Experiencing institutionalization:the development of new budgets

in the UK devolved bodiesMahmoud Ezzamel

Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, UK

Noel HyndmanQueen’s University, Belfast, Northern Ireland

Age JohnsenOslo University College, Oslo, Norway

Irvine LapsleyThe University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, and

June PallotUniversity of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

Abstract

Purpose – This paper aims to examine an early stage of the institutionalization of accountingpractices in devolved UK governments, concentrating on: the construction by devolved bodies of a“rational” set of planning and budgeting documents; the extent of homogeneity/heterogeneity inorganizational response to seemingly similar institutional pressures; and politicians’ cognition ofaccounting numbers.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses neo-institutional theory to examine the planningand budgeting documents of the devolved bodies and material gathered from semi-structuredinterviews.

Findings – The findings point to a process of nested translations, from mission through aims andobjectives to targets, with accounting numbers present only in the last stage whereby time-boundedtargets are formulated and used to assess achievements. Because of the negotiations around thediverging interests of actors, the translation process is neither linear nor stable.

Originality/value – The paper contributes to the literature by: examining the emergence and use ofnew accounting and budgeting systems in political organizations; understanding the experience ofinstitutionalization of accounting practices; and exploring the impact of accounting reform on politicaldeliberation and joined-up government.

Keywords Government, Accounting, Budgetary control, Organizations, Business planning,United Kingdom

Paper type Research paper

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at

www.emeraldinsight.com/0951-3574.htm

This paper is part of the “Devolution, Parliamentalism and Democratic Accountability: AComparative Study” project in the ESRC research program on “Devolution and ConstitutionalChange”. We acknowledge the ESRC and the Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) forfinancial support. We also acknowledge the assistance of Gary Martin and Simona Scarparo.Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the European Accounting Association Congress,Prague, May 2004, and the EIASM Public Sector Workshop, Oslo, October 2004. We are gratefulto two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. Professor June Pallot passed awayon Friday 5 November 2004.

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Received 1 December 2004Revised 27 September 2005

Accepted 22 March 2006

Accounting, Auditing &Accountability Journal

Vol. 20 No. 1, 2007pp. 11-40

q Emerald Group Publishing Limited0951-3574

DOI 10.1108/09513570710731191

Although the process of devolution in the UK has a long history of at least 120 years(Bogdanor, 1999), it was not until the election of the Labour Government of 1997 that amajor devolution program was enacted as part of its political reform agenda. Followingreferendums in 1997 (Scotland,Wales) and 1998 (Northern Ireland), support for devolutionwas expressed by the electorate, to a stronger degree in Scotland and Northern Irelandand a much weaker degree in Wales. Scotland was granted a Parliament with tax raisingpowers and Northern Ireland and Wales were granted Assemblies with no such taxraising powers, and all began to function in 1999. This recent experience of devolution inthe UK is part of an international trend that varies in the extent of devolution, for examplefrom the highly consensual model of Norway at one extreme to the much more centralizedmodel of New Zealand at the other extreme (Ezzamel et al., 2004); hence, the implicationsof these developments go far beyond the UK.

The focus of this study is upon devolved governments within the UK, specifically inNorthern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The devolution process has proponents whoadvocate devolution because of the benefits of redrawing political territories (takingpolitical processes closer to local communities, increased transparency andaccountability for activities to local electorates) – a renewal of democracy (Jeffery,2006). Opponents of devolution see this development as a weakening of the politicalunion between England, Northern Ireland, Scotland andWales, with no obvious benefitfor the economy or public services. There are numerous strands to the above scenarios.In this paper we focus on whether a renewal of democracy (in the shape of moreresponsive political bodies to local needs, greater transparency of the funding andmanagement of public services) is an outcome of the process of devolution, byexamining the development and use of budgets in the three devolved UK bodies.

One of the key changes that occurred as a result of political devolution in the UKwas that national governments became responsible for designing their planningactivities in the areas for which they held power, in the main health, education,housing, local government and the economy. Each local government receives an annualallocation of funds from the Chancellor, using the Barnet Formula (largely based onheadcount), which is then allocated by devolved administrations to their particularpriorities. Hence, devolution has led to a new discontinuity in which each NationalGovernment now engages in a full budget cycle involving the preparation andmonitoring of its own budgets and supportive documentations.

This development creates an opportunity to examine budget construction and theplanning and budgetary process as a novel experience in national government. Wedevelop our research questions more fully following our theoretical framing. For now,suffice it to say that our concern is to understand how new accounting and budgetingpractices emerge and unfold in organizations. Our focus is of a micro nature; this isintended as a contribution to the accounting literature that adopts institutionalsociology as a theoretical framework where researchers have bemoaned the lack ofsufficient studies of micro-organizational practices (Hirsh and Lounsbury, 1997; Hirsh,1997). Our study is also a study of accounting and budgeting practices in newly createdorganizations, thereby offering the potential to contribute to our understanding of hownovel practices may begin to sediment and become institutionalized. As green-fieldsites, understanding the construction and functioning of accounting and budgetingsystems in these newly devolved institutions offers a contrast with studies of

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organizational change in older organizations that have been the subject of previousinstitutionalization processes.

Each of the new devolved institutions includes accountability among its keyfounding principles, and has similar arrangements aimed at its enactment. They allhave an executive (or cabinet), made up of ministers of the ruling party (or parties),responsible for drawing up a programme for government and a related budget. The fullParliament/Assemblies exercise their role of scrutiny of the executive through thedebating, in plenary sessions, of the legislative programme. Committees have powersto scrutinize the work of the executive. In Northern Ireland and Scotland, the financecommittee is responsible for addressing overall budget priorities and financialscrutiny. It is required to gather and consider the views of the subject committees andindividual members of the parliament, and to scrutinise the expenditure proposals ofthe executive. The results of the finance committee’s analysis inform the plenarydebate on the budget in the parliament. The executive should then take the outcome ofthe plenary debate into consideration in their financial plans. In contrast to NorthernIreland and Scotland, Wales does not have a finance committee. The budget proposalsare scrutinized by the individual subject committees, which are invited to provide theirviews on their spending priorities during the budget planning round, and to examineand comment on the draft budget. In addition, individual members of the devolvedinstitutions can hold the executive to account through oral and written parliamentaryquestions, and can ask for information in order to proceed with their enquiry.

The next section provides a brief overview of the relevant literature on planning andbudgeting in the public sector as a basis for the empirical work that is presented in thispaper. This is followed by a review of the thematic issues that influence each of thedevolved bodies’ overall planning documents (often referred to as programme forgovernment documents), and the extent of linkages between the mission and aims ofeach body, between aims and objectives, and between aims, objectives and targets withspecific reference to the education and health plans. The paper then examines the linksbetween each institution’s aims, objectives and spending plans, as expressed throughthe relevant budget documents and by our informants. The discussion and conclusionssections draw out the main implications of the paper and summarize the key findings.

Our findings point to a process of nested translations, from vision through aims andobjectives to targets, with accounting numbers absent in all but the last of these stages(where time-bounded and specific targets begin to be formulated and against whichachievements are compared). We argue that this process of translation is neither linearnor stable; as negotiating the diverging interests of human agency are brought to bearon the outcome of translation. We note the existence of certain key thematic similaritiesbut also differences in the planning and budgeting process of the three devolvedbodies, pointing simultaneously to the presence of both elements of isomorphism aswell as heterogeneity in the budgetary process. Finally, across all three devolvedbodies, most politicians encountered serious problems understanding budget contents,and tended to seek help by relying on others with financial expertise who effectivelybecame the gatekeepers to generating budget interpretations that most likely wouldhave impacted political debate.

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Theoretical framing, research questions and dataIn order to address the above research issues, we have drawn upon neo-institutionalsociology as a theoretical framework. Our interest in neo-institutional theory ismotivated by its focus upon the construction and functioning of knowledge and rulesystems (such as budgets) in organizations. As Scott (1995, p. 136) has noted: “Allorganizations are institutionalized organizations”. Organizations are sociallyconstituted and are subject to regulative pressures from constituencies such asgovernment and the public. They are also “the subject of institutionalized processesthat define what forms they can assume and how they may operate legitimately”(Scott, 1995, p. 136). Institutions are conventions that exhibit rule-like characteristicsthat operate between and within organization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).Organizational structures are assumed to embody the myths of institutionalenvironments more than the demands of their activities. As Meyer and Rowan(1977, pp. 343-344) have argued, such myths are “highly institutionalized, rationalizedand impersonal prescriptions” that specify in a rule-like manner avenues for pursuingsocial purposes that are subsequently constructed rationally as technical purposes.

