keating, eu intgration

7/30/2019 Keating, EU Intgration

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10.1177/0032329204267295POLITICS & SOCIETYMICHAEL KEATING

European Integration andthe Nationalities Question

MICHAEL KEATING

European integration questions the relationship between nation and state. It under-mines traditionalsovereignty and weakensthe needfor statehood. Minoritynation-alist movements have in many cases adopted the European theme, adjusting theirideology and strategy accordingly. Some have used new regionalist themes toconstructnewsystems of action below andbeyond thestate.Europeprovides oppor-tunities for territorial movements and grants some minority protections. There aredifferences betweenWestern Europeand Central andEastern Europebecause of theevolution of state structures. The prospective European constitution risks formaliz-ingthe European Union as a two-level game of states andthe Union,with little room

for regional and minority claims.

Keywords: European integration; nationalism; minorities; self-determination

THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION

The nationalities question, or the lack of fit between state borders andnational groups, has been a recurrent feature of European politics since the con-solidation of states in the nineteenth century. Such a misfit can arise because ofunification nationalism in fragmented territories, irredentism where a nationalminority is detached from its external homeland,1 the existence of a minoritystraddling borders of two states neither of which is its homeland, or the presenceof a nation contained within a wider state. This apposition and oppositionbetween state and nation has been transformed by the creation of an overarching

The research on which this paper is based is supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation.An earlierversion was presented at the International Political Science Congress, Durban, July 2003. Iam grateful to John McGarry, Adrian Guelke, and other participants for comments.

POLITICS & SOCIETY, Vol. 32 No. 3, September 2004 367-388DOI: 10.1177/0032329204267295 2004 Sage Publications

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but multifacted European polity above both. Some see this transnational integra-

tion as a way of ending the nationalities issue, itself the product of a phase ofmodernity that is now being transcended.2 Others see it disappearing in a post-nationalism, a Europe of the Regions, or a new medievalism.3 Increasingly, how-ever, transnational integration and the rise of new or revival of old nationalitydemands are seen as complementary processes; a reshaping of the connectionsamongterritory, function,and identity;and a consequentrestructuringof politicalauthority.

This article explores the links between substate nationality claims and Euro-pean integration and the ways in which Europe can help by providing a thirdway between national separatism andregional devolution. There are three levelshere. Thefirst concerns thetransformationof thestate, in both functional andnor-mative dimensions. The second is the transformation of nationality movements

towards doctrines of shared sovereignty, and the diffusion of liberal, democratic,and inclusive norms within European political space. Functional change encour-aged a new regionalism as state competences are shifted upwards and down-wards, and substate and transnational territories emerge as a significant frame-work for economic, social, and political change. Third, Europe opens upopportunity structures fornationality movements.The impact of thesechangesonnational movementsand their ability to exploit them varies. TheEuropean projectprovides incentives to de-ethnicize, to forge a civic, territorial project, to playdown separatism and to enter into the game of multilevel politics; but not allnationalist movements have been able or willing to adapt.

STATE TRANSFORMATION

European integration is part of a wider process of state transformation4 as wellas the unique process of polity building. It undermines the traditional identityamong sovereignty, territory, nationality, and function that is the essence of thetraditional nation-stateandopensthewayto otherconceptions of politicalauthor-ity and of public action.

First, European integration undermines state competences in matters such asmarket unityand regulation, the currency, and external security.5 This reduces theneed for thetraditionalstateapparatus andencourages a movetowardsnew formsof public policy instruments and of territorial autonomy. To the degree that func-tions requiring a commonregime are taken up to theEuropean level, it also weak-ens arguments against constitutional asymmetry within states.

Second, Europe challenges the doctrine of unitary and exclusive state sover-eignty,by constituting a legal order, encouraging a legal and constitutionalplural-ism, in which distinct normative orders coexist.6 The demystification of state sov-ereignty at the European level has led to a more general loss of ideologicalhegemony and opened up a discursive space for doctrines of shared sovereigntyand constitutional pluralism within and across states.

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Third, European integration hasundermined theoldclaim7 thatdemocracycan

only function in nationally homogeneous territories, which provide a commonidentity and trust. If Europe must manage with multiple demoi or without one atall, then the same argument can be applied to multinational states within it.

Fourth, Europe, in the form of the European Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights, separates human rights from nationality and citizenship, under-mining state claims to be the bearers of universal rights or the only means tosecure them. This also undermines some powerful normative arguments againstasymmetrical government within the state.8

Fifth, European transnational regimes, notably but not exclusively the Euro-pean Union (EU), have provided new opportunity structures beyond the state fornationality movements, often in alliance with regions.

All this hasprovidedincentivesto national minorityparties to rethink their ide-

ology and policy stance, to adapt to functional change, and to seek a place in thenew European architecture. Yet not all parties are able to make the necessaryshifts.

POST-SOVEREIGNTY

For some, like the Scottish National Party (SNP), European integration pro-vides an external support systemforan independence. Yet there is no provisioninEuropean law for secession, and the prevailing international norms strongly dis-courage it. Independence within Europe may represent an attenuated and lessrisky form of independence, since many of the externalities are catered for, but itdoes require secession.

More interestingly andsubtly, in other cases it provides a new discursivespacewithin which to project nationality claims. It has allowed some movements toabandon traditional claims for sovereign statehood and adopt a post-sovereigntist position based on shared sovereignty and authority. Post-sovereignty9 does notmean theend of sovereignty, but ratherits transformation sothat it is no longer monopolized by the state but becomes a claim to originalauthority, which canbe advanced by various actorsand institutionsand is intrinsi-cally divisible. This is a common theme of discourse among Europeanists andnational minorities and these two levels are increasingly linked so that the Euro-pean discourse becomes part of the constitutive fabric of nationalist movementsthemselves.10 Apart from providing doctrines of limited and shared sovereignty,this allows them tobuild or rebuild thenation internally by projecting it externally

as part of a European family.By the 1990s, most nationalist parties had abandoned independence and sub-

stituted other formulations, emphasizing self-determination, insertion intoEurope, or asymmetrical federalism. Some parties have long been ambivalent.Convergncia i Uni in Catalonia has never supported independence, althoughsome of its militants do. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya favors independ-

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ence only in the long term, as part of Europe of the Peoples transcending the old

model of statehood. The Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco[PNV]) has independentist andnonseparatist strands butin 2003, the lehendakari(Basque first minister) produced a plan providing for a freely associated statelinked to Spain and, directly, to Europe.11 In Flanders, Volksunie contained bothfederalist and independentist elements until 2002 when it split into a separatistanda post-sovereigntist party (Spirit). Plaid CymruParty of Wales has long beenambivalent about the meaning of self-government but in 2001 explicitly statedthat in the European context, national independence was no longer needed. Evenwithin the SNP, there are many who favor the Catalan approach. The moderatenationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party of Northern Ireland is stronglypro-European, and broader currents within both parts of Ireland have embracedEuropeanism as a means for transcending the division of Ireland.12

