kalyvas on castoriadis

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T he R adica l Ins titu ting P ow er

an d D em ocratic Th eoryby A N D R E A S K A L Y V A S *

A t the center of C astoriadis 's political thoug ht lies his steady

and uninterrupted e ffor t to e lucidate the pract ice of autonom yand to reco nstruct the radical content of dem ocratic politics. In-deed , from his very early w rit ings in S ocialism e ou B arbarie 1 tothe numerous books that followed his "rediscovery" of theimaginary and especia lly s ince the publ ica t ion of his mag numopus, T he Im aginary Institution of S ociety 2, one of his main pre-occu pat ions was to explore the poss ibil ity of renew ing dem o-crat ic theory in the l igh t of the c r isi s of Ma rxism and of the

l imits of inheri ted thoug ht .H is incisive and p athbreaking c riticism of structuralism an d

funct ional ism sho uld be read in this context . More than a me reacad emic exercise, it had a clear p olitical meaning 8. By discredit-ing an d rejecting their reductionist and rationalistic assumptions,C astoriadis made it po ssible to think anew alterity, creation, andotherness . He soug ht to replace cau sal ity and determinac y socom mo n in the topograp hical metaphors of " instance s," "struc-tures ," and "supers t ructures" w ith the subvers ive a nd creat ivepow er of collect ive subjects who are capa ble of qu est ioning an dshat tering insti tuted s tructures of dom inat ion and of s t rugglingfor the instauration of new political, legal, and institutionalorders . This mak es C as tor iad i s a ph i losoph er o f chan ge an d

*I wou ld l ike to thank D avid A mes C ur t is fo r h i s he lp fu l comm entsand sugge stions.

ANDREAS KALYVAS i s a g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t a t C o l u m b ia U n i v e r s i ty c o m -p le t i n g h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n o n t h e p o l it ic a l t h o u g h t o f W e b e n , Sc h m i tt ,A r e n d t , a n d C a s t o r i a d i s .

9



creation. Indeed , the singulari ty o f his poli t ical thou ght co nsistsin his having illuminated the source of form-giving action, polit-i ca l t r ansformat ion , and n ew beginnings .' To th is end he h as

formulated the seminal concept of the instituting pow er of theradical social imaginary, which re fers to the creat ive potent ia lof the mu lti tude. '

A s central and cru cial as this conc ept is for the redefinitionof dem ocracy, so too is its comp lexity and obscurity. It has beenthe cause of considerable puzzleme nt and man y con troversies .On num erous occasions, C astoriadis himself has acknowledgedth is problem. "Such recogn i tion" he w rote , "is wi thout d oubt ,

extremely diff icul t ,"° and sometimes ca n be even "shocking," 7

"unac cep table, if not absurd"' becau se it "dep art{s} from settledhabi ts of thoug hts ." ' I t is therefore impo r tant for us to u nder-take a c lar i fica t ion o f this conc ept . ' Se ct ion On e focu ses ex-clusively on the radical social imaginary. Sec tion Two examinesand co nfronts two we ll-know n cri tiques, by Jurgen H abermas"and A gnes H el le r ." A con s idered re jec t ion of these change sprovides the point of en try to Sect ion Three. Using the not ionof the soc ial imag inary, which I con sider remarkable in its orig-inali ty an d its ram ifications for d em oc ratic theo ry, I briefly re-frame key issues and debates that have been at the heart ofrecent dem ocratic theory.

I.

So ciety, Ca storiadis argue d, is the totality of its institutions.This inst i tut ional ense mble, wh at he cal ls the instituted society ,is not functiona l , pure ly proce du ral , or total ly instrume ntal . I tembo dies part icular social imaginary significations, a "magna "of substantive mean ings, values, norms, and collective represe nta-t ions that acc oun t for the uni ty and ident ity of each society, forits unique eidos. 1 3 The originality of Castoriadis's political

thoug ht, how ever, cann ot be accoun ted for by this definit ion ofsociety. Rather, i ts dist inctive charac ter emerg es from his effortto und erstand and elucidate the self-alteration of soc iety . "W hatis it" Castoriadis asked, "that brings abo ut other and n ew fo rmsof Society ?" 14 W hat is the origin of chan ges and m odificat ions?

10OURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA



H ow is one mag na of soc ial imaginary s ignif icat ions replacedby an other on e ? The o rigin of the insti tuted so ciety, he rep lied,is the instituting society, which corresponds to the creative form-

giving powe r of the radical social imag inary. Rather than lookingfor a ph i losophy of his tory tha t wou ld have located the sourceof creation either in a primordial, first cause or in an extra-social force, l ike, for examp le, some h istorical laws or e cono micimperatives or in a n o mnipotent collective, homogene ous m acro-subject inh erent to the traditiona l elaborations of po pular sover-eignty, Ca storiadis sough t to i lluminate the "unm otivated" and"unintended" origin of the instituted society, which is irreducible

to any pr ior laws o r ac tor .Steering between determinism and voluntarism, s tructures

and a gency , C as tor iadis deployed a u nique theore t ica l schemeand nove l concep tual tools. Insti tutions and the social significa-t ions they em body are n ot the conscious, intended design of anindividual or of a grou p of individuals . They a re instead, thecreat ion of society as suc h. "Society ," C astor iadis argue d, " is

sel f-creat ion de ployed in h is tory ,"" and therefore i t should berecog nized as the only sou rce of i tself . B uilding on this insight,he redefined a utono my as the lucid and explici t self- inst itut ionof soc ie ty. I t is th is provoca t ive argu men t , how ever , tha t h ascaused the mo st quest ioning a nd is a t the or igin of many dis-tor ted a nd m isleading read ings of C as tor iad is 's theory . W hatdo es i t me an to say that society inst i tutes i tself or that societyis the sou rce of itself ? Is not Castoriadis person ifying the social

in the form o f macro-subjec t and ad opt ing a na ive an thropo-mo rphic argum ent? Is he no t contradicting h is previous c la imabout the unm otivated or ig in of society by asser t ing no w thathistorical creat ion is " the wo rk of a soc ial imag inary, of the in-stituting soc iety" ?"