Organizations operate within organizational fields that reflect similarcharacteristics such as product/service line or size, but also competitors, suppliers,distributors and owners (Fligstein, 1993). Organizational action is constrained to agreater or lesser extent by the actions of other organizations in the field, including thestate through its regulative power. As Fligstein (1993, p. 6) has observed,organizational fields are “the basic mechanisms of control of the externalenvironment available to managers and entrepreneurs”. Much of the extantliterature on institutional theory has tended to focus more upon practices that havealready become institutionalized; that is upon conformity, or isomorphism, toinstitutionalized myths and beliefs. Conformity with such myths/beliefs is assumed tobring the organization resources that are necessary to its survival and legitimacy.Hence, the main focus has been on explaining observed structural similarities betweenorganizations, and upon revealing which mode of isomorphic behaviour was pursued:coercive, normative and mimetic (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995).

Whilst earlier formulations of institutional sociology incorporated some limitingassumptions, these have been subsequently questioned and addressed: the presumeddecoupling of organizational external claims of pursuing rational practices, in order togain legitimacy, from internal operating systems (Mezias, 1990); failure to account forpower (Covaleski et al., 1993; Fligstein, 1993); and the unwarranted assumption thathuman agency is passive (Scott, 1991, 1995). These corrections have improvedconsiderably the attractiveness of institutional sociology. It is now recognized thatdeclared intentions and actual practices are not always decoupled; that power relationsare endemic in organizations; that agency is frequently proactive and that in the face ofpressure for conformity, organizations are capable of pursuing different responses tosimilar institutional isomorphic pressures. Yet there remains a major concern thatprevious research has given little attention to understanding processes oforganizational change as much of the previous work has focused upon practicesthat had already become institutionalized. The theory tells little of how new practicesunfold, how they gradually become institutionalized, and how, if at all, they displaceprevious practices. This concern has been raised by most recently by researchers who

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pointed to the lack of attention given to organizational micro-practices (Hirsch andLounsbury, 1997; Hirsch, 1997; Dacin et al., 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002).

Accounting and budgeting systems in organizations are institutionalized practices.Accounting and budgeting information are frequently susceptible to differinginterpretations depending upon the cognitions and interests of organizationalparticipants. Accounting and budgeting practices can be viewed as myths thatunderpin, sustain, and even form belief systems concerning ideals such as rationality,efficiency, effectiveness, and value for money. Meyer (1983, p. 235) has noted“Accounting structures are myths. . . they describe the organization as bounded andunified, as rational in technology, as well controlled and as attaining clear purposes”.Conformity to certain accounting and budgeting practices can endow an organizationwith external legitimacy by creating an impression that the organization is wellmanaged.

The myth of rationality has a powerful appeal particularly to government bodies(Meyer, 1986). Indeed, rationality has been one of the key guiding principles stated inUK government publications that relate to planning and control (e.g. HM Government,1982; HM Treasury, 1992; HM Government, 1999), and this is also reflected in thetraditional literature on accounting and budgeting in government; an argumentconsistent with the quest for legitimacy under institutional theory. Ansoff (1979) hassuggested that in pursuing their objectives, organizations need to follow a rationalmanagement approach in order to cope with environmental uncertainty. Further, it hasbeen suggested that there is a need for specific and quantifiable objectives to guideaction in the public sector towards ultimate goals (Drucker, 1980; Anthony and Young,1999). Johnsen (1999) also stressed the usefulness of ambiguity and decouplingassociated with rational management models when implementing and usingcontestable management control models such as performance measures. Further,Czarniawska-Jorges and Jacobsson (1989) have argued that public sector budgets are“rituals of reason”, and hence have a key role to play in constructing reason and orderin organizations. We will therefore examine the planning and budgetingdocumentations produced by the devolved bodies as statements of their declared, ifnot necessarily always practised, rational pronouncements.

Accounting as a technology of calculation converts qualities, such as social welfare,into quantities in terms of specific targets and performance indicators. This conversionof qualities into quantities renders them visible. Such visibility is a double edge sword;for while it plays into the hands of those wishing to claim credit for performance, suchas politicians, as they construct numbers that show them in favourable light; yet it alsorenders such numbers susceptible to verification by those who can generate alternativenumbers or place different interpretations on the same numbers. Further, whataccounting and budgeting systems fail to quantify can be made less visible, or eveninvisible, thereby escaping serious accountability (Morgan and Willmott, 1993).

Given this theoretical framing, we articulate our research questions as follows. First,we are concerned to examine the translation process through which vision and missionstatements issued by the UK devolved bodies are ultimately translated into budgetarytargets. Such a process of translation is intriguing, in that as translations cascadethrough different layers there is scope for agency and interest to impact on what isbeing translated (Latour, 1987). It is therefore relevant to examine the extent to whichbudget targets and vision statements issued by each devolved body are aligned with

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each other. Failure to achieve such alignment, if it becomes the subject of scrutiny inthe external environment, could threaten the legitimacy of devolved bodies. Second, theUK devolved bodies share some similarities but also exhibit many differences. Wewish to examine the extent to which thematic differences or similarities occurred in theconstruction of budgets. At the heart of this concern is the presence of political andinstitutional norms that impact on the budgetary process. Thus, within the context ofour theoretical framing, the question is: to what extent has the expected pressure forconformity in the face of similar institutional isomorphic pressures resulted in similarresponses. Third, we seek to explore the cognition of politicians concerning the degreeof their understanding of budgets and the impact of such an understanding on politicaldeliberations that take place in the relevant parliament/assembly and on politicalaccountability. This should offer insights concerning the extent to which differences inactor cognition and interest, as well as their position within the networks of power,impact upon the process of institutionalizing new accounting and budgeting practices.

Data collectionThe data we mobilize to address the research questions comprise two sources: theplanning and budgeting documents for each of the devolved bodies andsemi-structured interviews.

We treat planning and budgeting documents as important for a number of reasons.First, they are formal translations of declared institutional aspirations, and as suchtheir examination may reveal the political ambitions of the devolved bodies. Second, itis possible to discern from them the extent to which the targets and performancemeasures translated from vision statements map onto these statements. Third, indevolved assemblies/parliaments these documents are likely to be drawn uponextensively by politicians and lobby groups of different persuasions to deliberate andconduct debate on policy and to exercise public accountability. Differences in interestsand cognition may lead to differing understandings of such documents. Fourth, thetargets and performance measures contained in such documents tend to be theyardsticks against which both the aspirations of each devolved body and its success indelivering promises may be considered by the electorate, or when targets are missedhighlighted by opposition parties in political debate.

Further, 58 interviews were conducted (18 in Northern Ireland, 22 in Scotland, 18 inWales) with members of the Executive (cabinet ministers and civil servants, 17),members of Assembly/Parliament (28) and others (audit institutions, quangos, etc., 13).The interviews were conducted over a period of 24 months beginning in October 2002.Each interview lasted between one and one and a half hours, and all interviews weretape-recorded and transcribed. The interviewees were asked about: the budget andplanning documents, the quality of and frequency of the information received; the extentto which politicians experienced information overload; the extent to which budgets wereunderstood by politicians, and the degree to which accountability was exercised. Theplanning and budgeting documents and the interview transcripts were then analyzed inrelation to the key research issues identified earlier. In order to focus our analysis, weconcentrate on education and health as two areas that attracted much of the attention ofthe three devolved bodies. To preserve anonymity, we refer to our informants as PNI, PS,PW, and NPNI, NPS, NPW when referring to quotes from politicians (P) andnon-politicians (NP) from Northern Ireland (NI), Scotland (S) or Wales (W).

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Programme for government documentsThis section examines plans for education and health in each of the devolved bodies’overall planning documents. These plans and their detailed breakdown (see below) aredetermined by the executive and civil servants in each devolved body. First, weattempt to identify the degree of alignment between the individual visions (missions),aims and objectives of each devolved body for education and health. Second, someexamples of education and health objectives are matched with targets deemedimportant in the pursuit of achieving these objectives. Because of space limitations, werestrict our analysis of these documents to the first year of government in eachdevolved institution. Our argument is that the quest for gaining external legitimacymay be a driving force for each devolved institution to demonstrate an element ofinternal consistency that links visions (missions) to aims to objectives to targets. Wecall this series of alignments “nested translations” owing to the seemingly hierarchicaland logical nature of attempting to establish such an orderly link. We use the term“translations” to emphasize the understanding that any such linking processinadvertently involves a cognitive exercise by those involved in forging the link.

Northern IrelandThe Northern Ireland Executive – Programme for Government is presented as one thatpromotes open and accountable government. Given the communal conflict thatprevailed in the recent history of Northern Ireland, the stated mission is to secure apeaceful, cohesive, inclusive, prosperous, stable, just, society, learned and healthyfounded on the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, mutual trust, and theprotection of human rights, and promoting partnership, equality and mutual respect(Foreword, Northern Ireland Executive, 2001a).

