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13 June 2000

Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint Reception,

Staging, Onward Movement,and Integration

Joint Publication 4-01.8

PREFACE

i

1. Scope

This publication provides overarchingguidelines for planning and executing jointreception, staging, onward movement, andintegration (JRSOI) of the Armed Forces ofthe United States. It explains the process ofJRSOI using three major functions —command, control, communications,computers, and intelligence; force protection;and the JRSOI support organization. Its focusis at the supported combatant command level.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine andselected joint tactics, techniques, andprocedures (JTTP) to govern the jointactivities and performance of the ArmedForces of the United States in joint operationsand provides the doctrinal basis for USmilitary involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrineand selected tactics, techniques, andprocedures for joint operations and training.It provides military guidance for use by theArmed Forces in preparing their appropriateplans. It is not the intent of this publicationto restrict the authority of the joint forcecommander (JFC) from organizing the forceand executing the mission in a manner theJFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity

of effort in the accomplishment of the overallmission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics,techniques, and procedures and guidanceestablished in this publication apply to thecommanders of combatant commands,subunified commands, joint task forces, andsubordinate components of these commands.These principles and guidance also may applywhen significant forces of one Service areattached to forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

C. W. FULFORD, JR.Lieutenant General, US Marine CorpsDirector, Joint Staff

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Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IOVERVIEW

• General ..................................................................................................................... I-1• Segments of Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration ............ I-2• Principles of JRSOI .................................................................................................. I-5• Elements of JRSOI.................................................................................................... I-7

CHAPTER IICOMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

• General .................................................................................................................... II-1• Roles and Responsibilities ....................................................................................... II-1• Command and Control Options ............................................................................... II-9

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING

• General .................................................................................................................. III-1• Joint Planning........................................................................................................ III-1• Environment and Threat Assessment .................................................................... III-3• JRSOI Planning ..................................................................................................... III-6• Synchronizing and Balancing the Flow ............................................................... III-12• JRSOI Planning Requirements and Considerations ............................................. III-14• Automated Support Planning Tools ..................................................................... III-15• Summary ............................................................................................................. III-18

CHAPTER IVRECEPTION

• General .................................................................................................................. IV-1• Reception Process .................................................................................................. IV-2• Reception Nodes .................................................................................................... IV-5• Reception Considerations .................................................................................... IV-16

CHAPTER VSTAGING

• General ................................................................................................................... V-1• Staging Process ....................................................................................................... V-2• Staging Areas ......................................................................................................... V-8

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CHAPTER VIONWARD MOVEMENT

• General .................................................................................................................. VI-1• Onward Movement Process ................................................................................... VI-1• Onward Movement Functions ................................................................................ VI-2

CHAPTER VIIINTEGRATION

• General ................................................................................................................. VII-1• The Integration Process ........................................................................................ VII-2• Integration Functions ............................................................................................ VII-4

CHAPTER VIIIENABLERS

• General ................................................................................................................ VIII-1• Automated Information Systems .......................................................................... VIII-1• Joint Total Asset Visibility ................................................................................... VIII-4• Theater Distribution ............................................................................................ VIII-8• Contingency Contracting ..................................................................................... VIII-9• Host-Nation Support ............................................................................................ VIII-9• Training............................................................................................................. VIII-10

APPENDIX

A Movement Control ........................................................................................... A-1B JRSOI Support Structure ................................................................................... B-1C Deployment Planning Tools .............................................................................. C-1D References ........................................................................................................ D-1E Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-5

FIGURE

I-1 Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and IntegrationEnhances Full Spectrum Dominance ......................................................... I-2

I-2 Deployment Process Overview ..................................................................... I-3I-3 The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

Process Map ............................................................................................... I-4I-4 Principles of Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and

Integration.................................................................................................. I-5

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I-5 Elements of Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, andIntegration.................................................................................................. I-7

I-6 Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and IntegrationSupport Considerations .............................................................................. I-9

III-1 Key Service Documents for Joint Reception, Staging, OnwardMovement, and Integration Planning ...................................................... III-2

III-2 Environment and Threat Assessment Considerations ............................... III-4III-3 Examples of Infrastructure Assessment ..................................................... III-5III-4 The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

Map — Mission Analysis ........................................................................ III-7III-5 Sources of Logistic Support . ..................................................................... III-8III-6 Host Nation Negotiating Considerations ................................................... III-9III-7 Prepare and Send Directives for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward

Movement, and Integration Support ...................................................... III-12III-8 The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

Map — Deployment Data Confirmation ............................................... III-13III-9 General Planning Considerations ............................................................ III-16III-10 Deployment Planning Tools .................................................................... III-18IV-1 The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

Map — Reception ................................................................................... IV-3IV-2 Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Support

Structure .................................................................................................. IV-5IV-3 Marshalling Area Operations .................................................................... IV-6IV-4 Notional Joint Aerial Port Complex .......................................................... IV-8IV-5 Aerial Port of Debarkation Support Functions .......................................... IV-9IV-6 Notional Aerial Port of Debarkation........................................................ IV-10IV-7 Organizations and Functions at Aerial Port of Debarkation .................... IV-11IV-8 Seaport of Debarkation Functions ........................................................... IV-12IV-9 Organizations and Functions at Seaports of Debarkation ........................ IV-13IV-10 Notional Joint Waterport Complex .......................................................... IV-16IV-11 Port Support Activity and Port Operations Group Functions ................... IV-17IV-12 Reception Planning Considerations......................................................... IV-18V-1 Staging Force-Related Activities ................................................................ V-1V-2 The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

Map — Staging ........................................................................................ V-3V-3 Notional Staging Area ............................................................................... V-8VI-1 Onward Movement Challenges ................................................................. VI-2VI-2 The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

Map — Onward Movement .................................................................... VI-3VI-3 Critical Functions of Onward Movement .................................................. VI-4VI-4 Notional Convoy Support Site ................................................................... VI-7VI-5 Host-Nation Support to Onward Movement .............................................. VI-8VII-1 The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

Map — Integration ................................................................................ VII-3VIII-1 Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Enablers ...... VIII-1VIII-2 Key Automated Systems.......................................................................... VIII-2VIII-3 Global Transportation Network ............................................................... VIII-3

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VIII-4 Key Joint Total Asset Visibility Processes ............................................... VIII-5VIII-5 In-Transit Visibility Critical Functions.................................................... VIII-5VIII-6 Principles of Theater Distribution ........................................................... VIII-8A-1 Joint Movement Control Architecture ........................................................ A-3A-2 Sample Command Relationships for Air Mobility Forces .......................... A-5A-3 Theater Relationships for Movement Operations ....................................... A-7C-1 Current High-Level Automated Information Systems Applications ............ C-1C-2 Global Command and Control System Applications ................................... C-2C-3 Analysis of Mobility Platform ..................................................................... C-4C-4 Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation Model ......................... C-5C-5 Current Theater Lines of Communications Development Applications ...... C-6

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

vii

Introduction

Discusses Guidance for the Joint Reception, Staging,Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) Phaseof Force Deployment

Discusses the Combatant Command and ServiceRelationships and Responsibilities

Details the JRSOI Process Including its Functional Areas,Elements, and Tasks

Considers Supporting Organizations and AutomatedInformation Technologies as JRSOI Enhancers

Joint reception, staging,onward movement, andintegration (JRSOI) is thefinal phase of deploymentand is the critical linkbetween deployment andemployment of joint forcesin the area ofresponsibility or jointoperations area.

The US Government utilizes diplomatic, economic,informational, or military means to project power in order torespond to crises, contribute to deterrence, and promoteregional stability. With fewer US forces present overseas, USNational Military Strategy relies heavily on the fundamentalconcept of force projection, the military element of powerprojection. Successful force projection rests on the ability toalert, mobilize, and deploy forces to a regional crisis and thenrapidly amass combat capabilities as personnel and materielarrive in the theater. A key element of force projection isdeployment. Deployment is movement of forces and theirsustainment from their point of origin to a specific operationalarea to conduct joint operations. This publication presentsjoint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration(JRSOI), the final phase of the four phases of the deploymentprocess. The JRSOI phase of joint force projection occurs inthe operational area. This phase comprises the essentialprocesses required to transition arriving personnel, equipment,and materiel into forces capable of meeting operationalrequirements.

The deployment process includes all planning and executionactivities beginning with notification of the need to accomplisha mission requiring deployment of US forces. Deploymentends when the supported combatant commander has sufficient

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Unity of command,synchronization, andbalance underscore theprinciples of JRSOI.

mission ready forces at the prescribed final destination.Although deployment is an iterative process overall, JRSOIas the last deployment phase completes the deployment processfor force elements. It is also important to remember that JRSOIprocess functions are applicable to both the deployment andredeployment phases of military operations.

Successful JRSOI is characterized by three overarchingprinciples: unity of command, synchronization, and balance.JRSOI expedites the continuous and controlled flow of forcesand supplies into and within the theater. JRSOI enhances theefficient use of limited assets, personnel, and facilities byavoiding saturation at nodes and along lines of communications(LOCs) en route and within the theater. In order to accomplishthis, JRSOI depends on a well-planned and carefully managedtime-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) flow.

• Unity of Command specifies that a single military individualis responsible for the overall coordination of JRSOIactivities; whereas unity of effort emphasizes the need fora variety of international military and nonmilitaryparticipants to be directed toward a common purpose.Both approaches are desirable to coordinate the efforts ofall key players in the JRSOI process, to include supportingcombatant commanders for orchestration or en routeinfrastructure. Multinational unity of effort requirescoordinated policy, a common understanding, and trustand confidence.

• Synchronization links deployed personnel, equipment,and materiel in a timely manner. Ensuring visibility ofassets between processing nodes is key to achievingsynchronization of forces. A well-synchronized flowexpedites buildup of mission capability and avoidssaturation at nodes and along LOCs, thereby enhancingsurvivability.

• Balance applies to managing the TPFDD flow by allowinga continuous and controlled flow of forces and suppliesinto and within the area of responsibility (AOR). Balanceis achieved by ensuring that people, equipment, materiel,and information flow are directed at a rate that can beaccommodated at every point along the entire networkfrom origin to destination. Achieving balance can resultin efficient JRSOI operations and help minimize the timerequired to complete JRSOI.

Principles of JRSOI

ix

Executive Summary

A variety of individuals, units, and organizations areaccountable for ensuring the success of JRSOI. They include:

• Supporting Combatant Commanders• Subordinate Joint Force Commanders• Components• Deploying Unit(s)• Support Organizations (Enabling Units)• Allies and Coalition Partners• Host Nation• Contractors

JRSOI includes receiving personnel, materiel, and equipment;assembling them into units at designated staging sites; movingthese units to a destination within the joint operations area orAOR; and integrating these units into a mission ready jointforce. Often, these activities are performed concurrently ratherthan sequentially; they may be performed in a differentsequence; and some steps may even be performed before adeploying unit enters the theater. For example, amphibiousMarine air-ground task forces task-organize before they deploy,thereby eliminating most staging area activities associated withreuniting forces and equipment and organizing them for onwardmovement.

Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and supportavailable, time available (METT-T) and civilian considerationsinfluence decisions. METT-T factors may require certain typesof units to be in high demand and prepared for immediateemployment. For example, security force units would be thefirst units to deploy into some ports of debarkation to provideprotection for deploying troops and equipment. Criticalresources such as heavy equipment transporters, fuel support,and ground transportation to move personnel may requireredirecting lift assets from other missions. Therefore, flexibilityand visibility are critical assets in planning JRSOI operations.A robust command, control, communications, computers, andintelligence infrastructure is also essential for distributinginformation and providing command and control to managethis type of complex, dynamic support architecture.

Responsibility

Fundamentals of JRSOI

JRSOI is the responsibilityof the supportedcombatant commanderreceiving forces.

During JRSOI, plannedcapability is turned intoactual on-site capability toconduct specified missions.

JRSOI must be responsiveto the supportedcombatant commander’spriorities.

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CONCLUSION

This publication establishes a detailed understanding of jointstaging, reception, onward movement, and integrationoperations. It provides joint tactics, techniques, and procedureson the fundamentals of JRSOI of the Armed Forces of theUnited States in response to mission tasking. The concepts ofthe JRSOI process are extensively addressed, with emphasison planning and execution. It discusses the responsibilitiesand command relationships for supported and supportingcombatant commands and Services with regards to theseoperations. Finally, consideration is given to the importanceof supporting organizations and the automated informationsystems and associated emerging automatic identificationtechnology that will provide worldwide asset visibility for thesuccessful completion of JRSOI operations.

CHAPTER IOVERVIEW

I-1

1. General

In order to respond to crises, contribute todeterrence, and promote regional stability, theUnited States Government utilizesdiplomatic, economic, informational, ormilitary instruments to shape theinternational environment. With fewer USforces present overseas, US NationalMilitary Strategy relies heavily on thefundamental concept of force projection,the military element of power projection.Successful force projection rests on the abilityto alert, mobilize, and deploy forces to aregional crisis and then rapidly amass combatcapabilities as personnel and materiel arrivein the theater. A key element of forceprojection is deployment. Deployment ismovement of forces and their sustainmentfrom their point of origin to a specificoperational area to conduct joint operations.This chapter presents an overview of jointreception, staging, onward movement, andintegration (JRSOI), which is the final phaseof deployment. It defines the segments,describes the principles, and identifies theessential elements of JRSOI as they supportand enhance full spectrum dominance (seeFigure I-1). It is important to rememberJRSOI process functions are applicable toboth the deployment and redeploymentphases of military operations.

“Future force projection missions, like those throughout history, will demandwell-developed operational and logistical planning, force mix, appropriatesequencing into and out of a theater, and a constant requirement for soldierand unit versatility. Such missions will require leaders and units that canoperate in ambiguity and have the agility to adapt and adjust. Set piecethinking does not fit force projection. All of these requirements will occur ina joint or combined environment.”

General Fredrick M. Franks, Jr.Commander, VII Corps, Gulf War

a. The deployment process requirescontinuous planning that begins with therequirement to deploy forces, and ends whenunits are assembled in the theater and areintegrated into the joint force. Deploymentis conducted in four phases: predeploymentactivities; movement to and activities at aport of embarkation (POE); movement toa port of debarkation (POD); and JRSOI.These segments describe the major activitiesof the joint force from point of origin to pointof employment. The first three phases arefurther discussed in Joint Publication (JP)3-35, Joint Deployment and RedeploymentOperations. This publication will focus uponthe final phase of deployment, JRSOI.

b. Joint force deployment is a dynamic andcomplex process that involves a multitude oforganizations and processes that requiretraining, continuous coordination, andintegration during planning and execution.Process seams and friction may occur atfunctional or organizational interfaces whenphysical resources and information aretransferred. A successful deploymentrequires the smooth implementation of eachsegment and seamless transition betweensegments.

c. Force deployments can originate fromthe continental United States (CONUS) or

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forward locations outside of CONUS. Unitsmay deploy with all or some of their suppliesand equipment, use supplies and equipmentmade available through host nation (HN) ortheater contract support, or they may usesupplies and equipment that has been pre-positioned around the world both ashore andafloat. Figure I-2 illustrates the deploymentprocess from POEs to final destination in-theater utilizing the strategic mobility triadof strategic airlift, strategic sealift, and pre-positioned equipment. The combination of

rapid lift, pre-positioned assets, andoverseas presence provides the supportedcombatant commander with flexiblemobility options that can be tailored tomeet requirements.

2. Segments of Joint Reception,Staging, Onward Movement,and Integration

a. In a force projection environment, theability to execute a mission largely depends

Figure I-1. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and IntegrationEnhances Full Spectrum Dominance

JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARDMOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

ENHANCES FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE

Effectively Integrating Widely DispersedJoint Forces Into the Combatant

Commander's Command Structure

Effectively Integrating Widely DispersedJoint Forces Into the Combatant

Commander's Command Structure

Unity of CommandUnity of Command

Cumulative Effect Generated by theFour Joint Reception, Staging,Onward Movement, and Integration(JRSOI) ProcessesGenerates MassedEffects FromDispersed Forces

Provides the Capabilityto Dominate the FullRange of MilitaryOperations

Recep

tion

Onw

ard

Mov

emen

tIn

tegr

atio

n

Stag

ing

JRSOI PrinciplesJRSOI Principles

SynchronizationSynchronization

BalanceBalance

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Overview

on the speed with which forces assembleat the required location. JRSOI is theessential process that transitionsdeploying forces, consisting of personnel,equipment, and materiel arriving intheater, into forces capable of meetingthe combatant commander’s operational

requirements. Maintaining effectivenessand promoting efficiency in JRSOIfacilitates preparation for operations byproviding adequately resourced, mission-capable forces to execute the combatantcommander’s mission. The four segmentsof JRSOI are described below.

DEPLOYMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW

CONUS orWorldwide

Pre-deploymentActivities

Movement to &Activities at Portof Embarkation

Movement toPort of

Debarkation

Joint Reception,Staging, OnwardMovement, and

Integration

APOEOriginOrigin

OriginOrigin

OperationalArea

SPOE

SPOD

APODDestination

AIRLIFT

GLOBAL SUSTAINMENT

STRATEGIC MANEUVER

SEALIFT

PREPO

STRATEGICMOBILITY

TRIAD

STRATEGICMOBILITY

TRIAD

APODAPOECONUSOAPOD

POEPREPO

SPODSPOETAA

port of embarkationpre-positioned force, equipment,or supplies

seaport of debarkationseaport of embarkationtactical assembly area

aerial port of debarkationaerial port of embarkationcontinental United Statesoperational areaport of debarkation

Combatant Commands,Services, and/or Agencies

Source to POE

USTRANSCOM(POE to POD)

CombatantCommands and/or

Service Components(POD to TAA/OA)

Figure I-2. Deployment Process Overview

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• Reception operations include all thosefunctions required to receive and clearunit personnel, equipment, and materielthrough the POD.

• Staging assembles, temporarily holds,and organizes arriving personnel,equipment, and materiel into units andforces and prepares them for onwardmovement and tactical operations.

• Onward Movement is the process ofmoving units and accompanyingmateriel from reception facilities,marshalling areas, and staging areas totactical assembly areas (TAAs) and/oroperational areas (OAs) or other theaterdestinations.

• Integration is the synchronized handover of units into an operationalcommander’s force prior to missionexecution.

b. The supported combatant commanderis responsible for JRSOI. This includes allactions required to make arriving unitsoperationally ready and then integrating theminto the joint force. The capability of strategiclift to move personnel, equipment, andmateriel to the reception points (e.g., thePODs) must be matched by the capability toreceive and process the force. Thecombatant commander must have visibilityof the deployment flow to control the rateas well as the sequencing and processing ofdeploying forces. Although the supportedcommander is responsible for JRSOI andother facets of logistic support, this does notrelieve supporting commanders ofresponsibility for detailed oversight of thedeployment flow and coordinating changeswith the supported commander, whenappropriate.

c. JRSOI is a critical operational challengethat relies on a logistic architecture forsuccessful execution. Even self-sustaining

units that arrive in-theater are heavilydependent on logistic systems until they arereunited with their equipment. As deployingunits assemble, efforts focus on preparingfor future operations and integrating intothe joint force. Successful JRSOI requirescommand emphasis in planning, training,synchronization, and attention to detail.JRSOI is an integral part of an operationand enhances employment potential.

d. JRSOI provides a common frameworkto focus joint and Service componentcapabilities on land, at sea, and in the airinto a coherent operation. The JRSOI processmap (see Figure I-3) was developed as a guideto assist with planning and executing JRSOI.The joint functional areas associated withplanning and executing JRSOI are depictedin the process map and are discussed in detailin subsequent chapters. The context of eachJRSOI process may vary reflecting the natureof the operation, mission, enemy, terrainand weather, troops and support available,time available (METT-T), and civilianconsiderations. However, deploying forces,regardless of Service, normally undergosome form of reception, staging, onwardmovement, and integration (RSOI). Forexample, a fighter squadron may completeJRSOI in a few hours at the reception pointor aerial port. Other units may require 30days or longer to complete the entire process.

3. Principles of JRSOI

There are three overarching principles ofJRSOI as depicted in Figure I-4. Theseprinciples can assist commanders and theirstaffs in the planning and execution of JRSOI.Combatant commanders should considerthese principles when planning JRSOIoperations.

a. Unity of command specifies that asingle individual is responsible for theoverall coordination of JRSOI activities.This individual is the combatant

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Overview

commander of the theater in which thedeploying force flows. The combatantcommander adjusts resources based upon thedeployment flow into the theater. Thecombatant commander also controls themovement of forces in the area ofresponsibility (AOR), provides support topersonnel arriving into the theater, andcentrally coordinates the efforts of all otherkey players in the JRSOI process to includesupporting combatant commanders.

UNITY OF COMMAND

“Unity of command is the interlockingweb of responsibil ity which is afoundation for trust, coordination, andthe teamwork necessary for unifiedmilitary action. It requires cleardelineation of responsibility amongcommanders up, down, and laterally.”

JP 0-2, Unified Action ArmedForces (UNAAF)

b. Synchronization links deployedpersonnel, equipment, and materiel in atimely manner. A well-synchronized flowexpedites buildup of mission capability andavoids saturation at nodes and along lines ofcommunications (LOCs), thereby enhancingsurvivability. Synchronization requires

THE JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARDMOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION PROCESS MAP

Reception OnwardMovement

IntegrationStaging

AnalyzeMission

ConfirmDeployment

Data

Prepareto

Receivethe

Force

ConductPort of

DebarkationOperations

Preparethe

Force

Assembleand

MarshalForces

OnwardMovement

ConductTactical

AssemblyArea

Operations

CompleteForce

Integration

JOINT FUNCTIONAL AREASJOINT FUNCTIONAL AREAS

Figure I-3. The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Process Map

PRINCIPLES OF JOINTRECEPTION, STAGING,ONWARD MOVEMENT,

AND INTEGRATION

UNITY OFCOMMAND

SYNCHRONIZATION

BALANCE

Figure I-4. Principles of Joint Reception,Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

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detailed joint planning, timely andpredictable airflow and seaflow, visibilityof assets moving through the distributionpipeline, and the ability to adjustmovement schedules.

Synchronization occurs when the rightunits, equipment, supplies, and capabilitiesarrive in the correct order at the appropriatelocations, and supporting activities arecoordinated in such a fashion to operate inconsonance with one another so that thetempo of force deployment, planning, andexecution is uninterrupted. This enhancescommand and control (C2) and helpsmaintain unit integrity. Managing thetiming of the time-phased force anddeployment data (TPFDD) flow up to thepoint of movement is a key activity forensuring that the arrival time of personnel,equipment, and materiel coincide. Forceplanners and supporting transportationdeployment agencies must ensure that unit

integrity is a dominant consideration whenplanning unit and equipment deploymentand/or movement increments to theirsupporting transportation load plans andmovement schedules.

c. Balance applies to managing theTPFDD flow. Managing the TPFDD allowsthe supported combatant commander toadjust the movement schedule for units asmission requirements or conditions change.Joint total asset visibility (JTAV) furtherprovides users with timely and accurateinformation on the location, movement,status, and identity of units, personnel,equipment, and supplies. Balance isespecially relevant to the relationship betweendeployment and theater distribution. Toachieve balance, the flow through theintertheater pipeline and the intratheaterdistribution network must be regulatedand integrated to allow a continuous andcontrolled flow of forces and supplies into

SYNCHRONIZATION

DESERT STORM synchronization required detailed joint planning, timely andpredictable airflow and seaflow. In December, the primary cause ofovercrowding (in the vicinity of [ports of debarkation]) was a lack of unitintegrity in the sea flow. Property of individual units was frequently dispersedamong multiple ships. An analysis of 19 randomly selected combat armsand combat support battalions indicate that, on average, a battalion’sequipment arrived on seven vessels over a period of 26 days. On average,combat service support battalions came into port on 17 vessels over a periodof 37 days. As an example of one extreme, all the equipment of the 121stSignal Battalion of the 1st Infantry Division (M), one of the lead units from[the continental United States], arrived on two ships within three days ofeach other. At the other extreme, gear belonging to the 143d Signal Battalionand 1st Maintenance Battalion from Europe was spread over 17 and 26 shipsrespectively, docking over periods of 25 and 45 days respectively. Thedisruption of throughput operations caused by dispersion of unit propertyon multiple ships was further exacerbated when single ships were loadedwith partial unit sets bound for two different ports. The failure to synchronizeairflow and sea flow and not maintain unit integrity contributed to excessivelylong stays in port by soldiers awaiting equipment. The consequent overconcentration in the staging area strained available reception capability andprovided the enemy a vulnerable target over an extended period.

SOURCE: 1st Infantry Division (Forward)DESERT SHIELD/STORM After Action Report, 30 May 1991

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Overview

and within the AOR. Supported combatantcommanders regulate the transportation flowby ensuring that adequate support andreception assets, effectively coordinatedthrough a theater reception plan, are availableor deployed early in the movement scheduleto facilitate JRSOI. Efficiency is enhancedto the degree that interface requirementsamong modes of transportation, ports, andstorage facilities have been planned andimplemented. Continuous flow (balance)is improved by minimizing handling, thenumber of transfer points, and the numberand variety of carriers. Saturation can beavoided, survivability enhanced, and balanceachieved by ensuring that people, equipment,materiel, and information flow are directedat a rate that can be accommodated at everypoint along the entire network, from originto destination. The operation environment,concept of the operations, and available

infrastructure are major considerations indetermining how to balance the transportationflow and sequence the arrival of combat andcombat support forces in theater.

4. Elements of JRSOI

In order to achieve unity of command,synchronization, and balance, JRSOI reliesupon essential and enabling elements asshown in Figure I-5. These elements combinein various ways under differing circumstancesto make the operations associated with JRSOIpossible.

a. Command, Control, Communications,Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) is themeans by which the combatant commandermaintains unity of command to balance andsynchronize joint force activities and achievemission success. Joint forces operate in

ELEMENTS OF JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING,ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

Essential Elements

Command, Control, Communications, Computers,and Intelligence

Force Protection

Support Organizations and Structures

Enabling Elements

Host Nation

Allied Support

Contract Support

Figure I-5. Elements of Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

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diverse environments and conduct a varietyof operations as part of multinational orinteragency teams. Rapid force projection,extended LOCs, and potential forcible entryprior to establishing operations in logisticallybare-based areas require a C4Iinfrastructure that is interoperable,flexible, responsive, mobile, disciplined,survivable, and sustainable.

• JRSOI requires effective C4I systemswith responsive leaders and managers.C4I systems must link the supportedcombatant commander, supportingcombatant commanders, Servicecomponents, deploying units, JRSOIsupport organizations, and the tacticalcommanders who will integrate thedeploying forces into their commands.Reporting and information systemsshould provide accurate, relevant, andtimely information to the appropriatestaffs and leaders to plan, integrate,direct, and execute their assigned partof the JRSOI operation.

• Effective C4I must be responsive to thesupported combatant commander fordeployment and JRSOI management.

The supported combatant commandermust be able to influence the outcomeof the deployment. To do this, thecommander must know what forcecapabilities are available and whatcapabilities will be available in thefuture. METT-T-influenced changesmay cause certain units to be in highdemand or needed for immediateemployment. C4I systems must enableJRSOI providers to locate these units anddivert resources to expedite their onwardmovement.

For detailed joint C4I planningguidance, see JP 6-0, Doctrine forCommand, Control, Communications,and Computer (C4) Systems Support toJoint Operations, and JP 6-02, JointDoctrine for Operation/TacticalCommand, Control, CommunicationsSystems.

b. Force protection is an essential elementof joint force operations. Commanders mustensure that requisite force protectionmeasures are enforced consistent with thethreat. For JRSOI, the challenge is toprotect those forces configured for

Units rapidly organize for departure from ports of debarkation in orderto reduce vulnerability from enemy threat.

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Overview

deployment that are geographicallydispersed and possess limited self-protection capability. Risk must be assessedand comprehensive force protection plansdeveloped to address vulnerabilities and tocounter potential threats to forces,infrastructure, and information systems. Thecombatant commander’s foremost forceprotection concern should be maintaininglocal security to preserve tactical andoperational flexibility and freedom ofaction. Effective and efficient JRSOIoperations can reduce force vulnerability byensuring that units quickly complete theprocess. Balance and synchronization ensurethat forces do not remain static in vulnerablesituations and is facilitated by:

• Coordinating the flow (achievingbalance) so personnel, equipment, andmateriel arrive nearly simultaneously;

• Minimizing the force footprint by time-phasing units so that those elementsrequired to conduct JRSOI deployinitially;

• Synchronizing theater reception,staging, and onward movementcapabilities to prevent bottlenecks; and

• Exercising the ability to control andadjust the TPFDD flow and movementschedules (unity of command).

For additional force protectioninformation see JP 3-10, Doctrine forJoint Rear Area Operations, and JP3-54, Joint Doctrine for OperationsSecurity.

c. JRSOI support organizations canconsist of one or more of combinations ofthe following: US forces, HN assets,contractors, or allied support forces. Theseorganizations are a force multiplier becausethey provide the means to expedite buildupof forces in the AOR. Normally, US forces

are deployed to support JRSOI operations ifthe required capability does not exist in theAOR. The necessity to deploy US forces maybe reduced if reliable support can be obtainedthrough one of the other sources. To enhanceJRSOI support, planners should initiallyevaluate support requirements (shown inFigure I-6), integrate support organizationsinto the deployment process, then scheduleunits that provide essential supplies andservices to arrive early enough in thedeployment flow to be operational whenneeded. As units arrive in the AOR, they arein a deploying status with no or limited self-sustainment capability and may requirelogistic support. Their requirements shouldbe met until the units assemble and becomecapable of sustaining themselves and/or havebeen logistically integrated into the gainingcommand.

The list in Figure I-6 is self-descriptive;however, other services encompass lifesupport requirements such as meals, water,shelter, sanitation, trash removal, and supportelements for operating marshalling andstaging areas, and reporting onwardmovements to the DOD in-transit visibilitysystem. Logistics to support JRSOIrequirements are supplied by organizationssuch as Army area support groups, combatservice support element (CSSE) of the Marineair-ground task force (MAGTF), Navyadvanced base functional components(ABFCs), the Defense Logistics Agency’scontingency support teams, expeditionarylogistic support facilities, contractor support,the HN, or other contracted agencies.Another important consideration is thatorganizations with JRSOI support functionssometimes have other missions that theyexecute simultaneously (e.g., sustainment,retrograde).

• Host nations can provide valuableresources to support JRSOIoperations. Host-nation support (HNS)may include support operations at

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reception facilities, air and navaloperating bases, staging facilities, andsupport areas, and may encompass awide variety of commodities andservices concerning supplies, medical,transportation, facilities, communications,rear area operations, petroleum, militarypolice, prisoners of war and internees,and civil labor. HNS can reduce theneed for early arriving forces andmateriel to support JRSOI, shrinkstrategic lift requirements, andminimize the in-theater logisticfootprint. In addition to establishedHNS agreements normally limited to usein war, this support can also be arrangedusing existing acquisition cross-Serviceagreements (ACSAs) or, at the locallevel, by directly contracting for supportand services. HN capabilities should beassessed and validated as early on in the

deployment process as possible. Incontingency operations, an enormoussaving in manpower, units, andequipment is possible by maximizingHNS. This is particularly true in theareas of transportation and specializedequipment.

• Multinational support has been atraditional strong point for successfulJRSOI. Historically the United Stateshas relied upon its allies to assist duringmajor worldwide contingencies andsmaller regional emergencies. Thissupport has ranged across the spectrumof JRSOI operations. Complementaryand unique multinational capabilitiesshould be considered during planning.

• Contracting support is another forcemultiplier and, like HNS, should be

JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARDMOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION SUPPORT

CONSIDERATIONS

SUPPLY

MAINTENANCE

TRANSPORTATION

SECURITY

CIVIL ENGINEERING SUPPORT

HEALTH SERVICES

OTHER SERVICES

Figure I-6. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, andIntegration Support Considerations

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Overview

planned and coordinated in advance ofan actual deployment. Normally HNSwill be considered first before a decisionis made to contract for required support.The supported combatant commandershould ensure the early deploymentof contracting, finance, resourcemanagement, and legal personnel toaccomplish necessary contractingactions. In the context of JRSOI, contractsupport is the use of foreign or UScivilian personnel and/or equipment toperform a function, such as offloadingvessels or transporting supplies forward.Using contractor personnel reducesthe need for US military personnel incombat service support (CSS) roles.

Additional guidance for JRSOI-relatedtasks and operations can be found in thefollowing publications: JP 3-35, JointDeployment and RedeploymentOperations, JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic

Support of Joint Operations, JP 4-01,Joint Doctrine for the DefenseTransportation System, JP 4-01.1, JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forAirlift Support to Joint Operations, JP4-01.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Sealift Support to JointOperations, JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures forMovement Control, JP 4.01.4, JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forJoint Theater Distribution, JP 4-01.5,Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Water TerminalOperations, JP 4-01.6, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for JointLogistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS), JP4-04, Joint Doctrine for CivilEngineering Support, and JP 6-02, JointDoctrine for Employment ofOperational/Tactical Command,Control, Communications, andComputer Systems.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IICOMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

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1. General

Clear articulation of responsibilities is thefirst step in conducting a synchronized andcoordinated deployment. This chapterdescribes the responsibilities, roles, andrelationships of the primary commands andagencies involved in JRSOI.

Basic responsibilities for combatantcommanders, subordinate joint forcecommanders (JFCs), and other supportingagencies are outlined in JP 0-2, UnifiedAction Armed Forces (UNAAF), JP 3-0,Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 4-01,Joint Doctrine for the Defense TransportationSystem.

Under provisions of title 10, US Code(USC), as revised by the Goldwater-NicholsDepartment of Defense (DOD) ReorganizationAct of 1986, the combatant commanderdirects subordinate commands and forcesas necessary to carry out missions assignedto the command, including authoritativedirection over all aspects of militaryoperations, joint training, and logisticswithin the AOR. A force assigned orattached to a combatant command may betransferred from that command only asdirected by the Secretary of Defense andunder procedures prescribed by the Secretaryof Defense and approved by the President.When forces are transferred, the commandrelationship the gaining commander willexercise over those forces must be specified.The combatant commander exercisescombatant command (command authority)

“Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is centralto unity of effort. Inherent in command is the authority that a militarycommander lawfully exercises over subordinates and confers authority toassign missions and to demand accountability for their attainment.”

