kant on aesthetic autonomy and common sense

volume19,no.24 june2019

Kant on Aesthetic Autonomy

and Common Sense

Samantha MatherneHarvard University

© 2019 SamanthaMatherneThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/019024/>

1. Introduction

Although thenotionofautonomy is typicallyassociatedwithKant’smoral philosophy, in theCritique of the Power of Judgment he also as-cribesautonomytojudgmentsoftaste.Forexample,heclaimsthatajudgmentoftasteis

nottobegroundedoncollectingvotesandaskingamongotherpeopleaboutthesortofsensationstheyhave,butisasitweretorestonanautonomyofthesubjectjudgingaboutthefeelingofpleasureinthegivenrepresentation,i.e.,onhisowntaste(KU§31,5:281,myemph.).1

Continuinginthisvein,heasserts:

[I]t is required of every judgment that is supposed toprove the tasteof thesubject that thesubject judge forhimself,withouthaving togropeaboutbymeansofex-perienceamongthejudgmentsofothers[…]Tastemakesclaimmerelytoautonomy.Tomakethejudgmentsofoth-ersintothedetermininggroundofone’sownwouldbeheteronomy(KU§32,5:282,myemph.).

Kant thuscharacterizes judgmentsof tasteasautonomous invirtueoftheirbeinggroundednotonwhatothersthink,butrather,insomesense,onthesubject’sownfeelinginresponsetotheobject.2

Kantthenofferstwoexamplesthatappeartoillustratethenotionofaestheticautonomy.Thefirstisthatofayoungpoet:

1. ReferencestoKantaretothevolumeandpageofKants gesammelte Schriften, exceptcitationstoKrV,whicharetotheAandBpagination.Anthro:Anthro-pology from a Pragmatic Point of View; EE:FirstIntroductiontotheCritique of the Power of Judgment;Gr:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals; JL:Jäsche Logic:;Prol.:Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics;KpV:Critique of Practical Judgment; KrV:Critique of Pure Reason; KU:Critique of the Power of Judgment; WE:“WhatisEnlightenment.”

2. Thekindofaestheticautonomyatissueinthesepassagesshouldbedistin-guishedfromanotherkindofaestheticautonomy,whichpertainstothein-dependenceofouraestheticevaluations frommoralor cognitiveconsider-ations.Theformerkindofaestheticautonomyratherthanthelattershallbemyconcerninthispaper.

samanthamatherne Kant on Aesthetic Autonomy and Common Sense

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.19,no.24(june2019)

quasi-realism.4MeanwhileHopkins,KerenGorodeisky,andAmirKo-nigsberghaveexploredtheconsequenceshisdiscussionofaestheticautonomyhasforthevalueofaesthetictestimony.5AndRichardMo-ranhas focusedon the connectionbetweenKant’s approach toaes-theticautonomyandaestheticnormativity.6

Althoughthesediscussionshaveshedmuch lightonthe implica-tionsofKant’saccountofaestheticautonomy,thereisacrucialrespectinwhichthephenomenonofaestheticautonomytendstobeunder-described,viz.,whyitcountsasautonomyintheKantiansense.Com-mentators often emphasize thenegative aspect of this phenomenon,i.e.,thesenseinwhichanautonomousaestheticjudgmentcannotbegroundedonthetestimonyofothers.7However,asthosefamiliarwithKant’smoralphilosophyare aware,hedefines autonomy inpositive terms.Tothisend,hedistinguishesbetweenfreedominthe‘negative’

4. Although Hopkins (2001) argues that the quasi-realist strategy ultimatelycannot account for aesthetic autonomy, Todd (2004) claims that if we en-dorseaquasi-realisminspirednotbyKant,butbyScruton,itwillfarebetter.MeanwhileMcGonigal(2006)offersadefenseofKantianaestheticautono-myinlightofthestatusaestheticjudgmentshaveasvaluejudgments,andheclaimsthatthisviewofaestheticautonomyisopentoquasi-realistsandcognitivists.

5. Inparticular,Hopkins(2000),(2001),(2011);Gorodeisky(2010);andKonigs-berg(2012)attributetoKanta ‘pessimistic’viewaboutaesthetic testimony,accordingtowhichitcannotcountasareasontomakeajudgmentoftaste,eventhoughitmaycountasareasontoexperiencetheobjectagain,asinthebeautydeniercase.

6. SeeMoran(2012):309–17.Intheend,however,MoranarguesthatKantmis-placesthesourceofaestheticnormativity:whereasKanttiesittotheuniver-saldemandthatothersagreewithus,Moran,followingProust,claimsthatthisnormativityhasitssourceinbeautifulobjectsthemselves.

7. Theemphasisonthenegativefeaturesofthisphenomenonhasbeenpreva-lentinthediscussionofKant’sviewofaesthetictestimony.Particularlyinflu-entialinthisregardhasbeenHopkins’s(2001)glossofKantianaestheticau-tonomy,accordingtowhich,“aestheticjudgmentsareautonomousinawayinwhichordinaryempiricaljudgmentsarenot:intheformercase,unlikethelatter,thefactthatothersdisagreecannotjustifyachangeofmind”(167–8).Inthisvein,seealsoGorodeiskyandMarcus’s(2018)descriptionofaestheticautonomyas, “Autonomy:Neither themere fact that everyoneelsemakesacertainaesthetic judgmentnorthetestimonyofexpertscanbeadequategroundsformakingthejudgmentoneself”(122).

Hence a youngpoet does not let himself be dissuadedfromhisconvictionthathispoemisbeautifulbythejudg-mentofthepublicnorthatofhisfriends[…]Onlylater,whenhispowerofjudgmenthasbeenmademoreacutebypractice,doeshedepartfromhispreviousjudgmentofhisownfreewill,justashedoeswiththoseofhisjudg-mentsthatrestentirelyonreason(KU§32,5:282).

Kant’ssecondexampleisofabeautydenier:

Ifsomeonedoesnotfindabuilding,aview,orapoembeautiful, then […] he does not allow approval to beinternally imposed upon himself by a hundred voiceswhoallpraiseithighly.Hemayofcoursebehaveasifitpleasedhimaswell,inordernottoberegardedaslackingintaste;hecanevenbegintodoubtwhetherhehasade-quatelyformedhistastebyacquaintancewithasufficientnumberofobjectsofacertainkind[…]Butwhathedoesseeclearlyisthis:thattheapprovalofothersprovidesnovalidproofforthejudgingofbeauty(KU§33,5:284).

Differences between these two cases notwithstanding, both can bereadasexamplesof aesthetic autonomy: the relevant judge refusestomakehisaestheticjudgmentonthebasisofwhatothersthink,butratherbasesit,insomeway,onhisownfeeling.

Morerecently,Kant’saccountofaestheticautonomyhasreceivedattentionfromthoseinterestedinarangeofissuesinaesthetics.Han-nahGinsborg,forone,hasarguedthathisviewofaestheticautono-mysupportsasubjective,ratherthananobjectivetheoryofaestheticjudgment.3Inarelatedvein,RobertHopkins,CainTodd,andAndrewMcGonigal have explored whether Kant’s conception of aestheticautonomy lends itself to some version of aesthetic expressivism or

3. Ginsborg (2015): 19, 28–9 and (forthcoming)makes this case against thatmore objective readings defended by Ameriks (2003): Ch. 12 and Guyer(1997):130.



these descriptors for judgments of taste alone.12 So, judging on thebasis of one’s own feeling of pleasure does not yet account for theautonomyofjudgmentsoftaste.Rather,forKant,inorderforourjudg-mentsoftastetoqualifyasautonomoustheymustinvolveanaestheticformofself-determinationandself-legislation,orso Ishallargue inthispaper.13

However,inordertodevelopmyinterpretationofthepositiveas-pectsofaestheticautonomy,IappealtoanotherkeyconceptinKant’saesthetics,viz.,‘commonsense’.AndIclaimthat,onKant’sview,com-monsenseiswhatmakesaestheticself-determinationandself-legis-lationpossible.Thisbeingsaid,Kant’streatmentofcommonsenseisnotoriouslycomplicated.Forthisreason,Iwilldevotemuchofwhatfollows toan interpretationofhis theoryofcommonsense.Centraltomy interpretationare theclaims thatKantdistinguishesbetweenanaestheticandacognitivespeciesofcommonsenseandthatheun-derstandsaestheticcommonsenseassomethingthatweacquireonthebasisofaestheticeducation. It isonlyafterdefending this inter-pretationofKant’s theoryof common sense that I presentmy read-ingofaestheticautonomy,asdependentonaestheticeducationandaestheticcommonsense,andIusetheexampleoftheyoungpoettohelpmakemycase.

I,therefore,beginin§§2–3withmyinterpretationofKant’stheoryofcommonsense. In§2Iaddressquestionsregardingthenatureofcommon sense andwhywe have reason to attribute to Kant a dis-tinctionbetweenanaestheticandcognitivespeciesofcommonsense.In§3Iconsiderthequestionofwhethercommonsenseisnaturalor

donotinvolveself-legislationorself-determination,IdonotthinktheycanqualifyasautonomousinKant’ssense.Ireturntothetopicofjudgmentsoftheagreeablebelow.

12. Inadditiontothepassagesfrom§§31–2citedaboveinwhichheascribesau-tonomytojudgmentsoftaste,seehisclaimthatonlyjudgmentsoftaste,andnotjudgmentsoftheagreeableorthegood,involve‘free’satisfaction(KU§5,5:210;§6,5:211).

13. AsGuyer(2014)makesthispoint,aestheticautonomymustinvolve“aself-givenlaw”(43).

sense,whichinvolvesasubjectbeingfreefromoutsideinfluence,andfreedominthe‘positive’sense,whichinvolvesthesubjectlegislatingtoanddeterminingherself(Gr.4:446,KpV5:33).AnditisonlyifweareabletolegislateaprincipletoourselvesanddetermineourselvesaccordinglythatKantthinksweareautonomous.8

Extendingthislineofthinkingtotheaestheticcase,weshouldex-pectthat,onKant’sview,itisnotsimplybecauseourjudgmentsoftastearefreefromoutsideinfluencethattheyareautonomous.9Nor,how-ever,isitthecasethattheyareautonomous,assomeinterpretershaveargued,becausetheyarebasedonourownfeelingofpleasure.10Tobesure,judgingonthebasisofone’sownfeelingofpleasureispartofthepositiveprofileofthephenomenonofaestheticautonomy;however,thisfeatureisnotyetenoughtoqualifyajudgmentasautonomousintheKantiansense.Indeed,Kantdiscussesotheraestheticjudgments,e.g.,so-called‘judgmentsoftheagreeable’,whicharebasedonone’sownfeelingofpleasure,butarenotfreeorautonomous.11Hereserves

8. IntheGroundwork,hesays,“Autonomyofthewillisthepropertyofthewillbywhichitisalawtoitself”(Gr.4:440).AndinthesecondCritique,heasserts,“lawgiving of its own…isfreedominthepositive sense.Thusthemorallawex-pressesnothingotherthantheautonomy ofpurepracticalreason”(KpV5:33).