Education and health: The above mission is translated into aims for the Executive:At the outset of both Investing in Education and Skills and Working for a HealthierPeople (Northern Ireland Executive, 2001), the topics are briefly introduced beforestating what the priorities for the Executive are. Attention is drawn to the central roleof education and training, “not only for their social impact, but also as major engines ofour economy” (Northern Ireland Executive, 2001, p. 14) by developing skill/knowledgeand gaining employment. The mission empahsizes: “the strong links between healthycitizens, healthy communities and a healthy economy within our society” (NorthernIreland Executive, 2001, p. 31), with the aim of reducing health inequalities, promotingpublic safety and healthy living.

In education, it is stated that while 57 percent of year 12 pupils achieved 5 þ GCSEs(General Certificate of Secondary Education) A* - C in 1999/2000, and this proportion hasbeen rising over time, it needs to rise still further, particularly for socially disadvantagedpupils where only 31 percent achieved 5 þ GCSE at A*-C. Similarly, while theproportion of pupils who do not achieve any GCSEs has dropped to 3.6 percent in1999/2000, with the aim to reduce it further, particularly among the less well off groupsfor whom the figure was 11 percent (Northern Ireland Executive, 2001, p. 42). It is alsoindicated that surveys showed “19 percent of the existing workforce with few or noformal qualifications, and 24 percent of adult population perform at the lowest levels ofliteracy, with commitment to taking action to tackle these problems”. In the case ofhealth, similar targets were stated, e.g. by 2003 to achieve a 20 percent reduction on the1996 level in the number of high and medium severity water pollution incidents, and to

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meet and maintain requirements for EU recognition of Northern Ireland’s low incident ofBSE. It is clear from the above, therefore, that numbers begin to dominate as translationsof mission, aims and objectives into seemingly precise targets.

The style of presentation combines both narrative and descriptive prose allied withtime-bounded, specific targets[1]. For example, the Investing for Health Strategy Paperset a number of high level targets for health improvement, showing awareness thathealth is influenced by a wide range of social, economic, and environmental factors andpolicies. The targets might include improving life expectancy for all while reducing thegap between the most deprived and the Northern Ireland average; promoting mentalhealth and emotional well-being; reducing injuries and deaths from accidents;promoting healthy diet and physical activity; and reducing the levels of respiratoryand heart disease exacerbated by air pollution.

The strategy to be implemented in each health area is intended to address the healthand well-being issues in the area (Northern Ireland Executive, 2001, p. 33); how issuessuch as healthy life style in schools can be harnessed to improve health (NorthernIreland Executive, 2001, p. 34); and time-bounded, specific courses of action that willassist in achieving the objectives needed to be reached under the priority, for examplethe health impact assessment introduced in April 2002. This varied presentationapproach allows for greater opportunity for demonstrating the anticipated effects ofcross-cutting policy implementation.

The above analysis shows the outcome of a process of nested translation, wherebymission is translated into aims, objectives, and quantitative targets against whichachievements are compared. We are inclined to assume that the linkages entailed inthis nested translation are intended to convey a rational, carefully planned politicalagenda for the people of NI.

ScotlandThe plans for the Scottish Executive are contained in, “Working together for Scotland –A Programme for Government” (Scottish Executive, 2001a) with the vision “making adifference for the people of Scotland”[2]. The document is intended to account of whatthe politicians have delivered against targets, showing commitment to improving thelives of the Scottish people through delivery of social justice, creation of opportunities,careful targeting of resources, meeting needs, and delivering better services. Theseplans are intended to be achieved through the cooperation of the Executive with othersocial partners in a “working together” mode.

Education and health: The education mission, “working together to give ourchildren the best start in life” (Scottish Executive, 2001a, section 2.4), was to beaccomplished by: ensuring that all children have access to early learning and qualitycare; promoting social justice; modernizing schools; raising standards and achievingexcellence; strengthening leadership in schools and rewarding professionalism inteaching. Under the aim of ensuring that all children have access to early learning andquality care, one objective is: “Having delivered a nursery place for every four-year-old,we will ensure a nursery place for every three-year-old whose parent wants it by 2002”(Scottish Executive, 2001a, section 3.4). This objective is then linked to an allied statusreport: “Achieved for four-year-olds (and) on track for three-year-olds: over 40,500 (68percent) in pre-school education in July 2000” (Scottish Executive, 2001a, section 3.4,and Table 1). For early support and improving schools, the following achievements

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were listed: increased spend on “Sure Start Scotland” with resources for 2001-2002reaching £19 million, reduced class sizes in primary one and two to 30 or less, providedmodern computers in schools, one for every nine secondary and 28 primary pupils andprovided two special increases in funding, totaling £48.9 million, specifically for books,equipment and repairs in schools. Targets include reducing class sizes in primary threeto 30 or less, and increasing the number of modern computers to one for every fivesecondary and every 7.5 primary pupils by 2002. The focus is therefore on themaximization of all children’s potential, with an emphasis on achievement, highstandards and teaching-focused approaches.

To achieve the health mission, “working together to build a healthy, caringScotland” (Scottish Executive, 2001a, section 2.6), key aims are stipulated to monitor,protect and improve people’s health, implement policies that address inequalities inhealth, prevent disease and prolong life and deliver modern, person-centred, primaryand community care services. This is premised on providing a modern, high quality,responsive and technology-driven NHS, working in partnership with patients toprovide services designed from the patient’s perspective. Examples of theachievements include, funding 110 more doctors and 210 more nurses andintroducing a fairer way of sharing NHS funds to address what are perceived to bethe needs of deprived and rural areas. Targets include building eight new hospitals onschedule, reducing patients wait for inpatient treatment from 12 to 9 months, launchingNHS24 to give round the clock access to health advice and services, and improving theway vulnerable people are cared for through the new Commission for the Regulation ofCare. Thus, the need to improve health and community care services are highlighted,and their operation is assumed to be secured through partnership between healthprofessionals and the community, and greater investment and actioning of NHS reformby increasing accountability and reducing bureaucracy.

In the above, a hierarchical nesting of translations is evident: achievements arereported by way of a broad mission statement, supported by a number of aims, with aset of objectives listed under each aim, and permeated by financial and non-financialmetrics. For each objective, a note on its status with regard to implementation is given.Each operational aspect deemed necessary for achieving the strategies is laid out interms of achievements and time-bounded targets:

. what the Executive has achieved in specific terms in each operational area; and

. what the Executive intends to do in the future to progress plans.

WalesIn the Plan for Wales 2001 (Welsh Executive, 2001a) the mission is offering a clearersense of direction for a modern Wales – its economy, its environment, its society, and acommitment to improving public services in schools and hospitals. The programme ofreform intended to achieve this is based on universal and comprehensive provision ofservices, community involvement, and support for those most in need (WelshExecutive, 2001a, section 1.1).

Education and health: Separate strategic plans for education and health have beendeveloped: The Learning Country (Welsh Executive, 2001b), and Improving Health inWales – A Plan for the NHS (Welsh Executive, 2001c). With regard to education theaim is: “to deliver better outcomes in schools, colleges, universities and work-basedtraining” (Welsh Executive, 2001b, p. 5). Moving on from the general to the specific, the

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documents stipulate that the Executive’s commitments are to be supported by a seriesof objectives. For example, the commitment to giving children a flying start has theobjective of ensuring “Early Years” education for all three-year-olds whose parentswant it. The commitment of having excellent schools and the highest expectations forchildren is linked to the objective of increasing the funding for school buildings (£100million a year for the next three years) to ensure progress to the 2010 target of allbuildings being in good physical condition.

Proceeding from commitments and objectives, greater specificity is introduced intothe planning process when time-bound, specific targets are announced. The specifictargets to be achieved by 2003/2004 were, no infant or junior classes have over 30pupils; 90 percent of classes to be of at least satisfactory standard and 50 percent to begood or very good; and that the number of 15 year olds leaving full-time educationwithout a recognized qualification to be cut by 25 percent from 1999 levels. In addition,it is anticipated that by 2010: over 75 percent of pupils finish compulsory educationattaining at least five GCSE A*-C or equivalent, with all remaining in education orgoing on to training opportunities in employment, and none leaving unqualified; thatno school is assessed as failing; none has less than 35 percent of pupils achieving fiveGCSE A*-C or equivalent; that all junior class sizes are below 25; 80 percent of pupilsachieve at the expected level at the end of Key Stage 4 (for children in years 10 and 11)in all subjects of the curriculum; and that at least 25 percent of 16–19 year olds attainthe Welsh Baccalaureate.

