judgment on the pleadings to remedies minus tuazon v ca

8/12/2019 Judgment on the Pleadings to Remedies Minus Tuazon v CA

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-33695 May 15, 1989

MANUFACTURER'S BANK & TRUST CO., petitioner,

vs.

DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIES, INC., and ALFONSO TAN, respondents

Calapatia, Gaviola & Associates for petitioner.

Antonio N. Lucero, Jr. for respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The propriety of a judgment on the pleadings is the principal issue in the case at

bar. The rule is set out in Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings.Where an answer fails to tender an issue,

or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the

court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. ..

Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of

Manila for the recovery of a sum of money against Diversified Industries, Inc. and

Alfonso Tan. 1 The complaint alleged. 2

2. That on December 17, 1963 the defendants were granted a loan in the form of an

agreement for credit in current account in the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE

THOUSAND PESOS (P125,000.00) with interest at the rate of 10% per annumcomputed upon average daily balances, a copy of the xx Agreement for Credit in

Current Account .. (being attached) as Annex "A" ..

3. That the loan became due and pay able on February 26, 1965, but the defendants

failed and refused to liquidate their obligations, leaving an outstanding balance of

P100,119.21 as of June 25, 1965;

4. That by reason of the unjust refusal on the part of the defendants to satisfy their

just and valid obligation upon maturity, the plaintiff was compelled to engage the

services of counsel for a fee equivalent to 10% of the total sum due which the

defendants have expressly agreed to pay in accordance with the terms of theagreement, Annex "A".

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed .. that judgment be rendered in favor of

the plaintiff ordering the defendant to pay:

a) the sum of P100,119.27 plus interest thereon from June 26, 1965 until complete

payment is made;

b) the sum equivalent to 10% of the total sum due as attorney's fees;

c) the costs of suit.

PLAINTIFF prays for such other remedy as this Honorable Court may deem just and

equitable under the premises.

In their answer, 3 the defendants admitted the averments of paragraph 2 of the

complaint (and paragraph 1 thereof relative to the parties' personal circumstances);

but they professed to have no "sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief

as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 and,

therefore, .. (denied) the same."

Manufacturers Bank moved for judgment on the p leadings. 4 It adverted to the

defendants' admissions of the parties' personal circumstances and "the fact that thedefendants were granted a loan in the form of an Agreement for Credit in Current

Account in the sum of P125,000.00 with interest at the rate of 10% per annum

computed upon average daily balances, a copy of which agreement has been

attached as Annex A of the complaint." It also branded as contrived and

inefficacious the defendants' profession of lack of knowledge of "the fact that the

loan was due and payable on February 26, 1965 and that the same has been

unliquidated as of the time that the complaint was filed," as well as the fact "of

attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total sum due since

1) the Agreement for Credit in Current Accountwhich the defendants had

expressly admitted

clearly stated that the loan would automatically be due andpayable on February 26, 1965 and that attorney's fees would be payable at the rate

of 10% of amount due, and hence, it was not credible for them to claim to have no

knowledge of the transactions in question, including the drawing they had made in

virtue of the agreement; and

2) by letter dated October 18, 1966, written to Manufacturers Bank by defendant

Alfonso Tan, as President of Diversified Industries (copy attached to the motion),

the latter had requested that they be allowed to pay the obligation by installments

at the rate of P20,000.00 every six (6) months until the same was paid in full.

The defendants, Diversified Industries and Tan, filed an opposition to the bank's

motion for judgment on the pleadings. 5 They alleged that neither the amounts


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drawn against the overdraft account nor the current balance due from them, were

within the knowledge either of Alfonso Tanbecause he was a mere "guarantor"

or even of Diversified Industriesbecause its account officer had long since

resigned, and moreover, they could not be expected to know the attorney's fees

that Manufacturers Bank had undertaken to pay to its attorney. They also theorized

that since there was no allegation that they had in fact made drawings against the

overdraft account, no obligation to pay a sum of money had been pleaded and

therefore, the complaint failed to state a cause of action.On the same date the defendants filed a motion for leave to amend their answer,

and the amended answer itself. 6 Their motion alleged that their original pleading

had failed to embody their true plea respecting every material allegation of the

complaint and had failed to set forth their affirmative defenses. Their amended

answer

1) again admitted the execution of the Agreement for Credit in Current Account but

stressed that (a) at time of execution and delivery of the agreement, the bank had

not disbursed a single centavo, and (b) the agreement failed to reflect the true

intent of the parties which was that Tan, as "guarantor" of Diversified Industries,

was merely an 94 accommodation party;

2) denied (a) the claim that defendants' obligation had become due on February 26,

1965 as expressly stipulated because the bank had extended the term of payment

at said defendants' behest; (b) having knowledge of the veracity of the claim that

their outstanding balance was P100,119.21 as of June 25, 1961; and (c) having

knowledge of Manufacturers Bank's engagement of counsel for a fee of 10% of the

total amount due; and

3) set up the following "affirmative defenses:" (a) Tan was meant to be only a

guarantor of Diversified Industries, with the benefit of excursion and since this was

not expressed in the agreement, the agreement failed to express the parties' realintention; (b) the term of the agreement had been renewed without Tan's consent

and therefore, the guaranty had been extinguished; (c) there had been no demand

for payment before suit was instituted; (d) alternatively, Tan's hability, if not that of

a guarantor, was solidary only as regards payment of interest and merely joint as

regards payment of the principal; and (e) the complaint fails to state a cause of

action.

The Court denied the defendants' motion for leave to amend their answer and

rendered judgment on the pleadings. 7 It opined that the original answer failed to

tender any issue, the defendants' asserted lack of knowledge or information

regarding matters principally and necessarily within their knowledge could not beconsidered a specific denial. It disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants, Diversified

Industries, Inc. and Alfonso Tan to pay the plaintiff the sum of One Hundred

Thousand One Hundred Nineteen Pesos and Twenty Se ven Centavos (P100,119.27),

with interest thereon at the legal rate, from 26 June 1965 until fully paid, plus the

sum of 110% on the amount due as and for attorney's fees. Costs against

defendants.

From this judgment appeal was taken to this Court on questions of law by the

defendants as well as the plaintiff, Manufacturers Bank.

Manufacturers Bank faults the Trial Court for (1) not specifying the defendants'

liability to it to be joint and several; and (2) requiring payment by defendants of

interest only at the legal rate instead of that stipulated in their agreement.

On the other hand, Diversified Industries and Alfonso Tan ascribe the following

errors to the Court a quo: (1) refusing to admit their amended answer; (2) not

dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action; and (3) rendering

judgment on the pleadings.

Of no little significance is the fact that the motion to amend the answer was

presented only after two (2) years had lapsed from the date of its filing, and only

after the plaintiff had drawn attention to its patent and grave imperfections and

moved for judgment on the pleadings. Equally noteworthy is that defendants never

challenged the authenticity of their letter to the bank dated October 18, 1966,

advising that they had made, thru an Atty. Colayco, payment on their account and

requesting that they be allowed to pay their obligation by installments at the rate of

P20,000.00 every six (6) months. 8 These facts, considered conjointly with the

admissions expressly made in the pleadings and those reasonably inferable

therefrom, dictate a verdict in favor of the plaintiff bank.