9. Commentatorswho have focused on the positive aspects of autonomy in-cludeMoran (2012): 309–11 andGuyer (2014): 43–7.Moran distinguishesbetweentwosensesofKantianaestheticautonomy,onethatappliestojudg-mentsoftheagreeableandbeautiful,viz.,beinggroundedinthesubject’s‘ap-prehensio’oftheobject,andonethatappliesonlyjudgmentsofthebeautiful,viz.,beingfreefrom“desireorneed”(310–1).AlthoughIthinkMoranthushighlightsimportantfeaturesofaestheticjudgmentsonKant’sview,IdonotthinkeitherformofautonomyamountstoautonomyinthepreciseKantiansensebecausetheylackself-legislation.Guyer,meanwhile,doesemphasizetheroleofself-legislation.However,whileGuyeridentifiesthelawwegivetoourselvesas“theclaimthateveryoneoughttoexperiencethesamepleasureintheobjectthatonedoesoneself,”Iidentifyitastheprincipleofcommonsense(45).AndIarguebelowthat thedemandforuniversalagreement isconditionedbycommonsense.

10. See,e.g.,Guyer(1997):240,Allison(2001):167,Hopkins(2001):167–8,Todd(2004):278,Hamawaki (2006): 113,Konigsberg (2012): 159,Moran (2012):309–11,Ginsborg(2015):19,28.

11. Onthispoint,IdisagreewithMoran’s(2012):310–1characterizationofjudg-ments of the agreeable as autonomous. Since judgments of the agreeable



onemightlike.Indeed,ascommentatorshavenoted,therearethreesets of questions that arise as a result of his treatment of commonsenseacrossthesesections.

Tobegin, it is not clear exactlywhat Kant thinks common senseis.14 IntheFourthMomentofTaste,hecharacterizescommonsenseasa ‘principle’and ‘norm’ (KU§20,5:238;§22,5:239).However,healsodescribesitasafeeling,morespecificallyas“theeffectofthefreeplayofourcognitivepowers”(KU§20,5:238–9).Meanwhile, in§40hedescribesitasa ‘faculty’and,indeed,alignsitwiththefacultyoftasteitself(KU5:295).Whatthenisthenatureofcommonsenseonhisview:isitaprinciple,feeling,orfaculty?

TherearealsoquestionsconcerninghowmanyspeciesofcommonsenseKantidentifies.WhilesometakeKanttodiscussonlyonekindofcommonsense throughout,15othershaveargued thatKantdistin-guishesbetweentheaestheticformofcommonsenseinvolvedintasteandacognitiveformofcommonsense,whichheaddressesin§21oftheFourthMoment.16

Finally, the concluding section of the Fourth Moment poses anadditionalchallengeasKantraisesaquestionregardingthestatusofcommonsense:

Whetherthereisinfactsuchacommonsense,asacon-stitutive principle of the possibility of experience, orwhether a yet higher principle of reason onlymakes itintoaregulativeprincipleforusfirsttoproduceacommonsenseinourselvesforhigherends,thuswhethertasteisanoriginal and naturalfaculty,oronlytheideaofonethat

14. SeeCrawford (1974): 128–30,Guyer (1997): 249–50,Allison (2001): 156–7,Dobe(2010):49.

15. SeeMakkreel(1990):157–8,164;Savile(1993):32–9;andKemal(1997):62–8.See also commentators, likeGuyer (1997):Ch. 8,Ameriks (2003): 285–93,andHughes(2007):169,177–89whoread§21asanattemptatadeductionoftaste.

16. See Savile (1987): 145–7, (1993): 38–9; Fricke (1990) 168–73; and Allison(2001):Ch.7.

acquired,andIclaimthatKantendorsesthelatterposition.Morespe-cifically, Imaintain that, forKant, aesthetic common sense is some-thingweacquireonthebasisofanaestheticeducationthatissensitivetothedemandsofthepowerofjudgment.In§4Iteaseouttheimplica-tionsmyaccountofcommonsensehasforunderstandingKant’sviewofaestheticautonomy,arguingthataestheticself-determinationandself-legislationdependontheacquisitionofaestheticcommonsense.Inthissection,IaddressKant’scaseoftheyoungpoetandIdefendanon-standardinterpretationofthisexample,accordingtowhichKantusesittodemonstratetheneedforaestheticeducationandpracticewithexamplesinordertoacquireaestheticautonomy.Iconcludein§5.

2. Common Sense: Its Nature and Species

TherearetwomainpartsofthethirdCritique inwhichKantdiscussescommonsense: theFourthMomentofTaste(KU§§18–22)and§40,“Ontasteasakindofsensus communis.”Andinbothcontexts,heunder-scoresthecentralityofthenotionofcommonsensetohisaccountoftaste.IntheFourthMoment,forexample,KantindicatesthathistaskintheAnalyticoftheBeautifulhasbeen“toresolvethefacultyoftasteinto itselementsand tounite them in the ideaofacommonsense”(KU§22,5:240).The‘elements’Kanthasinmindarethedisinterested-ness,universality,purposivenesswithoutpurposive,andnecessityofjudgmentsoftaste,whichhehasbroughtoutineachMomentofTaste.AndhisclaimhereattheendoftheAnalyticisthatconstruingtasteinlightoftheideaofcommonsenseenablesustoseehowalltheseele-mentsfittogether.Meanwhile,returningtothisthoughtin§40,KantchoosestobookendtheDeduction(§38)withananalysisoftasteasakindofcommonsense.Inbothcontexts,then,Kantsummarizeshispositionwiththeclaimthattasteisakindofcommonsense.Commonsensethusservesasacornerstoneofhistheoryofwhattasteisand,assuch,itplaysapivotalroleinhisaccountofwhatmakesjudgmentsoftastepossible.

Yet, in spiteof the significanceof commonsense forKant’sover-archingtheoryof taste,hisanalysisof it isnotasstraightforwardas



distinguishesbetweenanaestheticandcognitivespeciesofcommonsense. Iwill then takeup thequestion regarding the statusof com-monsensein§3andclaimthatKantconceivesofitassomethingweacquireinaccordancewitharegulativedemand.Withthesepiecesinplace,Iwillthenreturntoaestheticautonomyin§4.

2.1. Common Sense in the Fourth Moment of TasteIntheFourthMomentofTaste,Kantintroducescommonsenseaspartofhisdiscussionofthedistinctivetypeofnecessityinvolvedinjudg-mentsofthebeautiful.Therehearguesthatjudgmentsofthebeauti-ful have ‘exemplary’ necessity:whenonemakes a judgment of thebeautiful,sheholdsupher judgmentasanexamplethatshethinksothers‘should’follow(KU§19,5:237).AndKantthinksthatwhatputsoneinthisnormativepositionisthatsheregardsthegroundofherjudgmentasbeing“commontoall”(KU§19,5:237).Thatistosay,shetakesherjudgmenttobegroundedinthedisinterestedpleasurethatresultsfromfreeplaythatanyoneinhersituationshouldbeabletofeelaswell.

In§20Kantidentifiescommonsenseasthe‘condition’ofthatex-emplarynecessity:“Theconditionofthenecessitythatisallegedbyajudgmentoftasteistheideaofacommonsense[Gemeinsinnes]”(KU 5:237). Kant then glosses common sense as “a subjective principle,whichdetermineswhatpleasesordispleasesonlythroughfeelingandnotthroughconcepts,butyetwithuniversalvalidity”(KU§20,5:237–8). So defined, common sense is a principle that demands that ourjudgmentsof tastebegrounded inauniversallycommunicable feel-ingofpleasurewithoutconcepts.Kant,inturn,specifiestherelevantfeelingasthe“effectoffreeplay”(KU§20,5:238).Thus,theprincipleofcommonsensedemandsthatourjudgmentsoftastebegroundedinafeeling,viz.,thedisinterestedpleasurethatresultsfromfreeplay.And,onhisview,itisonlyinsofaraswetakeouraestheticjudgmentstomeetthisstandardthatwearelicensedtotreatthemasexamplesthatothersshouldfollow.

isyettobeacquired andis artificial,sothatajudgmentoftaste,withitsexpectationofauniversalassent,isinfactonlyademandofreasontoproducesuchaunanimityinthewayof sensing [Sinnesart]…thiswewouldnotandcannotyetinvestigatehere(KU§22,5:240,transl.modi-fied,myemph.).

Here Kant raises two possibilities regarding the status of commonsense.Ontheonehand,commonsensecouldbea‘constitutive’prin-cipleofexperience—i.e.,anecessaryconditionwithoutwhichexperi-encewouldnotbepossible,inwhichcaseitwouldbean‘original’or‘natural’faculty.Ontheotherhand,commonsensecouldbea‘regula-tive’principle,i.e.,ademandplacedonusbyreasoninlightofsome‘higherend’. Itwould thenbean ‘artificial’ and ‘acquired’ facultyweachievebypursuingthisend.17GiventhatKantrefusestosettle thisissuein§22,ithasbeenamatterofdebatewhetherhethinksofcom-monsenseasconstitutive/natural,regulative/acquired,orboth.18

In lightof thesecomplexities,beforeIcanbeinapositiontode-fendmyclaimthatcommonsensegroundsaestheticautonomy,Ineedtoworkthroughthedetailsofhisaccountofcommonsense.Tothisend,inthissectionIwillanalyzehisdiscussionofcommonsenseintheFourthMoment(2.1)and§40(2.2),arguingthatKantconceivesof common sense as a principle, feeling, and faculty, and that he

17. SeeGuyer(1997):294–373foradiscussionofthedifferentnotionsof‘regula-tive’Kantmaybeoperatingwithhere.

18. Whilesomecommentators,likeRogerson(2008):105,107–11,advocateforaconstitutivereading,others,likeCrawford(1974)andLonguenesse(2006),argueforaregulativeone.Guyer(1997):264–73,288–91alsoexploresthepossibilityofcommonsensebeingregulative,butheclaimsthatKantneverclearlycomesdownonewayortheother.Meanwhileothercommentatorsarguethatcommonsenseisbothregulativeandconstitutive.Savile(1987),forone,arguesthatalthoughcommonsenseisanatural‘capacity’,itisnev-erthelessan‘ability’wemustacquirethrough‘training’and‘practice’((1987):190–1).Kemal(1997):62–8,87–103,108maintainsthatcommonsenseiscon-stitutiveofjudgment,whereastheideaofthesensus communis isregulative.Dobe(2010):48,50,57–8arguesthatcommonsenseisconstitutive,asthereflectingpowerof judgment,andregulative,assomethingwecultivate inaccordancewithourmoralinterests.



