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JWBK003-FM JWBK003-Keasey January 7, 2005 18:14 Char Count= 0

Corporate GovernanceAccountability, Enterprise and

International Comparisons

Edited by

Kevin KeaseySteve Thompson

andMike Wright

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Innodata0470870311.jpg


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Corporate Governance

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Corporate GovernanceAccountability, Enterprise and

International Comparisons

Edited by

Kevin KeaseySteve Thompson

andMike Wright

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Copyright C© 2005 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester,West Sussex PO19 8SQ, England

Telephone (+44) 1243 779777

Except

Chapter 9: Governance and Strategic Leadership in Entrepreneurial Firms by C. Daily, P. McDougall, J. Covin andD. Dalton from Journal of Management, Vol. 28, Issue 3, June, pp. 387–412, 2002, reprinted with permission fromElsevier.

Chapter 11: Explaining Western Securities Markets by M. Roe from Corporate Governance and Firm Organization,edited by A. Grandori (2004), reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.

Chapter 12: International Corporate Governance by D.K. Denis and J.J. McConnell from Journal of Financial andQuantitative Analysis, 38, 1, March 2003, reprinted with permission from JFQA.

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Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Corporate governance : accountability, enterprise and international comparisons / [edited by] Kevin Keasey,Steve Thompson, and Mike Wright.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 0-470-87030-3 (Cloth : alk. paper)1. Corporate governance—Cross-cultural studies. 2. Corporations—Finance—Cross-cultural studies.

I. Keasey, Kevin. II. Thompson, Steve (R. S.) III. Wright, Mike, 1952–

HD2741.C775 2005338.6—dc22 2004023807

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 0-470-87030-3

Typeset in 10/12pt Times and Helvetica by TechBooks, New Delhi, IndiaPrinted and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, WiltshireThis book is printed on acid-free paper responsibly manufactured from sustainable forestry in which at least two treesare planted for each one used for paper production.

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Contents

About the contributors xi

1 Introduction 1Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson and Mike Wright

Introduction 1Alternative perspectives on corporate governance 2Background to corporate governance reform 4Governance reforms: the early days 5New perspectives from the 1990s 7The volume’s contents 8Notes 17References 18

2 The Development of Corporate Governance Codes in the UK 21Kevin Keasey, Helen Short and Mike Wright

Introduction 21Corporate governance in the UK – definitions and framework 22The evolution of policy recommendations – from Cadbury to Hampel 23The evolution of governance policy – from Combined Code I to Combined Code II 34Overview of policy evolution 40Conclusion 42Notes 42References 42

3 Financial Structure and Corporate Governance 45Robert Watson and Mahmoud Ezzamel

Introduction 45Capital structure and financial risk 48Does capital structure matter? 50The agency costs of debt 51Employees as residual claimants 56Notes 58References 59

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Contents

4 Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the UK 61Helen Short and Kevin Keasey

Introduction 61Institutional shareholdings in the UK 63General overview of the objectives and incentives of institutions 65The willingness and ability of institutions to intervene in the governance of

corporations 70Methods of intervention 80Governance by institutional shareholders: empirical evidence 84Summary and conclusions 90Notes 92References 93

5 Boards of Directors and the Role of Non-executive Directors in theGovernance of Corporations 97Mahmoud Ezzamel and Robert Watson

Introduction 97The corporate form, governance and the board of directors 99The UK’s governance by disclosure 104Conclusions 112Notes 112References 113

6 Executive Pay and UK Corporate Governance 117Alistair Bruce and Trevor Buck

Introduction 117Executive pay and corporate governance in the UK: an overview 119The empirical analysis of executive pay 120Executive pay evolution in the UK 123Performance indicator(s) 128Further discretionary elements in LTIP design 131Mix of remuneration components 132Disclosure 132Conclusions 133References 134

7 Compensation Committees and Executive Compensation:Evidence from Publicly Traded UK Firms 137Rocio Bonet and Martin J. Conyon

Introduction 137Compensation committees and executive pay 138Prior literature 140New data and results 144Discussion and conclusion 149

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Contents

Notes 151References 153

8 The Governance Role of Takeovers 155Noel O’Sullivan and Pauline Wong

Introduction 155Takeovers and company performance 156The likelihood of takeover success 158Post-acquisition performance 164Management turnover subsequent to takeover 171The consequences of takeover failure 172Conclusions 174References 176

9 Governance and Strategic Leadership in Entrepreneurial Firms 183Catherine M. Dalton, Patricia P. McDougall, Jeffrey G. Covin and Dan R. Dalton

Introduction 183Governance and strategic leadership do matter 185CEOs/Founders 186CEO duality 190Top management teams 191Boards of directors 193Venture capitalists 194Discussion: an opportunity lost 196Conclusion 199References 200

10 Corporate Governance: The Role of Venture Capitalists and Buy-outs 207Mike Wright, Steve Thompson and Andrew Burrows

Introduction 207Theoretical issues 208Empirical evidence 215Conclusions 227Notes 227References 228

11 Explaining Western Securities Markets 235Mark J. Roe

Introduction 235The argument: corporate law as propelling diffuse ownership 237Corporate law’s limits 239Data: political variables as the strongest predictor of ownership separation 243Conclusion: politics and corporate law as explanations for securities markets 246Notes 247References 248

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Contents

12 International Corporate Governance 251Diane K. Denis and John J. McConnell

Introduction 251First generation international corporate governance research 255Second generation international corporate governance research 267Convergence in corporate governance systems 272Conclusion and directions for future research 275Notes 277References 278

13 Corporate Governance in Germany 285Marc Goergen, Miguel C. Manjon and Luc Renneboog

Introduction 285Ownership and control 286Internal corporate governance mechanisms 303External corporate governance mechanisms 306The recent evolution of corporate governance regulation and stock exchange

structures 311Conclusion 315Notes 316References 319

14 Network Opportunities and Constraints in Japan’s Banking Industry:A Social Exchange Perspective on Governance 327William P. Wan, Robert E. Hoskisson, Hicheon Kim and Daphne Yiu

Introduction 327Japan’s main bank system 329A social exchange approach to Japan’s banking networks 331Opportunities and constraints in Japan’s banking networks 333Implications and conclusion 343Notes 347References 347

15 Analysing Change in Corporate Governance: The Example of France 351Mary O’Sullivan

Introduction 351Understanding systems of corporate governance 353The ownership and financing of French corporations 355Implications for French corporate governance 369The role of structure in corporate governance 378Conclusion 384Notes 384References 385

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Contents

16 Ownership and Control of Chinese Public Corporations: A State-dominatedCorporate Governance System 389Guy S. Liu and Pei Sun

Introduction 389Overview of the Chinese corporate governance system 390Ultimate ownership, intermediate shareholding classes, and their relation

to corporate performance 393The evolution of ownership and control and its determinants 402Concluding remarks 409Notes 410References 412

17 Corporate Governance in Transition Economies 415Mike Wright, Trevor Buck and Igor Filatotchev

Introduction 415Corporate governance and differing privatisation approaches

in transition economies 416Corporate governance in transition economies 418Post-privatisation governance 423Studies of the effects of different ownership and governance forms 431Conclusions 438Notes 439References 440

Index 445

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About the contributors

Rocio BonetThe Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2000 Steinberg Hall Dietrich Hall,Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA

Rocio Bonet is a PhD candidate in the Management Department at the Wharton School of theUniversity of Pennsylvania. She received her MSc in Economics, Management and Financefrom the University Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona and her BA in Business Administration fromthe University of Zaragoza. She is interested in the study of corporate governance and inparticular in the study of boards of directors and the role of non-executive directors on theboard. Her research interests also include the study of human resource management withspecial focus on the importance of company characteristics in shaping career outcomes anddecisions of employees.

Alistair BruceNottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, The University of Nottingham,Nottingham, NG8 1BB, UK

Alistair Bruce is the Director of Nottingham University Business School and Professor ofDecision and Risk Analysis. His current research interests focus on decision making underuncertainty and in complex environments, market efficiency, and the analysis of executiveremuneration as an element in corporate governance regimes. He has published widely in theleading economics, management and decision-making journals.

