of contexts.1 By "heresy"I refer to the idea usually expressed in Hebrew by terms such askefirah, minut, and 'epiqorsut. I cannot define the term further at this point sincein this paper I hope to prove, inter alia, that the exact meaning of the term was amatter of dispute in the Middle Ages. The issue of heresy usually arose in themedieval period in the context of discussions of dogma. On that subject see my"Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought: A Biblical Survey," Studies in Bibliog-raphy and Booklore 15 (1984): 5-21. I have dealt with some of the issues raised inthe present study in my essay "What is Heresy?,"Studies in Jewish Philosophy 3(1983): 55-70. In that article I explored some of the contemporary implications ofthe issues treated here. The purely historical portions of that article were pub-lished in Hebrew in JerusalemStudies in Jewish Thought 3 (1983): 393-404.2 Maimonides' text may be most easily found in English on pp. 417-23 ofI. Twersky (ed.), A Maimonides Reader (New York, 1972).3 I purposely use the term "accept" since the question of whether Maimonidesinsisted on knowledge of the principles or belief in them is a vexed one. See myDogma in Medieval Jewish Thought (henceforth: Dogma), chapter 1, n. 160(p. 233).


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from the community of Israel, both in this world and in the next.This is what he says:When all these foundations4 are perfectly understood andbelieved in by a person, he enters the community of Israel, andone is obligated to love and pity him and to act towards him inall ways in which the Creator has commanded that one shouldact towards his brother, with love and fraternity. Even were heto commit every possible transgression, because of lust andbecause of being overpowered by the evil inclination, he will

be punished according to his rebelliousness, but he has aportion [in the world to come]; he is one of the sinners inIsrael. But if a man doubts any of these foundations, he leavesthe community [of Israel], denies the fundamental,5 and iscalled a sectarian,6 an 'epiqoros,7 and one who "cuts amongthe plantings."8 One is required to hate him and destroy him.About such a person it was said, Do I not hate them, 0 Lord,who hate Thee? (Ps. 139:21).9This statement teaches a number of important lessons:'1 first,that entry into the community of Israel depends upon the perfectunderstanding and acceptance of Maimonides' Thirteen Prin-ciples;11second, that a person who accepts these principles isthereby renderedworthy of all the benefits of being a Jew;12 hird,that sinning (i.e., violating specific precepts of the Torah) doesnot cost one either one's membership in the community of Israel

4 I.e., Maimonides' Thirteen Principles.Kafarbe- iqqar.6 Min.

7 On this term see B. Sanh. 99b-100a.8 A reference to Elisha ben Abuyah; see B. Hag. 14b.9 My translation here is based upon the text presented by Rabbi Joseph Qafihin his dual (Arabic and Hebrew)edition of Mishnah 'im Perush Rabbenu Moshehben Maimon (Jerusalem, 1965),4:217.10I ought to emphasize that in this article I deal only with the "public"

Maimonides, ignoring altogether the question of whether or not he had a "secretdoctrine." This is entirely legitimate, since the other medieval thinkers with whomI will be dealing were respondingto the public Maimonides." Maimonides seems to accept the halakhic implications of this contention; seehis codification of the laws of conversion, discussed below.12 Maimonides codifies the obligation to love a fellow Jew in "Laws of MoralQualities"(6.3).

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or one's portion in the world to come; fourth, that an individualwho doubts any one of the principles excludes himself or herselffrom the community of Israel and by implication from the worldto come;13 ifth, that such a person must be hated and destroyed.14It is clear from this that Maimonides construes as heresy thedenial (or even questioning) of one or more specific teachings.15Maimonides gives no reason to assume furthermore that a personwho denies one of his Thirteen Principles without thereby in-tending heresy (out of ignorance, stupidity, poor education, orwhatever) is any the less a heretic. Just as a rose is a rose is arose, so also heresy is heresy is heresy, no matter what theintentions of the heretic.16

Maimonides' clear position on the issue of condemning asheretics all who deny certain Torah teachings was explicitly ac-cepted by at least two other medieval thinkers: Abraham benShem Tob Bibago (died ca. 1489),'7 and Isaac Abravanel (1437-1508).18 n his Derekh 'Emunah (completed about 1480),19Bibagoanalyzes Maimonides' Thirteen Principles in detail and respondsto a number of possible objections to them. The second of theseobjections involves the question of why one should be considereda heretic for denying a principle of the Torah if one's denial wasnot motivated by rebelliousness. Bibago attributes this objectionto R. Abraham ben David of Posquieres (RABaD)20 and re-sponds to it in the following way:

'3 It is implied by the fact that the mishnah on which Maimonides is comment-ing here (see below) deals precisely with the question of who does and who doesnot merit a share in the world to come. Maimonides makes the point explicitly in"Laws of Repentance"3 and in his commentary on Sanh. 10.2 and 11.3.14 See "Laws of Idolatry" 10.1, "Laws of Testimony" 9.10, and "Laws of theMurderer" 13.14.