With regard to health similar nesting translations emerge. The aspiration is forreduction in variation in life expectancy between rich and poor, better health for all,where the elderly can live in their own homes, and equal opportunities for all children(Welsh Executive, 2001b, p. 8). In health targets to be achieved by 2003/2004 include:increase the number of doctors in training by 65 percent and the number of nurses intraining by 35 percent; ensure 90 percent of NHS estate complies with statutory healthand safety requirements, including fire safety; reduce overall waiting times, movecloser to levels that compare to the best; and achieve the maximum waiting times forinpatient treatment for the priority areas of cardiac surgery (12 months), cataractsurgery (four months) and orthopedics (18 months). With respect to 2010, targetsinclude: increase life expectancy and reduce death-rates from major and long-termillness, especially in most deprived communities; bring five-year survival-rates forserious cardiac disease and cancers far closer to the best in Europe; and bring infantmortality-rates far closer to the best in Europe, with the largest reduction in mostdeprived communities. As in the cases of NI and Scotland, the outcome of a process ofhierarchical nested translation emerges: from mission to aims to objectives to targetsagainst which achievements are compared.

AnalysisThere are common thematic factors in the executive programs of all three devolvedbodies. The visions all promise grand aspirations stated in terms of either providing apeaceful, cohesive and tolerant society (Northern Ireland), or making a difference to theelectorate (Scotland), or providing a clearer sense of direction to the nation (Wales).Such visions are understandably grandiose and broad, as politicians attempt to marktheir ambitions and woo the electorate. Ambiguity that arises out of such vision

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statements can be useful in building consensus and lubricating the functioning ofcoalition politics (Downs, 1957; Baier et al., 1963).

A process of nested translation seems to be at work in all three cases, proceedingfrom mission through aims, objectives, and targets, to achievements and back tovision. The level of detail and specificity gradually increases with the move from visiononwards, and gradually accounting and, as we argue later, budgeting numbers beginto intervene, in the form of quantifiable, financial and non-financial, performancemeasures and achievements. A demonstrably clear link of such nesting translation canbe argued to endow the process of government with visibility and external legitimacy.Such a hierarchical nesting translation can convey an illusion of rationality andpurposeful behaviour on the part of devolved bodies, which in turn could enhance theirlegitimacy and underpin their survival, as neo-institutional theory suggests (Meyerand Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995).

The intervention of numbers is not totally overwhelming; they are present in many,but by no means all, cases. Thus, other targets are expressed in terms of unstated, butpresumably known, European benchmarks such as “meet and maintain requirementsfor EU recognition of Northern Ireland’s low incidence of BSE”, or in even aspirationalterms such as providing an NHS service “attuned to the needs of the people” (Wales).Political targets, therefore, are not seen to be the preserve of either financial ornon-financial numbers; rather they are utterances of both the precise and theaspirational. However, it is clear from the above that numeric targets are an integralpart of political programmes. In Wales, there is stronger evidence of quantificationcompared to the other two bodies, an issue that is addressed later in our interviews.

The ambiguity of mission statements and the apparent precision of targets andachievements could be a double-edged sword. Ambiguity makes it possible for theexecutive of a political body to forge a link between some specific target orachievement and the broad mission. By the same token, detailed targets andachievements could be made to appear, say by opposition parties or lobby groups, to beinsufficient to meet the mission, since the numeric nature of targets and achievementscan immediately invite comparisons with the past and the aspirations for the future.Further, working back from targets and achievements towards objectives, aims andmission may prove problematical. Indeed, despite the key differences in the statedmission statements of the devolved bodies, it would be difficult to discern thesedifferences purely from an examination of targets and achievements.

This use of numbers in the programmes of the devolved bodies can be explained interms of the prevalence of a “measurement culture” and a mode of “managing by thenumbers” (Ezzamel et al., 1990), whereby trust is placed in numbers in the pursuit ofobjectivity (Porter, 1995) and external legitimacy. Numeric targets embody all whatnumbers imply. As Porter (1995, p. ix) has noted, numbers “summarize a multitude ofcomplex events and transactions.” Further, any “quantification is a technology ofdistance” (Porter, 1995, p. ix), whereby numbers are capable of being used to manage ata distance (Robson, 1992; Ezzamel, 2002). As quantifications, targets and performancemeasures have the aura of a number system that is highly structured, rule-bound, anduniform (McLeish, 1991; Ifrah, 1998).

Yet, it is important to recognize that many of the qualities of numbers’ systems,such as the targets in the devolved programmes, could be more apparent than real. AsPorter (1995, p. 5) notes: “Mapping mathematics onto the world is always difficult and

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problematical. Critics of quantification in the natural sciences as well as in social andhumanistic fields have often felt that reliance on numbers simply evades the deep andimportant issues.” Similarly, Boyle (2000), a populist writer, titled his book: TheTyranny of Num8ers: Why Counting Can’t Make Us Happy, with the number “8”displacing the letter “b” to signify the intrusion of numbers into every aspect ofcontemporary life. As the targets of the devolved bodies combine the precise, numericand the aspirational, it may be that there is a feeling that such a combination will bothguard against the “tyranny of numbers” by showing relatively less reliance upon themand ensuring that the “deep and important issues” are not evaded. The underlyingbelief that numbers can be the ultimate translations of missions, aims, and objectivesseems to be based more on faith than on knowledge of an inherent representationalability of numbers. A consideration of this process of translation continues below,where we reflect on the instability of translation and the possible use of budgets asmyths of rationality and rituals of reason.

Budgetary practices: education and healthIn this section we examine in some detail budget practices for education and health inthe three devolved bodies. We draw upon both formal budget documents andinterviews to examine how aims were translated into key objectives and then intospending plans as contained in the budget, and we also examine budget format(narrative vs. numbers), quality of information provided, information overload, andcognition of budget numbers by politicians and its impact on political deliberations.

Formal budget documentsUsing formal planning and budget documents we attempt to construct a map of aims,priorities and spending plans for education and health. It was possible to do that foreach of Northern Ireland and Scotland, but not for Wales due to the inability to makeconnections with the data available (see later). For illustrative purposes, and in theinterest of brevity, we only show the figures for Northern Ireland; this causes no loss ofinformation for although there are notable differences in the mission statements, aimsand objectives, of the devolved bodies, the connections we emphasize for NorthernIreland are very similar to those of Scotland.

Northern Ireland: In examining the three devolved budgets, we note manysimilarities but also some differences, particularly in the case of Wales. In the main,budget documents have tended to provide an overview of the main areas and drivers ofspending and what the spending will achieve (see Figures 1 and 2). In Northern Ireland,the aim of education (see Figure 1) is to provide for the highest possible standards andequal access of education and development to all young people (Northern IrelandExecutive, 2001, p. 30, Figure 1), and in health “to improve the health and well-being ofthe people of Northern Ireland” (Northern Ireland Executive, 2001, p. 42; Figure 2). Thisis followed by a number of central objectives concerning education and health, beforereviewing any figures. For example, under each objective heading listed in thepreamble, each spending category that supports the achievement of that objective isstated; then, for 2001-2002 and 2002-2003, amounts of expenditure are presented, bothwith regard to resource spending and capital spending (Figures 1 and 2). Theseamounts are then eventually built up into overall Departmental Expenditure Limits

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(DELs). Year on year percentage changes in allocations are also shown. Eachdepartment’s budget is then concluded by explanatory narrative; for example:

[. . .] total expenditure by the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety will riseby 9.7 percent to £2,527.7 million in 2002-2003. However, it is recognised that this includes atransfer of £19 million of social security expenditure from AME [Annually ManagedExpenditure] to DEL which provides no new spending power to the department. The planswill enable the department to maintain existing services and to make a meaningful responseto the rising costs of modern medicine. The plans, which take account of the Chancellor’spre-budget statement, will also enable some key service enhancements. Overall, the resourceswill be allocated across a broad range of services to have maximum impact on the health andwell being of the community (Northern Ireland Executive, 2001, p. 44).

Scotland: In Scotland, the amounts spent on education and health in the previous yearare disclosed and matched in the budget with some of the activities the money helpedfund (e.g. reduction in Primary 1-2 class sizes to 30 or below in education or 955,000operations in health). This is followed by the amounts earmarked for the coming year,again matched with the activities they are planned to fund, e.g. providing pre-schooleducation places for 100 percent of three-year-olds. The introductory section presentsthe planned spend in each function on education and health, along with some of the

Figure 1.Map of aim, objectives andspending plans relating to

education: NorthernIreland Executive

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planned funding activities, e.g. increasing spending in the modernization of schoolbuildings and equipment and improving services for cancer, heart disease and mentalillness. After the introductory sections the overall aims for education and health arestated.

The overall budget allocations for education are split from the one line of theintroduction to two lines, showing how money is allocated between schools andspending on children and young people. Responsibilities for school fundingarrangements are explained in terms of the role of each funding source (the ScottishExecutive, central government and local councils), with a detailed exposition of thefunctions of each education body (Scottish Executive, 2001b). This exercise is alsocarried out for spending on children and young people. After explaining the role of theExecutive in allocating specific grants, the Executive lays forth what they intend doingwith the money, in respect of the various categories covered by the education budget.This includes a mixture of target-based objectives, along with more generic, strategicoutlooks. The budget closes with a statement of principal objectives, along with datesby which they are due to be achieved.

