july 20, 1969

6
LETTERS ambassador in error Bakimore. Md DEAR SIRS: The article on Brazil by Dom Bonafede in your May 26 issue [“Blunder in Brazll. Washington Backs the Pooh Bahs”] contams a number of hlstorlcal errors which call for correctlon . . . The charge that the US armed forces “acted as coun- sel and banker” to the BradIan armed forces when they deposed JOaG Goulart in 1964 has no foundatlon what- soever As I testlfied m Senate hearings in 1966, that ac- tion was a purely Brazilian affair. We not only did not instigate it but were unaware of a serious movement to that end until a few days before It happened . . . I did welcome the revolutlon when It took place because the speeches and actlons of Goulart over the prevlous nlne months, and especially from March 13 through March 30, 1964, made It crystal clear that he was embarked on an effort to estabhsh a Populist dlctatorship of his own, In the pattern of hls mentor Getullo Vargas three decades earlier I dld then believe, and st111 belleve, that success by Goulart in hn campalgn mlght well have led to a subsequent Communlst capture of power, because of Gou- lart’s own weakness . . . The charge that I later became a “virtual viceroy” to President Castelo Branco and “was consulted at every turn” is equally unfounded My relations with Castelo Branco were cordial and frlendly, but he consulted me less than President Kennedy consulted Davtd Ormsby- Gore in Washlngton. Our AID mlssion and I dld Indeed consult extenslvely and frequently with Plannlng Minlster Roberto Campos and Flnance Minister Octavio Bulhoes . . . The most extraordmary assertlon In Mr Bonafede’s artlcle is that the Flfth Instltutlonal Act of December 13, 1968, and the subsequent extremely arbitrary actlons of the present reglme, were “inevitable.” They were no more “inevitable” than the resignation of President Quadros in 1961. the clash between Castelo Branco and Carlos Lacerda, and many other critical events in Brazilian polltlcal history. Fen I wrote hopefully in July 1967 of prospects for constitutional democracy, it was because much evidence then pointed to the taking root of the 1967 constitution . . . with effective guarantees of press freedom ind of individual civd llbertles. I turned out to be wrong. . . . The real tragedy, which goes back to late 1964, 1s that neither Castelo Branm nor Presldent Costa e Silva made use of the opportunity to build a new politlcal infrastruc- ture for Brazilian representatwe government on a more stable basis than the three increasingly obsolete and lr- relevant polltlcal parties that dommated the scene from 1946 to 1964. From early 1965 on, I tned, as a frtendly outside observer, to make this point with Presldent Castelo Branco and his associates . . . It IS a true measure ofhow little a “viceroy” I was that these efforts made no headway. Lincoln Gordon Wadzingron, D. C. DEAR SIRS It seems that when on the defensive, Mr. Gor- don resorts to the blunderbuss technique of claimtng “his- torlcal error” on the part of his critics, as he did in re- sponse to my article in The Nafion, and earller to The New York Tzrnes editorial to which I made reference. However, in a glarlng oversight he fails to support his charge against the thesis of my article with substantwe evidence In no instance does he even attempt to cite one error of fact Instead, he makes an impassloned argument m defense of hls ambassadorial role durlng the 1964 Bra- zllian revolutlon. Yet he demolishes the appeal wlth hls own words As a case In point, he denles betng ~n on the ground (Conttnued on page 83) 66 EDITORIALS What Price Moondust? There is cause for genwne admiration, even awe, at wh,at the Apolloprogram has accompllshed At this wnt- ing, the spacecraft 1s on Its way, an,d there is reasonable expectation that the rest of the trip wtll be accompllshed on schedule. After the traglc failure in January of 1967, American engineering talent took hold, and the most com- plex machme ever concelved by man has performed almost faultlessly on every test. The courage and self-control of the astronauts is to be applmauded; there may even be some unforeseen benefit to mankmd m what they brlng back from the moon, but even the most unsurprlslng results wlll serve to extend human knowledge of the universe. But knjowledge of another type could be gamed from the undertaking. knowledge of ourselves Our natlonal responsetothe flrst Sputntkhas astonished the world- Includmg, probably, the Russians Its appearance In the skles on October 4, 1957, triggered U.S. production of adrenalln to a new record Not Pearl Harbor, nor Sen. . Joseph McCarthy’s discovery of the Communlst con- splracy, ha’d caused the collective Amerlcan pulse to pound at such a rate Had a flve-pomted Red Star, m place of the moon, been seen In the heavens the following nlght, our natlonal panlc could not have been greater. The event was subsequently alluded to In NASA’s public relatlons pronouncements as a “disaster.” creatlng a “nat~onal emer- gency Webb’s Magical Flymg Clrcus was off the ground from then on. Had there been no Soviet satelllitein 1957, Amermans would not by now be reachmg for the moon. Our whole space program has been fuelled by the U.S. relactlon to the fmt and subsequent Russlan explolts. A predictable, almost Pravlovlan reflex has developed; the Russians and the world have le’arned much, in the process, of what makes us tlck. Have we learned as much about ourselves7 Over the past twelve years, we have successlvely been challenged, enraged and spumed Into action-and have demonstrated to all our courage, strength, speed, ingenuity and technical sk~ll. The Russlans’ role in the lunar rlvalry may perhaps have been as reflexively competitwe as our own, or It may have boen more sophisticated and more subtly motivated. But wlth Luna 15, whlch was threatening at the last pos- sible moment to beat us to the moondust strlke (at a small fraction of the cost and risk), Pavlov’s bell rang once more. The sallva has already started to flow. Mr. Agnew has urged, as a new ob~ectlve, a landing on Mars. And T m a s 0. Pame, who succeeded James Webb as head of h.\SA, indlcates hls approval. It was Paine who, after the successful return of the Apollo 8 astronauts, defen,ded NASA’s budget by saying thatthe technology involved wou18d be hel’pfull m “wlnnmg” the next war, a comment thmat somewhat barnislhes the “Space Olympics” image of the moon race, ‘anda further reason for greet- ing the ‘agency’s mnnulal budget demands with more than leglslatlve huzzahs. THE NATION/IU~Y 28, 1969