Trevor BuckBusiness School, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU, UK

Trevor Buck is Professor of International Business at Loughborough University BusinessSchool. His main current research is international corporate governance and strategy, includinga project on executive pay involving comparisons between the UK, the US and Germany, witha £212 000 grant from the ESRC on executive pay and performance. Transition economies areanother strand of this governance research, covering governance and HRM strategies in Russia,Ukraine and China. Finally, international corporate governance is part of a business historyproject that involves applications of institutional theory and translation theories of innovation.Recent publications include the Academy of Management Journal and Journal of InternationalBusiness Studies.

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Andrew BurrowsNottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, The University of Nottingham,Nottingham, NG8 1BB, UK

Andrew Burrows is Director of the Centre for Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR).Previously, he worked in the high-performance composites industry, spending many years asa director of an SME. His research interests are private equity and venture capital, applied tothe management buy-out market in the UK and Europe, particularly public to private buy-outs,university spin-outs and SME funding and development. He has worked on a number of fundedresearch projects, had articles published in a number of corporate financial publications and isa regular conference speaker.

Martin J. ConyonThe Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2000 Steinberg Hall Dietrich Hall,Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA

Martin J. Conyon is currently a faculty member of the Wharton School, University ofPennsylvania. He has previously held posts at the Universities of Oxford and Warwick. Hisresearch and writing interests are in applied microeconomics, personnel economics, industrialorganisation and corporate governance. His research can be accessed at his web site: http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/conyon/ and SSRN Author page http://ssrn.com/author=222606.

Jeffrey G. CovinKelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701, USA

Jeffrey G. Covin is the Samuel and Pauline Glaubinger Professor of Entrepreneurship at theKelley School of Business, Indiana University. Professor Covin received his PhD in Organ-isation Studies and Strategic Planning from the University of Pittsburgh. He teaches in thefields of entrepreneurship, strategic management, and technology management. His currentresearch interests include the antecedents and consequences of corporate entrepreneurship,strategic processes and innovation mode choice, decision-making styles that promote firmperformance in various industry contexts, and competitive strategy among high-technologyfirms.

Catherine M. DaltonKelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701, USA

Catherine M. Dalton is the David H. Jacobs Chair of Strategic Management in the Kelley Schoolof Business, Indiana University. She also serves as Editor of Business Horizons, ResearchDirector of the Institute for Corporate Governance and Fellow in the Randall L. Tobias Centerfor Leadership Excellence. She received her PhD degree in Strategic Management from theKelley School of Business, as well as her MBA and BSBA degrees from Xavier University.Professor Dalton is an expert in corporate governance, and is widely published in a varietyof academic and practitioner outlets. She serves on the board of directors of Brightpoint,Inc., where she also serves as Chairperson of the Corporate Governance and NominatingCommittee.

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Dan R. DaltonKelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701, USA

Professor Dalton is widely published, with over 250 articles in corporate governance, businessstrategy, law, and ethics. Additionally, his work has been frequently featured in the businessand financial press including Business Week, Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Economist, Finan-cial Times, Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and theWashington Post. Professor Dalton regularly addresses public, corporate, and industry groupson corporate governance issues. Dan R. Dalton is the founding Director of the Institute forCorporate Governance and the Harold A. Poling Chair of Strategic Management in the KelleySchool of Business, Indiana University.

Diane K. DenisKrannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907,USA

Professor Denis is a 1981 MBA graduate of the Cranfield School of Management in the UKand a 1990 PhD graduate of the University of Michigan. She began her academic career atVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State University and has been on the Purdue faculty since1995. She has published numerous empirical corporate finance articles in top finance journals.Her current research areas include corporate governance, corporate diversification strategy, andmergers and acquisitions. She teaches corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, and inter-national finance, primarily at the MBA level, and is a Fellow of Purdue University’s TeachingAcademy.

Mahmoud EzzamelAccounting & Finance Division, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Colum Drive,Office T32, Cardiff, CF10 3EU, UK

Mahmoud Ezzamel, BCom and MCom (Alexandria, Egypt), PhD (Southampton) is CardiffProfessorial Fellow, prior to holding professorships at Aberystwyth, UMIST and ManchesterUniversities. He has published numerous papers in leading journals, including AdministrativeScience Quarterly, Academy of Management Journal, Accounting, Organizations and Society,Organization Studies, Journal of Management Studies, Accounting and Business Research,and Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. He has also written seven scholarly booksand one book of readings. His main research interests are in the areas of corporate governance,management accounting and accounting history.

Igor FilatotchevDepartment of Management, King’s College London, 150 Stamford Street, London,SE1 9NN, UK

Igor Filatotchev is Professor of International Strategic Management at King’s CollegeLondon. Before coming to King’s in 2004 he held various academic positions in the UK in-cluding Bradford University School of Management, Nottingham University Business School,and Birkbeck College (University of London). He earned his PhD in Economics from theInstitute of World Economy and International Relations (Moscow, the Russian Federation).His research interests include analysis of resource and strategy roles of corporate governance;corporate governance life-cycle; and a knowledge-based view on governance development

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in entrepreneurial firms. He has published extensively in the fields of corporate governanceand strategy in journals such as Academy of Management Journal, Academy of ManagementExecutive, Strategic Management Journal, California Management Review, and Journal ofInternational Business Studies.

Marc GoergenThe University of Sheffield School of Management, 9 Mappin Street, Sheffield, S1 4DT, UK

Marc Goergen has held posts at the Manchester School of Management (UMIST), theManchester School of Accounting & Finance (University of Manchester) and the Univer-sity of Reading. In 2005, he took up a chair in finance at the University of Sheffield School ofManagement. His research interests are corporate governance, initial public offerings, corpo-rate investment models and dividend policy. He has papers published in European FinancialManagement, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,and Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. He has also written two books on corporategovernance and has contributed chapters to several books. Marc is a fellow of the Interna-tional Institute of Corporate Governance and Accountability and a Research Associate of theEuropean Corporate Governance Institute.

Robert E. HoskissonArizona State University, W.P. Carey School of Business, Department of Management, MainCampus, PO Box 874006, Tempe, AZ 85287-4006, USA

Robert E. Hoskisson is a Professor and W.P. Carey Chair in the Department of Management atArizona State University. He received his PhD from the University of California-Irvine. Profes-sor Hoskisson’s research topics focus on corporate governance, acquisitions and divestitures,international diversification, privatisation and cooperative strategy. He teaches courses in cor-porate and international strategic management, cooperative strategy, and strategy consultingamong others. Professor Hoskisson has served on several editorial boards for such publicationsas Academy of Management Journal (including consulting editor and guest editor of a specialissue), Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Management (including associate editor),and Organization Science.

Kevin KeaseyLeeds University Business School, The University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK

Kevin Keasey is Professor of Finance and the Director of the International Institute of Bankingand Financial Services, Leeds University Business School, The University of Leeds. Kevinis an author of 10 books, monographs and edited volumes on small-firm finance, corporategovernance and financial markets, and is the author of over 75 refereed articles in leading inter-national journals. His research covers a range of disciplinary perspectives and methodologiesfrom the empirical to the experimental.

Hicheon KimKorea University Business School, 1, 5Ga Anam-Dong, Sungbuk-Gu, Seoul, 136-701, Korea

Hicheon Kim is an associate professor of management at Korea University Business School.He received his PhD from Texas A&M University. His research interests centre on diversifi-cation and restructuring, business groups, corporate venturing and innovation, and corporate

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governance. His work appears in journals including Strategic Management Journal, Academyof Management Journal, and Journal of Management.

