jurisdiction case digests batch 1

JURISDICTION| Monica S. Cajucom | 1

SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA v.

THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO and the COUNTRY

BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-75079, January 26, 1989, SECOND DIVISION (Paras, J.)

FACTS:

Petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was

authorized to transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the

corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the latter. Under their

agreement, she is required to make a periodic report and accounting of

her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office in

Manila. An audit was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a

shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was charged with

estafa in the RTC of Manila with Hon. Polo as the presiding judge. She

filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. The subsequent motion for

reconsideration was likewise denied by the said judge.

These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It

is the contention of petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has

no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the

funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.

Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely

civil in nature because the fact that a separate civil case was filed

involving the same alleged misappropriated amount. According to her,

this separate filing of civil action is an acceptance that it is not a proper

subject of a criminal action.

On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the denial of a motion

to dismiss/quash is interlocutory in character and cannot be questioned

by certiorari. According to them, it cannot also be a subject of appeal until

final judgment is rendered.

The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain

exceptions the reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant

or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has

no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of

proper venue.

Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of

Manila to take cognizance of this criminal case for estafa.

ISSUE:

WON the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: Petition DENIED.

Yes. In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493)

this Court ruled that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in

criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of

ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment

provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the

complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is

determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by

the findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil.

641).

Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all

criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the

court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed

or any of the essential elements thereof took place.

The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during

the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila,

Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)

Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial

Court of Manila has jurisdiction.

Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which

may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of

the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage

or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its


principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the

petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused

damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 149995, September 28, 2007, THIRD DIVISION (Ynares-

Santiago, J.)

FACTS:

Isidro Palana was charged for the violation of BP 22 for issuing a bouncing

check as a loan security to Alex Carlos, his business partner, even though he

knew that he did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank. The warrant

of arrest was recalled and set aside after Palana posted bail. He was then

arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Palana raised the

issue of investment. He alleged that Carlos cajoled him to issue a check in

his favor allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the

partnership with the necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when

the check was issued, complainant knew that the same was not funded.

The RTC decided in favor of Carlos. Palana appealed before the Court of

Appeals but it was dismissed, affirming the RTCs decision in toto. Both the

trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued as a

guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioners investment theory. The

trial court noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palanas General

Merchandising, was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of

petitioner. The Court of Appeals also held that the act of lending money

does not necessarily amount to an investment of capital.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision despite the fact that its

jurisdiction was in question during the time of arraignment due to the

effectivity of the RA. 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

HELD: Petition GRANTED with MODIFICATION as to penalty.

No. It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is

determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and

not during the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging

petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that

time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129, which

provides:

Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional

Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all

criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any

court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the

exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the

latter.

x x x x

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,

Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in

Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the

exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and

the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal

Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall

exercise:

x x x x

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all

offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding

four years and two months, or a fine of not more than

four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,

regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,

including the civil liability arising from such offenses or

predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or

amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses

involving damage to property through criminal negligence


they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the

imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less

than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not

more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case

exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the

court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the

Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The

Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action

because its jurisdiction is only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more

than P4,000.00.

The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, An Act

Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit

Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court on June 15, 1994 cannot divest

the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioners case. Where a court

has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its

jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected

by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another

tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect

that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its

enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions. However,

these only apply to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial

stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be

construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases

pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. The

jurisdiction of the RTC over the case attached upon the commencement of

the action by the filing of the Information and could not be ousted by the

passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the

application of which to criminal cases is prospective in nature.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEJO TAROY y TARNATE

G.R. No. 192466, September 7, 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Abad, J.)

FACTS:

Mila is Taroys wife. Mila has an eldest daughter from her first marriage

named Des. The couple lived with Milas children in Benguet at the boundary

of Baguio City.

According to Des, when she was still 10 years old, Taroy raped her when she

was alone cleaning their house. She was told not to tell anyone lest Mila and

her siblings would suffer harm. This incident was followed by another sexual

abuse on the next year. This time it occurred inside Des bedroom where

Taroy pointed a knife at her and ordered her to undress and submit to his

sexual desires.

Des only confided the story to her mother and aunt four years later. They

accompanied her to the NBI to complain. She also underwent medical

examination where it was revealed that there was indeed a history of

previous blunt force caused by an insertion of an erect penis.

The public prosecutor charged Taroy with two counts of before the RTC of La

Trinidad, Benguet.

Correspondingly, the RTC convicted Taroy of the offense and penalized him

to suffer reclusion perpetua.