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

(COCOM) over forces assigned by theNational Command Authorities (NCA).Operational control (OPCON) is inherent inCOCOM. Along with these commandrelationships there are roles andresponsibilities that are important to JRSOI.

2. Roles and Responsibilities

a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS) transmits NCA orders to thecombatant commanders (as directed by theNCA), coordinates all communications inmatters of joint interest, and acts as thespokesman for the combatant commanders.Responsibilities of the Chairman come froma variety of sources such as title 10 USC andDOD Directive 5100.1. Some CJCSresponsibilities relating to deploymentinclude:

• Monitoring the projection of militaryforce operations and keeping the NCAinformed;

• Advising the Secretary of Defense oncritical deficiencies in force capabilities;

• Preparing joint logistic and mobilityplans to support strategic and jointoperation plans (OPLANs); and

• Apportioning critical transportationassets.

b. Military Departments. Subject to theauthority of the Secretary of Defense and of

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the commanders of the combatantcommands, the Military Departments areresponsible for administration and supportof forces assigned or attached to thecombatant commands (10 USC Section165(b)). These responsibilities includeorganizing, training, equipping, andproviding logistic support for their respectiveServices. The Services fulfill theirresponsibilities by exercising administrativecontrol through the commanders of theService component commands assigned tothe combatant commands. The MilitaryDepartments will normally monitordeployment operations through theirrespective operations centers to ensure thatadequate resources are made available to thesupported JFC so that the assigned task canbe successfully accomplished.

c. Supported Combatant Commandersprovide authoritative direction to subordinatecommands, including authoritative directionover all aspects of military operations, jointtraining, and logistics. They provide forceprotection for all subordinate command andother US forces as required undermemorandum of agreement or law withintheir AOR. Supported combatantcommanders are tasked with planning andexecuting joint military operations,including all facets of RSOI. They mustorganize the available logistic resources tosupport JRSOI and sustainment operations.Forces deploy and are sustained through thedistribution system, which the supportedcombatant commander is responsible forplanning and operating. Responsibilities fortheater support may include the following.

• Identification of the movement, timing,and sequence of the deploying forces inthe TPFDD.

• Report theater in-transit visibility (ITV)theater movement data and ensure thatcommunications infrastructure supportsthe timely transmission of ITV data from

theater field activities to the GlobalTransportation Network (GTN).

• Validating the theater’s JRSOIinfrastructure.

• Development and operation of theLOC.

• Movement control through the LOC andforce tracking.

• Security of the LOC and protection offorces in the LOC. A joint rear areacoordinator (JRAC), if designated, willbe responsible for key LOC security inthe joint rear area.

JP 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear AreaOperations, defines the mission of theJRAC.

• Liaison for most strategic lift with theU S Tr a n s p o r t a t i o n C o m m a n d(USTRANSCOM) or appropriatesupporting combatant commanders and/or other agencies.

• Integration of pre-positioned (ashoreand/or afloat) materiel in theater.

• Establishment of HNS agreements.

• Contracting and acquiring reception,staging, onward movement facilities,supplies, and services.

• Command and control of assigned,allocated, or attached forces.

• Managing JRSOI to centrally controlcritical assets and more effectively reactto unforeseen circumstances byorganizing functional boards andcenters. The following functional boardsor centers, if established, may have keyroles in the planning and execution ofJRSOI operations.

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Command Relationships

•• Theater Joint TransportationBoard (T-JTB) and/or Theater JointMovement Center (T-JMC).Transportation is a critical asset in anyoperation requiring the movementof military forces. Combatant andsubordinate commands need thecapabili ty to rapidly changetransportation resource allocation toadjust to changing circumstances orimmediately react to emergency orunanticipated situations. Onerecommendation for effective control oftheater transportation assets is theestablishment of a supported combatantcommander’s T-JTB to interface withthe CJCS Joint Transportation Board(JTB) and at the theater operational levelas required. Procedures for establishingthe T-JTB are developed duringpeacetime to facilitate rapid stand-up andexecution under emergency or wartimeconditions. The T-JTB’s role is toresolve contentious transportationissues within the command at theoperational level as well as with theCJCS JTB, such as allocatingtransportation assets apportioned to thetheater among components for unitmovement, non-unit movement, andresupply. Another effective transportationcontrol option is the establishment of asupported combatant commander’s T-JMC. The T-JMC is responsible forcoordinating the employment of allmodes of theater transportation(including that which is provided by allies,coalition partners, or the HN) to supportthe theater concept of operations atthe operational level with the joint taskforce (JTF) joint movement center(JMC). When used, the T-JMC is thesingle coordinator for all movement into,through, and out of the theater. Specifically,it is the supported combatant commander’sfocal point for strategic movements andshould oversee the execution of theatertransportation priorities.

For additional information on the JMCand theater movement control, refer toJP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Movement Control,Appendix A, “Joint Movement CenterOrganization.”

•• Logistics Readiness Center (LRC).Combatant commanders andsubordinate commands may form LRCsto monitor and coordinate the theaterlogistic effort. At the theater level, theLRC is operated by the combatantcommand logistics staff to monitor theoverall logistic status by commodityin theater. The LRC receives reportsfrom Service components and externalsources, distills information forpresentation to the combatantcommander, and responds to questions.Within the LRC, the combatantcommand logistics staff performs fourkey functions: monitors current andevolving theater logistic capabilities;coordinates logistic support withupcoming operations; advises thecombatant commander on the logisticsupportability of proposed operations orcourses of action (COAs); and acts asthe combatant commander’s agent andadvocate to non-theater logisticorganizations.

•• Director of Mobility Forces(DIRMOBFOR). The DIRMOBFORworks directly for the Air Forcecomponent commander or joint force aircomponent commander as thedesignated coordinating authority for airmobility with all commands and/oragencies, both internal and external tothe combatant command. TheDIRMOBFOR provides direction tothe air mobility division in the airoperations center (AOC) and willnormally be a senior officer withextensive air mobility expertise andfamiliarity with the AOR. The

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come together to form a JTF. This isespecially true during crisis situations whenlimited planning time, lack of a fullycoordinated OPLAN, or the ad hoc formationof a JTF, may require development of TPFDDwhile simultaneously executing deploymentoperations. The challenge, in this case, isbuilding a TPFDD that deploys the propermix of early JRSOI capability to meet forcethroughput mission requirements. Foreffective management of change, the JTFshould have the authority (unity ofcommand) and capability to make TPFDDadjustments to achieve balance andsynchronization. The CJTF exerciseslogistic coordination or control only to theextent necessary to meet those logistic needsof the subordinate commanders that areessential to successfully accomplish themission, and to meet any request of thesubordinate commanders for logistic support.

e. Supporting Combatant Commandersare frequently tasked to support othergeographic combatant commanders duringthe execution of joint operations. Types ofsupport for JRSOI may include thedeployment of forces, provision of en routebasing, in-transit staging areas, and theprovision of sustainment. Responsibilitiesof supporting combatant commandersinclude:

• Verifying supporting movement data.

• Regulating the support flow to maintainbalance and synchronization.

• Coordinating effectively with thesupported combatant commander (unityof command) to meet the supportedcommander in chiefs’ (CINCs’) needs.

• USTRANSCOM. The mission ofUSTRANSCOM is to provide strategicair, land, and sea transportation forthe Department of Defense across therange of military operations. It has

DIRMOBFOR may be sourced by thetheater Air Force componentcommander or nominated by theCommander in Chief, United StatesTransportation Command(USCINCTRANS); whenUSTRANSCOM intertheater airmobility forces are employed in supportof a JFC, the DIRMOBFOR should haveexperience in intertheater air mobilityoperations, applicable laws, regulations,executive orders, and policy as well asconservation of natural, cultural, andhistoric resources.

For more information on organizationscreated for movement control purposes,see Appendix A in this publication,“Movement Control,” or JP 4-01.3,Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Movement Control.

“JFCs have the authority to organizeforces to best accomplish the assignedmission based on their concept of theoperations. The organization shouldbe sufficiently flexible to meet theplanned phases of the contemplatedoperations and any development thatmay necessitate a change in plan.”

JP 0-2, Unified Action ArmedForces (UNAAF)

d. Subordinate Joint Task Forces. A JTFmay be established on a geographical area orfunctional basis when a mission has a specificor limited objective. Normally, the JTF willbe dissolved when the purpose for which itwas created has been achieved, or it isno longer required. The commander, jointtask force (CJTF) exercises C2 overforces assigned or attached to the JTF. TheCJTF is responsible for makingrecommendations to the superiorcommander on the proper employment ofassigned and attached forces to accomplishthe mission. The formation of a JTF maycomplicate JRSOI planning and executionbecause of the diverse elements that may

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COCOM over the three transportationcomponent commands (TCCs); AirMobility Command (AMC), MilitarySealift Command (MSC), and MilitaryTraffic Management Command(MTMC). USTRANSCOM supportsthe movement requirements andrequired delivery dates of supportedcombatant commanders. USTRANSCOMuses the Defense Transportation Systemto provide movement from origin toinitial theater destination through itsTCCs. To assist with movementoperations, USTRANSCOM normallyestablishes forward elements within thetheater to coordinate strategictransportation information with thesupported combatant commander’sagencies. Among its numeroussupport, planning, and liaisonfunctions, USCINCTRANS has beendesignated by the Secretary of Defenseas the worldwide manager for allcommon-user aerial ports ofembarkation (APOEs) and debarkation(APODs) and seaports ofembarkation (SPOEs) anddebarkation (SPODs).USTRANSCOM exercises responsibilityfor global air, land, and seatransportation planning in support of thegeographic combatant commander. Thisincludes reviewing the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan (JSCP) tasking,analyzing supported commanders’requirements for transportationfeasibility, and advising on changesrequired to produce a supportable andsustainable force deployment concept.

For additional information onUSTRANSCOM, see JP 4-01, JointDoctrine for the Defense TransportationSystem.

• United States Space Command(USSPACECOM). USSPACECOM isthe combatant command that provides

significant space force enhancementto improve the effectiveness ofdistribution and logistic C4I operations.These capabilities include navigation(global positioning system), satellitecommunications, and weather andmissile warning.

f. Service Component Commandsnormally exercise OPCON of the forcesassigned or attached to the combatantcommand. Each Service is responsible forthe logistic support of its own forces, unlesslogistic support is otherwise provided for byagreements with national agencies, allies, orby assignments to common, joint, or cross-Service agreements. The supportedcombatant commander may assign specificjoint support responsibilities to the Servicecomponents for JRSOI under directiveauthority for logistics for efficiency. EachService needs to ensure that proper unitmovement documentation, to includemanifest data, is provided to the supportedcombatant commander in order to haveadequate ITV of forces and supplies arrivingor departing the theater of operations. Inaddition to these responsibilities, logisticelements of the Services that provide keysupport and enable the operations staff toexecute the geographic combatantcommander’s requirements for JRSOI arenoted below.

• Air Force Component Command. TheA-4, Logistics Director, on theCommander, Air Force Forces(COMAFFOR) staff, is responsible forcivil engineers, supply, services,transportation, fuel, and logistic plans.The A-4 ensures that COMAFFORcomponent forces are sustained to meetthe capability tasked by the JFC. TheA-4 ensures the adequacy of supplies,storage, and beddown facilities in theAOR; interfaces with the AOC; andprovides analysis of logisticrequirements for the air tasking order.

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The COMAFFOR ensures centralizeddirection and control of deployments,reception, execution, and redeploymentof logistic assets and functions. The A-4 and/or the COMAFFOR staff willensure that appropriate automatedinformation systems (AIS) and keyautomatic identification technologies(AITs) are employed to facilitate datacapture and reporting of transportationand supply information. TheCOMAFFOR is the Air Forcecomponent commander (AFCC) andwill advocate with the JFC, the LogisticsDirectorate of a joint staff (J-4), the JointPetroleum Office, and JMC to ensurethat priorities are surfaced andaccommodated within the JFC’scapability and force objectives.

• The Army Component Command.Army component commanders andArmy tactical commanders operate theArmy-in-the-field segment of the Armylogistics system. The Army-in-the-fieldsegment consists primarily of those CSSunits that are assigned or attached tooperating forces in a theater. Thecomposition of the Army-in-the-fieldlogistics system may vary greatly and isflexible enough to be tailored to anygiven theater. The major Armyechelon above corps (EAC)multifunctional logistic command isthe Theater Support Command(TSC). There are also other functionalEAC support commands, to include aCivil Affairs Command, PersonnelCommand, Medical Command,Transportation Command, EngineerCommand, and the TheaterCommunications Command (Army).

•• The TSC is the major Army supportcommand responsible to provide JRSOIsupport to major operations. Itssubordinate organizations include thosethat provide traditional logistic functions

such as supply, maintenance, and fieldservices. However, the geographiccombatant commander’s Army Servicecomponent commander may also chooseto include transportation, health services,personnel, and finance supportorganizations under the TSC. Inaddition, the TSC has contracting andHNS resources on its staff, and itincludes a movement control agency anda materiel management center (MMC).It also has a distribution managementcenter organic to its headquarters. Itsmission is to plan and manage Armydistribution operations and reportinginformation to the DOD ITV system, theGTN. The support organizations at theArmy corps and division levels alsoinclude distribution management centersto synchronize distribution operations.The TSC is an organization that isdesigned to deploy modularly to providerequired capabilities early in a forceprojection operation with minimumlogistic footprint.

•• The corps is the largest self-contained, tactical-level US Armyorganization that has combat, combatsupport (CS), and CSS functions. Itconsists of a headquarters; a corpssupport command (COSCOM); avariable number of divisions; and otherunits, such as artillery, signal, militarypolice, and engineer. COSCOM is thelogistic element of the corps. Itnormally supports a corps with aheadquarters and associated functionalcontrol centers, MMC, and a movementcontrol center (MCC). The organizationof COSCOM is tailored on a companybuilding block basis to fit its missionrequirements. A COSCOM normallyincludes two or more support groups, anammunition group, transportationbrigade, petroleum supply battalion,MMC, MCC, and explosive ordnancecontrol center. A civil affairs and/or

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chemical unit may be assigned to theCOSCOM or corps. In an aridenvironment, a water supply battalionmay be provided.

•• In some conflicts, the theater ofoperations may be small. In suchcases, the Army component of thetheater may consist of a single corpsor a smaller force. The concepts oforganization, mission, and functions areapplicable to the smaller theater,modified as necessary to satisfy itsrequirements. When a corps is the majorArmy component of a theater, itsCOSCOM will be tailored to providethe EAC Army base support activitiesnormally provided by the TSC and otherEAC support commands. EAC-tailoredpackages can include functional modulesand/or subordinate units. When corpsheadquarters has theater Armyresponsibilities it is, in effect, the Armycomponent command.

• Marine Component Command. TheMarine Corps force service supportgroup (FSSG) is the principalMarine element for logistics. Itfunctions as a major subordinatecommand under the Marineexpeditionary force (MEF) and isorganized to provide direct or generalsupport in tactical-, operational-, andstrategic-type scenarios. It can be thenucleus of a Marine Logistics Command(MLC). The FSSG provides CSSEsto support units undergoing arrivaland assembly operations (thedeployment of combat-readyMAGTFs precludes the requirementfor the full range of RSOI (i.e.,reception, training, and unitintegration)). Depending on the sizeof the force being supported, durationof the support required, and magnitudeof the operation, the CSSE could be assmall as a detachment or as large as the

FSSG. Each unit, after completingarrival and assembly operations, willthen support the process with all facetsof logistics and/or CSS and C2 to its task-organized capability. A Marineexpeditionary unit’s (MEU’s) CSSE isreferred to as the MEU service supportgroup and provides CSS task-organized to suit the MEU tacticalrequirements.

Marine Corps C2 for logistics insustained operations ashore willintegrate within a joint construct. It willdepend on communication of itsrequirements, sourcing, and distributionof its capabilities through a MarineService component agency at the theaterlevel. This is particularly true when themission and scope of the operation issuch that it requires more than one FSSGto support the Marine forces in theater.To address this need, the MLC concepthas been developed.

•• The Commander, Marine Forces(COMMARFOR) may establish anMLC. The MLC establishes theMarine Corps theater supportstructure to facilitate arrival andassembly operations. On order, theMLC provides operational logisticsupport to Marine Corps forces(MARFOR) as the Marine componentoperational-level logistic agency intheater. MLC is a task-organizationoption, not a permanent organization.COMMARFOR may choose to assign aspecific FSSG responsibility for MLCfunctions. The COMMARFOR assignsMarine component resources to an FSSGfor detailed task-organization andconduct of MLC support operations intheater based on the operationalsituation, theater geography, C2 (for bothtactical operations and logistics), andinfrastructure requirements.

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•• The FSSG designated as the MLCdeploys early and provides arrival,assembly, and initial CSS to the arrivingMEF until its own CSSE can beestablished. This ensures maximumflexibility on the ground should thesituation change drastically before all forceshave flowed into the theater. Asaugmentation arrives and the force matures,direct support CSS missions are taken overby the MEF’s CSSE. The MLC thenconcentrates on general support missionsand interaction with other theater logisticagencies as they arrive.

•• The MLC, perhaps representing theinitial predominant logistics-capableforce in a developing theater, wouldcoordinate with joint and combinedforces as the Marine component logisticsagency. While it may initially be taskedto provide some lesser degree of supportto other Services, due to its limitedcapabilities it is not envisioned that theMLC would assume the role of thepermanent theater support agency in amature theater. It would however,function as the Service component linkto the theater distribution system,communicate Marine Corps sustainmentrequirements, and ensure capabilities inresponse to those requirements that areintroduced into the theater and passedalong to the warfighter.

•• In the absence of an MLC, theMARFOR CSSE (most likely a singleFSSG or elements thereof task-organizedas the MAGTF CSSE) will coordinatelogistic requirements for MARFOR atthe tactical level. The MAGTF CSSEfurther task-organizes to provide generalsupport to the MAGTF, operate CSSareas, and provide direct support to theaviation combat element and the groundcombat element in the form of CSSdetachments and mobile CSSdetachments respectively. Requirements

exceeding CSSE capability at the tacticallevel are communicated through theMAGTF logistics officer to the JTF J-4or agent designated to coordinate theaterdistribution (TD) and common-userlogistics for the joint force at theoperational level. Requisitions unableto be filled within the system or throughalternate sources of supply in theater areforwarded to the deployed support unitat home station.

• Navy Component Command. TheNavy Service component commander forthe combatant commander is responsiblefor theater Navy logistics, includingcommand and operational control ofNavy logistic forces in theater. Logisticsupport to afloat units is primarily theresponsibility of a numbered fleetcommander. The principle organizationsfor performing naval RSOI functions arenaval advanced support bases (ASBs),naval advanced logistic support sites(ALSSs), and naval forward logistic sites(FLSs). Advanced bases are overseasareas or localities in or near the theaterof operations from which the Navyorganizes logistic facilities to conductand support joint and naval operations.

•• ASBs may be joint and may beconfigured to support multinationaloperations. ASBs may be permanent —long-term, well-developed installations— or temporary facilities established tosupport specific operations. Permanentbases are generally integrated into thelogistic support capabilities of the HNand have, or have access to, well-established airlift, sealift, storage, andtransshipment facilities. When logisticsupport from existing permanent basesis either inaccessible or inadequate for aparticular contingency, the Navy mayconstruct temporary ASBs for thesituation. The use of situational(temporary) bases allows the Navy to

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position logistic support nodes in the bestproximity to the operation. Primarilyestablished ashore, temporary supportbases consist of ALSSs and FLSs.

•• ALSSs serve as the primary shore-based reception and transshipmentpoints for personnel, equipment, andmateriel. An ALSS is established at asecure location readily accessible toseaport and airfield facilities, but not inclose proximity to a main operating baseor combat area. ALSSs possess a fullcapability for handling, reception,storage, consolidation, and forwardingof supplies, munitions, petroleum, andpersonnel required to support deployedunits operating in the area. The FLSsin theater receive personnel, equipment,and materiel transshipped through theALSS for final delivery to the supportedforces. FLSs may be located in closeproximity to main battle areas to permitforward staging of services, throughputof high priority cargo, advancedmaintenance, and battle damage repair.FLSs are linked to in-theater ALSSs byintra-theater airlift and sealift. ALSSsand FLSs also support shore-basedaviation, fleet hospitals, air and surfacecargo handlers, naval mobileconstruction battalions, and other shore-based units. The size and compositionof these organizations are dependent onthe required support and are tailored tomeet mission requirements. The logisticinfrastructure and functional capabilitiessupporting naval expeditionaryoperations can be augmented or providednew capabilities. Temporary bases aredynamic and, as the operation moves,additional FLSs may be established ordisestablished as required.

•• Temporary support bases maydraw upon war reserve materiel(WRM), facilities, and HN-providedservices. They are staffed by Navy

component theater support personneland augmented by specialized packagesof personnel, facilities, equipment, ormateriel. These groupings are knownas ABFCs. Each is designed to fulfill aspecific capability. By combining anumber of these packages, thegeographic combatant commander cansupplement or expand organiccapabilities of assigned forces to meetoperational requirements. Capabilitiesof an ABFC include administration,harbor control and/or defense,communications, supply, fuel, and/ortransportation, maintenance, cargohandling, health services, ordnance,camp and welfare, construction andengineering, and special groups.

•• The ultimate goal of advancedbasing is a logistic structure that isflexible, supports the concept ofoperations, and meets the needs of thewarfighters. ASBs are an essential linkin providing responsive and continuouslogistic support when Navy forces arefunctioning independently or togetherwith joint and multinational forces.

g. Other Agencies. DOD agencies arefrequently tasked to provide support duringthe execution of joint operations. Thissupport may include deploying personnel,equipment, and materiel into the AOR (e.g.,Defense Logistics Agency’s ContingencySupport Team, Department of State personnelfor noncombatant evacuation operations(NEOs) or foreign humanitarian operations).

3. Command and ControlOptions

a. The Secretary of Defense maydesignate one or more Services to providecommon resources to all DOD forces toassist the supported CINC. These areknown as Service executive agents.However, the exact nature and scope of the

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authority must be stated in the documentdesignating the executive agent. Anexecutive agent may be limited to providingonly administrative support orcoordinating common functions, or it maybe delegated authority, direction, andcontrol over specified resources forspecified purposes. For example, the Armyis the Department of Defense’s executiveagent for joint mortuary affairs.

b. The combatant commander mayexercise directive authority for logistics (ordelegate directive authority for a commonsupport capability). It is not to beconsidered as authorization to discontinueeach Service’s responsibility for logisticsupport. The exercise of directiveauthority for logistics is necessary duringJRSOI to ensure the:

• Effective execution of OPLANs;

• Effective employment and use of AISand AIT;

• Effectiveness and economy ofoperations; and

• Prevention or elimination of unnecessaryduplication of facilities and overlappingof functions among the Servicecomponent commands.

c. The combatant commander must designand implement a C4I system enterprisearchitecture, consisting of organizations,procedures, and communications systems,that provides the ability to manage andcontrol the rate of the flow and facilitate in-transit data documentation and reporting.Service executive agents and directiveauthority for logistics not withstanding, thesupported combatant commander mayemploy other options for C2 of JRSOIforces to include the following.

• Service Responsibility. Each Serviceis responsible for the logistic support ofits own forces.

• Lead Service. The combatantcommander assigns responsibility forproviding or coordinating JRSOIsupport to the Service component thatis the dominant user. This option mayinclude OPCON or tactical control(TACON) of other Service logisticorganizations as determined by thecombatant commander. Lead Servicefunctions are managed by the leadService within the parameters of thecombatant commander’s orders. JTFboards and centers may also be required.

No single C2 option works best for allJRSOI operations. Supported combatantcommanders and their subordinates shouldbe flexible in modifying command structuresto meet the specific requirements of eachsituation with emphasis on unity of effort,whether it be a small foreign humanitarianoperation up to a major theater war. Jointlogistics C2 may be best implemented bytasking an existing organization (leadService) with the joint mission, authority,and responsibility to execute JRSOIoperations. The supported combatantcommander organizes the headquarters (HQ)as necessary to carry out all duties andresponsibilities and usually makes the finaldecision on the establishment of boards,centers, and cells that are necessary to supportmilitary operations in certain cases.Depending on which C2 option is utilized,the combatant commander may decide toaugment the lead JTF J-4 staff with sufficientassets to exercise both staff planning andJRSOI management functions. Thesupported combatant commander maydelegate appropriate logistics commandauthority to a subordinate Service componentor JFC. For instance, a Service component

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command may be delegated commandauthority to synchronize support functions,manage joint operational efforts, and identifyresource shortfalls. This HQ would serve asa fusion point between strategic and theaterJRSOI support organizations. Advancedplanning precludes the confusion that oftenresults from rapidly establishing logisticorganizations during contingencies. Thethree levels of command authority that arenormally delegated include OPCON,TACON, and support.

d. Deploying forces are often split intoelements (passengers and cargo) as theytransit the various nodes of the theaterLOC. As these elements transit the theaternodes, they fall under the control of thetransportation system until they are reunitedwith their equipment and are assembled andready for onward movement. Accurate andtimely reporting from theater processingnodes is critical. A commander should bedesignated for each theater LOC node toensure unity of command and to facilitate

COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS

1. Combatant Command (Command Authority)COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assigned forces involving organizing andemploying commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives,and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, jointtraining (or, in the case of United States Special Operations Command, trainingof assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missionsassigned to the command.

2. Operational ControlOPCON is the command authority that may be exercised by commanders atany echelon at or below the level of combatant command and may bedelegated or transferred. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authorityto perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involvingorganizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designatingobjectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish themission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of militaryoperations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned tothe command.

3. Tactical ControlTACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces orcommands or the military capability made available for tasking that is limitedto the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements ormaneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACONmay be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at orbelow the level of combatant command. TACON is inherent in OPCON.

4. SupportSupport is a command authority. A support relationship is established by asuperior commander between subordinate commanders when oneorganization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.

SOURCE: JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

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passenger and cargo throughput (balance).Regardless of the established C2relationships, JRSOI operations require theaccurate, timely exchange of essentialelements of information concerning thedeploying forces.

e. Delineation of responsibility andauthority will help achieve effectiveness andeconomy of operations, and the preventionor elimination of unnecessary duplication offacilities and overlapping of functions amongthe Service component commanders.

f. Joint Theater Logistics Management.Joint theater logistics management (JTLM)is one way to help achieve a unified focuswithin theater by integrating information,product delivery, flexible response, andeffective C2. JTLM ensures that the rightproduct is delivered to the right place at theright time. The CINC may, as an option,establish a JTLM element to fuse movementcontrol and materiel management to integrateand synergize the logistic capabilities of thejoint force. JTLM should be planned for anddocumented in OPLANs, operation plans inconcept format (CONPLANs), and functionalplans as part of the deliberate planningprocess. JTLM allows the CINC to chooseamong a variety of options when selectingthe logistic support function best suited tofulfill the needs of the AOR. Some optionsinclude the following: using a Serviceorganization as its nucleus, for instance theArmy Theater Support Commandorganizational concept; augment J-4;delegate to a JTF commander; establish astand-alone logistic agency; ensure that thepredominant Service manages jointrequirements; or expand the LRC.

• JTLM key elements include increasedreliance on common-user logisticsupport, a smaller logistic footprint,integrated logistic forces, increasedtactical flexibility, single theater logisticmanagement system, common logisticpicture, asset visibility across the supplychain, anticipatory logistic management,and rapid access to operationalinformation.

• JTLM relies heavily on improvedcommunications and enablingtechnologies such JTAV, Global CombatSupport System (GCSS), GTN, and AISto track force and sustainment flow whileeliminating redundancy and excess.Although these enabling technologiesare not fully mature, the CINC shouldcapitalize on all available AITs and theServices’ AIS to integrate joint forcerequirements and capabilities into asingle, common operating picture.Further, JTLM uses enhancedautomation capability to link JRSOI andjoint theater distribution in order toprovide common-user and cross-Servicelogistic support.

• In the end, JTLM success depends onthe supported CINC setting a commonstandard for support, enhanced logisticconnectivity, and the flexibility andresponsiveness of logisticians operatingat the strategic, operational, and tacticallevels.

See JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Supportof Joint Operations, for moreinformation.

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING

III-1

1. General

This chapter examines joint planningconsiderations and procedures concerningJRSOI. The combatant commander isresponsible for planning and executingmilitary operations in the assigned AOR.These responsibilities encompass all facetsof RSOI. Based upon the CINC’s guidance,planners must assess the theater’s operationalenvironment and determine JRSOIrequirements for supporting the JFC’sconcept of the operations. JRSOI feasibilitymust be included in the COA development.Successful employment requires fullintegration of JRSOI into the CINC’scampaign plan.

2. Joint Planning

a. Joint operation planning begins inresponse to perceived or identified threatsto US security, national vital interests, orto support other missions requiringdeployment of US forces. The JSCP initiatesthe deliberate planning process for thedevelopment of plans to support nationalsecurity objectives. Joint operation planningis a coordinated process used by combatantcommanders to determine the COA foraccomplishing the assigned task and to directthe actions necessary to accomplish themission. Military planners use the JointOperation Planning and Execution System(JOPES) as the primary tool for crisisaction and deliberate planning, as well as

“To successfully fight and win wars, we must make war planning our centralfocus. We will develop the best possible plans using the collective wisdomavailable among all military planning staffs . . . The products of our planningefforts must be able to stand up to the strongest scrutiny, including the ultimatetest: execution.”

General John M. ShalikashviliChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993-1997

executing strategic deployments. JOPESis an integrated system of people, policies,procedures, and reporting systems. It isthrough JOPES that the following deliberateplans are developed.

• Operation Plan. An OPLAN is acomplete and detailed joint operationplan. An OPLAN includes detailedannexes with associated appendices anda TPFDD.

• Operation Plan in Concept Format.A CONPLAN is a joint operation planin an abbreviated “concept” format. ACONPLAN may or may not contain aTPFDD.

• Functional Plan. A functional plan isdeveloped for specific militaryoperations in a permissive or non-hostileenvironment (for example, intratheaterlogistics, C4I infrastructure, andcontinuity of operations).

Planners must be cognizant thatcombatant commander war planningdocuments contain the preponderance ofJRSOI capabilities information. However,key Service documents contribute todeliberate planning, thus supporting theJSCP. These Service documents helpconfirm availability of forces and resourcesfor performing JRSOI. Service documentssupporting JRSOI planning are shown inFigure III-1. These documents along with

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the JSCP combine to facilitate the jointplanning process.

b. Regardless of whether deliberate orcrisis action planning is used, joint planningdetermines the requirements for joint forceemployment to achieve the military

objectives. Once the supported CINC’sstrategic concept is approved by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, itbecomes the concept of operations uponwhich further planning is developed.Planning is based on CINC(s) andService(s) guidance and joint doctrine. The

KEY SERVICE DOCUMENTS FOR JOINTRECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT,

AND INTEGRATION PLANNING

Army Force Planning Dataand Assumptions

Navy Capabilities PlanMobilization Plan

US Air Force War andMobilization Plan

Marine CorpsCapabilities Plan

Coast GuardCapabilities Manual

Army Mobilization andOperations Planning &

Execution SystemDOCUMENTS

Figure III-1. Key Service Documents for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement,and Integration Planning

III-3

Planning

supporting and subordinate commanders usethe supported CINC’s concept and theapportioned or allocated combat forces as thebasis to determine necessary support,including JRSOI forces and sustainingsupplies for the operation (mission analysis).The supported combatant commander’s stafforganization is established and commandrelationships are formulated to assist thecommander in determining priorities andassigning tasks for receiving forces andconducting JRSOI in the OA. SupportedCINCs may task assign Service componentswith the majority responsibility for JRSOIoperations based upon various factors (e.g.,dominant user, most capable Service). Eachsupporting or subordinate commander whois assigned a task in the CINC’s strategicconcept prepares a supporting plan. TheCINC consolidates these plans to build arecommended phasing of forces andJRSOI support, and performs atransportation analysis of the entiremovement from the POD to the finaldestination. In essence, the supportedcombatant commander uses the informationto validate the adequacy of the theater anddetermine whether the JRSOI infrastructureis satisfactory for employment of assets,forces, facilities, and supporting systems.Joint intelligence preparation of thebattlespace (JIPB) provides the frameworkfor determining methods of accomplishingthe assigned tasks. Following these actions,USTRANSCOM hosts TPFDD refinementconferences to validate the requirements andthen allocate the strategic lift assets.

3. Environment and ThreatAssessment

JRSOI planners must assess the impact ofthe operational environment and threats inrelationship to the JRSOI mission. JIPBmust address whether and to what degreea potential threat can interdict, disrupt,or block JRSOI operations and assist in

determining what infrastructure and othersupport assets are available to supportJRSOI operations. In this case, theoperational environment consists ofinfrastructure and information resources. Incases where the joint operations areainfrastructure is inadequate, the combatantcommander’s available options includeincreasing the JRSOI infrastructure, reducingthe deployment flow, or extending allowableforce closure times. Figure III-2 is a nominallisting of items that should be addressed inJIPB.

a. Threat assessment is the first step inunderstanding the operational risk to JRSOIoperations and developing risk controls tomitigate the perceived threat. The JIPBprocess assists the combatant commanderin formulating planning guidance byidentifying significant enemy capabilitiesand likely enemy COAs. Based on theassessed threat, the combatant commandermust determine where to accept risks, whereto focus protection efforts, and how much ofthe force should be initially devoted to forceprotection. The threat assessment shouldinclude threats to the following.