Across Eastern and Central Europe, the European theme has been taken up byminorities as a substitute for irredentism and as a counter to the old revanchisteattitudes found during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Silesian autonomists, longtorn between Polish and German identities, and with a history of irredentism andexpulsions, now stress the Europe of the Regions theme and autonomy within areconfigured Polish state.13 Hungarians in the Banat region of Romania empha-size their essentially European character.14 The Democratic Alliance of Hungari-ans in Romania, a center-right party linked to the Christian Democratic move-ment and European Peoples Party (EPP), also emphasizes itsEuropean mission,which allows it to claim that Hungarians are both a constituent element of theRomanian state and part of a wider Hungarian nation.15 The Party of HungarianCoalition in Slovakia, also linked to the EPP, dreams of a Europe of the natural

regions, reflecting culture and identity. Regionalists and minorities in EasternEurope have also drawn on the examples of mobilization in the West.16

CIVIC NATIONALISM

The normative dimension of Europe extends to a broader value framework,founded on rejection of Fascism in the aftermath of the Second World War andemphasizing democracy and tolerance. Nationalism was widely discredited, andminority nationalisms in Flanders and in Brittany were tainted by the collabora-tion of some of their members with Nazism. Since then, the European politicalarena has been open to nationalist and regionalist movements that have empha-sized territorial and inclusive nationalism and democracy, and not to those that

cleave to ethnic exclusiveness or racism. It has thus encouraged the growth of aself-consciously civic nationalism.17 Such movements would include the SNP,Plaid Cymru, Convergncia i Uni, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, orVolksunie/Spirit. The Basque PNV moved away quite early from the ethnicexclusivism of Sabino Arana (though this element has never quite disappeared)



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andwas anearlyconvert toEuropeanism,encouragedby itslinks with theinterna-

tional Christian Democratic movement.18

Efforts by extreme right-wing or ethnically exclusive or racist parties to adaptto Europe have been less successful, since they violate the founding norms of thepostwar European order. The Italian Lega Nordhas gone through a series of pol-icy realignments but for much of its history has emphasized the ability of Lom-bardy and thenPadania tooperate inEurope, ifonlyit werefreed ofthe incubus oftheMezzogiorno and theItalian state.19 By themid-1990s, it hadadopted a policyof independence in Europe in which northern Italy could join the Euro, leavingthe south with the Lira. They failed to gain any allies among other regions andnationalities, largely because of their racism and extremism, and found that theEurope they sought to join was antagonistic to their values. In 1994 they wereforcedoutof theEuropeanFree Alliance.20 By 2001 they hadchanged their rheto-

ric to become strong defenders of the (albeit federalized) Italian state againstEurope. The Lega dei Ticinesi in Italian-speaking Switzerland takes much thesame line. InFlanders,the VlaamsBlokrejectscivic nationalism in favor of ethnicexclusiveness, favoring a European confederation of peoples, or ethnic states,including Central and Eastern Europe. Yet despite its references to movementslike those in Scotland and Catalonia, it has failed to gain any allies and, like theother extreme right parties, it has fallen back on an anti-European rhetoric.21

Radical left nationalistsalso tend to hostility to Europe, seeingit as a capitalistclub dominated by large states. So Herri Batasuna and its successors in theBasque Country have no time for the EU, nor has Sinn Fin in Northern Ireland.The Bloque Nacionalista Galego (of Galicia in Spain) for long purveyed a popu-list anti-European rhetoric, portraying Galicia as even more peripheralized in

Europe than in Spain.22 Radical leftist groups in Brittany and in Occitania(France) similarly excoriated the EC/EU. Until at least the 1970s, an ideologicalunderpinning for these radical leftist parties was provided by internal colonial-ism, an extrapolation of theThird World strugglesfor liberation back to the impe-rial countriesof Europe. Gradually this theme lost itsattraction or relevance andacertain ideological shift took place,aidedby theemphasison socialsolidarity andcultural pluralism in the European discourse of the 1980s. In some cases, includ-ing the Galicianand Breton movements, this led to a discovery of Europe and thedeploymentofthethemeofaEuropeofthePeoplesasanalternativetothestates 23

bringing them closer to Plaid Cymru and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya.

A USABLE PAST

Nationality movements usually look back as well as forward, rooting theirclaims and seeking legitimacy in a historic past that is itself continually rein-vented. Yet the scope for invention is limited by the available materials, and bytheir present resonance. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, national-

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istmovementsoftenevokeda myth of ancient independenceandprecocious state-

hood, crushed by external repression. Sabino Arana anachronistically tried topresenttheBasqueprovinces(initiallyjustVizcaya)asnation-stateswithfullsov-ereignty until broken by the Spanish state.24 Many contemporary nationalitymovements, by contrast,have chosen to present themselves as themost Europeanof the Europeans and have rediscovered prestate traditions of shared sovereigntyand pactism, which lend themselves to the new European dispensation.25 Suchhistorical revisionism has been favored by the rediscovery of regional history26

and efforts to construct a history of Europe as opposed to its states.27 So Scottishintellectuals haveemphasized thelack ofa traditionof unitary state sovereigntyinScots law and philosophy28 and stress Scotlands early European connections.Catalans have taken as a reference point Catalonias status before 1714, as a self-governing nation within a complex confederal arrangement standing between

Spain and Europe.29 Welsh nationalists emphasize community as an almostmythical alternative to theclassic form of nation. Basquenationalism has reinter-preted the ancient rights or fueros of the historic territories as a form of pactismbased on shared sovereignty. Intellectuals in turn have used such old doctrines toback claims for divided sovereignty within Spain and Europe.30

In other cases, such argumentation carries less weight. Breton claims that theRevolution illegitimatelybroke the terms of the treatyof 1532 by which theprov-ince was annexed to France,31 clash with the powerful image of the Revolutionitself and its democratizing myths. The Belgian lands have a usable past in theform of the Burgundian and later imperial order, with its complex patterns ofrights and usages, andnationalistshave long engaged in historiographical wars.32

Yet modernFlanders andWallonia do notcorrespond to thehistoricunitsbut area

product of social andpoliticalmodernizationsince thenineteenthcentury, and theconstitutional legacy is slight. Padania, the imagined nationof theLega Nord, hashad to do with a concocted vision of itself as the oldest community in Europe,33

which convinces nobody.In Central and Eastern Europe, a powerful theme after the fall of Communism

was thereturn to Europe. This is rather ambivalent, as it can refer to several dif-ferentvisions ofEurope, past, present, andfuture. Theavailabilityof a usablepastalso varies. Silesians are pressing into use their history as a borderland andquintessentially European people as a way of resolving their confused nationalidentity question.34 Hungarians of Banat have drawn on the Habsburg culturalheritage and their history of interethnic harmony.35 There is even a broader reas-sessment of the Habsburg experience, which twentieth-century historiographyassumed had to break up as an inevitable consequence of democratization, sincethe nationalities would only be fulfilled in their own state. Yet as early as 1848there were thinkers advocating a new form of multinational order; the Czechnational leader Palacky went so far as to claim that if the Austrian empire did notexist it would be necessary to invent it.36 The Hungarian Etvos favored morecomplex solutions still, retaining the historic Crownlands, which were not drawn