B efore co nfronting these quest ions, it is important that weattempt a clarification of the co ncep t of the radical social ima g-

inary . I consider i t helpful to begin by drawing some paral le lsw ith two re la ted but mo re acce pted fo rmu lat ion s. I t i s in thet rad it ion of the S cot t ish E nl ightenm ent and espec ia lly in thewo rk of Ad am Ferguson tha t one can f ind a f i rs t modern a t -t empt , a l thou gh in an e lemen tary and crude m ann er , to con-

T he R adical Instituting Pow er and D em ocratic Theory1



ceptualize and elucidate the instituting pow er of society. De spitethe fact that C astor iadis h imself never und ertook such a c om -par ison and that his conc ept wa s inf luence d by his cr it ica l en-

coun ter with the works o f K ant, Marx, and Freu d, the similaritieswith Ferguson are striking. Spe culating on the sourc es of historic-al creation and social change , Ferguson , distancing himself fromsocial con tract theories , adva nce d an extreme ly unusu al claimacco rd ing to w hich " like the w inds , tha t com e w e know notwhe nce, and blow withersoever they l i st , the forms o f societyare de rived from a n o bscure an d dis tant origin.' The total ity ofsocial inst i tut ions, he fam ou sly conclud ed, "are inde ed the re-sul t of hum an ac t ion, but not the execut ion of any hu man de-sign. ' B y d irect ly at tacking the "tradi t iona l his tories of an cientlegis lators , and fo un ders of s tates" for w hich soc iety wou ld bethe resu lt of " their sup po sed p lans . . . an e ffect of [ their] de -sign,"" Fergu son rejected the und erlying theoret ical parad igmof causal i ty that explains phe nom ena a s the conscious effect ofpurposive ac tion. Usually representing society as a rational, self-

t ransparent ac tor , i t r educes h is tory to the me chanics of p ro-duction."

To take this com parison even fur ther , Ca stor iadis 's con ceptof the insti tuting po we r of society sha res certain affinit ies withFriedrich H ayek 's idea of the "sportane ous o rder."" It is not mypurpo se here to shock the reader by establ ishing l inks betweentwo totally op pose d thinkers, given that C astoriadis himse lf hasfuriously attacked H ayek's po litical ideas, rather it is to exemp lifythe idea o f the ins t itu ting soc ie ty as a fo rm of rad ica l pow erthat gen erates social inst itut ion s withou t invo king a legis lator .Ac cording to H ayek, a social order is not created by a d eliberateplan but eme rges whe never hum an beings in teract to form re-la tions of m utual adjustment, reciprocity, and e xchang e. Theserelations spon taneou sly c oalesce at c ertain focal points , givingrise to relat ively s table n orm s of pred ictabil ity, regulari ty, and

gene ral ity . These norm s nei ther a im a t a h igher , u lt imate goalnor ref lec t a deeper m eaning or rea l ity . A s the consequen ce ofan impersona l process , they "are not in tended or foreseen, anddepend on a multitude of circumstances not known in theirto ta li ty to an ybod y."'




Likew ise, C astoriadis viewe d society as the "spontane ouscreation of a human collective," 23 located in the unm otivated"creative capacity of the anonymo us collective" that "is realized

each t ime hu mans are assembled" 24 and achieved " through thepursuit of an unde termined num ber of particular ends." 25 Society,C astor iadis forceful ly p roclaimed , "is in tented as such by no -body."° As in the case of Hayek's "sportaneous order," the

notion o f the radical social imagina ry con cep tualizes social self-alteration as interactive and relational. There is no creationw ithou t a ser ies of a ims, in tent ions , and o bject ives . B ut th isdoes n ot mean that it results f rom the choice or d ecis ion o f an

individual or a gro up. N ew soc ial imag inary significations eme rgefrom a m ult ipl icity of unde fined relat ions and interac t ions, ofceaseless struggles an d con frontations, and o f endless tactics andmotives, which, attracting and colliding with one another, becom econ nected , gradu ally giving rise to unp redictable and u nforsee nmateria l and sym bol ic bases of support . Thus, they form n ewmea nings, va lues, habi ts , and norm s. Indeed , one may safe lyconc lude that the instituting p owe r of society is constituted partlyby the ac t ion of individua ls and group s and p ar t ly def ined bytheir inf inite , inde termina te interrelations, in suc h a wa y thatneither can a pa rt icular w ill not the w ill of society as a whole

pretend to represent or m onop olize i t .

Take the example of languag e. Wh ile it is a human c reation,i t cann ot be t raced to a person or a g roup o f persons . It s st ruc-ture is perfec t ly c lear , it s a ims de ciphe rable , and yet i t is the

case no o ne is there to have de sired and invented this part icularlanguage or even to have fo l low ed i ts gradu al crys ta ll izat ion.La ngua ge is the uplanned creation of the subterranean institutingpow er of the nea r-anonym ous, unspoken, unseen intersect ionsam ong strategies, relations, an d a cts. Likew ise, polit ical institu-t ions, cultural practices, custom s, values, mean ings, and socialnorms are all the result of this endless creative flow of theradical social imag inary.

The con cept of the ins ti tu t ing p ow er of the radical socialimaginary, therefore , direc t ly chal lenges the f ic t ion of so cia ltranspare ncy , collective voluntarism, and g lobal creation. 27 Theoriginal creat ive pow er of society is imp erson al and cannot be

The Radical Instituting Power and Democratic Theory3



located at a sp ecif ic instance o f society. Furthermore, i t cannotbe fully absorbed by instituted society o r its explicit mec han ismsof po l it ical pow er. Nor ca n any poli t ical ent i ty ap prop riate for

i tself all the c reat ive poten t ial of the rad ical ima ginary . Hen cei ts nam e the ground-pow er of the Collective A nonym ous 28 The

opac ity and impe rsonality of the social impose s strong ontologicallimits of explicit power, ma king all aspirations to rational ma steryand soc ial engine ering precariou s and partial. These impene trablelimitations un derm ine the omnipo tent drive for a total reorga niza-t ion of socie ty. The p sych oana lyt ica l content o f C astor iadis 'stheory here informs and shapes his understanding of the radicalsocial imag inary. The eve rlasting pre sence of the radical imagina-t ion can never be ful ly eradica ted o r mastered. Ca s tor iadis hast ime an d aga in em phas ized the unthem at ized and inexorablepresen ce of an "outside" that restricts and fram es the insti tutingpow er. This recognit ion o f the opac ity of the social— the imagi-nary ch aracter of collective representation— establishes a perma-nen t gap betwe en the s ignif ier and the s ignif ied. N o col lect ive

subject "has an y ne ed to ' represe nt to i tself ' the totali ty of theins t itu t ion of so cie ty or the s igni f icat ion s that i t carr ies , no rindeed cou ld do so."'