Taroy challenged the Benguet RTCs jurisdiction over the crimes charged

contending that their residence where the alleged offenses took place was at

the boundary of Baguio City. The RTC held, however, that Taroys testimony

that their residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of its jurisdiction

since he waived the jurisdictional requirement.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that the

prosecution has sufficiently established the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Hence, this appeal.


ISSUE:

WON the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet has jurisdiction to hear the rape

cases against Taroy.

HELD: Appeal DISMISSED.

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor

subjected to stipulation. The right venue must exist as a matter of

law. Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be

instituted and tried in the proper court of the municipality, city, or province

where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients

took place.

The Informations filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were

committed in the victim and the offenders house in City Limit,

Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet. This allegation

conferred territorial jurisdiction over the subject offenses on the RTC of La

Trinidad, Benguet. The testimonies of Mila and Des as well as the affidavit of

arrest point to this fact. Clearly, Taroys uncorroborated assertion that the

subject offenses took place in Baguio City is not entitled to belief. Besides,

he admitted during the pre-trial in the case that it was the RTC of La Trinidad

that had jurisdiction to hear the case. Taken altogether, that RTCs

jurisdiction to hear the case is beyond dispute.

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ET. AL v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO

G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006, FIRST DIVISION (Chico-Nazario, J.)

FACTS:

Two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela,

which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and

Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao,

SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander

Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the RTC of

Santiago City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. The RTC of Manila convicted

all of the accused. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic

review where the accused were acquitted on the ground of reasonable

doubt.

Later on, SPO2 Maderal (who was then at large) was arrested. He

executed a sworn confession and identified the other persons

responsible for the deaths of the victims. Respondent Tuliao then filed a

complaint. After which, the judge issued warrants of arrest.

Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to

reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Presiding Judge

Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and denied the urgent motion

on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their

persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

The new Presiding Judge Anghad took over the case and reversed the

order of Judge Tumaliuan. State Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for

the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of


Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration and the prayer for

inhibition were both denied.


ISSUE:

WON an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his

person to the jurisdiction of the court.


No. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither

jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the

body of the accused.

In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the

adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of

Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first

acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or

grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court

acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under

Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and

the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs.

Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the

accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been

arrested.

In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed

waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative

relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the

court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow

cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the

processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the

person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special

jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the

custody of the law.

In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule

applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the

jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding

this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The

following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs

to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to

have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court.

Custody of the law vs. Jurisdiction over the person

Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the

application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs

sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes

a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the

accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary

surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired

upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody

of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his

person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a

motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one

can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not

be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody

after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies

restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and

liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of

the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is

not limited to, detention.


VENANCIO FIGUEROA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Nachura, J.)

FACTS:

An information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed

against the petitioner before the RTC of Bulacan. The petitioner was

convicted as charged. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned,

among others, for the first time, the trial courts jurisdiction.

The CA, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to

have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the

jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from

asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction.

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of

this case constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.

Sibonghanoy? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in

the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public

prosecutor, amount to estoppel?

HELD: Petition GRANTED.

No. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the

issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on

appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a

litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only

supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.

Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke

unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter

challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction

must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially

true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the

court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not

suffer any harm.

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way

estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that

he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that

time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True,

delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of estoppel

by laches unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not

sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in

good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state,

if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,

intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of

estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein

considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the

judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15

years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.

The trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein

and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his

part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter

may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay

is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.

What happened in Sibonghanoy case?

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered

the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was

ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a

motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling

had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by

laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising

due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or

omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption

that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.


It is noteworthy that the party questioning the jurisdiction actively participated

in the trial and even raised affirmative reliefs. It was only when the adverse

decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise

the question of jurisdiction. This strategy is frowned upon because the party

only challenges the jurisdiction for the purpose of nullifying the entire

proceedings.

HEIRS OF JANE HONRALES v. JONATHAN HONRALES

G.R. No. 182651, August 25, 2010, THIRD DIVISION (Villarama, Jr., J.)

FACTS:

Jane Honrales was accidentally shot by her husband, Jonathan, which

immediately caused her death. An information for parricide was filed against

Jonathan before the RTC of Manila. He was ordered arrested by judge of

said RTC. He then filed a motion for reconsideration. In view of this, the

assistant public prosecutor moved to defer the proceedings. Jonathan filed

an urgent ex-parte motion to recall the warrant of arrest which the public

prosecutor opposed. The RTC deferred the proceedings in view of the

pending motion for reconsideration. However, the motion to recall the arrest

was denied. The trial court maintained that it found probable cause for the

issuance of the arrest warrant.

