Emergency Planning College Occasional Papers

New Series

Number June 2017

Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sendai Framework

What does it mean for UK resilience practitioners?

Dr Hugh Deeming HD Research and Senior Research Fellow

Emergency Planning College

21

Please Note:

This Occasional Paper is a discussion article, written and published in order to

stimulate debate and reflection on key themes of interest to the resilience

community. It is part of a series of papers published by the Emergency Planning

College on the Knowledge Centre of its website and available freely to practitioners

and researchers. The opinions and views it expresses are those of the author

alone. This paper does not constitute formal guidance or doctrine of any sort,

statutory or otherwise, and its contents are not to be regarded as the expression of

government policy or intent.

For further information, including a submissions guide for those who wish to submit a

paper for publication, please contact:

Mark Leigh Emergency Planning College

T: 01347 825036 E: mark.leigh@emergencyplanningcollege.com

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Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sendai Framework:

What does it mean for UK resilience practitioners?

Introduction

For many people the international discussions and processes associated with attempts to

reduce disaster risk and to increase resilience are somewhat esoteric. This is because

disaster risk reduction can be regarded by some as a necessity only for developing

countries. From this perspective, the only issue relevant to the G20 nations becomes how

much international aid should be allocated to enable this stream of activity to be undertaken

by others.

This understanding does, however, fail to acknowledge two important factors: Firstly, the fact

that since 2005 the United Nations frameworks for disaster-risk reduction (DRR) have been

applicable to all nations and at all scales, from local, to national, regional, and global. Thus,

in addition to guiding the activities of others, such context underlines a clear relationship

between these internationally agreed frameworks and the risk reduction and risk

management aspirations of all national civil-protection practitioners, including the whole UK

Civil Protection sector. Secondly, that recent decades have seen disasters occurring in

nations spanning the gamut of ‘development’, suffice that the UN suggests that despite

concerted mitigation activity disaster losses resulting from natural and manmade causes

remain a significant challenge for all nations:

“Disasters, many of which are exacerbated by climate change and which are

increasing in frequency and intensity, significantly impede progress towards

sustainable development. Evidence indicates that exposure of persons and

assets in all countries has increased faster than vulnerability has decreased, thus

generating new risks and a steady rise in disaster-related losses, with a

significant economic, social, health, cultural and environmental impact in the

short, medium and long term, especially at the local and community levels.”

UN/ISDR (2015: p.10)

In light of these factors, this paper will investigate where the principal model through which

UK civil protection is delivered – Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) – aligns with and

supports the meeting of the targets and priorities that have been set out in the current UN

framework, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) (UNISDR, 2015b).

In doing so, this paper will enable those working with IEM concepts to understand

where IEM and the Sendai framework need to be meshed in order to reinforce the DRR

aspects of their practice. It will also identify where gaps may exist between the

capabilities, capacities and competences inhered within UK IEM doctrine and practice

(MacFarlane, 2017) and those of any other sectors, whose engagement with disaster risk

reducing activities will undoubtedly be necessary to meet SFDRR targets at the local and

national scales.

This secondary aim is important because, whilst the SFDRR is focussed on attaining

disaster-risk reduction and building disaster resilience, the framework clearly associates

such activities as bearing “a renewed sense of urgency within the context of sustainable

development and poverty reduction” (Ibid., p.9), i.e. the need to reduce systemic

vulnerabilities (e.g. poverty) – something which has not necessarily been a traditional civil-

protection function – make achieving the SFDRR targets and priorities a truly integrated

undertaking. Whilst these issues will be expanded on later, a key illustration of this broader

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conceptualisation of DRR is encompassed within SFDRR’s Priority 4 and its focus on

‘Building Back Better’; something that has only recently become clearly accepted as a key

component of risk mitigation in the UK (e.g. Bonfield, 2016).

Following a short definition of concepts, this paper will commence with a description of how

the SFDRR came into being. The framework itself will then be described relative to parallels

with the Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) model. This will be followed by a

discussion of those current workstreams and measures in place within the UK civil protection

sector that correlate with SFDRR targets and priorities and which act as illustration to the

sector’s implicit and explicit capability to deliver on these agreed ambitions. Finally, some

conclusions will be drawn and tentative recommendations made, which illustrate

opportunities where changes to policies and practices may assist the sector in contributing

effectively to achieving SFDRR targets.

Definitions

This paper discusses concepts that have numerous definitions across a range of academic,

policy and practice applications. Accordingly, it is important to frame the discussion in a way

that encourages a consistent understanding of the concept being discussed. This does not

mean that other interpretations are invalid. Rather, it simply ensures that all readers are

considering the same interpretation and building their understandings, and their challenges

to that interpretation, from that position.

This approach is slightly at odds with straightforward analysis, because the subject matter

means that it is possible to use either of two lexicons from which to adopt concept

definitions. The UNISDR glossary of terms1 contains definitions for several of the relevant

concepts, which have been deliberated and agreed between member nations. Accordingly, it

is important not to ignore these interpretations. However, as this paper discusses SFDRR in

the context of UK IEM, it is also important to acknowledge the terminology within the UK

Emergency Responder Interoperability Lexicon2.