Guy S. LiuDepartment of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH,UK

Dr Guy S. Liu obtained his PhD at Oxford University, and specialised in economics of industrywith a particular interest in China’s enterprise reform. He is a lecturer at Brunel University andProfessor of Sichuan University in China. He also lectures on Chinese economy and industryfor the visiting MBA/EMBA programme at Oxford University. His research papers have beenpublished widely in internationally leading journals such as Economic Journal, Journal ofIndustrial Economics, and Journal of Comparative Economics etc. He has been invited as aguest editor of a special issue on China’s economy and enterprise reform for a number of jour-nals including China Economic Review, Economics of Planning, and Corporate Governance –An International Review. He has also been involved in policy advisory work on Chinese en-terprise reform for both the British and Chinese governments. He is a regular commentator onChina’s economic affairs for the BBC and Free Asia.

John J. McConnellKrannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907,USA

John J. McConnell is the Emanuel T. Weiler Distinguished Professor of Management (Finance)at Purdue University. He received a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from Denison University, anMBA from the University of Pittsburgh, and a PhD from Purdue University. He has publishedextensively in the areas of corporate finance, stock and bond pricing, and derivatives. He wasawarded the Distinguished Scholar Award by the Eastern Finance Association in 2002. Hehas served as Associated Editor of Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial and QuantitativeAnalysis, Journal of Fixed Income, Financial Management, and AREUEA.

Patricia P. McDougallKelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701, USA

Patricia McDougall is the William L. Haeberle Professor of Entrepreneurship and the InterimAssociate Dean of Academics at Indiana University’s Kelley School of Business. Her ma-jor research interests include new venture strategies and accelerated internationalisation. Inrecognition of their pioneering role in the growing field of international entrepreneurship, sheand her co-author were presented the 2004 JIBS Decade Award for their article on the earlyinternationalisation of new ventures. The award is given to the article that has had the mostsignificant impact on international business research during the past decade.

Miguel C. ManjonDepartment of Economics, Rovira i Virgili University, Avda. Universitat-1, 43203 Reus(Tarragona), Spain

Miguel C. Manjon is Associate Professor at the Department of Economics, Rovira i VirgiliUniversity (Spain). He has also held visiting positions at the Netherlands Bureau for Eco-nomic Policy Analysis and the Universities of Warwick (UK) and Tilburg (the Netherlands).

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His research interests include corporate ownership, dividend policy and the econometrics ofcorporate governance. He has published in Applied Economics, European Journal of Law andEconomics, Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, Small Business Economics,and others.

Mary O’SullivanINSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau Cedex, France

Mary O’Sullivan is an Associate Professor of Strategy and Management at INSEAD. Shecompleted her undergraduate degree in 1988 at University College Dublin, then worked atMcKinsey & Co. in London prior to attending the Harvard Business School where she graduatedfrom the MBA programme in 1992. O’Sullivan subsequently joined the PhD programme inBusiness Economics at Harvard University and took up her appointment with INSEAD inJanuary 1997. In April 2000 she published a book entitled Contests for Corporate Controlwith Oxford University Press, which is a comparative-historical analysis of national systemsof corporate governance. Shortly afterwards she embarked on a major research project onvariety and change in the role of financial systems in national economies which is ongoing.She is spending the academic year 2004–2005 as a Visiting Associate Professor in the WhartonSchool at the University of Pennsylvania.

Noel O’SullivanBusiness School, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU, UK

Noel O’Sullivan is a Reader in Accounting at Loughborough University Business School.He has previously held positions as ABI Research Fellow at Nottingham University BusinessSchool and as an Account Executive with C.T. Bowring Insurance Brokers in London. Hismain research interest is corporate governance, especially the interrelationship between dif-ferent governance mechanisms. Recent and current research projects include: the governancerole of takeovers; the use and usefulness of non-executive directors; the holding of multipledirectorships by senior executives; governance in insurance companies; and the governancerole of auditing.

Luc RenneboogTilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

Luc Renneboog graduated from the Catholic University of Leuven with degrees in managementengineering (MSc) and in philosophy (BA), from the University of Chicago with an MBA,and from the London Business School with a PhD in financial economics. He is currentlyAssociate Professor of Finance at Tilburg University and a research fellow of the EuropeanCorporate Governance Institute (Brussels). He held appointments at the University of Leuvenand Oxford University, and visiting appointments at London Business School, European Uni-versity Institute (Florence), Venice University, CUNEF (Madrid) and HEC (Paris). He haspublished in Journal of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal ofBanking and Finance, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Cambridge Journal ofEconomics, European Financial Management, and others. His research interests are corporatefinance, corporate governance, dividend policy, insider trading, financial distress, and law andeconomics.

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Mark J. RoeHarvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA

Mark J. Roe teaches corporate law and corporate bankruptcy at Harvard Law School. Hewrote Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance(Princeton, 1994) and Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (Oxford, 2003). Hisrecent articles include Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harvard Law Review 588 (2003); Cor-porate Law’s Limits, 31 Journal of Legal Studies 233 (2002); Rents and their CorporateConsequences, 53 Stanford Law Review 1463 (2001); Political Preconditions to SeparatingOwnership from Corporate Control, 53 Stanford Law Review 539 (2000).

Helen ShortLeeds University Business School, The University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK

Dr Helen Short is a senior lecturer in accounting and finance at Leeds University BusinessSchool at the University of Leeds. Her main research interests are in the areas of corporategovernance in the UK, focusing particularly on the role of institutional shareholders and onthe relationships between ownership, corporate governance and firm performance.

Pei SunJudge Institute of Management, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB2 1AG, UK

Mr Pei Sun obtained his MPhil in economics at Cambridge University, and currently is a PhDcandidate in business economics at Judge Institute of Management of Cambridge University.His research interests include comparative corporate governance, corporate governance impacton firm strategy, and enterprise reform in transition and developing economies.

Steve ThompsonNottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, The University of Nottingham,Nottingham, NG8 1BB, UK

Steve Thompson is currently a professor in Nottingham University Business School, havingpreviously held positions in economics departments and business schools in the UK, the USand Ireland. He has published approximately 100 articles in economics and business journalsincluding Review of Economics and Statistics, European Economic Review, Journal of Mone-tary Economics, Economica, Journal of Industrial Economics, Strategic Management Journal,and Journal of Management. His corporate governance research currently concerns the impactof governance reforms on pay and tenure and the internationalisation of the managerial labourmarket.

William P. WanThunderbird, Global Business Department, 15249 59th Avenue, Glendale, AZ 85306-6000,USA

William P. Wan is an assistant professor of management at Thunderbird, the Garvin Schoolof International Management. He received his PhD from Texas A&M University. His currentresearch focuses on product and international diversification strategies, international corporategovernance, and institutional environments and firm strategies. His research articles appear in

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Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of InternationalBusiness Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, and Accounting,Organizations, and Society.

Robert WatsonDurham Business School, University of Durham, Mill Hill Lane, Durham City, DH1 3LB, UK

Robert Watson is currently a professor of Financial Management at the Durham BusinessSchool. Over the past 20 years, he has published many articles in both academic and practitionerjournals on a wide range of issues related to his research into various aspects of governanceand performance, for example remuneration committees and executive pay, utility regulation,stakeholder performance measures, corporate financing and corporate collapse.

Pauline WongNottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, The University of Nottingham,Nottingham, NG8 1BB, UK

Pauline Wong has held the positions of Director of Administration and Lecturer in Accountingand Finance at Nottingham University Business School. Previously, she was the Full-time MBAProgramme Manager at Warwick Business School. Her research interests are in the marketfor corporate control and corporate governance. She has worked on research projects fundedby Nuffield and the Office of Fair Trading and has published in such journals as Accountingand Business Research, Journal of Economic Surveys, and Journal of Business Finance andAccounting.

Mike WrightNottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, The University of Nottingham,Nottingham, NG8 1BB, UK

Mike Wright is Professor of Financial Studies and Director of the Centre for Management Buy-out Research at Nottingham University Business School. He is a visiting professor at INSEAD,Erasmus University and University of Siena and an editor of Journal of Management Studies.He is the author of over 25 books and more than 200 papers in academic journals in theareas of corporate governance and restructuring, venture capital, management buy-outs andentrepreneurship.