'5 See the texts cited above in note 13.16 For further elaboration of this point see my "What is Heresy?" (referred toabove in note 1).17 On Bibago see Allan Lazaroff, The Theology of Abraham Bibago (Univer-

sity, Alabama, 1981).18 The best one-volume treatment of Abravanel may be found in BenzionNetanyahu, Don Isaac Abravanel, 3rd edition (Philadelphia, 1972).19The book was printed completely only once (Constantinople, 1521). Selec-tions from it were critically edited by Chava Fraenkel-Goldschmidt (Jerusalem,

1978).20 On RABaD (12th cent.) see I. Twersky, Rabad of Posquieres, revised edition(Philadelphia, 1980).

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RABaD's statement is really amazing to me, since if it werecorrect everyone who denied a principle without meaning todo so would have an excuse and a portion in the world tocome. [Even] the belief of the Christians would not be incon-sistent with true felicity, since they understand Scripture liter-ally and think that the intention of the verse is as they believeit. [On this basis] they would not be called heretics and sec-tarians. It would be possible to find a man who does notbelieve in any one of the principles or beliefs of the Torahbecause of his failure to understand the meaning of the Torah.[On this position] such a one could be called neither a sec-tarian nor a heretic. All this opposes reason and faith.21

Thus for Bibago reason and faith join hands in rejecting the ideathat a person who innocently denies a principle of the Torah is noheretic.In his lengthy disquisition on Maimonides' Thirteen Principles,entitled Rosh 'Amanah,22 saac Abravanel adopts Bibago's posi-

tion and quotes him nearly word for word.23 He makes thefollowing addition to Bibago's statement:These things are intolerable according to both the faith ofTorah and correct reason. For a false doctrine about any oneof the principles of faith turns the soul from its true felicityand will not bring [one] to life in the world to come, even ifthe opinion is held without intention to rebel. It is like poisonwhich consumes the spirit of him who eats it, and his spirit willbe gathered to God (Job 34:14), even if he ate it thinking thatit was good and healthy food. Similarly, heresy and false beliefin the matter of principles of religion will expel the soul ofman and without a doubt make it impossible for him to inheritthe world to come.24

21 Derekh 'Emunah, p. lOld.22 This work is available in my English translation, Principles of Faith (EastBrunswick, N.J., 1982).23 But without acknowledging his indebtedness to Bibago. On the question ofAbravanel's free use of the writings of others see Principles of Faith, p. 219, andDogma, chapter 7, n. 74 (p. 278).24 P. 113.

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Maimonides,Bibago, and Abravanel,then, all togetherdis-allow inadvertenceas valid groundfor a plea of exculpation nthe questionof heresy.By this I meanto saythattheydo not seethe issue of intent as relevant o the definitionof heresy,nor dotheysee inadvertence s anexculpatingactor njudgingheresy.Thisstrict and no-nonsenseapproach o the questionof heresyrepresentsa theologicalnovum in Judaism,ignoringas it doesthe entirecategoryof shegagah (inadvertence)whichplays suchan importantrole in halakhah. While in the MiddleAges thisview wasnot recognized or the theologicalnoveltywhich it was,it did not go unchallenged. t was explicitly rejected by Mai-monides'contemporary ndcritic,RABaD of Posquieres,andbyR. Simeon ben Semah Duran (1361-1444).25 I have argued else-where26hat thereis very good reasonto suspectthat R. HasdaiCrescas died ca. 1412)27oined RABaD and Duranin rejectingthe Maimonides-Bibago-Abravanelosition,andthat R. JosephAlbo(15thcentury)28asambivalent n theissue.29The centralfocus of the oppositionto Maimonides s a state-ment of his. In "Lawsof Repentence" .7 Maimonides odifiesaslaw thatFiveclassesaretermedsectarians:30e whosaysthat there sno God and thattheworldhasno ruler;he whosaysthat thereis a rulingpowerbut that it is vestedin two or morepersons;hewhosaysthatthere s one Ruler,but that Hehas a bodyandhas form;he who denies that He alone is the First Causeand

Rock of the universe; ikewise he who rendersworship toanyonebesideHim,to serveas a mediatorbetween he human

25 For English language studies of Duran see M. Kellner, "Rabbi Shimon benZemach Duran on the Principles of Judaism," PAAJR 48 (1981): 231-65; idem.,"What is Heresy?";and J. David Bleich, "Duran's View of the Nature of Provi-dence,"JQR 69 (1979/80): 210-38.26 In "What is Heresy?"

27 H. A. Wolfson's Crescas' Critique of Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass., 1929)remains the only availableextended English language study of Crescas.28 On Albo see Isaac Husik's translation of Sefer ha-'Iqqarim (Philadelphia,1929).29 See Dogma, chapter 5, section 4, pp. 151-55.30 Minim.