Table 1 lists the interpretations of the key concepts discussed in this paper side by side, as

they are defined in the respective glossaries. This comparison allows the reader to

understand key similarities and differences between these definitions, and from there to

make an individual judgement on their respective applicability in this context.

Table 1: Comparison of key concepts between two relevant glossaries

Concept UNISDR Glossary of Terms UK Emergency Responder Interoperability Lexicon

Disaster A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts.

Emergency (usually but not exclusively of natural causes) causing, or threatening to cause, widespread and serious disruption to community life through death, injury, and/or damage to property and/or the environment

1 https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology

2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-lexicon

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Emergency Emergency is sometimes used interchangeably with the term disaster, as, for example, in the context of biological and technological hazards or health emergencies, which, however, can also relate to hazardous events that do not result in the serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society

An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or the security of the UK or of a place in the UK.

Integrated Emergency Management (IEM)

See: Disaster Risk Reduction (below)

Multi-agency approach to emergency management entailing six key activities – anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery

Risk Management

See: Disaster Risk Management (below), but comparison is not exact

All activities and structures directed towards the effective assessment and management of risks and their potential adverse impacts.

Disaster Risk Management

Disaster risk management is the application of disaster risk reduction policies and strategies to prevent new disaster risk, reduce existing disaster risk and manage residual risk, contributing to the strengthening of resilience and reduction of disaster losses.

See: Risk Management (above), but comparison is not exact

Disaster Risk Reduction

Disaster risk reduction is aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the achievement of sustainable development. Annotation: Disaster risk reduction is the policy objective of disaster risk management, and its goals and objectives are defined in disaster risk reduction strategies and plans

Not explicitly defined. However, Disaster Risk Reduction can be understood as a key function of UK Civil Protection Doctrine, which is ingrained within the concept of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM).

Resilience The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management

Ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges

Vulnerability The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards.

Susceptibility of individuals or community, services or infrastructure to damage or harm arising from an emergency or other incident

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As Table 1 illustrates, some of the differences between definitions are effectively semantic

(e.g. vulnerability and, indeed, disaster). However, in other cases it would be remiss to adopt

one definition without acknowledging either the conceptual limitations of or, correspondingly,

the greater comprehensiveness of the other. The key example in this regard is that of

resilience. For this, the UK lexicon offers an understanding of this now familiar term as a

relatively stable system attribute that underpins an ability to ‘bounce back’ after adversity.

The UN definition, by contrast, is much more open to a broader interpretation, which

acknowledges that ‘bouncing back’ risks the reproduction of vulnerabilities which may feed

future disasters (Manyena, 2011). Accordingly, the UN definition foregrounds adaptation and

transformation as potential resilience pathways to recovery. Again, this interpretation of

resilience as a dynamic attribute, which is encompassed in an ability to change, is a

fundamental component of the SFDRR’s priority 4: ‘Building Back Better’.

It should also be noted that disaster risk reduction (DRR) is recognised by the UNISDR as

the desired outcome of effective disaster risk management (DRM). In other words, success

in DRR will inevitably be predicated on the effective delivery of DRM, through the

implementation of strategies, integrated into all relevant plans, policies and programs,

developed to meet specific risk-reduction objectives and goals.

The History of UN Disaster Risk Reduction Frameworks

The international aspiration to achieve disaster risk reduction (DRR) at all levels, from local,

national, regional to global, was initially institutionalised within the Hyogo Framework for

Action 2005-2015 (HFA) (UNISDR, 2005). HFA introduced the requirement for signatory

nations to self-assess and report disaster risk reduction outcomes based on five priority

areas:

1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong

institutional basis for implementation.

2. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning.

3. Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience

at all levels.

4. Reduce the underlying risk factors.

5. Strengthen the disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

Over the course of the HFA’s 10-year life, relative success was met in terms of Priorities 2

(Identifying risks, etc.) and 3 (Use knowledge, etc.). These included undoubted progress in

developing early-warning systems, for diverse hazards, which have already saved

thousands of lives around the world. However, considerable impasse occurred in relation to

the other priorities, where deeper systemic changes were required to go beyond

straightforward ‘hazard management’, i.e. in order to reduce vulnerability as a root driver of

risk and to institutionalise DRR as a social and political objective (Pearson and Pelling,

2015). Box 1 provides an example of how this shift could be said to have occurred in relation

to English flood risk management.

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One issue with the self-reporting structure within the HFA approach was that compliance did

lead governments to develop national policies. Unfortunately, however, when viewed

objectively these policies achieved very few DRR outcomes at the local scale: where

disaster impacts are most keenly felt.

So, HFA’s success was in achieving limited DRR outcomes focussed on multi-hazard

management, rather than through success in confronting the factors that underpin risk

accumulation and risk persistence (e.g. inappropriate land use; failing to reduce

vulnerability). This limited success, therefore, fed deliberation over what would succeed

HFA. The consensus became that there was a clear need to actively tackle these ingrained

constraints as part of the global DRR strategy:

“As a result, if the expected outcome of the HFA, the substantial reduction in

disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of

countries and communities, is ever to be achieved, there is a growing consensus

that the development drivers of risk, for example climate change, the

overconsumption of natural capital, poverty and inequality will have to be

addressed.