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along strictly ethnic lines, but providing for local self government within these.37

The Austro-Marxists Renner and Bauer advocatedseparating personal fromterri-torial nationality altogether, but with both coming under an overarching trans-national order.38 The Czech national leaders Masaryk and Benes favored self-government within the empire until the First World War and fear of Germandomination rendered such schemes impossible.39 On the other hand, the Habs-burg legacy has negative connotations across much of the region, and the dis-course of recovered national statehood is a powerful theme; this is often com-bined with a profound suspicion of federalism or any territorial recognition ofminority claims.40

It is hardly surprising that small nations and nationalities, with big and power-ful neighbors, should not have developed doctrines of absolute state sovereignty,preferring to put their faith in overarching and transnational security and market

regimes. This was the view of Masaryk41 and it finds an echo in other smallnations.42 The ideological expression of this sentiment and its associated tradi-tions inpartsof Europeprovide an important doctrinalinstrument in theemergingcomplex European order. Self-determination in this context is less about estab-lishing a separate state than about constitutingthenation as thesubject of politicalclaims, with certain inherent rights, which then need to be negotiated in a widerorder. In this way, premodern and postmodern conceptions of order meet. Theresultingdoctrines, however, areoftenvague. Some, like theCatalan CiU, make avirtue of this, arguing that their constitutional doctrines must evolve along withEurope, while others postulate a utopian vision of a Europe of the Peoples inwhich the state has withered away. In the meantime, nationality movements seekto exploit existing opportunities in the form of regionalism, minority rights

regimes, and European constitutional reform.

THE NEW REGIONALISM

Theimpossibility of fitting thenationinto theprocrustean bedof thestate or ofbreaking states into territorially coherent national units is one of the most power-ful criticisms of nationalist doctrine, Brubakers architectonic illusion.43 Onetrend in analyses of late modernity detects an end of territory44 as the bonds ofidentity, function, and space are severed. In this context, nationalities could bereconceptualized as nonspatial cultural communities and endowed with variousforms of nonterritorial rights.45 The debate about nationalities and nationalismthen flows into the more general debate about multiculturalism and group rights.

Nationality claims, with their assertion of self-governing rights, however, aremore than mere claimsfor cultural recognitionindeed in some places, their cul-tural content is rather small. They do still entail territorial autonomy and, indeed,territory is in many ways becoming more important. Yet the significance of terri-tory is changing as a result of functional transformations in the state and transna-tional systems. This has allowed nationalist movements in Western Europe to

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embrace thenew regionalism, whichpromisesa territorial basisfor self-rulebut

without the exclusive connotations of territorial control implied in classicalnationalist doctrine.The new regionalist paradigm embraces functional change, institution build-

ing, and new ways of conceptualizing territorial politics.46 The most importantstrandconcerns theimportance of local andregionallevels foreconomicdevelop-ment and change, within global and European markets.47 Much of this literaturestresses also thesocialconstructionof the region and therole of norms, collectiveidentities, and shared memories in facilitating social cooperation and change.48

The key powers are no longer those held by the classic state, such as tariff policyor even macro economic powers, but rather supply-side factors that stimulateentrepreneurship and adaptation. Many of these powers, including education,training, infrastructure, and planning, are held by substate governments. Reterri-

torializationis alsooccurring in otherfunctionalsystems, including language andculture, despite the availability of new forms of communication technology inwhichdistanceisnota factor. This isbecause instruments like educationand otherpublic services essential to maintaining a cultural community are usually territo-rial, and because face-to-face communication remains important.

This territorialization of nationality and cultural claims is visible in Flanders,where a linguistic group has become strongly territorialized, uniting previouslyrather disparate provinces and localities. The autonomous community of theBasque Country has emerged as an important unit, although based on three sepa-rate historic territories, themselves part of a wider but territorially ill-definedBasque cultural region. Wales, previously so divided between north and south asto make any project of national self-government impossible, has found a new

unity as a European region.This process has also involved institution building in state and civil society.

States have devolved to their constituent territories to varying degrees, both toaccommodate autonomist demands and for reasons of functional efficacy. Inter-est groups and other elements of civil society have in turn adapted, to consolidatethe territory as a social, economic, and political system. Given the decline ofstates abilities to manage their spatial economies, such regions are increasinglycompetingwith each other for investment, technology, andmarkets, withinEuro-pean and global space. It is not surprising then, that stateless nations have oftenemerged as sitesof such region building, with nation-building elitescommitted tonew regionalist theories about the ability of small units to compete in Europeanspace autonomously. There is no consensus on what to call these new territorialsystems of action or on what the political implications are. Allen Scott writes ofregionaldirectorates.49 ThetermregionalstatewascoinedbyKenichiOhmaein a rather breathless but acultural and ahistorical account of the emergence ofregional systems that are supposedly replacing the nation-state.50 The term istakenupbyThomasCourchene51 and,inthecontextofthenationalitiesdebate,byAlain-G. Gagnon52 who sees the regional state as a way out of the Quebec



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dilemma between federalism and independence. Catalan authors, in recalling

Catalonia before 1714, have written of it as an incomplete state, but a state none-theless.53 Georg Jellinek in the nineteenth century wrote of fragments of state,entities that have some but not all of the characteristics of statehood.54

The possibility thus exists of territorially integrated nations and nationalitiesgaining a substantial degree of functionalautonomywithin thenewregionalpolit-ical economy. Identity and culture, previously seen as an obstacle to moderniza-tion, maybe assets in the new development paradigm. This is not because territo-ries like Scotland, Catalonia, or Flanders have any natural coincidence betweenterritory, identity, and functional systems, but because the evolution of the West-ern European state and transnational order has encouraged stateless nation andregion builders to construct new systems of action. The new regionalism, with itsterritorial focus, also encourages nationalists to adopt an inclusive or territorial

conception of the nation. So territorial devolution within the state and a role forregions within theEU (see below) might be useful mechanisms foraccommodat-ing nationalities. Yet it may be difficult to apply the territorial solution in Centraland Eastern Europe, as recommended by Will Kymlicka55 and others, where thenationalities have not undergone the same process of territorial consolidation.

FRAGMENTED TERRITORIES

Territoryandnationalitydonotcoincidewheremore than onegroupsharesthesame territory, where one group straddles two territories, and in combinations ofthese. One solution is deterritorialized forms of autonomy such as the Austro-Marxist proposals for personal autonomy. Yet these, like consociational arrange-

ments, can be criticized for reifying an exclusive ethnicity and for underminingterritorial self-government, and there are few opportunities for nonterritorialautonomy in Europe. A more promising idea is that of partially territorializedsolutions, in which territories are open rather than closed and their citizens canprofess different degrees of identity with it. A nationality can thus have a territo-rial base without either monopolizing this territory or being confined to it. Thisconcords with modernunderstandings of space in politicalgeography, allowingamore open conception of the region, with less rigidly defined boundaries andcomplex identities.56

Under the Habsburg Empire territorial autonomy through the Crownland sys-tem corresponded rather imperfectly to the self-identifying nationality groups.The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, while providing for territorial

autonomy, allows people to identify variously with Ulster, Northern Ireland, allIreland, or the United Kingdom. In Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, anumberof states57 passedor proposed laws giving special statusto co-nationalsinneighboring countries. Thesecould be read in two ways: as a provocative gestureof extraterritorial jurisdiction and covert irredentism, or as a way of securingnationality rights without moving borders. The Hungarian law of 2001 was par-

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ticularlycontroversial, since it came in a context in which some nationalist politi-

cians had talked of reversing Trianon and restoring the old Hungary. Romaniaand Slovakia saw it as a vestige of old-fashioned ethnic nationalism, while theHungariangovernment defended it as an example of themultiple identity politicspossible in the new Europe of cultural diversity.58 Eventually the issue requiredmediation through the Council of Europe. Ironically, Hungarian accession to theEU means that the law will have to be abandoned since it will no longer bepossible to discriminate among European citizens, or indeed among third-partynationals.

