judge dismisses count 3 in bundy case

7/26/2019 Judge dismisses Count 3 in Bundy case

1/16

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF

OREGON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

P l a i n t i f f

v .

AMMON

BUNDY

JON RITZHEIMER,

JOSEPH O SHAUGHNESSY, RYAN

PAYNE, RYAN

BUNDY

BRIAN

CAVALIER,

SHAWNA

COX, PETER

SANTILLI,

JASON PATRICK,

DUANE LEO EHMER, DYLAN

ANDERSON, SEAN ANDERSON,

DAVID LEE FRY,

JEFF

WAYNE

BANTA,

SANDRA

LYNN ANDERSON,

KENNETH MEDENBACH

BLAINE

COOPER,

WESLEY

KJAR,

COREY

LEQUIEU, NEIL

WAMPLER

JASON

CHARLES BLOMGREN DARRYL

WILLIAM THORN, GEOFFREY

STANEK, TRAVIS COX,

ERIC

LEE

FLORES,

and

JAKE RYAN,

Defendants .

3:16-cr-00051-BR

ORDER

GRANTING MOTION

( 465)

TO

DISMISS AND

DISMISSING

COUNT

THREE OF THE SUPERSEDING

INDICTMENT

1 -

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

( 465) TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING

COUNT

THREE

OF

THE

SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT

Case 3:16-cr-00051-BR Document 671 Filed 06/10/16 Page 1 of 16


2/16

BROWN Judge

This mat te r comes before the Cour t on the

Motion

(#465)

to

Dismiss

f i l e d

by Defendants David Lee Fry,

mmon Bundy, Jon

Ritzheimer, Ryan Payne, Ryan Bundy, Brian Caval ie r ,

Jason

Pat r ick ,

and

Sean

Anderson. For

the

reasons

t ha t

fo l low,

the

Cour t GRANTS

Defendants '

Motion and ISMISSES Count Three

of

the

Superseding

Indictment .

BACKGROUND

In

Count

Three

of the Superseding

Indictment

(#282) the

government

charges Defendants with the use

and

carry ing

of

a

f i rearm in

r e l a t i o n to a crime

of v io lence

i n v io l a t i o n

of

18

U.S.C. 924 (c)

(1) (A).

The

crime of v io lence to

which

Count

Three

r e f e r s i s the

conspiracy

to impede

o f f i c e r s

of the United

Sta t e s in

v io l a t i o n

of

18 U.S.C. 372 as charged

in

Count One

of

the

Superseding

Indictment . In Count

One

the government a l leges

Defendants

knowingly and

w i l l fu l l y consp i re[d )

and

agree[d)

toge ther

and

with each othe r

and

with

persons

known

and

unknown

to

the

Grand

Jury to preven t

by force,

i n t imida t ion ,

and

t h r e a t s , o f f i c e r s and

employees

of

the

United Sta t e s

Fish and Wild l i fe Serv ice and the

Bureau

of Land

Management, agencies

within

the

United

Sta t e s Department of the In t e r io r , from discharg ing the

The Motion

was

f i l e d by David Lee Fry on beha l f of each

o f

the Defendants

named in

Count

Three

o f the Superseding

Indictment , and

for purposes of t h i s

Order

the

Cour t uses

Defendants and

a l l

Defendants to r e f e r to those

Defendants.

2

ORDER GR NTING MOTION (#465) TO

DISMISS

ND

DISMISSING

COUNT

THREE OF THE




3/16

dut i e s of t he i r

o f f i c e

a t the Malheur

National

Wildl i fe

Refuge and other

l oca t ions

in Harney County, Oregon, in

v io l a t i o n

of Ti t l e 18, United Sta t e s Code, Sect ion 372.

DIS USSION

Defendants contend Count

Three must

be dismissed because the

Sect ion 372 consp i racy offense charged in Count One i s

not

a

crime of v io lence wi th in the

meaning

o f

924(c)

(1) (A).