• HNS

• Contracted support

• Nongovernmental organizations

• Information resources

• PODs

• Pre-positioned equipment facilities

• Staging areas

• Movement routes and en route supportfacilities

• Assembly areas

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JP 4-01.8

• Other nodes deemed critical forsuccessfully executing JRSOI

b. Infrastructure Assessment.Understanding the capabilities of the theaterinfrastructure and the time when assetsbecome available are essential to developinga successful JRSOI operation. Aninfrastructure assessment is key tounderstanding the capabilities andlimitations of the operational area as wellas the theater to support JRSOIoperations. It serves as a basis to determinethe JRSOI forces, equipment, and materielthat must be deployed as well as facilityupgrades required to enhance operations.Theater infrastructure consists of twogeneral categories: the physical networkand the resource network.

• The type, number, and condition offacilities, transportation networks,real estate, and modes oftransportation characterize physicalnetworks. Transportation infrastructurestrongly influences JRSOI and a robustinfrastructure of modern air- andseaports, highways, railroads, and inland

waterways greatly expedite thethroughput of forces, equipment, andsupplies. A lesser-developed, austere,or damaged infrastructure impedesJRSOI and may require an earlydeployment of support capabilities suchas port opening, joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS), or engineer units. Thecombatant command engineer and staffprepare a civil engineering support plan(CESP) as part of the JOPES planningprocess. Development of the CESPensures that essential civil engineeringcapabilities are identified and will beprovided at the required locations andat the appropriate times to support themobilization, deployment, employment,sustainment, and redeployment of thejoint force in support of joint operations.The CESP establishes theater-levelrequirements for facilities, Class IV(construction materiel), and civilengineering capability in support ofdeployed US forces. The Joint EngineerPlanning and Execution System is a toolused to support the combatant commandengineer and staff in development of thequantitative aspects of civil engineering

ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT ASSESSMENTCONSIDERATIONS

Threat location and capabilities

What are the capabilities and limitations of host-nation transportation infrastructure?

Is the "nation state" intact, or will the operation be ina "failed nation state"?

Level of cooperation expected from host nation

Type of environment (desert, jungle, arctic)

Figure III-2. Environment and Threat Assessment Considerations

III-5

Planning

support planning and provides thegeneral requirements for the CESPappendix to an OPLAN.

Additional information on CESP can befound in JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for CivilEngineering Support, and Appendix 6to Annex D of CJCSI 3122.03, JointOperation Planning and ExecutionSystem Vol II: (Planning Formats andGuidance).

• Resource networks are the personnel(uniformed and civilian, HN,government, military, and contractor),organizations, materiel, andequipment operating within thephysical network of the distributionsystem. The infrastructure capacity (netcapability of the combined physical andresource nets) establishes the finitecapacity of the distribution system.Figure III-3 depicts examples of the

infrastructure (physical and resourcenetworks).

c. Information Resources. Receivingdetailed information concerninginfrastructure and transportation capabilities,maintaining the visibility of assets that willmove on that infrastructure, and the abilityto C2 this information plays a key role forplanning and working JRSOI. Informationresources can be divided into intelligence,automation, and communicationsnetworks.

• The collection and maintenance ofinfrastructure data (intelligence) is thepurview of the Services and numerousagencies that include the DefenseIntelligence Agency, the supportedcombatant commander’s jointintelligence center, USTRANSCOM’sjoint intelligence center, and Serviceorganic intelligence services. The data

PHYSICAL NETWORK

EXAMPLES OF INFRASTRUCTURE ASSESSMENT

RESOURCE NETWORK

AirportsSeaportsHighwaysRailroadsBridgesTunnelsTerminalsInland WaterwaysStorage FacilitiesPipelines

AircraftShipsTrucks and Rail EquipmentLighterageHost-Nation SupportContractorsMaterials Handling

Equipment and CargoHandling Equipment

Civilian, Government, andMilitary Personnel

Figure III-3. Examples of Infrastructure Assessment

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JP 4-01.8

collected and available includesinformation on infrastructurecapacity and condition as well asengineering capability (ports,railroads, inland waterways, roads,airfields, bridges, off-road landtractability, power plants,communications nodes) in mosttheaters. The characteristics of roads,ports, and rail lines within the theaterare sometimes available in digital form.Such information serves as baseline datafor planning. For example, the MilitaryTraffic Management CommandTransportation Engineering Agency(MTMCTEA) compiles unclassified andclassified data on many seaports, toinclude throughput calculations andinfrastructure assessments. MTMCTEAalso develops and maintains detailedtransportation infrastructure networks ofvarious theaters for use in analyzingtheater transportation capabilities usingthe Enhanced Logistics IntratheaterSupport Tool (ELIST).

• The automation network combines allof the information collection devices,AITs, and AIS that either support orfacilitate the JRSOI process.Examples of these include JTAV, jointpersonnel asset visibility (JPAV), andGTN.

• The communications network is acritical infrastructure requirement thatenables information collection andmanagement. When combined withautomated systems, knowledgeablecommanders, and a robustcommunications network, C2technology provides the efficiency andeffective information management socritical to JRSOI. Effective informationmanagement, in turn, enables leaders tomake sound and timely decisions

regarding the JRSOI process.Communications networks are anintricately managed resource that requiresdetailed planning. Initial phases of adeployment may not have the robustcommunications network required forextensive use of Global Command andControl System (GCCS), GCSS, GTN,and other C2 and information systems.Phasing joint and Service communicationssystems into the TPFDD flow to give theJRSOI (as well as other activities) a systemthat allows them to take advantage of theautomated tools available for force andsustainment tracking, provides thecombatant commander with a potent toolfor deployment and employmentmanagement.

d. The c o m b a t a n t c o m m a n d e rdetermines whether the theater is adequatefor employment of assets, forces, facilities,and supporting systems. In cases where thegeographic area is inadequate, optionsavailable to the combatant commanderinclude increasing the JRSOI infrastructure,reducing the deployment flow, or extendingallowable force closure times.

4. JRSOI Planning

Military operations begin with an eventthat requires movement of forcessomewhere in the world. This can be aplanned or no-notice movement. Figure III-4depicts the joint functional area and the fourjoint processes associated with missionanalysis (see Figure I-3 for the master JRSOIprocess map). Analyzing the mission leadsto the development of COAs and selection ofthe desired COA, and ends with thedevelopment of orders and their transmission.This process is a particular method ofplanning where procedures are individually,sometimes simultaneously executed, andoften interrelated to produce the plan.

III-7

Planning

a. Conduct Initial Mission Analysis.Based upon early information acquired,planners assess potential scenariodevelopments, mission requirements, andCOAs. This requires a thorough andcontinuous JIPB to account for a changingoperational environment.

b. Identify JRSOI Support Requirements.Utilizing JIPB, the JRSOI mission planneridentifies the specific JRSOI theaterrequirements. In this, the staff identifies thenumber of personnel and the amount of cargoand equipment to be throughput in the JRSOIprocess, to include movement from POD to anyintermediate staging areas as well as unit movesto TAAs or OAs. This information thusprovides guidance for JRSOI planning andincludes:

• commander’s intent for deployment;

• identification of size and composition ofdeploying forces;

• time-phasing of personnel, equipment,and materiel to support the mission; and

• force closure date.

Once this information is known, theplanner, utilizing backward planning,determines the JRSOI requirements anddevelops plans that meet the operationaltimelines. This backward planning isuseful in developing support requirementsfor JRSOI and the design of the theaterLOC. This planning and force designingprocess helps develop the theater LOCstructure by:

• determining locations of air and seaPODs;

• determining JLOTS throughputrequirements and capabilities;

• determining the throughput capabilityof the PODs;

THE JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARDMOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION MAP--

MISSION ANALYSIS

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and IntegrationPlanning

JOINT FUNCTIONAL AREAS

JOINT PROCESSES


JOINT PROCESSES

AnalyzeMission

Conduct InitialMission Analysis

Prepare & SendJRSOI Directive

Identify JRSOISupport

Requirements

Identify Host-Nation, Contract,

& CommandCapabilities

PLANNING - MISSION ANALYSISPLANNING - MISSION ANALYSIS

Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and IntegrationJoint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and IntegrationJRSOIJRSOI

Figure III-4. The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, andIntegration Map — Mission Analysis

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JP 4-01.8

• estimating theater distribution capabilityrequired to move deploying forcesforward;

• identifying locations of marshallingareas, staging areas, convoy supportcenters, and other supporting LOCnodes;

• establishing force and sustainmentrequirements with actual units;

• evaluating force, logistic, andtransportation feasibility;

• recommending resource allocations; and

• producing COAs that have been assessedfor JRSOI feasibility.

c. Identify HN, Contract, and CommandCapabilities. Within each geographiccombatant commander’s AOR, the USorganizations available to accomplishJRSOI vary significantly. Fundamentalfactors that cause this variance includegeographical constraints such as the lengthof LOCs, capability of HN infrastructure,ACSA, anticipated threat and mission, andforward-stationed US force structure. EachService component possesses unique,specialized forces and capabilities to supportvarious aspects of JRSOI. The supportedcombatant commander must utilize thisknowledge in assessing HN, contract, andcommand capabilities available to supportkey JRSOI functions. Depending upon theexisting infrastructure, the HN, contract,and command capabilities that areavailable may greatly reduce the type andamount of JRSOI support a combatantcommander must deploy from outside thetheater. The inputs include requirements for:

• transportation;

• facilities;

• security;

• supplies;

• services;

• labor service; and

• POD support and other key functions.

There are many sources of logisticsupport that can be used as enablers andenhancements for JRSOI. These enablerscombine in various ways under differingcircumstances to make the operationsassociated with JRSOI possible. How theseenablers combine will depend upon thecondition of the HN infrastructure, whatagreements exist (allied or otherwise), and

SOURCES OFLOGISTIC SUPPORT

Host Nation

Multinational

Contract

Civil AugmentationProgram

Cross-ServiceLogistics

Acquisition andCross-ServiceAgreements

Figure III-5. Sources of Logistic Support

III-9

Planning

how or if civil augmentation programs, orcross-Service logistics, are necessary. FigureIII-5 lists some sources of logistic support forthe joint planner to consider during COAdevelopment.

• Host-Nation Support. When available,HNS successfully assists in executingJRSOI. Typical items that the combatantcommander should negotiate with theHN are shown in Figure III-6.Maintaining current, comprehensivebase support plans and conductingperiodic site surveys are critical forvalidating HNS agreements required forimplementing specific OPLANs andCONPLANs. If HNS agreements do notexist, or have limited application, thenthe combatant commander, incoordination with the State Department,should immediately start negotiation ofHNS agreements and arrangements

combined with an integrated contractingplan to obtain necessary support. It isrecommended that counterintelligenceteams be included for use in screeningHN contractors.

• Multinational Support. Multinationalsupport is another force multiplier.Many US allies have capabilities orfunctional units similar to UScapabilities. The use of these units canenhance JRSOI operations, minimizeUS support requirements, and ensuremission success. The joint plannershould consider complementarymultinational capabilities during COAdevelopment. However, during theplanning phase, this capability shouldbe balanced against the potential forcompetition for US transportation assetsto deliver those multinational units intothe theater.

Figure III-6. Host Nation Negotiating Considerations

HOST NATION NEGOTIATINGCONSIDERATIONS

Basing Rights

Transit Authority (Land, Sea, Air)

Border and/or DiplomaticClearance Procedures

Port of Debarkation Services

Life Support

Medical Facilities and Services

Construction and Engineering

Transportation Assets and Infrastructure

Labor Force

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• Contract Support. To optimize contractorsupport among Services, a centralcontracting authority (CCA) should bedesignated. The goal of the CCA is toachieve and maintain controls and optimizecontracting resources. Contracting officersshould make every effort to ensure thatclauses excusing contractor performancein the event of hostilities or war are notincluded in contracts that augment USforces during contingency or combatoperations. MTMC and MSC, forexample, routinely use civilian contractorsto perform or augment their operations. Inaccordance with standing directives andwith guidance from appropriatecommanders, contractors should be used.However, the joint planner should be awarethat in some cases wartime exclusionclauses may prevent contractor personnelfrom delivering goods and services.

“The shape of conflict is changing, too.It may be waged with little or no alliedbacking, and with unknown host-nationsupport or infrastructure. Any fightingthat we do will probably occur wherewe are not, distant to our borders, andin a land that cannot adequatelyreceive our ships and planes.”

LTC Scott ConradMoving the Force: DESERTSTORM and Beyond, 1994

• Civil Augmentation Program. Civilaugmentation programs are separateMilitary Department contracting optionsmost often used when HNS is insufficientor unavailable. They employ pre-existing contracts with US and othervendors to provide support in many areasincluding facilities, supplies, services,maintenance, and transportation.Additionally, planners should considerinitiating contracting services if status-of-forces agreements do not alreadycontain those provisions. The goals ofcivil augmentation programs are to:

•• Allow planning during peacetime forthe effective use of contractor support ina contingency or crisis;

•• Leverage global and regionalcorporate resources as facility andlogistic force multipliers;

•• Provide an alternative augmentationcapability to meet facility and logisticservices shortfalls; and

•• Provide a quick reaction tocontingency or crisis requirements.

Information concerning the logisticscivilian augmentation program (Army),

CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS

One of the most dramatic lessons to come out of Operation JOINT ENDEAVORis that civilian contractors are an integral part of the total force, particularlywhen it comes to providing logistical and engineering services . . . LOGCAP[logistics civilian augmentation program] uses a civilian contractor to performselected logistics and engineering services to augment US forces duringmilitary contingency operations . . . The Corps [of Engineers] is also usingLOGCAP in unison with Air Force Red Horse and Navy Seabee constructiontroops. Red Horse and Seabee trade specialists erect the tents while theCorps uses the LOGCAP contract to set up latrines, showers, heaters, dininghalls, laundries, and other essential life support facilities.

SOURCE: Corps of Engineers News Release31 January 1996

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Planning

emergency construction capabilitiescontract program (Navy) and Air Forcecontract augmentation program may befound in the applicable Service

publications, JP 4-0, Doctrine forLogistic Support of Joint Operations,and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for CivilEngineering Support.

CONTRACTING — OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Supporting operations in the Balkans for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR wouldhave required a much more robust combat support and combat servicesupport military organization had it not been for the use of logistics civilianaugmentation program (LOGCAP) . . . LOGCAP has provided much of thecritical logistics and engineering services, with costs exceeding $460 millionfor the first year’s effort. Use of LOGCAP allowed the deployed combat unitsto focus on critical operational missions and the deployed engineering unitsto focus on horizontal construction.

On 26 November 1995, Brown & Root (the LOGCAP contractor) was activatedto provide an intermediate staging base at Kasposvar and Taszar,Hungary...The initial work focused on renovating old communist barracks tobring them to minimum standards for use by US soldiers. Then working withthe soldiers, the contractor’s staff braved the same harsh weather and siteconditions to provide warm tents, hot food, and adequate sanitary facilitiesduring the start-up of operations throughout the theater.

After establishing the intermediate staging base, the contractor was taskedto support the 1st Armored Division’s Task Force Eagle by setting up andoperating camps in Croatia and Bosnia . . . In order to complete all the Bosniacamps by March 1996, Brown & Root was integrated with Army engineerunits, Navy Seabees, and Air Force Red Horse engineers on a fast-trackedscenario. Specifically, Brown & Root’s tasks were to —

• Setup 12 camps

• Provide flooring materials for the Army, Navy, and Air Force engineerunits charged with setting up all other camps.

• Upgrade camps to meet the Army’s sustaining base standards, replacingsoft-side, canvas tents with hardback tents or modular buildings (in areaswith the harshest conditions).

• Provide all basic life-support services, such as food services, laundry,water delivery, garbage collection, and shower and sanitary facilities.

• Provide other logistics services such as transportation and cargohandling, vehicle maintenance and washing, port operations, road repairand maintenance, and storage yards.

SOURCE: Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas J. Kolar, Jr.LOGCAP: Providing Vital Services to Soldiers

The Engineer Professional Bulletin, March 1997

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d. Prepare and Send JRSOI Directives.At this point in the planning process thesupported combatant commander has nearlycompleted the JRSOI planning process map’sfirst functional area of mission analysis. Nowthe supported combatant commanderbegins to give specific JRSOI guidance inthe form of directives. These directivesclarify the support that selected Services andnations should expect. Figure III-7 expandsthe joint process associated with the JRSOIplanning process map.

Examples of the types of support directedby the supported combatant commander mayinclude information from the followingagreements.

• Cross-Service Logistics. The term“cross-Service logistics” defines theprocess of one US Military Serviceproviding dedicated logistic support toanother. If one Service has thepreponderance of a particular skill,commodity, or class of supply in theater,such as fuel, ground transportation, orconstruction engineering, it may betasked by the combatant commander orby the Secretary of Defense to provide

support to other Services operating inthat theater. The combatant commandertasks the Service components under hisor her directive authority, whereas theSecretary of Defense tasks under theexecutive agent designation system.Employing cross-Service logistics helpseliminate CS and CSS redundanciesamong the Services.

• Acquisition and Cross-ServiceAgreements. While HNS agreementsprovide US pre-negotiated support forpotential war scenarios, ACSAs providethe legal authority for the US militaryand other nation armed forces toexchange logistic goods and servicesduring contingencies. Unlike HNSagreements, transactions under thisprogram must be reimbursed, replacedin kind, or an exchange of equal valuemust take place.

5. Synchronizing and Balancingthe Flow

Because JOPES is the system used toallocate and sequence movement assets, it isessential that movement data inputs are

PREPARE AND SEND DIRECTIVES FOR JOINTRECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT,

AND INTEGRATION SUPPORT

The supported combatant commander issuesdirectives that outline joint reception, staging,onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) plansand/or assigns responsibility for the execution ofJRSOI operations in the theater.

Subordinate commanders provide additionalguidance to subordinate headquarters, asnecessary.

The supported combatant commander issuesdirectives that outline joint reception, staging,onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) plansand/or assigns responsibility for the execution ofJRSOI operations in the theater.

Subordinate commanders provide additionalguidance to subordinate headquarters, asnecessary.

Figure III-7. Prepare and Send Directives for Joint Reception, Staging,Onward Movement, and Integration Support

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Planning

accurate. The TPFDD is a computer-supported database portion of an OPLAN. Itcontains time-phased data for movingpersonnel, equipment, and materiel into atheater. The TPFDD reflects therequirements that strategic and intratheater liftsare assigned against to ensure that the full scopeof JRSOI requirements are identified andsatisfied. Successful execution of thecombatant commander’s plan depends onintegrating JRSOI within JOPES.

For a detailed explanation of the jointplanning process, its components, and theirfunctions, see CJCS Manual 3122.01, JointOperation Planning and Execution SystemVol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).

a. “Confirm Deployment Data” is thesecond joint functional area of the planningphase of the JRSOI process map.Deployment data is confirmed prior to entryinto JOPES via the TPFDD. TPFDDrefinement manipulates and confirms forceflow data until the updated information isentered into JOPES. “Confirm Deployment

Data” and its associated sub-elements areillustrated in Figure III-8 (see Figure I-3 forthe master JRSOI process map).

b. The TPFDD establishes the flow ofunits into the theater. The supportedcombatant commander must carefullybalance the force mix and arrival sequenceof combat forces and CSS units to ensure thatJRSOI support and throughput requirementscan be met. The Service componentresponsible for JRSOI operations mustcontinuously review and validate the TPFDDto determine its mission support requirementsand request changes to its support forcestructure. As with any dynamic process,external changes in the environment, as wellas those within the force, necessitatecorrespondent changes to the flow of forces(personnel, equipment, and materiel). Thefollowing recommended changes to theJRSOI support force structure are requestedby the Service component responsible in orderto maintain balance and synchronization (inaccordance with combatant commanderguidance) to accomplish the mission.

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and IntegrationPlanning


JOINT PROCESSES


JOINT PROCESSES

ConfirmDeployment

Data

ValidateTPFDD

MovementRequirements

RecommendTPFDD

Changes

PLANNING - DEPLOYMENT DATA CONFIRMATIONPLANNING - DEPLOYMENT DATA CONFIRMATION

TPFDD = time-phased force and deployment data

THE JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARDMOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION MAP--DEPLOYMENT DATA CONFIRMATION

Figure III-8. The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, andIntegration Map — Deployment Data Confirmation

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JP 4-01.8

• Validate TPFDD MovementRequirements. The commandcontinuously evaluates the JRSOImission capabilities of inbound units toensure that JRSOI mission requirementscan be met in a timely manner.

• Recommend TPFDD Changes. Allassigned units within the JRSOIorganization report through the chain ofcommand on status of unit (personneland equipment) capability to performassigned missions. The commandheadquarters makes TPFDD changerecommendations to the combatantcommander based on assigned unitcapability, JRSOI requirements, andprojected missions to ensure thatsufficient JRSOI support capability ispresent in theater to support unitthroughput.

c. Dependable transportation feasibilityanalysis relies on accurate analysis ofstrategic lift capability and JRSOIcapability. Port throughput data shouldconsider not only port offload capability, butalso the theater’s ability to move and sustainforces away from the port. Matching thestrategic TPFDD flow to the theater’sreception, staging, and onward movementcapability should prevent port saturation andbacklogs that slow the build-up of missioncapability.

d. While theater infrastructure is studiedduring the concept development phase beforethe TPFDD is developed, this is no substitutefor a feasibility study of the flow of theTPFDD through the theater. Intratheatertransportation feasibility may significantlyimpact upon port-to-port flow. It may showrequired changes to the type and sequence ofstrategic lift. It could also reveal whetherthe number, type, and sequence of unitsproviding JRSOI are adequate to deliverplanned capabilities to the combatantcommander.

6. JRSOI PlanningRequirements andConsiderations

During deployment planning, all of therequirements to support JRSOI activities needto be addressed. These requirements canbe broken down into two broad categories:operational and support. Operationalrequirements include training, forceprotection, and C4I systems that support thevisibility of the JRSOI process. Supportrequirements include transportation,infrastructure, HNS, sustainment, and landmanagement. JRSOI requirements shouldappear in all planning documents andOPLANs. The planner must demonstrateto the approving authority that an earlyinvestment of strategic lift for logisticenablers will actually increase the flow ofcombat forces into the theater.

a. Loading Considerations forDeployment. Planning deployments is basedprimarily on the commander’s concept of theoperations for employment. These factorsdetermine the entry operations, deploymentconcept, and mobility options required toposture a joint force in the theater. Animportant consideration in posturingforces is to determine how deploying forcesshould be configured when they arrive intheater. This determines how deployingforces should be loaded for deployment. Themanner in which units are loaded is animportant factor in determining JRSOIreception requirements as well as the amountof time units must be supported at thereception and staging areas. Three loadingmethods are described below.

• Combat loading boards personnel andstows equipment and supplies in amanner designed to conform to theanticipated tactical operations of theorganization embarked. Each individualitem is stowed so that it can be unloadedat the required time. Combat loading is

III-15

Planning

desirable when deploying units mustintegrate into the force quickly, but isgenerally the least efficient method formaximizing strategic lift capacities. Incases where strategic lift is constrained,greater use of combat loading may delayforce closure. Combat loading includesemploying the loading methods ofvertical and horizontal stowage anddispersion (spread loading), in order tosupport the landing plan and to effectselective unloading when required.“Selective unloading” is the controlledunloading and movement ashore ofspecific items of cargo from assaultshipping at the request of the landingforce commander.

• Unit loading places units with theirequipment and supplies in the samevessels, aircraft, or land vehicles. Thismethod may be more efficient inutilizing strategic lift than combat

loading and maintains unit integritybetter than administrative loading.

• Administrative loading maximizestroop and cargo space without regard totactical considerations. However,equipment and supplies must be unloadedand sorted before they can be used.

b. General Planning Considerations. Inconsidering planning for JRSOI, the generalconsiderations are listed in Figure III-9. Thisis by no means a comprehensive listing butis provided to assist the planner.

7. Automated Support PlanningTools

Automated support planning tools assistcombatant command planners to monitor,plan, and execute mobilization, deployment,employment, sustainment, and redeploymentof US forces. The enhanced C2 inherent in

TRANSPORTATION FEASIBILITY

OPLAN(s)/CONPLAN(s) are considered transportation feasible when thecapability to move forces, equipment, and supplies exists from the point oforigin to the final destination in accordance with the CINC’s concept ofemployment. Transportation feasibility determination will require concurrentanalysis and assessment of available strategic and theater lift assets,transportation infrastructure, and competing demands, and restrictions:

• the supported CINC will analyze deployment; reception, staging, onwardmovement, and integration; and theater distribution of forces, equipment,and supplies to final destination.

• supporting CINCs will provide assessment on movement of forces frompoint of origin to air and sea ports of embarkation.

• USCINCTRANS will assess the strategic leg of the TPFDD fortransportation feasibility, indicating to the CJCS and supported CINC thatmovements arrive at POD consistent with the supported CINC’sassessment of JRSOI and theater distribution.

• following analysis of all inputs, the supported CINC is responsible fordeclaring a plan to be executable from end-to-end.

SOURCE: CJCSI 3110.11C, Mobility Supplementto the FY 98 JSCP, 2 Jan 1998

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JP 4-01.8

Figure III-9. General Planning Considerations

GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Threat location and capabilities.

Level of cooperation expected from host nation.

Amount of host-nation support required.

Is the "nation-state" intact, or will the operation be in a "failed nation-state"?

Type of environment (desert, jungle, arctic).

Time expected between arrival and commencement of operations.

Transshipment loading level 4 detail.

Force protection during JRSOI.

How does the combatant commander intend to exercise the statutory "directiveauthority for logistics"?

How should the theater LOC be designed?

What capability exists in theater to conduct effective JRSOI?

What capability needs to be deployed for JRSOI?

Is predeployment, deployment, and sustainment training required?

What are US requirements and capabilities to track or conduct JRSOI for allied or coalitionforces?

Can the host nation perform any theater LOC functions or must US capabilities bedeployed?

Are military assets sufficient to conduct JRSOI and competing requirements (sustainmentand/or NEO) in the event HN or contractor support is lost throughmilitary or other actions?

How will deploying forces be sustained while conducting JRSOI?

Have required transit agreements been negotiated?

Are status-offorces agreements adequate?

Are there any existing contracts, or is there a need for new contracts?

What kind of ACSAs should be negotiated?

What kind of Allied support?

What level of ITV is there?

Are JRSOI operations being performed in a mature theater of operations orimmature theater of operations?

Have liaison officers been identified to support JRSOI operations?

What throughput requirements must be met through the use of joint logistics over-the-shore operations?

III-17

Planning

the use of these advanced planning andexecution tools provides the commander withthe readiness, deployment, tracking, intelligence,theater movement, and employment detailscritical to effective JRSOI.

Joint operation planning is accomplishedusing JOPES. JOPES is resident on theGCCS. It provides the capability to developthe TPFDD and, along with the GTN and

emerging JTAV capabilities, to monitor itsexecution. It is essential that deploying unitsdocument and transmit shipment informationin electronic format to maximize electronicreporting of movement data via AIS feedingthe GTN. Software and hardwareimprovements, such as seen in GCCS, allowcommanders to more rapidly and accuratelyshare vital information during planning andexecution of joint operations. GCCS

PRIORITY IN PLANNING

The issue is educating users and following doctrine. In JOINT ENDEAVOR,controversy over aerial port management and airlift staging/supportrequirements resulted in the theater command not providing the personnelneeded for the airlift control center to effectively coordinate with DIRMOBFORand air mobility element (AME). Consequently, AME struggled to performthe missions. The DIRMOBFOR was assigned to Vincenza, Italy, isolatedfrom the theater command in Stuttgart, Germany. This compoundedcoordination problems and hampered the interface between theater andstrategic airlift.

SOURCE: General Walter Kross, Single Port ManagementJoint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97

EMPLOYMENT DRIVES DEPLOYMENT

At the conclusion of the planning phase of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, theTask Force Eagle (TFE) commander envisioned a deliberate, balanceddeployment. The TFE lead force package augmented the Corps’ nationalsupport element in establishing the intermediate staging base in Hungary.The task force would then follow with an engineer heavy force package toconduct a river crossing and open the lines of communications into Bosnia.It was not until the fourth force package that any substantial combat powerwould move into the TFE area of operations. With the signing of the GeneralFramework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), the implementation requirementsof the peace agreements required the immediate entry of a sizable combatforce. To meet the unanticipated demands of the GFAP timeline, a “minimumessential force” was created, using a mix of employment capabilities andminimum logistic assets. Comprised mainly of Cavalry, Armor and Engineerassets, the force was re-sequenced to lead the task force deployment. Thislate — and significant — adjustment minimized the early deployment ofcombat service support assets and reflected the GFAP requirement to rapidlyestablish a significant and viable military presence. It also tended todesynchronize a wide range of deployment activities including reception,staging, onward movement, and integration as well as movement control.

SOURCE: Initial Impressions ReportTask Force Eagle Initial Operations

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, May 1996

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JP 4-01.8

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING TOOLS

High LevelPlanning

Tools

Theater Linesof

CommunicationsDevelopment

Planning Tools

NodePlanning

Tools

Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem

Analysis of Mobility Platform

Joint Flow and Analysis System forTransportation

Enhanced Logistics Intratheater Support Tool

Scenario Unrestricted Mobility Model forIntratheater Simulation

Base Resource and Capability Estimator

Integrated Computerized Deployment System

Transportation Coordinator-AutomatedInformation for Movement System

Automated Air Load Planning System

Port Simulation

Transportation Systems Capability Model

Coastal Integrated Throughput Model

Figure III-10. Deployment Planning Tools

encompasses a myriad of enablers to assistin planning, directing, and managinglogistics operations. Shown in Figure III-10are other planning tools available.

See Chapter VIII, “Enablers,” and AppendixC, “Deployment Planning Tools,” foradditional details on deployment supporttools and enablers.

8. Summary

While this chapter endeavored to stepthrough the JRSOI planning process map

and explain the joint functional areas andprocesses in a logical manner, the plannermust be aware that these steps aresometimes iterative, sometimessimultaneous, and often conflicting.Flexibility is one of the most importanttools a joint planner can possess. Eventsmay impact and overcome even the mostindepth planning. Unity of command, byway of maintaining the big picture andpaying attention to detail, will go far towardachieving the balance and synchronizationnecessary to successfully accomplish themission.

CHAPTER IVRECEPTION

IV-1

1. General

This chapter describes reception operationsat theater PODs and other reception nodes.Reception is the process of receiving,offloading, marshalling, and transportingof personnel, equipment, and materielfrom strategic and/or intratheaterdeployment phase to a sea, air, or surfacetransportation point of debarkation to themarshalling area. When the NCA directsdeployment of military forces into a theater,their ultimate success substantially dependson how well the process of receiving that forcein-theater is executed.

Reception begins with the arrival ofdeploying forces and equipment into an AOR.During major strategic deployment, thepreponderance of personnel arrive in-

“Aerial port of debarkation control in joint operations is complex. It requirespersonnel with special skills, available in sufficient numbers at the earliestopportunity.”

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (1994-1996)Joint After-Action Report

theater via strategic airlift and mostequipment and materiel arrives bystrategic sealift. Exceptions to this ruleinclude time-sensitive equipment such as C2assets and other items identified as criticalcombat capabilities. Deployment is mostoften strategic, i.e., intertheater, but can beintratheater. In some cases, intertheater andintratheater airlift will compete for availableAPOD space and services.

An effective interface between the phasesof strategic movement to POD and receptionis crucial to the overall success of the JRSOIprocess. Reception capacity, should, at aminimum, equal strategic lift and deliverycapabilities. This enables the port to becleared in an efficient manner. The transitionto theater responsibility can be facilitated byUSTRANSCOM TCCs in conjunction with

The success of NCA deployment depends on the smooth execution offorce reception in theater.

IV-2

Chapter IV

JP 4-01.8

the Services and/or joint forces operating theair and sea PODs. Although the primaryfocus of reception is to receive, offload,marshal, and transport deploying forces, thereception process inevitably shifts fromreceiving sustainment materials,replacement equipment, and personnel toultimately supporting redeploymentoperations of in-theater forces. At PODs,these activities may occur simultaneouslywith two-way traffic into and out of thetheater. In all cases, detailed planning, forcetracking, and the principles of movementcontrol, as described in JP 4-01.3, JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forMovement Control, are essential to the overallsuccess of reception.

2. Reception Process

The reception process is made up of twofunctions; prepare to receive the force andconduct POD operations. These twofunctional areas are further broken down intojoint processes. Figure IV-1 depicts theJRSOI reception process (see Figure I-3 forthe master JRSOI process map).

a. Prepare to Receive the Force. Acritical step in the JRSOI planning processis the actual preparation to receive the force.Reception and accountability of personneloccur at either a Service reception center(SRC) or joint reception center (JRC). A JRCis activated as directed by the JFC at a theater

DESERT SHIELD RECEPTION

Although personnel were usually flown to the Gulf, most equipment andsupplies were sent by sea. Close coordination among the entire transportationnetwork was necessary to ensure that airlifted personnel reached the theaternear the date their equipment was scheduled to arrive. Arrival of personnelbefore their equipment would increase the burden on the Saudi infrastructure.It also would expose troop concentrations in the port areas to possible enemyattack by ballistic missiles, aircraft, and terrorists.

SOURCE: Conduct of the Persian Gulf WarDOD Final Report to Congress, April 1992

JOINT ENDEAVOR

As was demonstrated in 1995 during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia),forces can move from origin to mission site within the same theater. Duringoperational deployments to a contingency area located within the same theateras the stationed forces, units may deploy by various combinations of unitconvoys, self-deploying aircraft, intratheater airlift, trucks, rail, barges orintercoastal shipping, and commercial surface transportation. Regardlessof the transportation mode utilized during deployment, efficient reception isessential in assisting the debarkation of arriving forces that ultimately leadsto the integration and subsequent rapid buildup of mission capability.

SOURCE: Initial Impression ReportOperation JOINT ENDEAVOR (1995- )

IV-3

Reception

APOD or SPOD. The theater capacity andsupporting force structure must besynchronized with the scheduled arrival ofdeploying forces to ensure that the requiredsupport is provided. This includes establishingthe command structure and assigning JRSOIresponsibilities to specific forces.

Refer to JP 1-0, Doctrine for PersonnelSupport to Joint Operations, for detailedinformation on reception center operations.