Daphne YiuDepartment of Management, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong

Professor Daphne Yiu is an assistant professor at the Department of Management of theFaculty of Business and Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong. She received herPhD from the University of Oklahoma. Her research interests lie in corporate diversificationand international strategies, corporate control and governance systems. Her current researchprojects study strategies and inner workings of business groups in China, as well as internationaldiversification strategies and corporate entrepreneurship in emerging economies.

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IntroductionKevin Keasey, Steve Thompson and Mike Wright

INTRODUCTION

Corporate governance, a term that scarcely existed before the 1990s, is now universally in-voked wherever business and finance are discussed.1 The subject has spawned consultancies,academic degrees, encyclopaedias, innumerable articles, conferences and speeches. Almost allthe OECD nations are currently revising their corporate governance practices or have recentlydone so (OECD, 2003), while the establishment of a viable corporate governance system hasbecome a priority objective for emergent economies from Latin America to China. In themidst of so much interest, the underlying issues of the subject are always in danger of beingswamped. Moreover, since ‘good governance’, like ‘fair trade’ and ‘free competition’, is anabstraction that commands near-universal respect but diverse interpretation, it has also becomethe destination board for a bandwagon carrying those who would, in fact, take the corporationin myriad directions.

Not merely does the term corporate governance carry different interpretations, its analysisalso involves diverse disciplines and approaches. For example, the behaviour of senior man-agers is variously constrained by legal, regulatory, financial, economic, social, psychologicaland political mechanisms which are themselves sometimes substitutes and sometimes com-plements. Academic researchers, predominantly coming from a single subject background,will typically explore the operation of merely a subset of these and then in the context of thepriorities of their own discipline. This inevitably means that research on the subject becomesBalkanised and less accessible.

The quantity and variety of material being produced on corporate governance has forcedus to be selective in compiling this volume. The book aims to bring together scholars from avariety of backgrounds, particularly accounting and finance, economics and management, topresent a series of overviews of recent research on issues within corporate governance and ongovernance developments within particular countries and institutional regimes. Coverage of thesubject has inevitably involved a trade-off between breadth and depth, and in largely restrictingourselves to these business disciplines we have been mindful of the need for coherence. Thisis not to say that other perspectives, perhaps drawing upon social sciences including politicsand sociology, would not have a valid contribution.

Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons. Edited by K. Keasey,S. Thompson and M. Wright. c© 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. ISBN 0-470-87030-3

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Since corporate governance carries such a wide variety of interpretations, it seems appro-priate to begin by setting out the approach generally adopted in the volume. Here it is assumedthat an effective system of corporate governance has two requirements, one micro and onemacro: at the micro level it needs to ensure that the firm, as a productive organisation, func-tions in pursuit of its objectives. Thus if we follow the traditional Anglo-American conceptionof the firm as a device to further the well-being of its owner–shareholders, good governance isa matter of ensuring that decisions are taken and implemented in pursuit of shareholder value.Importantly, this involves actions that reconcile the need to protect the downside risk to share-holders (that is, accountability of managers) as well as to encourage managers to take risks toincrease shareholder value (that is, encourage managers to act entrepreneurially (Keasey andWright, 1993)). If the purpose of the firm is modified, perhaps to accommodate the interests ofother ‘stakeholders’, including employees, suppliers etc., the objective changes but the needfor mechanisms to further this objective does not.

At the macro level corporate governance, in the words of Federal Reserve Chairman AlanGreenspan: ‘has evolved to more effectively promote the allocation of the nation’s savings toits most productive use’.2 Thus in financing corporate activity, whether through equity or debt,savings are channelled into productive activities, the return on which ultimately determinesnational prosperity. The recent US experience with Enron, WorldCom and other failures isa reminder that if failures at the firm level are sufficiently serious and/or widespread, therewill be a misallocation of funds in the short term and systemic consequences for longer-terminvestment if confidence is damaged.3 Similarly, a major problem for transition economies hasbeen to create governance systems which engender sufficient trust to allow private savers tosupply local entrepreneurs with their funds.4

ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATEGOVERNANCE

Whether success at the micro and macro levels is separable is itself very much part of thedebate. It reflects, in particular, the individual’s perception of the nature of governance and thedegree of confidence held in the efficiency and effectiveness of financial markets. We mightbroadly distinguish four perspectives in the governance debate: the principal–agent or financeperspective, the myopic market view, the stakeholder view and the abuse of executive powercritique.5

Those approaching corporate governance issues from a principal–agent or finance per-spective, following Jensen and Meckling (1976), see governance arrangements, including theapparatus of non-executive directors, shareholder voting etc., as devices that the suppliers offinance require to protect their interests in a world of imperfectly verifiable actions. Jensenand Meckling (1976) consider the case of a 100% owner–manager considering the sale ofan equity interest to outsiders. As the original owner’s share falls, so does the incentive toexert effort to generate shareholder wealth. In the absence of any controls on the owner–manager’s anticipated post-float behaviour, the issue price of outside equity would fall toreflect the corresponding threat to shareholder wealth. Therefore, with full anticipation ofthe consequences of the manager–shareholder relationship the total ex ante cost falls on thewould-be issuer of outside equity, that is, the owner–manager. This generates a correspond-ing incentive to introduce devices to control and monitor managerial behaviour – that is,

2


Introduction

to establish corporate governance arrangements – at least up to the point where themarginal cost of so doing equals the marginal benefit. On such a view, an efficient cap-ital market will generate effective governance arrangements without the need for externalintervention.

It follows that those adopting this principal–agent perspective tend to see unrestricted capitaland managerial labour (Fama, 1980) markets as the most effective checks on executive malper-formance. On such a view, well-functioning capital markets will tend to solve both the micro-level governance problem and, by directing funds to the use of those managers that appear tooffer the best risk–return combinations, ensure compatibility with the macro-level objectiveof efficient funds allocation.

Conversely, those who view the capital market as fundamentally flawed and myopic in itsconcern for short-term returns, argue that purely private bargaining between a firm’s ownersand the supplier of funds will not produce effective governance. On this view, a myopic stockmarket encourages managers to underinvest in long-term projects. Effectively a higher cost ofcapital is applied than is strictly economically justifiable, thus screening out many longer-terminvestments. This problem is intensified in environments where a hostile takeover threat – seebelow – further restricts managerial discretion.

Adherents to the myopic market position unlike, say, supporters of the stakeholder viewdo not necessarily question shareholder value maximisation as an objective. What they doconclude, however, is that in the presence of a myopic capital market there is likely to be amacro failure of corporate governance in that there will be systematic distortions of investmentin the economy to the detriment of long-run growth. On such a view insulating managers fromstock market pressures will also benefit shareholders in the longer term. Thus some myopicmarket critics would endorse the involvement of other stakeholders – for example, employees –in governance not necessarily to further the interests of the latter themselves, but where thesemight have interests that favoured long-term projects.6

Proponents of the stakeholder perspective contend that the traditional Anglo-Americanview of the firm’s objectives is too narrow and that it should be extended to embrace theinterests of other groups associated with the firm, including employees, community groupsetc. These stakeholders are considered to have interests that depend, in part, on the continuingdevelopment of the firm. Therefore, a governance process that offers no explicit voice to suchgroups is unlikely to take sufficient account of their interests. On this view, it is the firmobjective of unalloyed shareholder value-maximisation that leads primarily to a micro failureof governance arrangements.

Finally, there is a view that corporate governance reforms should be used to restrict, ifnot prevent, the pathologies that arise from the abuse of executive power. Supporters of sucha position may variously hold to shareholder value or stakeholder interests as the optimalobjective for the firm, but they suggest that the pursuit of any such objective may be flawedif dysfunctional behaviour by senior executives emerges. On such a view executives may beable to exploit situations that were simply unanticipated or even inconceivable at the time ofshare flotation. Governance arrangements can be created to reflect principles of transparency,representation and a division of responsibility, but there will be a need for a periodic reformof procedures to reflect evolving circumstances in the firms themselves. While the misuse ofpower by the CEO of firm A is primarily a micro failing, perhaps hurting firm A’s shareholders,bondholders, pensioners or employees, if the As are too big or too numerous the problemdevelops into a systemic macro one.