In clarifying the communicability of this disposition, Kant notesthatthisdisposition“hasadifferentproportiondependingonthedif-ferenceoftheobjectsthataregiven”(KU§21,5:238–9).Andhesug-geststhatthereisan‘optimal’proportion,whichinvolvesthe“anima-tionofboth [imaginationandunderstanding] (theone through theother)withrespecttocognition(ofgivenobjects)ingeneral”(KU§21,5:238–9).He,inturn,claimsthatthisoptimaldispositionisonethatwecanaccessonlythrough‘feeling’:thereisnorulethatcanpredictwhichobjectswillputusinthisstate,itissomethingwesense(KU§21,5:239). In order for thedisposition tobe communicable, then,Kantmaintainsthatthisfeelingthatgivesusaccesstoitmustalsobecom-municable:“sincethedispositionitselfmustbecapableofbeinguni-versallycommunicated,hencealsothe feelingof it” (KU§21,5:239).AccordingtoKant,however,“theuniversalcommunicabilityofafeel-ingpresupposesacommonsense”(KU§21,5:239).Thatistosay,wemusthave thecapacity to sense theuniversal communicabilityof afeeling,andthatcapacityjustiscommonsense.Kantthenconcludesthatcommonsensecan,indeed,“beassumedwithgoodreason”(KU §21,5:239).

The reason some commentators have argued that the commonsenseatissuein§21istheaesthetickindisbecausetheytaketheopti-malproportionKantdescribestobeonethatobtainsonlyinfreeplay.21 There are, indeed, passages inwhichKant appears to describe freeplayintermssimilartothoseheusestodescribetheoptimalpropor-tionin§21,e.g.,claimingfreeplayinvolvesthe“playofbothpowersofthemind(imaginationandunderstanding),enlivenedthroughmutualagreement”(KU§9,5:219).AndsomehavesuggestedthatKantneedstobe committed to this position if he is to avoid the ‘everything isbeautiful’objection.22Accordingtothisobjection,ifKantthinksthatthisoptimalproportionisonethatisinvolvedincognitivejudgments

21. See Guyer (1997): 254, 262–3, 286; Ameriks (2003): 286, 289–91; Kalar(2006):141–2;Hughes(2007):181–4;Dobe(2010):50,52.

22. Fordiscussionofthisobjection,seeMeerbote(1982):81–3;Husdon(1991):87,Guyer(1997):262–4,284–8;Allison(2001):184–9;Rind(2002).

Although in §20Kant identifies common sense as the conditionof the necessity of judgments of taste, in §21 he raises the issue of“Whetheronehasgoodreasontopresupposeacommonsense”(KU 5:238).Heargues intheaffirmative;however,hedoesso in lightofconsiderationsnotabout judgmentsof taste,butratheraboutcogni-tivejudgments.Thisleavesopenthequestion,mentionedabove,astowhetherthespeciesofcommonsenseKantdiscussesin§21isidenti-caltothecommonsensehehasjustdetailedin§20,asthestandardoftaste.

Inordertomotivateacommitmenttosomeformofcommonsensein §21,Kant draws on considerations about the communicability ofcognition.19Heopenswiththeclaimthat:

Cognitionsand judgmentsmust, togetherwith thecon-victionthataccompaniesthem,beabletobeuniversallycommunicated,forotherwisetheywouldhavenocorre-spondencewiththeobject(KU§21,5:238).20

OnKant’sview,then,cognitivejudgmentsareuniversallycommunica-ble:theyarecapableofbeingsharedbyothercognizers.However,ac-cordingtoKant,ourcognitivejudgmentshavea“subjectivecondition,”i.e.,thereisa“mentalstate”or“disposition”ofourcognitivecapacitiesthatgivesrisetothosejudgments(KU§21,5:238).Andhearguesthat:

[I]fcognitionsaretobeabletobecommunicated, thenthementalstate,i.e.,thedispositionofthecognitivepow-ersforacognitioningeneral,andindeedthatproportionwhichissuitableformakingcognitionoutofarepresen-tation[…]mustalsobecapableofbeinguniversallycom-municated(KU§21,5:238).

19. While I cannotconsiderall thedetailsofKant’sargumenthere, seeGuyer(1997):252–64,Allison(2001):149–55foramorethoroughdiscussionof§21.

20.Kant,here,appearstobechannelinghisargumentfromtheProlegomena thatthe universal validity of a cognitive judgment is ‘interchangeable’with itsobjectivevalidity(Prol.4:298).



22.Foritisattheendof§22thatKantposesthequestionconcerningwhetherthecommonsenseinvolvedinjudgmentsoftasteisconstitu-tiveofexperienceorregulative.Giventhathehasjustconcluded§21withtheclaimthatcommonsenseis“thenecessaryconditionoftheuniversal communicability of our cognition,” it seems that the com-monsenseunderdiscussionin§21 is, indeed,constitutiveofexperi-ence (KU5:239).Thisbeing thecase,hehasno reason to raise thequestion regarding the statusof common sense in §22unlesshe isaddressingadifferent,aestheticformofcommonsense.

Soalthoughin§21Kantbelieveshehasshownthatthereisgoodreason to presuppose a common sense in cognition, a further taskremains, viz., showing that there is good reason to presuppose anaesthetic commonsense that conditions theexemplarynecessityofjudgmentsoftaste.Now,Kantthinkshehas,atleast,takenastepinthisdirectionin§21becausehetakesthefactthatthereisacognitivespeciesofcommonsensetomotivatethepossibilityoftherebeinganaestheticspeciesof it.AsIreadhim,thereasonheregardstheexis-tenceoftheformerasrelevanttopossibilityofthelatterisconnectedtohis largerargument concerning the symmetrybetweencognitivejudgments and judgments of taste, especially with respect to theircommunicability.

Kantaddressesthissymmetryearlierin§9,wherehearguesthatthatcognitivejudgmentsandjudgmentsoftastearegroundedinthesame cognitive faculties, viz., imagination and understanding. Ofcourse,hemaintainsthateachkindofjudgmentdeploysthesecapaci-tiesinadifferentway:cognitivejudgmentsdosoundertheconstraintofconcepts,whereasjudgmentsoftaste,freefromsuchconstraint,in-volvethefreeplayofthesecapacities.Nevertheless,Kantclaimsthatgiventhesharedcognitivebasisofbothcognitivejudgmentsandjudg-mentsoftaste,certainfeaturesthatpertaintotheformerwillpertaintothelatteraswell.Ofparticularinteresttohimin§9isuniversalcom-municability.Tothisend,hearguesthat,likeourcognitivejudgments,

andthatthisproportioniswhatgroundsjudgmentsofthebeautiful,thenwewouldhave to judgeeveryobjectwecognize tobebeauti-ful.If,however,thisoptimalproportionobtainsonlyintheaestheticcase,thenonlysomeobjects,viz.,thosethatoccasionfreeplay,wouldbejudgedtobebeautiful.23Onthisreading,then,insofarascommonsenseiswhatgivesustheabilitytosensetheuniversal,communicablefeelingofthisoptimalproportion,thenitmustbeanaestheticformofcommonsense.

Bymylights,theproblemwiththisinterpretationisthatitdoesnotfullyfitthetext.Beginningwith§21,Kantgivesusnoindicationthatheistalkingaboutbothcognitiveandaestheticjudgments.Ratherev-erythingKantsaysleadinguptotheremarkabouttheoptimalpropor-tionisaboutcognition.Andafterthisremark,heasserts:

[C]ommonsense[…]mustbeabletobeassumedwithgoodreason[…]asthenecessaryconditionoftheuniver-salcommunicabilityofourcognition,whichisassumedineverylogicandeveryprincipleofcognitionsthatisnotskeptical(KU§21,5:239).

Furthermore,itseemsreasonabletothinkthatcognitioncan,indeed,involveanoptimalproportion,viz.,whenweencounterobjectsthatbringaboutaparticularlyfelicitousinteractionbetweenourimagina-tionandunderstanding,asweapplyaconcepttothatobjectforthesakeofcognition.Tobesure,thiswilldifferfromhowthosecapacitiesinteractwithoutconceptualconstraintinfreeplay;nevertheless,thisproportionincognitionstillseemstobeanoptimalone.

Moreover,Kantonlyexplicitlyreturnstotherelationshipbetweencommonsenseandjudgmentsoftastein§22.There,heopenswiththeclaimthat,“Inalljudgmentbywhichwedeclaresomethingtobebeautiful[…]we[…]makeourground[…]acommon[feeling]”(KU §22,5:239).Andthewayheproceedsinthissectiononlymakessenseifhedistinguishesbetween thecommonsenseat issue in§§21and

23. SeeGuyer(1997):263,Ameriks(2003):289–91.



cognitivejudgmentsandjudgmentsoftaste,togiveusreasontosus-pectthereis,indeed,anaestheticspeciesofcommonsense.

2.2. Common Sense in §40Kantreturnstothetopicofcommonsenseagainin§40,justtwosec-tionsafterhisofficialDeductionofTaste in§38.This context is sig-nificantbecausethetrajectoryofhisargumentacrossthesesectionsparallelshisargumentforthecognitivespeciesofcommonsensein§21.Recallthatin§21Kantmovesfromtheclaimthatwecanexperi-enceauniversallycommunicablefeelingtotheclaimthattheremustacapacityofcommonsensethatmakesthispossible.Onmyreading,hepursuesa similar strategy in§§38and40.Although I cannotgointothedetailsoftheDeductionhere,in§38hetakeshimselftoprovethatwecanfeelpleasureinauniversallycommunicablewaywithoutrelyingonconceptsbecausethispleasureisgroundedincognitiveca-pacitiesweallshareincommon.Applyinghisstrategyfrom§21tothisclaim,ifwecanexperiencetheuniversalcommunicabilityofafeelingofpleasurewithoutconcepts,thenwemusthaveacommonsensethatmakesthispossible. I takethis tobepreciselythereasonKantgoeson in§40toanalyze“tasteasa formofsensus communis”:he thinkstasteoraestheticcommonsenseisthecapacitywemustpresupposeifjudgmentsoftastearetobepossible(KU5:293).Thatistosay,itisinvirtueofhavingcommonsensethatweareabletomakeaestheticjudgmentsthatinvolvedisinterestedpleasure,universality,purposive-nesswithoutpurpose,andnecessity.Iaccordinglyunderstandhisgoalin§40tobeclarifyingjustwhatthefacultyofcommonsenseis,suchthatitenablesustomakejudgmentsoftaste.