• Establish and Orient TheaterDistribution System. Joint theaterdistribution is the system that enablesthe combatant commander to deploy,sustain, and redeploy forces and materielto carry out the assigned mission.Theater distribution synchronizes thecomplementary activities of movementcontrol, mode operations, materielmanagement, and supply and servicesupport. The supported combatantcommander establishes a theater logisticdistribution system to support JRSOI

operations from the POD to thedesignated area. The theater distributionsystem manager (J-4) advises thecombatant commander on the bestlogistic methods to support the mission.The supported combatant commander’sstaff plans, tracks, and manages thetheater logistic support, establishesadequate air and surface distributionoperations, and captures the logistic datafrom the entire theater.

• Coordinate Host-Nation and ContractSupport. Host nations may provide avariety of services through their nationaland commercial agencies in support ofJRSOI operations. It will be necessaryto coordinate and contract with theHN and commercial agencies for theuse of land, transportation, andservices. Rental cars, buses, cargotrucks, forklifts, and cranes are necessaryfor the basic transportation of troops andequipment during the reception phase.Contracting for HN transportation

Figure IV-1. The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, andIntegration Map — Reception


RECEPTIONRECEPTION PROCESSRECEPTION PROCESS

Staging, Onward Movement,and IntegrationReception


JOINT PROCESSES


JOINT PROCESSES

Prepare toReceiveForce

ConductPort of

DebarkationOperations

Establish &Orient

TheaterDistribution

System

CoordinateHost-Nation& Contract

Support

EstablishSupport

Organizations

PrepareAreas to

Assemble &StageForces

ReceivePersonnel& Cargo

ProcessPersonnel &

Cargo forMovement &

PrepareDocumentation

Move to StagingArea

Conduct MovementControl Operations

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JP 4-01.8

resources may diminish as TPFDD-scheduled transportation units arrive intheater and begin to assist with thesupport of JRSOI. Also, it may takeconsiderable time to generate HNtransportation; transportation units musttherefore be scheduled early in the flow.Consideration should be given to earlyarrival in the deployment flow oftransportation units.

• Establish Support Organizations. Theorganizations designated to providesupply and service, security,maintenance, facility and other types ofsupport must be established at keylocations to support the JRSOI effort.

• Prepare Areas to Assemble and StageForces. PODs, marshalling areas,intermediate staging areas, convoysupport centers, forward support bases,and TAAs and/or OAs must be readiedto receive and support forces undergoingthe JRSOI process.

b. Conduct POD Operations. Thedeploying forces will arrive at theater APODsand SPODs and be processed by either anSRC or JRC. Reception centers will receive,account, provide temporary life support (as

necessary), and coordinate follow-onmovement for deployment and redeploymentof personnel. Reception is the process ofoffloading, marshalling, and transportingpersonnel, equipment, and materiel tocomplete the intertheater deployment phaseto a sea, air, or surface transportation POD.Reception operations at the POD includeall those functions necessary to receive andclear unit personnel, equipment, andmateriel through the POD.

• Receive Personnel and Cargo.Personnel and cargo are offloaded atterminals. The support organizationanalyzes ITV data to determine how andwhere the arriving personnel and cargoare to be moved to appropriate holdingareas. Status reports are provided tohigher headquarters. The units areadvised of the general situation and maybe tasked for personnel to work onvarious work parties (i.e., drivers foroffloading, security, cargo offload).

• Process Personnel and Cargo forMovement and Prepare Documentation.Personnel and cargo are received andprocessed for movement. Unit personneland cargo may move on unit equipmentand/or common-user transportation.

Reception operations at seaports of debarkation.

IV-5

Reception

Appropriate documentation is preparedfor subsequent movement.

• Move to Staging Area. Unit personneland cargo will usually move to a stagingarea. In some situations, unit personneland cargo may move directly to their finaldesignated theater destination. Ifmovement is to a staging area, preparationsbegin there for onward movement to thedesignated theater destination. In certaininstances, the POD, staging area, anddesignated area may be collocated.

• Conduct Movement Control Operations.Movement control elements coordinate,monitor, and report movement inaccordance with movement instructions.The movement control element alsoestablishes procedures with HN,commercial contractor, and allied forces onthe use of available transportationresources. The appropriate AIS at themovement control operation will capture

the associated departure or receiptinformation and provide that informationto the GTN.

3. Reception Nodes

The most critical nodes in the theaterfor supporting deployments are the APODsand SPODs. Seaport and airfield capacitiesand throughput capabilities significantlyinfluence the speed with which forces can bedeployed, the order in which forces must bedeployed and, to a large extent, the types ofunits that can be deployed. Port efficiencyor throughput is a function of theoperational environment and the level ofport modernization (developed versusundeveloped). Some instances maynecessitate improving or constructing portfacilities to meet operational requirements.In addition to the PODs and nodes, severalother facilities and areas support the receptionprocess. Figure IV-2 depicts an overview ofthe JRSOI support structure.

JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT,AND INTEGRATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE

RECEPTION FACILITIESAerial Ports of DebarkationSeaports of DebarkationAir-to-Air Interface Airports

Aerial Ports of DebarkationSeaports of DebarkationConvoyMedicalContainer

Frustrated CargoHazardous CargoAmmunitionHelicopter

Sea-to-Air Interface AirportsInland Waterway PortsRail Port of Debarkation

HOLDING AREAS

War Reserve Materiel SitesAmmunition DepotsPetroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Depots

Logistic BasesWater Points

STORAGE SITES

Figure IV-2. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, andIntegration Support Structure

IV-6

Chapter IV

JP 4-01.8

Appendix B, “JRSOI Support Structure,”describes each of the supporting LOC nodesshown below.

Marshalling is another essentialcomponent of the reception process thatfacilitates port clearance. The timelymovement of personnel, equipment, andmateriel to a common assembly or holdingarea gives the commander the firstopportunity to reassemble mission capability.This very important task of assembling forcesis often complicated by the fact that units mayarrive in-theater at separate PODs and atdifferent times. To further enhance portclearance, the combatant commander

must designate marshalling areas thatsupport unit re-assembly without impedingthe arrival ports for follow-on units. FigureIV-3 illustrates a notional marshalling areaoperation.

a. Port Management. The Departmentof Defense uses the single port managerapproach for most APOD and SPODoperations. As outlined in the UnifiedCommand Plan and USTRANSCOMCommand Arrangements Agreement,USTRANSCOM has the mission to provideworldwide common-user aerial and seaportterminal management and may provideterminal services by contract. Thus

MARSHALLING AREA OPERATIONS

IN-PROCESSING AREA

FRUSTRATED, HAZARDOUS,AND/OR SENSITIVE CARGO AREA

Safety and SecuritySOP briefing

Messing and billetingPetroleum, oils, andlubricants

MaintenanceMedical supportTransportation

Assemble andreconfigureequipment

MaintenanceDocumentation updateVehicle key controlSecurity measuresPrepare for movementfrom port ofdebarkation

Frustrated CargoHazardous CargoSensitive Cargo

MUSTER AREA

Scanning AreaHold Area

Frustrated orHazardousArea

TO STAGING AREA

Unit Muster Area

In-processing

Offload and In-processPersonnel, Equipment,

and Supplies

Figure IV-3. Marshalling Area Operations

IV-7

Reception

USTRANSCOM, through AMC andMTMC, will normally manage common-useaerial ports and seaports respectively for thecombatant commander. In areas not servedby a permanent USTRANSCOM presence,USTRANSCOM will deploy an AMCmission support element including aerial portexpertise. If mobile C2 is also required, amission support team or tanker airlift controlelement (TALCE) will deploy as well as anMTMC port management cell to manage theports in concert with the designated portoperator. Based on availability of fixed-portterminals or operational environments orrequirement, the port manager may also serveas the port operator.

b. Theater Port Management. To ensureefficient operations of the port (air or sea)and to achieve maximum throughput at theport, AMC and MTMC (as single portmanagers as designated by USTRANSCOMand in accordance with CommandArrangements Agreement with othergeographic CINCs) are identified ascommon-user theater port managers with themission of overseeing the entire receptionphase of JRSOI. In doing this, JRSOIplanners ensure that balance andsynchronization are applied to the receptionphase to achieve maximum throughput of theport.

c. Aerial Port of Debarkation. TheAPOD serves as the primary port of entry fordeploying personnel, as well as for early entryforces airlifted into theater together with theirequipment. APODs by their very natureare facilities most often operated inconjunction with the HN. Figure IV-4depicts a notional aerial port complex.

• APOD Functions. Numerousoperational and support functions occurat the APOD. Primary operationalfunctions are to receive, offload,marshal, provide essential field

services, and transport deployingforces and their equipment. Tasksinclude offloading cargo (bothequipment and materiel), clearingpersonnel through air terminals,accomplishing movement control, andmaintaining ITV. In addition tooperational functions, there are APODsupport functions as listed in FigureIV-5.

• APOD Service Capabilities. Variousorganizations provide the operationalcapabilities needed for APOD reception.For example AMC through its airmobility support squadrons and/or aerialport flights and TALCEs provides muchof the operational and logistic supportneeded to receive arriving aircraft; Navyoverseas air cargo terminal (NOACT)units unload aircraft and operate aircargo and passenger airheads. Throughits cargo transfer company (CTC), theArmy provides the required support tointerface with the TALCEs and beginthe staging and onward movementphases for the deploying personnel,equipment, and materiel. Whenperforming this mission, the CTC isoften referred to as the arrival/departure airfield control group( A /DACG). When a CTC is notavailable, other Army or Marine Corpsunits may be given the A/DACGmission. In addition, HNS, providedunder the provisions of an existingagreement or contracted port services,may be used to free up finite receptionassets and minimize the logistic footprintat the APOD. Close coordination withHNS activities is necessary to balancethe operational requirements of allorganizations competing for limitedresources. The layout of a typical APODis illustrated in Figure IV-6. PrimaryUS and HN elements involved in APODoperations are shown in Figure IV-7.

IV-8

Chapter IV

JP 4-01.8

• APOD Infrastructure Optimization.Various factors can impede APODreception, but the overridingconsiderations for any airfield operationare parking maximum (aircraft) on theground (MOG) and working MOG.Parking MOG is the number of aircraftthat can fit, or be parked, on the ground.Working MOG pertains to how manyparked aircraft can be worked based onavailable personnel, materials handlingequipment (MHE), and ramp space.Optimally, working MOG equals

parking MOG. But this is seldom thecase, since parking MOG usuallyexceeds working MOG. Service andHN operators must ensure that theiractivities do not reduce MOG capacities.For example, during OperationDESERT STORM there were 114 acresof 463L pallets on the ground when theground war commenced. The inabilityto balance and synchronize thereception, staging, and onwardmovements phases of JRSOIsignificantly reduced the throughput of

NOTIONAL JOINT AERIAL PORT COMPLEX

Gate #1Gate #1 Gate #2Gate #2 Gate #3

Gate #4

Gate #3

Gate #4Non-UnitPersonnel

ProcessingCenter

Enemy Prisonerof War Holding

Area

North Perimeter Road

Host NationAirport

Manager

HelicopterServicing

Area

HeloPad

US Command & Control

Air Terminal

H

South Perimeter Road

Air-to-AirInterface

Operations

Aerial Portof

DebarkationHolding

Area

Hazardous

Materiel

Storage

AeroMedEvacHolding Area Vehicle Holding

Area

PassengerOperations

Car

goO

pera

tions

UnitAssembly

Area

ConvoyAssembly

Area

Petroleum, Oils,and Lubricants

Storage

6 27

25

7

FrustratedCargo Area

Pallet Holding,Breakdown, andBuild-up Area

CargoStorage

Area RailPipelineAir TerminalBoundary

AirportBoundary

Road

Figure IV-4. Notional Joint Aerial Port Complex

IV-9

Reception

the airfield and led to a reduction of theMOG.

• APOD Joint Use. Anotherconsideration is ownership andmanagement of the APOD facility. TheAPOD may be controlled and/oroperated by various HN military andcivilian organizations. Additionally,other military and commercial activitiesmay compete for limited facilities. Thesecompeting requirements undermineunity of command and may limit orreduce facility throughput capacitiesavailable for reception of forces. Toovercome this obstacle, clear C2relationships must be established for allAPODs and JRSOI functions as outlinedin paragraph 3a, above.

d. Seaport of Debarkation. The SPODis the second primary LOC node and perhapsthe most important because of its enormousthroughput potential. The SPOD receivesdeploying forces through the offloading oftheir equipment and materiel from sealiftvessels. Historically, 90 percent of adeploying force’s equipment and materielare delivered to the theater via strategicsealift. This is especially true for largeequipment, bulk materiel, and supplies thatare not required to arrive early in theater.There are three types of seaports that canfunction as an SPOD: fixed, which areimproved, world class ports such asDammam, Saudi Arabia or Pusan, Korea;unimproved or degraded ports such as thosefound in Somalia and Haiti; and bare beacheswhere fixed facilities are unavailable.

AERIAL PORT OF DEBARKATIONSUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Maintenance

AirfieldManagement

EquipmentRefueling

Command andControl

Materials HandlingEquipment

Air Defense

TransportationResources

Security

Transient AircraftServicing

Medical

Hazardous CargoHandling

SUPPORT FUNCTIONSAT APOD

SUPPORT FUNCTIONSAT APOD

APOD aerial port of debarkation

Figure IV-5. Aerial Port of Debarkation Support Functions

IV-10

Chapter IV

JP 4-01.8

• SPOD Functions and Responsibilities.Responsibility for essential SPODfunctions is shared between HNseaport organizations and US DODorganizations such as MSC andMTMC, military terminal service units,and contractors. Shown in Figure IV-8are examples of essential SPODfunctions.

• SPOD operations are normallyconducted at established fixed waterterminal facilities such as a sea or inlandwater port. Pre-positioned portopening packages are an option

available to the combatant commanderthrough the different Service’s pre-positioned equipment located either in-theater or afloat. Pre-positioned portopening packages are capable ofoperating a water terminal and providingthe initial transportation and logisticunits necessary to receive forces. PrimaryUS and HN elements involved in SPODoperations are shown in Figure IV-9.

• SPOD water terminals include bothseaports and inland water facilitiescapable of receiving deep draft vessels,coastal vessels, and barges. Many

NOTIONAL AERIAL PORT OF DEBARKATION

ASSEMBLYAND

INSPECTION

Off-loadingRamp Area

Holding Area Unit Areas

PROVIDE MINORSERVICE

(GAS, OIL, &MINOR

MAINTENANCE)

IN-TRANSITHOLDING

AREA

Tanker AirliftControl Element

Arrival Airfield Control Group Unit

UNITAREA

UNITAREA

UNITAREA

Figure IV-6. Notional Aerial Port of Debarkation

JOINT ENDEAVOR

In Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the Army established a heliport to reassemblehelicopters that were shipped by air. The heliport occupied a portion of anairfield, which affected the number of aircraft that could be parked on thefield. This reduced the throughput of the airfield and consequently slowedthe deployment, an Army decision that impacted the strategic flow.

SOURCE: Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (1995- )Draft Lessons Learned

IV-11

Reception

Figure IV-7. Organizations and Functions at Aerial Port of Debarkation

ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS ATAERIAL PORT OF DEBARKATION

Organization orActivity

Parent Organizations Major Functions

Aerial Mobility SupportSquadron and/or AerialPort Flight

USTRANSCOMAir Mobility Command

(AMC)

Plan aircraft loads, process anddocument personnel and cargo, loadand service airlift aircraft

AeromedicalEvacuation LiaisonTeam

USTRANSCOM (AMC) Communicate and coordinate aeromedicalevacuation requirements between medicalfacilities and the Global Patient RegulatingCenter

Facilities Management Combatant CommanderDesignated Executive

Agent and/or HostNation

Plan and manage facilitiesmaintenance, repair, and constructionrequirements

Arrival/DepartureAirfield Control Group

Army and/or MarineComponent Command

Coordination with the TALCE, cleararrival and departure airfield

Port Movement ControlDetachment

Movement ControlAgency

Assist deploying units with onwardmovement from port. Resolveproblems with frustrated cargo

Area Support Group(ASG) Liaison Element

Theater SupportCommand

Coordinate ASG support at port

NoncombatantEvacuation OperationLiaison Element

Army ComponentCommand

Coordinate all movements ofnoncombatants

Aircraft MaintenanceTeam


Provide technical assistance to Armyaviation units deploying through thejoint aerial port complex

Postal OperationsTerminal

Air Force or ArmyComponent Command

Process inbound or outbound mailshipments

Tanker Airlift ControlElement (TALCE)

USTRANSCOM (AMC) Control, coordinate, and monitor USairlift operations

Port Security Air Force ComponentCommand, Army

Component Commandoutside airfield

Provide physical security for theairfield and port complex

Airlift ClearanceAuthority

Air Force ComponentCommand

Provide clearance for theater airlift ofAir Force cargo from aerial portcomplex

Host-Nation SupportElements

Host Nation Operate airfield, load and unload aircraft,service aircraft, provide localtransportation, provide security, provide airdefense

Navy Overseas AirCargo Terminal

Naval ExpeditionaryLogistics Support

Force

Operate expeditionary air cargo terminals;operate air terminal operations centersand remote consolidated aerial portsystems; certify hazardous material cargo;tracks depot level repairables

IV-12

Chapter IV

JP 4-01.8

established terminals will have atransportation infrastructure in placesuch as railways, highways, inlandwaterways, and adjacent airfields.Although terminal facilities will vary,many will already be equipped to handleroll-on/roll-off vessels, containers,general and bulk cargo, and lighterage.Figure IV-10 depicts a notional jointwaterport complex.

• JLOTS is an option available to receivethe force when debarkation at anestablished port is impractical or notavailable. JLOTS operations areoperations in which Navy and Armylogistics over-the-shore (LOTS) forcesconduct LOTS operations together undera JFC. JLOTS operations are conductedover unimproved shorelines, throughfixed ports not accessible to deep draft

SEAPORT OF DEBARKATION FUNCTIONS

Seaport Management

Cargo Offloading, Documentation, and Clearance

Berthing and Chandler Services

Ship Arrival and Departure Coordination

Coordination for Transportation for Onward Movement

Movement Control from Seaport of Debarkation toMarshalling Area

Hazardous Cargo Handling

Port Support Activity Operations

Transient Ship Services

Field Services

Medical Support

Contract and Demurrage Administration

Holding Area Operations

Maintenance and Logistic Support for Arriving Forces

Port Security and Force Protection

Seaport Management

Cargo Offloading, Documentation, and Clearance

Berthing and Chandler Services

Ship Arrival and Departure Coordination

Coordination for Transportation for Onward Movement

Movement Control from Seaport of Debarkation toMarshalling Area

Hazardous Cargo Handling

Port Support Activity Operations

Transient Ship Services

Field Services

Medical Support

Contract and Demurrage Administration

Holding Area Operations

Maintenance and Logistic Support for Arriving Forces

Port Security and Force Protection

Figure IV-8. Seaport of Debarkation Functions

IV-13

Reception

Figure IV-9. Organizations and Functions at Seaports of Debarkation

ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS ATSEAPORTS OF DEBARKATION



Military Sealift Command(MSC) Office

USTRANSCOM (MSC) Coordinate husbanding services ofships in port

Military TrafficeManagementCommand (MTMC)

USTRANSCOM(MTMC)

Coordinate loading and unloading ofships, administer contracts, anddocument cargo; report movement toGlobal Transportation Network withinone hour of arrival and departure offorces or equipment

Ocean CargoClearance Authority

USTRANSCOM(MTMC)

Coordinate movement of outboundcargo from seaport

Logistic SupportElement

Army MaterielCommand

Provide support to Army pre-positioned afloat operations

Naval Control ofShipping Organization

Navy ComponentCommand

Coordinate deployment of merchantship convoys

Port Support Activityand/or Port OperationsGroup

Combat Service SupportElement and LandingForce Support Party

Loading and unloading of personnel,supplies, and equipment fromshipping

Port Movement ControlTeam

Movement ControlAgency (MCA)

Assist deploying units with onwardmovement from port

Area Support Group(ASG)

Theater SupportCommand

Coordinate ASG support at port

NoncombatantEvacuation OperationLiaison Element


Coordinate all movements ofnoncombatants

Aircraft Maintenance Army ComponentCommand

Provide technical assistance to Armyaviation units and unmannedreconnaissance aircraft deployingthrough the joint water port complex

Driver Holding Area(DHA) Control Group

CombatantCommander

Provide necessary services foraccommodating personnel at DHA

Transportation Group(Composite) andTransportationBattalion (TerminalService)


Provide common user port operationsto include heavy lift crane operations,stevedores, and C2 personnelcapable of loading and discharging allclasses of cargo includingammunitions; control of port supportactivity; cargo documentation

Tanker Airlift ControlElement

USTRANSCOM AirMobility Command

(AMC)

Control, coordinate, and monitor USairlift operations at sea-to-air interfacesite (SAIS)

Aerial Port Squadronand Mobility Flight

USTRANSCOM (AMC) Provide cargo and passenger serviceat SAIS

IV-14

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JP 4-01.8

shipping, and through fixed ports thatare inadequate without the use of JLOTScapabilities. JLOTS operations shouldbe considered when port throughputcapacity or reception capability isinadequate to support planned joint forceoperations, or to augment port receptioncapability to handle the surge of majorcombat forces during the early stages oflarge force deployments. The magnitudeof JLOTS operations extends from thereception of ships for offload through the

onward movement of equipment andmateriel to inland marshalling andstaging areas.

See JP 4-01.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).

e. The SPOD will contain facilities andorganizations, both military and civilian, toperform many of the APOD functionsdescribed earlier. One of the key

Figure IV-9. Organizations and Functions at Seaports of Debarkation (cont’d)

ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS ATSEAPORTS OF DEBARKATION (cont’d)



Airlift ClearanceAuthority

Air Force ComponentCommand

Provide clearance for theater airlift ofcargo from SAIS

ASG SAIS LiaisonElement

TSC Coordinate ASG support at SAIS

Port Movement ControlTeam

MCA Assist deploying units with onwardmovement from SAIS

Port Security US Coast Guard, ArmyComponent Command,

and/or Host Nation

Provide physical security of the portcomplex

Facilities Management Combatant CommanderDesignated Executive

Agent and/or HostNation

Plan and manage facilitiesmaintenance, repair, and constructionrequirements

Host-Nation SupportElements

Host Nation Operate port, load and unloadvessels, operate SAIS airfield, loadaircraft, provide local transportation,provide security, provide air defense

Navy Cargo HandlingBattalion

Naval ExpeditionaryLogistics Support

Force

Provide maritime pre-positioningships and AFOE cargo handling,heavy lift marine crane operations;provide stevedores and commandand control personnel capable ofloading and discharging all classes ofcargo including munitions

Harbor DefenseCommand Unit


Provides seaward defense of harbor

Mobile InshoreUndersea Warfare Unit


Provides underwater defense inharbor

Landing Force SupportParty

US Marine CorpsComponent

Reception and staging for MarineCorps forces

IV-15

Reception

organizations for SPOD operations is theport support activity (PSA) and/or portoperations group (POG). It is a temporarymilitary augmentation organization that aidsthe port commander in receiving, processing,

and clearing cargo. The PSA is under theOPCON of the single port manager atcommon-user seaports. For seaports notdesignated as common-user seaport, thegeographic CINC will designate the portmanager, whereas the POG remains underthe OPCON of the CSSE and/or landing forcesupport party. PSA and POG functions areshown in Figure IV-11.

• Transportation systems are crucial to thetimely and efficient reception ofdeploying forces at the SPOD. Thesupported commander should considerall available resources, geography,transportation capabilities, climate andseasonal changes, and distance betweenLOC nodes as well as projectedrequirements for movement of the forcesfrom the SPOD. When selecting anSPOD, the supported commandershould consider the transportationinfrastructure as well as the capacityof the port to handle potentialthroughput and surges of deployingforces. A robust rail, road, airport, andinland waterway system will be vital inefficiently receiving and moving theforce to staging areas.

SEAPORT MANAGEMENT

As outlined in the Unified CommandPlan and USTRANSCOM CommandA r r a n g e m e n t s A g r e e m e n t ,USTRANSCOM is the DOD-designated single port manager forall common-user seaportsworldwide. When necessary, inareas where MTMC does notmaintain a manned presence, a portmanagement cell may beestablished to direct water terminal(i.e., fixed, unimproved facility, and/or bare beach) operations, includingthe work loading of the portoperator based on the combatantcommander’s priorities andguidance. Depending on thesituation, the geographiccombatant commander may alsorequest, in their commandarrangement agreement withUSTRANSCOM, MTMC to operatesome or all water terminals in thetheater.

Joint logistics over-the-shore operations

IV-16

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JP 4-01.8

4. Reception Considerations

In order to support operations at the APODand SPOD, there are conditions that supportthe JRSOI process that should be considered.The combatant commander should determinethe type of support units and the compositionand/or method of logistic support necessary tocarry out reception. The combatant commandermay consider most capable Service ordominant user options when configuring thesupport structure. Figure IV-12 illustrates somereception planning considerations.

a. Economy of Resources. Combatantcommanders should tailor their receptionoperations to provide efficiency and economy

as well as eliminating duplication of limitedresources among the Services. The decisionby the JFC to establish a JRC maximizes useof scarce resources. Efficient resourcemanagement of limited transportationassets and reception facilities assists inoptimizing reception throughput.Discharge workload should not exceed PODthroughput capacity. Time-phased build-upof reception capabilities is an option that mayaccomplish this. At the same time, however,reception forces must be configured in sucha way that they are capable of handlingpotential surge capacities of strategicdeployment and provide intermodal servicesfor transshipment of arriving cargo andsupplies.

NOTIONAL JOINT WATERPORT COMPLEX

HelicopterServicing

Area

HeloPad

H

VehicleHolding

Area

USCom

man

d &

Control

Host N

atio

nPor

t

Comm

ande

rContainerHolding

Area

UnitAssembly

Area

InstreamOffload

ConvoyAssembly

Area

Petroleum,Oils, and

LubricantsStorage

Petroleum, Oils, andLubricants Pier

Frustrated

Cargo

Area

Wat

erTe

rmin

al

CargoStorage

Area

Sea-to-AirInterfaceAirfield

Container Pier

Roll On/Roll Off Pier

DriverHolding

Area

ToStaging

Area

RailPipelinePortBoundaryRoad

Gate #1

Gate #2

Gate #3

Figure IV-10. Notional Joint Warterport Complex

IV-17

Reception

b. Command and Control. Command andcontrol functions are essential to the successfulreception of forces into a developing theater, andare the responsibility of the supported combatantcommander. Prior to commencement ofdeployment and reception operations, theJFC should develop an in-theater structurefor executing C2 of JRSOI operations. Thisstructure must address the integration ofUSTRANSCOM assets into the overall C2 forJRSOI to be an efficient operation. Some C2assets may be pre-positioned in theater,geographically in close proximity to the region,or afloat on MSC or maritime pre-positioningforce vessels. Successful execution of a reception

operation involves a centralized C2 structure(unity of command), a decentralized executionstrategy, and disciplined (synchronized andbalanced) movement control. The following C2functions (mission and situation dependent) areexamples of what may be required to successfullyexecute reception functions at APODs andSPODs.

• Maintain unity of effort for all primaryand secondary LOC nodes.

• Coordinate, control, and monitor USairlift and sealift operations into APODsand SPODs.

PORT SUPPORT ACTIVITY ANDPORT OPERATIONS GROUP FUNCTIONS

Receiving

Correcting

Serving

Assisting

Providing

Assisting

Providing

and staging unit equipment inmarshalling areas

configured equipment and cargodeficiencies

as vehicle operators

with the servicing of self-deployingaircraft

necessary maintenance andrecovery capability

the port commander with cargoaccountability

for security of sensitive andclassified cargo

Figure IV-11. Port Support Activity and Port Operations Group Functions

IV-18

Chapter IV

JP 4-01.8

• Designate marshalling area.

• Provide personnel and cargo clearanceof arriving forces.

• Provide for personnel, equipment, andmateriel accountability.

• Determine whether an SRC is to bedesignated as a JRC.

• Provide movement control of arrivingpersonnel, equipment, and materiel.

• Provide visibility over arriving anddeparting personnel and cargo by input ofJTAV source data into appropriate AIS.

• Perform liaison with HN military andcivilian officials for coordinatingrequired clearances and support.

• Coordinate and control loading andoffloading from aircraft and ships.

• Coordinate and control personnel andcargo movements from PODs viasurface and air to planned holdingareas.

• Monitor and manage the TPFDD.

• Coordinate and control movement ofnoncombatants.

• Provide clearance for intratheater airliftcargo movements.

• Provide distribution management for thetheater and arriving unit commandstructures of all arriving personnel,equipment, and materiel.

RECEPTION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Economy of Resources

Command and Control

Communications

Force Protection

Transportation

Supply and Services

Host-Nation Support

Contractor Support

Figure IV-12. Reception Planning Considerations

IV-19

Reception

• Provide intermodal services fortransshipment of arriving cargo andsupplies.

• Provide, coordinate, and controlconstruction in support of personnel andcargo movement.

• Provide life support facilities.

c. Communications . E f f e c t i v ec o m m u n i c a t i o n s , v e r t i c a l l y a n dhorizontally, is essential for JRSOI due tothe complexity of the operation. Timelyand reliable communications should becontinuous among all JRSOI participants,both supporting and supported. Thefollowing communications functions may berequired to successfully execute JRSOIoperations.

• Establish links between LOC nodes.

• Use automation technology.Communications should utilizeadvanced technologies that will be bothan enabler and force multiplier of thereception process. The entire JRSOIprocess, especially reception, shouldleverage the power of automation.Through GCSS programs, JTAV cantrack as well as manage the flow of forcesin-theater and through the numerousPODs. Establishing a reliable networkto disseminate this valuable informationto all Services involved in the receptionphase must be a priority for those unitswith GCSS and GTN capabilities.

• Provide liaison officers (LNOs).Effective liaison among the Servicecomponents and with HN agencies isparamount in order for effectivecommunication to occur during theentire reception operation.

• Monitor GTN and JOPES to provide realtime force tracking information of

deploying forces and non-unitreplacement personnel. Monitor JTAVand GTN to provide real-time trackingof non-unit sustainment items for allorganizations and activities.

• Provide for reliable and compatible two-way communications between jointforces.

d. Force Protection. Deploying forces aswell as strategic airlift and sealift assets maybe the most vulnerable during loading ordischarge. The threat must be consideredin light of the concentration of forces withinthe limited confines of a POD. As unitsmove forward to secondary LOC nodes, theyremain vulnerable until fully integrated intoa mission-capable force. Force protectioncapabilities and/or measures should beintegrated into the reception plan. Thecombatant commander is responsible forproviding the assets needed to protect theforce throughout the entire reception process.Force protection functions should include butare not limited to:

• Providing theater air defense;

• Maintaining coastal, harbor, and inlandwaterway defense;

• Providing APOD and SPOD facilitydefense;

• Providing military police support;

• Establishing rear area operations centerfor security oversight;

• Preparing for the effects of NEO onJRSOI operations; and

• Providing protection against weapons ofmass destruction threats.

See JP 3-10, Doctrine for Joint RearArea Operations.

IV-20

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JP 4-01.8

e. Transportation. All three elements ofa transportation system (mode operations,terminal operations, and movementcontrol) should be integrated early into theTPFDD flow to provide adequate receptioncapabilities for the deploying forces. Theseelements may be Reserve Components (RC)assets that must be mobilized and flow earlyin the TPFDD. Essential to any JRSOImission is an executable plan thatfacilitates intratheater transportationbetween nodes. The primary transportationnodes and the extended LOCs should bemutually supportive of the principle of unitintegrity. To transition from strategicintertheater deployment to in-theaterreception, the following transportationfunctions may be required.

• Place port opening force packages atPODs providing hand-off of deployingpersonnel, equipment, and materiel.

• Employ movement control principles.Movement control coordinates allaspects of transportation; modes, nodes,and terminals. It includes Service-unique capabilities, HNS, andsupporting commands.

• Have a support element for offloadingof arriving forces.

• Provide intratheater air and surfacetransportation assets.

• Manage and monitor the TPFDD.

• Establish theater LOC nodes and linksrequired to meet the anticipatedtransportation and throughputcapacities. Allow for sufficientcoordination to ensure timely movementof cargo and equipment through the portto minimize port congestion.

• Identify, assess, and provide for requiredphysical transportation capacities andcapabilities (ports, airfields, rail and roadnetworks, littoral and inland waterways,and communications infrastructure).

f. Supply and Services. Supply andservices compete for limited strategic liftresources as the priority is on receiving andmoving the force forward into the theater.However, sustainment of the force whiletransitioning into the theater cannot beforgotten, and neither can the resources that

Life support services provide in-theater shelter, food, water, lodging.

IV-21

Reception

will be required to sustain reception. Thecombatant commander must provide arrivingpersonnel, equipment, and materiel withrequired life support and field services untilunit personnel are reunited with their suppliesand equipment and become self-sufficient.These services may be RC assets that mustbe mobilized and flow early in the TPFDD.The following are typical categories ofsupport that may be provided to sustain newlyarriving forces in-theater:

• Field and life services such as food,water, lodging, and sanitation.

• Maintenance and operator supportfor deploying equipment, vehicles,helicopters, and aircraft.

• Munitions storing and handling.

• Petroleum products storing andhandling.

• Medical support and evacuation.

• Mortuary affairs services.

• Frustrated cargo storing, handling, andprocessing.

g. Host-Nation Support as a potentialforce multiplier should be planned andcoordinated well in advance of an actualdeployment. This can best be accomplishedthrough coordination with the US countryteam (ambassador and staff), if one exists

within country. The effect of a well plannedHNS agreement should be a reduction ofthe US military logistic footprint in-theaterand a concurrent reduction in the need forearly deployment of supporting units.Some HNS considerations include:

• Augmenting reception capabilities earlyin the deployment cycle with dedicatedunits if civilian or military HNS are notavailable at APODs and/or SPODs toquickly throughput combat forces;

• Analyzing the PODs and in-theatertransportation infrastructure capacity; and

• Anticipating limited materiel, keyservices, and HNS in-country.

h. Contractor Support for materielrequirements is another force multiplier and,like HNS, should be planned and coordinatedin advance of an actual deployment.Normally HNS will be considered first beforea decision is made to contract for requiredsupport. The supported combatantcommanders should ensure early deploymentof contracting, finance, resourcemanagement, and legal personnel toaccomplish the contracting actions.Contracts will not be without cost, nor shoulddeploying forces expect to have unlimitedaccess to local facilities and resources. Inmost cases, military forces will have toshare and compete with HN military, civil,and commercial operations for scarceresources and facilities.