Sect ion 924 (c) (3) def ines

a

cr ime

of v io lence

as

an offense

t h a t i s

a

fe lony and

-

A)

has

as

an

element t he use,

at tempted use ,

o r

th rea tened use

of

phys ica l fo rce

aga ins t the

person

or

proper ty o f ano ther , or

B)

t ha t by i t s

nature ,

involves

a subs tan t i a l

r i sk

t ha t phys ica l fo rce aga ins t the

person

or p roper ty o f

another may be used

in

the course of committ ing t he

offense .

The f i r s t

h a l f of t h i s s t a tu to ry de f in i t ion

o f

cr ime

o f

vio lence

i s

known

as

the

force c lause .

The

second

h a l f

o f

the

def in i t ion ,

924 (c) (3)

(B),

i s known as the r es idua l c lause .

Sect ion 372,

in

turn ,

proh ib i t s

conspir[ ing] to prevent , by force, i n t imida t ion , o r

t h rea t , any person from accep t ing

or

holding any

off i ce , t r u s t ,

or

p lace

of

confidence under the United

Sta tes , or from discharg ing

any

dut i e s the reof , or

to

induce

by l i ke

means

any o f f i c e r

of

the

United

Sta tes

to

leave

the p lace , where h is dut i e s as an o f f i c e r

are

requ i red

to

be

per formed,

or

t o i n ju r e

him

in h is

person

or p roper ty on account of hi s

lawful discharge

of the dut i e s

of

hi s off i ce , or while engaged in the

lawful discharge

t he reof , or to

in ju re h i s

proper ty

so

as to moles t , i n t e r ru p t , hinder ,

or

impede him

in

the

discharge of

hi s o f f i c i a l du t ies .

3 - ORDER

GR NTING MOTION

(#465)

TO

DISMISS

ND

DISMISSING

COUNT

THREE

OF

THE




4/16

I

tandard

At

the

ou tse t the Court must determine the

s tandard to

apply

when

assess ing whether

372 i s

a

crime of v io lence wi th in the

meaning o f 924(c) .

The p a r t i e s

genera l ly

agree the Cour t should apply

the

ca tegor i ca l approach f i r s t se t out in Taylor v . Uni ted S ta t es

495 U.S. 575

(1990) ,

to

determine w h e t h e r

372 i s

crime of

violence

u n d e r 924(c) .

Under

the ca tegor ica l approach

the

cour t

look[s ] to

the elements

of

the o f fense

r a th e r than

the

p a r t i c u l a r f ac t s

underly ing a

defendant ' s

convict ion

to

decide

whether

the offense cr imina l ize

[s]

'a

broader swath

o f

conduct '

than the conduct covered

by

the def in i t ion of crime of

vio lence

in

924

(c) .

See United

S ta tes

v . Dominguez-Maroyoqui

748

F. 3d 918,

920

(9 th Cir . 2014) (quoting

Descamps

v . Uni ted

Sta tes

133 S. Ct. 2276,

2281

(2013)) . Under the ca tegor ica l

approach the ana lys i s focuses exc lus ive ly on the elements of the

s t a tu t e . Thus, i the

elements of

372

cr imina l ize

a

broader

swath of conduct

than

the

def in i t ion

of crime of v io lence

in

924(c) ,

t h e n

372

cannot

qua l i fy as a

cr ime of v io lence ,

even

i

the f ac t s

underly ing

the charge

o therwise meet

the

def in i t ion . Dominguez-Maroyoqui

748

F.3d a t 920. See also

Taylor

495

U.S.

a t 600.

The

Court ,

the re fo re , does not express

any opinion as to whether

the a l leged

conduct underly ing Count

4

ORDER

GR NTING MOTION

(#465) TO

DISMISS ND DISMISSING COUNT

THREE OF

THE SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT



5/16

One in the Superseding

Indictment meets

the d e f i n i t i o n of cr ime

of vio lence

in 924(c) .

Under

the

ca tegor ica l approach,

the c r ime-of -v io lence

determinat ion ' f unc t ion[s ] as an on-of f swi tch ' :

An

offense

q u a l i f i e s as

a

cr ime of vio lence

' i n

a l l cases or

in

n o n e . '

Dominguez-Maroyoqui 748

F.3d

a t 920

(quot ing Descamps 133 S.Ct .

a t

2287) .