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  • LETTERS ambassador in error Bakimore. Md DEAR SIRS: The article on Brazil by Dom Bonafede in your May 26 issue [Blunder in Brazll. Washington Backs the Pooh Bahs] contams a number of hlstorlcal errors which call for correctlon . . .

    The charge that the U S armed forces acted as coun- sel and banker to the BradIan armed forces when they deposed JOaG Goulart in 1964 has no foundatlon what- soever As I testlfied m Senate hearings in 1966, that ac- tion was a purely Brazilian affair. We not only did not instigate it but were unaware of a serious movement to that end until a few days before It happened . . .

    I did welcome the revolutlon when It took place because the speeches and actlons of Goulart over the prevlous nlne months, and especially from March 13 through March 30, 1964, made It crystal clear that he was embarked on an effort to estabhsh a Populist dlctatorship of his own, In the pattern of hls mentor Getullo Vargas three decades earlier I dld then believe, and st111 belleve, that success by Goulart in hn campalgn mlght well have led to a subsequent Communlst capture of power, because of Gou- larts own weakness . . .

    The charge that I later became a virtual viceroy to President Castelo Branco and was consulted at every turn is equally unfounded My relations with Castelo Branco were cordial and frlendly, but he consulted me less than President Kennedy consulted Davtd Ormsby- Gore in Washlngton. Our AID mlssion and I dld Indeed consult extenslvely and frequently with Plannlng Minlster Roberto Campos and Flnance Minister Octavio Bulhoes . . .

    The most extraordmary assertlon In Mr Bonafedes artlcle is that the Flfth Instltutlonal Act of December 13, 1968, and the subsequent extremely arbitrary actlons of the present reglme, were inevitable. They were no more inevitable than the resignation of President Quadros in 1961. the clash between Castelo Branco and Carlos Lacerda, and many other critical events in Brazilian polltlcal history. F e n I wrote hopefully in July 1967 of prospects for constitutional democracy, it was because much evidence then pointed to the taking root of the 1967 constitution . . . with effective guarantees of press freedom ind of individual civd llbertles. I turned out to be wrong. . . .

    The real tragedy, which goes back to late 1964, 1s that neither Castelo Branm nor Presldent Costa e Silva made use of the opportunity to build a new politlcal infrastruc- ture for Brazilian representatwe government on a more stable basis than the three increasingly obsolete and lr- relevant polltlcal parties that dommated the scene from 1946 to 1964. From early 1965 on, I tned, as a frtendly outside observer, to make this point with Presldent Castelo Branco and his associates . . . It IS a true measure of how little a viceroy I was that these efforts made no headway.