He re, how ever, the s imilarit ies between H ayek an d C asto-r iadis end ." W here the f irst glorifies reali ty as i t is , end orsingfatalism an d resignation, the po lit ical program of the secon d re-mains f i rmly rooted in the ema nc ipa tory t rad it ion of the E n-l ighten me nt. The inexorable persistence of an imag inary layercond i tions but does not und ermine the de moc rat ic s t ruggle tocreate an auton om ous soc ie ty. Althoug h som e centra l , " f irs t -orde r" institutions, l ike lan gu age , religion, sexu ality, ha bits, andcustoms pro bably cannot direct ly be m odified o r eradicated byhum an decis ions without rais ing the total itar ian specter of totalma stery, there a re other first- and se con d-order insti tutions thatare susce ptible an d op en to the w ill , desires , and aspirat ion s of

individuals.31 L aw , fami ly , educ a t ion , the econ om y, the s ta te ,jus t to m ent ion a few of them , a re d i rec t ly de pend ent on thecreat ive p ow er o f explicit hu man , col lect ive intervention. H ereone can locate the dis t inc t ive and c entra l ins ight tha t informsC astor iadis 's po l it ica l thou gh t . For this intervent ion to be ef-




fective, a prior co ndition mu st be fulfi lled. C ollectivities mu stappro priate a segm ent of the ins t itu t ing pow er of the rad ica lsocial ima ginary in order to create, within the above-m entioned

l imits, their ow n insti tutions, norm s, and values. This appro pri-ation designa tes the spe cifici ty and su periori ty o f poli tics.

Poli tics , therefore , is de fined a s the explicit and reflect ivestruggle amo ng co mp eting collective entit ies over the appro pri-at ion of grea ter amou nts of the creat ive form-giving po we r ofsociety to con sciously intervene in those dom ains of social li fethat are op en to de liberate m odificat ions and to the inst i tut ion

of their par t icular values and goals . From the mom ent organ izedgroup s expl ic i tly and luc idly a t temp t to chan ge the insti tutedsocial and symbo lic structures in order to instaurate "a new mo deof inst itut ing a nd a ne w re la t ion of socie ty an d o f individua lsto the ins t itu t ion ," the e xper ienc e o f po l it ics i s born ." Thus,politics as a reflective mode of being that transforms socialexis tence an d mo dif ies a segm ent of the ins t itu ted rea l ity re -quires the transition from the C ollective A non ymo us to collective

action. The rem aining part o f the soc ial and sym bolic reality w illfol low a d ifferent pa t tern o f evolut ion: gradua l , s low, most lyunpe rceived, unplanned, and implicit .

A ccord ing to Castoriadis this "self-transform ation of societyconc erns soc ia l do ing— and so a l so po l it ics , in the p rofoundsense o f the t e rm— the do ing o f m en and w om en in soc ie ty ,and nothing else. Of this, thou ghtful doing, and poli tical think-

ing— society 's thinking as making i tse lf— is one essent ia l corn-pon ent ."" A qu al if icat ion n eeds to be add ed h ere, however. Al-though C astoriadis tende d to conflate pol it ics with democ racy,these a re two d ifferent con cep ts. In fact, it is possible for politicsto have an ant idem ocrat ic con tent . For example , a group o r analliance of groups that acquires the monopoly of legitimatesignifications m ay d ecide to instaurate a political and legal orderthat privileges o nly a m inority by establishing h ierarchical rela-

t ions of do minat ion an d exp loitat ion . In this case, the crea t ionof ne w insti tut ions, representat ions, and mea nings as the resul tof con scious an d expl ic i t hum an intervention i s indeed a m an-ifestation of an autono mous activity, even thoug h it directly aimsat the instaurat ion of heterono mo us social s t ructures .




B y con trast , dem ocrac y is that regime in wh ich all the cit i-zens pa rt icipate in the cre at ion of those inst itut ion s and n orm sthat mo st facilitate their individu al autono my a nd the ir effective

par t ic ipa t ion in a l l fo rms of exp l ic i t pow er . An au tonom oussociety is the on e that con sciously ap propriates a seg ment o f theins t itu t ing pow er of the radica l imag inary to crea te those in-stitutions an d significations and to establish those laws and prac-tices that will protect and e nhan ce co llective as well as individualself-determination. Acco rding to this redef ini tion o f dem ocracy,as socie ty pro ceed s to ar t icula te and to con st itute i tse l f as an

expanding subjectivity organ ized aroun d c entral social significa-tions, the project of po litical autono my gradua lly ac quires a sub-stant ive co ntent . A d em ocrat ic society m aterializes in i ts lawsand inst itut ions the fol low ing po lit ical impe rat ive: "Crea te theinstitutions that, by being interna lized by individuals, most faci-l ita te their accession to their individual autono my and their ef-fective part icipation in al l form s of explici t po we r exist ing insociety."

Now, the possibility of a self-instituting society, its ac-cumulation of greater amounts of the ground-power of the

social imag inary and thus its self-affirmation of its value-prod uc-ing potentialities, is inherently related to its capacity to actcollectively. Only throug h co llective action can society see itselfas wh at i t is— a self- inst i tut ing society, know ing an d assert ingits pow er as a self-producing subjectivity. D emo cracy is preciselythat regime that end ows an e xpansive collectivity with increasing

creative pow er.

IL

It is exactly this alleg ed d em iurgical and volun taristic ele-ment in Castoriadis's theory of political autonomy that has

attracted the most vehem ent attacks. Is not Ca storiadis resurrect-

ing a R ousseauian-Jacobin theory o f popular sovereignty thatpresuppo ses substantive homog eneity and strong iden tif ications?D oes he imply tha t only whe n a pol i tica l body is t ransform edinto a perfect ly s ingle pe rson, self- transparent an d o mnipotent ,can the o therwise d ispersed ins ti tu t ing p owe r be gathered a nd




mastered by the co mm unity? H aberma s exemplifies this criticismby arg uing tha t Ca storiadis replaces the se lf-inst itut ing su bjectw ith the sel f - ins t i tu t ing society an d thus "ha s to suppo rt the

world-disclosing produ ctivity of langu age o n an absolute ego- andreturn in fact to speculate ph ilosophy of con sciousness"; th is re-placem ent con seque ntly "fits with the perso nification of societyas a poe t ic dem iurge that re leases ever new wo rld- types f romitself."