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the amendment of the answer in

substantial aspects was not a matter of right, 9 but lay in the discretion of the

Court. 10 Where amendment is not a matter of right, a bare assertion of a desire to

amend the pleading because certain matters had not been therein alleged, or the

submission of an amended one, without more, is obviously not sufficient. It is

needful to state to the Court some reasonable ground justifying its exercise of

discretion to allow amendment. 11 Indeed, the Rules elsewhere provide that

judicial admissions "can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been

made through palpable mistake." 12 It is thus incumbent upon a party desiring to

amend his pleading, in other words, to furnish the Court with some adequate

foundation for it to grant leave to amend the pleading. This was not done by the

defendants. Their motion merely declared that they had failed to include certainallegations and defenses in their original answer, but gave no explanation for their


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failure to do so at the time they drew up that pleading or within a reasonable time

thereafter, and why they had not essayed such amendment until after two (2) years

and only after their receipt of plaintiff bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings

which cited certain serious defects of their answer. The absence of such an

explanation, and the implicit admission of liability in their letter of October 18, 1966

requesting that they be permitted to pay in installments of P20,000.00 every six (6)

months not unreasonably engendered the belief in the mind of the Court a quo that

their motion had been "made with intent to delay the action" 13 by relieving themfrom the effects of their judicial admissions without a showing of palpable mistake,

or other acceptable absolutory cause.

An analysis of the amended answer readily discloses its lack of merit if not its arrant

sophistry, adding persuasiveness to the Trial Court's resolution of the controversy.

The claim that defendant Tan was only an "accommodation party" or a "guarantor,"

or that he was solidarily bound only as regards interest, flies in the teeth of the

Agreement for Credit in Current Account. The agreement clearly and categorically

expresses the solidary character of the obligations of Tan and his firm, who are

referred to jointly as the "First Party."

The First Party agree to be jointly and severally bound by and to comply with the

following terms and conditions:

xxx xxx xxx

3. The principal and interest of this loan shall be due and become payable on

demand by the Second Party (Manufacturers Bank) whether in writing or otherwise;

Provided, That in any case, this loan shall automatically be due and become payable

and this agreement be terminated on February 26, 1965, without necessity of

demand.

The denials in the amended answer are cut from the same bolt as those in the

original answer. They are sham denials, consisting of an avowed lack of knowledge

of facts which could not but be clearly known to the defendants or ought to be or

could quite easily have been known by them. 14 Their disclaimer of knowledge of

the amount of their outstanding balance is implausible, but even if true, cannot be

deemed a proper denial because concerning something they could very easily have

learned or verified had they wished to. Their disclaimer of knowledge of the

amount of the fee undertaken to be paid by the Manufacturers Bank to its

attorneys is immaterial because not prayed for in the complaint, the claim being in

fact for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due, as expressly

stipulated in the contract. And the averment that their obligation was not yet due

because plaintiff bank had extended the term of payment is also specious, being

contrary to the defendants' written request to the bank that they be allowed to

repay their loan in stated installments.

The correctness, therefore, of the Trial Court's denial of the motion to amend

answer and the propriety of the assailed judgment on the pleadings are beyond

civil. Amendment in the circumstances was clearly subject to said Court's discretion

the exercise of which cannot be faulted; and the defendants' original answer in

truth tendered no issue, or otherwise admitted the allegations of the complaint

material and necessary to a valid decision. 15

Finally, since the Agreement for Credit on Current Account plainly declares both

Diversified Industries and Alfonso Tan jointly and severally liable for both principal

and interest on the loan, the interest being fixed at 10% per annum, it was error for

the Trial Court to decline to so hold them both solidarily liable, and to set the

interest payable at the legal rate instead of the stipulated rate of 10% of the total

amount due.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED WITH THE

MODIFICATION that the liability to Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. of Diversified

Industries, Inc. and Alfonso Tan is pronounced to be joint and several, and theinterest payable on their obligation is fixed at 10% per annum of the total amount

due, in accordance with the Agreement of Credit on Current Account, with costs

against the latter.

Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.


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SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 74766 December 21, 1987

DOMINGO VERGARA, SR., petitioner,

vs.

HON. JOSE T. SUELTO Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Davao City,

Branch IV, MANOLITO GUINOO ROMEO MONTEBON and PORFERIO CABASE

respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Two issues are involved in the instant special civil action of mandamus. The first is

whether or not the appropriateness of a summary judgment may ever be so self-

evident in a case as to make it well nigh a duty on the part of the Trial Judge togrant the plaintiff's motion therefor. The second relates to the propriety of the filing

directly with this Court an application for a writ of mandamus against a municipal

trial court, considering that jurisdiction to issue this extraordinary writ is also

possessed by the Court of Appeals as well as the Regional Trial Court of the district.

To resolve the first issue it will be necessary to deal with the facts in some detail.

Petitioner Vergara commenced in the Municipal Trial Court of Davao City an action

for illegal detainer against the private respondents. 1 His complaint 2 alleged in

essence that

1) he is the owner of a commercial building consisting of three (3) sections, each ofwhich is separately occupied by the defendants (private respondents herein) as

lessees;

2) the defendants' lease contracts, two of which were written, were all on "a month

to month basis," and originally prescribed a monthly rental of P350.00, later

increase to P450.00;

3) because the defendants all defaulted in the payment of their rentals for many

months, Vergara's lawyer sent each of them a letter "(1) demanding payment of

their unpaid rentals, (2) terminating their lease contracts effective at the end of

December 1985 on two grounds: non- payment of rentals and plaintiff's need of the

property for some other purpose, and (3) demanding that defendants vacate the

leased premises not later than the end of said month of December 1985; "

4) the defendants sent Vergara a joint reply pertinently reading as follows:

This is to confirm our verbal commitment with you to leave the said premises as

soon as you need it. However due to mainly economic reason, we request for an

extension of three months (3) to enable us to find new space wherein we can

continue our sole livelihood;

in addition, defendant Montebon also paid a part of his arrearage;

5) later however, the defendants wrote Vergara another letter; this time, while

acknowledging the latter's ownership of the building and their status as lessees

thereof they announced their refusal to vacate the premises on the ground that the

lot on which the building stands, though titled in Vergara's name, was part of a tract

of land Identified as Lot 508 which had been ordered reverted to the public domain

by the Regional Trial Court (Branch XIV) in a decision rendered in Civil Case No.

16192 for "Cancellation of Titles and Reversion" entitled "Republic of the

Philippines vs. Kwong Tai Lung y Cia et al. ;

6) Vergara wrote back to them, pointing out the error of the position thus taken by

them, and reiterating his demand to vacate; his reply having gone unheeded, he

initiated the requisite proceedings before the Office of the Barangay Captain; and

when the controversy was not settled by conciliation, he instituted the ejectment

suit at bar.

In their answer to the complaint, 3 defendants Guinoo, Montebon and Cabase

1) denied the averments of the complaint relative to their and the plaintiff's

personal circumstances;

2) denied Vergara's ownership of the building and the fact that it consisted of three

sections separately leased by him:

3) claimed that their lease contract with Vergara were null and void;

4) denied having initially paid rentals but thereafter defaulting and incurring

arrearages in the amounts specified in the complaint, claiming that they had been

"occupying the premises in the concept of an owner;"

5) denied knowledge and hence professed inability to form a belief regarding either

their joint letter to Vergara (copy of which was attached to the complaint) or of the

reply thereto by Vergara's lawyer;


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6) denied liability to Vergara for damages because as member(s) of good standing

of (a group calling itself) Salandanan et al Landless Association Inc., ... (they were)

occupying the land as owners;" and

7) claimed that in virtue of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.

16192 declaring null and void the title issued over "lot 508"- of which Vergara's was

formerly a part they were claiming Vergara's land "as their share as member of

Salandanan et al Landless Association," which was "a recognized intervenor" in the

case.