    Lincoln Gordon

    Wadzingron, D . C. DEAR SIRS It seems that when on the defensive, Mr. Gor- don resorts to the blunderbuss technique of claimtng his- torlcal error on the part of his critics, as he did in re- sponse to my article in The Nafion, and earller to The New York Tzrnes editorial to which I made reference.

    However, in a glarlng oversight he fails to support his charge against the thesis of my article with substantwe evidence In no instance does he even attempt to cite one error of fact Instead, he makes an impassloned argument m defense of hls ambassadorial role durlng the 1964 Bra- zllian revolutlon. Yet he demolishes the appeal wlth hls own words

    As a case In point, he denles betng ~n on the ground (Conttnued on page 83)

    66

    EDITORIALS What Price Moondust?

    There is cause for genwne admiration, even awe, at wh,at the Apollo program has accompllshed At this wnt- ing, the spacecraft 1s on Its way, an,d there is reasonable expectation that the rest of the trip wtll be accompllshed on schedule. After the traglc failure in January of 1967, American engineering talent took hold, and the most com- plex machme ever concelved by man has performed almost faultlessly on every test. The courage and self-control of the astronauts is to be applmauded; there may even be some unforeseen benefit to mankmd m what they brlng back from the moon, but even the most unsurprlslng results wlll serve to extend human knowledge of the universe.

    But knjowledge of another type could be gamed from the undertaking. knowledge of ourselves Our natlonal response to the flrst Sputntk has astonished the world- Includmg, probably, the Russians Its appearance In the skles on October 4, 1957, triggered U.S. production of adrenalln to a new record Not Pearl Harbor, nor Sen. . Joseph McCarthys discovery of the Communlst con- splracy, had caused the collective Amerlcan pulse to pound at such a rate Had a flve-pomted Red Star, m place of the moon, been seen In the heavens the following nlght, our natlonal panlc could not have been greater. The event was subsequently alluded to In NASAs public relatlons pronouncements as a disaster. creatlng a nat~onal emer- gency Webbs Magical Flymg Clrcus was off the ground from then on.

    Had there been no Soviet satelllite in 1957, Amermans would not by now be reachmg for the moon. Our whole space program has been fuelled by the U.S. relactlon to the f m t and subsequent Russlan explolts. A predictable, almost Pravlovlan reflex has developed; the Russians and the world have learned much, in the process, of what makes us tlck. Have we learned as much about ourselves7 Over the past twelve years, we have successlvely been challenged, enraged and spumed Into action-and have demonstrated to all our courage, strength, speed, ingenuity and technical sk~ll.

    The Russlans role in the lunar rlvalry may perhaps have been as reflexively competitwe as our own, or It may have boen more sophisticated and more subtly motivated. But wlth Luna 15, whlch was threatening at the last pos- sible moment to beat us to the moondust strlke (at a small fraction of the cost and risk), Pavlovs bell rang once more. The sallva has already started to flow. Mr. Agnew has urged, as a new ob~ectlve, a landing on Mars. And T m a s 0. Pame, who succeeded James Webb as head of h.\SA, indlcates hls approval. It was Paine who, after the successful return of the Apollo 8 astronauts, defen,ded NASAs budget by saying that the technology involved wou18d be helpfull m wlnnmg the next war, a comment thmat somewhat barnislhes the Space Olympics image of the moon race, and a further reason for greet- ing the agencys mnnulal budget demands with more than leglslatlve huzzahs.

    THE NATION/IU~Y 28, 1969

  • NASA has spent 8 total of $50 billion since the start, half of which has gone toward the Apollo program. Much has been qmte rightly sald about the uony of spending billions getting to the moon whde the mass of humanity at home lives in a stew of exploding population, poverty and pollution. But all that will be but as a pinprick in our hide, should we senously decide to strike out for the planets. They are more than a hundred times more remote than the moon in distance, in time, in economic and human cost. The time of decision is here, and the euphoria of the moment-however understandable it may be-must not be allowed to obscure our jud,gment.

    The ABM Debauch Before much was said about the ABM in the Senate,

    the public debate was conducted on a fairly high level. It involved technical questions, such as the workability of the proposed system, and questions of foreign policy: would deployment enhance or dimmish the chances of reaching an arms-limitation agreement with the Sovlet Union? W'hen the issue reached the Senate floor, the usua! thmg happened-the debate plunged from intellectual re- spons~blllty into a political debauch, with the Nixon Ad- ministration and the mllltary-industrial complex bidding for the vo'tes of the uncommltted Senators, and some of the latter holding out for the best price they could get in the way o tangible benefits for important Interests in their respective states, and the promotion of their own political Interests.