Kantbeginsdescribingthefacultyofcommonsenseasfollows:

By“sensus communis,”however,mustbeunderstoodtheideaofacommunalsense[gemeinschaftlichen Sinnes],i.e.,afacultyforjudging[Beurtheilungsvermögen]thatinitsre-flectiontakesaccount(a priori)ofeveryoneelse’swayofrepresentinginthought(KU§40,5:293,Kant’semph.).

ourjudgmentsoftastelayclaimtobeinguniversallycommunicablebecausetheyaregroundedincognitivecapacitiesweallshare.24

Hethenreturnstothenotionofcommunicabilityin§21,wherehefleshesoutthedetailsofwhatthecommunicabilityofcognitivejudg-mentsamountsto.Aswesawabove,heclaimsthatthiscommunica-bilityextendsnotjusttothesharedjudgment,butalsotothesharedmentalstatethatgivesrisetothatjudgment.Andheworkshiswaytotheconclusionthatcognitivecommonsenseistheabilitytosensetheuniversallycommunicablefeelinginvolvedinthissharedmentalstate,whenoptimallyproportioned.In§21Kanthasthusaugmentedhispic-tureoftheuniversalcommunicabilityofcognitionfrom§9inimpor-tantways:hemakesclearthatthiscommunicabilityencompassesthesharedmentalstateandfeelingofthatmentalstate,whenoptimallyproportioned. And he has argued that there is an ability, cognitivecommon sense, that enables us to sense this universally communi-cablefeeling.

Ifwepair theclaim from§9 that, likecognitive judgments, judg-mentsoftasteareuniversallycommunicabletogetherwiththisfulleranalysis of communicability in cognition, then itmakes sensewhyKantwouldtaketheanalysisofcognitivecommonsensetobearontheanalysisofaestheticcommonsense.Onhisview,cognitivecom-monsenseisakeycomponentofthecompleteaccountoftheuniver-salcommunicabilityofcognitivejudgments.Andifjudgmentsoftastearesimilarlyuniversallycommunicable, then theexistenceofcogni-tivecommonsensegivesusreasontosuspectthattherewillbesome-thinglikeanaestheticcommonsensethatplaysthesamesortofrole.Thislineofthoughtdoesnotyetamounttoaproofthatthere,infact,isanaestheticcommonsense;thatisthetaskoftheDeduction.How-ever,onmyreading,KantusestheFourthMomenttopavethewayforthisproof:hedrawsonconsiderationsabout theexistenceofcogni-tivecommonsenseandtheparallelbetweenthecommunicabilityof

24. Thisbeingsaid,Kantclaimsthatwhereascognitivejudgmentslayclaimto‘objective’universality, judgmentsof tasteonly layclaimto ‘subjective’uni-versality(KU§8,5:215).



end,hedistinguishesbetweenthepleasurewetake inthebeautifulfrom thepleasurewe take in,whathecalls, the ‘agreeable’ (seeKU §§3,7).AccordingtoKant,thepleasurethatwefeelintheagreeableisgroundedinsome“privatecondition”ofthesubject(KU§6,5:211).Asheanalyzesit, thisprivateconditionpertainstowhatthesubjecthappenstolikegivenhersensibleconstitutionandisreflectedinherpersonalpreferences,interests,anddesires.Bycontrast,heclaimsthatthepleasurewefeelinthebeautifulisgroundedinauniversallycom-municablestateoffreeplay;hencehisclaimthatthisstateoffreeplayisthe“groundof”and‘precedes’thispleasure(KU§9,5:217–8).Inso-farasthisfurtherconditionorstateservestogroundourfeelingsofpleasure,ittooseemstobeacandidateforthesubjectivegroundofaestheticjudgment.

Ultimately,ItakeKant’sconsideredpositiontobethatbothtypesofgroundsarerelevanttoaestheticjudgments.AsIreadhim,anaes-thetic judgment isgrounded ina feeling,but this feeling isnotself-standing,butratherhasafurthergroundintheconditionorstateofthesubject.Inthecaseofajudgmentoftheagreeable,thejudgmentisgroundedina‘private’and‘interested’feeling,i.e.,afeelingthatis,inturn,groundedinaprivateconditionconnectedtoourpersonalpref-erences, interests, anddesires (seeKU§§3, 22).Meanwhile, a judg-mentoftasteisgroundedina‘common’and‘disinterested’feeling,i.e.,afeelingthathasitsgroundintheuniversallycommunicablestateoffreeplay,whichisfreefrominterest(seeKU§§2,22).

Withthispictureofthegroundsofanaestheticjudgmentinplace,wecannowreturntotheaestheticformofcommonsense.Insofarasaestheticcommonsenseinvolvesreflectingonthegroundsofouraes-theticjudgments,andtherelevantgroundsarefeelingthatthemselvesaregroundedinaconditionorstateofthesubject,Iproposewethinkofaestheticcommonsenseasacapacityforhedonic discrimination.Sounderstood,aestheticcommonsenseisacapacitythatenablesustodetectwhatkindofpleasurewehave.Thisisvaluablebecause,atleastonKant’sview,justbecausewefeelpleasure,wedonotautomaticallyknowwhatkindofpleasurewearefeeling.However,whenweaim

FollowingAlixCohen’sreadingofthispassage,IthinkKantherechar-acterizescommonsenseasafacultythatenablesustoreflectonthegroundsofourjudgmentsfromauniversalpointofview.25Sounder-stood,commonsenseisnotjusttheabilitytoreflectingeneral;ratheritenablesaspecifickindofreflection,viz.,oneinwhichwereflectonwhether thegroundsofour judgments areuniversal, i.e., ones thatarevalidforanyotherhumanbeing,orareprivate,i.e.,onesthataremerelysubjectivelyvalid.

Whilethisinitialdescriptionofcommonsensemaymakeitseemasifitcouldoperateinbothcognitiveandaestheticcontexts,onmyinterpretationthefacultyofcommonsensethatKantdescribesin§40is a specifically aestheticone.However, beforemakingmy case forthisreadingof§40,IwanttolayoutwhatItaketobeinvolvedintheaestheticformofcommonsense.

Aswithanyexerciseofcommonsense,aestheticcommonsensein-volvesreflectingonthegroundsofone’sjudgments,butKantdescribesthegroundsofaestheticjudgmentsinseveralways.Atthemostbasiclevel, he argues that the “determiningground [of an aesthetic judg-ment]cannot beother than subjective”(KU§1,5:203,Kant’semph.).Yethegoesontohighlighttwotypesofsubjectivegrounds.Attimes,heidentifiesfeelingastherelevantsubjectiveground,e.g.,claimingthat, “every judgment from [taste] is aesthetic, i.e., its determininggroundisthefeelingofthesubject”(KU§17,5:232).26However,onhisview,notallfeelingsofpleasurearethesame;rather,heclaimsthattherearedifferenttypesoffeelingsofpleasure,whichthemselvesaregroundedinsomefurther‘condition’or‘state’ofthesubject.Tothis

25. Cohen (2014)and (2018)emphasizes thispoint inheranalysisof the sortofepistemicnormativityandepistemicautonomyKantthinksisinvolvedincognitive judgments.Although I amsympathetic to therebeing someana-logueofthiscommonsensethatisoperativeincognition,Iarguebelowthatin§40Kantisdescribingaspecificallyaestheticfacultyofcommonsense.

26.He says, e.g., of judgmentsof the agreeable, “everyone is content thathisjudgment,whichhegroundsonaprivatefeeling…berestrictedmerelytohisownperson”(KU§7,5:212),andofthebeautiful,“Inalljudgmentsbywhichwedeclaresomethingtobebeautiful,we…groundourjudgment…onourfeeling”(KU§22,5:239).



of judging [Beurtheilung],withoutanymatter (neither sensationnorconcept),”andit“take[s]intoconsiderationsolely…theformal condi-tion ofthepowerofjudgment),andispure,i.e.,mixedwithneitherconcepts of theobject norwith sensations as determining grounds”(KU§38,5:289–90,290n,Kant’semph.).OnKant’sview,it isthusauniquefeatureofjudgmentsoftastethat, inthem,weabstractfromthematerialfeaturesofourrepresentations,i.e.,fromthesensationsorconceptstheyinvolve,andfocus insteadontheir formal features.Insofaras thecommonsenseunderdiscussion in§40attunesus totheseformalfeatures,itseemstobeaestheticinorientation.27

Indeed,Kantcontinuesbysaying:

[P]erhaps this operation of reflection seems much tooartificial to be attributed to the faculty thatwe call thecommon sense; but it only appears thus iswe expressit inabstractformulas; initself,nothingismorenaturalthantoabstractfromcharm[Reiz]andemotion[Rührung] ifoneisseekingajudgmentthatistoserveasauniversalrule(KU§40,5:294,Kant’semph.).

Inthispassage,Kantemphasizesthatthe‘materialfeatures’thatcom-monsenseenablesustoabstractfromarethoserelatedto‘charm’and‘emotion’.ForKant,thenotionsof‘charm’and‘emotion’areaestheticones.Heintroducestheminhisearlierdiscussionofjudgmentsoftheagreeable(seeKU§3).AsInotedabove,likejudgmentsoftaste,Kantclaimsthatjudgmentsoftheagreeablearegroundedonthesubject’sfeelingofpleasure;however,unlikejudgmentsoftaste,thisisaninter-estedandprivateformofpleasure,whichis,inturn,groundedintheprivate conditionsof the subject. Sometimes, he suggests, this plea-sureistiedtothesensiblequalitiesthatwehaveapenchantfor—e.g.,thecolorgreenorthesoundoftheviolin—andhelabelsthesequali-ties‘charms’(KU§14,5:224).Othertimes,heindicates,thispleasure

27. Ithustaketheformalgroundsthatthecommonsenseatissuein§40orientsustowardtobedifferentfromthe‘objective’grounds,whichCohen(2014):320–1and(2018)claimscommonsenseenablesustoreflectonincognition.

tomake a judgment of taste,weneed tobe awareofwhat kindofpleasurewearefeeling,forweareonlylicensedinjudgingsomethingtobebeautifulifwearefeelingpleasurethatisofthe‘common’and‘disinterested’ratherthanthe‘private’and‘interested’variety.Inorderto detectwhat kind of pleasurewehave,we need to exercise com-monsenseandreflectonthegroundsofthatfeeling,withaneyetowhetheritisgroundedinprivateconditionsorintheuniversallycom-municablestateoffreeplay.