Vergara presented a reply to the defendants' answer, chiefly making the point that

neither he nor any of the defendants was a party to Civil Case No. 16192 and hence

could not be bound by whatever judgment or orders might be rendered therein;

that his title to the land was not void nor had it ever been subject of any action for

annulment; and that in any event Civil Case No. 16192 had no relevance to the

"case for ejectment against defendants for non- payment of rents on x x (his)

commercial building. 4

Under date of March 7, 1986 Vergara filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 5 The

motion was verified and had 8 supporting documents annexed to it. 6 It assertedand sought to substantiate the following propositions, to wit:

1. The 3 defendants were lessees of Vergara's commercial building, their status as

such being established by-

a) the 2 written contracts of lease of Guinoo and Cabase, copies of which were

attached to the verified complaint as Annexes A and B.

b) the demand letters sent by Vergara's lawyer to each of the 3 defendants, copies

of which were attached to the motion for summary judgment as Annexes A, B, and

C thereof;

c) the payment by Montebon on December 20, 1985 of back rentals for November

and December 1984, evidenced by Official Receipt No. 2300, a copy of which was

appended to the motion as Annex D;

d) the joint letter dated December 6, 1985 confirming their "verbal commitment to

leave the ... "premises" as soon as needed and asking for an "extension of three (3

months to enable ... (them) to find new space, " a copy of was attached to the

verified complaint as Annex C thereof.

2. Neither he (Vergara) nor the defendants were parties in Civil Case No. 16192 and

consequently could not be bound by any judgment or order therein promulgated, a

proposition confirmed by the Order of the Court in that action dated February 24,

1986, a copy of which he attached to his motion as Annex E.

3. Civil Case No. 16192, involving "parcels of land, " was relevant to the ejectment

case at bar involving ejectment from Ve rgara's "commercial building;" and

defendants had acknowledged in their joint letter dated January 7, 1976 that the

building belongs to Vergara, a copy of the letter being attached to the motion as

Annex F.

4. In view of their acknowledgment of Vergara's ownership of the building, the

defendants' claim of ownership of the land on which it stands is "false and absurd."

"Moreover, defendants as lessees are estopped from asserting any adverse claim or

title against plaintiff (Art. 1436 of the Civil Code). "

5. The defendants' answer is patently defective. It flatly denies their own personal

circumstances, and professes lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief about the

exchange of letters between them and Vergara's lawyer-matters about which they

could not but have direct, personal awareness and about which they could not

therefore claim ignorance. 7

Against this motion defendants filed an "Opposition to Motion for Summary

Judgment and Motion to Dismiss." 8 They argued that

1. A genuine issue exists which "cannot be resolved by mere resort to summary

judgment," that issue having arisen from defendants' controversion of Vergara's

claim "of possession and ownership over the commercial building and the land on

which the same is constructed, "

2. Their answer "tendered a genuine issue and does not only consist of a mere

general denial" since in the main "it specifically denied the material averment of

facts in the complaint setting forth the substance of the matters in support of their

denial;" and as regards their declared ignorance of some of the facts alleged in thecomplaint, an averment of lack of knowledge was under the Rules equivalent to a

specific denial.

3. The Court had no jurisdiction over the case because "the real issue involved ... is

title and/or ownership of the property and not physical possession," and "this case

should not be by accion interdictal but accion de reivendicacion (sic). "

Vergara submitted a reply dated April 9, 1986, adverting to the distinction between

a summary judgment under Rule 34 and a judgment on the pleadings under Rule

19, and reiterating and amplifying the propositions and arguments set out in h is

motion for summary judgment. 9


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The incidents were resolved by the respondent Judge in two separate orders

promulgated on the same day, April 15, 1986. The first order denied the

defendants' motion to dismiss. 10 The Judge ruled that-

... Ownership by the plaintiff of this building has not been seriously denied by

defendants who instead insist that their claim to ownership of the land be a ground

for a dismissal of this case for the court's lack of jurisdiction. But the court believes

that this case properly is an Unlawful Detainer action as it assesses the respective

claims of the parties and it (the court), in accordance with the provisions of Section33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not without authority to resolve the issue of

ownership if only to determine the issue of possession. 11

The second order 12 denied Vergara's motion for summary judgment. The denial

was grounded on the following observations of the respondent Judge:

... Of course, the (plaintiff's) discussion seeks to convince the court that there is no

more need of a trial because conclusively it is claimed that no genuine issue on a

material fact was raised. But it appears from the answer that the material

allegations of facts in the complaint constituting plaintiff's cause of action are

specifically denied and in addition thereto, defendants have put up affirmativedefenses in avoidance of plaintiff's claims. ... .

The rule gives the court limited authority to enter summary judgment. Upon a

motion for summary judgment, the court's sole function is to determine whether

there is an issue of fact to be tried. It does not vest the court with authority to try

the issues on depositions, pleadings, letters or affidavits. ... (I)f there is a

controversy upon any question of fact, there should be a trial of the case upon its

merits. 13

His Honor's observations expose no little confusion about the fundamental nature

of a summary judgment. The confusion is further bared by his statement that the

"only issue in this motion (for summary judgment) is whether, in this Unlawful

Detainer action the material averments of facts constituting plaintiff's cause of

action have been specifically denied in accordance with Section 10, Rule 8 of the

Rules of Court." He seems to think it is the same as a judgment on the pleadings

which, of course, it is not.

The confusion is shared by the defendants (private respondents), this being

revealed by their argument that in view of their denial of plaintiff's assertion of

ownership over the premises in question, and their controversion of "the material

facts of the adverse party," their answer did not only consist of a mere "general

denial" but "definitely tendered a genuine issue" "which cannot be resolved by

resort to mere summary judgment." 14 Indeed, they point out that in their answer

they have dealt with each paragraph of the complaint; and "considering therefore

the totality of the allegations of ... (said) answer vis-a-vis the allegations of the

complaint, ... the answer tendered a valid issue. 15

The essential question however is not whether the answer does controvert the

material allegations of the complaint but whether that controversion is bona fides.

The fundamental issue is not whether the answer does tender valid issues as by

setting forth specific denials and/or affirmative defenses but whether the issues

thus tendered are genuine, or fictitious, sham, characterized by bad faith.

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that where an answer "fails to

tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegation of the adverse party's

pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such

pleading." 16 The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not

comply with the requirements for a specific denial set out in Section 10 (or Section

8) of Rule 8; and it would admit the material allegations of the adverse party's

pleadings not only where it expressly confesses the truthfulness thereof but also if

it omits to deal with them at all. 17

Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of thecomplaint in the manner indicated by said Section 10 of Rule 8, and/or asserts

affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material

allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or

bar recovery by the plaintiff) in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 6, a

judgment on the pleadings would naturally not be proper.

But even if the answer does tender issues and therefore a judgment on the

pleadings is not proper-a summary judgment may still be rendered on the plaintiff's

motion if he can show to the Court's satisfaction that "except as to the amount of

damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," 18 that is to say, the

issues thus tendered are not genuine, are in other words sham, fictitious, contrived,set up in bad faith, patently unsubstantial. 19 The determination may be made by

the Court on the basis of the pleadings, and the depositions, admissions and

affidavits that the movant may submit, as well as those which the defendant may

present in his turn. 20

In this case, the defendants' answer appears on its face to tender issues. It purports

to deal with each of the material allegations of the complaint, and either specifically

denies, or professes lack of knowledge or information to form a belief as to them. It

also sets up affirmative defenses. But the issues thus tendered are sham, not

genuine, as the slightest reflection and analysis win readily demonstrate.


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1. To begin with, the defendants' denial of their own personal circumstances, as

these are stated in the complaint, is obviously sham. The accuracy of those stated

circumstances is quite evident. They are in truth all residents of Davao City, doing

business at Cabaguio Avenue, where the plaintiff's building is located, and in which

they have rented space and where they have been maintaining their commercial

establishments under one trade name or another. As fictitious is their denial of

plaintiff's own personal circumstances. They could not but know that those

circumstances had been correctly set down in the complaint, having been dealing

with the plaintiff for years, and he being the owner of the building occupied by

them.

2. Their disavowal of the plaintiff's ownership of the building occupied by them, and

also that the building is composed of three (3) sections, also cannot be genuine.