IV-22

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JP 4-01.8

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VSTAGING

V-1

1. General

This chapter describes the staging processand the activities performed in theater stagingareas (SAs). Staging includes theassembling, temporary holding, andorganizing of arriving personnel,equipment, and materiel into units andforces, and preparing them for onwardmovement and employment. Duringstaging, deploying forces have limitedmission capability and are not self-sustainable. The combatant commandermust provide facilities, sustainment, lifesupport, and protection until deploying unitsregain their combat or mission capability.Three essential force-related activities thatoccur during staging are described in FigureV-1.

“As we have learned many times, the US can ship supplies and materiel toan objective area much more effectively and efficiently than the objectivearea can unload and distribute those supplies.”

LTG (Ret.) Joseph M. HeiserA Soldier Supporting Soldiers, 1992

a. A major focus during JRSOI andspecifically during staging is buildingplanned capability, an example of which iscombat power. Success in building combatpower requires:

• Defining combat capability;

• Defining logistic capability andsustainability;

• Defining how to track and visualizecombat power;

• Establishing an incremental building ofcombat power;

STAGING FORCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

Units assemble into a mission-capable force.

Units of the force prepare to conduct theirmissions.

The force prepares for onward movement(if required) and subsequent integration into thetheater operation.

Units assemble into a mission-capable force.

Units of the force prepare to conduct theirmissions.

The force prepares for onward movement(if required) and subsequent integration into thetheater operation.

Figure V-1. Staging Force-Related Activities

V-2

Chapter V

JP 4-01.8

• Prioritizing and adjusting the flow asneeded;

• Managing and supervising the unit’sprogress; and

• Developing a complementary trackingsystem that applies for combat operationsas well as JRSOI.

COMBAT POWER

Combat power is the total means ofdestructive and/or disruptive forcewhich a military unit or formationcan apply against the opponent ata given time.

b. An important matter in predictingcombat power is force tracking. Forcetracking is the process of gathering andmaintaining information on the location,status, and predicted movement of eachelement of a unit (including the unit’scommand element, personnel, and unit-related supplies and equipment) while intransit to the specified operational area.The unit’s Status of Resources andTraining System status is used to gatherand maintain information on equipment,personnel, and location during deploymentand before integration. Force tracking aidsin predicting the unit’s arrival time in theaterand incremental build of mission capability.The supported combatant commander’slogisticians support the operationalcommander in force tracking by providingvisibility of deploying forces and materielthrough the evolving capability of JTAV.JTAV is possible through the integration ofthe capabilities provided by AIT and AIS aswell as decision support tools comprising theGTN and GCSS. Control of the deploymentprocess is exercised through the C2capabilities of GTN and GCSS. Forcetracking includes the following steps.

• Elements are monitored until they arereassembled

• Unit commander reestablishes control ofthe unit

• Unit becomes capable of sustaining itself

• Unit can perform assigned missions

• Unit completes onward movement andintegration.

These systems are further discussed inChapter VIII, “Enablers.”.

2. Staging Process

While unit personnel, equipment, andmateriel are deploying, commanders retainC2 of unit personnel and equipment whenthey embark on common-user lift assets atPOEs. Command relationships aremaintained through plane team commandersfor airlift and commanding officer of troopsfor sealift. Over time, the unit commanderregains control as elements of the unit arereunited with their equipment at marshallingand SAs. During staging, commanderscontinue the process of regaining integrityof their units as personnel, equipment, andmateriel are assembled and prepared foroperations. Combat power is builtincrementally throughout JRSOI aspersonnel, equipment, and materiel passthrough the LOC to the final destination.This often involves consecutive iterations ofstaging and onward movement. The stagingprocess begins in marshalling areas in thevicinity of PODs when personnel link up withtheir equipment and is completed in the SAs.Multiple actions, events, and activities mustbe accomplished to get the force assembledand prepared for movement to the finaldestination for integration. Stagingrequirements must be planned andcommunicated to supporting units that takeactions to prepare and organize the people,supplies, and equipment to support stagingoperations. The major objective of stagingis to assemble and prepare the force to

V-3

Staging

perform their mission. The staging processconsists of distinct steps, (see Figure V-2; seeFigure I-3 for the master JRSOI process map).

a. Prepare the Force (Personnel,Equipment, and Supplies). Units arrive atthe SA and begin preparations for movementto the TAA or OA. Support activities inthe SA provide life support until unitsbecome self-sustaining. In the SA, C2organizations should be in place to monitorstatuses, receive reports, prioritize movement,provide local security, monitor throughput ofsubordinate units, and forward statuses tohigher headquarters. The force is preparedfor movement to the TAA or OA. Equipmentand cargo, including WRM, are received,accounted for, and distributed. Units preparefor onward movement by assembling,processing and accounting for personnel;performing maintenance and operationschecks on equipment; and checking loadplans for movement from the SA to the OA

or TAA. When the unit has received itsmovement mission, adequate intelligence,and is task-organized in accordance withcommand guidance, it makes final movementpreparations and departs the SA.

• Establish C2, Security, and Unit Area.C2 and command post (CP) operationsare established and liaison elements aresent to higher, adjacent, external, andsubordinate organizations, as themission requires. C2 is established withhigher headquarters, and units maintainclose coordination with higherheadquarters as they make finalpreparations. Units ensure that securityoperations are established in accordancewith the security plan.

• Establish Command and Control. C2functions are vital to the overall successof staging forces. Staging requiresoperational command and staff

Figure V-2. The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, andIntegration Map — Staging


STAGINGSTAGING PROCESSSTAGING PROCESS

OnwardMovement

IntegrationReception Staging


JOINT PROCESSES


JOINT PROCESSES

PersonnelEquipmentSupplies

CoordinateSupport

Requirements

Assemble& ProcessPersonnel

ConductTraining &Perform

EquipmentOperability

Checks

ReceiveEquipment,

WarReserve

Materiel, &Supplies

EstablishCommand and

Control,Security, & Unit

Area

Report Status

Prepare theForce

V-4

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JP 4-01.8

organizations, informationmanagement, and reliablecommunication systems. Depending onthe size and scope of the operation, thecombatant commander can assignresponsibility for operating the SAs to ajoint headquarters or to a Servicecomponent.

•• In an immature theater, the SAs mayinitially be under the command of oneService component commander and latertransition to another Service componentcommander as the theater matures.Staging command structure,responsibilities, and mission roles mustbe clearly identified in the plan. It isessential that everyone understands thecommand relationships of thesupporting and supported units. The SAC2 headquarters responsibilities mayinclude: (1) providing C2 for SAoperations; (2) establishing standingoperating procedures (SOPs); (3)providing interface and coordinationamong the deploying units, task forceheadquarters, supporting commander,and rear area security operations; (4)allocating resources to support staging

operations based on establishedpriorities; and (5) serving as landmanager.

•• Real-time or near-real-timecommunications and informationprocessing are essential to operating theSAs and in providing integratedmanagement information for forcetracking, movement control, andmateriel distribution. Communicationsystems and information processingsystems should be established to provideeffective communication among allJRSOI LOC nodes and SAs, higherheadquarters, and internalcommunications within the SA.

• Establish Security. Force protection isan important aspect during marshallingand staging. Concentrations ofpersonnel, equipment, and materiel atthe SAs may make these forces apotential high value target vulnerable toenemy actions. Ensuring that personneland equipment pass smoothly andexpeditiously through the stagingprocess can reduce force vulnerability.In addition, the HQ responsible for

Total asset visibility is maintained while building combat power in staging areas.

V-5

Staging

operating the SAs should implementactive and passive security measuressuch as the following.

•• Developing and executing a forceprotection plan for units in the SA.Staging operations must be protectedfrom the full range of threats (espionage,local unrest, terrorist activities, weaponsof mass destruction).

•• Coordinating and integrating SAsecurity operations into the joint rearoperations center force protection plan.

•• Providing continuous intelligence onrear and forward area enemy situation.

• Report Status. Units continuouslymonitor the status of preparation in keyoperational and logistic areas as theyprepare for the mission and report statusto higher headquarters. Movements andthe status of units and forces should bereported from all nodes where JRSOIoperations are being conducted.

•• Commanders determine their level ofreadiness against the readiness standardsestablished by the combatantcommander. When commanders assess

their units as mission-capable, they arescheduled for onward movement to aTAA or final destination for integration.

•• Force tracking provides situationalawareness of combat-ready units withinthe AOR and can be used as a tool todetermine when specific unit capabilitieswill be available to the combatantcommander. This process begins in theSA where personnel, equipment, andmateriel reassemble into combat-readyunits. Efficient movement control is onemeans of force tracking.

•• In addition, the command responsiblefor operating the SAs must have andmaintain visibility of what and whenunits are arriving as well as when unitsare prepared for onward movement inorder to plan and coordinate support andintegration efforts. Staging operationsshould include the communications,automation, and personnel assets toprovide and receive force-trackinginformation.

b. Coordinate Support Requirements.While in a deploying status, forces are notself-sustainable, and may require life supportas well as other logistic support. Joint forces’

Security of staging areas can require rapid response.

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JP 4-01.8

support requirements are integral to theplanning process. Units arriving in the SAshould coordinate with the supportinglogistic activities to receive logistic supportand services as described below.

• The amount and type of supportrequired at staging locations to assistdeploying units are both unit- andsituation-dependent. The combatantcommander should consider thecomposition of logistic support units thatwill carry out these vital functions. Adeploying unit’s need for assistance inan SA can be influenced by the operatingenvironment, the length of time unitsspend at the SA, and the ability of theunit to use their own resources to providefor some of their requirements.

• Supply and services provide necessarysustainment and support to enable theforce to achieve readiness. To supportstaging operations, the followingfunctions should be accomplished.

•• Life support and essential services setup to support staging units that include,but are not limited to: food, water,shelter, sanitation, health service

support, local transportation,maintenance, supplies, personnelservices, and financial services.

•• Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)delivery systems should be capable ofsupporting joint forces.

•• Ammunition holding area(s) andammunition handling established forstaging units.

•• MHE and container handlingequipment (CHE) provided.

• Transportation and movement controlare important support services as forcesmove to and from SAs. The supportingheadquarters responsible for operatingthe SAs should consider the followingtransportation-related functions.

•• Maintain visibility of movementschedules and ITV of units that aremoving from the marshalling areas tothe SAs.

•• Coordinate staging unit movementrequirements with the appropriateMCC.

Providing life support at a staging area.

V-7

Staging

•• Provide local transportation servicesto support equipment staging andpersonnel billeting activities.

c. Assemble and Process Personnel.Units prepare for onward movement byassembling, processing, and accounting forpersonnel. Personnel are accounted for andprocessed in accordance with commandguidance, JRSOI directives, and unit SOPs.Units are task-organized to execute themission based on combatant commanderguidance and the operational environment.

d. Receive Equipment, WRM, andSupplies. Units receive their equipment,equipment augmentation, WRM, andsupplies as required. Equipment, cargo, andsupplies are received, accounted for, anddistributed in accordance with the logisticguidance. Units perform maintenance andoperational checks on their equipment suchas:

• Preparing equipment for onwardmovement;

• Uploading combat loads; and

• Ensuring receipt of unit cargo andequipment.

e. Conduct Training and PerformEquipment Operability Checks. Trainingis conducted in key mission-essential tasks.Equipment is checked to ensure that it is readyand mission-capable. Units conductindividual and unit training as required.Mission requirements may require trainingsites in the vicinity of staging and marshallingareas. Combatant commanders maydetermine there is a need to train selectedindividual, crew, unit, leader, and stafftasks prior to departure from marshallingor SAs. The operation of a training facilityis not a logistic function, but will requireresources that compete with the JRSOImission. Support training site coordinationand resources needed for operation willhave to be determined, and a plan to meetmission requirements developed. Trainingconsiderations may include:

• Weapons test firing and calibrationranges;

• Weapons qualification andfamiliarization range; and

War reserve materiel, pre-positioned worldwide, is available for issue and staging.

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JP 4-01.8

• Simulator and/or simulations site.

3. Staging Areas

SAs are specific locations along the LOC.The combatant commander usuallydesignates specific locations for staging inorder to provide space and focus resources tosupport staging operations. SAs provide thenecessary facilities, sustainment, and othersupport to enable units to become mission-capable. The size of the deployment andlocation of the PODs and marshalling areasmay necessitate multiple SAs. Shown inFigure V-3 is a notional staging area.

a. In selecting the location of the SAs,the combatant commander visualizes whereto strategically concentrate forces andlogistics to enter into the operational area.The combatant commander evaluates thelocation of TAAs or OAs, geographicconstraints, availability of organic and HNassets, transportation infrastructure, distanceto the ports, and force protectionconsiderations. These factors, along with thephysical dimensions of the theater, ultimatelydetermine the location of the theater SAs.

b. The size of the SA is influenced bynumerous variables, including the anticipated

NOTIONAL STAGING AREA

UNITASSEMBLY

AREA

UNITASSEMBLY

AREA

FUELSTORAGE

FUELSTORAGE

RAILHEADRAILHEADADMINISTRATIONADMINISTRATION

Entrance to Compound

WEAPONS TESTWEAPONS TESTFIRE AREA

MUNITIONSMUNITIONSSTORAGE

VEHICLEFUELINGFACILITY


HHELIPADHELIPAD

HELICOPTERPARKING

AREA

HELICOPTERPARKING

AREA

COMMUNICATIONS

FACILITY

COMMUNICATIONS

FACILITY

Figure V-3. Notional Staging Area

V-9

Staging

flow of forces in-theater, space available, andthreat. The TPFDD is an important tool forthe combatant commander to use inunderstanding the requirements for SAs.

c. Intermediate Staging Base (ISB).The theater operational situation maynecessitate the establishment of an ISBoutside of the combat zone or OA prior toinserting the forces. If established, the ISBis an initial theater staging facility.

Deploying forces debark from strategic lift,reassemble, and prepare to accomplishassigned missions. The ISB may serve eitheras a principal staging base for entryoperations in order to secure a lodgment toproject the force into the theater, or as a securefacility for split-based operations. In othercases, the theater may not have the physicalinfrastructure to support JRSOI and willrequire the use of superior air and sea basesoutside the region.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIONWARD MOVEMENT

VI-1

1. General

This chapter describes systems andprocesses for accomplishing the onwardmovement of deploying forces. Onwardmovement is the process of moving unitsand accompanying materiel fromreception facilities and marshalling or SAsto TAAs or other operating areas. Rail,road, inland or coastal waterway, and/or aircan accomplish this movement.

Some challenges to onward movement areillustrated in Figure VI-1.

Efficient onward movement ofpersonnel, equipment, and materielrequires a balanced, integrated system ofnode operations, movement control, modeoperations, and cargo transfer operations.

“Movement is the essence of strategy. This is true even though strategy isnot confined to the military art: the implementation of every political decisionrequires movement. It may be messages that move, or men, …or munitions.”

Stephen B. Jones“Global Strategic Views” in The Impact of Air Power, 1959

The onward movement process encompassessupport to all Service components of a jointoperation, and often includes HNS. As inall JRSOI activities, onward movement ofpersonnel, equipment, and materiel isprioritized according to the combatantcommander’s needs. Onward movement iscomplete when force elements are deliveredto the designated location at the designatedtime.

2. Onward Movement Process

Onward movement consists of severaldistinct steps (see Figure VI-2; see Figure I-3 for the master JRSOI process map).

a. Assemble and Marshal Forces.Assembly and marshalling of forces involvesbringing together personnel, supplies, and

The onward movement process encompasses support to all Servicecomponents of a joint operation, and often includes HNS.

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JP 4-01.8

equipment in preparation for movement.Support functions are established andpositioned in-theater to expedite and controlthe onward movement of the force to theobjective area.

• Process Personnel and Cargo forMovement and Prepare Documentation.Load plans are developed and checkedto ensure that essential equipment andsupplies can be transported. Externalmovement requirements are identifiedand movement requests are submitted.

• Sequence Loads. Loads are sequencedto ensure the most efficient use ofavailable transportation assets whilemeeting the combatant commander’srequirements. Safety and security of theforce are also considered when makingdecisions during sequence planning.

• Coordinate Movement SecurityRequirements. Units ensure thatsecurity operations are established inaccordance with the security plan andmonitor the movement.

b. Onward movement follows the“assemble” and “marshal forces” portion ofthe overall onward movement. Thesubsections of onward movement are:

• Move to Operational Area. Unitsdepart the SA en route to the OA inaccordance with movement and securityinstructions.

• Conduct Movement Control Operations.Movement control elements coordinatemovement requirements with thesecurity force and confirm thatmovement clearances have beenapproved. Departure, en route, andarrival statuses are monitored andreported.

3. Onward MovementFunctions

Key elements of the onward movementprocess are speed of movement andinformation flow. Speed of movement isvital for force protection and missionaccomplishment. Information flow

ONWARD MOVEMENT CHALLENGES

Establishing the Distribution Network

Enemy Interdiction

Reporting Procedures

Movement Control

Establishing the Distribution Network

Enemy Interdiction

Reporting Procedures

Movement Control

Figure VI-1. Onward Movement Challenges

VI-3

Onward Movement

encompasses locations and capabilities offorces, projected and actual arrival times aten route and final destinations, andcomponent commands’ ability to effect themovement. Successful onward movement ofdeploying forces can be viewed in the contextof six critical functions as depicted in FigureVI-3 and explained below.

a. Movement Control. Movementcontrol is the planning, routing, scheduling,and control of personnel and cargomovements over LOCs. JP 4-0, Doctrinefor Logistic Support of Joint Operations,authorizes a combatant commander toestablish a joint movement controlorganization. To ensure a fully integratedand responsive transportation system, thecombatant commander should considerassigning responsibility for theatertransportation movement control to a singlejoint office, the JMC. This JMC must beequipped with sufficient communication and

automation capability to ensure adequateinterface between strategic and theatertransportation systems and the combatantcommander’s staff. The combatantcommander may also choose to use one ofthe existing movement control centers of theService components. The Army has a corpsmovement control battalion, a theatertransportation battalion (movement control),and a theater movement control agency. TheMarine Corps has MCCs planned for alldeploying units from the Service componentlevel down to the battalion and squadronlevel. They are the force movement controlcenter, the logistic and movement controlcenter, and the unit movement controlcenters.

If a joint movement control organizationis established using assets from multipleServices, it must conduct joint training toensure that personnel understand and canoperate movement control equipment and C2

Figure VI-2. The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, andIntegration Map — Onward Movement


ONWARD MOVEMENT

ONWARD MOVEMENT PROCESSONWARD MOVEMENT PROCESS

Onward Movement IntegrationReception Staging


JOINT PROCESSES


JOINT PROCESSES

CoordinateMovementSecurity

Requirements

Move toOperational

Area

ConductMovement

ControlOperations

ProcessPersonnel &

Cargo forMovement &

PrepareDocumentation

Sequence Loads

Assembleand

MarshalForces

OnwardMovement

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JP 4-01.8

processes. The geographic combatantcommander should task-organize themovement control functions commensuratewith the mission, size, and geography of theOA.

“The geographic combatantcommander has a wide range ofoptions for performing movementcontrol. These options includedirecting subordinate JFC and Servicecomponents to perform their ownmovement control or creating a fullyintegrated joint organization.”

JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures

for Movement Control

The ITV systems provide a capabilityvital to coordinated onward movement.They provide a means to track units,personnel, equipment, and materiel en routefrom reception areas to SAs and forward tothe assembly areas. The physical capabilitiesand limitations of the distribution network,along with the effects of combat, can limit

the ability to execute onward movement asplanned. Thus, ITV information is criticalto successful execution of onward movementto include location, characteristics, andcapacities of roads, aerial ports, and rail lines,combined with current status of highwayregulation, traffic circulation and surfacedistribution plans, and movement programs.

For more information about movementcontrol see Appendix A, “MovementControl,” or JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for MovementControl.

“Inadequate control of movement,whether into or out of a theater, resultsin waste, reduced logistic efficiencyand consequently, a loss of potentialcombat power.”

JP 4-0, Doctrine for LogisticSupport of Joint Operations

b. Communications. Movement controlelements must be equipped with sufficient

Figure VI-3. Critical Functions of Onward Movement

CRITICAL FUNCTIONS OFONWARD MOVEMENT

MOVEMENT CONTROL

COMMUNICATIONS

TRANSPORTATION

SUPPLY AND SERVICES

HOST- NATION SUPPORT

ACQUISITION CROSS-SERVICE AGREEMENTS

FORCE PROTECTION

VI-5

Onward Movement

communication and systems to ensureadequate interface between strategic andtheater transportation systems and thecombatant command’s staff. They should beskilled in coordinating and directing theatertransportation operations in support of unitmovements and/or logistic resupply operations.

c. Transportation. Nodes, routes, and HNassistance should be coordinated to maximizethe speed of movement. Close coordinationis essential for minimizing congestionbecause in most cases the Services, alliedunits, and the HN populace will be usingthe same networks. It is essential thatcapacities and capabilities of thetransportation network are balanced againstthe movement requirements so that nodesand routes are neither saturated orunderutilized. As previously explained, thedesignated movement control element isresponsible for coordinating the use of alltheater transportation resources withUSTRANSCOM and its TCCs, othercombatant commands, and the HN.

d. Supply and Services. En route supportnodes along the theater LOC provide security,life support, refueling, limited vehiclemaintenance, and vehicle recovery. The sizeof the support centers will be based upon theavailable facilities, length of route, and

volume of equipment and personneltransiting the sites. Various types of en routefacilities that support onward movementinclude:

• Aircraft en route support sites;

• Convoy support sites;

• Trailer transfer points;

• POL transfer points;

• Pre-positioned equipment sites;

• Pre-stock supply points; and

• Railheads

Of the above listed facilities, convoysupport sites are among the most critical.Convoy support sites provide the bulk ofen route support during onwardmovement. Services provided by convoysupport sites may be tailored based upon suchfactors as distance between LOC nodes;number and location of support bases; andmain supply routes’ (MSRs’) congestion,condition, and force protection.

• Convoy support sites usually providesupport in the following areas.

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

At the time of execution, the rail deployment plan was based on an invalidateddeployment rate (20 trains per day). At the planned rate of movement, thedivision could deploy the bridge opening package, open the ground lines ofcommunications, accomplish the transfer of authority, and begin enforcementof the ZOS [zone of separation] by D+30. As the deployment began, it rapidlybecame apparent that the rail LOC [line of communications] would onlythroughput about half of the planned deployment rate. As a result, ad hocforce tailoring decisions had to be made to compensate for the reduced raillift capacity.

SOURCE: Initial Impressions ReportOperation JOINT ENDEAVOR (1995- )

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JP 4-01.8

•• Administration and communications

•• Refueling

•• Dining and billeting

•• Latrines

•• Laundry and showers

•• Vehicle recovery and maintenance

•• Medical

•• MHE and CHE

Convoy support sites provide the bulk of en route supportduring onward movement.

CONVOY SUPPORT SITES

The distances traveled were considerable. The long haul from the port ofAd-Dammam to the logistic bases at King Khalid Military City (KKMC) wasover 334 miles along the northern route. With the staggering number ofsupport vehicles using the northern MSR [main supply route], it was notuncommon for multiple convoys to jam the two-lane MSRs. Along the northernroute, it was a common site to see large trucks breaking off from the two-lane road and carving additional passing lanes through the sands of the desert.

With a long LOC [line of communications] over generally poor roads, ColonelWhaley was faced with the task of creating a transportation network capableof supporting Desert Shield objectives. As the Deputy Commanding General(DCG), Transportation, 22d Support Command, Colonel Whaley began byestablishing a series of convoy support centers to increase the road networkefficiency. According to the Army Chief of Staff’s official history, “Thesecenters resembled huge truck stops in the desert, and like all truck stops,operated 24 hours a day, providing fuel, latrines, food, sleeping tents, andlimited vehicle repair facilities. The convoy support centers quickly becamewelcomed oases for overworked and exhausted long haul truck drivers.”

SOURCE: BG Robert H. ScalesCertain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War, 1993

VI-7

Onward Movement

•• Security (force protection)

Figure VI-4 depicts a notional convoysupport site.

Descriptions of the other en route supportfacilities are in Appendix B, “JRSOI SupportStructure.”

e. Host-Nation Support resources andfacilities are essential to the successfulemployment and deployment of forces.HNs can often provide a variety ofservices through their national agenciesand can support onward movement in a

wide range of categories. Some of thesecategories are shown in Figure VI-5.

f. Acquisition and Cross-Serviceagreements provide US pre-negotiatedsupport for potential war scenarios.ACSAs provide the legal authority for theUS military and armed forces of othernations to exchange logistic goods andservices. Transactions under this programmust either be reimbursed, replaced inkind, or exchanged for equal value, whichmay not always be the case with HNSagreements.

NOTIONAL CONVOY SUPPORT SITE

FUELSTORAGE

FUELSTORAGE ADMINISTRATIONADMINISTRATION

LAUNDRYLAUNDRY

LATRINESLATRINESSHOWERSSHOWERS

Entrance to Compound



WATERDISTRIBUTION

WATERDISTRIBUTION

VEHICLEPARKING AREA

VEHICLEPARKING AREA

VEHICLEMAINTENANCE

VEHICLEMAINTENANCE

VEHICLERECOVERYVEHICLE

RECOVERY

BILLETING

DININGFACILITYDINING

FACILITY

Figure VI-4. Notional Convoy Support Site

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JP 4-01.8

g. Force Protection. Force protection iscritical to onward movement because itminimizes enemy opportunities to inflictserious losses and delays. The threat ofenemy interdiction to onward movementof forces presents a special challenge to thecommander. The combatant commandermust assume that interdiction of the LOCs

Figure VI-5. Host-Nation Support to Onward Movement

will form an integral part of enemy strategyand must plan operations to preclude themfrom impacting onward movement.

• Protecting the LOCs should requireminimum cost to committed combatunits through the use of geography andHN civil and military forces, as well as

Lines of communications are often targets of enemy interdiction,requiring additional active prevention measures.

HOST- NATION SUPPORT TOONWARD MOVEMENT

Combat service support (food, water, lighting, billeting,showers, and latrines)

Medical

Security

Communications

Materials/Cargo Handling Equipment

Ground transportation (buses, line haul, and heavy lift)

Convoy, road, rail, and diplomatic clearances

Combat service support (food, water, lighting, billeting,showers, and latrines)

Medical

Security

Communications

Materiels and Cargo Handling Equipment

Ground transportation (buses, line haul, and heavy lift)

Convoy, road, rail, and diplomatic clearances

VI-9

Onward Movement

ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, an Israeli commando team of 12 men and ajeep-mounted recoilless (RCL) rifle were inserted at 2400 hours along theBaghdad-Damascus Highway about 100 km north of Damascus, near a bridgecrossing a deep ravine. The bridge was rigged for demolition, ambushpositions were laid out covering the bridge approaches, with hasty minefieldscovering the ambush positions. At dawn, an Iraqi tank brigade, moving ontransporters, began crossing the bridge. After several vehicles had crossed,the bridge was destroyed, and the exits from the bridge approaches interdictedby the RCL, thus isolating the convoy on the road. The immobilized vehicleswere then destroyed by aircraft on-call, and by commandos using satchelcharges. In this manner, approximately 50 Iraqi tanks were destroyed, andthe road remained closed for several days (during a critical part of the war),due to fear of additional ambushes.

SOURCE: 1973 War Lessons Learned

assets of other US Services. It may benecessary to conduct a major operationto secure LOCs over which onwardmovement would be conducted to ensurethat the incremental build of combatpower is not interrupted. In addition,

alternatives such as rerouting or modesubstitution should be considered, i.e.,air and sea LOCs to replace orsupplement ground LOCs, if preventiveand preemptive measures fall short.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIIINTEGRATION

VII-1

1. General

This chapter describes the integrationprocess and key integration requirements tosuccessfully unite deploying forces into thetheater command structure. Integration isthe synchronized transfer of mission-readyunits into the combatant commander’sforce. Integration may take hours or days.The complexity and time required forintegration depends on the size, contingencyconditions, and coordination and planning.C2, communications, and security are thepriority of effort during the integration phase.Integration is complete when the receivingcommander establishes command andcontrol over the arriving unit and the unitis capable of performing its assigned

“When the enemy assesses our forces, he values only those forces whichthe logistics community has ready for combat, or can get ready in time, andthen sustain for a requisite period of time.”

General Felix M. Rogers, USAFIn Military Air Power, The CADRE Digest of

Air Power Opinions and Thoughts, 1990

mission. Force tracking, which occurs as theforce builds combat power, culminates inforce closure as reported by the commanderof the unit. Force closure is defined as “thepoint in time when a supported joint forcecommander determines that sufficientpersonnel and equipment resources are in theassigned operational area to carry outassigned tasks.”

a. During execution, the deploying forcecommander reports that the levels ofreadiness prescribed by the supportedcombatant commander have been achievedand that integration into the higherheadquarters is imminent. The supportedcombatant commander is concerned with thefollowing.

Integration is the synchronized transfer of mission-ready units into thecombatant commander’s force.

VII-2

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JP 4-01.8

(intelligence, situation, mission, deploymenttimeline) to expedite the in-theaterintegration.

INTEGRATION CHALLENGE

The integration challenge is toseamlessly integrate cohesive,mission-capable units into thegaining command.

2. The Integration Process

The goal of integration is to provide theoperational commander with a mission-capable force. Figure VII-1 depicts stepsnecessary to complete integration (see FigureI-3 for the master JRSOI process map).

a. Conduct Integration Operations. Theintegration area is a location designated bythe combatant commander where units willbe transferred to their gaining commands,integrated into the force, and be prepared fortactical employment. Units arrive at theintegration area and continuously monitorthe status of preparation in key operationaland logistic areas as they prepare for themission. Coordination is also made forintegration area security operations. WhenJRSOI operations are completed, units reportto higher headquarters ready for operations.Integration operations are as follows.

• Establish C2, Security, and Unit Area.C2 and CP operations are establishedand liaison elements are sent to higher,adjacent, external, and subordinateorganizations as the mission requires.Units improve their unit areas, establishand maintain security, and prepare forfuture operations.

• Report Status. Units continuouslymonitor the status of preparation in keyoperational and logistic areas as theyprepare for the mission and report statusto higher headquarters. Movements and

• Location of the forces.

• Capability of the forces.

• Projected and actual arrival time atdestination.

• Commander’s capability to effect themovement.

• Additional transportation needed(modes, quantities).

b. By definition, integration is the finalelement of JRSOI and is normallyaccomplished concurrently with other forceprojection and JRSOI tasks. It can occuranywhere along the JRSOI continuum andis normally the last JRSOI element to becompleted. There are two majorprerequisites to integration; the unit mustbe mission-capable and must be integratedinto the C2 processes of its higher HQ.

c. Tracking the components of buildingmission capability as a precursor tointegration is essential for overall missionsuccess. In order to track mission capabilities,the components of mission capabilities mustbe known and are listed below.

MISSION CAPABILITYCOMPONENTS

Operational CapabilityMobility and Survivability

Logistic CapabilityC4I

Monitoring mission capability, early andcontinuous coordination, and planning canhelp reduce integration time. Units canestablish predeployment liaisons to exchangeinformation, SOPs, and communicationnetworks, as well as plan for and prioritizean in-theater incremental buildup ofcombat power. Once established, the liaisonis maintained to update information

VII-3

Integration

the status of units and forces should bereported from all nodes where JRSOIoperations are being conducted.

• Conduct Force Assembly andAccountability. Units perform a finalunit assembly; account for equipment,supplies, and personnel; and reportstatus to the gaining command.

• Coordinate Support Requirements.Coordination is established with theTAA or OA support activities to providelogistic support and services.

b. Complete Force Integration. The unitis integrated with logistics and operationalcomponents of the gaining command andcompletes any final command-directedtraining and activities before beingcommitted to missions. The JRSOI processends when the unit commander reports theunit is ready for operations and the unit is

integrated with its higher headquarters.Force integration steps are as follows.

• Integrate Command, Control,Communications, and Computers(C4) with Gaining Command. C4 iscompletely integrated with the gainingcommand, supporting commands, units,JRSOI organizations, and commandersat all levels to facilitate the timely andaccurate exchange of criticalinformation. The receiving commandermust establish C2 over arriving units inthe OA.

• Integrate with CSS. The unitestablishes direct support relationshipswith various support elements in thesupport structure to include supply,services, maintenance, and medical.

• Conduct Field Training Exercises(FTXs) and Rehearsals. Units conduct

Figure VII-1. The Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, andIntegration Map — Integration


INTEGRATION

INTEGRATION PROCESSINTEGRATION PROCESS

Staging OnwardMovement

IntegrationReception


JOINT PROCESSES


JOINT PROCESSES

ConductIntegrationOperations

CompleteForce

Integrations

ConductForce

Assembly &Accountability

IntegrateCommand,

Control,Communications,and Computers

with GainingCommand

CoordinateSupport

Requirements

Integratewith

CombatServiceSupport

ConductField

TrainingExercise &Rehearsals

ConfirmMission

Readiness

EstablishCommand

and Control,Security, &Unit Area

ReportStatus

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JP 4-01.8

FTXs and rehearsals as part of finaltraining preparation.

• Confirm Mission Readiness.Commanders report their units status inaccordance with the readiness criteriaestablished by the combatantcommander and confirm when ready toexecute their assigned missions.