Onmyreadingof§40,then,itisaestheticcommonsense,definedasthiskindofcapacityforhedonicdiscrimination,thatisatissue,andnotcognitivecommonsense.Itakethistobethecasefortworeasons.

First,ifwetakeacloserlookathisdescriptionofthereflectivepro-cess involved in commonsense in§40,wefind that thisprocess isoneweemployparticularlyinaestheticcontexts.Hecharacterizestherelevant“operationofreflection”asfollows:

[T]hishappensbyoneholdinghis judgmentupnot somuchtotheactualastothemerelypossiblejudgmentsofothers,andputtinghimselfintothepositionofeveryoneelse,merelybyabstractingfromthelimitationsthatcon-tingentlyattachtoourownjudging[Beurtheilung];whichisinturnaccomplishedbyleavingoutasfaraspossibleeverything inone’s representational state that ismatter,i.e., sensation, and attending solely to the formal pecu-liaritiesofhisrepresentationorhisrepresentationalstate(KU§40,5:294).

In thispassage,Kantclarifies thesense inwhichhe thinks thecom-monsenseatissuein§40enablesustoreflectonthegroundsofourjudgments from a universal point of view: it enables us to abstractfromthe‘material’featuresofhowwerepresentanobjectandtofo-cus,instead,onits ‘formal’features.Now,forKant,reflectingonthe‘formal’ featuresofhowwe representanobject is somethingwedoparticularly in judgmentsof taste.Ashehas justmadethispoint intheDeduction,ajudgmentoftasteisdirectedtoward“theformalrules



inawaythatinvolvessettingasideconsiderationsaboutwhatpleasesusprivatelyand,instead,takesintoaccountwhatpleasesuniversally.And it is this faculty thathe thinksweneed ifweare tomake judg-mentsoftaste.

Steppingback, ifwe take the trajectoryof§40 togetherwith theFourthMomentofTaste, thefollowingpictureofcommonsensebe-ginstoemerge.OnKant’sview,commonsenseingeneralissomethingthat enablesus to sense theuniversal communicabilityof a feeling.He,inturn,distinguishesbetweentwospeciesofcommonsense:thecognitiveformofcommonsensehediscussesin§21andtheaestheticformofcommonsensehediscussesin§§20,22,and40.Whereastheformer involves sensing the universal communicability of a feelingwhenourcognitivecapacitiesareunderconceptualconstraint,thelat-terinvolvessensingtheuniversalcommunicabilityofafeelingofplea-surewhenthatconstraintisabsentandweareengagedinfreeplay.

Ofcourse,inthethirdCritique Kant’sprimaryinterestisintheaes-theticformofcommonsense,whichheidentifieswithtaste.Andwehaveseenthathehasreasontodescribeitasaprinciple,feeling,andfaculty.Asafacultyofcommonsense,itenablesustoreflectonthegrounds of our aesthetic judgments from a universal point of view.Insofar as the specific grounds of aesthetic judgments are feelings,whichthemselveshavefurthergroundsinaconditionorstateofthesubject,Ihavearguedthataestheticcommonsensecanbeunderstoodas a faculty for hedonic discrimination. Exercising the reflective ca-pacitiesinvolvedincommonsensethusenablesustodetectwhetherthefeelingofpleasurewehaveisgroundedinaprivateconditionorinauniversallycommunicablestateoffreeplay.Anditisonlyifthelatter is thecase thatweare justified in issuinga judgmentof taste.Moreover,theideaofthisfacultyservesasaprincipleornormweholdourselvestowhenwemakejudgmentsoftaste.Asanorm,commonsensedemandsthatourjudgmentsoftastebegroundedinauniver-sallycommunicablefeelingofpleasuregroundedinfreeplay.AnditisonlyinvirtueofmeetingthisstandardthatKantthinkswecanascribeexemplarynecessitytoourjudgmentsoftaste.

is tied toan internal sensationwehaveof “amomentary inhibitionfollowedbyastrongeroutpouringofthevitalforce,”andhelabelsthissensation‘emotion’(KU§14,5:226).Andifwereturntothepreviouspassageinlightoftheseconsiderations,wefindthatthesituationinwhichweneedtoabstractfromcharmandemotionisanaestheticone,foritiswhenweaimtomakeajudgmentoftaste,whichcanserveasa‘universalrule’,thatweneedtosetasidetheseprivateconsiderations.Thisbeingthecase,thesortofreflectiveskillsKanthereattributestocommonsense,onceagain, seem tobeones thatpertain to anaes-theticfaculty.

Thesecondconsiderationthatfavorstheaestheticreadingofcom-monsensein§40isconnectedtothefactthatKantalignsitwiththefacultyoftaste.28Taste,heclaims,“canbecalledsensus communis,”or,morespecifically,“sensus communis aestheticus”(KU§40,5:295,295n).29 Elaboratingonthisidea,hesaystasteis“thefacultyforjudging[Beur-theilungsvermögen]thatwhichmakesourfeelinginagivenrepresenta-tionuniversally communicable withoutthemediationofaconcept”(KU§40,5:295,Kant’semph.).OnKant’sview,thefacultyoftastethusamountstothefacultyofaestheticcommonsensebecauseinordertodetectwhat‘makes’ourfeelingofpleasureuniversallycommunicable,wemustreflectonthatpleasure inorder todetectwhether it is thecommonanddisinterestedsortthatisgroundedinfreeplay.

BetweenKant’scharacterizationofthereflectiveprocessinvolvedinthefacultyofcommonsenseandhisalignmentofthisfacultywithtaste,Ibelievewehavereasontoreadthecommonsenseunderdis-cussionin§40asaspecificallyaestheticcapacity.ThecommonsenseKanttheredescribesamountstoacapacityforhedonicdiscriminationthatenablesustoreflectonthegroundsofouraestheticjudgments

28.Asnotedabove,KantalsoalignstastewithcommonsenseattheendoftheFourthMoment,whereheclaimsthatintheAnalytic,hisaimwas“toresolvethefacultyoftasteintoitselementsandtounitethemultimatelyintheideaofcommonsense”(KU§22,5:240).

29. IreturntothecontrasthedrawsatKU§40,5:295nbetweencommonsenseasthesensus communis aestheticus andcommonhumanunderstandingasthesensus communis logicusbelow.



logicus’, on theother (KU5:295n).Althoughcommonhumanunder-standingis ‘logical’ initsorientation,i.e., it isdirectedtowardcogni-tionand it “judgesbyconcepts,”Kant compares it toaesthetic com-monsensebecausehethinks theyarebothconcernedwithmakingjudgmentsinauniversallycommunicableway(KU§40,5:294).AndIbelievethatifweteaseoutthisparallel,thenwewillfindthatcom-monsense,likecommonhumanunderstanding,isacapacitythatweacquireinresponsetoaregulativedemand.

3.1. Acquiring Common Human Understanding AccordingtoKantin§40,commonhumanunderstandinginvolvesadistinctive“wayofthinking”[Denkungsart] thatwerelyonincognition,whichisguidedbythreeepistemicmaxims(KU5:294).32

The firstmaxim is “to think for oneself” and Kant calls this the“maximoftheunprejudicedwayofthinking”(KU§40,5:294,Kant’semph.). Inprejudiced thinking,Kantclaims,wepassivelyallowourthinkingtobedeterminedbyotherpeople.Bycontrast,whenwead-heretothisfirstmaxim,weare“legislativefor”ourselvesinthought(KU§40,5:294n).Andwhenthishappens,Kantsaysweachieve‘en-lightenment’(KU§40,5:294).

The secondmaxim is “To think in thepositionof everyone else”andKantcallsthisthemaximofthe“broad-minded [erweiterter] way”ofthinking(KU§40,5:294,Kant’semph.).AccordingtoKant,theop-posite of broad-minded thinking is ‘narrow-minded’ [borniert] think-ing,i.e.,thinkinginwhichwefocusonlyonourprivatewayoflooking

32.AlthoughinthethirdCritique andtheJäsche Logic (9:57)heemphasizesthecognitiveorientationofcommonhumanunderstanding,intheAnthropology hedescribesitin‘practical’termsasrelatedtothesearchfor‘wisdom’(7:200).SeeCohen(2014)and(2018)foradiscussionofthesemaximsasnormsthatgovernourepistemicactivitiesandtheimplicationsthishasforhisaccountofepistemicautonomyandnormativity.SeeMerrittforadiscussionofthesemaximsandtheirrelationtoKant’saccountofreflection(2009,2018:Ch.2)andhisaccountofmoralpedagogy(2011).SeeO’Neill(1989):45–8foradis-cussionoftheconnectionbetweenthesemaxims,communication,andthepublicuseofreason.Inarelatedvein,seeDeligiorgi(2002):§2foradiscus-sionoftheconnectionbetweenthesemaxims,communication,andrationalautonomy.

Thereis,however,onefurtherquestionconcerningaestheticcom-monsensethatweneedtoaddress,viz.,whetheritisanaturalcapac-ityconstitutiveofexperienceoranacquiredcapacitywedevelopinresponsetoaregulativedemand.

3. Common Sense: Its Acquisition

AlthoughIshalldefendtheregulative/acquiredreadingofcommonsense,Iwanttobeginbyconsideringthealternativeconstitutive/nat-uralreadingofit.Commentatorswhohaveendorsedthisreadinghavepursued tworoutes. Inonevein, interpretershaveargued thatcom-monsenseisconstitutiveofexperiencedefinedinthenarrowKantiansenseas‘empiricalcognition’(KrVB218,277).Defendersofthisinter-pretationtendtoreadthecommonsenseatissuein§21asaestheticcommonsenseandtheytakehisremarksthereconcerningcommonsensebeinga “necessaryconditionof thecommunicabilityofcogni-tion”tosuggestthataestheticcommonsenseisconstitutiveofempiri-calcognition.30SinceIthinkthecommonsenseunderdiscussionin§21isthecognitiveratherthanaestheticformofcommonsense,Idonotthinkthisargumentprovesthataestheticcommonsenseisconsti-tutiveofempiricalcognition.

Othershavesuggestedthatthecommonsenseunderdiscussionin§22isconstitutiveof‘aestheticexperience’ortheaestheticuseofthe‘reflecting’powerofjudgment(seeKUIntroIV, VII; EEV,VIII).31How-ever,Idonotthinkthatthisstrategyworkseither.Instead,Ihopetoshowthat,onKant’sview,aestheticcommonsenseisafacultythatweacquirethroughaestheticeducation,andthatthisacquisitionissensi-tivetotheregulativedemandsplacedonusbythepowerofjudgment.