A lthoug h this line of critique finds gro und s in C astoriadis 'sam bivalent at t itude tow ard issues o f plural i ty, differen tiat ion,and multiple power-positions, it fails to appreciate the con-st itut ing dimension of p ol it ical autono my . This dimen sion pre-supposes ne i ther a ho mog eneo us social subject nor the not ionof po pular sovereignty. On the co ntrary, as I wil l argue , auton-om y as the self-institution of society imp lies the crea tion of newpolitical identities throug h succ essive displacemen ts and re-artic-ulations am ong particular collective en tit ies. 38 The pr imary ob-jec tive of an autonom ous p rogram is the cons t ruct ion o f a col -

lect ive, dem ocra tic w ill . To the existence o f plural values andinterests Castoriadis propo sed "the creation o f a public spac e . . .[of) a p ol it ical do m ain . . . which belong s to a l l"7 as a neces-sary precondition for the forging of common identity. "Nopha ntasm o f 'hom oge neity' here," he claime d. The "art iculationof the ci tizen body within a pol i tical perspect ive is created a ndsupe rimposed on the `prep olitical ' articulations without crushing

them.""

N ow we c an give a f i rst answer to H abermas's cr it ique. B ybringing toge ther, on c omm on g round s, a mu lti tude o f subject-po sitions, the pro ject of political autono my e ntails the strugg lefor the forma tion of a collective subjectivity, capable of bridgingthe differences amo ng plural imag inary significations, embodiedin divergent collective agents and incarna ted in distinct po liticalprograms, thus enabling it to conc eive and to posit comm on end s

dem oc rat ical ly . This social subject do es not ne ed to be sub-stantively articulated. Its different elements m ust simply comp osea "shared groun d," one o rganized around central symbol ic re-presen tations a nd m eaning s. Only such an "art ificial" collectiveagen cy can p articipate directly in the ground-po wer of the social




imaginary beca use i t "is the o ne w hich ma de i tse lf capable ofrecogn izing an d acc epting this very multiplicity of huma n worlds,thereby breaking as far as possible the closure of its own

world." 39

A dd i tional ly , th is effor t to con st ruct a dem ocra t ic bodychallenges the ideological mystifications an d social fragmen tationimpose d by the rule of capital and the logic of marke t comp eti-t ion . W hat H aberm as fai ls to unde rstand is that the fabricat ionof a pol i tical subject is on e o f those ins t itu t ion s that are thatby mean s of which an d on the basis of which dispersed identities

are displaced and re-articulated to form a social actor, one"capa ble of part icipat ing in social doing and rep resent ing/say-ing, and c apa ble of represe nt ing, act ing, thinking in a comp at-ible, coh erent, con vergen t manne r."

Two p oints are wo rth emp hasizing here. Firs t, Castoriadisal lude s to a co nf l ic tual mod el of pol i tics , acco rding to w hichthe cen tral social imag inary significations that establish the eido sof a particular society do not emanate from a single act, an

absolute, final decision. They are see n as the un intende d histori-cal effect of po lit ical con flicts and social struggles. Rather tha n"be thoug ht of on the basis of an al leged relat ion to a ' subject 'wh ich wo uld 'carry ' them o r 'intend' them,"" these social-histori-ca l c rea t ions , dem ocra t ic ident i ty be ing one of them , a re theunm ot ivated by-produ ct of antagonis tic in terac t ions tha t unde rcertain cond itions can coa lesce into a deliberate and lucid project.This is the pro ject of po lit ical auto no my . It is not a static man i-festation of the w ill of an om nipotent and omn ipresent sovereignpeo ple. I t is "a s trugg le over the inst itut ion s, a s trugg le aimedat the ch an ging o f these insti tution s. .. [a] strugg le that bring sabout a n e xtraordinary chan ge in insti tut ions." '

Sec ond , the po l it ical con struct ion o f a dem ocrat ic wil l re-quires extended p ractices of public dialogue and o pen d elibera-t ion amo ng ci tizens reg arding the a ppropria te ins ti tu t ions a nd

laws of their com mu nity, the al terat ion o f the inst i tuted n orm sand values, and the posi t ing of new ones according to the com -mo n en ds tha t the com mu nity each t ime po si ts for itse lf . Theexpl ic i t se lf - inst itut ion of socie ty presup poses the mo men t ofrationa l, discurcive will-formation. H ere, and h ere on ly, reason




acco mp anies the act of the se lf-institution o f society and e ntailsa set of publ ic proced ures and me chan isms wh ere reasons aregiven and debated , ' cri ticized an d cha lleng ed, according to "the

poss ibil ity— and actual ity— of free spe ech, f ree th inking, f reeexamination, and qu estioning without restraint." Demo cratic w illform ation cann ot but be gene rated in an insti tutionalized p ublicspace w here a "cont inuous ope n and publ ic discussion an d cr i t-icism" "p ertains to everything in so ciety that is part icipable andsharea ble"" and involves the effect ive part icipat ion of al l indi-viduals in the existing form s of explici t pow er. '

Though the conc ept of the radical social imag inary dispenses

with the fiction o f a collective, intrasubjective actor, i t appears,according to A gnes H el ler , tha t if dem ocracy is tantamount tothe absolute r ight of the major i ty ( the de mo s), as C astor iadismo stly asserts, auton om y is social, yet not individual autono my .More over, it is problem atic even in i ts capac i ty o f social auto-nom y, since the autonom y of the m inor ity is not warranted bysuch dem ocracy. Obviously C astoriadis takes i t for granted that

un fettered radica l imag ination results in the co nstan t re-institu-t ional izat ion of the ever-chang ing wish an d w ill of a majori ty(demos) .47 Heller's critique focuses on the elements of arbi-trariness, dec ision ism, and a utho ritarianism that seem to be in-here nt in this conc ept . As the inst itut ing p ow er is app ropriatedby the col lect ive en t it ies w ho becom e the exclusive creators oftheir world, the ones that have a radical and untransferablerespo nsibil ity tow ards i t , the issue o f bou nds and l imitat ion s is

ra ised. In o ther w ords , if dem ocracy is the sel f-aff irmat ion ofthe form -giving, inst itut ing pow er of society, boun d n ei ther bythe objec t ive ne cess i ty of h is tory no r by s t ruc tura l econo micl imits, then p oli tical action, divorced from reason and mo rality,appe ars dangerou sly arbitrary.