The budget attempts to show how health is being improved and the objectives ofthe strategic plan to which the Executive is operating, along with a description of how

Figure 2.Map of aim, objectives andspending plans relating tohealth: Northern IrelandExecutive

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resources are utilized to meet these objectives. The budget breaks down healthspending across major categories showing health spending on a per capita basis acrossdifferent ages, thereby demonstrating the critical influence age has on demand forhealthcare services. Projections of the future effects of demographics on healthspending are presented. The budget specifies what the health budget money will buy,how the healthcare infrastructure operates in practice, how the healthcare agenda inScotland will be advanced and how future funding of the system is likely to beincreased. The document concludes with a statement of principal objectives and datesby which they are due to be achieved which differ, as in the case of education, from thekey priorities. Overall, the budget is a mix of the numeric and narrative, but with thenarrative being dominant.

Wales: Detailed information on education and health is provided in tabular formatin relation to Original Plan (previous year), Original Baseline (current year), TotalChanges (current year), New Plans (next year), Original Baseline (next year), TotalChanges (next year), and Indicative Plans for each of the next two years. Itemsaccounted for include the amount being funded, both for specific projects (where onefigure or expenditure group item is stated) and for particular institutions’ total runningcosts where line items are provided, for example the running costs for all healthauthorities/trusts (where revenue expenditures in budgets, revenue receipts in budgets,capital and provisions are stated). Provisions to cover the cost of most items ofdepreciation and cost of capital charges are classified as Annually ManagedExpenditure (AME) and ring fenced by the central UK Government Treasury for suchpurposes.

The budget is presented in a heavily quantitative format, set out in a spreadsheetwith no explanatory narrative sections. In contrast to the budgets of Northern Irelandand Scotland, this makes it difficult to see how it relates to the various plans andobjectives of the Executive, as laid out in the Plan for Wales (Welsh Executive, 2001a).We are unable to comment on the extent to which this bias towards greaterquantification in Wales is a product of a particular type of expertise in civil service.Alternatively, this may have been caused by the need for time to negotiate and settlepolicies in the coalition Executive of Labour and Liberals. However, we have asked ourinformants for some explanation of this phenomenon. One senior civil servant directlyinvolved in budget preparation justified the absence of narrative in the budget bynoting his preference for numbers because he perceived numbers to instill a sense ofcertainty not possible with narrative:

At the end of the day my job is to make sure that this all adds up, and the problem withnarrative is that it is subject to interpretation. It is the old story, if you get ten lawyers theycan interpret the narrative in ten different ways and that is no good to me. Numbers have thevirtue that you can’t argue against them. People need that certainty for forward planning andthe Permanent Secretary as the accounting officer needs that certainty because he isresponsible for the Assembly remaining within its budget year on year. So he is not going tobe interested in beautifully constructed but ultimately flaky narrative (NPW).

In this sense, narrative is construed as an unwanted noise that breeds uncertainty andambiguity, in contrast to numbers that are trusted for their presumed precision andcertainty. In the political climate of a newly devolved Assembly, much uncertaintyprevails, and “managing by the numbers” (Ezzamel et al., 1990) may be seen by someas a welcome relief and a means of uncertainty reduction/absorption (Galbraith, 1972).

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Such an explanation is also consistent with a neo-institutional theory understanding,whereby budget numbers are seen as manifestations of calculative rationality aimed atgaining external legitimacy (Meyer, 1986). However, alternative explanations of thelack of narrative in the Welsh budgets emerged, with another informant offeringtime-pressure as an explanation:

One of the difficulties we would have is: we are developing the narrative now, we arebeginning to use those strategic statements within the government at the moment. The realtest for that, in any budgetary process, comes down to the wire and there is a lot of intensenegotiation about the figures over months, and then weeks, and then days, as you get to theend. And all the minds are focused on the data, informed by the narrative earlier. Whether wewould have the time in any real budgetary process to reconnect the data to the narrative, thatwould be a challenge and certainly we don’t do that at the moment (NPW).

This justification only serves to emphasize the importance of numbers in the Welshbudgetary process; when time pressure becomes acute, what seems to get sacrificed isthe narrative as the supplement that is seemingly of marginal importance. As theminds become “focused on the data” the narrative is pushed to the side in the quest forconcluding negotiations and producing an agreed budget “on time”. It is interesting,however, why this supposed time pressure did not arise in the cases of NorthernIreland and Scotland. Given the novelty of the budgetary cycle across all threedevolved institutions, it may be that those in charge of preparing budgets exhibitedfundamentally different mindsets concerning preference for numbers versus narrative;such an explanation would be contrary to the traditional expectation ofneo-institutional theory of isomorphic conformity. In this case we would bewitnessing some heterogeneity in institutional response to similar pressures. This is anissue that could be explored more in future research.

The somewhat utilitarian and stark presentational style of the Welsh budget iscounteracted by the publication of “Partnership Agreement” produced by the coalitionExecutive made up of Labour (the party that in the first Assembly elections held thehighest number of seats but without sufficient majority to rule on its own) and theLiberal Democrats (who joined in the political coalition to govern Wales). Thisdocument, is the result of political compromise in that the policies in the Labourelection manifesto were revised to incorporate some of the policies to which the LiberalDemocrats were committed, and was used in the Executive’s budget planning round,thus permitting more meaningful interpretation of the budget figures. The document:

[. . .] is a narrative. . . it is one of the key reference points in the budget turn around processbecause it is commitment by Ministers, we have to ensure that resources have been allocatedto deliver the promises they made in the Partnership Agreement (NPW).

This document charts initiatives the Welsh Executive is responsible for underdepartmental remits, and whether or not they have been actioned and funded. It is splitup along departmental lines and looks specifically at initiatives/targets promised, whatwas promised in terms of plans anticipated, whether the initiative has been actionedand whether or not funding was provided. An example from the education and lifelonglearning section is: “We will fully fund training grants for new primary school teachersby increasing the total training budget to £8 million in 2001-2002 and £12 million in2002-03” (Welsh Executive, 2001d, p. 1) – this initiative is shown as being actioned andit is stated that provision is made for it in the baselines from 2001-2002. Hence, in order

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to gain a most basic understanding of the budget, the Partnership Agreement mustalso be read. However, even a careful reading of both documents is unhelpful inattempting to draw out linkages between objectives/priorities and spending plans. Forinstance, in the example just cited, monies associated with the initiative to fundtraining grants may be included in two different expenditure groups in the finalbudget, e.g. within “Initial Teacher Training Bursaries” or “Teacher Development andSupport”. Without clearer lines of demarcation, it is difficult to draw out anymeaningful linkages between planning and spending from the budget documents asthey are presently constituted. This lack of linkage between the two documents createsa space in which politicians could pursue specific activities in the name of a givenoverriding policy. This lack of clarity is in contrast to the thesis that forging clearerlinks in the various government documents is a means of securing external legitimacy.Explaining such an observation may require appeals to other explanations other thanthose provided by neo-institutional theory. Whether the emergence of this space wasthe result of a deliberate choice by the Executive or an unanticipated consequence ofpolitical negotiation and compromise is unclear to us. While this possibility would beof interest to examine, the nature of our study did not afford us the opportunity toexplore this issue in any detail.

Evident in the above is the intervention of accounting numbers as the translation ofpolitical missions, aims and objectives into seemingly precise targets against whichactual achievements are measured. The underlying assumption is that this process oftranslation is a means of producing a linear mapping of numbers onto missions andobjectives. Clearly, a linear translation is still likely to influence action as well as claimsto action. However, we suggest that what is missing in claims of linear translations isrecognition of at least two possibilities that are likely to render the translation processmore complex and its outcome more unstable. First, a linear, faithful translation wouldrequire accounting to possess a technology of quantification that can faithfully convertpolitical aspirations, missions and qualities into numbers. While it has frequently beenclaimed that accounting has played similar roles in a variety of organizational settingsover time, the limitations of accounting in securing an unambiguous and preciseoutcome have been widely discussed in the literature.

Second, even if accounting technology was capable of such a feat, the role of humanagency cannot be ignored. The budgetary process is frequently the locus ofnegotiations of both organizational and personal interests as actors struggle to attendto potentially conflicting priorities. As different actors seek to negotiate their intereststhrough the translation process, outcomes different to those originally anticipated arelikely to emerge (Latour, 1987). Moreover, in the political domain, politicians utterpromises and make announcements that, at least on occasion, may not necessarily maponto previous plans and hence result in unanticipated outcomes:

You have to understand the way the political mind works, in that what they see themselvesdoing is making a personal commitment to something. So they come and they are making aspeech to some important body and they want to express their commitment to reforms,education let’s say, and they and their advisors have put together some form of words whichare intended to express their wish to see Welsh schools achieving more and more, but it endsup coming out as “by 2006 all Welsh schools will achieve a minimum of so and so” (NPW).