Inordertomotivatethisreading,Iwanttoreturnto§40andtheparallelKantdrawstherebetweenaestheticcommonsenseor‘sensus communis aestheticus’, on theonehand, and,whathe calls ‘commonhuman understanding’ [gemeine Menschverstand] or ‘sensus communis

30.SeeKemal(1997):66–7

31. SeeSavile(1993):38andDobe(2010):47,respectively.



Kantsaysthatenlightenment“isadifficultmatterthatcanonlybeac-complishedslowly”(KU§40,5:294n).Or,ashemakesthispointinthe“WhatisEnlightenment”essay:

[I]t isdifficult foranysingle individual toextricatehim-selffromtheminoritythathasbecomealmostnaturetohim[…]hence thereareonlya fewwhohavesucceed-ed,bytheirowncultivationoftheirspirit,inextricatingthemselves fromminority [Unmündigkeit] and yet walk-ingconfidently(WE8:36).

Meanwhile,concerningthesecondmaxim,aswesawabove,Kantin-dicatesthatpeopletendtoengageinanarrow-mindedwayofthink-ing:theyare‘asifbracketed’withinthesubjectiveprivateconditionsoftheirjudgments(KU§40,5:295).Itthustakesefforttosetasideourprivatestandpointandtothinkinabroad-mindedway.Finally,aboutthethirdmaxim,Kantsays:

[T]heconsistentwayofthinking,isthemostdifficulttoachieve,andcanonlybeachievedthroughthecombina-tionofthefirsttwoandafterfrequentobservanceofthemhasmadethemaskill[zur Fertigkeit gewordenen](KU§40,5:295,transl.modified,Kant’semph.).

Thus,onKant’sview,learningtothinkinthisconsistentwaydependsondevelopingtheskillofadheringtothefirsttwomaxims.Aswiththeothertwomaxims,then,thiswayofthinkingisnotsomethingweautomaticallydo;itissomethingweacquireonthebasisofeffort.

UltimatelytheseconsiderationsgiveusreasontoattributetoKantthe view that common human understanding is not constitutive ofcognitivejudgment,butrathersomethingweacquirethrougheffort,aswetrytomeetthedemandsplacedonusbythesethreeepistemicmaxims.Drawingouttheparallelwithaestheticcommonsense,then,weshouldexpect,ontheonehand,thatittooisnotconstitutiveofaes-theticexperience,butratherrepresentsonewayofmakingaestheticjudgmentsamongothers,and,ontheotherhand,thatitissomething

atthings(KU§40,5:294).However,ifoneadherestothesecondmax-im,Kantsays,

he sets himself apart from the subjective private condi-tionsofthejudgment,withinwhichsomanyothersareas if bracketed [eingeklammert], and reflects onhis ownjudgments from auniversal standpoint (which he canonlydeterminebyputtinghimselfintothestandpointofothers)(KU§40,5:295,Kant’semph.).

Bythussettingasidetheprivateconditionsofone’sownjudgmentandadoptingauniversal standpoint instead,Kantclaimsweareable toachieveabroad-mindedwayofthinkingincognition.

Kantphrasesthethirdmaximas,“Alwaystothinkinaccordwithoneself”andheclaimsitisthemaximofthe‘consistent’[konsequenten] wayofthinking(KU§40,5:294).Onhisview,thisrequiresthe“com-binationofthefirsttwo”maxims:wemustnotonlythinkonthebasisofourownreason,butalsoinawaythatisaccountabletoothers(KU §40,5:295).Doingso,Kantmaintains,enableustothinkinaconsis-tentwayacrossourcognitivejudgments.

Nowinsofaraseachof thesewaysof thinkingare, just that,waysof thinking, theyarenotconstitutiveofcognitive judgmentassuch;rathertheyarewaysof thinkingthatdependonushavingad-optedtherequisitemaxim.Indeed,Kantemphasizesthispointinhisdiscussionofthesecondmaxim,wherehesaysthat“theissuehereisnotthefacultyofcognition,buttheway of thinking neededtomakepurposiveuseof it”(KU§40,5:295,Kant’semph.).Thistellsusthatbroad-mindedthinkingisnotconstitutiveofthefacultyofcognition;itisawayofmakingpurposiveuseofthatfaculty.AndIbelievethatthisisapointKantextendstotheothermaximsaswell:theygovernaparticularlypurposivewayof thinking,butarenotconstitutiveofcognitionassuch.

Moreover,Kantindicatesthatthesewaysofthinkingareonesthatweacquirethrougheffort,aswestrivetomeettheregulativedemandsplacedonusbythesemaxims.Regardingthefirstmaxim,forexample,



OnKant’sview,then,whereasthetasteof thesenses issues in judg-mentsof theagreeable,whichareprivatelyvalid, the tasteof reflec-tionissuesinproperjudgmentsoftaste,whichlayclaimtouniversalvalidity.

Thesedistinctionsaresignificantforourpurposesbecausetheyre-vealthat, forKant,aestheticcommonsenseisnotconstitutiveofallaesthetic experience or the aesthetic exercise of the power of judg-ment.Ratheraestheticcommonsenseissomethingweexercisewhenwearemakingproper judgmentsof taste,notwhenwearemakingjudgments of the agreeable. Like common human understanding,then,aestheticcommonsenserepresentsonewayofmakingaestheticjudgmentsamongothers.

Moreover,aswithcommonhumanunderstanding,Kantindicatesthataestheticcommonsense issomethingweonlyacquirethrougheffort:

[A]mongallthefacultiesandtalents,tasteispreciselytheonewhich,becauseitsjudgmentisnotdeterminablebymeansofconceptsandprecepts, ismost inneedof theexamplesofwhatintheprogressofculturehaslongestenjoyedapprovalifitisnotquicklytofallbackintobar-barismandsinkbackintothecrudityofitsfirstattempts(KU§32,5:283).

IntheThirdMomentofTaste,Kantalignsthiscruditywiththetenden-cytomakeaestheticjudgmentsonthebasisofthetasteofthesenses:“Tasteisalwaysstillbarbaricwhenitneedstheadditionofcharmsandemotions forsatisfaction” (KU§13,5:223,Kant’semph.).And, there,heindicatesthatthisisthestatewefindourselvesinwhenweare‘un-practiced’(KU§14,5:225).Settingasidethequestionablelanguageofbarbarism,onKant’sview,then,inordertoovercomethisunpracticed,crudeaestheticstate,weneedtoexertsomeeffort.However,hethinksthatconceptsandpreceptscanbeofnousebecausetheresimplyarenoconceptsorpreceptsthattelluswhatisbeautiful.Insteadheclaims

weacquireonthebasisofeffortinresponsetoanormativedemand.AndasweturnbacknowtoKant’saccountofaestheticcommonsense,Ibelievewewillfindhimcharacterizingitinjusttheseterms.

3.2. Acquiring Common SenseLet’sbeginwiththequestionofhowubiquitousaroleaestheticcom-monsenseplaysinaestheticexperience.If thecommentatorsnotedabovearerightandKantconsidersaestheticcommonsensetobecon-stitutiveofaestheticexperienceortheaestheticuseofthereflectingpowerofjudgment,thenallaestheticjudgmentsshouldbemadeonitsbasis.However,thisisnotwhatKantargues.Instead,hedrawsadistinctionbetweendifferentkindsofaestheticjudgments,andheac-cordsaroletocommonsenseonlyinjudgmentsoftaste.

Morespecifically,accordingtoKant,therearetwodifferentkindsoftaste,whichissueintwodifferentkindsofaestheticjudgments.Helabelsthefirstkindoftastethe“tasteofthesenses,”andheclaimsitissuesin ‘private’aestheticjudgments(KU§8,5:214).Meanwhilehecallsthesecondkindoftastethe“tasteofreflection,”andhesaysitis-suesin“generallyvalid”aestheticjudgments(KU§8,5:214).Giventhereflectivenatureofthesecondkindoftasteanditsorientationtowardwhatisuniversal,wehavereasontoidentifyitwiththefacultyoftastehe describes in §40 and alignswith aesthetic common sense. Kantthusdistinguishesbetween the tasteof the sense,on theonehand,andthetasteofreflection,i.e.,aestheticcommonsense,ontheother.

Furtherclarifyingthetypeofaestheticjudgmentthatissuesfromeachkindoftaste,Kantsays,

Aesthetic judgments can be divided […] into empiricalandpure.Thefirstarethosewhichassertagreeablenessordisagreeableness,thesecondthosewhichassertbeau-tyof anobject […;] the formerare judgmentsof sense(materialaestheticjudgments),thelatter(asformal)arealoneproperjudgmentsoftaste (KU§14,5:223).



outofourselvesandencourageustoreflectonaestheticmattersfromauniversalstandpoint.Theyinviteustosetasideconsiderationsaboutwhatwehappentolikeandtoreflectonwhetherthepleasurewefeelisthesortthatanyoneinoursituationshouldfeelaswell.

Of course, there can be cases inwhich, even thoughwe are ex-posed toexamples,weremainwedded toourprivatepointofview.Forexample,Kantsaysthat,“Verystingypeopleusuallyhavenotaste;because they order everything according to their private purposes,theywillneverchooseaccordingtowhatpleasesothers”(Menschen-kundeAnthropologyLectures25:1096,mytransl.).36Therecanalsobecasesinwhichweultimatelydisagreewiththeprevailingopinionre-gardingthebeautyoftheobject,asisthecasewiththebeautydeniermentionedintheintroduction(seeKU§33,5:284).Nevertheless,onKant’sview,practicewiththeseexamplesatleastprovidesuswiththeopportunitytodevelopthereflectiveskillsofcommonsense.

Ultimately, I takethis lineof thinkingtorevealsomethingimpor-tant about Kant’s view of aesthetic education. To be sure, asmanycommentatorshavenoted,hethinksthatthecultivationoftastecancontributetoourmoralandculturalends.37However,onmyinterpre-tation,inadditiontothesefurtherbenefits,Kantconsidersaestheticeducation tobea requirement for theveryacquisitionof taste itself:weneed this education todevelop the capacity tomake judgmentsoftasteatall.38Soalthoughaestheticeducationissomethingwecan

36. “Sehr geitzige Leute haben gewöhnlich keinen Geschmack; denn weil sie alles auf ihre Privatabsicht einrichten, so werden sie nie nach Anderer Wohlgefallen wählen.”

37. ForadiscussionofKant’sviewofhowaestheticeducationcontributestomo-rality seeMunzel (1995), Louden (2000):Ch. 4,Allison (2001):Chs. 10–1,Baxley(2005),Guyer(2005):Ch.9),andtoculturevis-à-visenlightenment,seeWatkins(2014).