3



BACKGROUND TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCEREFORM

In the early 1990s much of the debate on corporate governance concerned the alleged weak-nesses of the Anglo-American corporate form (see Charkham, 1994). In economies such as theUSA and UK, with liquid stock markets in which the overwhelming proportion of shares wereheld by financial institutions, it was widely assumed that monitoring of managers would bedeficient. Shareholders, whose investments were held in diversified portfolios, were consideredto have weak incentives to involve themselves in information collection and participation incompany AGMs etc. Here the dominant strategy for individually dissatisfied investors was toutilise the opportunities generated by a liquid stock market and exit. In the face of diffusedshareholder power the divorce of ownership from control, long ago identified by Berle andMeans (1932), was assumed to be the norm. Managers thus had considerable discretion tofurther their own interests in ways that included diverting cashflow to preferred investments,often involving unnecessary diversification or the undertaking of entrenching activities, and ingiving themselves overly generous salary and bonus rewards.

While the takeover threat was always present for underperformers – and probably remainedquite potent for the more egregious examples – the takeover is a blunt and costly instrumentand the probability of being acquired falls with size. Indeed critics pointed to the high apparentfailure rate among takeovers to suggest that the market for corporate control was as much apart of the problem of inadequate monitoring as it was a solution.7 Value-destroying mergerswere interpreted as evidence of managers furthering their own aspirations for growth at theexpense of the shareholders. Furthermore, in the UK at least, a series of high-profile corporatefailures involving the apparent misuse of executive power by domineering CEOs such as RobertMaxwell and Asil Nadir pointed to the absence of effective checks and balances.

Nor did the Anglo-American corporate form escape criticism at the macro level. It waswidely noted by its supporters and critics alike that executives were ultimately constrained bythe ease of shareholder exit, employing the term of Hirschman (1970). Dissatisfied shareholderswould sell and if they did so in sufficiently large numbers the share price would fall and thefirm’s assets would ultimately become attractive to some rival group of managers who wouldthus bid for them, perhaps via a hostile takeover. Supporters saw this ‘market for corporatecontrol’ (Manne, 1965) as a key check on managerial malfeasance or incompetence. Criticscomplained it engendered perverse incentives. They pointed out that even a poorly performingtarget firm’s shareholders could usually expect some recompense for past underperformancevia a bid premium, thus further eroding their incentives to participate in the monitoring ofmanagement. The principal losers appeared to be the target’s senior management, many ofwhom would lose their jobs. Critics (for example, Charkham (1994)) argued that such a fear,coupled with perceived myopia in the capital market, encouraged a short-termist attitude in theAnglo-American corporate form. This was contrasted with lending-based systems such as thosein Japan and Germany, countries where stakeholder representation is also more pronouncedand where finance is typically supplied by a bank in a long-term relationship with its clientfirm.

Thus it was argued that in firms financed by debt and/or retained profits managers couldafford to take a longer-term perspective and invest in physical and human capital without day-to-day concerns about the consequences of share price falls. While this short-termist chargeremained highly contentious, not least because it implied serious capital market inefficiency,8

4


Introduction

it became quite influential. This was not least because its supporters could point to the superiorperformance of the German and Japanese economies in the 1970s and 1980s, in comparisonto the sluggish growth in the US and UK.

GOVERNANCE REFORMS: THE EARLY DAYS

The modern process of corporate governance reform can be said to have started in the UKwith the establishment of the Cadbury Committee (on the Financial Aspects of CorporateGovernance) in 1991. It was set up in response to three inter-related areas of concern in theexisting arrangements: first were anxieties over the use of ‘creative accounting’ devices, whichwere believed to be obfuscating the calculation of shareholder value (Whittington, 1993).Second were concerns over a string of corporate failures, particularly those associated withhigh-profile, domineering CEOs who were apparently able to conceal financial weaknessesthrough the opacity of their control mechanisms. Finally, there was a growing public unease overthe rapid growth of executive remuneration, especially an apparent failure to relate increasesmore strongly to firm performance (Keasey and Wright, 1993).

Cadbury’s recommendations, which are explored in detail by Keasey, Short and Wright inChapter 2, centred on ways to increase the accountability of executives. Thus the Committeeproposed a series of reforms designed to decentralise power within the firm and to increasethe role and independence of non-executive directors in the monitoring of executives. Theseincluded the splitting of the functions of chair and CEO and the establishment of a series ofmain board committees, to be dominated by non-executives, which would take responsibilityfor organising the audit function, executive remuneration and the nomination of future non-executive directors.

In the UK and elsewhere Cadbury has been followed by further moves to strengthen the in-direct voice of shareholders by enhancing further the role and independence of non-executives.There is a growing realisation that independence is compromised where directors remain in-postfor too long, spend too little time on their duties to understand the complexities of their firm’sactivities or where the executives remain in de facto control of non-executive appointments.Thus successive corporate governance reviews have introduced limited terms of appointment(Greenbury, 1995), redefined responsibilities and suggested still more independent recruitmentprocedures (Higgs, 2003).

Executive pay arrangements offer a particularly interesting proving ground for corporategovernance reforms. From Cadbury onwards, successive reformers have tried to increase thetransparency of the pay-setting process, distance it from the influence of affected executiveswhile generally looking for a pay determination process which strengthens the link betweenrewards and corporate performance. However, they have also had to accept that executive payremains a market price, determined by a managerial labour market where companies are incompetition for scarce talent. Therefore, harsh restrictions on the permissible provisions of amanagerial contract could restrict a company’s ability to hire international talent.

In institutional terms, Cadbury established the principle of a non-executive director-dominated remuneration committee, which would have access to outside pay consultants andbe accountable to the shareholders’ AGM. However, executive rewards continued to increasepost-Cadbury,9 often spectacularly. In the mid-1990s this was driven by option gains. Theuse of executive share options had spread from the US, to the UK and beyond in the 1980s.

5



This development was widely seen by contemporaries as a governance improvement in thatoptions directly tie the rewards of the manager to the well-being of the shareholders and hencemore closely align the interests of principal and agent.10 However, the bull market of themid-1990s generated option gains for all, even those whose companies did not appear to beparticularly successful. In the UK, particular media wrath was heaped on the ‘fat cat’ directorsof newly privatised utilities, for example regional water distributors, who were seen to enjoya very substantial growth in rewards over this period. These companies’ share price growthdid not appear to be indicative of especially good entrepreneurial management. Their primaryactivity was scarcely competitive: each was a monopoly supplier of an essential commod-ity at a generously regulated price and their newer activities were often wildly unsuccessfuldiversifications purchased with the shareholders’ money.

Thus in the UK at least executive stock options were widely seen as insufficiently discrimi-nating between well-run and mediocre firms. In a bull market almost everyone benefited; whilein a bear market options would soon become overpriced (‘out of the money’ or ‘underwater’)and irrelevant and need to be replaced by new option grants with a more generous strike price.Following another report (by Greenbury (1995)) the emphasis was moved to long-term in-centive plans (LTIPs) under which grants of shares (and/or cash) typically depend upon thebenchmarking of the firm’s performance against that of a sample of rivals over time. LTIPswere soon adopted and substantially displaced options. However, early attempts to assess theeffectiveness of LTIPs in aligning executive rewards more closely to firm performance (seeBruce and Buck, Chapter 6) suggest they have been largely unsuccessful.