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Information overload, budget cognition, and political deliberationNeo-institutional theory identifies cognition as a key concept in explainingorganizational behaviour. Cognition is impacted by several factors, including thebackground/training of an individual, the amount of information received, personalinterests, and ability to comprehend certain types of information received. Interest inaccessing/using information is also frequently intertwined with the ability tocomprehend and process information. In this section, we focus on information overloadand interest in/ability to understand budget information.

Information overload: Politicians complained that they often received too muchinformation and that providers of information tend to use a scattergun approach,disseminating everything to everyone regardless of individual interests. A differencebetween politicians and non-politicians on this issue focused on the reason why somuch information was being produced; politicians tending to see the responsibilitylying at the door of those distributing the information, while non-politicians viewedpoliticians’ compulsion with having everything that is available (regardless of theirability to use the information) as problematical:

I think the amount is extraordinary and I think there is no way that any living person couldcope with the amount of stuff that comes through (PNI).

As part of the annual budget process, I think that the Executive at the moment is producingabout 12 different documents over the year. Some of them are the size of a telephone directory.It is very difficult to know what to do with it. And the Parliament has been overwhelmed byfinancial information (NPS).

There is a huge amount of information that comes our way, huge quantities of documentationand that kind of thing that comes to the committee. Well, you spend a lot of hours reading.And you, of course, look at sometimes the executive summary and look at the mainrecommendations (PW).

Such complaints of information overload were typical in the three devolved bodies.Perception of overload may have been exacerbated by the difficulty most politicianshave experienced in understanding financial information (see below). It may also be ameans of responding to criticisms that politicians have failed to act upon detailedinformation made available to them, the excuse being that too much informationmilitates against the ability to consider all options given time constraints. In addition,it was stated that achieving equilibrium between the amount and level of detail ofinformation flowing between departments and members proved to be challenging.However, gradually confidence seems to be growing with interviewees suggesting thatmore appropriate, tailored information was being made available. Department officialsand civil servants are seen as crucial in reducing information load and guidingpoliticians:

The thing about the committees is that they are not really adequately resourced in terms ofstaff . . . . But again this is (information overload) when I think the servicing of the committeeshould help and say, “these are the issues, these are the things we think you should questionthe minister on, that you should question the witnesses on, the issues you should pick out topursue” (PW).

The question of whether or not sufficient information is provided to politicians has twodimensions. The first relates to the problem of information overload discussed above: if

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politicians are already overwhelmed with information, how could they cope with more?One non-politician from Scotland commented: “the capacity of Parliament and thecommittees to use the information is really very limited. They are demanding more, butwe don’t really see them making much use of it.” The second dimension relates to thedifficulty of reconciling members’ demands for information and departments’ ability toprovide relevant information. One informant illustrated this difficulty, while alsohinting at the emphasis on process:

The difficulty is if the balance is wrong. I feel for the department on this to a degree andprotocols are being developed on this all the time. But they have responded to the demands ofcommittees and they’re not sure some times what they should be providing or shouldn’t beproviding and then they’re castigated for not providing documents they would have thoughtthey wouldn’t have had to provide. So there is a focus on process on the part of members thatriles departments and they aren’t resourced to deal with it (NPNI).

In order to cope with the amount of information available, some participants expressedthe view that a discernment relating to the relevance of the information to their roleswas crucial. Effective mechanisms that ensured filtering and focusing on importantissues were identified as being needed. Interviewees were keen to stress, however, thatthe subject of information provision was one of learning and education. At the heart ofthis process, the relationship between politicians and departmental officials wasidentified as being important:

We’re getting information, but at times it’s not the right information, it’s not detailed enough,or perhaps it’s too detailed. And it is a learning process at the moment, as to what informationdo we need as an Assembly, within the committee structure, to do our job effectively (NPNI).

Budget cognition. Only a small number of politicians were either interested in or couldread and digest the budget; these tended to have either accounting/finance backgroundor extensive previous experience in the public sector. The vast majority of politiciansinterviewed said that the budget was something of a mystery, and this situation wasnot helped in the case of Wales because of the lack of budget narrative. Politicians whoconsidered themselves lacking in financial expertise tended to take a defensive postureby attributing the ability to understand budgets to the domain of the “genius”, or thosewith “a mathematical mind”, while presenting themselves as being better able to dealwith visual representations:

There are members of the Parliament who are interested in financial issues – may be10 percent. In fairness, most members are bored rigid by financial budgeting issues (PS).

To be quite frank I think for most of us it [the budget] is probably above our heads because Iam not a statistician and I am not a mathematical genius. And I think in many respects I am avisual person, charts, simple visual instruments. I can cope with those far better than lookingat spreadsheets (PW).

Similarly, another politician from the Welsh Assembly said: “I am pretty in-numerate,so I find the scrutiny of columns of statistics impossible.” Such cognition problemshave consequences, which could culminate in less than effective scrutiny andmonitoring of budgets. One politician, noting this difficulty, questioned whether or notthe Executive desired to be open:

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The financial grasp and the minutiae of the budget largely passes over the head of the electedmembers. It’s not to say we’re all stupid, it’s just to say that the accounting procedures andthe presentational aspects of it, the fine working of it, is not easily understood by thepoliticians. Now, is that deliberate or is every statement of that nature based like that? Ihaven’t made up my mind on that. One thinks that some may be blinded by science, butrather than admit to ignorance, they say wonderful, we’ll vote for that (PNI).

Such repeated emphasis by politicians upon their perceived lack of interest in, orability to comprehend, financial information is striking. Inability to understandfinancial information may in itself encourage politicians to treat financial informationas less relevant to their deliberations. Those who desired to mobilize financialinformation in their debate, and at the same time lacked the ability to understand suchinformation, tended to seek help either from their researchers or more likely from otherknowledgeable members of their party:

I don’t really mind who I go to, I will weigh up in my own mind how much credibility I wouldgive to other people’s comments. But I am sure that other members also go out and try to findother views (PW).

Much of the performance information in each devolved body is contained in the budgetand the budget reports. While there appeared to be some disagreement amongparticipants regarding their perception of the levels of performance information thatare produced, the vast majority were of the opinion that there was limited systematicdissemination of what was available. In addition, the flow and amount of performanceinformation were considered far from satisfactory:

[. . .] we only receive information on performance in briefings, when we actually search itout. . . Now, hitherto, I would have to say that it’s been a bit short. Quite what the reluctanceis; is it that it’s not available because the programme is relatively new or is it because theythink that the programme is addressing the problem but they’re not quite sure, and they don’twant to expose the fact that they’re pouring large sums of money into it without it havingproved itself? (PNI).

When it comes to finance and political debates, there is never enough information in detail onhow public money is allocated . . . It is very difficult, really, to get to the guts of manyquestions even with approval from the Treasury (PS).

[. . .] a lot of it [accounting information] is probably designed to keep us in the dark. There areall sorts of bold part figures, that is the right expression, circulating about, but you don’treally know what has been spent on what (PS).

With respect to performance information, there has been a focus on looking at inputsand activity levels, rather than this loop being completed by reviewing the associatedissues concerned with outcomes and customer services, but that this was changingbecause public bodies are:

Fabulous at firing arrows at walls, drawing targets around them and then saying it was abrilliant shot. The situation has now moved on to, there’s the target, now fire the arrow at it(NPNI).

Given politicians’ limited cognition of numbers, scrutiny (and accountability) is likelyto be diluted as it appears that little use is made of accounting information in politicaldeliberations. Politicians were perceived by non-politicians as being more concerned

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with how much money was being spent rather than with what it might achieve, andthat bids by non-ministerial politicians contained very little consideration of planningand performance issues. For example, one minister suggested that there was enoughtime to scrutinize but politicians were often more concerned with increasingdepartmental allocations than in looking at what particular levels of spending wouldachieve, a far cry from claims of rationality and efficiency that devolved bodies maywant to signal externally to enhance their legitimacy; this seems supportive of thenotion of decoupling suggested by neo-institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977;DiMaggio and Powell, 1991):

Is there sufficient total consideration to all that we’re doing? No . . . Everybody goes into theirown itsy, bitsy bit; there’s a lot of the bid chasing and there’s a lot of duplicity . . . It goes tocommittees and they go through the budget recommendations but, so far, in the main, whatcommittees have done is to come up with views on budgets that have mainly been saying wewant more money, we want the department we’re scrutinizing to get more money, it needsmore money for this, that and the other . . . So, they have been coming back with criticisms onthe inadequacies of allocations, rather than coming back with questions or challenges aboutthe strategic merits of the spending plans (PNI).