38. InsofarasIemphasizetheroleaestheticeducationplaysinacquiringtaste,myviewissimilartoWatkins’s(2011)view.However,hedrawsadistinctionbetween ‘general’educationneeded tomake ‘authentic’ thoughstill ‘crude’judgmentsoftaste,and‘special’aestheticeducationneededtomake‘correct’judgmentsonthebasisof‘training’and‘experience’(331).Since,onmyread-ing,Kantdoesnotregardcrudeaestheticjudgmentsasjudgmentsoftaste,Idonotthinkheiscommittedtothisdistinction.RatherItakeKant’sviewtobethatthereisasingleformofaestheticeducationthatguidesustowardthe

wemustrelyonexamplesofwhathas‘longestenjoyedapproval’inordertoworkourselvesoutofourcrudestate.

Kantdoesnotindicateherewhethertheexampleshehasinmindarejusttheclassicsfromartorwhetherbeautiesfromnatureshouldbeincluded.WhenhediscussesexampleselsewhereinthethirdCri-tique, he leaves it open as towhich kind of object is involved.33 In-deed,Kanthimselffrequentlyusesexamplesfromnature(e.g.,arose,a hummingbird)34 and art (e.g., Polykleitos’sDoryphorous,Homer’spoetry),35which suggests thathe thinksexamplesofboth sorts canserveus. I thus takeKant’sposition tobe that it ispracticewithex-amplesof,allegedly,classicalbeautiesinnatureandartthatweneedtoovercomethecrudityofthetasteofthesenses.

ButwhatdoesKantthinkwestandtogainthroughthissortofaes-thetic education?Tobe sure, it is nothis view that the goal of thiseducationistolearnto‘imitate’thejudgmentoftheseexamplesmadebyothers(seeKU§32,5:282;§17,232).Rather,asIreadtheabovepas-sage,hebelievesthatpracticewiththeseexamplesissomethingthatcanhelpusovercomeourcrudeaesthetictendenciesbecausetheyputusinapositiontogainthesortofreflectiveskillsinvolvedinthetasteofreflection.Thatistosay,theyhelpusdeveloptheabilitytoreflectonthegroundsofouraestheticjudgmentsfromauniversal,ratherthanamerelyprivate,pointofview.Examplescandothisbecausewhenwetreatthemas examples,wetreatthemasstand-insforwhat,atleastal-legedly,pleasesnotinapurelyprivatefashion,butuniversally.Whenweengagewiththemfromthisperspective,theseexamplesdrawus

33. Inhisdiscussionofexamplesin§17,hedescribesthem“certainobjects”thatthere is ‘unanimity’ about, i.e., objects that people, empirically, agree arebeautiful(KU5:232).Meanwhilein§34hesaysthatthecriticisto“layoutinexamplesthereciprocalsubjectivepurposiveness,aboutwhichithasbeenshownabovethatitsforminagivenrepresentationisthebeautyofitsobject”(KU5:286).Giventhatthereisempiricalunanimityaboutobjectsfrombothnatureandartandthatbothsortsofobjectscanbesubjectivelypurposive,heseemstoallowtheretobebothnaturalandartisticexamplesofwhathaslongbeenadmired.

34. SeeKU§8,5:215;§16,5:229.

35. SeeKU§17,5:235;§47,5:309.



beautyassocialcreatures,andthe‘intellectual’interestwehaveinitasmoralagents.AndithasbeensuggestedthattheseinterestsarewhatKantthinksmotivateustoacquirecommonsense.40

However,Ithinktherearereasonstoresistidentifyingtheinterestinthebeautifulwiththeendthatdemandsweacquireaestheticcom-mon sense: the former interest and latter end areoriented towardsdifferentthingsandarriveonthesceneatdifferentstagesinthedevel-opmentoftaste.AccordingtoKant,theinterestinbeautyfollows“af-ter [thejudgmentoftaste]hasbeengiven”andinvolvessome“further pleasure in [theobject’s]existence(asthatinwhichallinterestcon-sists)”(KU§41,5:296,myemph.).Itisthusonlyafterwehavejudgedanobjecttobebeautifulthatwedevelopanempiricalorintellectualinterestinit.Bycontrast,theendthatmotivatesustoacquirecommonsenseiswhatfirst putsusinpositiontomakejudgmentsoftaste.Andthisendtargetsnotthejudgmentofabeautifulobject,butrathertheaestheticpowerofjudgmentitself.

Insteadoftheinterestinthebeautifulbeingwhatmotivatesustoacquireaestheticcommonsense,IbelievethatKantconceivesoftherelevant endas theone thatbelongs to thepowerof judgment.Toseethis, let’sreturnto§40.Aswesawearlier,Kant’ssecondmaximofbroad-mindedthinkingis‘Tothinkinthepositionofeveryoneelse’andhelabelsthisthe“maxim[…]ofthepowerofjudgment”(KU§40,5:295).Giventheconnectionbetweenthismaximandthepowerofjudgmentassuch,itstandstoreasonthatthismaximshouldextendtoallusesofthepowerofjudgment,itsaestheticuseincluded.Sojustasthisenddemandsthatwedevelopabroad-mindedwayofthinkingincognitivejudgments,italsodemandswedevelopabroad-minded‘way of sensing’ [Sinnesart] in aesthetic judgments (KU §22, 5:240).40.Amongthosewhoendorsetheregulativereadingofcommonsense,Longue-

nesse(2006):217–9arguesthatbothinterestsplayarole.Crawford(1974)and Dobe (2010): 57–8 emphasize the intellectual interest. Savile (1987):Ch.6exploresthepossibilityofeithertheempiricalorintellectual interestservingasourmotivationtoacquirecommonsense;however,hearguesthatbothalternativesareunsatisfactorybecausetheycannotaccountfortasteasanability to takepleasure in ‘particular’objects (169).He then locates therelevantinterestintheonewehaveinaestheticideas(168–73).

engageinformoralandculturalpurposesafterwehaveacquiredtaste,itisalsosomethingKantthinksweneedinordertodeveloptasteinthefirstplace.

Takingthisaltogether,Ihavearguedthat,forKant,aestheticcom-monsenseisnotconstitutiveoftheaestheticpowerofjudgment;rath-eritrepresentsonewayofmakingaestheticjudgmentsamongothers.Moreover,Ipointedoutthat,accordingtoKant,wedonotmakeaes-theticjudgmentsinthisway—i.e.,onthebasisofcommonsense—inourunpracticedstate.Withoutpractice,wemakecrudejudgmentsoftheagreeableon thebasisof the tasteof the senses. It is thusonlythroughpracticeandaestheticeducationthatweacquirethefacultyofcommonsenseandthereflectiveskillsneededtomakeproperjudg-mentsoftaste.

3.3. The Demand to Acquire Common Sense There is, however, onefinal issue regarding the acquisitionof com-monsensethatweneedtoconsider:whatisthe‘higherend’or‘prin-ciple’thatdemandsweacquireit?

SomecommentatorshaveidentifiedthisendwithwhatKantcallsthe‘interest’inthebeautiful.Kantintroducesthisnotionofinterestin§40,wherehesays:

Ifonecouldassumethatthemereuniversalcommunica-bilityofhisfeelingmustinitselfalreadyinvolveaninter-est forus (which,however,one isnot justified in infer-ring from the constitution of amerely reflective powerofjudgment),thenonewouldbeabletoexplainhowitisthatthefeelinginthejudgmentoftasteisexpectedofeveryoneasifitwereaduty(KU5:296).39

In§§41and42Kantthenarticulatestwodifferentkindsofinterestthatcanattachtoajudgmentoftaste:the‘empirical’ interestwehavein

acquisitionoftaste,theaimofwhichistoteachustomakeproperjudgmentsoftaste,ratherthancrudeaestheticjudgments.

39.SeeCrawford(1974),Savile(1987):Ch.6,Longuenesse(2006):217–9.



theabilitytolegislatethisprincipletoourselves.Afterpresentingthisgeneral interpretationof aesthetic autonomy (4.1), Iwill thenarguethattheyoungpoetexamplesupportsthisinterpretation(4.2).

4.1. Common Sense as the Key to Aesthetic AutonomyLet’sreturntoKant’sanalysisofcommonsenseintheFourthMomentofTaste.There,wesawKantclaimthattheideaofcommonsenseisthe‘principle’or‘norm’thatgroundstheexemplarynecessityofjudg-mentsoftaste.AndIsuggestedthat,forKant,theprincipleornormofcommonsensedemandsthatourjudgmentsoftastebegroundedin theuniversallycommunicable formofdisinterestedpleasure thatresultsfromfreeplay.AsIseeit,onKant’sview,thisprincipleisjustwhatwe legislate toourselves: it is the standardweholdourselvesaccountabletowhenwemakeajudgmentoftaste.Anditisonlyinvirtueofmeetingthisstandardthatwetakeourselvestobeinaposi-tiontotreatourjudgmentasanexamplethatothersshouldfollow.

However,asIreadKant’sview,inordertobeabletolegislatethisprincipletoourselves,weneedtohaveacquiredthefacultyofaesthet-iccommonsense.Itakethistobethecasebecauseinordertolegislatethisprinciple toourselves,wemustbe able to regardour aestheticjudgmentsassubjecttouniversalstandards.Yet ifwelackaestheticcommonsense,wecannotviewouraestheticjudgmentsinthisway;weare, instead, locked in anarrow-mindedwayof consideringaes-theticmatters.Butifwehavecommonsense,thenwearesensitivetothefactthatnotallfeelingsareprivateandthatsomeare,atleastpo-tentially,universallycommunicable.Andifwearefeelingpleasureinrelationtoaparticularobject,commonsenseenablesustoreflectonthatfeelingwithaneyetodiscriminatingwhetheritisoftheuniver-sallycommunicablesortgroundedinfreeplayormerelysomethingprivate.Itisinthisreflectiveprocessthatwedemandofourselvesthatourjudgmentsmeetthestandardsetoutbytheprincipleofcommonsense:weshouldallowourselvestomakeajudgmentoftasteonlyifweregardourpleasureasthe‘common’,‘disinterested’pleasurethatisgroundedinfreeplay.Thus,onKant’sview,theself-legislationofthe

Sincethisbroad-mindedwayofsensingisnothingotherthanthefac-ultyofaestheticcommonsense,theendofthepowerofjudgmentiswhatissuesinthedemandthatweacquireaestheticcommonsense.