In the US, where stock options have long been a major element of executive remuneration,concern has been less with the level of option gains but rather with the size of option grants.These anxieties intensified after the Enron debacle where, in 2000 immediately prior to thecorporation’s collapse, it emerged that executive option grants covered some 96m shares, or13% of common shares outstanding. This gave rise to two major concerns: first, that optionswere not being clearly expensed in the firm’s accounts and hence that they were made to appearto be a costless way of remunerating managers, rather than a dilution of shareholders’ equity.Second, it emerged in the Enron case that very large tranches of option grants may encourageearnings manipulation. It became apparent that the senior executives had strong incentivesto ramp up the share price prior to the exercise date for these major blocks of options. TheSarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) has directly addressed both issues.11

The corollary of paying for success is not rewarding failure. In addition to finding a satisfac-tory way of encouraging managers to boost firm performance, corporate governance reformershave been concerned to reduce the pay-offs to sacked managers. In the early 1990s pressurefor reform came from institutional investors under the leadership of Hermes Asset Manage-ment which wrote to the FTSE 100 announcing its intention to vote against the then typicalthree- year rolling contracts for executives. These contracts had the effect of ensuring thatany sacking was likely to involve extensive compensation. Greenbury (1995) endorsed theseconcerns and recommended that directors’ notice should not exceed one-year rolling. PIRC(2003) reports that the ‘immediate effect’ of the post-Greenbury best practice guidelines,supported by institutional lobbying, was a reduction in the length of the typical executivecontract to two years. The DTI green paper recently reported that notice periods have contin-ued to fall such that by 2002 some 80% of FTSE 350 executives were on a one-year rollingcontract.

A reduction in the notice period clearly has the effect of lowering the severance pay-off.However, there remains an issue about what compensation is appropriate for fired executives,

6


Introduction

some of whom will be losing jobs which may prove difficult to replace, for reasons beyond theircontrol. Two alternative approaches exist for determining compensation. Under a liquidateddamages arrangement the contract specifies a formula detailing compensation in the event oftermination by the company. By contrast, mitigation involves reducing severance pay in recog-nition of the outgoing manager’s opportunities for earnings prior to the completion of noticeand, more controversially, in recognition of any poor performance suffered by shareholders.Penalising failed managers strictly requires the use of mitigation, but appointing risk-averseindividuals to senior positions usually requires a contract that details compensation in the eventof termination and proving managerial failure in a court or employment tribunal is difficult andcostly. So reducing the rewards for failure has proved no less difficult for corporate governancereformers than linking rewards to success.

In matters of executive remuneration, as with other aspects of corporate governance, muchof the effort of reform has gone into the establishment of structures and procedures intended tofunction on the shareholders’ behalf. However, there are indications that increasing the directvoice of shareholders may be at least as effective. It was noted above that the initial pressurefor a reduction in the duration of management contracts, to facilitate the easier removal ofunderperforming incumbents, came from institutional investors. Since early 2003 shareholdersin the UK have been required to approve the remuneration committee report, detailing theremuneration packages of executive board members. The early results are indicative of highlevels of institutional participation, especially where generous liquidated damage provisionsare incorporated in the CEO package. Institutions have been traditionally viewed as unwillingto withhold support for the current board except where corporate performance is seriouslydefective. By contrast, the early votes on remuneration have shown a surprisingly high levelof opposition, with at least one high-profile package being rejected.12

NEW PERSPECTIVES FROM THE 1990s

Much of the process of corporate reform in the Anglo-American system has been concernedwith protecting the interests of outside shareholders whose diffuse holdings and reluctanceto become involved in monitoring leave them vulnerable to self-serving behaviour by execu-tives. In the 1990s interest in corporate governance issues spread to other corporate systems.If the agency problems of the Anglo-American firm stem from maturity and capital marketdevelopment – that is, they generally arise when the equity holdings of the founding fami-lies have become diluted as ownership is dispersed and market liquidity permits easy exit –the problems encountered elsewhere are frequently those of immaturity and capital marketunderdevelopment.

The transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe faced a governance problem in theneed to provide protection for minority shareholders. If outside equity was to be subscribed,the potential investors needed to have confidence that the managers of the firm would notmisappropriate corporate assets. In the general absence of such confidence equity was perceivedto be unattractive and priced accordingly. In 1995 Shleifer (1997) estimated that the lack of anappropriate governance system in Russia left Russian private industry valued at under 5% of thelevel it would have reached under western governance arrangements. The consequences of suchan undervaluation included both severe underinvestment in the emergent private economy andthe widespread transfer of assets at unrealistic prices. Each of these had serious implicationsfor the longer term.

7



The financial crises of 1997–98 threatened countries in Asia and beyond that had becomeaccustomed to unprecedented growth. After years of double digit growth, economies such asMalaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Korea etc. suffered a severe shock as output fell and instabilitythreatened the corporate sector. Companies that had financed very rapid growth with highdebt obligations found these difficult to sustain in more straightened times. Furthermore, theproblem had systemic implications as corporate failure brought unpaid trade creditors whothemselves were pushed into failure and debtholders, including the principal banks, who wereleft looking at unserviced loans. That such financial contagion occurred so easily has beenattributed to both balance sheet weaknesses and a governance system that left huge discretionin the hands of senior executives. The latter could finance preferred growth from compliantbanks with minimal accountability to shareholders.

The third major change to the debate has been the change in the position of the Japaneseand German economies, whose economic growth record could be said to have gone from‘hero to zero’ over the period. In each case, the very absence of shareholder pressure that wasconsidered advantageous in insulating managers from the risks of short-termism is now widelyseen as contributing to a reluctance to restructure. Low growth is at least partially attributedto a system that protects managers from the need to exit from declining sectors. Close bank–company relationships that were once seen as the foundation of security are now blamed forscandals, corporate indebtedness and a financial system that is burdened with bad loans.

The result has been a convergence of Japanese and Anglo-American systems, if not in thedirection envisaged a decade ago. Since 2003 larger Japanese firms can opt for a US-stylegovernance system and almost one half has done so. Shareholder activism, both institutionaland private, has increased sharply with some pension funds taking the previously unthinkablestep of publicly exercising their votes against the incumbent managers. Since 1999, YoshiakiMurakami, a former MITI official, has run M&A Consulting as a hostile takeover specialist,13

in a complete reversal of the country’s former corporatist tradition. In addition, restructuringactivities typically associated with Anglo-American systems, notably leveraged managementbuy-outs, have also become a significant feature of the Japanese context (Wright et al., 2003).

A similar shift is apparent in Germany. Close bank–client relationships, underpinned bycross shareholdings, bank stewardship of proxy holdings and bank representation on the super-visory boards, have come under attack. Banks are moving away from long-term shareholdingsand looking to develop their more entrepreneurial investment banking arms. Shareholder voicehas been extended in numerous ways, together with the rights and responsibilities of the su-pervisory boards. Moreover, in an echo of earlier UK reforms the appointment, tenure, andaccountability of non-executive supervisory board members have been reformed with theintention of sharpening their scrutiny of the operating board.14 In both Japan and Germany,institutional and cultural factors, however, continue to constrain the wholesale shift to an Anglo-American system. In general, these institutional and cultural influences pose major questionsfor the diffusion and adoption of corporate governance mechanisms in different countries.

THE VOLUME’S CONTENTS

Reflecting the issues outlined in this Introduction, the chapters in this volume are essentiallydivided into three parts. The first part covering Chapters 2 to 7 reflects the development of thevarious aspects of corporate governance mechanisms, that is to say the development of cor-porate governance codes, the role of ownership, institutional shareholders, boards of directors

8


Introduction

and executive remuneration. The second part covering Chapters 8 to 10 deals with alternativearrangements to traditional internal governance mechanisms, notably the role of the market forcorporate control, the role of (entrepreneurial) leadership in conjunction with corporate gov-ernance mechanisms, and newer active forms of governance notably those involved in venturecapital firms and management buy-outs. The third part (Chapters 11 to 17) considers corporategovernance in different institutional environments, both in general and specifically in respectof Germany, Japan, France and transition economies.