3. Integration Functions

Unlike the functions described in reception,staging, and onward movement, theemphasis during integration is on C2 andcommunications of personnel, equipment,and materiel as they enter the theater andprepare for integration. Force tracking ofmission capability components helps predictwhen in-country integration can begin andhow long it will take to complete. Forceprotection is still critical but may be easier assecurity forces reestablish their militarycapability during staging and onwardmovement. However, to accomplish

integration of the force, the logistic supportmust be transferred from JRSOIsupporting organizations to the gainingcommand.

a. Upon notification of deployment, aliaison between the deploying unit andreceiving HQ should be established toenhance integration. This liaison isconducted through formal liaison teamsattached to the arriving and receiving HQ(the preferred method) or remotely throughcommunication channels. The size andmake-up of the liaison teams are based onthe mission and contingency conditions.

b. Effective liaison enhances thecommander’s confidence in planning,coordinating, and executing integration.Subordinate commanders may use an LNOto obtain necessary information such ascommon coordination measures; tactics,techniques, and procedures; SOPs; rules ofengagement; terms; symbology; andexercises.

CHAPTER VIIIENABLERS

VIII-1

1. General

Force projection operations requireenablers that improve JRSOI planning andexecution and possess the necessary flexibilityto adapt to changing situations. This chapterdescribes existing and maturing systems andsome of the processes that enable and enhanceJRSOI execution. The combatant commanderuses a variety of enablers including processes,systems, and equipment to manage movementflow, obtain total asset visibility (TAV), andachieve balance and synchronization. Some ofthese enablers are described in Figure VIII-1and the following sections.

“The key to success is a seamless communications architecture that allowscommanders to see the battlefield in every dimension, and with capabilitiessuch as Video Teleconferencing, Global Transportation Network, RadioFrequency Tags, and the Defense Tracking System that increases thecommander’s visibility and units’ command and control.”

Lieutenant General Robert Gray, USADCINC, USAREUR

2. Automated InformationSystems

The goal of automated systems is to providethe combatant commander with dominantbattlefield knowledge. Automated C2systems implement the exchange ofinformation among the combatantcommanders, the Service headquarters,and Service and functional componentcommands. The exchange, processing, andanalysis of data and information arecontinuous throughout mission execution.Necessary to this are systems andequipment that are interoperable.

Figure VIII-1. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Enablers

JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARDMOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION ENABLERS

Automated Information Systems

Joint Total Asset Visibility

Theater Distribution

Contingency Contracting

Host-Nation Support

Training

VIII-2

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JP 4-01.8

Interoperability is the condition achievedwhen information or services can beexchanged directly and satisfactorily betweenuser systems and equipment. It is a functionof commonality, compatibility, andstandardization of equipment and systemsand standardization of procedures.

See JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control,Communications, and Computer (C4)Systems Support to Joint Operations, foradditional information on interoperability.

Shown in Figure VIII-2 and describedbelow are five key systems that are availableto monitor and control the JRSOI process.As with any automated system, the qualityof the output is directly related to the accuracyof the data input.

Appendix C, “Deployment Planning Tools,”describes other automated information toolsthat facilitate the JRSOI process.

a. Global Command and ControlSystem. GCCS is a comprehensive C4Isystem. It provides a means for integratingService and agency C4I systems into a globalnetwork of military and commercialcommunications systems. GCCS supportsthe exchange of information from subordinateunits and agencies to combatant commandersand their components. Specific capabilitiesinclude:

• Incorporating the procedures, reportingstructures, automated informationprocessing systems, andcommunications connectivity to providethe information necessary to effectivelyplan, deploy, sustain, employ, andredeploy forces; and

• Providing JFCs with the ability to rapidlyprovide military information to the NCAas well as to other supportingcommands. The system’s commonoperational picture is a key tool forcommanders in planning andconducting joint operations.

b. Global Combat Support System. Thegoal of GCSS is to provide a means forachieving universal access to information andinteroperability of that information acrosscombat support and C2 functions. The endstate also expands the availability ofinformation to provide the combatantcommander with more options. Similar toGCCS, GCSS interfaces and integratescorporate-wide with Service- and agency-sponsored combat support systems. Thelogistic information systems that are criticalto GCSS include successful AIT, ITV, jointdecision support tools, and the emergence ofa flourishing JTAV capability.

c. Global Transportation Network.GTN is the designated DOD system for

KEY AUTOMATED SYSTEMS

Global Command and Control SystemGlobal Combat Support SystemGlobal Transportation Network

Transportation Coordinator’s AutomatedInformation for Movement System IIIntegrated Command, Control, and

Communications System

Figure VIII-2. Key Automated Systems

VIII-3

Enablers

visibility of assets in-transit from origin todestination, including all military andgovernment shipments. It will support thefamily of transportation users and providers(both DOD and commercial) by providingan integrated system of ITV information andC2 capabilities. In its current form, GTNcollects and integrates transportationinformation from selected transportationsystems. The GTN is not simply anotherdatabase; it is a network of systems thatcontinues to evolve. It gives the means toaccess C4 systems that support globaltransportation management. As GTNmatures, it will contain shipment statusinformation, booking information, passengerreservation information, aircraft and ship

manifests, personal property data, medicalpatient information, and vessel and aircraftscheduling data, providing near real time datato commanders. Figure VIII-3 depictselements of the GTN system.

d. Transportation Coordinator'sAutomated Information for MovementSystem II (TC-AIMS II). TC-AIMS II is ajoint automated information system andselected DOD migration system intended forunit move and installation transportationofficer and transportation management officefunctionality when fully developed. TC-AIMS II will integrate fielded Service-uniquesystems and select functions from systems toprovide day-to-day traffic management

GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION NETWORK

Defense InformationSystems Network

Defense InformationSystems Network

Service, Component,and/orOrigin

UNITMOVE

LOADPLANNING

PORTMANAGEMENT

FINANCIAL

PLANNINGAND

EXECUTION

THEATEROTHER

INDUSTRY

SUPPLYAND/ORDEPOT

TRANSPORTATIONMANAGEMENT

OFFICE

MODECLEARANCE

GLOBALTRANSPORTATION

NETWORK

GLOBALTRANSPORTATION

NETWORK

Figure VIII-3. Global Transportation Network

VIII-4

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JP 4-01.8

capabilities and to support deployment,redeployment, and sustainment of US forcesfrom within (and to) CONUS installationsand overseas theaters of operations.Functionality from various systems will becombined to produce the target TC-AIMS IIsystem. Integration of systems for TC-AIMSII include: the Marine Corps MAGTFDeployment Support System II andTransportation Coordinator's AutomatedInformation for Movement System; the AirForce Cargo Movement Operations System;and the Army Transportation Coordinator-Automated Command and ControlInformation System, Management System-Redesign, and Department of the ArmyMovements Management System-RedesignSystem. The Global Decision SupportSystem (GDSS) provides the capability toview mission information and, if required,to update or modify the information.

e. Integrated Command, Control, andCommunications (IC3) System. Sealifttransportation management consists ofeffectively providing SPOE to SPODtransportation. IC3 is the MSC C2 systemto efficiently manage this mission and toprovide the Commander in Chief,USTRANSCOM, the Chief of NavalOperations, and other customers withreliable, comprehensive, and timelyinformation. IC3 supports MSC'srequirements for C2 and tracking of sealiftassets, cargo, and POL. Additionally, itinterfaces with other key information systems,such as GTN, GDSS, and GCCS, to supportthe overall Defense Transportation Systemand USTRANSCOM mission duringdeployment operations.

3. Joint Total Asset Visibility

JTAV provides enhanced visibility ofmateriel and personnel assets in storage, intransit, or in process. JTAV is made possiblethrough the integration of the capabilitiesprovided by AIT and AIS as well as

decision support tools comprising GTNand GCSS. Control of the deploymentprocess is exercised through the C2capabilities of GTN and GCSS. Whenfunctionally complete, the emergingcapabilities of JTAV will enable thecombatant commander’s operational andlogistic managers to determine and act onaccurate and timely information about thelocation, quantity, condition, movement, andstatus of defense materiel. It will includeassets that are in storage, in process, and in-transit. Utilizing JTAV, commanders candetermine what items of supply are availablein the logistic system or must be deployedwith the unit.

“Transportation systems are joint . . .they ought to be managed in a jointfashion,’ General Armstrong remindedhis boss, Air Force Lieutenant GeneralMichael P.C. Carns, Director of theJoint Staff. But, he added, unlessUSTRANSCOM has peacetimeauthorities to enforce s y s t e mc o m p a t i b i l i t y , d a t astandardizat ion, t ra in ing, anddocument and data entry discipline,transportation systems — like GTNand JOPES — would likely be unableto meet warfighter needs andexpectations.”

James K. Matthews & Cora J. HoltSo Many, So Much, So Far,

So Fast, 1992USTRANSCOM and Strategic

Deployment for OperationsDESERT SHIELD

and DESERT STORM

JTAV requirements are broken down intofive areas: requisition tracking, visibility ofassets in-storage or in process, visibility ofassets in-transit, assets in-theater, andpersonnel asset visibility (see Figure VIII-4).GTN (in development), AIS, and the logisticinformation processing system currently helpmeet these requirements. In each case, aspecified “data repository” serves as a centralhub for asset visibility.

VIII-5

Enablers

a. Requisition Tracking. Services andDOD agencies use a variety of stovepipeautomated systems that provide visibility overthe status of requisitions. The JTAV systemgathers information from these stovepipesystems and makes it available to the JFC.

b. Assets In Storage or In-Process. TheAIS of each inventory control point (ICP)provides visibility of assets that are in storageor in-process, with the latter defined as assetsbeing procured or repaired at bothgovernment and commercial maintenancefacilities. ICP AIS provides TAV source datato the JTAV system as described in DODRegulation 4140.1-R, DoD MaterielManagement Regulation, and specifiedbelow.

• Army — direct support authorizedstockage lists.

• Navy — shipboard and major shorestations.

• Air Force — base supply.

• Marine Corps — installation supply andMEF support activities.

c. In-Transit Asset Visibility. ITV is theability to track the identity, status, andlocation of DOD unit and non-unit cargo(except bulk POL), passengers, medicalpatients, and personal property from sourceof origin to the consignee or destination.Combatant commanders, military Services,or DOD agencies during peace,contingencies, or war designate thesedestinations. Figure VIII-5 summarizes thefour critical functions of ITV.

d. In-Transit Visibility. Joint total assetvisibility in-theater (JTAV-IT), when fullyoperational, will provide to combatantcommanders and deploying forces theinformation concerning materiel andpersonnel asset visibility. JTAV-IT willinterface with Service and agency logisticdata bases to capture visibility of assets heldby theater forces, and then plug into GTN toprovide the full visibility of shipments. This

KEY JOINT TOTAL ASSETVISIBILITY PROCESSES

Requisition Tracking

Assets in Storage

In-Transit Asset Visibility

In-Theater Asset Visibility

Personnel Asset Visibility

Figure VIII-4. Key Joint Total AssetVisibility Processes

Figure VIII-5. In-Transit VisibilityCritical Functions

IN-TRANSIT VISIBILITYCRITICAL FUNCTIONS

In-transit materiel visibilityfor all classes of supply

In-transit status of unitmoves, sustainmentsupplies, equipment, andpersonnel

Identification of cargo anddistribution assetsunderway in thetransportation process

Two-way communicationcapability on specifieddistribution platforms

VIII-6

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JP 4-01.8

application will utilize the Defense AutomaticAddressing System to exchange informationwith Logistic On-line Tracking System andICP on assets in-bound to the theater andavailable in CONUS. It will also be able toobtain in-transit data directly from GTN.JTAV-IT will provide essential logisticplanning and analysis capabilities to include:

• Supporting deliberate and crisis actionplanning;

• Allocating critical assets;

• Identifying and resolving in-theaterlogistic bottlenecks;

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

The (asset visibility) problem can appear at any point in the distributionsystem. In the United States, vendor shipments — especially containerizedand palletized cargo — made directly to the port of embarkation quite oftenwere inadequately marked or documented. Shipments arrived at ports ofdebarkation with the destination classified or marked as Operation DESERTSHIELD. Even if adequately documented, pallets that contained materiel forseveral units were frequently broken down on arrival in theater andreconsolidated into shipments by destination unit. This almost alwaysdestroyed any visibility that may have existed pertaining to the pallet’scontents. As a result, in-transit visibility was virtually nonexistent for somemunitions, chemical warfare defense equipment, repair parts, and foodshipments once they arrived in Southwest Asia.

First, the materiel distribution system involved thousands of people aroundthe globe in many different organizations, inventory control points, depots,vendors, and transportation agencies. The distribution system was confrontedwith units spread across great distances, constantly changing unit locations,often with marginal communications, and with early saturation of the groundtransportation system. Second, there was a lack of discipline in the use ofthe military’s standard supply and transportation systems. In the case ofOperation DESERT SHIELD, there were inadequate communication andautomation capabilities in theater to receive and process status andtransportation manifest information. Another reason contributing to the assetvisibility problem was that manifest data received at water terminals was notshared quickly with materiel management centers because of the backlogthat accumulated. Finally, RC port units and their MHE, including heavyforklifts, were not among the early-deploying elements for reasons discussedelsewhere. This led to large materiel accumulations at the ports, adding tothe visibility problems and delaying delivery to already anxious users.

Though not without its problems, the logistic efforts of the United States andits allies were among the more successful in history. Moving a combat forcehalfway around the world, linking supply lines that spanned the entire globe,and maintaining unprecedented readiness rates, are a tribute to the peoplewho make the logistic system work. Logisticians from all Services supportedmore than half a million US Service members with supplies, services, facilities,equipment, maintenance, and transportation.

SOURCE: Conduct of the Persian Gulf WarDOD Final Report to Congress, April 1992

VIII-7

Enablers

• Monitoring the status and capability ofstrategic mobility assets;

• Projecting force closure times;

• Determining requirements for additionalasset and lift capability; and

• Supporting theater doctrine, budget, andprocurement decisions.

When available to the JMC and itssubordinate agencies, TAV of the unit willenable a comprehensive knowledge oflocation and status of required repair parts,inbound forces and personnel, sustainment,and equipment. This will provide plannersand operators with the data necessary tocontrol the logistic pipeline during thebuildup of combat power. The combatantcommander makes the final decision (subjectto combatant commander’s directiveauthority for logistics) concerning redirectingan inbound asset to another componentshould the Service components not reachagreement, achieving balance andsynchronization through the unity ofcommand. To effectively operate a theaterdistribution system, a fully integrated database and communications network needs to

exist both externally and internally to thetheater. The robust intertheater system must:

• Project distribution pipeline volume,flow rates, contents, and associated nodeand port handling requirements;

• Balance and synchronize the flowvolume, contents, and routing inresponse to operational requirements;

• Establish and maintain TAV and ITVfor sustainment materiel;

• Break-bulk, re-consolidate, divert, andcontrol the flow of multi-consigneeshipments;

• Retrograde, redeploy, and/or furtherdeploy materiel; and

• Reconstitute forces for follow-onmissions.

During deployment, unit readiness andmission capabilities are critical elements ofinformation. The combatant commander willrely heavily on the individual Servicereadiness reporting systems to determine thestatus of the assigned forces while in-transit.

Unit visibility provides the data to assess current status and mission capability.

VIII-8

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JP 4-01.8

JTAV, when fielded, will offer the potentialcapability for planners to determine the actualand projected readiness status of units as theyarrive in theater. Visibility of the compositionand status of WRM and pre-positionedmateriel can also assist planners in thedevelopment of COA analysis. Unit visibility,as it moves through the process, provides thedata to assess current status and missioncapability against the requirements of theexecution plan.

e. Personnel Asset Visibility. The JPAVsystem provides cross-Service integration ofthe various Service databases and allows thecombatant commander’s staff to have datavisibility on personnel deployed, employedin, or leaving the OA. The database containsbasic information on individuals such as rankand qualification skills needed to supportpersonnel and readiness assessments.Primary sources such as the TPFDD, Servicecomponent personnel systems, thetransportation manifesting systems, andcasualty reporting and tracking systemsupdate the integrated JPAV database.

4. Theater Distribution

a. Joint TD is the system that enables thecombatant commander to deploy, employ,sustain, and redeploy assigned forces, non-unitmateriel, and personnel to carry out assignedmissions. Theater distribution synchronizesthe complementary activities of movementcontrol, mode operations, materielmanagement, supply and service support, andassociated technology. The TD system providesthe means to accomplish JRSOI. The system isa network of nodes and links tailored to meetthe supported combatant commander’srequirements. The network is overlaid uponexisting HN infrastructure. The nodes andmodes of transport that distribute the forces andsustainment are operated by a combination ofUS military, HN, allied, or contractororganizations. These organizations collect andprocess data into information and issuing

instructions to ensure that the commander’sauthoritative direction in the theater is properlyexecuted.

b. TD is the act of receiving supplies andequipment in a theater and subsequentlyforwarding that cargo to a designated point-of-need flow of personnel, equipment, andmateriel within theater to meet thegeographic combatant commander’smissions. Effective TD calls for acomprehensive in-theater distributionsystem for deployment that is seamlesslyintegrated with strategic, operational, andtactical logistic systems. The intent of TDis to deliver critical supplies under positivecontrol and through a highly visible distributionpipeline, from source to combatant (unity ofcommand, synchronization, and balance). Theprinciples of theater distribution are shown inFigure VIII-6.

PRINCIPLES OFTHEATER DISTRIBUTION

Centralized management

Optimize the distributionsystem

Velocity over mass

Maximize throughput

Reduce logistic responsetime

Minimize stockpiling

Continuous, seamless, two-way flow of resources

Time definite delivery

Centralized management

Optimize the distributionsystem

Velocity over mass

Maximize throughput

Reduce logistic responsetime

Minimize stockpiling

Continuous, seamless, two-way flow of resources

Time definite delivery

Figure VIII-6. Principles ofTheater Distribution

VIII-9

Enablers

• Contracted support must be integratedinto the overall plan.

“The contracting office coordinatescontracting support requirements topreclude inter-Service competition forsupplies or services in order to obtaineffective utilization and advantageousprices through the consolidation of[joint task force] requirements.”

JP 5-00.2, Joint Task ForcePlanning Guidance

and Procedures

6. Host-Nation Support

Host nations own the infrastructure thatUS forces require to conduct JRSOIoperations. They have access to the nationaltransportation resources that can assist andsupport US and allied forces. The size andcomposition of the support force neededto conduct JRSOI operations depends uponthe type, quality, and extent of HNinfrastructure and access granted for USuse. Other HN infrastructure considerationsare as follows.

• It will often be necessary to share theinfrastructure and facilities with HN andallied forces and organizations.

• Operators at airports, seaports, and otherfacilities usually will be local nationals.Therefore, the combatant commandershould appoint a single point of contactfor all US operations at the node toresolve priority and real estate issuesamong US units transiting the facility.

• Capacities of infrastructure and facilitiesallocated for US use may be less thanplanned for. HN military andcommercial operations may compete foravailable assets, thereby impeding theflow of forces and materiel.

• Host nations may not honor previouslynegotiated contracts due to competing

See JP 4-01.4, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint Theater Distribution, formore information.

5. Contingency Contracting

Contingency contracting is the process ofcontracting for locally available supplies,services, and construction in immediatesupport of deploying units, either at staginglocations or a TAA, during a contingency.Contracting and outsourcing can be highlyeffective force multipliers. Contracting canextend existing capabilities and provideaugmentation support for CSS and CSfunctions on the battlefield, such asmaintenance, transportation, supply andservices, signal, engineer, and others.Contingency contracts may be used tosatisfy the requirements for supplies andservices to improve response time, freetransportation assets for other importantmissions, and serve to reduce dependenceon the CONUS-based logistic system.Several principles govern contracted support:

• Contingency contracting should notreplace HNS or the existing supplysystems where these systems areavailable or operational. However,deployed forces may augment theirexisting logistic support capabilitythrough contingency contracting toprovide an additional source for criticallyrequired supplies and services.

• Contractors do not replace forcestructure.

• Contractors are employed subject toMETT-T.

• Deployments most suitable foremployment of contingency contractingsupport are those likely to occur in areasof the world where there are few, if any,HNS agreements.

VIII-10

Chapter VIII

JP 4-01.8

demands, political considerations, or fora variety of other reasons.

• United Nations agencies, internationalorganizations, and nongovernmentalorganizations may already be deployedto the theater. Their capabilities mayaugment support provided by the HN.

• While HNS agreements provides USpre-negotiated support for potential warscenarios, ACSAs provide the legalauthority for the US military and otherarmed forces to exchange logistic goodsand services during contingencies — theunpredictable side of business.Transactions under this program must

be reimbursed, replaced in kind,exchanged at equal value.

7. Training

Training and rehearsal are key elementsto the success of JRSOI. Elements engagedin JRSOI do not always come from the unitswho regularly conduct joint trainingoperations. Additionally, JRSOI elementsmay come from various Services or fromService components. This “ad hoc” natureof elements engaged in JRSOI operationsrequire detailed training and rehearsal plansin order to synchronize these complexoperations.

The Government of Saudi Arabia’s decision not to allow the United States tolaunch possible air strikes from Saudi airbases against Iraq during OperationDESERT THUNDER in early l998 is an example of how political considerationscan affect access to or from host-nation facilities.

APPENDIX AMOVEMENT CONTROL

A-1

1. General

This appendix generally describes themovement control support structure(organizations, processes, systems, andinfrastructure) needed to execute JRSOIoperations. The JRSOI support structuremust be responsive to the combatantcommander’s priorities. METT-T-influenced changes may cause certain unitsto be in high demand or necessary forimmediate employment. Critical resourcessuch as heavy equipment transporters, fuelsupport, and ground transportation to movepersonnel may require diversion. JRSOIsupport organizations must be able to locatethese units and coordinate their onwardmovement via a movement controlarchitecture. Communications is a key tomanaging this type of complex, ever-changing support environment.Operationally, JRSOI impacts on the forcesavailable to the combatant commander, rateof operational build-up (planned capabilities),rate of onward movement, and size of force.

Movement control architecture is ageographically dispersed, integrated networkof movement control units with reportingcapabilities. This architecture is an essentialfoundation that must be established ifmovement control, ITV, and force trackingare to be successful. Movements and statusesof units and forces should be reported fromall nodes where JRSOI operations areconducted. Key locations include arrival airand water terminals, marshalling areas,staging areas, TAA or OAs, in-transit supportpoints, and locations where forces andsustainment cross international borders.

2. Managing the Flow (Balance)

The functions of movement control includethe planning, apportioning, allocating,

deconflicting, validating, and coordinatingof common-user assets as well as maintainingITV to assist commanders and operationsstaff in force tracking. This requiresanalyzing movement requirements, capabilityshortfalls, alternatives, and enhancements tosatisfy the operational commander’srequirements. One of the biggest challengesof movement control is rapidly adjusting tochanges in battlefield conditions andcommander’s priorities. Efficient movementcontrol enables the commander to redirectforces and rapidly overcome disruptions inthe LOC.

JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Movement Control, states thatthe combatant commander has a wide rangeof options for performing movement control.The combatant commander may directsubordinate JFCs and Service components toperform their own movement control, or mayestablish a theater JTB, a JMC, or both. Toensure a fully integrated and responsivetransportation system, the commander mayconsider assigning responsibility forcoordinating theater transportationmovement to a single joint office.

JOINT MOVEMENT CENTER

“An effective theater movement controloption recommended to geographiccombatant commanders is theestablishment of a JMC. The JMC isresponsible for coordinating all modesof theater transportation to support thetheater concept of operations.”

JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for theDefense Transportation System

The JMC or other establishedorganizations within combatant commanderstaffs handle the development of thecombatant command’s theater movementplan (which supports priorities) and the

A-2

Appendix A

JP 4-01.8

DIRECTOR OF MOBILITY FORCES

Director of Mobility Forces participation in air mobility operations is essentialfor successful mission accomplishment. The DIRMOBFOR may act as thetheater’s contingency airflow master for inter- and intratheater air mobilityoperations. The DIRMOBFOR is normally a senior Air Force officer who isfamiliar with the area of responsibility (AOR) or joint operations area (JOA)and possesses an extensive background in air mobility operations. TheCommander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) and/or joint force air componentcommander (JFACC) should request a DIRMOBFOR to function ascoordinating authority for air mobility with all commands and agencies, bothinternal and external to the joint task force. When established, theDIRMOBFOR serves as the designated agent for all air mobility issues in theAOR or JOA, and for other duties as directed. The DIRMOBFOR exercisescoordinating authority between the air operations center (or appropriatetheater command and control node), the tanker/airlift control center, the airmobility operations control center (when established and when supportingsubordinate command objectives), and the joint movement center, in orderto expedite the resolution of air mobility issues. The DIRMOBFOR may besourced from the theater’s organizations or US Transportation Command.Additionally, the DIRMOBFOR, when designated, will ensure the effectiveintegration of inter- and intratheater air mobility operations, and facilitatethe conduct of intratheater air mobility operations. Operationally, theDIRMOBFOR normally works directly for the COMAFFOR and/or JFACC whileremaining under the administrative control of COMAFFOR or the theater AirForce component commander.

SOURCE: JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System

concept of operations. The theater movementplan is of great use in the planning process,but it must be continually updated. Primaryresponsibilities include transportationplanning, apportioning, allocating,deconflicting and validating priorities,coordinating movements, and ITV.

3. Organization for MovementControl

a. The combatant commander’s logisticstaff usually forms the nucleus of a movementcontrol organization. The JMC, augmentedby Service movement control elements,assumes directive action for theatermovements and for execution of the theatermovement plan. The JMC relays thepriorities to the Service movement controlagencies. They then execute the prioritiesusing the mode tasking authority delegatedby the combatant commander. The Services

establish a movement control architectureto:

• exercise control of the movement ofunits;

• provide ITV; and

• provide force tracking information to theJMC.

Figure A-1 depicts the joint movementdirective and coordination controlarchitecture.

b. Theater airlift forces are assigned to thecombatant commander who will normallytransfer OPCON to the theater AFCC or to asubordinate JFC. The mission of theaterairlift forces is to provide airlift support tothe entire joint force. When theater airliftforces are assigned or attached to a

A-3

Movement Control

subordinate JFC, OPCON will normally beassigned to the JFC’s COMAFFOR or jointforce air component commander (JFACC).OPCON of theater airlift forces are exercisedthrough the Air Mobility Division within theAOC or Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC)if a JFACC is established. When the JFACCis from a Service other than the Air Force,the COMAFFOR will assist the JFACC inemploying theater airlift forces. As statedabove, the COMAFFOR or JFACC shouldrequest a DIRMOBFOR to function ascoordinating authority for air mobility withall commands and agencies, both internal and

external to the JTF. Within the JAOC, theaterairlift is controlled by the air mobility division(AMD), which is a component of the AOCand responds to DIRMOBFOR direction. TheDIRMOBFOR is responsible for integratingthe total air mobility effort for theCOMAFFOR (who may also be designatedas the JFACC), and serves as the designatedcoordinating authority for air mobility withall commands and agencies both internal andexternal to the JTF. The DIRMOBFORprovides direction to the AMD, which plans,coordinates, tasks, and executes the airmobility mission. Within the JAOC, an airlift

JOINT MOVEMENT CONTROL ARCHITECTURE

COMBATANTCOMMANDERSCOMBATANTCOMMANDERS

COMPONENTSCOMPONENTS

J-3/JointMovement Center

Joint MovementControl Group

USTRANSPORTATION

COMMAND

SUPPORTINGCOMBATANTCOMMANDER

MOVEMENTCONTROL AGENCY

(ARMY FORCES)

FORCE MOVEMENTCONTROL CENTER(MARINE FORCES)

LOGISTICS READINESSCENTER/ A-4

(AIR FORCE FORCES)


(ARMY FORCES)

AIR MOBILITYCOMMAND

(US AIR FORCE)


MILITARY SEALIFTCOMMAND(US NAVY)

MILITARYTRAFFICMANAGEMENT

COMMAND(US ARMY)


(AIR FORCE FORCES)


(ARMY FORCES)


ADVANCED LOGISTICSUPPORT SITE/ N-4(NAVAL FORCES)



(AIR FORCE FORCES)


(ARMY FORCES)

AIR MOBILITYCOMMAND

(US AIR FORCE)


MILITARY SEALIFTCOMMAND(US NAVY)



MILITARYTRAFFICMANAGEMENT

COMMAND(US ARMY)


(AIR FORCE FORCES)

CoordinationDirection

SUPPORTEDCOMBATANTCOMMANDER

J-3/JointMovement Center

Figure A-1. Joint Movement Control Architecture

A-4

Appendix A

JP 4-01.8

control team (ALCT) plans, coordinates,manages, and executes theater airlift operations.

c. The ALCT coordinates with thefollowing organizations and elements toconduct theater airlift operations:

• The joint movement control group(JMCG), formed by elements ofUSTRANSCOM and its TCCs, servesas the focal point to orchestrate andoptimize Defense Transportation Systemoperations in support of combatantcommanders and other customers. TheJMCG is linked to an array of C4 systemsto manage total movement requirementsand exercise C2 of assigned forces.

• The JMC receives component theaterairlift requests and priorities.

• The air mobility element deploys to thetheater as an extension of AMC’s tanker/airlift control center (TACC). TheTACC provides the coordination andinterface between the strategic airmobility system and the theater airlogistic system.

Figure A-2 provides a sample commandrelationship for air mobility forces.

d. A TALCE or an element performingTALCE functions conducts arrival anddeparture airfield operations. TALCEs aremobile C2 units deployed to support strategicand theater air mobility operations. Theseelements are tailored to provide C2 andmanage aerial ports, weather monitoring andreporting, communications, maintenance,security, transportation, and intelligence.These teams interface with the airliftcustomer and are responsible for marshallingdeploying units and associated equipment forairlift.

e. The TALCE works with an Army orMarine Corps A/DACG and/or a NOACT

as well as deploying units to ensure that theyare ready for air movement. Typical airliftrequirements include:

• Passengers;

• Pallets;

• Rolling stock; and

• Containers

Each flow requires different transportation,MHE, and CHE. If arriving aircraft aredifferent than anticipated, delays can occur.Failure in communicating ITV data andsending closure reports hampers nodeclearance and mismanages logistic assets.

f. The integration of strategic and theatermovement control systems is the jointresponsibility of USTRANSCOM and thesupported combatant command. To controlthe tempo of the operation, the commandermust know the location of the force and itscapability. ITV is the combatantcommander’s source of information on futureforce availability, and force tracking arraysthe present force available in its preparationand onward movement. Reporting,collecting, and processing systems andprocedures must be established well beforeonward movement begins. Movementcontrol organizations provide the combatantcommander with an information networkcapable of providing early ITV informationto the operators and to assist in force tracking.

4. Theater Infrastructure forMovement Control

a. Theater LOCs are established to connectthe deploying forces with the points of entryinto the AOR. LOCs are comprised of routesegments and nodes within the theater. Thecombatant commander designates themi n coordinat ion with the HN andUSTRANSCOM to support the deployment,

A-5

Movement Control

employment, and sustainment of forces.LOCs must be evaluated in terms of length,efficiency, and security. LOC operationsdepend upon existing infrastructure andfacilities, and must be coordinated with HN,local authorities, the supporting combatantcommands, and allied or civilianorganizations that participate in thedeployment operation. Listed below are a

SAMPLE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPSFOR AIR MOBILITY FORCES

ALCTAMCAMCTAMEAMOCC

ARCTCCCINCCOCOM

COMAFFORCOORD

Airlift Control TeamAir Mobility CommandAir Mobility Control TeamAir Mobility ElementAir Mobility Operations CommandCenterAerial Refueling Control TeamCommand CenterCombatant CommanderCombatant Command(Command Authority)

Commander, Air Force ForcesCoordination

DIRMOBFORJAOCJFACCJFCJOAJTFNCAOPCONTACCTACONUSCINCTRANS

USTRANSCOM

Director of Mobility ForcesJoint Air Operations CenterJoint Force Air Component CommanderJoint Force CommanderJoint Operations AreaJoint Task ForceNational Command AuthoritiesOperational ControlTanker/Airlift Control CenterTactical ControlCommander in Chief, US TransportationCommandUS Transportation Command

NCA

AMOCC/CC

AMOCC

TACC/CC

TACC

JFC

TheaterAssigned/AttachedAir Mobility Forces

Assigned/AttachedAir Power

Forces

Assigned/Attached

Air Mobility Forces

USTRANSCOMAttached

Air Mobility ForcesDedicated to JTF

USTRANSCOMAssigned

Air Mobility Forces

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

Combat Plans DivisionCombat Operations DivisionStrategy Division

Air Mobility DivisionAMCTARCTALCT

AME

JFACC / COMAFFOR

OPCON COCOM TACON COORD

JAOC Director DIRMOBFOR

CINC

TheaterCOMAFFOR

USCINCTRANS

AMC/CC

few control considerations for onwardmovement.

• The theater LOC begins at the locationswhere personnel, equipment, andmateriel arrive in theater — thereception complexes. Operation oftheater LOCs is the responsibility of thesupported combatant command.

Figure A-2. Sample Command Relationships for Air Mobility Forces

A-6

Appendix A

JP 4-01.8

• Movement control detachments deployearly to coordinate and synchronize theonward movement of units, materiel, andsustainment.

• Regulating teams, or equivalent militarypolice teams, facilitate the onwardmovement of assets in the theater. Theycan coordinate with and are normallycollocated with HN traffic controlauthorities.

Transportation mode operating units withsufficient lift are necessary to move units,materiel, and sustainment from the SAforward to the assembly area.

b. Within the AOR, certain nodes andlinks form primary routes identified as MSR.Nodes are locations where a movementrequirement is originated, processed foronward movement, or terminated. There arethree organizational elements needed tooperate the LOC: node operators, modeoperators, and movement controllers.

c. The overall coordination of movementsbetween the nodes in the LOC using availablelift resources is normally exercised by theJMC. The JMC is established by andcoordinates movements based on prioritiesset by the supported combatant commander.The movement control system must balancethe capabilities of the nodes and modes withthe commander’s priorities. To accomplishthis, the system must exchange informationand give direction. The generic informationflow among these organizations is depictedin Figure A-3.

d. Theater LOC organizations that operatethe nodes and modes include the following.