    It 1s a natural and perhaps inevitable descent. The tech- nical questions are intricate, and few members of Con- gress possess the background necessary to differentiate between heuristic arguments and those based on objective engineering analysis. Such matters are alien to their tem- peraments and remote from their experience. Nor are the majority of Senators and Representatives any more in- clined to take a statesmanlike vlew of the great political questions that the country faces at home and abroad. To a man, they esteem themselves as patriots, but nothing is easier for a politicmn than to identify his own interests with those of the country-especially when the latter in- volve the dilemmas posed by 20th-century technology in the service of 19th-century traditions and institutions.

    What the ordinary Congressman does understand is power politics, whether m the international arena or in the give-and-take of the legislative process. Getting himself reelected, and increasing hls influence among his col- leagues, are the objectives closest to his heart Thus the story by John Finney in the July 16 New York Tunes, "ABM Debate Is Becommg a Pol'ltlcal Struggle for the Votes of 3 or 4 Sen'ators," though it makes depressing readlng, does not come as a surprise. Technical, military and diplomatic arguments may play some part, but such issues as oil drilling m Alaska, a nuclear rocket for New Memco, a supersonic transport for the state of Washing- ton, a Naval shipyard in Maine, become the preoccupying considerations. And so do promises and pressures known TfIB NATION/JUIY 28, 1969

    IN THIS ISSUE Iuly 28, 1969

    EDITORIALS 66

    ARTICLES 70 New Poliltics:

    More Mood Than Movement Jack Newfield

    73 Latin America: Challenge from the Intellectuals

    Manuel Maldonado-Denis

    76 The Disney Imperative Wesley Marx

    78 Out To Get the Panthers L . F . Palmer, Jr.

    82 Harry Golden

    BOOKS Q THE ARTS 84 Kremllnology. Power and

    Terror David Joravsky 86 The Poetry of Earth Armand Schwerner 87 Las Angeles' Golden Goose Anne Strick 88 Accldent (poem) Wdllarn Pillin 89 Book Marks Sara Blackburn 90 Theatre Harold Clurman 92 Art Lawrence Alloway 92 The Poor Man Moves Through

    Washmgton, D.C . Spring 1968 (poem) Eugene Ruggles

    93 Music David Hamdton

    JAMES J STORROW JR Publasher Assoclate Publisher

    GIFFORD PHluIpS Editor Assoclate Editor

    CAREY McWILLIAMS PmL KERBY Executive Editor Literary Editor

    ROBERT HATCH BEVERLY GROSS Copy Editor, MARION HESS; Poetry Edltor, ALLEN PLANZ; Theat re , HAROLD CLURMAN; Art, MAX KOZLOFF, Music, BENJAMIN BORETZ. Science. CARL DREHER: Advertismn Manager, MARY SIMON

    - Editorial Associate, ERNEST GRUENMG

    Washington, ROBERT G SHERRILL, London, RAYMOND WILLIAMS, Paris, CLAUDE BOURDET: Bonn, C AMERY; Csnberra, C P FITZGERALD, UN, ANNE TUCKERMAN. The Nation IS published each week (except for the omlssion of tour Issues) by the Natlon Cornpaw and COpvrlght 1969 In the U.S.A. by the Natlon Associates, Inc , 333 Slxth Avenue, New York. N Y. 10014. Tel CH 2-8400 West Coast offlce 825 South Barrlngton Avenue, Los Anseles, Cahf 90049 Second class Postage pald at New York, N Y. and at dddltlonal mallme offlce Address nll manuscripts nnd odi- torial correspondence to the New York office. Subscr~~tion Price: One Year, $10. two years. S18 Add $1 per Year Postage for Canada and Mexico, 12 other forelon Change Of Address: It IS ersentlal that subscrlbers oraerlna I chanoe of address slve flve weeks' notice and PrOVlde thew old as well as thew new address Please glve ZIP Code numbers for both addresser.

    lnformatlon to Llbrrrles: The Nation 1s Indexed In Readers' Gulde I the Publlc Affairs lnforrnatlon Ssrvlce. Perlodlcal Llterature. Book Revlew Dlgest, Book Revlew Index and

    67

  • ~~

    SUMMER SCHEDULE During the summer, The Nation will not appear ( ~ 1

    the following dates: July 21, August 4, August 18. 1 I

    only to those concerned. Finney puts it as 0 common pre- mnption that Sen. John G . Tower of Texas, the chair- man of ~e Senate Republican Campaign Committee, was instrumental in shifting the vote of Sen. Winston L. Prouty, Vermont Republican, mto the pro-ABM column, when It had been widely expected that he would line up with his senior colleague, Sen. George D. Alken, one of the ABMs principal opponents.