In order to do so, it is essential to manage disaster risks more effectively.

However, this in turn implies reinterpreting the way disaster risk reduction has

been approached and practised to date. Managing risk, and not just the disasters

that arise from unmanaged risk, has to become the new normal in development

practice. Otherwise, sustainable development will not be sustainable.” (UNISDR,

2015a: p.248)

Box 1: English flooding as an example of a slow shift from hazard management to

flood risk management (FRM)

In a UK, and specifically English, flood-risk management (FRM) context, attempts to

generate new processes through which to share governance and responsibility for FRM,

were encompassed within the Department for the Environment and Rural Affairs (Defra)

strategic objective of ‘Making Space for Water’ (Defra, 2005). This strategy represented a

policy response to a series of high-magnitude floods, which had defeated structural flood

defence measures around the nation since 1998.

Accordingly, the implementation of multi-objective approaches to deliver whole catchment

management, which relied less on concrete and other structures and more on resilience

and adaptation to hazards, was the primary objective of this shift. However, flood

emergencies, which continued to occur from 2005 to 2013/14 resulted in the

perseverance of a political preference for structural defences, with the development of

whole catchment FRM approaches remaining a considerable challenge. This position

changed during the winter storms of 2015/16. The floods precipitated by Storms

Desmond, Eva and Frank, completely overwhelmed even newly installed, high-

specification, structural defences across the northern UK.

This led directly to much more strident calls from the public and policy communities to

implement integrated catchment flood-risk management strategies, which expressly

included the adoption of tested, but still relatively experimental, measures such as Natural

Flood Management (NFM) (Deeming, 2017, Environment Agency, 2016c)

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Accordingly, delegates at the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction:

“…reiterated their commitment to address disaster risk reduction and the building

of resilience to disasters with a renewed sense of urgency within the context of

sustainable development and poverty eradication, and to integrate, as

appropriate, both disaster risk reduction and the building of resilience into

policies, plans, programmes and budgets at all levels and to consider both within

relevant frameworks.” UNISDR (2015b: p.9)

Following extensive deliberation (i.e. political, academic, contextual) the World Conference

agreed the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) on 18th March 2015

(Appendix 1).

As appendix 1 illustrates, SFDRR is laid out as a table of the key components required to

deliver the framework’s expected output and goal, as predicated on its central scope and

purpose:

“The present framework will apply to the risk of small-scale and large-scale,

frequent and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters, caused by natural or

manmade hazards as well as related environmental, technological and biological

hazards and risks. It aims to guide the multi-hazard management of disaster risk

in development at all levels as well as within and across all sectors”

From a UK civil protection perspective, the wording of this scope is interesting in at least

two ways. Firstly, applying this wording in a UK context it is clear that, as with the HFA, the

SFDRR is effectively focussed on reducing disaster risks related to hazards and major

accidents (i.e. “manmade hazards”). Threats (i.e. terrorist and other malicious attacks),

which are differentiated from hazards and accidents in the National Risk Register (Cabinet

Office, 2015b) do not fall within the framework’s purview.

Secondly, answering the criticism of HFA and its poor record of achieving outcomes at the

all-important local level, the diversity of hazards and accidents that this framework relates to

is substantive. It is clear that the intent is to reduce risks related to all scales of disaster.

Therefore, the corollary of this is that local risk managers need to be as fully engaged

with applying this framework as national actors. SFDRR effectively recognises that

‘disaster’ is not scale dependent, i.e. a small village exposed to a spatially-confined extreme

hazard faces disaster (e.g. Boscastle: Jennings, 2009), but it is clearly on a different scale to

the disaster potential of a county or region exposed to a wide-area emergency (e.g. Winter

storms 2015/16).

Accordingly, it is important to accept that compliance with the SFDRR means that its targets

and priorities need to be considered whatever the geographical spread of a disaster is

projected to be. In other words, considering incident escalation, as it is illustrated in matrix

form in the UK Government Concept of Operations (Cabinet Office, 2013) (Figure 1),

SFDRR effectively encourages the development of coherent DRR strategies for all

hazards, from those requiring “Local response only” right through to those that

threaten catastrophic impacts and require direction from COBR.

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Figure 1: Likely form of Central Government engagement based on impact and

geographic spread of an emergency in England (Cabinet Office, 2013: p.68)

NB. At time of writing CONOPS has not been updated to reflect the change in regional

coordination structure; from Government Offices (GO) to the DCLG Resilience and

Emergencies Division (DCLG-RED)

SFDRR: Targets

Whereas HFA had no formalised targets for signatory nations to meet, SFDRR presents

seven global targets. Whilst an improvement, these targets are not legally binding and there

remains no sanction for failing to meet them. As Pearson and Pelling (2015: p.4) state,

however, “they do provide a starting point for measuring success”.

The seven targets (see Appendix 1) are, in effect, high-level aspirations for globally

significant disaster risk reduction (e.g. reduce global disaster mortality by 2030). However,

all these targets bear relevance for those orchestrating DRR efforts at the national scale

(e.g. reducing the number of people affected by flooding in the UK has already been a

strategic UK government objective for many years (MAFF, 2000, Defra, 2005, Environment

Agency, 2009).