Europe provides powerful incentives for external homelands of minorities towork together, where they are current or prospective members of European insti-tutions. This hasbeen a factor inCentral Europeandin Cypruswhere theprospectofTurkish EU membership hasprovidedan incentive forcompromise.The Coun-

cil of Europe has also helped by abandoning its old doctrine that dual citizenshipisa sourceof conflictand, in the1997Convention onNationality, activelyencour-aging it in certain circumstances.59 We may thus see a more open-ended orfuzzy regionalism, in which a territory may be a homeland for a nationalitygroup, providing symbolic recognition and some public goods, while containingpressures to move stateborders. Such homelandsmaybe statesor, as in Cataloniaand the Basque Country, autonomous regions.

OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

The emerging European order is complex and multilayered, with a range ofcontinental bodies, notall ofwhichhavethesameterritorialcoverage. There is the

EU, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation inEurope, anda range of interstate andinterregionalbodies. Although theEuropeantheme first entered the discourse of minority nationalists between the two worldwars with visions of a European federation of nations, the European EconomicCommunityattractedlittleenthusiasm among theminorities, who tended to see itas remote, bureaucratic, and unsympathetic to nationality claims. Some vagueexpressions of support for Europeanism remained, but without a clear institu-tional expression. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, institutional incentivesemerged for minority parties to enter the European political game.60 Direct elec-tions to the European Parliament from 1979 encouraged minorities to organizeand in 1981 the European Free Alliancewas created linking minority and nation-alist parties and creating a forum for dialogue and debate about building a new

Europe. The1980salso saw a deepeningof European integrationand extension ofCommunity competences into new areas, together with a strengthening of itssupranational aspects and an institutionalization of the regional level. Notableswitchers from an anti-European to a pro-European position have been the SNP,the Volksunie, Plaid Cymru, Union dmocratique breton,and,tosomedegree,theBloque Nacionalista Galego.61



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In the late1980s and early 1990s there was a flurry of interest in the concept of

a Europe of the Regions. Never clearly specified, this seemed to refer to an orderin which regions were recognized as a third level of government alongside statesand the EU itself.62 Regions and stateless nations were too heterogeneous ever tofit into such a scheme, and in practice it evolved into a series of opportunities tointervene in EU policy making, either by direct links to Brussels or via the Mem-ber States. Nationalities maybe able to adapt themselves to these regional oppor-tunity structures, and to ally themselves to non-national and powerful regions;at the same time it gives further incentives to territorialize nationality claims. Aclause in the 1992 Treaty on European Union allows regional ministers to repre-sent Member States in the Council of Ministers where domestic law permits andregional matters are at stake. This is applied in Germany, Austria, Belgium, andthe United Kingdom in various ways. In the United Kingdom, participation by

ScottishandWelshministers isat thediscretionof thecentralgovernment. InGer-many, the role of the Lnder is entrenched and they participate by right. In Bel-gium, the regions and communities have external competences correspondingexactly to their internal competences, and the right to represent the state in theCouncil of Ministers where these are concerned. While in Germany, the Lndermust come to a common position, in Belgium all the relevant governments mustagree,giving each a veto in matters falling within itsjurisdiction. Spanish autono-mous communities havenotyetsucceeded in gaining such rights. So,while Euro-pean high policy making remains largely intergovernmental, there are mechan-isms for regions to act, provided they first achieve victory in domesticconstitutional arenas.

A lot of attention has been given to the Structural Funds as a means of giving

regions access to Brussels, a partnership with the Commission, and a source offunding independent of Member States. In practice, this field is intergovernmen-talandregionshavenomeansofgettingmoneydirectlyfromBrussels.TheFundsare, rather, an arena for symbolic politics, in which regional politicians can claimto have established a funding link to Brussels, while the EU can claim credit forlooking after vulnerableregions.In thisway, theyhave helped bringEuropeanismand regionalist and minority claims further together.

A moredirect form ofaccess is the Committee of the Regions. Thishas proveda disappointment to regionalists and minority nationalists because of its weakpowers and lack of resources and because it represents all levels of subMemberState government equally. Frustrated at having to share a place with municipalgovernments, the strong regions, stateless nations, and federated units launchedan initiative for the RegionswithLegislative Powers, or ConstitutionalRegions,63

seeking a recognition of their place in the European constitution. Although thesedo not always correspond to cultural or national regions or minorities, there isenough of an overlap to make common cause among German Lnder and Italianregions, Scotland, Wales, Flanders, and Catalonia in asserting the need for a rec-ognized third level within the European architecture. While they have as yet

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achieved few concrete results, they have created another discursive space in

which dialogue andexchange takes place about thebuildingof Europe. Such dia-logue is also pursued by the many regional offices in Brussels, which havebecome part of the policy community and an important link in the exchange ofideas and policy initiatives. Another arena is theCouncil of Europe, whose Com-mitteeof RegionalandLocal Authorities hasbeen divided into two chambers, fortheregionsand themunicipalities. This hasproduceda European Charter ofLocalSelf Government and a draft European Charter of Regional Self Government.

An important opportunity lies in the transformation of borders. Bordersremainimportant asexpressionsof state sovereignty andare for thefirst time gen-erally uncontested; but they are losing their functional significance. These twinchanges have encouraged new forms of cross-border penetration and coopera-tion, which are no longer automatically seen as threats to the state. As empirical

studies have shown, identities in border regions are typically complex, with indi-viduals identifying both with their respectivestatesand with a transborder nation-ality or ethnic group, defying a simple geographical definition of identity.64 Per-meableborders allow a renegotiation of these and theemergence of new forms oflayered identity. Others have talked of porous or fuzzy borders.65 On a moreconcrete level, there is scope for cross-border functional cooperation on eco-nomic, environmental, and cultural matters, allowing more expression for thenewregionalism.The Council of Europe produced theMadrid Convention,whichprovides a legalinstrument forcross-border partnership.TheEU hasa substantialprogram of cross-border partnerships under the INTER-REG initiative, whichbythe end of the 1990s was active across every border within the EU and with thecandidate countries as well. Experience of cross-border partnership has been

mixed, sincedifference in legal systems and political incentives, together withthetendency of regions and localities to be in competition for investment, have oftenstymied genuine partnership.66 The effects on identity are also subtle. There arefew instances of border communities abandoning their state identities to find acommon ethnic or national one. Cooperation has, however, helped redefineborders as complex zones in which multiple identities can be expressed andnegotiated.