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being and the Lord of the universe. Whoever belongs to any ofthese five classes is termed a sectarian.31Sectarians, Maimonides tells us also, "have no portion in theworld to come, but are cut off and perish, and for their greatwickedness and sinfulness are condemned for ever and ever."32

RABaD composed a series of critical glosses on the MishnehTorah, the work in which "Laws of Repentance" is found. On thestatement cited above, with specific reference to Maimonides'third class of sectarians (believers in God's corporeality), RABaDcomments as follows:

Why has he called such a person a sectarian?There are manypeople greater than, and superior to him, who adhere to such abelief on the basis of what they have seen in verses of Scrip-ture, and even more in the words of the aggadot which corruptright opinion about religious matters.33

In typically forceful language34RABaD here defends the naivecorporealist from Maimonides' charge of heresy. RABaD is notdefending the view that God has a body;35he is, however, defend-ing those Jews who, because they mistakenly understood certainscriptural verses and aggadot literally, believed that God has abody. In other words, RABaD allows for the category of inad-vertence to play a role, not just with respect to commandmentsinvolving actions but also with respect to heresy; a person whoinadvertently (bi-shegagah) commits what otherwise would beconsidered heresy is no heretic.36

31 I cite the text as translated by Moses Hyamson, The Book of Knowledge(New York, 1974), p. 84b.32 Ibid.

33 I cite the text as translated by Twersky in his Rabad, p. 282.34 There exists a less forceful version of this gloss. See "What is Heresy?",n. 16,expanded in n. 10 of the Hebrewversion.35 See Twersky's discussion of the subject, ad loc. On the question of medievalJews who believed in a corporeal God, see Dogma, chapter 1, n. 159 (p. 233). Tothe sources listed there should be added Shem Tob Falaquera, "Mikhtab 'alDebar ha-Moreh," in Abba Mari Astruc of Lunel's Minhat Qena ot, ed. J.Bisliches (Pressburg, 1838), p. 183; and H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of theKalam (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), pp. 106-11.

36 This conclusion is not, strictly speaking, warranted by the text. It is con-ceivable that RABaD (a) admits the existence of principles of Judaism; (b) does

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RABaD's gloss here is quoted (in the more polite version) byDuran in chapter 9 of his 'Oheb Mishpat.37Duran then expresseshimself in the following items:

You also ought to know that one who has properly acceptedthe roots of the Torah but was moved to deviate from them bythe depths of his speculation, and who thereby came to believeconcerning one of the branches of the faith the opposite ofwhat has been accepted as what one ought to believe, and triedto explain the verses of Scripture according to his belief-eventhough he errs, he is no denier. For he was not brought to thisdeviation by heresy at all, and if he found a tradition from theSages to the effect that he ought to turn from the position hehad adopted, he would do so. He only holds that belief be-cause he thinks it is the intention of the Torah. Therefore, eventhough he errs, he is not a denier and sectarian according towhat is agreed upon by our people, since he had accepted theroots of the Torah as he should.38

Duran here expands upon RABaD's statement, making clear theimportance of intention to the definition of heresy. The inad-vertent denier denies Torah teachings because he or she thinksthat the Torah itself commands such denial. The heretic, onthe other hand, is the person who, fully knowing that the

not consider belief in incorporeality to be such a one; and (c) excuses inadvertentheresy only with respect to beliefs which are not principles. Were this the case, wecould say that RABaD excuses the naive corporealist, but only because belief inGod's incorporeality is not a principle of faith. There is, however, absolutely noevidence that (a) is true. This is so for the following reasons: RABaD was notfamiliar with Maimonides' Commentary on the Mishnah, the text in which theThirteen Principles appear (see Twersky, op. cit., p. 107). Maimonides' claim thatJudaism has dogmas or principles of faith was an absolute novum in Judaism (seemy Dogma, pp. 1-9). It stretches belief to maintain that RABaD independentlyarrived at a position identical or even importantly similar to Maimonides' greatnovum. But let us assume that this is wrong. It is still highly unlikely that (b)would be true. After all, had RABaD indeed adopted the view that Judaism hasdogmas, it is very unlikely that he would fail to include in his list of dogmas theclaim of God's incorporeality, especially since he was familiar with Maimonides'argument ("Laws of the Foundations of the Torah" 1.7) that incorporeality is anabsolutely necessary corollary of unity. On this see also Twersky, pp. 283-84.37 Venice, 1590.38 P. 146.

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THE JEWISHQUARTERLYREVIEWTorah teaches a particular doctrine, goes ahead and denies itnonetheless.39As indicated above, there are good grounds for linking R. Has-dai Crescas with RABaD and Duran as against Maimonides,Bibago, and Abravanel on the issue of inadvertence in heresy.Crescas' position, however, is complex and there is no clear-cuttext which I can cite in support of my claim.40Such, however, isnot the case with Crescas' well-known student, R. Joseph Albo.Although Albo appearsto be ambivalent on the issue, in one place(Ilqqarim 1.2) he clearly allies himself with the RABaD-Duran-Crescas camp:

It is proper to say this in justification of those Jewish scho-lars who deal with this subject.41Every Israelite is obliged tobelieve that everything that is found in the Torah is absolutelytrue, and anyone who denies anything that is found in theTorah, knowing that it is the opinion of the Torah, is aheretic.... But a person who upholds the Torah of Moses andbelieves in its principles, but when he undertakes to investigatethese matters with his reason and scrutinizes the texts, ismisled by his speculation and interprets a given principleotherwise than it is taken to mean at first sight;42or denies theprinciple because he thinks that it does not represent a soundtheory which the Torah obliges us to believe; or erroneouslydenies that a given belief is a fundamental principle, whichhowever he believes as he believes the other dogmas of theTorah which are not fundamental principles;43or entertains acertain notion in relation to one of the miracles of the Torahbecause he thinks that he is not hereby denying any of thedoctrines which it is obligatory upon us to believe by theauthority of the Torah44-a person of this sort is not a heretic.