    Or bake the case of a New Englander 0n the other side sf the aisle, Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre of New Hampshire, who at this wrltlng is one of the uncommitted. He is the i@ha of a proposed compromise plan under which radar and computers, but not missllcs, would be Installed at l ~ e initial two Safeguard sites. This is a one-sided com- prmise: one can be pretty sure that the missiles would follow, but since the Administration is obdunate on pas- sage of the complete system, the partlal installation satis- his no one and the amendment IS expected to lose. Sena- tor McIntyres inclinations are belleved to be against de- ployment, but he has h ~ s worries. One is the pro-ABM Manchester Union Leader, t,he largest (and most venom- ous) newspaper @ New Hampshire. Then Mr. McIntyre is understandably reluctant to lock horns with Sen. John C. Stemis, who is chaimrman of the Armed Services Commit- tee, of which Mr. McIntyre is a jmim member. Nor can he afford to antagonize the Defense Department, which wants to close ,the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.

    ~ Yet the vote on the ABM is expected to be close and, Mr. Aiken pointed out, if the Administration prevails

    it might be a Pyrrhic victory, since the opposition will have shown formidable strength. As always, Sen. John Sheman Cooper has been a leader on the side of reason. Suoh men are not invited to the White House sand sub- jacted to the Presidential blandishments; it would be a waste of time all around. Frank Church of Idaho is an- other of this stalwart band. The ABM controversy elicited from Church a brilliant speech on foreign policy which was released July 11 and seems to have produced hardly a ripple of interest in the press. hk. Church points out that regardless of the outcome of

    the ABM debate, our military budget will not shrink sig- r6fioantly as long as our foreign commitments remain at the present level and there is no determined opposition to

    policy abroad that rests upon the premise that we must be ever ready not only to repel an attack but to engage in as many as three foreign wars simultaneously. If we can but liberate ourselves from ideological obsession, Church B ~ S , from the automatic association of social revolution with oom,mumsm and of communism with Soviet or Chi- nese power, we may find it possible to discriminate among disorders in the world and to evaluate them with greater objectivity, which is to say, more on the basis of their own

    6p

    mntent and less on the basis of our own fears. Such ob- servations serve to remind us that the degradation of plt- tics is by no means universal and that men of intellect and enlightened judgment do manage to get into Congress- and sometimes to stay there.

    The Indicted Diplomat David Dellinger has organized numerous demonstra-

    tions against the Vietnamese War and is under lndlctment in Chicago on charges arising out of the clashes during the Democratic National Convention last August. More recently he has been functioning as the American negotia- tor for the release of three U.S. fliers, offered by the North Vietnamese (not without ulterior motives) to assist in the celebration of the American Independence Day. In these negotiations Mr. Dellinger is in effect representing the State Department, which made it clear to the U.S. Attorney in Chicago and the federal judge having jurisdic- tion thfat the travel restrictions imposed by the indictment should be lifted to enable Dellinger to fIy to Paris. On July 8 the State Depafiment confirmed th.at Dellin-

    ger had arrived in Paris to confer with North Vietnamese officials abowt the release of the prisoners. Dellinger re- turned to the United States on July 12 and told reporters at Kennedy International Airpo,rt that a team of negotia- tors, of the same persuasion as himself, would leave shortly for North Vietnam to brmg the men back. He added that he had assurances thcat the U.S. Army would not inter- cept the released prisloners atter they left Hanoi (see The Petty Route Home by Howard Zinn, The Nation. April 1, 1968) and that the arrangements precluded their assignment to further war activities against North Viet- nam.