Theseregional opportunitiesare closed to nonterritorializedminorities, whichinstead look to rights protection. Until the end of the Cold War, Europe lacked acommon minority rights regime, and efforts to apply the European Conventionfor the Protection of Human Rights to the collective rights of minorities wererebuffed.67 Since the 1990s, European institutions have gradually and hesitantlybeen building a minority rights regime, but this has three key features. It tends tofocus on the rights of individuals belonging to minorities rather than the minori-ties themselves; it emphasizes access to services and cultural guarantees ratherthan political autonomy, especially territorial autonomy; and it works thoughstates, allowingthem todefine theproblem andcontrol access toEuropean meansof redress. A Charter of Regional and Minority Languages was adopted by the



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Council of Europe in 1992, with reservations by several states, including the

United Kingdom and France; eventually France failed to ratify it. The enforce-ment mechanism is a three-yearly report to the Council of Ministers.68 Moreambitiousis the1995Framework Conventionon NationalMinorities, designed tobe adopted in appropriate form by signatory states but without direct application.It does not define or recognize minorities, but rather addresses the rights of indi-vidual members of minorities, determined by a mixture of self-designation andobjective criteria. Matters covered include the use of language, education, themedia, public administration, commercial signs, and cross-border contacts. TheConventionstands outamongtheEuropean instruments for its intentionto protectand preserve the minority communities themselves, so going beyond the mereprohibition of discrimination. On the other hand, signatory states themselveswere allowed to designate their own minorities before ratification. So Estonia

included only its own citizens in its scope, refusing to recognize Russians whohad not met its strict citizenship requirements; Russias own reservation specifi-callyaimed todeny this. Luxembourg, worriedabout therights of immigrantsandtheir descendants, confined its protection to minorities who had been present forseveral generations and then declared that, on this criterion, there were nominorities in Luxembourg. Other states, however, took the matter more seriouslyand many national minorities were expressly singled out for protection.

TheOrganization forSecurity andCo-operation in Europe (OSCE) hasa HighCommissioner for National Minorities. Originally intended as a trouble-shootingoperation in actual or potential conflicts, the role has extended to the realm ofminority ratherthan purelyindividualrights. Ithasso far been confinedentirely tothe countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The OSCE also enters into the field

for minority protection through the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.69The EU has been reluctant to be drawn into questions of minority rights but it

has proved impossible to remain entirely aloof. An article in the Treaty on Euro-pean Union (Maastricht) pledged support for cultural diversity, and the EuropeanParliament used this to establish a Bureau of Lesser Used Languages in Dublin.Negotiations for the admission of the countries of Central and Eastern Europebrought the issue to the fore, and the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 includedrespect for minorities. Regular accession reports note progress on the issue andcall for change where necessary. There has been some movement towards theacceptance of group rights, perhaps motivated by security and immigration con-siderations, notably the position of Russians in the former Soviet republics. Dis-crimination against Roma also featured quite prominently as an issue.

The EUs approach has often relied on principles and processes from theCouncil of Europe and the OSCE, with their prior experience.70 So it has pressedcandidate countries to adopt the Framework Convention on National Minorities,widely accepted within the existing Member States, rather than the more contro-versial European Convention on Regional and Minority Languages.71 The 1995StabilityPact (Plan Balladur), in which theEU encouraged candidatecountries to

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settleminorities andborder issuesamong themselves,was formally sponsoredby

the OSCE.72

This is a patchwork approach but, by individual initiatives linkedacross the various institutions, a minority rights regime of sorts has come intobeing.73 Accessionwillbeakeytestofthisregime,sincetheAmsterdamTreatyof1997 incorporating the Copenhagen criteria into the acquis de lUnion, left outthe minority rights clauses.74 This implies that, after accession, either theEU willceasetomonitorminorityrightsinthenewMemberStates,oritwillhavetoadopta new instrument to monitor them in the existing Member States as well.

STATE ADAPTATION

Europe thus allows a loosening of state control and the externalization of pre-viously centralized functions, but the response depends on adaptation of states

themselves, which remain gatekeepers between nationalities and Europe. Bel-gium has generally bent to the process of integration by handing powers down tothe communities and regions and upwards to Europe. At times it looks as thoughthe state itself will disappear, although it is precisely the ability to externalizeproblems that allows it to stay together in some form. The United Kingdom hasturneditself into an asymmetricalmultinationalstate. It is as though, neverhavinggone through the national revolution and retaining many features of an ancienrgime, it has been able to jump from a premodern to a postmodern state formdirectly. Europe has helped here in various ways, despite the prevailing Euro-scepticism. The European framework is one factor that made possible the GoodFriday agreement in which both theUnitedKingdom and theRepublic of Irelandput their claims overNorthern Ireland intoabeyance.75 It allowed a settlement for

Scotland in 1998 that was much less set about with safeguards and restrictionsthan that proposed in 1978. States based upon Napoleonic principles of unity anduniformity have found it more difficult to adapt, despite being in general pro-European. These include the obvious example of France as well as Italy and evenSpain, where the present government has tended to react to the challenge to itssovereignty by more aggressive assertion of its remaining prerogatives and aresistance to further devolution. In Central and Eastern Europe, there is a wide-spread fear of separatism and distrust of federal solutions as states, having justrecovered their independence, arereluctant to lose it.Yet here toothere arediffer-ences. Romania has tended to emphasize the French model of unitary citizenshipas the basis for democracy. Hungary, mindful of the large number of Hungariansin neighboring states, has argued for a looser and more complex idea of national-

ity and citizenship. Poland, living with the memory of partition, has stressednational unity and sought to restrict regionalism to a limited functional type, notbased on historic regions and framed within the Polish state rather than at aEuropean level. Stateshavediffered in theextent to which they haveallowed theirregions to operate within Europe.



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THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE

Much has been written about multilevel governance in Europe, about plural-ism and the complexity of policy-making structures.76 Yet without a constitution,it is feared, Europe lacks a clear normative basis andbecomes merelyan arena forgroup competition. This applies equally to the nationalities question, where weare witnessing a plethora of claims to self-determination, historic and presentrights, and original sovereignty. Such a complex normative order requires a newformofconstitutionalthinking,adaptedtoaworldinwhichtheoldtriadofnation,territory, and sovereignty can no longer be taken for granted.