It could also be said that the UK has already developed effective DRR strategies at national

and local levels, in the sense that the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) enacts statutory duties

for designated responders to carry out risk assessment and other activities at national and

local (i.e. Local Resilience Forum: LRF) scales. Closer reflection on this particular aspect

does, however, highlight that risk ‘treatment’3 (i.e. proactive intervention to reduce risks)

3 “Risk treatment involves deciding which risks are unacceptably high, developing plans and

strategies to mitigate these risks, and then testing the plans and any associated capabilities. […] It is important to note that the Act does not require Category 1 responders to take action to reduce the

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does not form a statutory duty for responders under the Act, even though it is

discussed “for completeness” in guidance (HM Government, 2013a: chpt 4, p.15), and is

increasingly being carried out as a key component of UK risk management.

It could also be said that risk treatment activities fall more clearly into the ‘Prevent’ stream of

the doctrine-based IEM model. Therefore, opportunities likely already exist to identify and/or

to develop and integrate quantifiable DRR objectives/outcomes into local to national

resilience plans relatively easily (e.g. consider for example Box 1 above, and the work

carried out to move toward the integrated catchment flood risk management process that

has been decided on in response to the winter storms of 2015/16: Environment Agency,

2016c, Environment Agency, 2016b).

Only one target (i.e. enhancing cooperation with developing countries to support their

national DRR actions) falls completely outside the remit of UK civil protection doctrine and

into that of the Department for International Development (DfID). However, it is clear that UK

expertise across DRR/IEM is of direct relevance to DfID’s investments and development

spending around the world. In a speech on the UK’s development priorities from 2015, then-

Secretary of State for International Development Justine Greening MP noted, “In Britain we

have a wealth of expertise to share… And I’m determined to draft in the best of British

expertise.”4 One of DfID’s four priorities in its’ Single Departmental Plan, which informs all of

DfID’s programmes, is “Strengthening resilience and response to crisis”5. Therefore, there is

a strong and tangible link between domestic implementation of the Sendai Framework, and

the UK’s role as the second largest national aid donor in the world, ensuring communities

most at risk from disasters are able to reduce their risk exposure.

SFDRR: Priorities

In order to make progress in achieving the SFDRR targets during the period, the framework

also lays out four Priorities for Action:

1. Understanding disaster risk.

2. Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk.

3. Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience.

4. Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to «Build Back Better»

in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Within the text of the framework document these priorities are expanded upon, with

suggested measures to achieve each one outlined separately for national/local and

global/regional regimes.

As this paper is focussed on the SFDRR’s relevance to UK civil protection practice, the

following section will discuss where the SFDRR’s local/national priorities mesh with current

UK civil protection doctrine and practice. It will also suggest gaps where this doctrine and

practice could be adapted or transformed to better align with the internationally agreed goal

of the SFDRR, that all nations should prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk.

likelihood of threats and hazards. “Category 1 responders may decide to do this as part of their treatment of assessed risks but the Act only requires that emergency plans be developed: prevention and pre-emption lie outside its scope.” (HM Government, 2013: Chpt 4, p.15) 4 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/justine-greening-beyond-aid-development-priorities-from-

2015 5 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-single-departmental-plan-2015-to-2020/single-

departmental-plan-2015-to-2020#strengthening-resilience-and-response-to-crisis

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It should be acknowledged, however, that whilst SFDRR relates to all disaster risks

associated with hazards and major accidents (as described above), this paper’s author has

expert knowledge relating to flood risk management (FRM). Therefore, FRM will be used as

a central lens for analysis of the priorities but, where possible, points related to other risks

will be made, as knowledge allows. Whilst this approach is obviously limited and will need

future elaboration for other risk-management sectors, inland and coastal flood risks have

always been assessed as bearing relatively high probability and impact scores in the

National Risk Register (Cabinet Office, 2015a). It also cannot be denied that contemporary

and projected trends in flood-generating hydrological conditions (e.g. winter rainfall) are

causing increasing concern (The Committee on Climate Change, 2017, Marsh et al., 2016).

Accordingly, this focus on the UK’s recent experience of severe flood effects and impacts

does offer an opportunity for learning that may make for clearer illustrations than would

suppositions related for other risks whose effects are undoubtedly planned for, but which

have not been so recently manifest.

Priority 1: Understanding Disaster Risk

Disaster risk management needs to be based on an understanding of disaster

risk in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons and

assets, hazard characteristics and the environment.

Understanding the risk potential of UK emergencies (and ‘disasters’ if the more emotive term

is to be used) is a fundamental component of the duties given effect by the Civil

Contingencies Act (2004). The Act formalised the requirement for Act-defined Category One

Responder organisations to carry out risk assessments as part of an IEM process. These

risk assessments are intended to be carried out in a uniform manner by all Local Resilience

Forums (LRF) and accordingly, these processes are informed by guidance included in the

statutory publication Emergency Preparedness (HM Government, 2012). In order to assist in

developing a uniformity of approach, LRFs are also provided with a set of plausible risk

scenarios, against which to assess their own IEM capabilities and capacities and through

doing so, develop a Community Risk Register (CRR). This CRR then “provides an agreed

position on the risks affecting a local area and on the planning and resourcing priorities

required to prepare for those risks” (Cabinet Office, 2012: p.7).