    Of cou,rse Mr. Dellinger did not act officially on behalf of the U.S. Government. He went to Paris in his capacity as chaiqman of the National Mobilization Commitkee to End the War in Vietnam. The Nomh Vietnamese had re- quested that #a delegation representing the Amerioan peace movement be sent to arrange for the repatriation of the prisoners. The State Department had no choice but to comply or leave itself open to the accusation &hat it had refused to cooperate in the freeing of the men. Thus it came labout that an arch-peacenik was empowered to o n - duct the talks instead of Ambassador Henry C a h t Lodge, who is not having conspicuous success in the broader task of negotiating an end to the war.

    These odd, though nat unprecedented, negotilations throw still another revealing light on the politioal schizo- phrenia of @he Nixon Administr,ation. A few days before Mr. Dellinger flew ,to Paris, our fatuous Vice Resident rebuked U.S. critics of the Vietnamese War for allegedly undermining our negotiations for peace and p longing the war. It is not enough that those who warned SUC- cessive administrations against the course that led us into Ohe qwagmire shoulld be ignored-now it is they who are prolonging the war! Yet m the DelQnger matter it is most unlikely that the State Department acted without Presiden-

    w m NATION/JU~V 28, 1%9

  • tial approval. If so, one of the principal peace activists was assignd by the Nixon Administration to a mission that could not be handled effectively m any other way. Evidently these people have their uses. And where does that leave Mr. Agnew?

    Security in HEW The Department of Health, Education and Welfare

    clings to a security system so redolent of the Joe McCarthy . era that it sometimes bars from its consultative commit-

    tees scientists who are serving the Department of Defense in the same capacity. An investigation conducted under the direction of Bryce Nelson and reported in the June 27 issue of Science implies that HEW is perhaps the most hagridden of the Executive depa~ments-and with the least excuse. The magazine found that several professors who were serving on high-level Defense Department or

    - National Science Foundation advisory panels were not clearable by HEW.

    That such HEW organizations as the National Insti- tutes of Health or the National Institute of Mental Health should be so afflicted, and should continue to spread their contagions among the countqs physicians, psyohologists and life scientists, is surely a matter warranting the early attention of Secretary Robert Finch himself. What he says-and more, what he does-will go far toward en- abling the scienti,fic community to gauge his ultimate stand in the political conflicts raging within the Nixon Adminis- tration, and to make thei,r organizational Nand personal decisions accordingly.

    While HEW has some 100,000 staff employees, Science was not,concerned with fihese. lts investigation was limited to the advisory groups, which draw on outside scientists for counsel. These groups are largely composed of scien- tists not emploved by bhe government. They are custom- arily recruited for a few days a year at a fee of, usually, $50 a day plus expenses, practically always on nonsensi-

    - tive, nonsmrity mattens. Why such people should be so rigidly screened is understandable only on the hypothesis that since it is not a defense agency, HEW is so harried by fear of Congressional budget cuts, in reprisal for re- fusal to continue zealous engagement in the witch hunt, that it will do almost anything to avoid suspicion.

    But this defensive posture entails two consequences which should concern Secretary Finch and his top sub- ordinates. One is that debarments on security or suit- ability grounds may deprive the department of assistance from the men best qualified. The other effect concerns the scientists themselves. If you havent been )asked to be on one of these groups, one sctentist noted, It looks as if you havent made it in your field.

    When questioned by Science, Secretary Finch said that he was looking into the matter of security and suitability checks for HEW advisory groups. But he must do more than look; if he does not act, inertia will continue to rule in the lower reaches of the bureaucpacy. One HEW of- ficial remarked: Most officials take the course of least resistance; we dont have enough people with guts in gov-

    THE NATION/JUIY 28, 1969

    ernnent. A former head of the National Institute dl Mental Health feels that many people In government m scared all the time. They are afraid that if they protcst the security system, the secu,riity people may stam to won- der about them.

    Of course, Science concludes, with some display of interest from Secretary Finch or from the White House, the whole system of swwity checks for partltime advisers in nonsensitive areas could be thoroughly reviewed and revised. If this were done at the initiative of the present occupant of the White House, it would be something of a miracle, bat perhaps Mr. Finch can steer one of Mr. Nixons ztgzags in ,the right direction.