They had each been occupying those three (3) sections for years and been paying

rentals therefor to the plaintiff. Their answer contains their admission that the

plaintiff has title over the land on which the building stands. 21 There are two (2)

written contracts showing the lease by two of them of the building from the

plaintiff, and a receipt evidencing payment by another of rentals to the plaintiff,

documents which they have made no serious or effective effort to controvert butwhich, on the contrary, they have impliedly admitted. There is, too, their own letter

to the plaintiff dated December 6, 1985, acknowledging receipt of the

communication of the latter's lawyer (demanding their vacation of the premises

and payment of rentals in arrears), and confirming their "verbal commitment to you

to leave the said premises as soon as you need it. 22 There is, finally, another letter

of their dated January 7, 1986 referring to Vergara's demand for the payment of

their "rental in arrears" and for them "to vacate the building rented by us." 23

3. Also patently sham is their professed ignorance of the joint letter sent by them to

the plaintiff under date of December 6, 1985, just referred to. It should be noted

that they have not denied writing or sending the letter. What they say is that "theyhave no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief" as to it. This is

ridiculous. Either they wrote the letter or they did not. Either way, they cannot but

have knowledge of it. To say that they are ignorant of it is palpable dishonesty. In

any event we have already pronounced such a profession of ignorance about a fact

which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge, or means of

knowing as ineffectual, as no denial at all. 24

4. So, too, their denial of ever having paid rents to the plaintiff is fictitious. The facts

on record, to which the plaintiff has drawn attention, inclusive of the official receipt

issued to defendant Montebon, prove they're beyond cavil.

5. Finally, their affirmative defense, in which they assert title in themselves over the

land on which the plaintiff's building stands, is also sham, even an absurdity. They

base their claim on a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in an entirely

separate action in which title over a large tract of land of which the plaintiff's once

formed a part had been annulled, and the land ordered reverted to the public

domain. But neither the plaintiff nor the defendants are parties to this action. The

judgment has moreover been appealed. And the defendants' connection with the

case rests on nothing more substantial than their alleged membership in an

association at whose relation the reversion suit had supposedly been instituted by

the Republic, and which association would presumably have preferential rights to

occupy or acquire the land once finally reverted to the public domain. It is apparent

that defendants' claim of title to the particular lot of the plaintiff is so tenuous and

conjectural as to be practically inexistent. In any event, the claim is utterly

irrelevant to the ejectment suit at bar, which involves merely the question of

whether or not their possession of the plaintiff's premises had become illegal in

virtue of their extended failure to pay rentals and their refusal to vacate the

premises and pay those arrears despite due demand. They are moreover estopped

to dispute the plaintiff's title. "The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his

landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenantbetween them." 25

Under the circumstances herein set forth at some length, the fitness and propriety

of a summary judgment cannot be disputed. The failure of the respondent Judge to

render such a judgment was due solely to his unfortunate unfamiliarity with the

concept of a summary judgment. It is a failure which we have it in our power to

remedy. No genuine issue having been tendered by the defendants, judgment

should be directed as a matter of right in the plaintiff's favor. To yet require a trial

notwithstanding the pertinent allegations of the pleadings and the other facts

indubitably appearing on record would be a waste of time, and an injustice to the

plaintiff whose obtention of the relief to which he is plainly and patently entitledwould be further delayed. As it is, the delay has already been considerable.

The remedy properly available to the petitioner in the premises, however, is not the

writ of mandamus. Well known is the rule that mandamus issues only to compel

performance of a mandatory, ministerial duty. 26 The determination that under the

facts and circumstances obtaining in a case a summary judgment is proper, and the

motion therefor should be granted and summary judgment consequently rendered,

rests in the sound discretion of a trial court and can not be regarded as a duty of

ministerial function compellable by the extraordinary writ of mandamus. In this

case, the respondent Judge had discretion to make that determination. What

happened was that His Honor made that determination with grave abuse of


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discretion. Despite the plain and patent propriety of a summary judgment, he

declined to render such a verdict. The writ of certiorari will lie to correct that grave

abuse of discretion. 27

We turn now to the second question posed in the opening paragraph of this

opinion, as to the propriety of a direct resort to this Court for the remedy of

mandamus or other extraordinary writ against a municipal court, instead of an

attempt to initially obtain that relief from the Regional Trial Court of the district or

the Court of Appeals, both of which tribunals share this Court's jurisdiction to issuethe writ. As a matter of policy such a direct recourse to this Court should not be

allowed. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to

satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and

immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of

dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called

extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where

serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should

generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of

Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts

for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Wherethe issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of

Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific

action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to

be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

In the case at bar, however, to apply the policy by referring the action to the

Regional Trial Court of the district would serve no useful purpose. It would on the

contrary work injustice to the petitioner to whom the relief rightly due has already

been withheld for many years. The case having been filed before this Court as early

as 1986, and having already been subject of an extensive exchange of pleadings, it

should and will now be decided without further delay.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Judge dated April 15, 1986 denying the

petitioner's (plaintiff's) motion for summary judgment, and that dated April 30,

1986 declining to reconsider the same, are hereby annulled and set aside. Said

respondent Judge is hereby commanded forthwith to render a summary judgment

in favor of the petitioner (plaintiff) against the private respondents (defendants),

namely: Manolito Guinoo, Romeo Montebon and Porferio Cabase, in accordance

with the prayer of the former's motion for summary judgment dated March 7,

1986. The appropriateness and correctness of a summary judgment in the premises

having already been adjudged by this Court, His Honor is further commanded to

direct execution of the judgment immediately upon its rendition. This decision is

immediately executory and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for

reconsideration shall be entertained. Costs against private respondents.

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Paras, * and Gancayco, JJ., concur.


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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131466. November 27, 1998]

CRISTINA DIMAN, CLARISSA DIMAN, GEORGE DIMAN, FELIPE DIMAN and FLORINA

DIMAN, petitioners, vs. HON, FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, PRESIDING JUDGE,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIAS, BRANCH 255; HEIRS OF VERONICA V. MORENO

LACALLE, REPRESENTED BY JOSE MORENO LACALLE, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

NARVASA, C.J.:

The petition for review on certiorari in this case was initially dismissed by

Resolution dated January 14, 1998; but after deliberating on petitioners' motion for

reconsideration dated February 23, 1998, the private respondents' comment

thereon, the reply to the comment, as well as the record of the case itself, the Court

was convinced that the order of dismissal should be reconsidered and the petition

reinstated. It accordingly promulgated a resolution to that effect on October 12,

1998, and required "respondents to file their Comment on the petition within ten

(10) days from notice **."

Notice of the Resolution was duly served on private respondents' attorney on

October 21, 1998. The latter filed a motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days

to file comment, counted from October 31. The Court granted the extension

sought, but only for fifteen (15) days.

The comment was filed late, on November 20, 1998, Counsel's explanation is that

he had sought an extension of 30 days "due to the other volume of legal works

similarly situated and school work of the undersigned as professor of law and dean

of the University of Manila," and had entertained "the honest belief" that it would

be granted. However, he learned belatedly that only a 15-day extension had beenconceded. He forthwith completed the comment and filed it, albeit five days late.

The Court admits the late comment, but takes this occasion to reiterate the familiar

doctrine that no party has a right to an extension of time to comply with an

obligation within the period set therefor by law; motions for extension are not

granted as a matter of course; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the

Court exercised in accordance with the attendant circumstances; the movant is not

justified in assuming that the extension sought will be granted, or that it will be

granted for the length of time suggested by him. It is thus incumbent on any

movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible

of the Court's action on his motion, by time inquiry of the Clerk of Court. Should he

neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have

nobody but himself to blame.

Now, the petition for review on certiorari appends practically all the material

pleadings, motions, orders and judgments in the Regional Trial Court and the Court

of Appeals. The respondents' comment on the petition has been filed, as just

mentioned, and opposes its material averments. There is now no impediment to

the adjudication of petitioners' appeal on the merits on the basis of the record as it

stands at this time. This, the Court will now proceed to do.