Whilst in theory this approach to understanding ‘local’ risks provides an important baseline of

understanding, three issues are important to acknowledge:

Firstly, it has been found that although the CCA-defined risk-assessment methodology

appears straightforward, some LRFs were, at least until recently, making errors in their

interpretation of the guidance (Leigh, 2013). Thus, what appeared to be a nationally

consistent picture of ‘local’ risks was in fact less so.

Secondly, the concept of ‘local’ that is defined in the guidance and in the CRR relates not to

‘community’ risks in a town-by-town, or an urban/rural context, but in terms of a

geographically and politically defined ‘Police Area’ (for example Devon & Cornwall and the

Isles of Scilly LRF’s risk register defines community risks in a geographical area comprising

3,961 square miles). Accordingly, whilst the CRR undoubtedly provides a valuable strategic

tool with which to inform and prioritise the delivery of IEM at that scale, it is reasonably clear

that ‘community’ in this sense should not be equated with ‘community’ or ‘local’ as they are

discussed in the SFDRR.

Thirdly, the CRR ostensibly provides LRFs with a framework through which to prioritise the

investment of resources, time and planning effort in appropriate IEM based on their risk

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profile. However, for those LRFs who host major accident and/or radiation hazard sites in

their area, the additional challenge of regulatory compliance, under COMAH and REPPIR

legislation, can test responders’ capacity to invest resources into managing hazards which

may appear much higher, or more ‘top-right’, in their area’s CRR assessment matrix (see

Leigh, 2013: p.5 for illustration of the matrix). This is not to say that regulatory compliance is

in any way wrong. Far from it. These regulations have been developed expressly to mitigate

up-to catastrophic level, major-accident risks, albeit that they have low-probability. However,

the point is that public sector resources are becoming increasingly stretched and without

innovation on the part of LRFs the resources available for managing all risks, as hazard-

exposed communities might expect, may actually diminish (Leigh, 2016).

That, however, is a rather pessimistic outlook if some of the risk assessment and

management activity currently on-going in the UK is to be considered. In relation to flooding

specifically, the efforts on-going in improving the science of flood forecasting have already

realised considerable benefits.

Prompted by Sir Michael Pitt’s review of the 2007 floods (Pitt, 2008), and before that Bye

and Horner’s (1998) inquiry into the 1998 floods, considerable effort had been expended in

improving risk assessment tools such as the Environment Agency’s Flood Map (Porter and

Demeritt, 2012). Following the Winter storms of 2015 these methodologies were further

revised as part of the National Flood Resilience Review (HM Government, 2016). The review

team tested planning assumptions related to the probability of ‘Storm Desmond + 20%’

floods. Whilst this modelling exercise only investigated fluvial and coastal flood probabilities

(i.e. surface and groundwater probabilities were not explored), the findings were significant

in risk assessment terms:

Crucially, … our models suggest that even this plausible extreme flooding

remains overwhelmingly within the areas and depths defined by the current

Environment Agency Extreme Flood Outlines (Ibid.: p.3).

This finding should prompt renewed confidence within the civil protection community that the

Agency’s flood map provides one of the best flood planning tools in the world. This is not to

diminish the difficulty of developing contingencies and adaptation strategies to reduce

floodplain risks. On the contrary, it reaffirms that we can assess where the greatest

floodplain risks are located at high resolution: regardless of both a persistent public

propensity to deny such risks, and the fact that managing them remains neither

straightforward nor cheap.

The fact that flood maps are available to specifically inform spatial planning and land-use

decisions will be further discussed under Priority 4.

The sector’s history of analysing the manifest effects and impacts of hazards and major

accidents should also be considered favourably and highly relevant under this Priority. Flood

reviews already mentioned and others (e.g. the East Coast storm-surge of 2013: LLRF,

2014), as well as the investigations convened following major accidents, e.g. Buncefield

(BMIIB, 2008) and Shoreham (AAIB, 2017), suggest an institutionalised desire to learn

lessons from such events.

Capacities and capabilities in relation to delivering civil protection are also assessed in

several ways. In relation to CCA compliance, the National Resilience Capabilities

Programme (NRCP) has provided a structure through which LRFs’ can evolve their

readiness for all hazards and threats through learning from the experience of others. In the

health sector, IEM contingencies are directly assessed through the Emergency

Preparedness, Resilience and Response (EPRR) framework. Accordingly, these frameworks

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offer important gauges under which the core effectiveness and resilience of local-to-national

emergency contingencies can be developed. Such assessment is also occurring in (and in

some respects is driving) a practice environment where interoperability and inter-LRF

mutuality of arrangements are becoming increasingly vital, as the potential impacts of major

cross-boundary emergencies, and the importance of dealing with them in a coordinated

manner, are understood (JESIP 2016).

As Pollock (2013) suggests, however, until relatively recently reviews, investigations and

inquiries have often identified lessons from events, but these lessons have tended to go

unlearned. From this perspective, it is reassuring that structures have been put in place to

encourage the civil protection sector to both share notable practice and to improve their

practice through joint organisational learning (JESIP, 2016). Such learning offers obvious

opportunities to the sector in terms of improving responders’ abilities to interpret risks and to

plan for emergencies using ‘ground-truthed’ understandings of available capabilities,

capacities and procedures.