After a few years, the assistant public prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw

the information for parricide. While this motion was still pending, an

information for reckless imprudence resulting to parricide was filed against

Jonathan before the MeTC of Manila. Jonathan was arraigned in the MeTc

and pleaded guilty to the charge.

Then Jonathan filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC. He cited that his

arraignment and conviction by the MeTc are grounds for the dismissal of the

pending case against him. On the other hand, the petitioner heirs filed a

motion to nullify the MeTc proceedings for failure to give them due process.

Also, they allege that the information filed before such court was invalid.

Thereafter, the RTC granted the motion to withdraw the information for

parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest against Jonathan. Petitioner heirs

filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the said

order. They also filed a motion to interplead the People of the Philippines.

Likewise, the OSG filed a similar motion. However, the CA dismissed the

motions despite finding that the judge who issued the order failed to exercise

his independent judgment and only relied on the DOJs wisdom on the

matter. The CA also held that remanding the case to the RTC would

constitute double jeopardy because the MeTC already decided on the case.

Their subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied.

Hence, this consolidated petitions by the Petitioner heirs and the OSG.

Petitioner heirs argue that the MeTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over

the case for parricide through reckless imprudence and that jurisdiction

remained with the RTC where the Information for parricide was filed.

The OSG, for its part, argues that the MeTC could not have validly acquired

jurisdiction over the case for the same offense of parricide or any offense

necessarily included therein because the prosecutions motion to withdraw

the Information for parricide before the RTC remained unacted upon by the

said court.

Jonathan, on the other hand, maintains that if the petition is granted, it would

violate his right against double jeopardy. He likewise contends that it is

already too late for petitioner heirs to question the validity of the MeTC

proceedings since its decision has become final and executory, no appeal

having been taken from the decision.

ISSUE:

WON the MeTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case while another case

was still pending before the RTC.

HELD: Petitions GRANTED.

No. It is beyond cavil that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in

granting the withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the

warrant of arrest without making an independent assessment of the merits of

the case and the evidence on record. By relying solely on the manifestation

of the public prosecutor that it is abiding by the Resolution of the Secretary of


Justice, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a

positive duty enjoined by law. What remains for our resolution is whether the

case may be remanded to the RTC without violating respondents right

against double jeopardy. On this question, we find the answer to be in the

affirmative.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as

amended provides:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double

jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or

acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise

terminated without his express consent by a court of

competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or

information or other formal charge sufficient in form and

substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had

pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the

accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to

another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any

attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any

offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included

in the offense charged in the former complaint or

information.

x x x x

Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a

first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been

validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in

the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before

a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been

entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the

case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless

imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal case for parricide was still

pending before the RTC. In Dioquino v. Cruz, Jr., we held that once

jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information is filed, it is there

retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in

parricide was included in the charge for intentional parricide pending before

the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the criminal case filed

before it, the RTC having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the

exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by

a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.

A decision rendered without jurisdiction is not a decision in contemplation of law

and can never become executory.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004, FIRST DIVISION (Panganiban, J.)

FACTS:

Accused Napoleon Roman was convicted by the RTC of San Fernando,

La Union of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,

multiple physical injuries, and damage to property. The court further ruled

that in case of Romans insolvency, the petitioner shall be liable for the

civil liability. The judgment became final and executory.

Roman remained at large and jumped bail. Counsel for the accused filed

a notice of appeal. However, under the Rules of Court, whenever the

accused jumps bail the notice of appeal shall be denied. The trial court

accordingly denied such appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial

of the appeal.

Petitioner Philippine Rabbit filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.

The trial court gave due course to the notice of appeal. When the Office

of the Solicitor General received a copy of the petitioners brief, it moved

to be excused from the filing respondents brief for lack of authority to

represent People in criminal cases on appeal.

The CA ruled that the Phil. Rabbit cannot independently file a notice of

appeal with regard to the civil liability in the criminal case against Roman

because to do so will amount to the nullification, amendment or defeat of

the final judgment as to the dismissal of the notice of appeal filed by its

employee.


Petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-

employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal

stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail.

In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the

employee.


ISSUE:

WON the Petitioner can still file a notice of appeal for the accused.


No. Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal."

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.

Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial.

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.

In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.

Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.

All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship.


G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Nachura, J.)

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