In 1991, more than fifty years after the effectivity of the Rules of Courti --

containing provisions relative inter alia to the modes of discoveryii -- this Court had

occasion to observe that "among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges), there

is, if not regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature,

purposes and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned

and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them -- which is a great pity for the

intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-discovery procedure, could, as the

experience of other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrate, effectively shorten the

period of litigation and speed up adjudication."iii

The case at bar deals with one of such modes of discovery -- a request for admission

under Rule 26 of the Rules of 1964; more particularly, the legal consequences of the

failure to respond thereto in the manner indicated by law. It also treats of other

adjective devices to expedite litigation: a summary judgment under Rule 34,iv and a

judgment on demurrer to evidence under Rule 35.v Had the principles involved

been better understood and more faithfully observed, the case might have been

more quickly decided.

Actually, there are several adjective tools incorporated in the Rules of Court

explicitly designed, like those just mentioned, to abbreviate litigation or abort it at

certain stages. Their obvious purpose is to unmask as quickly as may be feasible,and give short shrift to, untenable causes of action or defenses and thus avoid

waste of time, effort and money.vi For reasons yet to be fathomed, these devices

seem to be of scant familiarity and of infrequent availment, as above observed,

with the result that the salutary objective of the Rules of bringing about a simple,

inexpensive and expeditious system of litigation has not been fully achieved.

Now, to come to grips with the case. There is no disagreement about the

antecedents. The case began in the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias (Branch 255),

where a complaint for "Quieting of Title and Damages" was filed by the Heirs of

Veronica V.Moreno Lacalle (represented by Jose Moreno Lacalle) against Cristina

Diman, Clarissa Diman, George Diman, Felipe Diman and Florina Diman.vii In theircomplaint, the Lacalle heirs claimed that:


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a) their mother, the late Veronica V. Moreno Lacalle (who died in 1992), was

the owner of a "parcel of land situated at Brgy. Pulang Lupa Uno, Las Pias, **

covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 273301 of the Registry of Deeds of the

Province of Rizal;"

b) Veronica Lacalle had acquired the land in 1959 by virtue of a deed of

absolute sale, and retained as caretakers the persons she found in occupancy of the

lot at the time of the sale, namely: Julian Nario and his wife, Adelaida Legaspi, "with

arrangement to share the agricultural fruits" until the former would have need ofthe property;

c) the caretakers of the lot were served with a notice for them to vacate the

land (dated November 22, 1994) and an alias writ of demolition (dated June 7,

1994) issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 2619 -- a case for

"ejectment with damages" filed by the Dimans against the Narios, judgment in

which, commanding the Narios' ouster, had supposedly been affirmed by the

Makati Regional Trial Court (Branch 137);

d) neither the deceased Veronica nor any of her heirs had been made parties

to said ejectment action;

e) the complaint for ejectment contains false assertions, and had caused

them injury for which the Dimans should be made to pay damages.

In their answer with counterclaim dated February 2, 1995,viii the Dimans alleged

that:

a) they are the registered and absolute owners of the land registered in their

names under TCT Nos. 90628, 90629 and 58676 (Pasay City), and have no

knowledge of the land claimed by the Lacalle Heirs;

b) they are entitled to eject from their land the Nario Spouses, who werefalsely claiming to be their lessees;

c) if the Heirs' theory is that the land in their title, No. 273301, is the same as

that covered by the Dimans' titles, then said title No. 2733101 is spurious because:

(1) no less than three official agencies -- (i) the Office of the Registrar of Deeds

for Rizal and Regional Registrar for Region IV, (ii) the Registrar of Deeds of Pasay

City, and (iii) the Pangasiwaan Pangtalaan ng Lupain (Land Registration Authority) --

have certified to the absence of any entry in their records concerning TCT No.

273301 covering land with an area of 22,379 square meters in the name of Veronica

Vda. De Moreno Lacalle;

(2) Decree No. N-11601 explicitly cited as basis by TCT No. 273301 refers to

land in Mauban, Quezon Province, according to the records of the Land Registration

Authority; and GLRO Record No. 14978 also expressly mentioned as basis for TCT

No. 273301, refers to a registration case heard in Pangasinan;

and

d) they are entitled to damages on their counterclaim.

After joinder of the issues, the Dimans served on the Heirs on February 2, 1995, a

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION (dated February 2, 1995) of the truth of the following

specified matters of fact, to wit:ix

a) the Heirs' TCT 273301 (Rizal) is not recorded in the Registry of Rizal, or of

Pasay City, or of Paraaque, or of Las Pias;

b) the Dimans' transfer certificates of title are all duly registered in their

names in Pasay City, as alleged in their answer;

c) in the Index Records of Registered Property Owners under Act No. 496 in

the Office of the land Registration Authority, there is no record of any propertysituated in Las Pias in the name of Veronica Lacalle, more particularly described in

TCT 273301;

4) the Heirs cannot produce a certified true copy of TCT 273301;

5) neither Veronica Lacalle nor any of her heirs ever declared the property

under TCT 273301 for taxation purposes since its alleged acquisition on February

24, 1959 or since the issuance of said title on August 7, 1959;

6) not a single centavo has been paid by the Heirs as real estate taxes; and

7) no steps have been taken by the Heirs to ascertain the genuineness and

authenticity of the conflicting titles.

The REQUEST FOR ADMISSION was received by Jose Lacalle himself through

registered mail on February 6, 1995, and copy thereof, by the latter's lawyer (Atty.

Cesar T. Ching) on February 4, 1995. However, no response whatever was made to

the request by Lacalle, his lawyer, or anyone else, despite the lapse of the period

therefor fixed by Section 2 of Rule 26 (not less than ten days after service). The

Dimans thereupon filed with the Court a "MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO

REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION," dated March 28,

1995,x giving the Heirs ten (10) more days to file their answer to the request for

admission, a copy of which was personally delivered to the latter's lawyer; but

again, no response whatever was made.


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The Dimans then submitted a "MOTION FOR SUMMARRY JUDGMENT" dated April

17, 1995.xi In that motion they drew attention to the Heirs' failure to file any Pre-

Trial Brief, and the several instances when the Heirs failed to appear at scheduled

hearings resulting in the dismissal of their complaint, which was however later

reinstated. They argued that because the heirs had failed to respond to their

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, each of the matters of which an admission was

requested, was deemed admitted pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26. On this basis, and

on the basis of the joint affidavit of Clarissa Diman de los Reyes and Florina Diman

Tan -- attached to the motion and substantiating the facts recited in the request for

admission -- the Dimans asserted that no genuine issue existed and prayed that "a

summary judgment be entered dismissing the case for lack of merit."

The Heirs' counsel filed a two-page opposition dated May 15, 1995xii in which,

betraying an unfortunate unfamiliarity with the concept of summary judgments, he

asserted inter alia that:

"In order for defendants (Dimans) to successfully pray for judgment on the

pleadings, they have to clearly alleged in their permissive counterclaim their cause

of action and if the answer of the plaintiffs (Heirs) to such kind of counterclaim

admit (sic) it or the answer to the counterclaim is a sham, that is the time for thedefendants to move for a judgment summarily. ** ** (D)efendants have no cause

of action for praying for summary judgment. It is the plaintiffs who will pray for

that and not the defendants."

Subsequently, the Dimans submitted a reply dated May 23, 1995;xiii the Heirs, a

rejoinder dated June 1, 1995;xiv and the Dimans, a pleading entitled "Exceptions

and Comment to Plaintiffs' Rejoinder" dated June 8, 1995. xv

The Trial Court denied the Dimans' motion for summary judgment. In its Order of

June 14, 1995,xvi the Court declared that a "perusal of the Complaint and the

Answer will clearly show that material issue is raised in that both plaintiffs anddefendants claimed ownership over the land in dispute, presenting their respective

titles thereto and accused each other of possessing false title to the land." It

stressed, citing jurisprudence, that a summary judgment "is not proper where the

defendant presented defenses tendering factual issues which call for the

presentation of evidence."