Looking outside the practitioner community, Community Preparedness has been another

concept that has been developed out of a Pitt Review (2008) recommendation.

Encouragement for practitioners to enable diverse communities to develop their own

contingency arrangements, “that complement the response of the emergency services”

(Cabinet Office, 2011: p.11), has now been ongoing for several years and has recently been

refreshed in new practitioner guidance (Cabinet Office, 2016).

From an SFDRR perspective, what such participatory approaches and toolkits should be

seen as providing are opportunities for practitioners to work directly with at-risk communities

to carry out location and community specific risk assessments and risk management

interventions at truly-local spatial and social resolutions. Whilst such initiatives are intended

(correctly) to be all-hazards focussed, the fact that it is the flooding of recent years that has

acted as a stimulus for flood-risk exposed communities to engage in planning activity should

always be acknowledged. As with risk-perception generally, the recent and easy availability

of flood experience and flood-risk evidence has sensitised the population to the importance

of planning for flooding. Accordingly, it is vital to enable more encompassing community risk

assessments to be carried out, by encouraging and enabling practitioners to actively lead

communities through this process.

Priority 2: Strengthening Disaster Risk Governance to Manage Disaster

Risk

Disaster risk governance at the national, regional and global levels is vital to the

management of disaster risk reduction in all sectors and ensuring the coherence

of national and local frameworks of laws, regulations and public policies that, by

defining roles and responsibilities, guide, encourage and incentivize the public

and private sectors to take action and address disaster risk

The duties and institutions introduced to the UK civil protection sector by the Civil

Contingencies Act (2004) undoubtedly go a long way in satisfying this SFDRR priority. Civil

Protection in the UK does indeed take a stepped approach (Figure 1) and the principle of

subsidiarity dictates that “decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with co-

ordination at the highest necessary level” (HM Government, 2013b) (see Figure 1).

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At the national level, the UK has a highly developed national policy and framework for risk

management6. The National Risk Assessment (NRA) drives an all-threats and all-hazards

approach to risk management, which incorporates all relevant government departments,

agencies and other actors. Flowing from the NRA, the National Resilience Planning

Assumptions and National Capabilities Programme further develop practical risk reduction

measures, by identifying common consequences of risks/hazards and driving work to

address them. The strong UK Lead Government Department (LGD) model encourages all

aspects of risk management to be addressed in partnership between Government, industry

and regulators7.

Importantly, however, in recent years the UK civil protection arrangements have been further

improved with the introduction of the Ministerial Recovery Group (MRG) concept. The

activation of the MRG for the Winter storms of 2015/16 only represented its fourth activation.

However, the continuity of ministerial oversight now provided for major emergencies, from

COBR during preparedness/response to MRG for recovery, indicates a clear aspiration for

emergency management to be more effectively integrated and to reduce consequences from

not only the hazard/accident effects, but also from emergencies’ secondary effects (e.g. The

MRG has enabled high-level coordination with insurers to ensure efficient and equitable

restoration for affected populations).

As well as the undoubted relevance of the community preparedness work mentioned above

to this priority, is the duty placed on Local Authorities, “to provide advice and assistance to

those undertaking commercial activities and to voluntary organisations in relation to business

continuity management (BCM) in the event of emergencies” (HM Government 2012). This is

exemplified by the experience that businesses can be and have been seriously affected by

emergencies. For example, the best estimate of business damages during the Winter

2013/14 storms was £270m (Environment Agency, 2016a), with between 3,100 and 4,900

businesses directly affected. Also in a provisional impact assessment following Storm

Desmond in Cumbria in 2015, it was estimated that 1,029 out of 2,923 businesses situated

on the floodplain (10% of all businesses in the County) were directing affected by flooding

(Cumbria County Council, 2016). These are significant numbers.

To support increasing BCM planning across the private sector the British Standards Institute

has adopted a core international standard for businesses to meet (i.e. ISO 22301). However,

whilst uptake of BCM practice by large businesses appears relatively healthy, adoption by

small and medium size enterprises (SME) is still slow. Looking into the reasons for this,

again particularly in relation to flood risk, the SESAME project identified several business

perceptions, which may present challenges for local authority staff trying to exercise their

duties effectively. These included the finding that business owners generally listen more

attentively to the opinions and advice of other businesses than they do to people with

formalised expertise in risk management. Also, risk-mitigation actions tended to result from

the experience of flooding, rather than as a result of developing formal knowledge, through

reading books, leaflets or web-pages (Harries et al., 2016). The obvious lesson to take from

these findings is the importance of civil-protection practitioners working collaboratively with

engaged business owners to share learning across appropriate business forums.