• Assigned joint and Service componentcommand elements.

• Elements of USTRANSCOM that willoperate the joint and Service air andwater terminals in the AOR.

• HN civilian or military organizations.

• Contractors.

• Allied military or civilian organizations.

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTSOF THE LOC

Node Operators operate the nodesof LOCs, performing the tasksnecessary to facilitate the flow ofsupplies and military forces, andmay be composed of military and/or civilian personnel.

Mode Operators operate common-user lift resources (highway, rail,airlift, sealift, inland waterway, andintracoastal transportation) totransport military requirementsbetween nodes, and may becomprised of military and/or civilianpersonnel.

Movement Controllers plan, route,schedule, procure transportationservices, and control movementsthrough the LOC. Controlling theflow of supplies and military forcesbetween nodes in accordance withpriorities established by thesupported combatant commander.

A-7

Movement Control

THEATER RELATIONSHIPS FORMOVEMENT OPERATIONS

Movement Controllers

HNCINC-JMC

AFFOR-TACCARFOR-TMCAMARFOR-G4NAVFOR-N4

Other Organizations

Typical Operators

AFFOR, AMC: Aerial PortsNAVFOR, MTMC: WaterTerminalsARFOR, MARFOR: StorageSites,Tactical Areas, SupportFacilities, En Route FacilitiesHN: FacilitiesOther Organizations

Typical Operators

AMC: AirliftMSC: SealiftARFOR: Trans UnitsHN: Rail, Barges,Trucks,BusesContracted ResourcesOther Organizations

MOVEMENTCONTROL

LOCNODES

TRANSPORTMODES

Call Forward for Movement

Provide Movement Schedules

Requirements,Priorities

Report Asset Visibility,Arrivals and Departures,Movement Schedules

Report Node ActivitiesProject Future Status

Requirements,Priorities,Taskings

Movement Requirements

Report Status and Project

UNITS

AFFORARFORAMCCINCHNJMC

MARFORMSCMTMCNAVFORTACCTMCA

Marine ForcesMilitary Sealift CommandMilitary Traffic Management CommandNavy ForcesTanker and Airlift Control CenterTheater Movement Control Agency

Air Force ForcesArmy ForcesAir Mobility CommandCombatant CommanderHost NationJoint Movement Center

Figure A-3. Theater Relationships for Movement Operations

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Appendix A

JP 4-01.8

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BJRSOI SUPPORT STRUCTURE

B-1

This appendix describes select elements ofthe physical structure, facilities, and areasnecessary to support JRSOI.

1. Reception Facilities

a. APOD and/or APOE. A US or HNmilitary or civilian facility designated by acombatant command to unload or loadelements of a force and its sustainment tosupport a military operation. The complexcontains the facilities and organizationsneeded to perform the following functions asrequired:

• operate a joint air terminal;

• coordinate movement, parking,servicing, and maintaining strategicairlift;

• load and unload personnel, equipmentand materiel;

• provide life support and assistance todrivers and other personnel whileawaiting transportation, when deliveringequipment to the joint air terminal, orwhen awaiting arrival of equipment;

• provide technical assistance to aviationunits deploying through the complex;

• assist deploying units and non-unitpersonnel, equipment, and materiel withonward movement from the complex;

• provide movement control into, within,and out of the complex; and

• conduct air-to-air interface (AAI)operations. Prior coordination for useof AAI site is the responsibility of thedesignating command.

b. Air-to-Air Interface Site. The locationat an air terminal where personnel,equipment, and/or materiel arriving by eitherstrategic or theater airlift are transferred totheater or strategic airlift for onwardmovement to an intermediate or finaldestination. The combatant commander, incoordination with the HN andUSTRANSCOM, will designate the AAI site.

c. Contingency Operating Location. Anairfield or seaport, generally located withinthe OA of a contingency, used to supportoperations without establishing full supportfacilities. The combatant commanderdesignates the location in coordination withHN, Service components, or allied forcesoperating in the area. It may be used fortemporary or extended operations, but willrequire support from a main operating baseduring extended operations.

d. Main Operating Base. An airfield orseaport located within the theater that has amature support organization, stores of WRM,and is capable of receiving and operatingaugmentation equipment, supportingorganizations, and non-unit materiel duringcontingency or wartime operations. The basewill have a Service air and/or sea terminaland be designated for US use by thecombatant command in coordination with theHN, appropriate Service components, andUSTRANSCOM. The base may be requiredto provide support to designated contingencyoperating locations during militaryoperations.

e. SPOD and SPOE. A US or HNmilitary or civilian facility designated by acombatant commander to be used to unloador load elements of a force and its sustainmentto support a military organization. Thecomplex contains the facilities and

B-2

Appendix B

JP 4-01.8

organizations needed to perform thefollowing functions as required:

• operate a water terminal;

• coordinate movement, berthing,chandlering, and husbanding forstrategic sealift;

• load and unload personnel, equipment,and materiel;

• provide life support and assistance todrivers delivering equipment to the jointwater terminal or awaiting arrival ofequipment;

• provide technical assistance to aviationunits deploying through the complex;

• assist deploying units with onwardmovement from the complex;

• provide movement control into, within,and out of the complex; and

• conduct sea-to-air interface (SAI)operations. Prior coordination for useof the site is the responsibility of thedesignating command.

f. Sea-to-Air Interface Site. The locationof an air terminal, in close proximity to anSPOD, where unit personnel, equipment, andequipment and/or non-unit related cargo istransferred from strategic sealift to theaterairlift for onward movement to destinationsalong theater LOCs. The supportedcombatant command designates the SAI sitein coordination with the HN andUSTRANSCOM.

g. Inland Waterway Port. Anestablished or existing location with facilitiesfor mooring, cargo loading and unloading,dispatch and control, and repair and service ofall craft capable of navigating the waterway.

2. Holding and Assembly Areas

a. APOD Holding Area. A site in thevicinity of the APOD, designated by theaerial port commander in conjunction withthe HN, where life support is provided toarriving military personnel of deployingunits or non-unit related personnel andcivilian personnel while awaiting onwardmovement to final destination.

b. POD Marshalling Area. A locationin the vicinity of a reception terminal whereunit personnel, equipment, materiel, andaccompanying supplies are reassembled,returned to the control of the unitcommander, and prepared for onwardmovement. The joint complex commanderdesignating the location will coordinate theuse of the facilities with other alliedcommands and the HN, and will providelife support to the units while in themarshalling area.

c. Cargo Holding and Handling Area.A designated location for temporarilyholding:

• arriving cargo until movement to theconsignee can be arranged;

• departing cargo until strategictransportation can be arranged; or

• cargo pallets to be built or brokendown.

d. Vehicle Assembly Area. An area inthe vicinity of a reception facility whereunit drivers and vehicles are assembled formovement by convoy, rail, or theater airlift.

e. Convoy Assembly Area. An area inthe vicinity of a reception terminal wherearriving unit equipment and personnel areassembled in convoys for movement tointermediate or final destinations.

B-3

JRSOI Support Structure

f. Container Holding and HandlingArea. A designated location, normallylocated near a seaport, for holding:

• arriving containers until onwardmovement to consignees can bearranged;

• departing containers until strategictransportation can be arranged; or

• container transshipment or intermodaloperations.

g. Frustrated Cargo Holding Area. Adesignated location for temporarily holdingfrustrated cargo until onward movementinstructions can be clarified. Frustrated cargoconsists of any shipment of supplies and/orequipment that, while en route to destination,is stopped prior to receipt and for whichfurther disposition instructions must beobtained. Frustrated cargo areas are normallylocated at each LOC node.

h. Helicopter Assembly Area. An areain the vicinity of a reception facility wherehelicopters are assembled and prepared forflight, test flown, and flown with crews tothe helicopter marshalling area.

i. Staging Area. A location designatedby the geographic combatant command, incoordination with the HN and Servicecomponent, where units are staged. The SAwill provide necessary facilities and supportto enable the major combat formation toachieve readiness for combat operations.

j. Tactical Assembly Area. An areagenerally out of the reach of light artillery,where units make final preparations (pre-combat checks and inspections) and rest priorto moving to the line of departure to engagethe enemy or enter into operations other thanwar. This is the last phase of intratheaterdeployment.

3. En Route Facilities

a. Aircraft En Route Support Sites. Sitesthat provide security, life support to transientair crews, services for aircraft and helicopters,and limited specialized maintenance foraircraft or helicopters.

b. Convoy Support Sites. Sites along themain supply routes that provide security, lifesupport for drivers, fuel, limited maintenancesupport, and vehicle recovery.

c. Trailer Transfer Points. Locationsestablished along the LOCs by the joint (orcombined) movement center to support line-haul operations. Loaded or unloaded trailersare received, segregated, assembled, anddispatched at the point in accordance withpriorities established by the JMC. The siteusually provides emergency refueling andmaintenance support.

d. POL Transfer Point. A location wherePOL can be transferred between two modes.

e. Pre-positioned Equipment Sites.Sites where WRM is stored and maintainedfor use during a contingency or exercise.This materiel may be maintained by USmilitary, US civilian, contractors, or HNpersonnel.

f. Pre-stock Supply Points. Sitesdesignated by a combatant command wherestocks of essential materiel needed toreplenish accompanying supplies or tosustain units during deployment and militaryoperations are stored.

g. Railheads. Points on a railway whereloads are transferred between trains and othermeans of transport, and the point wheretactical control of the personnel, equipment,and materiel or units passes to or from thenode commander to the movement controlsystem.

B-4

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JP 4-01.8

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX CDEPLOYMENT PLANNING TOOLS

C-1

1. High-Level Planning Tools

The NCA, the Joint Staff, and the Servicesmust have the ability to monitor, plan, andexecute the mobilization, deployment,redeployment, and demobilization of USmilitary forces. These organizationsaccomplish these missions through the useof the JOPES and other applications residenton GCCS. These tools are the keystonesystems by which the NCA retains controlover US military operations. The JOPES isthe primary US system for deploymentplanning and execution. It is acomprehensive, integrated system of people,policies, procedures, and reporting systemssupported by automated systems andapplications. The JOPES (see Figure C-1)provides the capability to develop a TPFDDand to monitor its execution. The JOPESwas specifically designed to provide strategicdeployment information useful to the NCA,the Joint Staff, and the Service headquarters.

The GCCS is an integrated architecture oftelecommunications, software, and computer

equipment designed to support informationsharing among various echelons ofcommand, including the NCA, the CINCs,the Services and DOD agencies, the Serviceelements, and JTFs. GCCS will provideworldwide user-to-user information exchangefor command and control, communications,intelligence, functional, and administrativemanagement including logistics,transportation, personnel, and medicalsupport. Figure C-2 depicts GCCSapplications.

2. Theater TPFDDDevelopment

Once the high-level planning tools are usedto select the major forces that will participatein contingency operations, other tools areused both to help plan which specific unitswill deploy and to help schedule how theseforces are going to be moved to the theater.These tools are part of analysis of mobilityplatform (AMP) that is an end-to-endtransportation modeling planning system.The Joint Flow and Analysis System for

Figure C-1. Current High-Level Automated Information Systems Applications

CURRENT HIGH-LEVEL AUTOMATED INFORMATIONSYSTEMS APPLICATIONS

Acronym Name Proponent Users Use RemarksJOPES Joint

OperationPlanningandExecutionSystem

Joint Staff Service HQs,combatantcommanders,combatantcommandcomponents,and sub-components

Provides guidance forplanning, monitoring, andexecuting mobilization,deployment, employment,and sustainment activitiesin peacetime, crisis, andwar. Permits schedulingof transportation andmonitoring of strategicdeployments. Databasecontains reference filesand time-phased forceand deployment data ofapproved plans.

JOPEScurrentlyruns on theGlobalCommandand ControlSystem.

C-2

Appendix C

JP 4-01.8

Figure C-2. Global Command and Control System Applications

GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROLSYSTEM APPLICATIONS

Application Function Application Suite

Operation Plans(OPLANs) and

Operation Orders(OPORDs)

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System(JOPES) automated data processing applications facilitaterapid building and updating of OPLANs and conceptsummaries in deliberate planning, and rapid developmentof effective options and OPORDs in crisis action planning.In Global Command and Control System (GCCS) Version3.0, the JOPES requirements are developed using therequirements development and analysis, rapid query Tool,JOPES Editing Tool (JET), Force Validation Tool, andscheduling and movement applications.

JOPES

RequirementsDevelopment and

Analysis

Allows planners and operators to develop, edit, andmanipulate the time-phased force and deployment data(TPFDD). JET is a prototype that provides a rapid, userfriendly approach to develop and maintain the JOPESTPFDD. JET will provide a faster, easier approach toTPFDD detail maintenance than is currently provided inRequirements Development and Analysis (RDA). Note:JET is being fielding and will replace RDA. Force ModuleEdit provides the user with the ability to manipulateTPFDD force modules and generates force capabilitysets for initial deployment analysis and forcemanagement capability. Joint Force RequirementsGenerator II provides a Windows PC based remoteTPFDD editing tool that will support all services ingenerating Type Unit Character data and allow transactionto update OPLANs.

JOPES

Rapid Query Tool Allows planners and operators to define, design, and printreports for information and analysis.

JOPES

Scheduling &Movement

Global Transportation Network is the application interfacewith US Transportation Command that provides in-transitmovement information through planning allocations, manifestedpassenger and cargo information, and carrier schedules.

JOPES

Transportation Planning The Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportationapplication provides quick response capability todetermine the transportation feasibility of an OPLAN orcourse of action (COA). Force Validation Tool is a JOPESapplication that identifies source requirements forvalidatiion and scheduling of movement assets. EnhancedTheater Analysis and Re-planning Graphical ExecutionToolkit provides collaborative planning tools to aid theplanner in all phases of crisis action planning. It facilitatessimultaneous access to a distributed network of graphicplanning cells sharing a common reasoning infrastructure.This enables current assessment of plan generation,scheduling, and analysis process. Common OperationalModeling, Planning, and Simulation System enablesinteroperability and connectivity between disparate andService-unique mission planning systems. It willsignificantly enhance Distributive Collaborative Planningbetween ground, sea, and air forces. In addition, it willprovide a means for exploiting modeling and simulationservices for the warfighter during the planning andexecution of operational missions.

JOPES

C-3

Deployment Planning Tools

Transportation (JFAST) is a tool that assistsplanners in estimating force closure dates inthe theater of operations, provides the theaterTPFDD developer with the capability to

rapidly create a TPFDD, and estimates whenstrategic transportation will deliver TPFDDelements into the theater port complexes.Figures C-3 and C-4 summarize these tools.

Figure C-2. Global Command and Control System Applications (cont’d)

GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROLSYSTEM APPLICATIONS (cont d)


Logistic Planning The Logistics Sustainment Analysis and FeasibilityEstimator application provides the capability to bothestimate logistic sustainment requirements and evaluatematerial supportability.

JOPES

Medical Planning The medical analysis tool provides combatant commandmedical planners with the capability to perform grossmedical feasibility and supportability assessments ofoperation plans.

JOPES

Civil EngineeringSupport Planning

The Joint Engineering Planning and Execution Systemapplication is a tool used to support the combatantcommand engineer and staff in development of thequantitative aspects of civil engineering support planningand provides the general requirements for the civilengineer support plan appendix to an OPLAN.

JOPES

Unit Status The Global Status of Resources and Training Systems(GSORTS) application provides both map-based queryand display of joint information on the status of units withrespect to personnel, equipment, materiel, and training.

GSORTS

NationalReconnaissance

The Global Reconnaissance Information Systemapplication provides automated support for the Joint Staff,unified commands, National Security Agency, and DefenseIntelligence Agency. This system provides near real timemission status to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; generatesworldwide airborne sensitive reconnaissance operations(SRO) schedule requests; maintains the historical library ofall SRO tracks and operations conducted; and providesdaily schedules of all intended airborne SRO.

JMASS

NoncombatantEvacuation

The Evacuation File Maintenance and Retrieval Systemapplication supports noncombatant evacuation planningand operations. It responds to queries concerning thenumber of noncombatant personnel to be evacuated in acountry or area.

JMASS

Fuel Planning The Fuel Resources Analysis System application providesan automated capability for determining the fuel supportabilityof an OPLAN or COA.

JOPES

Utility Software Utility services are provided as part of GCCS throughintegration of existing government-off-the-shelf orcommercial-off-the-shelf applications, including messagehandling software, E-mail, office automation,teleconferencing, Telnet, and file transfer.

Common OperatingEnvironment (COE)

Fused OperationalBattlespace Picture

The Joint Maritime Command Information Systemapplication is the foundation for the GCCS-fusedoperational battlespace picture. Incorporated as part ofthe COE, it provides near real time sea and air tracks,geographic display, contact correlation, and track database management.

COE

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Appendix C

JP 4-01.8

Figure C-2. Global Command and Control System Applications (cont’d)

Figure C-3. Analysis of Mobility Platform

GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROLSYSTEM APPLICATIONS (cont d)


Intelligence The Integrated Imagery and Intelligence segment of GCCSwill include the Modern Intelligence Database, ImageryProduction Library, Integrated Broadcast System andColiseum. These applications within GCCS provideintelligence capabilities that include an authoritative andfused common tactical picture with integrated intelligenceservices and databases; access to theater, service, andnational intelligence databases; transmittal and receipt ofspecific intelligence requests; and the fusion of intelligencewith operations data for a common operating picture of thebattlespace.

JMASS

Collaborative Planning Theater Analysis and Replanning Graphical ExecutionToolkit is a suite of distributed collaborative planning tools.

JOPESCOE

ANALYSIS OF MOBILITY PLATFORMAcronym Name Proponent Users Use Remarks

AMP Analysisof MobilityPlatform

USTRANSCOM USTRANSCOMHQ,USTRANSCOMTCCs, CINCs,CINCcomponentsand sub-components

Set of transportationanalysis tools aimed atimproving jointtransportation planningand execution. Providesplanners with a rapidanalysis of thetransportation feasibility ofa specific deploymentplan against a plannerdefined transportationenvironment. AMPenables USTRANSCOMto determine, within hours,whether a deliberate orcrisis deployment plan issupportable by theDefense TransportationSystem.

AMPcurrentlyincludes themodel forintertheaterdeploymentby air andsea andELISTtransportationmodels anddirectlyinterfaceswith theJFASTtransportationmodel; aswell as thelogisticsgeneratorsustainmentestimatingtools. Othertransportationandschedulingtools will beadded to theAMP suite asthey aredeveloped.Classified.

C-5


3. Analysis of Mobility Platform

AMP integrates such systems as the Modelfor Intertheater Deployment by Air and Seaand the ELIST while directly interfacing withJFAST.

4. Joint Flow and AnalysisSystem for Transportation

JFAST provides transportation feasibilityestimates on the requirements to transportmilitary forces, including cargo, personnel,and their sustainment, during variousscenarios. The primary output of JFAST isan estimation of when forces will arrive atthe theater port complexes. In addition,JFAST presents a wealth of graphic andtabular output showing the impact of thetheater deployment upon the strategictransportation resources, vehicles, and portsused during the simulation. JFAST inputprimarily comes from JOPES in the form ofOPLAN TPFDDs and reference files. JFASTcan also export plans to other transportationmodels such as ELIST.

A useful feature of JFAST is its capabilityfor creating notional movement requirementsfor instances in which no plan exists. In this

situation, an OPLAN or exercise TPFDDmay identify where and when the militaryforces are to be deployed. The JFASTNotional Requirements Generator takesdivision or brigade echelon ground units andsquadron echelon air units, as well asexpected levels of activity, climate, anddesired days of supply, and generates detailedcompany and detachment level TPFDDdeployments. This information can then beused by the JFAST model to estimate closuredates of the generated forces, as well as bythe planner for further analysis.

5. Theater Lines ofCommunicationsDevelopment

Two tools that help plan the overall theaterLOCs are ELIST and scenario unrestrictedmobility model of intratheater simulation(SUMMITS) as described in Figure C-5.

6. Enhanced LogisticsIntratheater Support Tool

ELIST is an analytical tool that simulates,from a transportation perspective, thedeployment of forces within CONUS (origin-to-port) or theater (POD-to-destination). It

Figure C-4. Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation Model

JOINT FLOW AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM FORTRANSPORTATION MODEL

Acronym Name Proponent Users Use RemarksJFAST Joint Flow

and AnalysisSystem forTransportation

USTRANSCOM CINCs andsubordinatecommands,JCS,USTRANSCOM,Services,analyticalagencies, andService schools

High-speed analyticaltool used to performtransportationfeasibility estimateson requirements totransport militaryforces (includingcargo, personnel, andtheir sustainment)during variousscenarios. Estimateswhen forces will arrivein theater.

Interfaceswith the AMPsuite oftransportationmodels.Classified.

C-6

Appendix C

JP 4-01.8

helps planners analyze and develop COAsthat ensure forces arrive at particular in-theater destinations on specific dates.

ELIST uses an object-oriented database tomodel unit and HN transportation assets andtheater infrastructure. The theatertransportation network moves personnel andcargo from a mobilization installation to aPOE or from the theater entry points such asair- and seaports of debarkation to finaltheater destinations.

Planners can generate movement scenariosfor ELIST from TPFDD data, as well as frommodels such as JFAST, TPFDD Editor, andmodel for intertheater deployment by air andsea. Movements are constrained by available

theater transportation assets and thecapacities of the theater infrastructure.

ELIST can be used to play out a masterscenario events list. The user can add orsubtract transportation resources, furtherconstrain link capacities to simulate enemyaction, or close down specific ports todetermine the effects of these actions on theoverall simulated movement of forces andcargo within the theater transportationnetwork. The user interface is a graphicwindowing system that integrates maps, data,and a variety of charts, reports, and graphsto show the results of the simulation. ELISTdoes not plan a CONUS or theater LOC;rather, it assesses the LOC’s ability to handlethe flow of forces and equipment as

Figure C-5. Current Theater Lines of Communications Development Applications

CURRENT THEATER LINES OF COMMUNICATIONSDEVELOPMENT APPLICATIONS

Acronym Name Proponent Users Use RemarksELIST Enhanced

LogisticsIntratheaterSupportTool

Army MilitaryTraffic

ManagementCommandTransporta-

tionEngineering

Agency(MTMCTEA)

Office of theSecretary ofDefense (OSD),Joint Chiefs ofStaff, USTransportationCommand HQ,MTMCcombatantcommanders,combatantcommandcomponentsand sub-components

Discrete event, simulation-based system that evaluatesthe logistic feasibility of thecontinental US and theatertransportation portion of acourse of action (COA).Models theater air, ground,and rail transport assets andtransportation infrastructurewith object-oriented database. Compares theplanned theater arrivalschedule against a theater stransportation assets, cargohandling equipment,facilities, and routes.

Part of thecurrentanalysis ofmobilityplatformsuite. Army iscurrentlyfundingimprovementsto the model.Classified.ELISTnetworksneeded toconductanalysis areavailable viatheMTMCTEAclassifiedwebsite.

SUMMITS ScenarioUnrestrictedMobilityModel forIntratheaterSimulation

OSD (ProgramAnalysis andEvaluation)

(PA&E)

OSD (PA&E)and JSLogisticsDirectorate

Evaluates the logisticfeasibility of a proposedtheater transportation COA.Quantifies the totalrequirement for common-user theater transportationto deliver the specified forceto its destination.

Very detailedmodel thatrequiresconsiderableprogrammingsupport touseeffectively.Secret.

C-7


determined by deliberate or crises actionplanners.

7. Scenario UnrestrictedMobility Model forIntratheater Simulation

SUMMITS executes an intratheaterdeployment simulation based on inputsprovided by the user. The simulation movespersonnel, unit equipment, materiel, andsupplies in accordance with definedrequirements . Requirements fortransportation are processed in priority order,with each requirement being provided anassigned delivery path through establishedair, road, rail, water, and pipeline networks.Available transport resources are diminishedas each requirement is applied to its assigneddelivery path.

SUMMITS measures the total requirementfor common-user transportation to deliver thespecified force and the required logisticsupport using the established transportationresource assets. The SUMMITS modelvalidates the performance of the establishedtransportation network and the resource mixby modeling the delivery of the force to itsfinal destination.

The model produces reports that detail thetransportation requirement for eachtransportable commodity represented, whichusually includes personnel, unit equipment,sustainment cargo, ammunition, bulk fuel,and water. For example, the trips requiredper day for a particular vehicle type can beexamined as a day-by-day requirement, astatic average daily requirement over a fixednumber of days per 5 day period, or a rollingaverage daily requirement over a fixed rollingaverage period. As with ELIST, SUMMITScannot plan a theater LOC; rather it assessesthe feasibility of a proposed LOC concept.

8. Using ELIST and SUMMITSto Plan the Theater LOC

Neither ELIST nor SUMMITS canindependently develop a proposed theaterLOC concept. Detailed inputs are required:

• A completely planned theater LOC;

• Lift resources available;

• Storage and throughput capacities foreach mode and node in the theater;

• Node and link capacities;

• Other theater LOC constraints; and

• A planned, detailed TPFDD flow intoand within the theater.

SUMMITS also require the theatercampaign results entered to determine thelocations where the unit personnel,equipment, and materiel must be deliveredas a function of time, intensity of combat,and friendly combat success. The combatconsumption of all classes of supplies and adetailed theater logistic support plan play inthe model.

9. Node Planning Tools

There are also tools available to assist inthe planning of specific nodes in the theaterLOC. The base resource and capabilityestimator (BRACE) can model military aerialport operations to estimate airfield throughputcapability. The integrated computerizeddeployment system (ICODES) can helpdevelop ship stow plans, while the portsimulation (PORTSIM) model simulatesseaport operations during a forcedeployment.

C-8

Appendix C

JP 4-01.8

10. Aerial Port Planning Tools

The planning tool to model military airterminal operations is BRACE. BRACEsimulates airfield onloading, offloading, enroute, and recovery base operations, includingground activities such as cargo handling,refueling, maintenance, and aircraft parking.The model can be used to:

• Estimate airfield throughput capability;

• Estimate air, ground, and other resourcesrequired to support a given level ofthroughput at an airfield; and

• Validate MOG values used in existingair transportation models such as jointmodeling and simulation systems andJFAST.

11. Seaport Planning Tools

Joint water ports in the theater of operationare critical to the success of the operationbecause most of the Army and Marine Corpsunit equipment and sustainment cargo willbe received through them. Two of the mostuseful tools for assisting in planning SPOEand SPOD operations are ICODES andPORTSIM.

a. Integrated Computerized DeploymentSystem. ICODES is a decision supportsystem for developing stow plans for ships.It assists the user in developing stow plansby matching vessel characteristics against thecargo being offered for shipment. ICODESdevelops the stow plans for up to four specificships concurrently while continuouslychecking for access and hazard violations.

At the user’s request, ICODES canautomatically attempt to maintain unitintegrity in the stow plans it develops.

Once the stow plans are completed,ICODES automatically generates shipmanifests and templates cargo items onto shipdrawings in a matter of minutes. ICODESincludes video clips of ship decks and cargoitems and a wealth of customized reports.These reports detail both the process ofconstructing the stow plans and results of theprocess, and builds a database that providesdetails on the availability of external shipramps and the facilities for many ports aroundthe world.

b. Port Simulation Model. PORTSIM isa time-stepped, discrete event simulation ofSPOE and SPOD during a force deployment.PORTSIM provides scenario-specific, forceclearance profiles and reports on theutilization of port assets. The model has aport reference capability via a geographicinformation system database.

• PORTSIM determines a port’s reception,staging, clearance, and throughputcapabilities. The model identifiessystems or infrastructure constraints andprovides port-specific, time-phased forceclearance profiles. The cargo (unitequipment) is flowed at the line itemlevel of detail.

• PORTSIM will interface with ICODESvia a load sequencing agent, calculatethe impact of JLOTS, incorporate 2- and3-dimensional visualization for training,and interface with ELIST to betterfacilitate theater analysis.

APPENDIX DREFERENCES

D-1

The development of JP 4-01.8 is based upon the following primary references.

1. US Government Publications

Title 10, United States Code, and as specifically amended by: Department of DefenseReorganization Act of 1986 and the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Department of DefenseReorganization Act of 1986, as attached to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1986.

2. DOD Publications

a. DOD Directive 4500.9-R, Defense Transportation Regulation Part III, Mobility.

b. DOD Regulation 4140.1-R, DoD Materiel Management Regulation.

3. Joint Publications

a. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

b. JP 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

c. JP 1-01, Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures Development Program.

d. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

e. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

f. JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.

g. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

h. JP 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations.

i. JP 3-17, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations.

j. JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.

k. JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

l. JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

m. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

n. JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.

D-2

Appendix D

JP 4-01.8

o. JP 4-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to JointOperations.

p. JP 4-01.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to JointOperations.

q. JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.

r. JP 4-01.4, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution.

s. JP 4-01.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Water Terminal Operations.

t. JP 4-01.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).

u. JP 4-01.7, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Use of Intermodal Containersin Joint Operations.

v. JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

w. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

x. JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) SystemsSupport to Joint Operations.

y. JP 6-02, Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control,Communications, and Computer Systems.

z. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (PlanningPolicies and Procedures).

aa. CJCSM 3122.02, Manual for Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD)Development and Deployment Execution.

bb. CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formatsand Guidance).

4. Air Force Publications

a. AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power.

b. AFDD 2-4, Combat Support.

c. AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations.

d. AFDD 2-6.1, Airlift Operations.

D-3

References

5. Army Publications

a. FM 55-1, Army Transportation Services in a Theater of Operations.

b. FM 55-10, Movement Control in a Theater of Operations.

c. FM 55-60, Army Terminal Operations.

d. FM 55-65, Strategic Deployment.

e. FM 63-4, CSS Operations, Theater Army Area Command.

f. FM 63-11, TTP for Logistics Support Elements.

g. FM 100-5, Operations.

h. FM 100-10, CSS Operations.

i. FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.

j. FM 100-17-1, Army Prepositioned Afloat Operations.

k. FM 100-17-2, Army Prepositioned Land.

l. FM 100-17-3, Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration. (Draft)

m. FM 100-17-4, Deployment: Fort to Port.

6. Marine Corps Publications

a. MCDP 1-2, Campaigning.

b. MCDP 4, Logistics.

c. MCRP 5-12D, Organization of Marine Corps Forces.

d. MCWP 0-1.1, Componency.

e. MCWP 3-32, Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations.

f. MCWP 4-1, Logistics Operations.

g. MCWP 4-11, Tactical Level Logistics.

h. MCWP 4-11.3, Transportation Operations.

D-4

Appendix D

JP 4-01.8

7. Navy Publications

a. NWP 3-2.3, Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations.

b. NDP 4, Naval Logistics.

c. NWP 4-01, Logistics Task Force.

d. NWP 4-01.1, Naval Expeditionary Shore-based Logistics Support and RSOI Operation.

e. NWP 4-08, Naval Supply Operations.

8. Other

a. Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), US Army Transportation School ForceDeployment Rock Drill - Read Ahead, Nov 1996.

b. Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for PeaceOperations, 28 Feb 95.

c. Lidy, A. Martin, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), Recommendations for ImprovingJoint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI).

d. Powell, General Colin L., A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint OperationalConcepts, 10 November 1992.

e. 3d TMCA RSO&I Briefing, Sept 1996.