Never the less ,

a

cour t may employ

a

modif ied ca tegor ica l

approach

in

a

narrow

range

of

cases

to

look beyond the

s t a t u t o ry elements to ' t he

charging

paper

and

j u ry

i n s t ru c t i o n s '

used

in

a

case

in

order to determine whether the cr ime charged

q u a l i f i e s as

a

crime of

v io lence . Descamps 133 S. Ct. a t

2283-84 (quot ing

Taylor

495 U.S. a t

602) .

Thus, the modif ied

ca tegor ica l approach i s a too l fo r

implementing the

ca tegor ica l

approach

t ha t in ce r t a in cases

permi ts

the cour t to examine

a

l imi t ed c las s

of

documents to determine which

of

a

s t a t u t e ' s

a l t e rn a t i v e

elements

formed the

bas i s

of the

defendant ' s

p r i o r

conv ic t ion . Descamps 133

S. Ct.

a t

2284. The modif ied

ca tegor ica l approach, however, does not prov ide

any

bas i s fo r the

cour t to look

a t

the

conduct

of the

defendant beyond

the e lements

within

the

s t a tu t e .

See

id

In any event , a cour t

may

only

apply

the

modif ied

ca tegor ica l approach i the

s t a tu t e a t i s sue

i s

d iv i s ib l e . Rendon v . Holder

764 F.3d 1077,

1083 (9th Cir .

5

ORDER GR NTING MOTION (#465) TO

DISMISS

ND

DISMISSING

COUNT

THREE OF




6/16

2014) . The

c r i t i c a l

d i s t i nc t i on when determining whether a

s t a tu t e i s d i v i s i b l e

i s t ha t

while i nd i v i s i b l e s t a tu t e s

may

conta in

mul t ip l e ,

a l t e rna t i ve means

of

committ ing

the crime,

only

d i v i s i b l e

s t a tu t e s conta in mul t ip le , a l t e r na t i ve elements of

funct ional ly separa te cr imes . Id. a t

1084-85.

Here

the

government

emphasizes the

f ac t t ha t

the

ca tegor ica l

approach

i s most

of t en

appl ied

when

a

cour t

i s

re t rospec t ive ly

determining whether a

defendant ' s

exi s t i ng convic t ion qua l i f i e s

as

a

crime of v io lence for sentenc ing purposes or o ther

s t a t u t o ry app l i ca t ions . Moreover,

the

government notes some

t r i a l

cour t s

have

ques t ioned whether

the

ca tegor ica l approach

even app l i es when a

cour t

i s determining whether a

concur ren t ly -

charged of fense for

which a

defendant has ye t to s tand

t r i a l

qua l i f i e s

as

a

crime of v io lence u n d e r 924(c) ) . See e . g .

United

Sta te s v .

Wells

No.

2:14-cr-00280-JCM-GWF,

2015

WL

10352877, a t *1-*5 D. Nev.

Dec.

30, 2015),

adopted

by 2016

WL

697107 (Feb. 19,

2016);

United Sta te s v . Woodley No. 15-c r -

20007, 2015 WL

7770859 (E.D.

Mich. Dec.

3,

2015); United

Sta te s

v.

S tandberry 139 F.

Supp.

3d 734, 735-37 (E.D. Va. 2015) . But

see

United Sta te s v . Smith No. 2:11-cr-00058-JAD-CWH, 2016

WL

2901661, a t *3

D. Nev. May

18,

2016) (ques t ioning

the u t i l i t y of

the

ca tegor ica l approaches ou t s ide o f

the

sentenc ing con tex t ,

but ,

none the less , fo l lowing

the Ninth C ircu i t ' s

holding

t ha t the

6 - ORDER GR NTING

MOTION

(#465) TO DISMISS ND DISMISSING COUNT

THREE OF

THE




7/16

ca tegor ica l analyses apply to

924(c)

cr ime-of -v io lence

determinat ions

both

a t

t r i a l and a t

sentencing

'w i thou t

regard

to

whether the given offense i s

a p r io r

offense o r the o f fense o f

conv ic t ion . ' )

(quot ing United

S ta t es

v Piccolo

441

F.3d

1084,

1086 (9th Cir .