6 2013 United Kingdom Peer Review - Building resilience to disasters: Implementation of the Hyogo

Framework for Action (2005-2015), UNISDR, EC, OECD http://www.unisdr.org/files/32996_32996hfaukpeerreview20131.pdf 7 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/list-of-lead-government-departments-responsibilities-

for-planning-response-and-recovery-from-emergencies

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It should also be noted, that in terms of the challenges in increasing BCM amongst hazard

and major-accident risk exposed businesses, a recent ‘Horizon-scan’ survey by the Business

Continuity Institute revealed that ‘adverse weather events’ were regarded as only the 8th

highest threat by business BCM professionals, with cyber and terrorism registering higher,

along with utility disruption and data issues (BCI, 2016). These latter two concerns obviously

represent potential ‘common consequences’ of hazards and major accidents and therefore,

may well represent hooks with which to attract businesses into BCM thinking.

Priority 3: Investing in Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience

Public and private investment in disaster risk prevention and reduction through

structural and non-structural measures are essential to enhance the economic,

social, health and cultural resilience of persons, communities, countries and their

assets, as well as the environment. These can be drivers of innovation, growth

and job creation. Such measures are cost-effective and instrumental to save

lives, prevent and reduce losses and ensure effective recovery and rehabilitation

In relation to investment in structural and non-structural measures to reduce the impact of

emergencies, no apology is made here in again focussing on specific aspects of evolving

flood risk management policy and practice. Whereas risk reduction in terms of major

accidents tends to be covered by regulatory instruments, legislation, and compliance, flood

risk reduction has in the last decade become much more of a societal endeavour. Whether

this has been an acceptable shift from the publics’ perspective is, of course, another matter

(Begg et al., 2015).

However, in real terms, current expenditure on flood defence is at record levels (House of

Commons Library, 2016). But, whereas in previous decades such expenditure would have

come almost completely from the public purse, since 2011 a partnership funding model has

been adopted by the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra, 2011).

This model was designed to attract funding from non-government sources in order to share

costs and potentially increase the opportunities for developing schemes where they would

not have previously met state funding criteria. The development of such a model represents

important evidence of attempts to garner public and private-sector engagement with risk

reduction. However, a Parliamentary inquiry found that the majority of the partnership

funding that had been secured under this model had actually come from local authorities,

rather than from other sources, i.e. the implication being that additional opportunity costs

were being incurred by already financially-stretched local authorities, when that had not been

the scheme’s intention (EFRA, 2013). The corollary of this finding being that although

national government is attempting to engage and to push responsibility for FRM across a

wider stakeholder group, inherent barriers still exist against this at more local levels.

In relation to non-structural FRM measures, there has recently been clear evidence in

England of a related aspiration to support ‘resilience building’ in flood affected communities.

Post-flood grant schemes have been a feature of national government’s response to

extreme floods for several years. Most significantly, following the winter storms of 2015/16

the Government offered Property-Level Resilience (PLR) grants to all affected households

as well as match-funding charitable donations and providing other financial relief via

instruments such as council tax and business-rate relief and a farming recovery fund.

Whether there is, or should be, a political appetite to continue such financial interventions in

the future should be regarded as a currently open question. However, it will be important to

better understand the implications of either continuance or cessation relatively soon; if for no

other reason than to foster realistic expectations in at-risk communities. A key question that

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presents itself here is, for example, how many times should a property benefit from a PLR

grant if it is subjected to repeat inundations?

In relation to understanding property-level resilience and other risk-influencing factors, a

review was also commissioned in 2015 to explore opportunities: through which to enable the

uptake of effective PLR measures by at-risk households and businesses; to assess any

requirement to change building regulations and to enhance sector skills to deliver ‘resilient

reinstatement’; to better understand effective risk communication and behaviour-change

needs; to investigate how insurers could act to increase resilience and; to share all lessons

publicly via a one-stop-shop (Bonfield, 2016).

The parallel National Flood Resilience Review (HM Government, 2016) investigated the

flood modelling, mentioned above, as well as exploring key opportunities and challenges in

improving the resilience of key critical infrastructure against flooding.

Both these reviews undertook broad consultations before reporting and, if their

recommendations are followed, both should be seen as representing significant actions to

better understand risks and to enable a broader and inclusive constituency of publics and

professionals to improve their own and others practices in attaining greater flood resilience.

A further development in terms of governmental support for more innovative methods to

reduce flood risks has been the catalytic effect of the winter 2015/16 storms in shifting

political and public perceptions of Natural Flood Management (NFM) measures and the

concept of integrated catchment management, from broad-based ambivalence to

unequivocal support (Deeming, 2017, EFRA, 2017).

Priority 4: Enhancing Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response,

and to «Build Back Better» In Recovery, Rehabilitation and

Reconstruction

Experience indicates that disaster preparedness needs to be strengthened for

more effective response and ensure capacities are in place for effective recovery.

Disasters have also demonstrated that the recovery, rehabilitation and

reconstruction phase, which needs to be prepared ahead of the disaster, is an

opportunity to «Build Back Better» through integrating disaster risk reduction

measures. Women and persons with disabilities should publicly lead and promote

gender-equitable and universally accessible approaches during the response and

reconstruction phases

Preparedness issues have undoubtedly been confronted in recent years, both within civil-

protection practice and the public spheres. As discussed above, concerted efforts have been

made to develop community preparedness. This has been done through the facilitation of an

emergency planning process within at-risk communities, via the provision of frameworks,

toolkits and resources with which people can plan responses and protect themselves

(Cabinet Office 2016). These initiatives are important. However, it should always be

remembered that such groups may see themselves as occupying two clearly differentiated

roles, one focussed on actively reducing risks faced by their communities and another that

concentrates on activism to ensure the relevant authorities do not step away from their

statutory, as well as perceived, risk management obligations.