39 The interpretation of Duran offered here is defended in detail in my PAAJRarticle (cited above in n. 25).40 I refer the reader to my detailed argument in "What is Heresy?"(cited abovein n. 1).41 I.e., the subject of the principles of the Torah.42 E.g., Maimonides' treatment of resurrection:see Albo's 'Iqqarim 1.2 (Husik'stranslation, p. 54).43 E.g., Maimonides' treatment of creation: see 'Iqqarim 1.2 (p. 51).44 Possibly a reference to Gersonides;see 'Iqqarim 1.2 (p. 52).

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HERESY AND THE NATURE OF FAITH-KELLNERHe is, rather, classed with the sages and pious men of Israel,although he holds erroneous theories. His sin is due to errorand requires atonement.45In this passage Albo adopts Duran's principle that basicallyone is obliged to accept that all that the Torah teaches is true.Once he does accept it, if he is led-either by philosophicalspeculation or by honest exegesis of Scripture-to adopt certaintypes of heterodox positions, he does not thereby become aheretic who forfeits his share in the world to come. Albo dis-

cusses four types of heterodox positions to which one might beled by faulty speculation or faulty exegesis and which do notremove one from the community of Israel: (1) misinterpretationof a principle; (2) denial of the truth of a principle; (3) denyingthat a particular belief is a principle, while not denying that thebelief is true and truly taught by the Torah; and (4) misinter-preting a miracle. Persons who err in any of these ways are notheretics, are not excluded from the community of Israel (indeed,they may be classed among "the sages and pious men of Israel"),and although they have sinned and must expiate their sin, theyare not denied a share in the world to come.Albo goes on to give various examples of "sages and pious menof Israel"who, misled either by philosophy or their failure to un-derstand Scripture properly, adopted one or more of the hetero-dox positions listed above.46"We say, therefore,"he concludes,

that a person whose speculative ability is not sufficient toenable him to reach the true meaning of scriptural texts, withthe result that he believes in the literal meaning and entertainsabsurd ideas because he thinks they represent the view of theTorah, is not hereby excluded from the community of thosewho believe in the Torah, heaven forfend! Nor is it permittedto speak disrespectfully of him and accuse him of "perverting

45 cIqqarim 1.2 (pp. 49-50).46 Albo cites as examples the statement in Gen. Rabbah 3 that "temporalsequence existed before creation" and the discussion in Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer 3on the primordial matter out of which the world was created. He also refers to aninterpretation of the story of Balaam's ass which was adopted, as we know but asAlbo does not mention, by both Maimonides (Guide 2.41) and Gersonides (in hiscommentary to Num. 22).

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the teaching of the Torah"47and class him among the hereticsand sectarians.48Thus we find Albo staunchly defending those Jews who are led tomistaken beliefs by honest mistakes in their understanding ofScripture."That man alone," Albo tells us,

who knows the truth and deliberately denies it, belongs to theclass of the wicked whose repentance is rejected. But the manwhose intention is not to rebel, nor to depart from the truth,nor to deny what is in the Torah, nor reject tradition, butwhose sole intention is to interpret the verses according to hisopinion, though he interprets them erroneously, is neither asectarian nor a heretic.49

Albo concludes this chapter with the following declaration:It is clear now that every intelligent person is permitted toinvestigate the fundamental principles of religion and to inter-pret the verses [of the Torah] in accordance with the truth as itseems to him. And though he believe concerning certain thingswhich earlier authorities regarded as principles, like the com-ing of the Messiah and creation, that they are not fundamentalprinciples, but merely true doctrines, which the believer in theTorah is obliged to believe . . ., he is not a denier of the Torahor its principles.50We have before us, therefore, two very clearly opposed views.The first, that of Maimonides, Bibago, and Abravanel, holds that

every Jew is required to accept certain teachings51and that therejection of any of these teachings for any reason constitutesheresy. On this account the category of inadvertence (shegagah)simply does not obtain with respect to questions of doctrine. Thesecond view, that of RABaD, Duran, Crescas, and Albo, does

47 'Abot3.15.48 Clqqarim1.2 (p. 52); Albo goes on to support his position by citing RABaD'sgloss to "Repentance"3.7.49 clqqarim 1.2 (p. 54).50 Ibid., p. 55.51 Maimonides and Abravanel do, of course, disagree on how many teachings aJew must accept. For Maimonides it is thirteen; for Abravanel it is every doctrinetaught by the Torah. See Principles of Faith, p. 28.