The case proceeded to trial in due course. At its start, the Heirs' counsel, Atty.

Michael Moralde, responding to questions of the Court, admitted that his clients

did not have the original copy of the title which was the basis for their cause of

action, but asserted that they were "still searching" for it since "(i)n every

municipality there are several Registry of Deeds." He theorized that the word

"'title' ** is a relative term ** (and) does not only refer to a document but refers to

ownership."xvii

Only Jose Moreno Lacalle gave evidence for the plaintiff Heirs. Like Atty. Moralde,

he admitted that he had no copy "of the document which says ** (his) mother is

the registered owner;" that the deed of sale was not the only basis for his and his

co-heirs' claim to the land, but also "a xerox copy of the ** title ** except that **

(he) cannot find the original;" that "maybe" the original was in possession of the

person who was his mother's agent in all her transactions, a certain Mr. Lopez,whom he could no longer locate; that he had tried to verify the existence of the title

"from the Register of Deeds of Pasig and Pasay" without success; that he had not,

however, gone to the Register of Deeds of Paraaque or Las Pias.xviii

The Heirs' documentary evidence consisted of (1) Veronica Lacalle's death

certificate, (2) the special power of attorney authorizing Jose Lacalle to act for his

brothers and sisters; and (3) the deed of absolute sale purportedly executed by

Eusebio Mojica, Clara Mojica, Maria Mojica, Antonia Mojica, Amanda Mojica and

Teodora Aranda which deeded over to Veronica Lacalle the "Land 'known as Lot 1

PSU-151453,'" but which made no reference to any Torrens title over it

Shortly after the Heirs rested their case, the Dimans filed a "Motion for Judgment

on Demurrer to Evidence," dated June 25, 1996.xix They summarized the Heirs'

evidence -- focusing attention on the Heirs failure to present "even an

unauthenticated photocopy of the title," and the absence of any proof that any

proceedings for registration of the land under the Torrens Act had been instituted --

and emphasized anew said Heirs' implied admissions resulting from their failure to

answer their (the Dimans') request therefor as a mode of discovery. On these

premises, the Dimans contended that a judgment on demurrer should be rendered,

there being no genuine issue between the parties notwithstanding the ostensible

conflict of averments in their basic pleadings.

The Heirs presented a three-page opposition, dated July 7, 1996.xx In it their

counsel set out the startling contention that "(d)emurrer to evidence is violative to

due process as the judgment be rendered without giving the plaintiff the

opportunity to cross-examine the defendant," and petulantly inquired, "How could

the truth come out without cross-examination of the defendants by plaintiff?"

particularly, as regards "whether their (the Dimans') title is not fake." Said counsel

also posited the amazing notion that "Demurrer to evidence may be correct only in

criminal cases as it is the right of the accused to remain silent, and that includes his

right to file demurrer for fear of cross-examination. But not in Civil Cases." Once

more counsel regrettably exposed his ignorance of quite elementary legal

principles.


12/29

Again, the Dimans' efforts at expediting disposition of the litigation were

unsuccessful. By Order dated December 2, 1996,xxi the Trial Court denied their

motion to dismiss. Respecting the Heirs' omission to present in evidence any copy

(even a photocopy) of TCT No. 273301, the Court remarked that "Not being able to

prove the genuineness and authenticity of TCT No. 273301, it being only a mere

xerox copy ** (the Heirs) did not formally offer the same in evidence." However,

the Court said, the deed of sale of the land in Veronica Lacalle's favor that was

submitted instead -- the "genuineness and authenticity ** (of which had) been fully

established" by the certification of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC -- was

adequate for the purpose. According to the Court, "(e)xecution of a deed of

conveyance in a certain prescribed form gave to the transfer of a title to the land

conveyed ** (and) without being controverted by any convincing evidence to the

contrary can be sufficient basis in granting the plaintiffs' relief for quieting of their

title." The Order passed sub silentio on the quaint contentions in the Heirs'

opposition.

The Dimans moved for reconsideration under date of January 2, 1997,xxii inter alia

(1) alleging that although the photocopy of TCT 2773301 annexed to the Heirs'

complaint states that the "certificate is a transfer from T.C.T. No. 259150" (and this,

presumably, would be the vendors' [the Mojicas'] title), no effort whatever was

made to submit proof thereof, and (2) reiterating the proposition that the Heirs

were bound by their implied admissions under Rule 26.

The Dimans also submitted a "SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION"

dated January 7, 1997xxiii in which they invited attention to the identity of the

technical description of the land contained in the deed of sale to Veronica Lacalle

and that set out in TCT No. 273301. It must therefore have been Veronica Lacalle,

they reasoned, who had instituted the registration proceedings leading to the

supposed issuance of said TCT No. 273301. Yet the heirs failed to present evidence

of the record of any such registration proceedings, just as they failed to presentevidence of any authentic copy of the title itself.

The Heirs filed a one-page "Vehement Opposition ** " dated February 15, 1997.xxiv

Once again they reiterated the astounding argument that the Dimans' "insistence

** (on the demurrer to evidence) is tantamount to suppression of their evidence as

they are afraid of cross-examination"!

Again the Trial Court rebuffed the Dimans. In its Order of February 28, 1997,xxv the

Court ruled that the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration and its

supplement had already been passed upon in the Order of December 2, 1996. It

then set the case "for the reception of defendants' evidence on April 22, 1997 **."

What the Dimans did was to commence a special civil action of certiorari,

mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals praying (a) that it set aside the

Orders of June 14, 1995 (denying summary judgment), of December 2, 1996

(denying demurrer to evidence), and of February 28, 1997 (denying

reconsideration); (b) that the Trial Judge be commanded to dismiss the case before

it; and (c) that said judge be prohibited from conducting further proceedings in the

case.

But once again their efforts met with failure. The Appellate Tribunal (SeventhDivision) promulgated judgment on September 9, 1997 decreeing that their petition

be "DENIED due course and DISMISSED." The Court of Appeals held that insofar as

concerned the Order of June 14, 1995, the petition for its invalidation had not been

filed within a reasonable time; and that as regards the Order of December 2, 1996,

the remedy of certiorari was improper because : (1) said order was merely

interlocutory, (2) any error therein constituted only an error of judgment

correctible by appeal, and (3) there was no capriciousness or whimsicality attendant

upon the order. The Dimans' motion for reconsideration was later denied by the

Court of Appeals by Resolution dated November 5, 1997.xxvi

The Dimans thereupon filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari of theAppellate Tribunal's Decision of September 9, 1997. But seemingly consistent with

the pattern of judicial misfortune which they had theretofore been traversing, their

petition for review was dismissed, by Resolution dated January 14, 1998. Their

appeal was however subsequently reinstated, as earlier recounted.

Now, what first strikes the Court about the case at bar is the regrettable absence of

familiarity, therein laid bare, with the rules of discovery and with the underlying

philosophy and principles of the cognate remedy of summary judgment. That

resulted in the undue protraction of the present action despite ample

demonstration of the absence of any genuine issue -- that is to say, that the issues

ostensibly arising from the pleadings were sham or fictitious.