2006)). In p a r t i c u l a r , these cour t s have

quest ioned whether the Supreme Cour t ' s

r a t i o n a l e

for employing

the ca tegor ica l approach in

a

r e t rospec t ive ana lys is appl ies with

equal fo rce when a cour t determines whether a concur ren t ly -

charged offense

i s a

crime of v io lence

in

the context of

a

p r e t r i a l

motion

to dismiss .

These

cour t s

have

observed t ha t ,

unl ike in

the

sen tenc ing context , a proper ly i n s t r u c t ed

j u ry

may

determine

f ac tua l ly whether the under ly ing

cr ime

q u a l i f i e s a

crime o f

v io lence . See Woodley

2015

W 7770859, a t *4-*5.

Although t h i s Cour t acknowledges the

l eg i t ima te

reasoning

of

the d i s t r i c t cour t opinions on

which

the

government

r e l i e s , the

Court , never the less ,

i s bound by

Ninth

C i r cu i t preceden t t h a t the

ca tegor ica l approach

app l i e s

even in the con tex t

o f

determining

whether

a

concurrent ly-charged pred ica t e offense

i s a

crime of

violence

u n d e r 924(c) .

United S ta tes

v.

Amparo

68 F.3d 1222,

1224-26

(9th

Cir .

1995).

See

a l so

Piccolo

441

F.3d a t

1086.

Thus, t h i s Court must apply the ca tegor ica l

ana lys i s ( including,

i

appl icable , the

modif ied ca tegor i ca l approach) when

determining

whether

372

ca tegor ica l ly

qua l i f i e s

as a

crime of

violence under e i the r the fo rce c lause o r the re s idua l c lause o f

7 ORDER GR NTING

MOTION

(#465) TO DISMISS ND DISMISSING COUNT

THREE OF THE SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT



8/16

924 (c) (3) .

II The Force lause

As

noted , the

force

c lause ,

18

U.S. C. 924 (c)

(3) (A),

def ines

a

crime of vio lence to

inc lude

an offense t ha t i s

a

fe lony

and t h a t

has as an element the use, a t tempted use,

o r

th rea tened use

of

phys ica l force

aga ins t

the person

or

proper ty

of ano the r .

18 U.S.C. 372, in

turn ,

proh ib i t s

consp i r [ ing]

to preven t , by force, i n t imida t ion , or t h rea t

a

fede ra l o f f i c i a l

from discharg ing the dut i e s

of

t he i r

o f f i c e .

2

The p la in language

of

Sect ion 372

c r imina l i ze [ s ] ' a

broader

swath

of conduct '

Dominguez-Maroyoqui,

748

F.3d

a t

920

(quot ing

Descamps, 133 S. Ct.

a t 2281)) than

the def in i t ion

of

crime

o f

violence

under

the fo rce c lause , 18 U.S.C.

924 (c) (3)

(A),

because

a t h rea t does not always impl ica te

the threa tened

use

of phys ica l

fo rce

aga ins t the person or p roper ty o f ano the r .

For

example, because the

express te rms

of

372 do not

l imi t

a

t h rea t to the t h r e a t of phys ica l fo rce aga ins t the person

or

proper ty

of another ,

a t h rea t u n d e r 372 could be a t h r e a t

to

blackmai l a

federa l of f i c e r for the purpose of p reven t ing the

of f i c e r from

discharging

h is

or

her du t ies ,

which

i s

a

kind of

2

Although 372 ou t l ines four

separa te objec ts of the

consp i racy t h a t

are proh ib i t ed

(see

United

ta tes v.

Demott,

No.

05-CR-0073,

2005

WL

2314134 (N.D. N.Y. Sept . 22, 2005)), the only

objec t

named in Count One of the Superseding Indictment i s

to

preven t

o f f i c e r s

of

the United Sta t e s f rom discharg ing the

dut i e s

of

t he i r o f f i c e by

force, i n t imida t ion ,

and

t h rea t s .