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allow for shegagah with respect to doctrinal matters. This viewdoes not by any means deny that the Torah teaches certaindoctrines; nor does it deny that some of these doctrines may besingled out and categorized as dogmas or principles of faith. Thisview, however, does distinguish between a person who purpose-fully denies Torah teachings knowing that they are Torah teach-ings, on the one hand, and a person who denies the very sameTorah teaching without realizing that he or she is thereby con-tradicting the Torah, on the other hand. The first person iscondemned as a heretic while the second may be excused asmistaken.We can make the point clearer by examining some cases. Letus say that a person purposefully denies some teaching that is nota principle of faith because he or she purposefully rejects theTorah; all would agree that such a person is a heretic. Mai-monides would count such a person as a heretic because his orher purposeful denial of Torah teaching involves a rejection of hiseighth principle, Torah from heaven. Duran would count suchdenial as heresy because that is exactly how he defines it: know-ing and purposeful rejection of any Torah teaching. What aboutthe case of a person who denies a principle innocently (i.e.,through what we have been calling inadvertence)? Maimonideswould count such a person as a heretic, while Duran would not.This last case must be contrasted with the case of a person whoinadvertently denies some teaching not included in the principles.In such a case, both Maimonides and Duran would admit thatsuch an individual is no heretic.In other words we may say that the two views of the nature ofheresy delineated here reflect two different conceptions of what itmeans to be a Jew. The first conception defines a Jew as a personwho holds certain specific doctrines. There may be some dis-agreement over what these beliefs are, but no disagreement overthe fact that to be a Jew means to accept certain specificteachings.52Once that is accepted, it follows as a matter of coursethat a person who rejects any of the specified teachings has failed

52 I do not mean to ignore the halakhic definition of a Jew as an individualborn of a Jewish mother or properly converted to Judaism. In phrasing the issuehere in theological terms I simply follow Maimonides' lead. Maimonides, ineffect, added a theological dimension to the halakhic definition.

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to fulfill one of the cardinal requirements of being a Jew. It is nosurprise that, in this conception, such a person is condemned as aheretic and excluded from both the community of Israel and theworld to come.The opposed view is also willing to define a Jew in theologicalterms but refuses to specify the precise and exact teachings whichmust be accepted in order to count as a Jew. In this view, "thereis only one principle of the Torah: to believe that everythingincluded in the Torah is true."53It is acceptance of the Torah ingeneral which defines a person in theological terms as a Jew.Once the Torah is accepted wholeheartedly, innocent deviationsfrom the exact letter of its teachings can be accepted for whatthey are-mistakes. One can be mistaken about details of Torahteachings without thereby impugning its overall truth.This dispute reflects a yet more basic disagreement, a con-troversy over the question of what faith or religious belief actu-ally is. It is almost a commonplace to distinguish between "twotypes of faith",54between belief that something is the case andbelief in something or someone, between "theology" and "depththeology."55These two ideas are so often and so easily contrastedthat one is tempted to forget how important and fundamental thedistinction actually is and suspect that it cannot stand up to closescrutiny. Kenneth Seeskin has recently subjected the distinctionbetween intellectual acquiescence to the truth of a proposition("belief that"), on the one hand, and trust, loyalty, and commit-ment ("belief in"), on the other hand, to acute analysis and hasconfirmed the prephilosophical intuition that we have here adistinction with an important difference.56In general, when the Bible and the Talmud use the word'emunah ("faith"), it relates not to propositions but to disposi-tions, not to assent but to consent,57not to intellectual acquies-

53 DOhebMishpat 9.54 The title of Martin Buber'sbook on the subject (New York, 1951).55 See A. J. Heschel, God in Search of Man (New York, 1977), p. 7.56 See Kenneth Seeskin, "Judaism and the Linguistic Interpretation of Faith,"Studies in Jewish Philosophy 3 (1983): 71-81. This is not the place to reviewSeeskin's arguments. It is, however, safe to continue assuming that the distinctionbetween "belief that" and "belief in" is significant and well-understood. Furtheron the issue see Louis Jacobs, Faith (New York, 1968), chapter 1, and E. E.

Urbach, The Sages: TheirConcepts and Beliefs (Jerusalem, 1975), 1:31-36.57 This formulation of Seeskin's.

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cence but to loyalty and faithfulness. Short of an exhaustivetextualanalysis,1 cannotprovethis contention.I shall, instead,cite a numberof examplesfrom rabbinic iterature58 hichsup-port my position. I have not chosen these examplesat random.Rather,they are drawnfrom placeswhere we would expect tofind evidenceof the propositionalconceptionof faith had theidea been so understoodbythe rabbis.The first text is central o all discussionof dogmain Judaism,sinceit is the onlyplacein the entirecorpusof rabbinic iteraturewherewe find whatappears o be a systematicattempt o specifywhatteachingsa Jewmust hold in order o merita portion n theworld o come.59M. San. 10.1readsasfollows:

All Israeliteshave a share n the worldto come,as it states,Thypeople areall righteous, heyshall inherit he land orever(Isa. 60:21).But the followinghave no share in the worldtocome:he who saysthat there s no resurrection,hatthe Torahis not fromheaven,and the 'epiqoros.R. Akibasays:Evenhewho reads the external books and he who whispersupon awound,sayingI willput noneof the diseasesuponthee,whichI haveput upon theEgyptians:forI am the Lord that healeththee(Exod. 15:26).Abba Saul says:Evenhe who pronouncestheNameaccordingo its letters.