Withthislastpieceoftheregulativereadingofaestheticcommonsenseinplace,wecannowstepbackandconsiderKant’saccountofcommonsenseasawhole.In§2IarguedthatKantdistinguishesbe-tween a cognitive and aesthetic species of common sense and thatthelattercanbecharacterizedasaprinciple,afeeling,andafaculty.Meanwhile, inthissectionIhaveconcentratedonKant’saccountofthefacultyofaestheticcommonsense,ortaste,andhowweacquireit.OntheinterpretationIdefended,thefacultyofaestheticcommonsenseenablesustoreflectonthegroundsofouraestheticjudgmentsfromauniversalpointofview.Thenteasingouttheparallelbetweencommon human understanding and common sense, I claimed that,forKant,thefacultyofaestheticcommonsenseisnotconstitutiveofthe aestheticpowerof judgment; rather it is somethingweacquirethroughaestheticeducationand in response to thedemandsof thepowerofjudgment.

4. Common Sense and Aesthetic Autonomy

Havingdefendedmy interpretationof common sense, I cannowfi-nallyreturntothetopicofaestheticautonomy.RecallthatintheIntro-duction,InotedthatrecenttreatmentsofKant’saccountofaestheticautonomyhavetendedtoneglectthequestionofwhyjudgmentsoftastecountasautonomousintheKantiansense.AsIurgedearlier,itisneitherenoughforthejudgmentoftastetobefreefromoutsideinflu-ence,norforittobegroundedinthesubject’sownfeelingofpleasureinordertoqualifyasautonomous.Rather,inorderforajudgmentoftastetobeautonomous,itmustinvolvesomekindofaestheticself-de-terminationandself-legislation.Iamnowinapositiontomakegoodonmyearlierproposal,viz.,thatthisaestheticself-determinationrestsoncommonsense.Morespecifically, Iaim toshowthat the ideaofcommonsenseistheprinciplethatwelegislatetoourselvesinjudg-mentsoftaste,andthatthefacultyofcommonsenseiswhatgivesus



Thoughtheyoungpoetexamplecanbereadinthisway,Ithinkitisbetterreadasaffirmingtheeducation-dependentaccountofaestheticautonomy I have attributed to Kant. On this non-standard reading,rather than thepoet exemplifying aesthetic autonomy inhis youngand unpracticed state, it is only once he acquires common sensethroughpracticethathelearnshowtomakeanautonomousaestheticjudgment.AndIbelievethatthisreadingistheonethatisbestsup-portednotonlybyKant’streatmentoftheyoungpoetin§32,butalsobyhisdiscussionofthisexampleintheAnthropology.

Beginning with the latter point, although in the thirdCritique itmight seemas ifKant ispraising theyoungpoet inhisunpracticedstate, intheAnthropology Kantpresentsthesameexamplenotasanexampleofaestheticautonomy,butratherasanexampleofaestheticegoism:

Theaestheticegoistissatisfiedwithhisowntaste,evenif others find his verses, paintings, music, and similarthingsever sobad,andcriticizeoreven laughat them.He deprives himself of progress toward that which isbetterwhenheisolateshimselfwithhisownjudgment;heapplaudshimselfandseeksthetouchstoneofartisticbeautyonlyinhimself(Anthro7:129–30).42

Kant goes on to suggest that the only way to overcome egoism isthrough“pluralism,thatis,thewayofthinking[Denkungsart]inwhichoneisnotconcernedwithoneselfasthewholeworld,butratherre-gardsandconductsoneselfasamerecitizenof theworld” (Anthro.7:13).Ifwereadtheyoungpoetexampleinthislight,theninhisinitialstate theyoungpoet is anaestheticegoistwhohasnotyet learnedhowmakeaestheticjudgmentsinabroad-mindedway.

42. Here,Kantalsodiscussesthe‘logical’egoistwho“considersitunnecessarytotesthisjudgmentalsobytheunderstandingofothers;asifhehadnoneedatallforthistouchstone”andthe‘moral’egoistwho“limitsallendstohimself”and“seesnouseinanythingexceptthatwhichisusefultohimself”(Anthro7:128–30).

principleofcommonsensedependsonushavingacquiredthefacultyofaestheticcommonsense.

Nowgiventhatthefacultyofaestheticcommonsenseissomethingthatwemustacquire, thismeansthat, forKant,aestheticautonomyis likewise somethingwe acquire. So understood, aesthetic autono-myissomethingthatdependsonaestheticeducationandthesortofpracticewithexamplesthatIdiscussedabove.Itisthispracticethatteachesushowtoreflectonthegroundsofourjudgmentsfromauni-versalpointofview,anditisonlyifwehaveacquiredthisskillthatwecanlegislatetheprincipleofcommonsensetoourselves.Onmyread-ingofKant’sview,then,aestheticautonomyisnotsomethingguaran-teed;itissomethingweachievethroughtheacquisitionofcommonsense.

4.2. The Autonomy of the Young PoetOne potential objection tomy interpretation of Kant’s view of aes-theticautonomy is that it seemstoconflictwith theexampleof theyoungpoet fromabove.According to theprevailing readingof thisexample,theyoungpoetdemonstratesautonomyfromtheoutset.In-sofarashe“doesnotlethimselfbedissuadedfromhisconvictionthathispoem isbeautifulby the judgmentof thepublicnor thatofhisfriends,”heappearstobemakinganautonomousaestheticjudgment(KU§32,5:282).41Giventhatthepoetmakesthisjudgmentinhisim-maturestate,itwouldthenseemthatpracticeisnotrequiredforaes-theticautonomy.

41. Forexample,inhisdiscussionofaestheticautonomy,Guyer(1997)saysthatinmakinghisinitialjudgment,theyoungpoet“isnotbeingparticularlyego-centric or demonstrating any adolescent stubbornness.He ismerely com-plyingwiththerequirementoftastethathebasehisjudgmentonhisownfeelingsofpleasureordispleasure” (240). Ina similarvein,Allison (2001)says,“Thisexampleisinterestingbecauseitapparentlyusesaninstanceofbad (ormistaken) taste to illustrate theprincipleof the autonomyof taste”(167).Meanwhile,althoughSavile(1987)arguesthatinhisunpracticedstatetheyoungpoethasnotyet“acquired[…]tasteproper,”thepoetneverthelessmakesa“perfectlyrespectablejudgmentoftasteabouthisownwork”(152–3).



prescribes:heovercomesthecrudityofhisinitialwayofmakingaes-theticjudgmentsbymeansofpractice.

Incontrastwithstandard interpretationsof theyoungpoet, then,onmyreading,thepoet’sinitialjudgmentthathispoetryisbeautifulis not aesthetically autonomous. Although this judgment masquer-adesasa judgmentof thebeautiful, it is, in fact, a judgmentof theagreeable thathe formson thebasisof the tasteof thesenses.Thepoetonlybecomesaestheticallyautonomouswhenhehasgainedthepracticeneeded toovercomehisaestheticegoism.For it is throughthisaestheticeducationthathelearnstosetasidewhatinterestshimprivatelyandtoreflectonthegroundsofhisaestheticjudgmentsfromthemoreuniversalperspectiveofaestheticcommonsense.Oncehehasacquiredthefacultyofaestheticcommonsenseinthisway,heisthenabletolegislatetheprincipleofcommonsensetohimself,i.e.,todemandofhimself thathisaesthetic judgmentsbegrounded in thedisinterestedpleasurethatresultsfromfreeplay.Whenhethencon-sidershisinitial judgmentthathispoemisbeautifulfromthismorematurestate,heisabletopartwayswithitofhisownfreewill,asherecognizes it falls shortof thestandardheset forhimself.Thus,onmyreading,ratherthanunderminingtheclaimthatKantianaestheticautonomyrequirespracticeandtheacquisitionofcommonsense,theyoungpoetconfirmsit.

5. Conclusion

InthispaperIhaveofferedareadingofKant’stheoryofaestheticau-tonomy,whichtakesseriouslytheideathatthiscountsasaformofKantianautonomy.Inthisspirit,Iarguedthat,forKant,aestheticau-tonomydoesnot just involvenegative freedom, i.e.,makinganaes-thetic judgment free fromoutside influence; it requires thepositivefreedomof self-determinationand self-legislation. Inorder tomakesenseofhisaccountofthisaestheticself-determinationandself-leg-islation, IdrewonKant’saccountofcommonsense.Afterclarifyinghis position on the nature, species, and status of common sense, Iclaimedthat,onhisview,inanautonomousaestheticjudgment,we

However, it is not just Kant’s discussion of this example in theAnthropology that shouldgiveuspauseover theyoungpoet’s initialbehavior.ForKantcontinuestheyoungpoetexampleinthethirdCri-tiqueasfollows:

Onlylater,whenhispowerofjudgmenthasbeenmademoreacutebypractice,doeshedepartfromhispreviousjudgmentsofhisownfreewill,justashedoeswiththoseofhisjudgmentsthatrestentirelyonreason.Tastemakesclaimmerelytoautonomy.Tomakethejudgmentsofoth-ersintothedetermininggroundofone’sownwouldbeheteronomy(KU§32,5:282).

There are several thingsworthnoting about this passage.TheonlytimeKantmentions ‘freewill’ in the youngpoet example is in rela-tiontohiminthismorepracticedstate.Moreover,itisonlythepoet’sjudgments in thismature state thatKant compares to judgmentsofreason, the latter being the kind of judgment he usually associateswithautonomy.AndKantissueshisclaimabouttheautonomyoftasteonlyafterhediscusses thepoet’smaturation.Onmyreadingofaes-theticautonomy,however,thismakessense:thepoetonlybecomesaestheticallyautonomousoncehehasengagedinthepracticeneededtoacquireaestheticcommonsenseandsobecomescapableofmakingproperjudgmentsoftaste.

Indeed, I take this tobewhyKant bookends the youngpoet ex-amplewiththeclaimdiscussedabove,that

tasteis[…]mostinneedoftheexamplesofwhatintheprogressofculturehas longestenjoyedapproval if it isnotquicklytofallbackintobarbarismandsinkbackintothecrudityofitsfirstattempts(KU§32,5:283).

Whentheyoungpoetisinhisunpracticedstate,heillustratesjustthesortofcrudityofone’sfirstattemptsatmakingaesthetic judgmentsthat Kant highlights here. So toowhen the poet is in his practicedstate, he illustrates just the sort of remedy to this crudity thatKant



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legislatetheprincipleofcommonsensetoourselves.Moreover,Isug-gestedthathetakesourabilitytolegislatethisprincipletoourselvestodependonusfirsthavingacquiredthefacultyofaestheticcommonsensethroughanaestheticeducationthatissensitivetothedemandsofthepowerofjudgment.AndImaintainedthattheyoungpoetex-amplesupportsthisreadingofaestheticautonomy.FarfromKantianaestheticautonomythenbeingamatterofsimplymakinganaestheticjudgmentonthebasisofone’sownresponse,freefromoutsideper-suasion,Ihopetohaveshownitisafreedomweearn,througheffortandeducation.43

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kant on aesthetic autonomy and common sense

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