8 ORDER GR NTING MOTION

(#465) TO

DISMISS ND DISMISSING COUNT




9/16

t h r e a t

t ha t

does not necessa r i ly

requi re

as an element the

threa tened

use of phys ica l fo rce .

3

See 18 U.S.C.

924 (c) (3) A) Never the less , a

t h rea t

under 372 must

be

i l l e g i t im a te .

See

United

States v. Fulbright 105 F.3d

443,

452

(9th Cir . 1997).

Moreover, the Cour t notes

the word

i n t imida t ion may a l so

encompass conduct t ha t does not

present

a

t h r e a t o f phys ica l

fo rce

because i n t imida t ion

could ,

fo r

example, apply to t h r e a t s of

nonvio len t

harm to proper ty . See

United S ta tes v . Casse l 408 F.3d

622,

636

(9th Cir .

2005) ( We

conclude t ha t

' i n t imida t ion ' under 18 U.S.C. 1860

requi res

the

t h r e a t

of harm

i n f l i c t e d by the defendant

upon

the v ic t im ' s

person

or

proper ty . ) .

The Court , t he re fo re , concludes 372

c r imina l i ze s

a

broader swath

of

conduct than the

def in i t ion o f crime of

violence

in

the

fo rce

c lause ,

and, consequent ly ,

372

i s not a

ca tegor ica l match

to the

fo rce

c lause .

See Dominguez-Maroyoqui

748

F.3d a t 920.

In addi t ion , the Court concludes t may not apply the

3

In ts

Order

(#650) Regarding Defendants ' Motions to

Dismiss

Count One for

Vagueness and

Overbreadth, the

Cour t

narrowly

cons t rued

a

t h r ea t

under

372

to

be

l imi t ed to

t r u e

th rea t s as

well

as

nonvio len t t h r e a t s such

as

blackmai l and

ex to r t ion

t ha t are not protec ted

by the

Fi r s t

Amendment. When

apply ing

the ca tegor ica l approach,

however,

the Cour t i s

not

permi t t ed to cons t rue a s t a tu t e to narrow the sweep of a broader

swath

of conduct

in

order to

f ind a match to t h e 924(c)

(3)

def in i t ion

of crime of v io l ence .

9 - ORDER GRANTING MOTION

(#465)

TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING COUNT




10/16

modif ied

ca tegor i ca l

approach

to determine whether

372

q u a l i f i e s as a cr ime of v io lence under 924 (c) (3) A) because

372

i s not d i v i s i b l e as

to whether t he ob jec t

of the consp i racy

was

accomplished by force , in t imida t ion ,

o r

t h rea t .

Indeed,

the s t a t u t o ry

t e x t

makes

c l ea r

t ha t fo rce , i n t imida t ion ,

o r

t h rea t are t h ree means

by which

the consp i racy

to

preven t

federa l o f f i c i a l s

from discharg ing the

dut i e s

o f t h e i r o f f i c e may

be

accomplished. See

DeMott

2005 WL 2314134, a t

*1-*2.

Accordingly , the Court cannot employ the modif ied ca tegor ica l

ana lys i s t o determine

whether

372

qua l i f i e s as a

crime

of

vio lence under

18 U.S.C. 924 (c) (3) (A).

Applying the ca tegor i ca l approach on t h i s record , t he re fo re ,

the

Cour t concludes

372

i s

not

a

crime

o f

vio lence

as

def ined

in

the

fo rce

c lause

o f 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (3) (A).

I I I The

Residual

lause

Sect ion 372 may, nonethe less , co n s t i t u t e a

crime

o f

vio lence with in the

meaning

o f

924

(c) (3)

i

372

i s

a

ca tegor i ca l match wi th the re s idua l c lause o f 924 (c)

(3)

B)

Rather

than contend 372 does not

qua l i fy as

a

crime

o f

vio lence under the r e s i d u a l c lause ,

however,

Defendants i ns t ead

argue the re s idua l c lause

o f

924 (c) (3) B) i s void because it i s

u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague,

and,

t he re fo re ,

the government may not

r e ly

on

the

re s idua l c lause def in i t ion t o qua l i fy

372

as

a

crime o f vio lence . As noted, the re s idua l c lause def ines a

10

- ORDER GRANTING

MOTION (#465)

TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING

COUNT

THREE

OF




11/16

crime of vio lence

as an

an offense t ha t

i s

a

fe lony and

t ha t

by i t s natu re , invo lves a

s u b s t an t i a l

r i s k t ha t phys ica l fo rce

aga ins t the person

or

proper ty

of

another may be used

in

the

course

of

committ ing

the

of fense . 18

U.S.C.