According o this mishnah here aresix thingsthat cost a Jew hisor hersharein the world to come:denyingresurrection, enyingthedivineoriginof theTorah,beingan 'epiqoros, eadingcertaintypes of forbidden iterature,using Scripturemagically n orderto heal, andpronouncingGod'sname(thetetragrammaton)s itis spelled.Let it be notedthat of these six items the last three areclearlyactions, not beliefs. Let it be further noted that the Gemara

58 For biblical examples see Gen. 15:10, Deut. 32:2, Prov. 20:6, and Job 4:18.For important confirmation of the thesis advanced here see Norman J. Cohen,"Analysis of an Exegetic Tradition in the Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael: The Mean-ing of Amanah in the Second and Third Centuries,"AJS Review 9 (1984): 1-25,especially pp. 7-8.59 This is certainly the way in which Maimonides understood the mishnah. Icite the text according to Maimonides' version.

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understands the third, 'epiqoros, in purely actional terms.60Theremaining two issues (resurrection and Torah from heaven) mayvery well relate to specific disputes which occupied the tanna ortannaim whose views are expressed in the mishnah. But even ifthey do not, this mishnah is still a far cry from the systematicstatement of necessary beliefs that it is often presented as being.61Had the rabbis of the Mishnah really believed that Jewish faithwas measured by acceptance of carefully delineated specific teach-ings, this mishnah would have been a natural place for them tolist these teachings. That they failed to do so is indirect evidencefor the thesis that "faith" or "belief"was not so understood.Had the rabbis defined Jewish faith in terms of its proposi-tional content, there is another place where we would expect tofind some systematic discussion of those specific teachings whicha person had to hold in order to be considered a faithful Jew:discussion of conversion. Given the fact that the rabbis wereconstrained by the halakhic definition of a Jew as a person bornof a Jewish mother or properly converted to Judaism, they hadvery little control, so to speak, over the beliefs of a person bornJewish; but they surely could lay down explicitly what beliefs aperson converting to Judaism had to adopt. But when we turn tothe central talmudic discussion of conversion this is what we find:

Our rabbis taught: If at the present time a man desires tobecome a proselyte, he is to be addressed as follows: "Whatreasons do you have for desiring to become a proselyte? Doyou not know that Israel at the present time are persecutedand oppressed, despised, harassed, and overcome by afflic-tions?" If he replies, "I know, and yet I am unworthy," he is tobe accepted forthwith and given instruction in some of theminor and some of the major commandments.... He is alsoto be told of the punishment for the transgression of thecommandments.... And as he is informed of the punishmentfor the transgression of the commandments, so is he alsoinformed of the rewardgranted for their fulfillment.62

60 See B. Sanh. 9b-1 la. This, of course, is no proof that this was the opinion ofthe author of this mishnah. But the Gemara gives no hint of any nonactionalinterpretation of the term.

61 Note that the holders of these deviant views are not labeled heretics by therabbis.62 B. Yeb. 47a-47b.

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The entire emphasis here is on the teaching of the command-ments, as opposed to the acceptance of any catechism.We find then that in two crucial places-discussions of whowill and will not merit a share in the world to come and who mayor may not be converted to Judaism-that the rabbis give noindication of having adopted a propositional definition of theconcept of 'emunah. For had they so interpreted it, they surelywould have been careful, wherever they were able, to excludefrom the community of Israel in this world and in the nextindividuals of defective faith, and would have specified how tomeasure the wholeness or defectiveness of that faith.I should like to adduce one more example, one in which wefind the Talmud actually defining the term 'emunah. The conceptis defined, as we shall see, not in terms of specific teachings orpropositions which can be accepted or rejected, but in terms ofthe performance of the commandments:

R. Simlai, as he was preaching, said: Six hundred andthirteen precepts were communicated to Moses, three hundredand sixty five negative ones, corresponding to the number ofsolar days [in the year], and two hundred and forty-eightpositive ones, corresponding to the number of members ofa man's body.... David came and reduced them to eleven[principles], as it is written, A Psalm of David. Lord, whoshall sojourn in Thy tabernacle? Who shall dwell in Thy holymountain? {i} HIe that walketh uprightly, and {ii} workethrighteousness, and {iii} speaketh truth in his heart, that {iv}hath no slander upon his tongue, {v} nor doeth evil to hisfellow, {vi} nor taketh up a reproach against his neighbor, {vii}in whose eyes a vile person is despised, but {viii} he honoreththem thatfear the Lord, {ix} he sweareth to his own hurt andchangeth not, fx} he putteth not out his money on interest, {xi}nor taketh a bribe against the innocent. He that doeth thesethings shall never be moved (Ps. 15).