Keasey, Short and Wright (Chapter 2) chart the development of corporate governance policyin the UK between the formation of the Cadbury Committee and the publication of the firstCombined Code in 1998, and then between the publication of the first and second CombinedCode in 2003 and to the present day. They provide an overview of the changing approach togovernance policy which has occurred since the publication of Cadbury Report (1992) andconsider how current government initiatives towards greater legislation may risk harming thebalance between accountability and business prosperity. They show that the developments inpolicy from the Cadbury Report to the Combined Code 1998 represented a shift from a narrowapproach which focused mainly on accountability, to a more balanced one that recognised theneed for governance systems to produce structures and incentives to allow business enterpriseto flourish. However, they go on to observe that recent government initiatives provide a sig-nal that governance policy in the UK may be about to undergo a fundamental change awayfrom self-regulation. They caution that while a self-regulatory system has previously beencriticised for failing to deliver improved corporate governance standards, there is a dangerthat increased regulation will simply lead to more ‘box-ticking’ by both companies and share-holders. Furthermore, they suggest that greater emphasis on legislation risks forcing particulargovernance structures on all companies, regardless of whether they are suitable for the partic-ular circumstances of the firm. A legislative approach risks changing the ‘comply or explain’ethos developed hitherto into a ‘comply or else’ stance which is likely to result in companiesadopting suboptimal governance structures simply to avoid the threat of sanctions from failingto comply. They note that it is important to remember that while corporate governance hascome to embrace those mechanisms and structures which act as a check on managerial self-serving behaviour, the purpose of doing so is to promote the efficient operation of the firm.Devices employed to improve accountability cannot be seen as efficient if they also hamperthe performance of the firm. ‘Good’ corporate governance, therefore, needs to refer to the mixof those devices, mechanisms and structures which provide control and accountability whilepromoting economic enterprise and corporate performance.

Watson and Ezzamel (Chapter 3) examine corporate financial structure decisions and someof their implications for corporate practitioners and stakeholders. More specifically, the chap-ter examines how a firm’s leverage may impact on firm value and the riskiness of differentstakeholders’ financial claims. In practice, how far the economic welfare of corporate stake-holders is significantly affected by corporate financial structure decisions depends on how fartheir financial claims are protected by legal, regulatory and governance arrangements typicallyavailable and utilised by stakeholders. This type of analysis suggests that, if the reliability offirms’ financial information disclosures is assured, most debtholders can normally be confident(assuming a degree of diligence) that their contractual claims can be adequately protected vialegal/contractual means. However, as emphasised by Watson and Ezzamel, firms are by theirnature risky and, therefore, any number of factors have the potential to produce unanticipatedbusiness outcomes that render the fulfilling of existing contractual promises excessively costly.The chapter then goes on to examine why a broader view of the firm (as compared to a nexus

9



of contracts and maximising the value of the firm from a shareholder perspective) might bemore fruitful; it concludes that fundamentally all stakeholders are dependent on managementmaximising the value of the company given their own specific objectives.

Short and Keasey (Chapter 4) address the abilities and incentives of institutional share-holders to enhance corporate governance in larger publicly quoted companies. The Cadbury,Greenbury, Hampel and Higgs reports have all stressed the importance of institutional investorsas a mechanism of corporate governance. This chapter identifies the objectives of institutionswith respect to their ownership and investment behaviour, examines their incentives in termsof management behaviour, and considers whether incentives can be altered such that a moreproactive corporate governance role can be achieved. The chapter concludes that although theperceived degree of institutional activism has increased in recent times, due largely to govern-ment pressure, there are many factors which act to provide incentives for institutions not toinvolve themselves in corporate governance issues. Institutions have few incentives to act on anindividual basis and their so-called short-termist attitudes are in part a rational response to themarket, institutional and corporate arrangements which have existed in the UK. In fact, inter-vention tends to occur only in cases of extreme underperformance by the investee companiesand if changes in corporate governance are to be brought about, fundamental changes in themarket and institutional arrangements in the UK will be required. However, in the present con-text it is not clear that increased intervention, especially as a response to government pressure,will significantly improve the situation because this may just end up as another ‘box-ticking’exercise with little real meaning or substance.

A key element of the corporate governance process is the operation of the board of directors.A number of factors, including several cases of management excesses and corporate collapses,led to major criticism of the UK’s unitary board structure in the 1990s. Ezzamel and Watson(Chapter 5) examine the duties and composition of the board of directors, with particular focuson the roles of non-executive directors in monitoring and disciplining senior executives. Theyoutline the role of the board in mitigating agency problems and review the literature relatingto the effectiveness of boards. Key themes to emerge from this literature, which is largely USbased, are that CEOs have typically played a central role in selecting non-executive directors(NEDs), that outsider-dominated boards enhance board independence and power over CEOsas well as improving performance, but may demotivate managers from taking decisions thatinvolve higher expected risks and associated higher returns, that NEDs are able to influencethe process of strategic choice and control, but that boards may not have sufficient informationor expertise compared to the CEO. Ezzamel and Watson point to the conflicts arising fromNEDs being required to wear two hats, that is to say, to monitor senior executives but at thesame time contribute as equal board members to the leadership of the company. They thenconsider how recent reforms of UK corporate governance regulation have served to alter theduties, objectives, composition and incentives of boards. They suggest that, while voluntarycodes have their limitations, the UK experience indicates that these are more adaptable andresponsive to problems arising from developments elsewhere in the corporate and financialworlds than would be possible with a formal legal code. They do, however, argue that therelative success of the UK’s approach to corporate governance compared to the US has beenaided by a large institutional base, fewer restrictions on shareholder voting rights and thefunctioning of the market for corporate control and less reliance on overly generous stockoptions granted to senior executives. These differences have meant that fewer UK CEOs havebeen able to develop the level of entrenchment and power over the board that is more evidentin the US.

10


Introduction

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of corporate governance relates to executive pay.Bruce and Buck (Chapter 6) provide an overview of the nature and anatomy of contemporaryexecutive pay in the UK and the significance of executive pay for corporate governance. Theyshow that the design of executive payment systems is influenced by a number of factors apartfrom the promotion of strong governance and that the firm’s payment regime is only one of anumber of mechanisms that the firm may seek to employ in assembling a robust governanceregime. They then go on to review the significant body of empirical work in this area. Third, theyfocus on the recent evolution of executive pay in the UK and in particular the emergence of theExecutive Stock Option (ESO) in the 1980s, its relative demise and the increasing popularityof the LTIP in the 1990s, and the current situation, where the coexistence of ESOs and LTIPsis commonplace among larger corporations. They note an increasing shift from the traditionalfocus on alignment of incentives in terms of returns to executives and shareholders, towardsa consideration of alignment in terms of attitudes to risk. This is an important developmentsince, while it is often assumed that the use of performance-contingent elements in aggregatepay serves to increase risk taking by eligible executives, newer evidence suggests the contrarymay be true with the use of ESOs often increasing the risk aversion of CEOs. They conclude,however, that the cases for and against UK executive pay packages remain unproven. Whilethere is some evidence that sensitivity between total share return and executive rewards hasbeen found, this sensitivity only explains a small proportion of total pay variance. Innovationslike LTIPs, designed to increase this sensitivity, do not seem to have made a spectacularimprovement, and firm size remains a more significant influence on executive pay, lendingsupport to the further tightening of the regulation of executive pay in the UK. They observethat while there has been a focus on ESOs, LTIPs, severance payments, perquisites and salary,a neglected aspect of remuneration relates to short-term bonuses which are subject to weakdisclosure requirements and possibly abuse. They also note that despite the extensive empiricalevidence on executive remuneration, there remain gaps in our understanding of the complexissues of causality in the relationship between pay and performance. They also suggest thatthere is a need for greater understanding of the process of executive remuneration setting interms of the relations between board representation, remuneration committee membership andnomination procedures for new directors.