924(c)

(3)

(B).

Defendants

pr imar i ly

r e ly on

United

S ta t e s v. Johnson 135

S. Ct. 2551 (2015), to support

t he i r

argument

t ha t

the r es idua l

c lause

o f

924 (c) (3) B) i s void fo r vagueness . In Johnson

the

Supreme Court addressed whether the r es idua l c lause of the

Armed Career Criminal Act ACCA) was void

for vagueness.

The

ACCA

def ined v io len t fe lony

as any cr ime

punishab le

by

imprisonment fo r a term exceeding one year .

. t ha t . i s

burg la ry , arson , or ex to r t ion , involves use of explos ives ,

or

otherwise involves

conduct t ha t

presents ser ious po ten t ia l o f

phys ical

i n j u ry to another . 18

U.S.C. 924(e)

(2) B)

( i i )

(emphasis added).

The

c los ing c lause o f the d e f i n i t i o n

( i t a l i c i z e d above)

was

known as the r es idua l c lause .

Johnson

135 S. Ct.

a t 2555-56.

The

Johnson Cour t exp la ined t h a t use

of the

ca tegor ica l

approach when determining whether

a pred ica t e offense

f i t s with in

the ACCA's r es idua l c lause requ i re s a court

to p ic tu re

the kind

o f

conduct

t ha t

the cr ime invo lves in ' t he ord inary case , ' and to

judge

whether t ha t

abs t rac t ion

pre sen t s a se r ious po ten t i a l r i s k

of

phys ica l i n ju ry . Id. a t 2557

(quoting James

v.

United

States ,

550 U.S.

192, 208

(2007)) .

11 -

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

(#465) TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING

COUNT

THREE OF THE




12/16

The Cour t then found two

fea tu re s of

the re s idua l c lause

consp i re to make t uncons t i tu t iona l ly

vague.

Johnson 135 S.

Ct.

a t

2557. Fi r s t , the Court determined t he re s idua l c lause

leaves grave unce r t a in ty

about

how

to es t imate

the

r i s k posed by

a crime because

the cour t performing t h a t

ana lys i s t i e s

the

j ud i c i a l assessment of r i s k to a j ud i c i a l l y imagined ' o rd ina ry

case '

of

a

crime, not to rea l -wor ld

f ac t s

or s t a tu to ry e lements .

Id.

Second,

the Court reasoned the CC r es idua l c lause l eaves

unce r t a in ty

about how

much r i sk

t takes for

a

cr ime

to

qua l i fy

as

a

v io len t fe lony

because

the cour t making

t ha t

assessment

must

apply an

imprecise ' s e r ious

p o t e n t i a l r i s k ' s tandard

to

a

judge-imagined abs t rac t ion as

a

r e s u l t

of the

ord inary case

ana lys i s .

Id. a t

2558.

The

Court found the se r ious p o t e n t i a l

r i sk

s tandard

to

be espec ia l ly unclear because the

four

enumerated

crimes

t ha t the

CC

provided as examples (burg lary ,

arson, ex to r t ion , and

crimes

invo lv ing the

use of

exp los ives )

are

' f a r

from c l e a r in

respec t

to the degree of r i s k

each

poses . ' Id quoting Begay

v . Uni ted

S ta te s

553

U.S. 137, 143

(2008)) . Accordingly,

the

Court reasoned: By

combining

indeterminacy

about how to

measure

the

r i sk

posed by a cr ime with

indeterminacy

about how

much r i s k t t akes fo r the cr ime to

qua l i fy as a

v io len t fe lony,

the re s idua l c lause produces

more

u n p r ed i c t ab i l i t y and

a rb i t r a r i n e s s

than

the

Due

Process

Clause

12 ORDER GR NTING MOTION (#465) TO

DISMISS

ND

DISMISSING

COUNT

THREE

OF THE SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT



13/16

t o l e ra t e s .