Constitutionalismhas increasingly been detached conceptually fromthe state,with an appreciation that constitutions may exist at multiple levels and thatconstitutionalism itself may be as much a process as a final and definitive set ofrules. The expression metaconstitutionalism has been coined for the realm inwhich the various constitutional visions meet and are negotiated.77 Within such aframework,a constitutional pluralismis possible, in which various forms of orderand sovereignty claims can coexist, including those of shared and divided sover-eignty. There are two versions of arguments about divided sovereignty. One is tothe effect that sovereignty is still in principle indivisible, but that, since a numberofactorsatdifferentlevelsaremakingclaimstoit,wehavenotalternativetocom-promise among them. Politics thus comes in where constitutional theory fallsdown. So the Basque Nationalists claim that, since the 1978 Spanish constitutiondid not recognize their original rights and did not gain the support of an absolutemajority of Basques in the referendum, it is not legitimate.78 This does not stopthem working within it. There is an unresolved intellectual and legal question

aboutthesourceandnatureofsovereigntyinScotland,butitdoesnotstoppoliticsproceeding. In an open constitutional order, wecanlivewithmany of these anom-alies,and itis often preferable not to resolve them. The other version is tosee sov-ereigntynot asa claim tothe monopoly ofauthority, but ratheras a claim toan ele-ment of original authority (that isnot derived from a higher authority), but whichrecognizesthe existenceof other sources of originalauthoritythatnecessarily andinherently limit each other. This is more consistent with the historic doctrinesbeing refurbished in the stateless nations of Europe. A European constitution-alism is thus possible in which there is a shared European level, marked by com-monvalues andequal rights, within which highlyasymmetrical arrangementsarepossible reflecting the status of different nationalities, states, and regions.

This would require aEuropean constitution that was strong enough to provide

an overarching framework, but flexible enough to allow diversity within it. AEuropean Union builton thelinesof the traditional nation-statewould fail to meetthe need for the same reasons as the states have. At the other extreme, a Europefunctioning merely as a holding company, a market order, or a convenience forexternalizingdifficult problems would not sustain thecommon values and consti-

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tutional order in which pluralismis possible.There maybe an emergingconstitu-

tionalpractice, aswehaveseen in reviewing thevarious institutionsand strategiesin Europe, but there is no overall framework for managing the new nationalcomplexity.

The debates around the Convention on the Future of Europe and its draft con-stitutionprovide some evidence for this. Thenational/regionalquestion was not apriority in theConvention, which wasnot taskedwith proposing a new statute fornations and national minorities. Nor could it challenge the sovereignty of statesandtheir authorityhead on.On thecontrary, thedebates followeda logic in whichauthority is divided in complex ways between European and state-level institu-tions. So nationalities and regions must find their niche in a Europe of the statesrather than dreaming of their disappearance in favor of a utopian Europe of thePeoples.79 Yet the various visions of Europe on offer provide more, or less, space

for the accommodation of nationalities. An intergovernmental Europe based ontheexisting statesclearly offers the least scope for statelessnationalities.An inte-gratedbutcentralizedanduniform Europewould offer littlemore.So regions andnationalities have pressed for an integrated Europe but one that is decentralizedand pluralist. In this way, the pro-Europeanism of the national minorities andstateless nations can serve as a means to legitimize the European project itself bylinking it to local mobilization and identity. Rather than Europe seeking its ownseparatedemos, therefore, it canbe theframework formultipledemoi, themselvesconstitutive, along with the state, of a larger political community. Such a dispen-sation is closer to the idea of pluralistic federalism80 than of classical uniformfederalism on the U.S. model.

The clarification and demarcation of roles and responsibilities, however,

threaten to reduce the space available for regions and nationalities to those speci-fied in the new constitution. Indeed, the very process of constitution making mayreduce those areas of uncertainty in which new forms of authoritymight be nego-tiated,andEuropecouldendupasanobstacletonewformsofaccommodation.Inthelast major treatyrevision, at Maastricht,opportunities were created that Mem-ber States could use at their discretion (discussed above). In the present constitu-tional round, there seems less willingness to allow such differentiation. Themajority in the Convention and in the Committee of the Regions even refused todistinguish betweenfederatedunits anddevolved national parliaments,on theonehand, and municipal government on the other. The Flemish government and theCatalan Convention on Europe proposed that it be possible to divide a MemberStates vote in theCouncil of Ministers, but this was a nonstarter,as wasthe Euro-pean Free Alliance for internal enlargement in which stateless nations couldbecomefull members of theEU.The Basque government proposed expanding onthe Lamassoure proposal81 whereby regions could becomepartners of theUnion,to provide for the Basque Country to become an associated state. Yet the origi-nalLamassoure idea, which wasalready a long way from this, was further diluted



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to a form of administrative decentralization. Nor has the EU always agreed to

allowstates to differentiate internally in their applicationof EU directives thewaythey are allowed in many cases to differentiate between themselves. The numer-ous exceptions in the existing treaties to accommodate regions, including theCanaries, the Azores, and the land islands, are not to be generalized. Even theproposal to recognizea categoryof regions with legislative powersfell victimto acombination of those who considered that all regions were the same and thosewhothought that they were sodifferentthat they were impossible tocategorize.

CONCLUSION

European integration has thus affected the nationalities question at three lev-els, that of the state, that of the nationalities, and in the European arena itself. Yet

its impact is two sided. On theonehand, the increasing language of pluralismanddivided sovereigntyprovides a discursive spacefor newauthorityclaims.Thereisa trend among the nationalities movements to adopt a post-sovereign stance; toexpress a civic, inclusive form of nationalism; and to emphasize their territorialbasis. Thishas tamed and restrained nationalism, althoughsomeethnicallyexclu-sive and separatist movements still exist. States remain the obstacle to utopianvisions of a Europe of the Peoples, but some have adapted to the new pluralismmore than others. Europe, by externalizing common functions, permits a greaterasymmetry within states. The European institutional structure furnishes a set ofopportunities for nonstate actors to intervene, gain recognition, build systems ofaction, andsecureprotection. On theother hand, theconcrete opportunities avail-able within Europe are limited and rather disparate. Europe creates spaces for

more diversity, butmany of its institutional and policy initiativesassumea homo-geneous substate level of authorityand identity.82 An intergovernmental EU, withthe states taking a restrictive line on what their substate governments can do, willplace a premium on becoming a state even if this should be the second choice ofthe nationalities themselves.

So far, a gradual evolution hasallowed Europe and thenationalities to adapt intandem, exploring new forms of political order. Formulas such as the regionalstate, fragment of state, or incomplete state have been criticized for theirimplication that they are somehow unfinished, but this very characteristic markstheevolution ofEuropeitself. Anopen andloose form of constitutionalismwouldallow thisprocess to continue, making adjustments where necessary. An effort toclose the process or to fix the status, categories, and competences of Europe,

Member States, and nationalities and regions would risk re-creating the type ofmisfit that has caused such problems in the past.

NOTES

1.RogersBrubaker,Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question inthe New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

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2. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1990).

3. Yael Tamir,Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993);Alexander B. Murphy, Rethinking the Concept of European Identity, in Nested Identi-ties: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale, ed. H. Herb Guntram and David H. Kaplan(Lanhmam, MD:Rowman &Littlefield, 1999); and Richard Kearney, Postnationalist Ire-land: Politics, Culture, Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1997).

4. Martin Creveld, The Rise and Decline of theState (Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sity Press, 1999).

5. External security has been collectivized at the supranational level. The only ques-tion is whether this is to be within a predominantly European or a broader transatlanticframework.

6. Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the Euro-pean Commonwealth (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999); Neil Walker, Euro-pean Constitutionalism and European Integration, Public Law (Summer 1996):266-90.