A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the consequences of a party's

refusal to allow or make discovery should be; it is the law which makes that

determination; and it is grave abuse of discretion for the Court to refuse to

recognize and observe the effects of that refusal as mandated by law. Particularly

as regards request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the law

ordains that when a party is served with a written request that he admit : (1) the

genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with

the request, or (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in

the request, said party is bound within the period designated in the request,xxvii to

file and serve on the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either (10


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denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or (2) setting

forth in details the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those

matters. If the party served does not respond with such sworn statement, each of

the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.xxviii

In this case, the Dimans' request for admission was duly served by registered mail

on Jose Lacalle on February 6, 1995, and a copy thereof on his lawyers on February

4, 1995. Neither made any response whatever within the reglementary period. Nor

did either of them do so even after receiving copy of the D imans' "MANIFESTATIONWITH MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION."

dated March 28, 1995. On account thereof, in legal contemplation, the Heirs

impliedly admitted all the facts listed in the request for admission. These plain and

simple legal propositions were disregarded by His Honor.

It is also the law which determines when a summary judgment is proper. It declares

that although the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact -- e.g., there

are denials of, or a conflict in, factual allegations -- if it is shown by admissions,

depositions or affidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious, or not genuine, or, in

the language of the Rules, that "except as to the amount of damages, there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entiled to ajudgment as a matter of law,xxix the Court shall render a summary judgment for

the plaintiffxxx or the defendantxxxi as the case may be.xxxii

Parenthetically, the existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings,

on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what

distinguish a proper case for a summary judgmentxxxiii from one for a judgment on

the pleadings under Rule 19 of the 1964 Rules.xxxiv In the latter case, there is no

ostensible issue at all, but the absence of any because of the failure of the

defending party's answer to raise an issue. Rule 19 expresses the principle as

follows:

"Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material

allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,

direct judgment on such pleading **."xxxv

On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist --

i.e., facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no

admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are

in truth set out in the answer -- but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are

sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown by admissions, depositions or admissions.

In other words, as a noted authority remarks, a judgment on the pleadings is a

judgment on the facts as pleaded while a summary judgment is a judgment on thefacts as summarily proven by affidavits, depositions or admissions.xxxvi Another

distinction is that while the remedy of a judgment on the pleadings may be sought

only by a claimant (one seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-

claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, supra), a summary judgment may be applied

for by either a claimant or a defending party.

These basic distinctions escaped His Honor. He denied the Dimans' motion for

summary judgment in his Order of June 14, 1995, opining that a "perusal of the

Complaint and the Answer will clearly show that material issue is raised in that both

plaintiffs and defendants claimed ownership over the land in dispute, presentingtheir respective titles thereto and accused each other of possessing false title to the

land." He added, citing cases, that a summary judgment "is not proper where the

defendant presented defenses tendering factual issues which call for the

presentation of evidence." Such a ratiocination is grossly erroneous. Clearly, the

grounds relied on by the Judge are proper for the denial of a motion for judgment

on the pleadings -- as to which the essential question, as already remarked, is: are

there issues arising from or generated by the pleadings? -- but not as regards a

motion for summary judgment -- as to which the crucial question is: issues having

been raised by the pleadings, are those issues genuine, or sham or fictitious, as

shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the application

therefor?

Errors on principles so clear and fundamental as those herein involved cannot but

be deemed so egregious as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, being

tantamount to whimsical or capricious exercise of judicial prerogative.

When the Heirs closed their evidence as party plaintiffs, and the Dimans moved to

dismiss on ground of insufficiency of the Heirs' evidence, the Trial Judge was

charged with the duty to assess the evidence to ascertain whether or not "upon the

facts and the law the plaintiff(s) ** (have) shown no right to relief." It was in the

first place incumbent on His Honor to hold the Heirs bound to their admissions

appearing in the record, express and implied. In accordance with Section 2, Rule 26of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Heirs were impliedly, but no less indubitably,

deemed to have admitted the facts on which admissions had been duly requested

by reason of their failure to reply thereto. Said Section 2 reads as follows:

"SEC. 2. Implied admissions. -- Each of the matters of which an admission is

requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the

request, which shall not be less than twn (10) days after service thereof, or within

such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom

the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn

statement either denying specifically the matters on which an admission is


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requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either

admit or deny those matters.

Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter requested

shall be promptly submitted to the court for resolution."xxxvii

In determining the chief issue in the case, the Trial Judge should have taken due

account of the following circumstances on record and obvious legal propositions:

1) the Heirs' admissions of the following facts, viz.:

a) the Heirs' TCT 273301 (Rizal) is not recorded in the Registry of Rizal, or of

Pasay City, or of Paraaque, or of Las Pias;

b) on the other hand, the Dimans' transfer certificates of title are all duly

registered in their names in Pasay City;

c) there is no record of any property situated in Las Pias in the name of

Veronica Lacalle -- more particularly described in TCT 273301 -- in the Index Records

of Registered Property Owners under Act No. 496 in the Office of the Land

Registration Authority;

d) the Heirs do not have and cannot produce even a certified true copy of TCT

273301;

e) neither Veronica Lacalle nor any of her heirs ever declared the property

under TCT 273301 for taxation purposes since its alleged acquisition on February

24, 1959 or since the issuance of said title on August 7, 1959;

f) not a single centavo was ever paid by the Heirs as real estate taxes; and

g) no steps were ever taken by the Heirs to ascertain the genuineness and

authenticity of the conflicting titles.

2) the statement in open Court of the Heirs' own counsel that his clients did

not have original copy of the title, that they were fact "still searching" for the

title;xxxviii

3) the testimony of Jose Moreno Lacalle that he had no copy "of the

document which says ** (his) mother is the registered owner" of the land in

question; that he "cannot find the original" which "maybe" was in possession of his

mother's agent, a certain Mr. Lopez, who, he could no longer locate; that he had

tried to verify the existence of the title "from the Register of Deeds of Pasig and

Pasay" without success; that he had not, however, gone to the Register of Deeds of

Paraaque or Las Pias;xxxix

4) that the only document bearing on the issue submitted by the heirs, the deed of

absolute sale purportedly executed by Eusebio Mojica, Clara Mojica, Maria Mojica,

Antonia Mojica, Amanda Mojica and Teodora Aranda -- which deeded over to

Veronica Lacalle the "land 'known as Lot 1 PSU-151453,'" but which made no

reference to any Torrens title over it -- was not accompanied by proof of the

vendors' ownership of the land in question;

5) that the land subject of the Heirs' action for quieting of title being

registered land (being in fact registered in the Dimans' favor), the unregistereddeed of sale relied upon by the Heirs cannot and does not affect said land, or bind

any third party (including the Dimans) for the reason that, as a matter of law:

" ** (N)o deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will

purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or

bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as

evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration;" and it is the

"act of registration (that) shall be the operative act to convey or effect the land in

so far as third persons are concerned," which "registration shall be made in the **

Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies."xl

and

6) that there is no proof whatever of the ownership or character of the rights of the

vendors (the Mojicas) over the property purportedly conveyed.

In fine, the Heirs had proven nothing whatever to justify a judgment in their favor.

They had not presented any copy whatever of the title they wished to be quieted.

They had not adduced any proof worthy of the name to establish their

precedessors' ownership of the land. On the contrary, their own evidence, from

whatever aspect viewed, more than persuasively indicated their lack of title over

the land, or the spuriousness of their claim of ownership thereof. The evidence on

record could not be interpreted in any other way, and no other conclusion could be

drawn therefrom except the unmeritoriousness of the complaint. The case at bar is

a classic example of the eminent propriety of a summary judgment, or a judgment

on demurrer to evidence.