Johnson

135 S. Ct.

a t

2558.

In add i t i on

to

eva lua t ing the vagueness

o f

the s t a tu t e on

i t s face, the Cour t

in

Johnson

a lso

noted i t s own r epea ted

a t tempts and

repea ted f a i l u re s to c ra f t

a pr inc ip led

and

ob jec t ive s tandard

out

of

the r es idua l c lause confirm i t s

hopeless indeterminacy and t ha t

lower cour t s

had

a l so s t rugg led

with how to apply the r es idua l

c lause in

the

ACCA

Id. a t

2558,

2560-61. Ult imate ly the Cour t concluded

[e ]ach of

the

u n ce r t a in t i e s i n the r es idua l

c lause may be t o l e rab le

in

i so l a t ion , but

' t h e i r

sum makes a t a sk fo r

us which

a t bes t could

be only guesswork . ' Id. a t 2560.

Defendants contend

the

r es idua l

c lause

o

924(c)

(3)

B) i s

mater ia l ly i nd i s t i ngu i shab le from the ACCA r es idua l c lause t h a t

the Supreme Cour t

found

void

for

vagueness in

Johnson. Moreover,

Defendants po in t

out

t ha t s ince

Johnson the

Ninth

Circu i t has

held

ano ther

s t a tu t e , 18

U.S.C.

16(b) , incorpora ted

in to

t he

Immigration

and

Nat iona l i t y Act, 8

U.S.C.

l lOl (a )

(43) (F), i s

a l so

void

for vagueness on s imi la r grounds. Dimaya v.

Lynch 803

F.3d 1110 (9 th Cir .

2015).

Sect ion 16(b) de f ines a crime of v io lence as any o the r

offense

t h a t i s a felony and

tha t ,

by i t s

na ture ,

invo lves a

subs tan t i a l

r i s k t ha t phys ica l

fo rce

aga ins t t he person or

proper ty of

ano ther

may be used in the

course

of committ ing t he

of fense . 18 U.S.C. 16(b) . A f te r expla in ing t h a t 16(b)

13

-

ORDER

GRANTING MOTION (#465)

TO

DISMISS AND DISMISSING COUNT




14/16

requ i re s cour t s

to ' i nqu i re whether the conduct encompassed by

the elements of the of fense , in the o rd ina ry case , presen t s ' a

s u b s t an t i a l r i s k

of

fo rce , the Ninth C i r cu i t found the same two

cons idera t ions

t ha t rendered

the

CC r es idua l c lause

uncons t i tu t iona l ly vague

a l so

mandated the inva l ida t ion

of

16(b) . Dimaya

803

F.3d a t

1116-17 (quot ing Delgado-Hernandez

v.

Holder

697 F.3d

1125,

1128 (9 th Cir . 2012)).

Defendants ,

the re fo re , contend the r es idua l c lause of 924

(c)

(3) B) i s void

for

vagueness

because

it i s mater ia l ly ind i s t ingu i shab le from

16

(b) .

On the

other

hand, the

government

emphasizes the Dimaya

cour t ex press ly dec l ined to reach

the c ons t i t u t i ona l i t y of

app l i ca t ions of 18 U.S.C.

16(b)

outs ide of 8

U.S.C.

1101

(a) (43) F} or

to

cas t

any

doubt on the c ons t i t u t i ona l i t y of

18

U.S.C.

16(a ) ' s def in i t ion of a cr ime of v io lence .

Dimaya

803 F.3d

a t 1120

n.17 .