The Talmud continues, citing Isaiah who reducedthe six hundredand thirteen commandments to six principles, Micah who re-duced them to three, and Isaiah again who is said to havereduced them to two. The pericope ends as follows:Amos came and reduced them to one [principle], as it is saidFor thus saith the Lord unto the house of Israel: Seek ye Me

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and live (Amos 5:4). To this R. Nahman ben Isaac demurred,saying: [Might it not be taken as meaning] Seek Me by observ-ing the whole Torah and live? But it is Habakkuk who cameand based them all on one [principle], as it is said, But therighteous shall live by hisfaith (Hab. 2:4).63

We have here before us a text which begins with the six hundredthirteen commandments of the Torah and which, by a series ofgraduated steps, reduces them to one: that the righteous shall liveby hisfaith (be-'emunato). 'Emunah is defined here not in termsof its propositional content but in terms of fulfilling the com-mandments of the Torah.

These three strategically chosen texts support the contentionthat 'emunah as generally used by the rabbis of the Talmud isbest understood in terms of loyalty, faithfulness, and commit-ment, rather than in the intellectualist terms of acquiescence in(or rejection of) certain specified doctrines.We may compare this conception of faith with the conceptionfound in a number of medieval Jewish philosophic and halakhicworks.

Saadiah Gaon sought to convert the 'amanat of Judaism("doctrines accepted as an act of religious faith") into 'ictiqaddt("doctrines subject to an attitude of firm belief as the result of aprocess of speculation").64This latter term (ordinarily renderedinto Hebrew as 'emunot and into English as "beliefs") Saadiahdefines as follows:

It behooves us to explain what is meant by 'i'tiqad. We saythat it is a notion that arises in the soul in regard to the actualcharacter of anything that is apprehended. When the cream ofinvestigation emerges [and] is embraced and enfolded by theminds, and through them acquired and digested by the souls,

63 B. Mak. 23b-24a.64 See Alexander Altmann, "Translator's Introduction" to Saadiah Gaon'sBook of Doctrines and Beliefs in Three Jewish Philosophers (New York, 1972),

pp. 19-20. See also H. A. Wolfson, "The Double Faith Theory in SaCadia,Averroes, and St. Thomas," Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion(Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 1:583-618, especially pp. 585, 587-88, and 597. Seefurther Israel Efros, Studies in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (New York, 1974),pp. 27, 31-32.

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then the personbecomesconvincedof the truth of the notionshe has thus acquired.He then deposits it in his soul for afutureoccasionor futureoccasions.65Thesubjectof 'itiqad, then,arepropositionswhichare either rueor false.Judaism or Saadiah, t must be emphasized,s a matterof both 'amdndt and 'i'tiqaddt, specific discrete propositions.Maimonidespresentsa similardefinitionof the term:"Know,thou who studied this my treatise,that 'itiqdd is not the notionthat is utteredbut thenotion that is representedn the soul whenit has been averredof it that it is in fact just as it has beenrepresented."66urthermore,Maimonidesusesthis term,and itsHebrewcognate dacat,consistently n the context of religiousbeliefs.67 or SaadiahandMaimonides,hen,religiousbelief wasmore than a matter of trust, loyalty, and faith; it was also amatterof the affirmation rdenialof certainpropositions.Further,and striking,evidenceconcerningMaimonides'viewon this mattermaybe foundin the Mishneh Torah.In "LawsofForbidden ntercourse"4Maimonides odifies heprocedureorconversion,basing himself upon the texts from B. Yeb. citedabove.He writes:

1. In what manner are righteousproselytesto be received?When a heathen comes forth for the purposeof becomingaproselyte,andupon investigationno ulteriormotive is found,the court should say to him, "Why do you come forth to65 See Saadiah Gaon, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Introduction, chapter 4

(translatedby S. Rosenblatt [New Haven, 1948]), p. 14.66 Guidefor the Perplexed 1.50, translated by S. Pines (Chicago, 1963), p. 111.See further H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (Cambridge, Mass., 1934),2:147.67 Maimonides opens his commentary on Heleq (which contains, his ThirteenPrinciples) with the following words: "I have seen fit to speak here about manyprinciples concerning very important doctrines [al-'itiqadat]." See Rabbi Qafih'sedition, p. 195. He concludes his discussion with the following statement (citedabove): "When all these foundations are perfectly understood and believed in['i'tiqaduhii] by a person he enters into the community of Israel"(Qafih, p. 217).See further A. Nuriel, "Musag ha-'Emunah 'esel ha-RaMBaN," .Daat 2-3(1978/9): 43-47. Nuriel shows how Maimonides uses al-'iman (= 'emunah) in thesense of "trust"with no referenceto cognitive content. The term appears rarely inthe writings of Maimonides, since he understands the content of faith in terms ofspecific teachings ({ictiqad).