Others also felt that the process of scrutinizing the budget could miss the point ofensuring the delivery of public service as attention is focused on other priorities, orsimply members become obsessed with chasing the numbers:

What is it that people are coming to the table (to scrutinize the budget) to do? Are theyseeking to improve a service? Are they seeking to change priorities? Or are they simplylooking at numbers and saying, “well, if the numbers are alright, it must be OK”, and it isreally delivery of public service that we are here to deal with (PS).

Most devolved politicians had an extended experience in the public sector, asprofessionals; e.g. medics, previous members of Parliament at Westminster, orcouncilors, and some had previous extensive training in the accountancy profession.However, the vast majority of politicians in the devolved institutions were veryinexperienced in financial matters, and this has been cited as an explanation for theapparent limited use of financial information to inform political debate:

We have some inexperienced members here at the moment because we are developing apolitical culture. Financial information is in many cases central to political decision making,because it is about the amount of resources you apply and the value that you get from thoseresources . . . A lot of people here in the Assembly still don’t understand how important it canbe to ask questions, even written questions, just to elicit that information about the levels ofactual commitments and so on (PW).

A number of interviewees noted the newness of the devolution experience ascontributing to the limited exercise of accountability and expressed an expectation thatthings would evolve and improve through time. Evidence regarding how the budgetingprocess had changed since its inception was proffered to support this, including:putting in place changed structures to ensure more robust future scrutiny; andaddressing difficulties (e.g. a fairly tight timescale) identified by earlier pre-budgetreports.

The main themes of the above discussion are: significant information overload thatat the limit results in some politicians ignoring the contents of most reports and onlyreading the summary and recommendations; lack of interest by most politicians in

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financial numbers, and serious difficulty faced by them in reading and interpreting thenumbers. From a neo-institutional theory perspective, these observations have anumber of implications. The desire to demonstrate rationality to externalconstituencies in the quest for legitimacy places pressure on the devolved bodies todemonstrate that their members both understand and make appropriate use ofaccounting and budget information. If a decoupling of external signaling and actualuse is possible, as per the traditional thesis of neo-institutional theory (e.g. Meyer andRowan, 1977; Scott, 1995), then the above evidence would bear witness to thisdecoupling being a common theme across all devolved bodies. However, thisinterpretation assumes intention: actors can pursue rational behaviour but they choosenot to in pursuit of their interests. This models subjectivity as a proactive, rather than apassive construct (Covaleski et al., 1993; Scott, 1991, 1995). Parts of the evidence citedabove are certainly supportive of such a possibility; we have encountered claims byboth politicians and civil servants that some politicians are simply not interested inreading and using numbers. Thus, with their rule-like characteristics, budgets arepresented by devolved bodies as ideals of rationality, but beneath that veneer budgetsare no more than a myth in the process of being institutionalized. Given the prevalenceof the use of budgets in both the private and public sectors, creating a myth ofcompliance with such rational systems can endow devolved bodies with legitimacy.

Yet, we have argued earlier that while such an explanation has much appeal, wemust resist the temptation to take it for given as a deterministic explanation. Thenotion of complete decoupling between the declared and the practiced is problematical,to say the least. Our empirical evidence throws some useful light on this issue. Thisevidence suggests that a (small) number of politicians, because of their previousbackgrounds, not only have the necessary expertise to comprehend budgets but alsomake use of budget figures in their political debate. At least for this (small) group,decoupling does not hold. Further, our evidence suggests that at least some politicianswho lack expertise in financial matters seek the support of advisors, civil servants orcolleagues to gain some understanding of numbers. In this case, at the very least, thereis an attempt to engage with the budget, thereby rendering the notion of completedecoupling questionable. This latter possibility also admits another contingency to theanalysis; in so far as the advice given to the non-financially expert is likely to becoloured by the cognitions and interests of those who are providing help with theinterpretation.

Discussion and conclusionsIn this paper, we have examined the planning and budgeting documents of the threeUK devolved national governments and supplemented these texts withsemi-structured interviews. We have drawn upon neo-institutional theory to guideour collection and analysis of the data. Based on our theoretical framing, we haveidentified three key issues that form the basis of discussion in this section: nestingtranslations; homogeneities/heterogeneities in responding to institutional pressures,and number cognition and political deliberations.

Nesting translationsWe have argued that, under neo-institutional theory, devolved bodies could enhancetheir external legitimacy by demonstrating that a clear and logical set of linkages

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underpin all their planning and budgeting documents. We called this “nestingtranslations”. Although we did not examine the process of nested translations, we areable to comment on its outcome by examining publicly available documents affords usthe possibility to. From such an examination, it was evident that there was a “drillingdown” of translations. Our use of the term “nested” signals the interconnected nature ofthe various stages of translations, as each level is meant to follow from the one above itand lead to the one immediately following it. However, our analysis suggests that thisnesting process is non-linear. The planning process was originated in broad, strategicand visionary statements of declared intent on the part of the devolved administrations.Even as broad, visionary statements, such pronouncements differed considerably in theirdegree of specificity across the three devolved bodies. In Scotland, we encountered thebroadest of all three missions “making a difference for the people of Scotland”. In Wales,a somewhat more detailed mission is stated, one that emphasizes a modern society,including the economy, environment, with commitment to public services, in particularschools and hospitals. Finally, Northern Ireland has the longest mission statement, withexplicit emphasis upon peace, cohesion, inclusiveness, reconciliation and tolerance.Identifying what these broad missions mean is strongly dependent on the process oftranslation. It would appear that these mission statements in their diversity are born outof the specific historical settings of each devolved body. The most noticeable linking ofmission to history is in the case of Northern Ireland, where the desire to remove thedamaging effects of decades of violence between Catholics and Protestants is soprominent. In Scotland, the pressure was on the Executive to demonstrate thatdevolution will deliver better services and care. In Wales, there was at least theperception that public services, in particular health and education, were not as wellsupported as in the rest of the UK. Thus, the mission statement of each devolved bodywas, at least in part, influenced by its specific socio-political setting, which immediatelygives rise to a measure of heterogeneity in the response of the devolved bodies to the(similar) institutional pressures that came with the move towards devolution.

Such slogan-like statements were then translated into a succession of stagesinvolving: aims, objectives and targets. We noted how political missions began toassume more specific, though still relatively broad, meanings when they were firsttranslated into aims for broad policy areas/themes such as education and health. Thus,for example, “working together to give the children the best chance in life” was seen bythe Scottish Executive as a translation of education policy that is consistent with themission of making a difference for the people of Scotland. Similarly, “developing thelearning country” was considered consistent with the aspiration to provide directionfor a modernWales with well-supported public services. Second level translations fromaims to objectives still remained broad; in the case of education in Northern Ireland forexample, this entailed providing training and skills to secure gainful employment. Atbest, such broad visionary material can produce some differentiating characteristicsbetween the Executive and opposition but not enough to ensure a sensible measure ofaccountability. In these two levels of translations, numbers are absent as the missions,aims and objectives are all stated exclusively as narratives. More detailed translationsare required in order for more precise differentiations to be derived and through whichthe cabinet could enunciate its responsibilities towards the electorate. Such detailedtranslations could be taken as a means of rendering accountability both possible andtransparent as a means of securing external legitimacy.

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Translating and operationalizing objectives further involved the formulation oftime-bounded and specific targets where specific numbers begin to mediate as theexpression of political commitments in what is emerging as a “management bynumbers” culture (Ezzamel et al., 1990). Given the prevalence of such a management bynumbers culture within the institutional field, the emphasis on numbers could be takenas a means of the devolved bodies demonstrating their compliance with that culture(isomorphic pressure). This focus on numbers was evident in each body; in someinstances, reference was made to past achievements and how these fitted in with theoverall plan (in Scotland and Northern Ireland, though more so in Scotland), whilstothers focused solely on future intentions and plans (Wales). This situation in Walesmay be due to the Scottish and Northern Ireland documents being relatively morecomprehensive, as Wales developed separate planning documents for separate policyissues. Targets, particularly those stated in numerical terms, seemingly became moreprecise translations of the broad, less differentiating, mission, aims and objectives asmore precisely delineated measures of accountability to which the Executive could beheld. In this sense, the targets stated in the budget documents of each devolved bodyprovided a visible link back to objectives, aims and ultimately mission. It is theseprecise targets that are likely to act as the yardstick against which actual achievementsand political aspirations could be contrasted and compared. This chain of seeminglylogical, precise translation, which we gleaned from our analysis of the planning andbudgeting documents, from missions ultimately into numbers, both creates andreinforces a myth of rational governance, where trust is placed into governance byquantification. The budget in each devolved institution therefore can be seen tofunction as a “ritual” of reason, seeking to legitimize the manner by which the devolvedbodies conduct themselves (Czarniawska-Jorges and Jacobsson, 1989).