If Heller is correct , thoug h C astor iadis wou ld have avoidedthe traps of the philosophy of the subject and the ensuing fictionsof hom ogeneity and transparency, he would sti ll be facing a mo repressing problem. D oes his not ion of the col lect ive anon ymo ust ransgress l im ita t ions, boun dar ies , " r igh ts ," an d inst i tut ion alguarantees ? Is the meaning-creat ing pow er of the anon ym ouscollective left unrestrained? A re po litical decisions totally severed




from ethica l, legal, or institutiona l constra ints? This criticism isbased o n a selective and dis torted read ing. By isolat ing certainpassag es from their context and inflating their significance , H el-

ler constructs her point on frail and insecu re grou nds. I t is t ruethat some of C astoriadis's assertions are open to such misinterpre-tation s— for exam ple, the on e that "this self-insti tuting a ctivitydoes no t take in to accou nt and do es no t recogn ize any limi tN othing can escape i ts in terrogat ion, nothing, in and of i t se l f ,s tands o uts ide it s province ' or the on e that pol i tics is fund a-me ntal ly dis t inct from m oral i ty an d that therefore the d ecis ionof the p olit ical com munity can not be d etermined by extra-social

norm s, s ince they w ould den y i ts creat ive, unbounde d sel f- in-stituting pow er."

H eller is missing C astoriadis 's point, how ever. Rathe r thanproviding a n apo logy for the " tyranny of the m ajor ity ," C as to-r iadis descr ibed w hat he cons idered to be the t ragic dimen sionof demo cracy. B y sugg esting that the mo st minimal ties betweenpolitics and mo rality have been d estroyed an d, conseque ntly, that

political autono my , con cep tualized in abstract and form al terms,can take on a ny con ceivable content , C astor iadis openly con-fronted the inescap able, dang erous p otent ia l ity of de moc rat icpolitics: its lack of o bjective gu arantees: "D emo cracy lives w ithinthe pro blem o f i ts self-limitation , an d no thing ca n ' resolve' thisproblem in advance . On e cann ot d raw up a c ons t itu tion tha two uld prevent , for examp le, 6 7 perce nt of the individuals fromone day m aking the 'democra t ic ' decision to deprive the o ther

33 pe rcen t of their r ights . Imp rescript ible r igh ts of individualscan be w rit ten into the const i tut ion; one cann ot inscribe w ithini t a clause that absolutely forbids any revision of the co nstitution— and w ere one to d o so , th i s prov is ion w ould sooner or la te rprove impotent." 5 °

This extreme form ulation, wh ich falls far short of an endo rse-me nt of dem ocrat ic authoritar ianism, represents a ge nuine a t -

temp t to con front the imperfections of self-determination. Onlyby ackn owledging this major problem can o ne s tar t to exploreforms of se lf - limita t ion tha t con stra in, norm atively and onto-logical ly , the ins t itu t ing po w er of the social imag inary . Thisi s what C as tor iadis had soug ht to do a l l a long.




A s noted above, C as tor iadis located the crea t ive powe r ofthe col lec t iv i ty within a proced ura l f ram ew ork of discurs ivewill-forma tion o riented towa rd pu blic del iberat ion a nd c ri tical

open contes ta t ion. Thus, he brou ght together w i ll and reaso n.A ddit ionally , and mo st importantly , he n ever dispensed w ith in-dividual autonom y, its "private" space , and the resistance of thepsych e. They all form a bounda ry, an ineradicable "outside," thatsubverts the o mn ipresence of p ol it ics . As I have t r ied to showelsewhere, Ca storiadis 's framew ork provides the n ormative re-sources for the protec t ion of "pr ivate f reedom s." 51 There are

inst i tutiona l l imitations on the de cisions that a poli t ical com -

mu nity can reach , due to the fact that " the explicit self- inst i tu-t ion of soc ie ty wil l a lways enco unter th[osle boun ds . .. [tha t]the na ture of the psyche imposes upon the modes and the con-tent o f i ts social izat ion. '" 52 Castoriadis time and again has

argu ed tha t "it is also ne cessa ry . .. to en sure fo r them [i.e., allindividuals] the greatest possible sph ere of autono mo us individ-ual l ife . .. we ca n e vident ly , on the basis of the pro jec t of au-tonomy , jus t ify ( found, i f you prefer) 'hum an r ights ' and m uchm ore i f you l ike.""

Finally, and from a more general and abstract point of

view, the posi t ing act ion of the c ollect ivi ty, the affirma tion o fi ts instituting po we r can n either transgre ss external "historical-cul tural" con straints imp osed by the successive layers of t radi-tion, past experiences, and collective mem ory— residues of earliersocial imaginary significations— nor transcend its immanen t pre-

supp osi t ion s of coh eren ce, com pleteness, and intr insic con sis-tency." The creat ions o f the an ony mo us co l lect ive, Castoriadishas repeatedly em pha sized, are ex nihilo, not cum nihilo. Theform-invest ing a c t ion of so cia l subject iv i ty " takes place ," hestressed: "upon, in, and through the already instituted. Thiscon dition s i t and limits it , but do es no t determine it."55 I t formsthe background upo n w hich a new ins ti tu t ion o f the socia l hasto lean and wh ich i t thus has to respect . To take this argum entone step further, it is my co ntention that the inst itut ing pow erof the rad ica l socia l imaginary face s an add i tional l imita t ion:the existence of m ultiple, sometimes an tagon istic social significa-t ions tha t accou nt fo r the fac t o f p lu ra lism. A l thoug h i t can-




not be denied that they ca n intersect , overlap, and fuse, nei thercan i t be fo rgo t ten tha t they fo rm d i s tinc t and e ven con f li c t-ing relationships, themselves constitutive of a dynamic and

preca rious ma gm atic constellat ion. Polit ical agen ts strugg le andact a lwa ys within the ho r izons of a plura l and h eterogen eousuniverse. It delimits a context and delineates the availablet e r ra in for the c rea t ion of a co mm on pro jec t.

C astoriadis 's con cept of the inst itut ing pow er of the socialimaginary as the source of alterity and genuine change hasmajor ramif ica t ions for con tempo rary demo crat ic theory. Byconc eptualizing an d app reciating, more incisively than any o therthinker in our time, the political importance of this indeter-minate surging forth of ne w mea nings, inst itut ions, representa-tions, and laws from the creative potential of the collective

anony mou s, he has m ade som e t imely, though overlooked, con-t r ibut ions to contem porary p ol it ica l though t . A lready one re-alizes that the terrain here is vast. The limits of the presentdiscuss ion d o no t a f ford m e but a se r ies of broadly ske tchedproposit ions, which need careful elaboration elsewhere.