Neil Walker, Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union,European Law Journal 4, no. 4 (1998): 355-88.

7. John StuartMill, On Liberty, Utilitarianism,and Considerations on RepresentativeGovernment(London: Dent, 1972); David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford, UK: OxfordUniversity Press, 1995).

8. In the United Kingdom, the only statutory charter of rights is the European one,incorporated differently into the legal systems of the four nations.

9. The concept is discussed at greater length in Michael Keating, PlurinationalDemocracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-sovereignty Era (Oxford, UK: Oxford UniversityPress, 2001).

10. Montserrat Guibernau, Nations without States: Political Communities in a GlobalAge (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1999); David McCrone, TheSociology of Nationalism (Lon-don: Routledge, 1998); and StphanePaquin,La revanche des petites nations: Le Qubec,lcosse et la Catalogne face la mondialisation (Montreal, Canada: vlb, 2001).

11. Juan Jos Ibarretxe, Nuevo pacto poltico para la convivencia (www.Euskadi.net/konponbideak/nuevopacto, Basque Government, 2002).

12.John McGarry, Globalization,EuropeanIntegration andthe NorthernIrelandCon-flict, inMinority Nationalism and the Changing International Order, ed.MichaelKeatingand John McGarry (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001).

13.WandaDresslerHolohanandMaria Ciechocinska, TheRecomposition of IdentityandPolitical Space in Europe: The Case of Upper Silesia, inBorders, Nations and States,ed. Liam ODowd and Thomas M. Wilson (Aldershot, UK: Averbury, 1996).

14.JudyBatt Reinventing Banat,Regional and FederalStudies 12, no.2 (2002): 178-202; Judy Batt, Fuzzy Statehood versus Hard Borders: The Impact of EU Enlargementon Romania and Yugoslavia, in The Regional Challenge in Central and Eastern Europe,Territorial Restructuring and European Integration, ed. Michael Keating and JamesHughes (Brussels: Presses interuniversitaires europennes/Peter Lang, 2003).

15. DAHR, Democratic Alliance of Hungarians of Romania, Programme, 1998.

www.hhrf.org/rmdsz/.16.Karoly Gruber,Constitutional Regions, Stateless Nations and the Futureof EuropeDebate (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2002).

17. Michael Keating, Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism inQuebec, Catalonia and Scotland, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2001.)

18. Alexander Ugalde, Las relaciones internacionales del nacionalismo vasco, inParadiplomacia: las relaciones internacionales de las regiones, ed. Francisco Aldecoaand Michael Keating (Madrid, Spain: Marcial Pons, 2001).



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19. Roberto Biorcio, La Padania Promessa (Milan, Italy: Il Saggiatore, 1997).20. Peter Lynch, Minority Nationalism and European Integration (Cardiff, UK: Uni-

versity of Wales Press, 1996).21. Cesreo Aguilera de Prat, Partidos y estrategias nacionalistas en Catalua,

Escocia y Flandes (Valencia, Spain: Tirant lo Blanc, 2002).22.Michael Keating, Lesnationalits minoritaires dEspagne face lEurope, Etudes

Internationales 30, no. 4 (1999): 729-43; Michael Keating, Rethinking the Region: Cul-ture, Institutions and Economic Development in Catalonia and Galicia, European UrbanandRegionalStudies 8,no.3 (1999):217-34;and MichaelKeating, TheMinority Nationsof Spain and European Integration: A New Framework for Autonomy? Journal of Span-ish Cultural Studies, 1, no. 1 (2000): 29-42.

23. Michael Keating, Nations against the State; Michel Nicolas, Bretagne, un destineuropen (Rennes, France: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2001).

24. Sabino Arana, Bizkaya por su independencia, extract in Documentos para lahistoria del nacionalismo vasco, ed.Santiago dePablo, Jos Luis de la Granja, andLudgerMees (Barcelona, Spain: Ariel, 1998).

25. Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy.26.Celia Applegate, A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-

nationalPlacesinModernTimes,AmericanHistoricalReview104,no.4(1999):1157-82.27. Norman Davies, Europe: A History (London: Pimlico, 1997).28.NeilMacCormick,IsTherea ScottishPath to Constitutional Independence? Par-

liamentary Affairs 53 (2000): 721-36; William Ferguson, The Identity of the ScottishNation: An Historic Quest (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1998); andPaul H. Scott, Andrew Fletcher and the Treaty of Union (Edinburgh, UK: John Donald,1992).

29. Eduardo Moreno and Francisco Mart, Catalunya para espaoles (Barcelona,Spain: DORESA, 1977); Salvador Giner and others, La cultura catalana: el sagrat i el

prof (Barcelona, Spain: Edicions 62, 1996); Ricard Lobo, La devolucin de lasoberana, in El modelo cataln: Un talante poltico, ed. Xavier Bru de Sala and others(Barcelona, Spain: Flor del Viento, 1997); Joaquim Albareda i Salvad and Pere Gifre iRibes, Historia de la Catalunya moderna (Barcelona, Spain: Edicions de la UniversitatOberta de Catalunya, 1999); and Jaime Vicens Vives, Approaches to the History of Spain,2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

30. Miguel Herrero de Mion, Derechos Histricos y Constitucin (Madrid, Spain:Taurus, 1998); and Miguel Herrero de Mion and Ernest Lluch, Derechos Histricos yConstitucionalismo Util (Barcelona, Spain: Crtica, 2001).

31. Michel Nicolas, Bretagne.32. Lode Wils, Histoire des national belges (Ottignies: Quorum, 1996); Louis Vos,

Reconstructions of the Past in Belgium and Flanders, in Secession, History and theSocial Sciences, ed. Bruno Coppieters and Michel Huysseune (Brussels: Brussels Univer-sity Press, 2002).

33. G. Oneto, Linvenzione della Padania: La rinascita della communit pi anticadEuropa (Bergamo, Italy: Foedus, 1997).

34. Luiza Bialasiewicz, Upper Silesia: Rebirth of a Regional Identity in Poland,Regional and Federal Studies 12, no. 2 (2002): 111-32.35. Judy Batt, Reinventing Banat, Regional and Federal Studies 12, no. 2 (2002):

178-202.36. Batt, Fuzzy Statehood.37. Ibid.

MICHAEL KEATING 385


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38. Otto Bauer, The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy, trans. JosephODonnell, ed. Ephraim Nimni (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000);

Ephraim Nimni, Nationalist Multiculturalism in Late Imperial Austria as a Critique ofContemporary Liberalism: TheCaseof Bauer andRenner,Journal of Political Ideologies4, no. 3 (1999): 289-314.

39. C. A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918 (New York: Russell and Rus-sell, 1969); Frederick Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics (London: Kegan Paul,Trench and Turner, 1944); Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and

National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy,1848-1919 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 1950); and Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Cen-tral Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914-1923 (London: Routledge, 2001).

40.Andr Liebich,Ethnic Minorities andLong-TermImplications of EU Enlargement,RSC Working Paper 98/49 (Florence, Italy: European University Institute, 1998).