Taking up this theme of the remuneration process, Bonet and Conyon (Chapter 7) examinethe effectiveness of the primary corporate institution that determines executive compensationin US and UK publicly traded firms, that is, the compensation (or remuneration) committee.They document the structure and ubiquity of compensation committees in the population ofUK publicly traded firms and show that most companies have remuneration committees, theirsize varies positively with market capitalisation, and that few companies have insiders on thesecommittees. They then go on to examine whether poorly constituted compensation committees,as measured by insider membership of this committee, result in agency costs. Based on apanel data sample of about 500 publicly traded firms, their analysis indicates that executivecompensation is higher when there is an insider (executive) present on the pay committee.Finally, their evaluation of prior academic research shows that self-interested behaviour andpay outcomes are more likely in the presence of poorly governed compensation committees.However, they note that the evidence is ambiguous. Some studies have failed to find evidenceof higher agency problems in the presence of insiders in the remuneration committee. Theysuggest that the advice of compensation consultants to the remuneration committee may beparticularly important in influencing the remuneration–performance relationship and warrantsfurther investigation.

11



Where internal governance does not adequately monitor the behaviour of managers,takeovers, and especially hostile bids, represent an important external governance mechanismwhereby shareholders can replace underperforming or opportunistic managers. O’Sullivan andWong (Chapter 8) review the evidence in relation to the underperformance of bid targets, thefailure of takeover bids, the role of bid defences and the behaviour of target management inthe context of takeovers, particularly concerning why managers resist some bids and acceptothers and the influence of internal governance characteristics on this decision. They findmixed and inconclusive evidence from both event and accounting studies regarding the linkbetween preacquisition performance and takeovers is mirrored in respect of accounting studies.They also show that when takeover targets are categorised between hostile and friendly, noconsistent performance differences are identified, suggesting that takeovers have a weak gov-ernance role. However, they point to recent research identifying higher rates of CEO turnoverin takeover targets showing weak pre-bid performance provides some support for takeovershaving a governance role. With respect to reaction to bids, evidence indicates that independentboards and active blockholders seek to ensure the maximisation of shareholder wealth in thetakeover process. Initial hostility to bids falling short of forcing abandonment can be a meansof increasing the bid price. When managers possess significant equity in the target company,takeovers are more likely to be friendly while managerial resistance is associated with lowownership levels, although high levels of managerial ownership may deter the disciplining ofentrenched managers. O’Sullivan and Wong note that the significant decline in hostile takeoverssince the mid-1990s may be the result of a general improvement in the internal governance ofcompanies. O’Sullivan and Wong also find that from the perspective of shareholders in targetcompanies, there is clear evidence of significant wealth gains arising from takeover bids. Thesegains appear to have been relatively consistent over the past three decades. There is emergingevidence that the size of shareholder gains may be greater where the takeover is financed bycash and where a bid is hostile especially in the presence of more independent boards. Boardsresisting takeovers appear to possess a greater proportion of non-executive members and suchresistance appears to result in greater bid premiums for shareholders. However, such board-oriented resistance does not impede the likelihood of bid success. The effects of takeovers onthe shareholders of bidding companies have produced inconclusive results but the impact ofspecific bid characteristics suggest that the announcements effects of cash-financed bids andbids resisted by target management may be more positive. Research on the post-bid perfor-mance of bidders suggests that bids have a negative impact on the long-run performance ofbidders. The majority of studies suggest that corporate efficiency does deteriorate in the yearsafter the acquisition. The main conclusions regarding top management turnover is that ratesof change after takeover are higher than either prior rates of turnover in targets or turnoverlevels in non-targets. There is some evidence that top management replacement is more likelysubsequent to hostile bids. The abandonment of a bid typically results in a revaluation of thetarget by investors that may persist for many years after the abandonment with the long-termprofitability of the targets improving. The successful defence of a takeover by managementdoes not appear to guarantee management’s own employment, the rate of management turnoverin abandoned targets appearing to exceed what might be expected in non-targets prior to thebid. Consequently, it appears that such bids also have an important governance role.

Corporate governance issues have typically been focused on large firms with diffuse own-ership. Filatotchev and Wright (2004) argue that they are also important for younger founder-managed firms, particularly for those reaching a point in their development when they beginto face constraints on their ability to realise growth opportunities. The agency-based corporate

12


Introduction

governance lens may be applied to these threshold firms since it is at this point that issues arisesurrounding the pressures on founders to cede control if their firms are to grow. Yet, at the sametime these firms need to find the resources and knowledge to enable them to grow. Corporategovernance may thus need to be viewed as a dynamic system that may change as firms evolveover these stages. The firm’s evolution is accompanied by changes in ownership structure,board composition, the degree of founder involvement etc. The balance of the accountabilityand enterprise roles of the various governance elements may change over this life-cycle fromestablishment, growth, maturity and decline. There is then a need to understand governanceissues in firms that are more entrepreneurial.

Dalton et al. (Chapter 9) consider these issues and in particular focus on the intersectionof governance and strategic leadership with firm performance. They find little evidence of apositive link between founders and firm financial performance, and also that research both onthe link between founder characteristics and firm performance and on the difference betweenfounders and non-founders is inconclusive. However, there appears to be a strong relationshipbetween founders’ strategic decisions and performance. Duality among publicly traded en-trepreneurial firms tends not to be related to firm performance but establishing an effectivelyfunctioning top management team is critical to the success of an entrepreneurial firm. Boardsof directors may also have an important role to play in entrepreneurial firms, where the founderis likely to be dominant and where there may be benefits from external oversight provided byan independently structured board. Studies have yielded inconsistent findings but do suggestthat board of director composition and size are important for firm financial performance andthat board composition is associated with the market’s response at the time of an IPO. Daltonet al. also note that studies of venture-backed firms do indicate that venture capitalists addvalue, yet how much and at what price remains to be determined.

This last issue provides a link to the focus of the chapter by Wright, Thompson and Burrows(Chapter 10) which examines the contribution of the mechanisms involved in venture capital in-vestments and leveraged management buy-outs to dealing with corporate governance problemsin a wide variety of enterprise types. Both venture capitalists and leveraged and managementbuy-out financiers represent developments in capital markets that address the governance prob-lems encountered therein. Both involve relationship investment with management, managerialcompensation oriented towards equity and likely severe penalties for underperformance. Theprincipal differences between them concern the nature of the relationship between investor andinvestee and that in investments by buy-out financiers most of the funding required to financean acquisition is through debt. Investments by venture capitalists, which may also involvebuy-outs as well as start-ups and development capital, make greater use of equity and quasi-equity. These differing relationships and financing instruments may be used to perform similarfunctions in different types of enterprise, so widening the applicability of the active investorconcept within the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. Wright et al. review theevidence relating to the effects of buy-outs and venture capital investment and show that suchchanges in the ownership and financial structure may yield large gains in shareholder valueand operating performance, but that both pre- and post-transactional governance problemsalso need to be addressed. They also suggest that the governance issues raised by buy-outsand venture capital investments have implications for the general corporate governance debate.First, they identify a need for a flexible approach to governance under which the forms adoptedtake account of specific factors such as the firm’s product market and life-cycle circumstances.This approach recognises a role for enhanced voice, even in the context of exit-dominatedcapital markets. Second, their review of evidence relating to the monitoring problems of active

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investors suggests that even in cases where they have a major incentive to exercise voice, theirability to do so may be constrained by both access to information, the nature of the relation-ship with the management of the firm being monitored and the effort–cost–reward trade-offinvolved in close involvement. Third, it is clear from the evidence on the longevity of bothbuy-out and venture capital investments that governance structures are not necessarily fixedover time. As enterprises develop they may need to change their governance structure if valuefor shareholders is to be optimised.

There is growing recognition that corporate governance may vary between countries. Roe(Chapter 11) provides the first of two chapters considering international differences by examin-ing the importance of corporate law, and in particular its ability to protect minority shareholders,in building securities markets and separating corporate ownership and control. Roe concludesthat studies that examine corporate law worldwide tend to overpredict its importance in theworld’s richest nations. In these countries, where contract can usually be enforced, it is typicallyfeasible to develop satisfactory corporate law. In such cases, if ownership and control havestill not separated widely, Roe suggests that other institutional arrangements (such as productcompetition, tax laws, incentive compensation etc.) probably explain the situati

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