APPENDIX EADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

E-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center CodeJW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments shouldaddress content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, andappearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the Department of Army (DAMO-FDQ). TheJoint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-SSP//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

E-2

Appendix E

JP 4-01.8

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy(Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD), US Coast Guard2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

CommanderUSJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

A/DACG arrival/departure airfield control groupAAI air-to-air interfaceABFC advanced base functional componentACSA acquisition cross-Service agreementAFCC Air Force Component CommanderAIS automated information systemsAIT automatic identification technologyALCT airlift control teamALSS naval advanced logistic support siteAMC Air Mobility CommandAMD air mobility divisionAMP analysis of mobility platformAOC air operations center (USAF)AOR area of responsibilityAPOD aerial port of debarkationAPOE aerial port of embarkationASB naval advanced support base

BRACE base resource and capability estimator

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCCA central contracting authorityCESP civil engineering support planCHE container handling equipmentCINC commander in chiefCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ManualCJTF commander, joint task forceCOA course of actionCOCOM combatant command (command authority)COMAFFOR Commander, Air Forces forcesCOMMARFOR Commander, Marine ForcesCONPLAN operation plan in concept formatCONUS continental United StatesCOSCOM corps support commandCP command postCS combat supportCSS combat service supportCSSE combat service support elementCTC cargo transfer company (USA)

GL-2

Glossary

JP 4-01.8

DIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility ForcesDOD Department of Defense

EAC echelon above corpsELIST enhanced logistics intratheater support tool

FLS naval forward logistic siteFM field manualFSSG force service support groupFTX field training exercise

GCCS Global Command and Control SystemGCSS global combat support systemGDSS Global Decision Support SystemGTN Global Transportation Network

HN host nationHNS host-nation supportHQ headquarters

IC3 integrated command, control, and communicationsICODES integrated computerized deployment systemICP inventory control pointISB intermediate staging baseITV in-transit visibility

J-4 Logistics Directorate of a joint staffJAOC joint air operations centerJFACC joint force air component commanderJFAST Joint Flow and Analysis System for TransportationJFC joint force commanderJIPB joint intelligence preparation of the battlespaceJLOTS joint logistics over-the-shoreJMC joint movement centerJMCG joint movement control groupJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJP joint publicationJPAV joint personnel asset visibilityJRAC joint rear area coordinatorJRC joint reception centerJRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integrationJSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities PlanJTAV joint total asset visibilityJTAV-IT joint total asset visibility - in theaterJTB Joint Transportation BoardJTF joint task forceJTLM joint theater logistics management

GL-3

Glossary

LNO liaison officerLOC line of communicationsLOTS logistics over-the-shoreLRC logistics readiness center

MAGTF Marine air-ground task forceMARFOR Marine Corps forcesMCC movement control centerMCDP Marine Corps Doctrinal PublicationMCWP Marine Corps Warfare PublicationMEF Marine expeditionary forceMETT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support

available, time availableMEU Marine expeditionary unitMHE materials handling equipmentMLC Marine Corps Logistics CommandMMC materiel management centerMOG maximum (aircraft) on the groundMSC Military Sealift CommandMSR main supply routeMTMC Military Traffic Management CommandMTMCTEA Military Traffic Management Command Transportation

Engineering Agency

NCA National Command AuthoritiesNEO noncombatant evacuation operationNOACT Navy overseas air cargo terminal

OA operational areaOPCON operational controlOPLAN operation plan

POD port of debarkationPOE port of embarkationPOG port operations groupPOL petroleum, oils, and lubricantsPORTSIM port simulationPSA port support activity

RC Reserve ComponentsRSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

SA staging areaSAI sea-to-air interfaceSOP standing operating procedureSPOD seaport of debarkationSPOE seaport of embarkation

SRC service reception centerSUMMITS scenario unrestricted mobility model

of intratheater simulation

TAA tactical assembly areaTACC tanker/airlift control center (USAF)TACON tactical controlTALCE tanker airlift control elementTAV total asset visibilityTC-AIMS II Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for

Movement System IITCC transportation component commandTD theater distributionT-JMC theater-joint movement centerT-JTB theater-joint transportation boardTPFDD time-phased force and deployment dataTSC Theater Support Command

USC United States CodeUSCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, United States Transportation

CommandUSSPACECOM United States Space CommandUSTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WRM war reserve materiel

GL-4

Glossary

JP 4-01.8

administrative control. Direction orexercise of authority over subordinate orother organizations in respect toadministration and support, includingorganization of Service forces, control ofresources and equipment, personnelmanagement, unit logistics, individual andunit training, readiness, mobilization,demobilization, discipline, and othermatters not included in the operationalmissions of the subordinate or otherorganizations. Also called ADCON. (JP1-02)

Air Mobility Command. The Air ForceComponent Command of the USTransportation Command. Also calledAMC. (JP 1-02)

air mobility division. The division withinthe air operations center responsible forplanning, coordinating, tasking, andmanagement of air mobility missions. Alsocalled AMD. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

air operations center. The principal airoperations installation from which aircraftand air warning functions of combat airoperations are directed, controlled, andexecuted. It is the senior agency of the AirForce Component Commander from whichcommand and control of air operations arecoordinated with other components andServices. Also called AOC. (JP 1-02)

air support operations center. An agencyof a tactical air control system collocatedwith a corps headquarters or an appropriateland force headquarters, which coordinatesand directs close air support and othertactical air support. Also called ASOC.(JP 1-02)

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-5

air terminal. A facility on an airfield thatfunctions as an air transportation hub andaccommodates the loading and unloadingof airlift aircraft and the intransitprocessing of traffic. The airfield may ormay not be designated an aerial port. (JP1-02)

arrival/departure airfield control group. Auser provided group to perform aerial portfunctions during unit deployment,employment, and/or redeployment. Thearrival/departure airfield control group isa provisional organization. A l socalled A/DACG. (This term and itsdefinition are applicable only in the contextof this publication and cannot be referencedoutside this publication.)

assembly area. 1. An area in which acommand is assembled preparatory tofurther action. 2. In a supply installation,the gross area used for collecting andcombining components into completeunits, kits, or assemblies. (JP 1-02)

automated identification technology. Asuite of tools for facilitating total assetvisibility (TAV) source data capture andtransfer. Automated identificationtechnology (AIT) includes a variety ofdevices, such as bar codes, magnetic strips,optical memory cards, and radio frequencytags for marking or “tagging” individualitems, multi-packs, equipment, air pallets,or containers, along with the hardware andsoftware required to create the devices, readthe information on them, and integratethat information with other logisticinformation. AIT integration with logisticinformation systems is key to theDepartment of Defense’s TAV efforts. Alsocalled AIT. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

GL-6

Glossary

JP 4-01.8

automation network. The automationnetwork combines all of the informationcollection devices, automatic identificationtechnologies, and the automatedinformation systems that either support orfacilitate the joint reception, staging,onward movement, and integrationprocess. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

bare base. A base having minimum essentialfacilities to house, sustain, and supportoperations to include, if required, astabilized runway, taxiways, and aircraftparking areas. A bare base must have asource of water that can be made potable.Other requirements to operate under barebase conditions form a necessary part ofthe force package deployed to the bare base.(JP 1-02)

closure. In transportation, the process of aunit arriving at a specified location. Itbegins when the first element arrives at adesignated location, e.g., port of entry/portof departure, intermediate stops, or finaldestination, and ends when the last elementdoes likewise. For the purposes of studiesand command post exercises, a unit isconsidered essentially closed after 95percent of its movement requirements forpersonnel and equipment are completed.(JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specifiedcommand with a broad continuing missionunder a single commander established andso designated by the President, through theSecretary of Defense and with the adviceand assistance of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. Combatant commandstypically have geographic or functionalresponsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander inchief of one of the unified or specified

combatant commands established by thePresident. (JP 1-02)

common-user transportation. Transportationand transportation services provided on acommon basis for two or more Departmentof Defense agencies and, as authorized,non-DOD agencies. Common-user assetsare under the combatant command(command authority) of USCINCTRANS,excluding Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets. (JP 1-02)

component. 1. One of the subordinateorganizations that constitute a joint force.Normally a joint force is organized with acombination of Service and functionalcomponents. 2. In logistics, a part orcombination of parts having a specificfunction, which can be installed or replacedonly as an entity. (JP 1-02)

Defense Transportation System. Thatportion of the Nation’s transportationinfrastructure which supports Departmentof Defense common-user transportationneeds across the range of militaryoperations. It consists of those common-user military and commercial assets,services and systems organic to, contractedfor, or controlled by the Department ofDefense. Also called DTS. (JP 1-02)

deployment. 1. In naval usage, the changefrom a cruising approach or contactdisposition to a disposition for battle. 2.The movement of forces within operationalareas. 3. The positioning of forces into aformation for battle. 4. The relocation offorces and materiel to desired operationalareas. Deployment encompasses allactivities from origin or home stationthrough destination, specifically includingintra-continental United States,intertheater, and intratheater movementlegs, staging, and holding areas. (JP 1-02)

GL-7

Glossary

director of mobility forces. Normally asenior officer who is familiar with the areaof responsibility or joint operations areaand possesses an extensive background inairlift operations. When established, thedirector of mobility forces serves as thedesignated agent for all airlift issues in thearea of responsibility or joint operationsarea, and for other duties as directed. Thedirector of mobility forces exercisescoordinating authority between the airliftcoordination cell, the air mobility element,the Tanker Airlift Control Center, the jointmovement center, and the air operationscenter in order to expedite the resolutionof airlift problems. The director of mobilityforces may be sourced from the theater’sorganizations, United StatesTransportation Command, or United StatesAtlantic Command. Also calledDIRMOBFOR. (JP 1-02)

fixed port. Water terminals with animproved network of cargo-handlingfacilities designed for the transfer ofoceangoing freight. (JP 1-02)

force closure. The point in time when asupported joint force commanderdetermines that sufficient personnel andequipment resources are in the assignedoperational area to carry out assigned tasks.(JP 1-02)

force movement control center. Atemporary organization activated by theMarine air-ground task force to control andcoordinate all deployment supportactivities. Also called FMCC. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

force planning. Planning associated withthe creation and maintenance of militarycapabilities. It is primarily theresponsibility of the Military Departmentsand Services and is conducted under the

administrative control that runs from theSecretary of Defense to the MilitaryDepartments and Services. (JP 1-02)

force projection. The ability to project themilitary element of national power fromthe continental United States (CONUS) oranother theater, in response torequirements for military operations. Forceprojection operations extend frommobilization and deployment of forces toredeployment to CONUS or home theater.(JP 1-02)

force protection. Security program designedto protect Service members, civilianemployees, family members, facilities, andequipment, in all locations and situations,accomplished through planned andintegrated application of combatingterrorism, physical security, operationssecurity, personal protective services, andsupported by intelligence, counterintelligence,and other security programs. (JP 1-02)

force tracking. The identification of unitsand their specific modes of transport duringmovement to an objective area. (JP 1-02)

frustrated cargo. Any shipment of suppliesand/or equipment which, while en routeto destination, is stopped prior to receiptand for which further dispositioninstructions must be obtained. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives theforces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on,to operate in, or to transit through itsterritory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or militaryassistance rendered by a nation to foreignforces within its territory during peacetime,crisis or emergencies, or war based uponagreements mutually concluded betweennations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

GL-8

Glossary

JP 4-01.8

host-nation support agreement. Basicagreement normally concluded atgovernment-to-government orgovernment-to-combatant commanderlevel. These agreements may includegeneral agreements, umbrella agreements,and memoranda of understanding. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

information resources. Information and relatedresources, such as personnel, equipment, andinformation technology. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

infrastructure. All building and permanentinstallations necessary for the support,redeployment, and military forcesoperations (e.g., barracks, headquarters,airfields, communications, facilities, stores,port installations, and maintenancestations). (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

integration. 1. In photography, a processby which the average radar picture seenon several scans of the time base may beobtained on a print, or the process by whichseveral photographic images are combinedinto a single image. 2. In force projection,the synchronized transfer of units into anoperational commander’s force prior tomission execution. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

in-transit visibility. The ability to track theidentity, status, and location of Departmentof Defense units, and non-unit cargo(excluding bulk petroleum, oils, andlubricants) and passengers; medicalpatients; and personal property from originto consignee or destination across the range

of military operations. Also called ITV.(JP 1-02)

joint air operations. Air operationsperformed with air capabilities/forces madeavailable by components in support of thejoint force commander’s operation orcampaign objectives, or in support of othercomponents of the joint force. (JP 1-02)

joint air operations center. A jointly staffedfacility established for planning, directing,and executing joint air operations insupport of the joint force commander’soperation or campaign objectives. Alsocalled JOAC. (JP 1-02)

joint flow and analysis system fortransportation. System that determinesthe transportation feasibility of a course ofaction or operation plan; provides daily liftassets needed to move forces and resupply;advises logistic planners of channel andport inefficiencies; and interprets shortfallsfrom various flow possibilities. Also calledJFAST. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

joint force. A general term applied to a forcecomposed of significant elements assignedor attached, of two or more MilitaryDepartments operating under a singlecommander. See also joint forcecommander. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. Thejoint force air component commanderderives authority from the joint forcecommander who has the authority toexercise operational control, assignmissions, direct coordination amongsubordinate commanders, redirect andorganize forces to ensure unity of effort inthe accomplishment of the overall mission.The joint force commander will normallydesignate a joint force air component

GL-9

Glossary

commander. The joint force air componentcommander’s responsibilities will beassigned by the joint force commander(normally these would include, but not belimited to, planning, coordination,allocation, and tasking based on the jointforce commander’s apportionmentdecision). Using the joint forcecommander’s guidance and authority, andin coordination with other Servicecomponent commanders and otherassigned or supporting commanders, thejoint force air component commander willrecommend to the joint force commanderapportionment of air sorties to variousmissions or geographic areas. Also calledJFACC. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint movement center. The centerestablished to coordinate the employmentof all means of transportation (includingthat provided by allies or host nations) tosupport the concept of operations. Thiscoordination is accomplished throughestablishment of transportation policieswithin the assigned operational area,consistent with relative urgency of need,port and terminal capabilities,transportation asset availability, andpriorities set by a joint force commander.Also called JMC. (JP 1-02)

joint operations. A general term to describemilitary actions conducted by joint forces,or by Service forces in relationships (e.g.,support, coordinating authority), which, ofthemselves, do not create joint forces.(JP 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea,and airspace, defined by a geographiccombatant commander or subordinateunified commander, in which a joint forcecommander (normally a joint task forcecommander) conducts military operationsto accomplish a specific mission. Jointoperations areas are particularly usefulwhen operations are limited in scope andgeographic area or when operations are tobe conducted on the boundaries betweentheaters. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem. A continuously evolving systemthat is being developed through theintegration and enhancement of earlierplanning and execution systems: JointOperation Planning System and JointDeployment System. It provides thefoundation for conventional command andcontrol by national- and theater-levelcommanders and their staffs. It is designedto satisfy their information needs in theconduct of joint planning and operations.Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES) includes joint operationplanning policies, procedures, andreporting structures supported bycommunications and automated dataprocessing systems. JOPES is used tomonitor, plan, and execute mobilization,deployment, employment, and sustainmentactivities associated with joint operations.Also called JOPES. (JP 1-02)

joint reception center. The centerestablished in the operational area (perdirection of the joint force commander),with responsibility for the reception,accountability, training, processing, ofmilitary and civilian individualaugmentees upon their arrival in theoperational area. Also the center whereaugmentees will normally be outprocessedthrough upon departure from the

GL-10

Glossary

JP 4-01.8

operational area. Also called JRC.(JP 1-02)

joint reception complex. The group of nodes(air and/or sea) designated by the supportedcombatant command, in coordination withthe host nation and United StatesTransportation Command, that receives,processes, services, supports, and facilitatesonward movement of personnel,equipment, materiel, and units deployinginto, out of, or within a theater line ofcommunications. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

joint reception, staging, onwardmovement, and integration. A phase ofjoint force projection occurring in theoperational area. This phase comprises theessential processes required to transitionarriving personnel, equipment, andmateriel into forces capable of meetingoperational requirements. Also calledJRSOI. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

joint task force. A joint force that isconstituted and so designated by theSecretary of Defense, a combatantcommander, a subunified commander, oran existing joint task force commander.Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

joint total asset visibility. A capabilitydesigned to consolidate source data from avariety of joint and Service automatedinformation systems to provide joint forcecommanders with visibility over assets in-storage, in-process, and in-transit. Alsocalled JTAV. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

line of communications. A route, eitherland, water, and/or air, which connects an

operating military force with a base ofoperations and along which supplies andmilitary forces move. Also called LOC.(JP 1-02)

logistic and movement control center. Acenter organized from service supportelements (or the supporting establishment)in the geographic proximity of themarshaling units. It is tasked by the forcemovement control center to provideorganic and commercial transportation,transportation scheduling, materialshandling equipment, and all other logisticsupport required by parent commandsduring marshaling and embarkation. Alsocalled LMCC. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

logistics over-the-shore operations. Theloading and unloading of ships without thebenefit of deep draft-capable, fixed portfacilities in friendly or nondefendedterritory and, in time of war, during phasesof theater development in which there isno opposition by the enemy; or as a meansof moving forces closer to tactical assemblyareas dependent on threat forcecapabilities. Also called LOTS operations.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

logistic support. Logistic supportencompasses the logistic services, materiel,and transportation required to support thecontinental United States-based andworldwide deployed forces. (JP 1-02)

Marine Logistics Command. The USMarines may employ the concept of theMarine Logistics Command (MLC) inmajor regional contingencies to provideoperational logistic support, which willinclude arrival and assembly operations.

GL-11

Glossary

The combat service support operationscenter will be the MLC’s primary combatservice support coordination center forunits undergoing arrival and assembly.Also called MLC. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

marshalling. 1. The process by which unitsparticipating in an amphibious or airborneoperation group together or assemble whenfeasible or move to temporary camps inthe vicinity of embarkation points,complete preparations for combat, orprepare for loading. 2. The process ofassembling, holding, and organizingsupplies and/or equipment, especiallyvehicles of transportation, for onwardmovement. See also staging. (JP 1-02)

marshalling area. A location in the vicinityof a reception terminal or pre-positionedequipment storage site where arriving unitpersonnel, equipment, materiel, andaccompanying supplies are reassembled,returned to the control of the unitcommander, and prepared for onwardmovement. The joint complex commanderdesignating the location will coordinate theuse of the facilities with other alliedcommands and the host nation, and willprovide life support to the units while inthe marshalling area. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

materials-handling equipment.Mechanical devices for handling ofsupplies with greater ease and economy.(JP 1-02)

Military Sealift Command. The USTransportation Command’s componentcommand responsible for designated sealiftservice. Also called MSC. (JP 1-02)

Military Traffic Management Command.The US Transportation Command’scomponent command responsible formilitary traffic, continental United Statesair and land transportation, and common-user water terminals. Also called MTMC.See also transportation componentcommand. (JP 1-02)

mode of transport. The various modes usedfor a movement. For each mode, there areseveral means of transport. They are: a.inland surface transportation (rail, road,and inland waterway); b. sea transport(coastal and ocean); c. air transportation;and d. pipelines. (JP 1-02)

movement control. 1. The planning,routing, scheduling, and control ofpersonnel and cargo movements over linesof communications. 2. An organizationresponsible for the planning, routing,scheduling, and control of personnel andcargo movements over lines ofcommunications. Also called movementcontrol center or MCC. See also non-unitrelated cargo; non-unit related personnel.(JP 1-02)

naval advanced logistic support site. Anoverseas location used as the primarytransshipment point in the theater ofoperations for logistic support. A navaladvanced logistic support site possesses fullcapabilities for storage, consolidation, andtransfer of supplies and for support offorward-deployed units (includingreplacements units) during majorcontingency and wartime periods. Navaladvanced logistic support sites, with portand airfield facilities in close proximity,are located within the theater of operationsbut not near the main battle areas, and mustpossess the throughput capacity requiredto accommodate incoming and outgoingintertheater airlift and sealift. When fullyactivated, the naval advanced logistic

GL-12

Glossary

JP 4-01.8

support site should consist of facilities andservices provided by the host nation,augmented by support personnel locatedin the theater of operations, or both. Alsocalled NALSS. (JP 1-02)

naval forward logistic site. An overseaslocation, with port and airfield facilitiesnearby, which provides logistic support tonaval forces within the theater ofoperations during major contingency andwartime periods. Naval forward logisticsites may be located in close proximity tomain battle areas to permit forward stagingof services, throughput of high prioritycargo, advanced maintenance, and battledamage repair. Naval forward logistic sitesare linked to in-theater naval advancedlogistic support sites (ALSSs) byintratheater airlift and sealift, but may alsoserve as transshipment points forintertheater movement of high-prioritycargo into areas of direct combat. Inproviding fleet logistic support, navalforward logistic site capabilities may rangefrom very austere to near those of a navaladvanced logistic support site. Also calledNFLS. (JP 1-02)

naval port control office. The authorityestablished at a port or port complex tocoordinate arrangements for logisticsupport and harbor services to ships undernaval control and to otherwise support thenaval control of shipping organization.(JP 1-02)

Navy cargo handling battalion. A mobilelogistics support unit capable of worldwidedeployment in its entirety or in specializeddetachments. It is organized, trained, andequipped to: a. load and off-load Navy andMarine Corps cargo carried in maritimeprepositioning ships and merchantbreakbulk or container ships in allenvironments; b. to operate an associatedtemporary ocean cargo terminal; c. loadand offload Navy and Marine Corps cargo

carried in military-controlled aircraft; d.to operate an associated expeditionary aircargo terminal. Also called CHB. Threesources of Navy Cargo Handling Battalionsare; a. Navy Cargo Handling and PortGroup—The active duty, cargo handling,battalion-sized unit composed solely ofactive duty personnel. Also calledNAVCHAPGRU. b. Naval Reserve CargoHandling Training Battalion—The activeduty, cargo handling training battalioncomposed of both active duty and reservepersonnel. Also called NRCHTB. c. NavalReserve Cargo Handling Battalion—Areserve cargo handling battalion composedsolely of selected reserve personnel. Alsocalled NRCHB. (JP 1-02)

Navy Cargo Handling Force. Thecombined cargo handling units of the Navy,including primarily the Navy CargoHandling and Port Group, the NavalReserve Cargo Handling TrainingBattalion, and the Naval Reserve CargoHandling Battalion. These units are partof the operating forces and represent theNavy’s capability for open ocean cargohandling. (JP 1-02)

Navy support element. The MaritimePrepositioning Force element that iscomposed of naval beach group staff andsubordinate unit personnel, a detachmentof Navy cargo handling force personnel,and other Navy components, as required.It is tasked with conducting the off-loadand ship-to-shore movement of maritimeprepositioned equipment/supplies.(JP 1-02)

node. A location in a mobility system wherea movement requirement is originated,processed for onward movement, orterminated. (JP 1-02)

non-unit-related cargo. All equipment andsupplies requiring transportation to an areaof operations, other than those identified

GL-13

Glossary

as the equipment or accompanyingsupplies of a specific unit (e.g., resupply,military support for allies, and support fornonmilitary programs, such as civil relief).(JP 1-02)

non-unit-related personnel. All personnelrequiring transportation to or from an areaof operations, other than those assigned toa specific unit (e.g., filler personnel;replacements; temporary duty/temporaryadditional duty personnel; civilians;medical evacuees; and retrogradepersonnel). (JP 1-02)

off-load preparation party. A temporarytask organization of Navy and Marinemaintenance, embarkation, equipmentoperators, and cargo-handling personneldeployed to the maritime pre-positioningship before or during its transit to theobjective area to prepare the ship’s off-loadsystems and embarked equipment for off-load. Also called OPP. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

onward movement. The relocation of forcescapable of meeting the commander’soperational requirements to the initial pointof their mission execution. This includesthe movement of associated sustainment,equipment, and personnel. (JP 1-02)

operational area. An overarching termencompassing more descriptive terms forgeographic areas in which militaryoperations are conducted. Operationalareas include, but are not limited to, suchdescriptors as area of responsibility, theaterof war, theater of operations, jointoperations area, amphibious objective area,joint special operations area, and area ofoperations. (This term and its definitionare provided for information and areproposed for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)

operational control. Transferable commandauthority that may be exercised bycommanders at any echelon at or belowthe level of combatant command.Operational control is inherent incombatant command (commandauthority). Operational control may bedelegated and is the authority to performthose functions of command oversubordinate forces involving organizingand employing commands and forces,assigning tasks, designating objectives, andgiving authoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operationalcontrol includes authoritative directionover all aspects of military operations andjoint training necessary to accomplishmissions assigned to the command.Operational control should be exercisedthrough the commanders of subordinateorganizations. Normally this authority isexercised through subordinate joint forcecommanders and Service and/or functionalcomponent commanders. Operationalcontrol normally provides full authority toorganize commands and forces and toemploy those forces as the commander inoperational control considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions.Operational control does not, in and ofitself, include authoritative direction forlogistics or matters of administration,discipline, internal organization, or unittraining. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for theSingle Integrated Operation Plan, for theconduct of military operations. Plans areprepared by combatant commanders inresponse to requirements established by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andby commanders of subordinate commandsin response to requirements tasked by theestablishing unified commander.Operation plans are prepared in either acomplete format (OPLAN) or as a conceptplan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can

GL-14

Glossary

JP 4-01.8

be published with or without a time-phasedforce and deployment data (TPFDD) file.a. OPLAN—An operation plan for theconduct of joint operations that can be usedas a basis for development of an operationorder (OPORD). An OPLAN identifiesthe forces and supplies required to executethe CINC’s Strategic Concept and amovement schedule of these resources tothe theater of operations. The forces andsupplies are identified in TPFDD files.OPLANs will include all phases of thetasked operation. The plan is preparedwith the appropriate annexes, appendixes,and TPFDD files as described in the JointOperation Planning and Execution Systemmanuals containing planning policies,procedures, and formats. Also calledOPLAN. b. CONPLAN—An operationplan in an abbreviated format that wouldrequire considerable expansion oralteration to convert it into an OPLAN orOPORD. A CONPLAN contains theCINC’s Strategic Concept and thoseannexes and appendixes deemed necessaryby the combatant commander to completeplanning. Generally, detailed supportrequirements are not calculated andTPFDD files are not prepared. Also calledCONPLAN. c. CONPLAN withTPFDD—A CONPLAN with TPFDD isthe same as a CONPLAN except that itrequires more detailed planning for phaseddeployment of forces. (JP 1-02)

port capacity. The estimated capacity of aport or an anchorage to clear cargo in 24hours usually expressed in tons. (JP 1-02)

port complex. A port complex comprisesone or more port areas of varyingimportance whose activities aregeographically linked either because theseareas are dependent on a common inlandtransport system or because they constitutea common initial destination for convoys.(JP 1-02)

port of debarkation. The geographic pointat which cargo or personnel are discharged.May be a seaport or aerial port ofdebarkation. For unit requirements, it mayor may not coincide with the destination.Also called POD. (JP 1-02)

port of embarkation. The geographic pointin a routing scheme from which cargo orpersonnel depart. May be a seaport oraerial port from which personnel andequipment flow to port of debarkation. Forunit and non-unit requirements, it may ormay not coincide with the origin. Alsocalled POE. (JP 1-02)

port operations group. A task-organizedunit, located at the seaport of embarkationand/or debarkation under the control of thelanding force support party and/or combatservice support element, that assists andprovides support in the loading and/orunloading and staging of personnel,supplies, and equipment from shipping.Also called POG. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

port support activity. A tailorable supportorganization composed of mobilizationstation assets that ensures the equipmentof the deploying units is ready to load. Theport support activity (PSA) operates uniqueequipment in conjunction with shiploading operations. The PSA isoperationally controlled by the military portcommander or terminal transfer unitcommander. Also called PSA. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

power projection. The ability of a nation toapply all or some of its elements of nationalpower — political, economic,informational, or military — to rapidly andeffectively deploy and sustain forces in andfrom multiple dispersed locations to

GL-15

Glossary

respond to crises, to contribute todeterrence, and to enhance regionalstability. (JP 1-02)

reception. 1. All ground arrangementsconnected with the delivery and dispositionof air or sea drops. Includes selection andpreparation of site, signals for warning andapproach, facilitation of secure departureof agents, speedy collection of deliveredarticles, and their prompt removal tostorage places having maximum security.When a group is involved, it may be calleda reception committee. 2. Arrangementsto welcome and provide secure quarters ortransportation for defectors, escapees,evaders, or incoming agents. 3. Theprocess of receiving, offloading,marshalling, and transporting ofpersonnel, equipment, and materiel fromthe strategic and/or intratheaterdeployment phase to a sea, air, or surfacetransportation point of debarkation to themarshalling area. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

seaport of debarkation. The geographicpoint in theater at which strategic sealiftis offloaded. Also called SPOD. See portof debarkation. (This term and itsdefinition are applicable only in the contextof this publication and cannot be referencedoutside this publication.)

seaport of embarkation. The geographicpoint at which strategic sealift is onloadedfor transit to theater. Also called SPOE.See port of embarkation. (This term andits definition are applicable only in thecontext of this publication and cannot bereferenced outside this publication.)

single port manager. Through itstransportation component commands, USTransportation Command is the DOD

designated single port manager for allcommon-user aerial and sea portsworldwide. The single port managerperforms those functions necessary tosupport the strategic flow of the deployingforces’ equipment and sustainment fromthe aerial and sea port of embarkation andhand-off to the combatant commander inthe aerial and sea port of debarkation(APOD and SPOD). The single portmanager is responsible for providingstrategic deployment status information tothe combatant commander and to manageworkload of the APOD/SPOD operatorbased on the commander’s priorities andguidance. The single port manager isresponsible through all phases of thetheater aerial and sea port operationscontinuum, from a unimproved airfield andbare beach deployment to a commercialcontract supported deployment. Alsocalled SPM. (JP 1-02)

staging. Assembling, holding, andorganizing arriving personnel, equipment,and sustaining materiel in preparation foronward movement. The organizing andpreparation for movement of personnel,equipment, and materiel at designatedareas to incrementally build forces capableof meeting the operational commander’srequirements. See also staging area.(JP 1-02)

staging area. 1. Amphibious or airborne— A general locality between themounting area and the objective of anamphibious or airborne expedition,through which the expedition or partsthereof pass after mounting for refueling,regrouping of ships, and/or exercise,inspection, and redistribution of troops. 2.Other movements — A general localityestablished for the concentration of troopunits and transient personnel betweenmovements over the lines of communications.Also called SA. (JP 1-02)

GL-16

Glossary

JP 4-01.8

support. 1. The action of a force whichaids, protects, complements, or sustainsanother force in accordance with a directiverequiring such action. 2. A unit whichhelps another unit in battle. Aviation,artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as asupport for infantry. 3. A part of any unitheld back at the beginning of an attack asa reserve. 4. An element of a commandwhich assists, protects, or supplies otherforces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. The commanderhaving primary responsibility for allaspects of a task assigned by the JointStrategic Capabilities Plan or other jointoperation planning authority. In the contextof joint operation planning, this term refersto the commander who prepares operationplans or operation orders in response torequirements of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander whoprovides augmentation forces or othersupport to a supported commander or whodevelops a supporting plan. Includes thedesignated combatant commands andDefense agencies as appropriate. (JP 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel,logistic, and other support required tomaintain and prolong operations or combatuntil successful accomplishment orrevision of the mission or of the nationalobjective. (JP 1-02)

tactical assembly area. An area that isgenerally out of the reach of light artilleryand the location where units make finalpreparation (pre-combat checks andinspections) and rest, prior to moving tothe line of departure. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority overassigned or attached forces or commands,or military capability or forces made

available for tasking, that is limited to thedetailed and, usually, local direction andcontrol of movements or maneuversnecessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. Tactical control is inherent inoperational control. Tactical control maybe delegated to, and exercised at any levelat or below the level of combatantcommand. Also called TACON. See alsocombatant command; operational control.(JP 1-02)

Tanker Airlift Control Center. The AirMobility Command direct reporting unitresponsible for tasking and controllingoperational missions for all activitiesinvolving forces supporting USTransportation Command’s global airmobility mission. The Tanker AirliftControl Center is comprised of thefollowing functions: current operations,command and control, logistics operations,aerial port operations, aeromedicalevacuation, flight planning, diplomaticclearances, weather, and intelligence. Alsocalled TACC. (JP 1-02)

Tanker Airlift Control Element. A mobilecommand and control organizationdeployed to support strategic and theaterair mobility operations at fixed, en route,and deployed locations where air mobilityoperational support is nonexistent orinsufficient. The Tanker Airlift ControlElement provides on-site management ofair mobility airfield operations to includecommand and control, communications,aerial port services, maintenance, security,transportation, weather, intelligence, andother support functions, as necessary. TheTanker Airlift Control Element iscomposed of mission support elementsfrom various units and deploys in supportof peacetime, contingency, and emergencyrelief operations on both planned and “nonotice” basis. Also called TALCE. (JP 1-02)

GL-17

Glossary

task force. 1. A temporary grouping of units,under one commander, formed for thepurpose of carrying out a specific operationor mission. 2. Semi-permanentorganization of units, under onecommander, formed for the purpose ofcarrying out a continuing specific task. 3.A component of a fleet organized by thecommander of a task fleet or higherauthority for the accomplishment of aspecific task or tasks. (JP 1-02)

theater airlift. That airlift assigned orattached to a combatant commander otherthan the Commander in Chief, USTransportation Command, which providesair movement and delivery of personneland equipment directly into objective areasthrough air landing, airdrop, extraction,or other delivery techniques; and the airlogistics support of all theater forces,including those engaged in combatoperations, to meet specific theaterobjectives and requirements. Also calledintratheater airlift. (JP 1-02)

throughput. The average quantity of cargoand passengers that can pass through a porton a daily basis from arrival at the port toloading onto a ship or plane, or from thedischarge from a ship or plane to the exit(clearance) from the port complex.Throughput is usually expressed inmeasurement tons, short tons, orpassengers. Reception and storagelimitation may affect final throughput.(JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data.The Joint Operation Planning andExecution System data base portion of anoperation plan; it contains time-phasedforce data, non-unit-related cargo andpersonnel data, and movement data for theoperation plan, including: a. In-placeunits. b. Units to be deployed to supportthe operation plan with a priority

indicating the desired sequence for theirarrival at the port of debarkation. c.Routing of forces to be deployed. d.Movement data associated with deployingforces. e. Estimates of non-unit-relatedcargo and personnel movements to beconducted concurrently with thedeployment of forces. f. Estimate oftransportation requirements that must befulfilled by common-user lift resources aswell as those requirements that can befulfilled by assigned or attachedtransportation resources. Also calledTPFDD. (JP 1-02)

total asset visibility. The capability toprovide users with timely and accurateinformation on the location, movement,status, and identity of units, personnel,equipment, materiel, and supplies. It alsoincludes the capability to act upon thatinformation to improve overallperformance of the Department ofDefense’s logistic practices. Also calledTAV. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

transportation component command. Thethree component commands ofUSTRANSCOM: Air Force Air MobilityCommand; Navy Military SealiftCommand; and Army Military TrafficManagement Command. Eachtransportation component commandremains a major command of its parentService and continues to organize, train,and equip its forces as specified by law.Each transportation component commandalso continues to perform Service-uniquemissions. Also called TCC. (JP 1-02)

transportation feasibility. Operation plans andoperation plans in concept format areconsidered transportation feasible when thecapability to move forces, equipment, andsupplies exists from the point of origin to the

GL-18

Glossary

JP 4-01.8

final destination according to the plan.Transportation feasibility determination willrequire concurrent analysis and assessmentof available strategic and theater lift assets,transportation infrastructure, and competingdemands and restrictions. a. The supportedcommander of a combatant command(CINC) will analyze deployment, jointreception, staging, onward movement, andintegration (JRSOI), and theater distributionof forces, equipment, and supplies to finaldestination. b. Supporting CINCs willprovide an assessment on movement of forcesfrom point of origin to aerial port ofembarkation and/or seaport of embarkation.c. The Commander in Chief, United StatesTransportation Command will assess thestrategic leg of the time-phased force anddeployment data for transportation feasibility,indicating to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff and supported CINC that movementsarrive at the port of debarkation consistentwith the supported CINC’s assessment ofJRSOI and theater distribution. d. Following

analysis of all inputs, the supported CINC isresponsible for declaring a plan end-to-endexecutable. (JP 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broadcontinuing mission under a singlecommander and composed of significantassigned components of two or moreMilitary Departments, and which isestablished and so designated by thePresident, through the Secretary of Defensewith the advice and assistance of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Alsocalled unified combatant command.(JP 1-02)

unit movement control center. A temporaryorganization activated by majorsubordinate commands and subordinateunits during deployment to control andmanage marshalling and movement. Alsocalled UMCC. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or JointStaff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrinepublications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 4-01.8 Logistics

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub,makes required changes and prepares pubfor coordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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