    The Loss of Mboya A few weeks after the murder of Tom Mboya on a

    street in Nambi, world opinion seems it0 be gravitating to the opinion that the deed was a poht~cal assassination brought about by strains within Kenya. It is know^ that Mboya himself, who two years ago was fired upon by a sentry (officially declared deranged) stationed to guaia his house, believed that developments in Kenya inoreakd his personal danger. According to The New York Tim8, on his last trip to Amerioa he told friends here that the general elections planned by President Kenyatta for lator in the year would inevitably call upon hi,m, 0s secretary general of the Presidents party, io play a leading role, and thsat his enemies would be spurred to silence him. And on a plrane ret,wning to Africa, he wrote to one d these friends, saying that he had determimd to hire the body- guard his American wellwishers had been urgimg on him.

    One thing that hlis foes held against him was that Mboya liked and was table to communicate wilth Ameri- cans. And another thing was that he had moved out of the tribal context that stdl thwarts African development tn all the new states south of the Sahara, and stood as a leader of his natlon. As the New Statesman remarked recently, the fact that he had no tribal base was at once his greatest polltical weakness and his greatwt potential contribution to Kenya. Mboya rose to prominence in a highly contemporary m,anner: hmis support from the skmt came from the detribalized workers and unemployed of the cities, Nairobi and Mombasa, and he acted for them as a modem trade union politxian, educating thein, the New Statesman continues, in nationalist politics,

    Tribalism is a sentiment of great emotional power- indeed emotion is the essence of its power-and bow may well have spumed it at the cost of hu life. Whether or not *hat was the reason, and whether or not we eves know the reason, it is clear that Kenpa, as well as the rest of Africa and indeed the international community, has suf- fered a loss it cannot easlly overcome. Mboya was prob- ably admired more widely than he was beloved-he never minced words mover whlat he saw as the problems ahead,

    -and he never tailored his words to the expectations of his audience. He wrote recently in The New York Times Magazine that whereas there were many similarities be- tween the African and black Amerlcan struggles f o r polit-

    ap

  • icd and euonom,ic freedom, black Amerioam sihould not hope to flnd an escape for the problems stdl confrontlng them in any back to ABlca movement, m fact or m spirit. He was a very modern man, of whom Mrioa has too bw; and he was a very stnaightforward political lead- er, of whom the world has too few.

    More Fat for the Germans In ( a n innocuous story (buried on the back pages of

    most local newspapers), the Associated Press recently in- dioated that West Germany would cover about 80 per cent of #&he cost of matntainmg U S . forces in Germany for the next two years, leaving but a mmimal dram on the U.S. balance of payments. As rts part of the bargain, West Germany will buy a b u t $295 mdlion m U.S. goods &d smv~ces (presumlably instruments of war). The agree- ment hather provldes that Bsonn will lend the United States an additional $760 milllon per year.

    And is thk supposed to reimburse the American Bax- payers for money spent on military forces in Ger,many? We spend bd1,nons m Germany on mllltary installations, and the Germans kindly agree to lend us funds! Mean- Whil,e the German economy becomes stronger, and the German mark among the strongest cjull;rencles in the world.

    By continuing this wasteful policy, the American Gov- m e n t adds to the German cotfers while mismg taxes at home. WorGt d all, borrowing abroad in order to spend abroad stimulates idlation, land Amencans wlll pay dwbly for this govement folly.

    NEW POLITICS

    The Resistance For a long time, almost the only effectlve COngreSSiOnd

    opposition to the Uetnamese War was furnished by Sena- tors Gruening and Morse, who simply refused to approve the money. Deaf to the argument that they were letting the boys down, they voted no on the apprOpriatlOn bills. They knew how fraudulent ahat argument was. There is always enoqgh miaterial in the pipe line to sup- port combat aotivltles, whether defensive or offenswe, for an indefinite period.

    Now that Gruenmg land Morse, to the countrys loss, are no longer in the Senate, others have adopted Oheir courageous tactx, and in far greater numbers. On July 9, forty-nme Representatives voted against the Supplemental Approprlatlon bdl, which not only contatned funds for Vietnam but increased the amount. These forty-nine oast negative votes, despite the fact h t the b,dl provided funds for domestic purposes to which they had no ob- jection.

    The overrldmg objective was to show disapproval of the war in the most emphattc terms .available t o a member of Congress. The best people in the Holuse are on that roll of honor Brown, Burton land Edwards of California, Mrs. Ghlsholm, Conyers, Dlggs, Farbstem, Kastenmeler, Ottinger, Podell, Rosenthal, Ryan, Saylor, Scheuer among them. One may hope they wdl be joined by a still greater number who will vote against any appropr