In terms of understanding how people respond to warnings, numerous projects have

investigated these challenges, with findings directly influencing the way an increasingly

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sophisticated range of warning systems are developed (Cabinet Office, 2014, Cave et al.,

2009, Environment Agency, 2015).

Another specific capability that must be mentioned in relation to response has been the

development by Defra and other key stakeholders, of a Flood Emergency Concept of

Operations (Defra, 2014). This CONOPS has effectively moved the sector from the effective

but presentationally deficient response to the 1998/2000 floods – characterised by the image

of rescuers pulling householders into hastily appropriated dinghies – to the incredibly

professional, nationally-coordinated swift-water rescue capability that was deployed across

the north of the UK during the winter 2015/16 storms.

A further element of progress has been the change in relationship between the military and

the civil authorities, which has culminated in a much more ‘forward-leaning’ (but still

contingent) approach by the military in terms of its willingness to provide Military Aid to the

Civil Authorities (MACA). This coming in the shape of access, at relatively low cost, to a

formidable array of capability, capacity and niche assets (Ministry of Defence, 2016).

In relation to recovery, progress in planning for this phase of emergencies has improved,

particularly following the evolution of National Recovery Guidance and the Recovery Plan

Guidance Template (HM Government, 2007). However, recovery is still an incredibly

challenging task and one which involves the inclusion of a far larger stakeholder group than

is normally associated with response. Such complexity is also inevitable, given that recovery

is not solely associated with dealing with ‘emergency-related effects’, but incorporates a

mosaic of inter-related challenges and the potential ‘retraumatisation’ of impacted publics,

due to the presence of the additional actors and bureaucracies required to manage this long-

term process (Whittle et al., 2010).

That being said, the apparent ambivalence with which some responders view recovery as a

key element of IEM has not been assisted in recent years by an apparently institutionalised

resistance against incorporating recovery, in any meaningful way, into otherwise

comprehensive and successful major exercises. Illustrations of this are the national flood-

exercise Watermark, as well as the simulated underground-rail emergency Exercise Unified

Response: both of which were concluded a notional few hours after the response-phase

ended.

It is clearly understood that there would be cost implications for extending such exercises to

include recovery challenges. However, there exclusion from these invaluable learning

experiences means that during and after live emergencies many actors continue to find

themselves drawn into recovery delivery with little or no preparation for these roles.

The SFDRR’s identification of ‘Building Back Better’ as a crucial element of DRR also

challenges any emergency-services focused ideas of risk reduction as being a job for the

civil-protection sector alone. Resilient reinstatement was discussed above under priority 3.

However, the need for the sector to collaborate and work alongside the spatial and land-use

planning, building and damage-restoration communities to identify risks and to mitigate

them, or to prevent them entirely through the judicious use of regulations, represents a key

element of SFDRR compliance. It is hoped that the outcome of the Bonfield (2016) and other

reviews into the efficacy of recovery and restoration practices will provide additional

opportunities for the sector to further influence critical decision-making where poor choices

can result in the persistence or creation of unnecessary vulnerabilities.

In speaking about vulnerability, it is also worthwhile noting the final clause in the SFDRR

Priority 4. This relates to the inclusion of women and those with disabilities into the

deliberation of DRR inputs and aspired outcomes. This raises an interesting issue, in that in

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most UK civil protection doctrine, gender, young and old age, minority ethnicities, faiths or

beliefs, and disability are more generally regarded as vulnerabilities to be managed by

others. What the SFDRR reminds us is that far from passive potential victims, these

individuals and groups possess key attributes and knowledges, which if facilitated, can

represent usefully nuanced perspectives to be integrated into the equity- and practicality-

based decisions that form the basis of planned contingencies.

Conclusions

This paper has sought to identify parallels between the aspirations of the internationally

agreed Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) and the current UK civil

protection practice of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM). The non-legally binding

targets and priorities of the SFDRR have been examined, predominantly against the context

of flood-emergency management in England, but also in respect to a broader range of

contingency planning for floods and other hazards and major accidents in the UK. In

comparing the SFDRR priorities against the partially statutory and partially doctrine-based

delivery of IEM, it can be seen that in many respects the UK is on track to deliver the

SFDRR goal of disaster risk reduction at a national level. It was found that learning that has

emerged, particularly as a result of extreme flood emergencies, has resulted in many

improvements to the way civil protection is both, perceived by the public, and delivered by an

expanding network of practitioners, businesses, voluntary-sector and community groups.

The UK civil-protection sector and those responsible for its resourcing should not, however,

be complacent. Maintaining the current trend toward including the wider population in

resilience building is an admirable aspiration, but it is not a one-shot undertaking. This will

require on-going and honest engagement by practitioners with appropriate negotiating skills

and resources, and who are able to foster relationships. If facilitated effectively there is no

reason why such networks should not be able to continue to develop increasingly ambitious

plans and programmes and to deliver clear and quantifiable risk reduction outcomes across

a continuum of local to national scales.

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Appendix 1: The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2015)

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