41. Alan Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918 (London:Longman, 1989).

42. Pau Puig i Scotoni, Pensar els camins a la sobirania (Barcelona, Spain:Mediterrnea, 1998).

43. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed.44. Bertrand Badie, La fin des territories: Essai sur le dsordre international et sur

lutilit sociale du respect(Paris: Fayard, 1995).45.Yael Tamir,Liberal Nationalism (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1993).46. Michael Keating, The New Regionalismin Western Europe: Territorial Restructur-

ing and Political Change (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1998).47. Allen Scott, Regions and the World Economy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University

Press, 1998); Michael Storper, The Regional World: Territorial Development in a GlobalEconomy (New York: Guilford, 1997).

48. Michael Keating, John Loughlin, and Kris Deschouwer, Culture, Institutions andEconomic Development: A Study of Eight European Regions (Aldershot, UK: EdwardElgar, 2003).

49. Scott, Regions and the World Economy.50.Kenichi Ohmae,TheEndoftheNationState:TheRiseofRegionalEconomies (New

York: Free Press, 1995).51.Thomas J. Courchene,A State of Minds: Toward a Human Capital Future for Cana-

dians (Montreal, Canada: Institute for Research in Public Policy, 2001).52. Alain-G. Gagnon, Le Qubec, une nation inscrite au sein dune dmocratie

trique, in Repres en mutation: Identit et citoyennet dans le Qubec contemporain ,ed.JocelynMcCureand Alain-G.Gagnon(Montreal,Canada:Qubec-Amrique,2001).

53. Nria Sales, Els sigles de la decadncia, Vol. IV of Histria de Catalunya (Barce-lona, Spain: Edicions 62, 1989).

54. Georg Jellinek, Fragmentos de Estado, translation of Uber Staatsfragmente(Madrid, Spain: Civitas, 1981).

55. Will Kymlicka, Reply and Conclusion, in Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, ed. Will Kymlicka and

Magda Opalski (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001).56. Anssi Paasi, Place and Region: Regional World and Words, Progress in HumanGeography 26, no. 6 (2002): 802-11.

57.Slovenia,Romania,Hungary, andSlovakiapassed suchlaws andPolandconsideredit. Only the Hungarian law specified the neighboring countries to which it would apply:Romania, Ukraine, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Slovenia.



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58. Brigid Fowler, Fuzzing Citizenship, Nationalising Political Space: A Frameworkfor Interpreting the Hungarian Status Lawas a New Form of Kin-State Policy in Central

and Eastern Europe, One Europe or Several Programme Working Paper, 40/02 (Brighton,UK: Sussex European Institute, 2002); European Commission for Democracy throughLaw (Venice Commission), Paper Containing the Position of the Hungarian Governmentin Relation to the Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (Strasbourg,France: Council of Europe, 2001).

59. The law on Hungarians abroad, however, was promoted as a substitute for dualcitizenship.

60. Lieven De Winter and Margarita Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, European Integrationand Ethnoregionalist Parties, PartyPolitics 8,no.4 (2002): 483-503; and Lieven De Win-ter, The Impactof European Integrationon Ethnoregionalist Parties, Working Papers, 195(Barcelona, Spain: Institut de Cincies Politiques i Socials, 2001).

61. Lieven De Winter, The Volksunie and the Dilemma between Policy Success andElectoral Survival in Flanders, in Regionalist Parties in Western Europe, ed. Lieven deWinterandHuri Tursan(London: Routlege,1998);PeterLynch,Minority Nationalism andEuropean Integration (Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press, 1996); Nicolas, Bretagne;and Keating, Minority Nations of Spain.

62. Udo Bullman, Die Politik der dritten Ebene: Regionen im Europa der Union(Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 1994).

63.Technically, these areseparateinitiatives,butonly for institutional reasons,asoneisbased on the EU and the other on the Council of Europe.

64. Zoe Bray, Boundaries and Identities in Bidasoa-Txingudi on the Franco-SpanishFrontier(Ph.D.diss.,EuropeanUniversity Institute, Florence, 2002);David Kaplan,Con-flict and Compromise among Borderland Identities in Northern Italy, Tijdschrift voorEconomischeen SocialeGeografie91,no.1(2000):44-60;PeterSahlins,Boundaries: The

Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press,1989);and Jorunn SemFure,TheGerman-Polish BorderRegion: A Case of Regional Inte-gration? ARENA Working Papers, 97/19 (Oslo, Norway: ARENA Project, 1997).

65. Batt, Fuzzy Statehood.66. JohnW. Scott, European and North American Contextsfor Cross-Border Region-

alism, Regional Studies 33, no. 13 (1999): 605-17.67. Christian Hillgruber and Matthias Jestaedt, The European Convention on Human

Rights and the Protection of National Minorities (Cologne,Germany: Verlag Wissenschaftund Politik, 1994); and Alain Fenet, LEurope et les minorits, in Le Droit et les

Minorits, ed. Alain Fenet (Brussels: Bruylant, 1995).68. Of the Council of Europe, not the European Union.69. Florence Benot-Rohmer, The Minority Question in Europe (Strasbourg, France:

Council of Europe, 1996).70.MartinBrusis, TheEuropean Union andInterethnicPower-Sharing Arrangements

in AccessionCountries,Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 1 (2003):1-20.

71. James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse, Monitoring the Montors: EU Enlargement

Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs, Journal of Ethnopolitics andMinority Issues in Europe 1 (2003): 21-36.72. Liebich, Ethnic Minorities.73. Jennifer Jackson Preece,National Minorities and the European Nation-States Sys-

tem (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998).74. Hughes and Sasse, Monitoring the Monitors.75. McGarry, Globalization.

MICHAEL KEATING 387


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76. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi-level Governance and European Integra-tion (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

77. NeilWalker,The Ideaof Constitutional Pluralism,Modern Law Review 65,no.3(2002): 317-59.

78. The Basque Nationalist Party recommended abstention in the referendum on theSpanish constitution but a vote in favor of the Basque Statute of Autonomy.

79. Gurutz Juregui, Los nacionalismos minoritarios y la Unin Europea (Barcelona,Spain: Ariel, 1997).

80. Miquel Caminal, El federalismo pluralista: Del federalismo nacional alfederalismo plurinacional (Barcelona, Spain: Paids, 2002).

81. Alain Lamassoure, a French MEP, has proposed that regions could become part-ners of the Union with broad responsibilities for applying EU policy directly. The Com-mission haspursuedthe idea in theform of tripartite contractsamong theCommission, theMember State, and the region.

82. Carlos Closa, La Pluralidad Nacional en un mismo Estado y en la UE, inDemocracia y pluralismo nacional, ed. Ferran Requejo (Barcelona, Spain: Ariel, 2002).

Michael Keating ([email protected]) is a professor of regional studies at theEuropean University Institute, Florence, and professor of Scottish politics at theUniversity of Aberdeen. Among his recent publications are Plurinational Democ-racy: Stateless Nations in a Post-sovereignty Era (Oxford University Press, 2001)andMinority Nationalism and the Changing International Order (edited with John

McGarry, Oxford University Press, 2001). He is currently working on nationalitiesand European integration and on devolution in the United Kingdom.


keating, eu intgration

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