To begin with, the idea of social imaginary providedC astor iad is wi th the nec essa ry theore t ica l and norm at ive re -sources for a fresh reconstruct ion of the idea of d emocracy . Hedeveloped a concept ion of p ol it ical autonomy free of the essen-tialistic connotations of traditional formulations. Given itsneu tral izat ion in the individualis t ic an d form al l iberal ideal of"mora l au tonom y" and i ts deco ns t ruc t ion by po s tmod ernism,C astor iadis 's projec t today represents one of the mo st promis-ing effor ts to re inscr ibe autonomy within con tempo rary dem -ocrat ic discourses . Au tonom y, defined as the lucid and explici t

self-institution of society, puts at the foreground of radicalpolitics the reflective strugg le of orga nized en tit ies to ap prop ri-ate greater am oun ts of the insti tut ing so cial imaginary gro und -pow er, with a view towa rd transforming the instituted, capitalistrelat ions of do mination and inequality .




Secon d, from this radical reconceptualization o f dem ocracy,C astoriadis attacked the proce dural ist ic app roache s adopted bythe main currents of contem porary po l it ica l thou ght . H e pro-pose d, instead, a substantive mo del of part icipatory dem ocrac yaime d at " the real izat ion o f those ins t itu t ions tha t favor anda llow fo r hum an au tonom y." 55 Rejecting the formalism andabstractness of K antian autonom y, Castoriadis argued that "wewill the au tonom y of soc ie ty— as wel l as of individuals— bothfor i tse l f and in orde r to be able to m ake /do th ings ."" Thereis a particular telos, he claimed , dis t inct ive to any dem ocrat icsocie ty. This is the "fabr ica t ion" of auto no mo us individuals ,

ones c apable of making an effect ive use o f their freedom. Thus,to see proced ures as neu tra l is to fa ll v ic t im to l ibera l myths.Procedu res a re inherent ly re la ted to the a ims and pro jec ts ofa p ol it ical com mu nity . They are segm ents of i t s centra l socialsignif icat ions, "inst ituted no t as mere 'mea ns ' but as a mom entin the em bodiment and faci li tat ion of the p rocesses that broughtthat regime into being ." 55 Thus, C as tor iadis has un covered thebroader f ie ld of soc ia l ima ginary s ignif ica t ions w ithin w hich

rules , form s, and proc esses acqu ire their specif ic mean ing. In-s t itu t ions do not exis t in a vacuu m. They are socia l-his tor ica lcrea t ions , a lw ays a l ready imm ersed in p re-g iven va lues an ddeterminat ions, embo dying the predom inant , heg emo nic goalsof their society.

C astoriadis did not dismiss procedures in gene ral, howe ver. 59

He rejected the liberal arguments of neutrality and 'impar-

t ia l ity tha t asp ire to hide the ir substan t ive o bject ives un der avei l of form al ism and legal ity ." It is a m is take , there fore , toin terpre t th is posi t ion as a tota l denia l of proced ures . His de-fense of a subs tan t ive dem ocra t ic m ode l he lps to expose theimpasses o f recent l ibera l e f for ts to em pty, weaken , and neu -tra l ize dem ocrac y, separa t ing i t f rom i ts egal i ta r ian and par-t ic ipatory con tent . This in tervent ion extends a nd enriches theold debate betw een d em ocra t ic legi timacy a nd l iberal legal ity,

wh i le a t the sam e t ime cut t ing across the s ter ile and n ow s tag-nan t liberal-com mun itarian divide.

Indee d, Ca storiadis 's cr i tique of l iberal proced ural ism didnot a l ly h im w i th the "neo-A r is to te l ian" cam p. He w as mo re




than suspicious of any at tempt to der ive the com mon good from'the facticity of tradition. On many different occasions hecri ticized the u se of t radi tion as a n orm ative-cri t ical principle.

To accept "that what tradit ion or society produces 'spontaneo us-ly ' i s good or the least bad thing," he argue d in on e of h is las tessay s, "leads to total historical nihilism? " 81 The ensu ing con -servative conseque nces of com mun itarianism, Castoriadis rightlyemp hasized, are coup led with an "ethicalization" of po litics thatamo unts to nothing m ore than an "eth ical re ject ion of po l it icsand the turn tow ard the private man ."' A lthou gh h e consideredthe exis tenc e of shared , substant ive values as a nec essary pre-

con di t ion for dem ocrat ic pol it ics , he wa s careful to avoid thet raps of com mu nitarianism. Instead of essent ializing an d natu-ra l iz ing com mun al values and co mm on goo ds, a s t ra tegy thatleads to group p ar t icular ism and h om ogen ei ty , he advanced aprovocative thesis about the political creation of a shared, publicethos. As w ith the ca se of dem ocratic will-formation, "the qu es-t ion of the com mo n good belongs to the dom ain of the social -

his tor ical m aking /doing g ai re] ,"" and is in tegra l ly re la ted tothe s truggles and project of conc rete social agents .

These ra ther has ty remarks con clude my investigat ion ofthe con cept o f the radical social imag inary and i ts implicat ionsfor dem ocratic theory. In the l ight of these observations, I hop eto have e stablished the terms of the articulation betwee n ge nuineform-giving act ivi ty o f the m ulti tude and dem ocrat ic s t rategiesof pow er. At least one sure conclusion m ay be advan ced at this

t ime , nam ely that this conce pt has perm itted C astoriadis to re-t r ieve the e man c ipa tory content of mo dern i ty tha t g ave b i r thonce again to the dem ocrat ic experience. Thus, h is work con-st itutes a prom ising fo cal point for the revi talizat ion o f a dem -ocratic theory w ith a rad ical content." H is elaboration of a su b-s tan t ive theory of rad ica l democracy i s based on the semina lcon cep t of the instituting gro und -pow er of the social imaginary

and on the crea t ive capa ci ty o f socie ty to inst i tute i tse lf . A s Ihave t r ied to sho w, th is theory w as succe ssful in avo iding theapologe tic formulations of neutrality and p roceduralism so com-mo n in recen t liberal theories as wel l as the anac hronis t ic an dexclusionary fiction of a hom ogen eous, self-transparent political




community, so hostile to pluralism and otherness, as in the case

of com mun i ta r ian ism.

N O T E S

'For an E nglish transla t ion o f the most impo rtant texts publishedin Ca storiadis 's E' edit ions 1 0 /18 collection of his Socialisme ou Barbariewritings, see Political and Social Writings, Vol. 1: 1946-1955, Min-neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988; Political and SocialWritings, Vol. 2: 1955-1960, Minne apo lis: Universi ty of Minnesota

Press, 19 88; and Political and Social Writings, Vol. 3: 1961-1979, Min-neapol is : Univers ity of M innesota Press , 19 9 3. Al l three volumes a reedited and translated by D avid Am es Cu rtis .