Considering these circumstances, including the outlandish grounds of opposition

advanced by the Heirs against the Dimans' motions for summary judgment and for

demurrer to evidence, no less than the obviously mistaken grounds cited by the

Trial Court for denying said motions, this Court has no hesitation in declaring that it

was indeed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial Court to have refused

to render a summary judgment or one on demurrer to evidence. In no sense may

the Trial Court's errors be considered, as the Court of Appeals did in its judgment of


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... This Summary Judgment or Accelerated Judgment is a device for weeding out

sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the

expense and loss of time involved in a trial. The very object is "to separate what is

formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial, so

that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial." In conducting the

hearing, the purpose of the judge is not to try the issue, but merely to determine

whether there is a meritorious issue to be tried. Where a motion is made for

summary judgment, such motion is not directed to the pleadings and deals only

with the question of whether there are triable issues of facts and where such issue

exists summary judgment must be denied. Summary judgment should not be

granted where it fairly appears that there is a triable issue to be tried. The Court

should not pass on questions of credibility or weight of evidence, and that the

summary judgment procedure should not be perverted to the trial of disputed

questions of fact upon affidavits'. The test, therefore, of a motion for summary

judgment iswhether the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of the

motions are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a

matter of law that there is no defense to the action or the claim is clearly

meritorious.

In proceedings for summary judgment, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to

prove the cause of action and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the

purpose of delay. After plaintiffs burden has been discharged, defendant has the

burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend. 12

The focal point of inquiry is whether or not there is a factual controversy in these

consolidated cases. To resolve this query, the pleadings and documents on file and

an analysis thereof are both indispensable and decisive. The sine qua non of such an

adjudicative recourse is spelled out thus: After the hearing, the judgment sought

shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file

together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law. 13

The mimeographed complaints filed against the defendants are identical in their

substantial allegations, with the plaintiff alleging as follows:

. . .

3. Plaintiff is the registered owner and in possession of parcels of land situated at

Barrio Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates Nos. 31527 and

31528 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal;

4. That for more than a year before the filing of this Complaint, defendant/s

has/have (sic) unlawfully occupying and possessing a portion of------ square meters,

more or less, with an assessed value of P----------- included in Pcs---------- and within

the aforesaid parcel of land, where his/her/their house and other construction

stand, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, thereby depriving the

plaintiff of the possession of the said portion;

5. Notwithstanding the demands made upon defendant/s to vacate the premises in

question and to remove his/her/their houses and/ or construction therefrom,he/she/they has/have failed and refused, and still continues to fail and refuse to do

so;

6. As a consequence of the acts of usurpation committed by the defendant's (sic)

plaintiff suffered and will continue to suffer damages at the rate of P50.00 monthly

from January 1980 representing the fair rental value of the premises in question; 14

On the other hand, the position of defendants is the same all throughout the case

and is set out in their "joint and common answer to the complaint," as follows:

x x x

3. In answer to paragraph No. 3 of the plaintiff's complaint, defendants have no

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of plaintiffs

claim of titles and consequently denies (sic) the same in that the alleged judgment

or decision from where it derived said titles are null and void as said title numbers

have the same serial numbers as those in the different municipalities of the

Province of Rizal and those included in Metro Manila that said titles are null and

void ab initio and should be cancelled and in lieu thereof issue new certificates of

titles (sic) to the defendants and their privies pursuant to the contract of legal

services with the undersigned counsel for the defendants and their privies who are

members of the Confederation of Farm and Home Lots Proprietors of the

Philippines in accordance with the land reform program as called for under PD No. 2

dated September 26, 1972 and the authority of this Honorable Court under Section

10 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

4. In answer to paragraph No. 4 of the plaintiffs complaint, defendants and their

privies denies (sic) the same, the truth of the matter being that the defendants and

their privies having tacked their respective possessions of their farm and home lots

through their several predecessors in interest without interruption in open,

continuous, public, and adverse (sic) in the concept of owner since time

immemorial by actual possession under claim of ownership as required by Article

433 of the Civil Code and the plaintiff has never identified the property of the

respective defendants in paragraph No. 4 of the complaint that Article 434 of the


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Civil Code provides that "In an action to recover, the property must be identified,

and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of

the defendant's claim' and said paragraph No. 4 of the complaint of the plaintiff

shows that it is for an accion reivindicatoria which cannot be had under the

circumstances since many of the defendants and their privies had been in actual,

physical, and material possession of the land in the concept of owner through their

predecessors in interest for more than fifty (50) years beyond the thirty (30) year

limit for an accion reivindicatoria to prosper hence plaintiff (sic) claim by virtue of a

null and void title is untenable because the plaintiff's claim of ownership of the land

in question cannot be maintained in these class suit of cases (sic), that is, the

plaintiff and their privies versus the defendants and their privies and predecessors

in interest.

5. In answer to paragraph No. 5 of the plaintiffs complaint, defendants and their

privies deny the same the truth of the matter being that as stated in the foregoing

paragraphs Nos. 3 and 4 above, defendants and their privies exercised their

ownership of the land in question in accordance with the provisions of the Civil

Code and the land reform program that the plaintiff should be prosecuted for

violation of the law. 15

x x x

Additionally, but inexplicably, defendants insist that the filing of a motion for

summary judgment is an admission by plaintiff of the prescription of their action

because said motion is applicable only in the inferior courts. They then pontificate

that only three kinds of actions are available to recover possession of real property,

that is, forcible entry or illegal detainer, accion publiciana, and accion de

reivindicacion which actions, according to them, cannot be availed of by the

plaintiff because the only issue in all the three kinds of actions is possession which

the plaintiff allegedly never had from the beginning. 16 The incongruity of their said

propositions dictate that they should be disregarded.

We are, consequently, convinced that the rendition of the questioned summary

judgment by the trial court is proper and valid. Tested against the statutory and

jurisprudential rules above stated, the very allegations of the defendants prove that

no valid issue has been tendered by them, They relied mainly on two points, the

alleged invalidity of the title of the plaintiff and their supposed acquisition of the

properties by adverse possession. Defendants' theses are obviously puerile but they

are entitled to the benefit of clarification.

We note with approval the lower court's patient explanation that, inter alia, the

certificates of title issued in the name of the plaintiff in accordance with the LandRegistration Act (Act No. 496) is indefeasible after the expiration of one year from

the entry of the decree of registration. Under Section 38 thereof, a petition for

review of the decree must be presented within one year after its entry as described

and defined in Section 40 of the same. After the lapse of one year, the decree of

registration becomes incontrovertible 17 and is binding upon and conclusive against

all persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the registration

proceedings. 18 The certificates of title of appellee corporation were issued more

than thirty years ago: Title No. 31527 was issued on September 11, 1953, while Title

No. 31528 (now N-67845) was issued on February 19, 1952,

Even assuming arguendo that said titles may still be challenged, the present case

does not provide the vehicle for that remedy since the judicial action required is a

direct, and not a collateral, attack. 19 In fact, under the existing law, Section 48 of

the Property Registration Decree 20 expressly provides that a certificate of title

cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only

in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126

of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land

Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496

provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registeredowner shall be acquired by adverse possession. 21

Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and

inconsequential.

There is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may be said to justify

appellants' claim that said decree granted the ownership of said lands to them and

their successors by title. 22 Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to

believe that they acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole country

was declared by the previous regime as a land reform area.

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed summary judgment rendered by the trial court is

hereby AFFIRMED in toto. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., took no part.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.


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SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 91779 February 7, 1991

GRAND FARMS, INC. and PHILIPPINE SHARES CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE ADRIAN R. OSORIO, as Presiding Judge of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 171, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; ESPERANZA ECHIVERRI, as Clerk

of Court & Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila;

SERGIO CABRERA, as Deputy Sheriff-in-Charge; and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND

MORTGAGE BANK, respondents.

Balgos & Perez for petitioners.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:p

The propriety of a summary judgment is raised in issue in the instant petition, with

herein petitioners appealing the decision 1 of respondent court in CA-G.R. SP No.

17535, dated November 29, 1989, which found no grave abuse of discretion on the

part of respondent judge in denying petitioners' motion for summary judgment. 2

The antecedents of this case are clear and undisputed. Sometime on April 15, 1988,

petitioners filed Civil Case No. 2816-V88 in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,

Metro Manila f

judgment on the pleadings to remedies minus tuazon v ca

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