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become a proselyte? Do you not know that Israel is at presentsorely afflicted, oppressed, despised, confounded, and beset ofsuffering?" f he answers,"I know, and I am indeed unworthy,"he should be accepted immediately.2. He should then be made acquainted with the principles ofthe faith, which are the oneness of God and the prohibition ofidolatry. These matters should be discussed in great detail; heshould then be told, though not at great length, about some ofthe less weighty and some of more weighty commandments.Thereupon he should be informed of the transgressions in-volved in the laws of gleanings, forgotten sheaves, the cornerof the field, and the poor man's tithe. Then he should be toldof the punishment for violation of the commandments. Howso? The court should say to him, "Be it known unto you thatbefore entering into this faith, if you ate forbidden fat, you didnot incur the penalty of extinction; if you desecrated theSabbath, you did not incur the penalty of death by stoning.But now, having become a proselyte, should you eat forbiddenfat, you will incur the penalty of extinction, and if you shouldprofane the Sabbath, you will incur the penalty of death bystoning." This, however, should not be carriedto excess nor totoo great detail, lest it should make him weary and cause himto stray from the good way unto the evil way. A person shouldbe attracted at first only with pleasing and gentle words, as it issaid first, I will draw them with cords of a man, and only thenwith bonds of love (Hos. 11:4).68

This statement, when compared with its talmudic source, is seento be really quite remarkable. Maimonides introduces referencesto the "principles"of religion, insists that we expatiate upon themin great detail, and prohibits lengthy discussion of the com-mandments. According to Maimonides, then, conversion seemsto involve the acceptance of what might be called "the yoke ofspecific beliefs" more importantly than the acceptance of the"yoke of commandments." Where the rabbis of the Talmud shiedaway from references to the acceptance of specific beliefs, Mai-monides makes it centrally important.

68 I cite the translation of Rabinowitz and Grossman (New Haven, 1964),pp. 91-92.

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One more example: Abraham Bibago subjects the concept of'emunah to minute analysis in Derekh 'Emunah and defines it interms of the specific beliefs (helqe 'emunah) which form its con-tent. "Do you not find some people," he complains, "who callthemselves believers [ma3aminim] and members of the Mosaiccovenant and who, if you ask them the number of their beliefsand what they are, put their hands upon their mouths?"69Bibagogoes on to say that one who cannot number and "define hisbeliefs in his mind" ought not properly to be called a believer atall. We have here very clear evidence that Bibago understoodDemunahn terms of its propositional content.70We have before us, then, evidence of two distinct understand-ings of the nature of religious faith: one, which I have labeledbiblical and talmudic, understands faith primarily in terms of theattitude of the believer. A religion conceived of in these terms hasno need of theological systemization. The second conception offaith defines it in terms of the specific propositions which thebeliever accepts or rejects. It is this conception of faith whichgives rise to statements of dogma, and it is thus no surprise thatwe find none in biblical and rabbinic literature. A person defining'emunah in this fashion would have good reason to be upset ifthe propositions held were incorrect. An attitude of trust in God,for example, is not compromised if some of one's specific con-ceptions concerning God are mistaken. But if one's faith in Godis defined in terms of certain specific propositions about God,then that faith is certainly defective if one affirms incorrect pro-positions about Him.We may now understand how these different attitudes towardsthe nature of belief underlay the different conceptions of heresywhich we have discussed here. If we define "belief" in fundamen-tally attitudinal terms, we can allow for a person to be considereda good and faithful Jew even if he or she is mistaken with respectto certain teachings of the Torah. The one has literally nothing todo with the other. If, on the other hand, we define "belief" in

69 I.e., cannot answer(compareMic. 7:16); Derekh 'Emunah,p. 94b (inFraenkel-Goldschmidt'selections,p. 289).70 For a furtherexamplesee Albo, Clqqarim.19(p. 165):"Belief n a thingmeansa firmconceptionof thething n themind,so thatthe lattercannot n anyway maginets opposite,even hough t maynot be able o prove t. Examples re,belief n theaxioms. . ."

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318 THEJEWISHQUARTERLYREVIEWterms of its specific content, then, while we would certainly de-mand of the faithful Jew an attitude of trust, loyalty, and com-mitment to God and to His Torah, we could not be satisfied withthat, but would also be forced to judge the faithfulness of everyJew in terms of the specific doctrines which he or she affirmsor denies.All this is clear in retrospect. It was not so clear to the medi-eval figures whose texts we have been analyzing. This is indicatedby the fact that strict consistency would demand that a thinkerwho defined "belief" in what I have called biblical-rabbinic terms("belief in") should reject the notion of dogma or principlesof faith altogether. This is emphatically not the case: Duran,Crescas, and Albo all put forward dogmatic systems of one formor another. They were willing to follow Maimonides' lead inlaying down principles of faith for Judaism, even as they resistedadopting the conception of faith which underlay his system ofdogmas.

kellner heresy and the nature of faith in medieval jewish philosophy

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