2Co rnelius C astoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society (1975) ,Cam bridge, MA; MIT Press and Ca mbridge, England, Poli ty Press, 1987 .

K astor iadis' s ea r ly confron ta t ion w ith s t ruc tura l ism w as the pre-cursor to many later critiques. It is worth noting, however, that heannou nced the "dea th of Marxism" when an impor tant par t of Frenchinte llectuals were u nde r the spe l l. of A lthusser ian s t ructural ism. In this

as in many subsequent cases, Castoriadis was at the margins of thedominant cu rrents, sometimes pushing ag ainst them, sometimes engagingin open disputes with well-established theories and beliefs. He thusbecam e a sor t of a theo r ist of the f ront ie rs .

"The similarities between Castor iadis and H annah A rendt , anothercontemp orary po l it ica l th ither who mad e c rea t ion and n ew ini t ia t ionsthe center of her work, are striking but generally overlooked. SeeHannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Ch icago. Chicago Universi tyPress, 1958 and On Revolution, London: Penguin B ooks , 19 6 5 .

5C astoriadis 's central distinction between the ra dical ima ginary an dthe radica l imagina t ion has of ten been ov er looked. W hile the secondrefers to the individual psyche , the first deno tes the collective anon ymo us,that is , the creat ing p ow er of the c ol lect ivity. See "R adical Imaginat ionand the S ocia l Ins t itu t ing Ima ginary" (19 9 4) , The Castoriadis Reader,

ed . David A mes C ur t is , C ambridge, MA and O xford , Eng land: B lack-well Publishers , 19 9 7.

°Co rnelius Ca storiadis, "Institution of Soc iety and Religion" (1982),World in Fragments. Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, andthe Imagination, ed. and t rans. D avid Ame s Cu rt is , Stanford, CA : Stan-ford Universi ty Press, 19 9 7, p. 327.

7C ornel ius C a.stor iadis , `Individua l , Society, Ra t iona l ity, History"(1988), Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, ed. by David Ames Curtis,N ew Y ork, Oxford: Oxford Univers i ty Press , 19 9 1 , p . 6 4 .

°C orne lius C astoriadis , "Imagination , ima ginaire , ref lexion," L es

The Radical instituting Power and Democratic Theory5



carrefours du labyrinthe, Vol. 4: Fait et a Faire, Paris: Ed itions du S euil,1 9 9 7 , p. 26 4 .

9Cornel ius Castor iad is , Individual, Society, Rationality, History

p . 6 4 .°W ith in the vas t oeuvre of C astor iad is there are three texts tha t

directly address the issue of the instituting power of the social imagina ry:"Pow er, Pol i tics , A utonom y" (19 88) , Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy,

"The Imaginary: Creation in the Social-Historical Domain" (1984),World in Fragments, and "R adical Imagination and the S ocial Inst i tut ingImagina ry" (19 9 4) , The Castoriadis Reader.

"Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.

Twelve Lectures. Ca mbridge, England: Polity Press, 1987 , p. 333.°A gnes H el le r , "W ith C as tor iadis to A r isto t le ; From A risto t le to

K ant ; From K ant to Us ," Autonomie et autotransformation. La philoso-phie militante de Cornelius Castoriadis, Geneva: L ibra ir ie D roz, 19 89and from A Theory of History in Fragments, C a m b r idge , MA a ndOxford, England: B lackwel l Publ ishers , 199 3.

°Co rnel ius C astor iadis , The Imaginary Institution, p . 359 ."C ornel ius Castor iad is , "The Imaginary: C rea t ion in the So cia l -

Historical Domain," World in Fragments, p. 6 .15Ibid. , p . 1 3."Ibid.

"Adam Ferguson , An Essay on the History of Civil Society, NewB runswick: Transac t ion B ooks , 1980 , p . 122.

p. 122.19 Ibid. , p. 1 23."A lthou gh C as tor iadis 's concept of the ins ti tu ting groun d-pow er

of soc ie ty shares m any a f f in i t ies w i th Fergu son 's theory, i t i s not thesame w ith A dam S mith . Indeed, and despi te the widespread view tha tthese two th inkers compose a un i ty of though t , there a re fundamenta land subs tant ive di ffe rences be tween them . W hile Ferguson sou ght to

unders tand the o rigin of new social format ions and of his tor ical change,Sm ith was primarily con cerne d with the stabilization and no rmalizationof mul t ip le , unp lanned eco nom ic t ransac t ions tha t he accep ted themas granted.

21F. A . Hayek , The Constitution of Liberty, Ch icago: The Un iver-si ty of C hicago Press, Vol . I , 19 73, pp. 20, 41, 59, 36 -7, 161.

F. H . Hayek , Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. 2: The Mirage

of Social Justice, Ch icago: Chicago Universi ty Press, p. 70 .25C orne l ius Ca s tor iadis , "Rad ica l Imagina t ion an d the So c ia l In-

s t itut ing Imagina ry," p . 331."Cornelius Castoriadis, "Anthropology, Philosophy, Politics"

(1990), Thesis Eleven, N o. 4 9 , Ma y 1 9 9 7 , p . 1 0 6 .25Cornelius Ca ctoriadis, The Imaginary Institution, p . 36 3 .26Ibid.

27C orne l ius C as tor iadis , "The L ogic of Magm as and the C rea t ionof Autonom y" (19 83) , The Castoriadis Reader, p. 314.




28A lthough the no t ion o f the anony mou s co l lec t ive appea red fo rthe first time in The Imaginary Institution (p . 36 9 ) , i t wa s develope din Casto riadis 's seminal essay Pow er, Poli tics, A utonom y .

29Cornelius Castoriadis , The Imaginary Institution, p . 36 6 .30A very interes t ing and or iginal "l iberal" appropriat ion of C asto-

riadis 's conce pt of the instituting powe r of society, building on the above-ment ioned s imi lari ties be tween H ayek and Ca s toriad is , has been elab-ora ted by Marce l Gau chet . In h is d iscuss ion of B enjamin C onstant ' spolitical thought, Gauchet inserts the idea of the self-institution ofsociety an d directs i t aga inst the alleged voluntarism o f the statist polit-ical t radi t ion of Ma rxism, social ism, an d the radical lef t, that accord ingto him, has led to the mo dern tota l itar ian exper ience. His use, how ever ,of Ca storiadis 's conce ptual appa ratus is highly problematic for two main

reason s. First , he loca tes the crea tive pow er of the m ultitude exc lusivelyin civil society and esp ecially in the ec ono my . Thu s, capitalism, insteadof dem ocracy , app ears to be the main ma nifes ta tion of the ins t itu t ingsocial imaginary. Acco rdingly, the liberal bourge ois emerges as the proto-type of the a u tonomou s agent . Second, he desubs tan t ia lizes au tonom yf rom i ts par t ic ipa tory a nd dem ocra t ic conten t . The se l f - ins t i tu t ion ofsociety, as Castoriadis has pointed ou t, aims at the instauration of a pa r-t icular po l it ical orde r that is ho st ile to the l iberal s t ructures of d om ina-tion and exploitation. See Marcel Gauchet, "Benjamin Constant: 1'

i llusion lucide d u l iberalisme," Marcel Gau che t (ed) B enjam in Constant.De la liberte chez les modernes, Paris: Librair ie Generale de Fran ce,Co llection Pluriel , 19 80 .