Homogeneities and heterogeneitiesThe three devolved bodies shared some commonalities in their planning and budgetingdocuments. First, a top-to-bottom management architecture (Meekings, 1995) wasevident in all bodies with one caveat; in Scotland, the formulation of the missionstatements was a more elongated process, and the Scottish programme for governmenthad much broader aims than in the other two institutions[3]. In Scotland, thereappeared to be a greater preponderance placed on defining, in Drucker’s (1980, p. 104)terminology, “a lofty organizational objective”. Second, a systematic reviewarchitecture (Meekings, 1995) was common across the devolved bodies, with theperiodic reporting of achievements being commonplace. Third, an integrated planningand budgeting process (Meekings, 1995) was in place, though to a lesser extent inWales compared to Scotland and Northern Ireland. In considering the link andcoupling between planning documents and the budgetary documents, tightarrangements were evidenced in both Scotland and Northern Ireland. In Wales, thisprocess was much less explicit and the reader needs to expend much more effort if theinterrelationships between all areas of planning and funding are to be made. This maybe a consequence of the existence of substantial alternative planning documents asalluded to above. Thus, while we are witnessing strong tendencies towards isomorphiccompliance, there are still some elements of heterogeneity between the three devolvedbodies (Townley, 2002).

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Further, there were quite apparent thematic emphases noted across the documentsof the three devolved bodies. Though the policy areas chosen for consideration(education and health) were given wide coverage by all, in Wales they wereparticularly held up as the beacons that would provide the guiding light for thefunctioning and success of the Welsh Assembly. In Scotland, the achievement of socialjustice was highlighted as the driving force in spurring on the endeavours of theExecutive. In Northern Ireland much was made of the exhaustive consultative andinclusion processes that were worked through at each stage of the planning project,possibly as a consequence of the overt conflict situation that preceded the introductionof the devolved body there and which contributed to an environment that suffered fromwhat some (e.g. Carmichael and Knox, 2003) have referred to as the “democraticdeficit”. Another striking element of the Northern Ireland documents is the focus oncompleting the reporting loop, in achieving the objectives of the Executive. Itsdepartments have adopted not only Public Service Agreements (PSAs), but alsoService Delivery Agreements (SDAs), in line with current practice at Whitehall.

Finally, with regard to the overall style of the documents, they all share anaspirational and invocatory style, with their eager and earnest urgings to improve thelot of the populace of their respective citizens; indeed, some (Wilson and Wilford, 2001)have had a less benign view of what some might see as utopian intentions- whenspeaking of Northern Ireland’s first programme for government, they state that it wasthe “political equivalent of Motherhood and Apple Pie”.

It is evident from this discussion that there are elements of convergence, orisomorphism, most likely of the normative type (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggioand Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995). There is also evidence of heterogeneity and diversity(Townley, 2002) possibly because of the differences in the contexts of the threedevolved bodies. The extent to which greater isomorphism may occur in the future islikely to depend on the extent to which elements of mimetic isomorphism begin tocreep in as those involved in the budgetary process across the three devolved bodiesbegin to take more note of each other’s practices, or alleged best practices emergingfrom elsewhere.

Number cognition and political deliberationsCognition, how actors process and make sense of the information they receive, is a keyissue in explaining organizational action under neo-institutional theory. As symbols,accounting and budgeting numbers shape the meanings actors attribute to activitiesand objects, and hence cognition of numbers will influence the way actors make senseof their working world (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Berger and Kellner, 1981).Numbers could result in developing a “way of doing things” that becomesinstitutionalized within a particular organization as the rule-like means of addressing aparticular issue, say value for money accountability. A common theme shared acrossthe three devolved bodies is the limited degree of understanding of accounting andbudget numbers by most politicians. Within each party, only a few could digest thenumbers and had confidence in interpreting and using them. The myriad of numbers inbudgets overwhelmed all but a few members in each party, even in Northern Irelandand Scotland where narrative was conjoined with numbers. From a neo-institutionaltheory perspective, this observation gives rise to a number of implications.

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First, those key individuals with financial expertise became the gatekeepers toaccounting and budgeting knowledge (Ezzamel and Bourn, 1990), as other members oftheir parties had to draw on these experts to understand the numbers. These numeratemembers became, intentionally or unintentionally, obligatory passage points (Latour,1987) who had to be consulted by other members in the quest of attempting tocomprehend accounting and budgetary numbers. This is likely to have created a newdynamic of power relations within each political party; one that favoured those withaccounting expertise.

Secondly, within each devolved institution the few politicians with financialexpertise are likely to have had a large impact on political deliberations. These expertsare expected to lead any financially inspired debate in plenary and committeediscussions, and they also had a major impact on shaping the debate conducted by theless financially knowledgeable, since the latter’s cognitive understanding of numbershas been substantially informed by such knowledgeable members. To the extent thatfinancial numbers might elicit different interpretations from those reading them, it isthose interpretations of the within-party experts that are likely to dominate the politicaldebate.

Third, the majority of politicians, who had modest financial expertise, tended tojustify their difficulty in understanding numbers by claiming other cognitiveadvantages, such as better ability to understand diagrams and charts, and/or bysimply submitting to the myth that being numerate means being a mathematicalgenius. In this way, their inability to understand numbers was conveyed as somethingthat they do not need to feel ashamed of, since only super-humans are capable ofcomprehending numbers; as one politician said “It is not to say we’re all stupid”. Suchjustification of lack of ability to comprehend financial details stands in some contrastto the position of members of the Assembly who were recognized as centres of financialexpertise, those who could not only interpret, but also question, and argue with,numbers by challenging the basis of their construction. The interaction ofpower/knowledge could be seen most clearly in this contrast; power and knowledgefeeding off each other as knowledgeable agents can manipulate power relations betterto their advantage which then helps to render their claims to knowledge more credible.

Fourth, and this is a qualification on the above points, the availability of financialknowledge centres (experts) within each political party did not always lead towidespread financially-inspired debate. Even those who called upon the experts withintheir parties to help them comprehend budget numbers did not always deploy thisknowledge in debate. As some more experienced members noted, the extent and levelof debate was frequently disappointing. Perhaps those members who were less adeptat understanding numbers were inhibited to use the understanding they gained fromtheir more experienced colleagues explicitly in the debate, preferring to “wait and see”how the debate developed, making use of their limited financial understanding only ifthey had to. This finding has parallels both in the UK and in other contexts. Likiermanand Vass (1984) reported that few Members of Parliament at Westminster couldcomprehend accounting information. Olson and Sahlin-Andersson (1998) noted how,despite attempts to embrace business-like accounting processes, Swedish politiciansrarely used accounting information in their deliberations. Even though the politicaldebate may seem wanting, judging by how the individual representatives act, theoverall political system may be relatively well informed when the division of labour

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between experts and non-experts, between parliamentary committees, between parties,and between lobbyists and media is taken into account (Downs, 1957).

Our study is of devolved bodies in transition and of accounting and budgetingpractices in the process of being institutionalized. This is a particularly crucial stagewithin the neo-institutional theory framework; it is during such episodes thatorganizations, such as the devolved bodies, seek to pursue whatever institutionalizingprocesses that subsequently define what forms they can follow and how they cansecure legitimacy (Scott, 1995). With their rule-like characteristics, accounting andbudgeting can be highly ritualized and institutionalized practices; hence, theimportance accorded them by all three devolved bodies (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

However, our findings may be limited by the transitional nature of our period ofinvestigation. For example, politicians’ cognition of accounting calculations and othernumbers may significantly improve over time, and so may the quality and frequency ofprovision of information. Our findings are therefore necessarily preliminary, and moreresearch is required to both refine our findings and extend enquiry to cover issuesother than those examined here. However, we believe that this paper has shed furtherlight on some of the tensions in a number of key themes in neo-institutional theory: theextent to which organizational efforts to demonstrate rationality in its programmes ofmanagement is constrained by the ability to produce a translation that maps onto theseprogrammes; the dynamics of possibilities of heterogeneities in organizationalresponses to similar institutional pressures; and the impact knowledgeable experts inmediating the cognitions, and hence the actions, of the less expert.

Notes

1. We are unable to comment upon any attempts to categorize performance measures orexplore their character because of the absence of public documentation on debate prior to theconstruction of budgets.

2. The time lag between the opening of the parliament in 1999 and the publication date of thisdocument in 2001 may suggest programs for government are less essential for thefunctioning of such political bodies than assumed as more informal means of governancemay have been pursued. Another possible explanation is the presence of a coalitiongovernment in which negotiations and co-ordination may have required time. This, however,has to remain as a speculation as we do not have the material that would allow a carefulexamination of this possibility.

3. However, somewhat perversely, what would be regarded as “objectives” within the rationalplanning model were actually referred to as “aims” in the Scottish document.

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