In

addi t ion ,

the

government

a s se r t s the

r es idua l c lause o

924(c)

i s d i s t ingu i shab le from the CC

r es idua l c lause t h a t the Supreme Court inva l ida ted in Johnson

b ecau s e 924(c) (3) B) lacks the list of enumerated of fenses t h a t

cont r ibuted to the

vagueness

of

the CC r es idua l

c lause ,

does

not

requi re

a cour t

to

look beyond the

elements of

the

pred ica t e

offense , and

does not

carry with

it

the same

h is to ry

of r epea ted

a t tempts

and

repea ted

fa i lu res to

c ra f t

a pr inc ip led and

ob jec t ive s tandard

as

the

CC r es idua l

c lause .

See Johnson

14

- ORDER GR NTING MOTION

( 465) TO

DISMISS ND

DISMISSING

COUNT




15/16

135

S. Ct. a t 2558.

Never the less , the

Cour t notes many

of the

grounds t ha t t he

government

r e l i e s on to

d i s t i n g u i s h

924(c)

(3) B)

from

t he ACCA

r e s idua l

c lause

were cons idered and r e j e c t e d

by

t he Ninth C i r c u i t

in

Dimaya. See

803

F.3d a t

1118-19. Moreover, fo l lowing Johnson

and Dimaya

severa l

d i s t r i c t cour t s w i th in the Ninth Circu i t have

conc luded

924(c) (3) B) i s uncons t i tu t iona l ly vague. See

United

S ta t es v . Baires-Reyes

No.

15-cr-00122-EMC-2, 2016 WL 3163049,

a t

*3-*5

(N.D. Cal . June

7,

2016) ( f inding the reasoning o f Dimaya

app l i es

to t he r e s idua l

c lause of

924

(c)

(3) B) and,

accordingly , f inding

924

(c) (3) B) void

for

vagueness) ; United

S ta t es v . Lattanaphom

No.

2:99-00433 WBS 2016 WL 393545,

a t

*3-*6

(E.D. Cal. Feb.

2,

2016); United S ta tes v. Bel l No. 15-c r -

00258-WHO, 2016 WL 344749, a t *13 (N.D.

Cal.

Jan. 28, 2016) .

Although the government

c o r r e c t l y

po in t s

out t ha t t he

Six th

Circu i t in United S ta t es v . Taylor concluded the r e s idua l c lause

o

924(c)

(3)

B)

was

not uncons t i tu t iona l ly

vague in

l i gh t of

Johnson the S ix th Circu i t d id so only a f t e r acknowledging

16

(b) appears i de n t i c a l to 924 (c) (3) B) in

a l l

mater i a l

r espec t s

and

only a f t e r

expre ss ly

decl in ing

to

fo l low

t he

Ninth

C i r c u i t ' s

reasoning

in

Dimaya.

814

F.3d

340,

379

(6th

Cir .

2016)

.

Unlike the S ix th Circu i t in Taylor

t h i s

Cour t i s no t

empowered to

dec l ine

to fo l low

Dimaya. As t he

Taylor cour t

15

- ORDER GRANTING

MOTION (#465)

TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING

COUNT

THREE

OF




16/16

noted, 16 (b)

appears

i d en t i c a l

to

924 (c) (3) B)

in

a l l

mate r i a l

r e s p ec t s .

Id. Accordingly ,

because

the Court

i s bound

by Dimaya

the Cour t must

conc lude

924(c) (3) B) i s void

for

vagueness . As

a

r e su l t ,

the Court cannot

r e ly

on the re s idua l

c lause in 924 (c)

(3)

B) to conclude t ha t

372

i s a cr ime o f

vio lence .

For

these

reasons ,

the Court concludes on t h i s

record t h a t

372

i s

not

a cr ime of v io lence with in the meaning o f

924(c)

(3) ,

and,

t he re fo re ,

Count

Three must

be

dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For

these reasons , the Court GR NTS Defendants ' Motion

(#465)

to Dismiss

and ISMISSES

Count Three

of the

Superseding

Indictment .

IT IS SO ORDERED.

D TED

t h i s

10th day o f

June,

2016.

NN J . BROWN

United Sta t e s D is t r i c t

Judge

16 - ORDER GR NTING MOTION (#465) TO DISMISS ND DISMISSING COUNT



judge dismisses count 3 in bundy case

Documents