"Castoriadis has dis tinguished between f irs t-order and second-orderinsti tutions. S ee The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 371. See a l so"The First Insti tution of Soc iety and Sec ond -Orde r Insti tutions" (19 85),Free Associations, 12 (1988) , pp . 39 -51 .

"Corne l ius C astor iadis , The Imaginary Institution, p. 373.

34Co rnelius C astoriadis , Power, Politics, Autonomy, p. 173.35 Jurgen Habermas , The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.

Twelve Lectures, p. 333.36Co rnelius C astoriadis, The Imaginary Institution, pp . 366 -67 ."Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Greek Polls and the Creation of

D emocracy" (1983), Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, p. 112.p . 111 (emphas i s added) .

"'Cornelius Castoriadis, Radical Imagination and the Social Institut-

ing Im aginary , p. 142.

°Cornel ius Castor iadis , The Imaginary Institution, p . 364 .41Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Crisis of Culture and the State"

(1987), Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, p. 222.

42Cornelius C astor iadis , "Intellectuals and H is tory" (19 87), Philos-ophy , Politics, A utonom y, p. 4. The elem ents of deliberation an d rat ionaldebate can be foun d in Ca storiadis 's early Marxist writ ings, wh ere he




discusses the proce dural mecha nisms of decision-making in the workers 'cou nci ls . The cou nci ls are general assemblies that permit "a con fronta-tion of views and an elaboration of informed political opinions .

[where] preliminary ch ecking , clarif ication, and elabo ration of the factsare almost always necessary before any m eaningful decision can be mad e.To ask the people as a whole to voice their opinions without suchpreparation wou ld often be a mystification and a negation of dem ocracy.There mu st be a f ramew ork for d iscuss ing problems an d submit tingthem to pop ular dec is ion ." "O n the C ontent of So cia li sm II" (19 57) ,Political and Social Writings, Vol. II, p . 1 4 0 .

Co rnelius Castoriadis , The Greek Polis, p.113.44Cornet ius C astor iadis , "The `En d' of Phi losophy ?" (19 88), Philos-

ophy, Politics, Autonomy, p. 22.

°Cornelius Castoriadis, Power, Politics, Autonomy, p . 1 6 9 .C ornel ius Castor iadis, "Dem ocracy as Procedure and D emocracy

as Regime" (1991), Constellations, Vol. 4:1 (April 1997), pp. 14-16.

47Agnes Heller, With Castoriadis to Aristotle; From Aristotle to

Kant; From Kant to Us, p. 170 . See also from the same author A Theory

of History in Fragments, p . 19 5 .°Cornelius Castoriadis, Power, Politics, Autonomy, p . 170 .°Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Ethicists' New Clothes" (1993),

World in Fragments, pp. 108-122."Cornelius Castoriadis, The Logic of Magmas and the Question of

Autonomy, p. 151 .51 An dreas K alyvas, "N orm an d C r it ique in C as toriadis 's Theory of

Autonomy, Constellations, forthcoming.52Co rnelius C astoriadis, Power, Politics, Autonomy, p . 170 .

p. 172.

54 C o m e l i u s Castoriadis, Radical Imagination and the Social Institut-

ing Imaginary, pp. 332-336.55 C orne l ius C as tor iadis , Individual, Society, Rationality, History,

p . 6 4 .56C o m e l i u s Castoriadis, Democracy as Procedure and Democracy as

Regime, pp. 14-16 .57C ornel ius Ca stor iadis , The Logic of Magmas and the Question

of Autonomy, p. 314 .58 Com elius C astoriadis , Democracy as Procedure and Democracy as

Regime, p . 11 .p. 6.

"In liberal states, Castoriadis argued, procedures are ostensibly

des igned and dep loyed so a s to p ro tec t , en t rench , and reproduce pa r -t icula r s t ruc tures of do mina t ion. Ins tead of ch a l lenging asymm etr ica lpow er re la t ions, ra ther they perfect them , mak ing them ade quate to thenew needs of capital accumulation and private profit. In contrast, ademo cra t ic , autonom ous soc ie ty is the on e tha t wi ll openly propo se adifferent se t of procedural ar rangem ents approp r ia te for the con sol ida-




t ion of a dem ocratic identi ty through th e effective part ic ipation of thecitizens in the insti tution o f society. Ibid. , pp. 8-11.

elibid., p. 9.62Co rnelius C astoriadis, The Ethicists' New Clothes, p. 111 .

"Cornelius Castoriadis, Dem ocracy as Proced ure and Dem ocracy asRegime, p. 15.

"There a re som e s t r ik ing s imila r i ties be tween C as tor iadis 's w orkand the crit ical tradit ion o f the Frankfurt Sch oo l. Their exploration willrequire a s tudy of i ts own. Su ff ice i t to say, howe ver, that these p ointsof enco unter no t only could in i t ia te a fe r t ile d ia logu e amo ng tw o dif -ferent currents of thou ght that was abrupt ly interrupted by H abermas 'sunjus t i f ied a ssaul t on C as tor iadis but , mo st impor tant ly , could revivethe no w d eclining cri t ical t radit ion . For a f irs t gl imp se, the rea der can

consul t "Psychoanalysis and Phi losophy," The Castoriadis Reader and"Psycho ana lys is and Pol i tics ," World in Fragments. Joel W hi tebookrepresents an except ion to th is ru le . He has p erce ived and recog nizedthe importance of Castoriadis's concept of the imaginary given the"uspe nsion of the utop ian mo tif in cr i tical theory ." See h is Perversionand Utopia. A S tudy in Psy choanaly sis and Critical T heory, Cambridge,MA: The MIT Press, 1995.


kalyvas on castoriadis

Documents

political thought of

political thought consistsin

instauration of new

clear political meaning

thelimits of inherited

seminal concept

instituted society

numerous occasions