july 1: what is the role of international organizations and do they really matter? abbot, kenneth...
TRANSCRIPT
July 1: What is the role of international organizations and do they really matter?
Abbot, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42:3-32.
Last class take-home point
• Analytical tool: – Time inconsistent preference problem– A.K.A. (also known as):
• Commitment problem• Present bias
Do IOs matter?
Dramatic action
• United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Libya
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in North Korea
• United Nations (UN) peacekeepers in the Middle East
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Bosnia
• The Uruguay Round the World Trade Organization (WTO) & the dispute settlement mechanism
Ongoing action:
• Global health policy (the WHO)
• Development (the World Bank)
• Monetary policy (the International Monetary Fund)
• Participation reduces the chances of war among members
• Participation increases the chances of democracy
Various sizes:
• From:
– Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) - $2 million budget (pays for their annual meeting?)
• To:
– European Union (EU) - verging on a sovereign state
– World Bank - >10,000 employees from 160 countries (2/3 in Washington)
– IMF (Aug. 2008: $341 billion)
Specialized agencies:
• ILO– http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/lang--en/index.htm
• ICAO – http://www.icao.int/icao/en/howworks.htm
• FAO– http://www.fao.org/about/about-fao/en/
• Others:– UNEP
• http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=43
– EBRD • http://www.ebrd.com/about/index.htm
Finding research on IOs:
• Google Scholar!!! http://scholar.google.com/
• ISI Web of Science http://isiknowledge.com/
IOs allow for:
• CENTRALIZATION– A concrete and stable organizational structure and an
administrative apparatus managing collective activities• May allow for immediate action (UN Security Council)• Or for specialization (OECD has >200 working groups)• May have flexible design (IMF voting structure) or be rigid
(UN Security Council)
• INDEPENDENCE– The ability/authority to act with a degree of autonomy
within defined spheres
Rational choice perspective:
• LEADERS found/use IOs when benefits of cooperation outweigh (sovereignty) costs
• IOs produce collective goods in PD settings & solve coordination problems
• Coordination problems?– E.g., Battle of the sexes game
PD settings?
• Prisoner's dilemma
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ED9gaAb2BEw&feature=related
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p3Uos2fzIJ0
Prisoner's Dilemma:
• A non-cooperative, non-zero-sum game. (Mixed game of cooperation and conflict.)
• Individual rationality brings about collective irrationality.
Example…
– You're reading Tchaikovsky's music on a train back in the USSR.
– KGB agents suspect it's secret code.
– They arrest you & a "friend" they claim is Tchaikovsky.
– "You better tell us everything. We caught Tchaikovsky, and he's already talking…"
• You know that this is ridiculous – they have no case.
• But they may be able to build a case using your testimony and "Tchaikovsky's."
• If you "rat" out your "friend" – they will reduce your sentence.
• If not, they will throw the book at you.
Player 2
Player 1Cooperate
w/friend Defect (rat)
Cooperate w/friend -3, -3 -25, -1
Defect (rat) -1, -25 -10, -10
• The same situation can occur whenever "collective action" is required.
• The collective action problem is also called the "n-person prisoner's dilemma."
• Also called the "free rider problem."
• "Tragedy of the commons."
• All have similar logics and a similar result:
– Individually rational action leads to collectively suboptimal results.
Is cooperation ever possible in Prisoner's Dilemma?
• Yes
• In repeated settings
• Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
• So, IOs facilitate cooperation by coordinating states on superior equilibria/outcomes
• And lower the transaction costs of doing so
Alternatives to the rational-institutionalist perspective
Realist theory
• States do not cede to supranational institutions the strong enforcement capacities necessary to overcome international anarchy
• Thus, IOs and similar institutions are of little interest
• They merely reflect national interests and power and do not constrain powerful states
• Does realism = rational choice?
• Realism focuses on state interests - ignores microfoundations (leader incentives, domestic politics)
Constructivist theory
• Where to ideas and preferences come from?
• Focus on norms, beliefs, knowledge, and (shared) understandings
• IOs are the result of international ideas, and in turn contribute towards shaping the evolution of international ideas
• Vital for the understanding of major concepts such as legitimacy and norms
Abbot & Snidal:
States use IOs to…
• Reduce transaction costs;
• Create information, ideas, norms, and expectations;
• Carry out and encourage specific activities;
• Legitimate or delegitimate particular ideas and practices;
• Enhance their capacities and power
Principal-Agent framework
• IOs are thus "agents"
• Their (biggest) members are the "principals"
• Agency slack?
– "bureaucratic" perspective
The principal-agent problem
• The agent works for the principal
• The agent has private information
• The principal only observes an outcome
• Must decide to reelect/pay/rehire/keep the agent
• If standards are too low, the agent “shirks”
• If standards are too high, the agent gives up
• We need a Goldilocks solution – set standards “just right.”
• We may have to accept some an “information rent”
– Either pay extra or accept agency slack (corruption?)
Nature chooses the state of the world (“luck”)
GovernmentGood
Bad
High Effort/skill
Low Effort/skill
High Effort/skill
Low Effort/skill
Government
VoterReelect
Not
• If reelection criteria are too high, the government will not supply effort when exogenous conditions are bad.
• If reelection criteria are too low, the government will not supply effort when conditions are good.
• What should you do?
• Intuition: It depends on the probability of good/bad conditions & on the difference in outcomes when conditions are good/bad…
Solution?
• TRANSPARENCY?
Public choice/Bureaucratic theory
• IOs are like any bureaucracy
• Allow governments to reward people with cushy jobs
• The bureaucracy is essentially unaccountable
• Seek to maximize their budgets
• Look for things to do
Back to rational-institutionalist view…
What do IOs do for their members?
• Pooling resources (IMF/World Bank, World Health Organization) - share costs, economies of scale
• Direct joint action - e.g., military (NATO), financial (IMF), dispute resolution (WTO)
LAUNDERING
• Allow states to take (collective) action without taking direct responsibility (or take responsibility with IO support)
• Examples:– The IMF does the dirty work
– UN Security Council resolutions - a form of laundering?
• When an IO legitimates retaliation, states are not vigilantes but upholders of community norms, values, and institutions
• Korean War - The United States cast essentially unilateral action as more legitimate *collective* action by getting UN Security Council approval
Neutrality• Providing information
– Really? http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jrv24/IMFforecasts.html
• Collecting information– Really! http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jrv24/transparency.html
• Example– Blue helmets: – http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O0n2-
YpwPWY&feature=PlayList&p=BBF5269792FC9ED6&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=15
Community representative
Legitimacy
• Articulate norms? http://goodliffe.byu.edu/papers/catcascade2.pdf
• Universal Jurisdiction (more than a norm - a legal standard) – The CAT
• Honduras and the OAS??
Enforcement?
• The problem of endogeneity– 100% Compliance may mean the IO is doing
*nothing*– Be careful what conclusions we draw from
observations
• Compliance is meaningful only if the state takes action it would not take in the absence of the IO
• IMF/World Bank CONDITIONALITY
Answers to today's question:• IO's reduce transaction costs - costs of doing
business & coordinate on superior equilibria
• Enabling members to have:– LAUNDERING– Neutrality– Community representative– Enforcement– Legitimacy - shared beliefs that coordinate actors
regarding what actions should be accepted, tolerated, resisted, or stopped
• To these ends IOs are created centralized & independent
Analytical tools
• Time inconsistent preference problem / Commitment problem / Present bias
• Research networking
• Prisoner’s dilemma
• Principal-Agent framework
• Realist theory
• Constructivist theory
• Public choice/Bureaucratic theory
Thank you