jp 3-0 doctrine for joint operations - globalsecurity.org · this second edition of joint pub 3-0,...

1 February 1995

Doctrine for

Joint Operations

Joint Pub 3-0

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILIChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

This second edition of Joint Pub 3-0,“Doctrine for Joint Operations,”represents yet another major milestonein the ongoing efforts to improve jointdoctrine. It reflects our commitment toregularly revise and refine jointpublications to ensure consistency,applicability, and readability.

This vital keystone publication formsthe very core of joint warfightingdoctrine and establishes the frameworkfor our forces’ ability to fight as a jointteam. It is the linchpin of the jointdoctrine publication hierarchy; and forgood reason. The fundamental conceptsand principles contained in Joint Pub3-0 provide a common perspective fromwhich to plan and execute joint and

multinational operations. This comprehensive document addresses almostevery aspect of joint warfighting at each level of war and across the range ofmilitary operations. I cannot overemphasize the critical role Joint Pub 3-0plays in how joint operations are conducted.

I challenge each commander to not only understand the principles of JointPub 3-0, but also teach them to their subordinates and train their organizationsusing these battle-tested tenets. Otherwise, we will not have real doctrine.To that end, I solicit your assistance to ensure the widest distribution of thisand all joint publications, and to promote their use at every opportunity.

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PREFACE

1. Scope

Joint Pub 3-0 is the keystone documentof the joint operations series. It providesfundamental principles and doctrine forthe conduct of joint and multinationaloperations.

2. Purpose

This publication sets forth doctrine togovern the joint activities and performanceof the Armed Forces of the United States injoint operations, as well as the doctrinalbasis for US military involvement inmultinational and interagency operations.It provides military guidance for theexercise of authority by combatantcommanders and other joint forcecommanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the ArmedForces in preparing their appropriate plans.It is not the intent of this publication torestrict the authority of the joint forcecommander (JFC) from organizing the forceand executing the mission in a manner theJFC deems most appropriate to ensure unityof effort in the accomplishment of theoverall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and sub-ordinate components of these commands.

These principles and guidance also mayapply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of anotherService or when significant forces of oneService support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment ofthe commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other membersof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has providedmore current and specific guidance.Commanders of forces operating as part ofa multinational (alliance or coalition)military command should follow multi-national doctrine and procedures ratified bythe United States. For doctrine andprocedures not ratified by the United States,commanders should evaluate and follow themultinational command’s doctrine andprocedures, where applicable.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER ITHE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

• Introduction ........................................................................................................... I-1• Security Environment ........................................................................................... I-1• Range of Military Operations ............................................................................... I-2• National Strategic Direction ................................................................................. I-4• Executing National Security Strategy................................................................... I-5• The Estimate Process and Strategy ....................................................................... I-8• The Strategic Goal and Conflict Termination....................................................... I-9

CHAPTER IIFUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

• General ................................................................................................................ II-1• The Levels of War ............................................................................................... II-1• Unified Action..................................................................................................... II-3• Joint Warfare ....................................................................................................... II-4• Command Relationships ..................................................................................... II-5• Organization of Forces ......................................................................................II-10• Command and Control ......................................................................................II-16• Organization of an Operational Area ................................................................II-17

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS

• General ............................................................................................................... III-1• The Link Between National and Combatant Command Strategies ................... III-1• Combatant Command Strategic Planning .......................................................... III-2• The Campaign .................................................................................................... III-4• Operational Art .................................................................................................. III-9• Key Planning Considerations........................................................................... III-24• Control and Coordinating Measures ................................................................ III-33

CHAPTER IVJOINT OPERATIONS IN WAR

• Considerations Before Combat .......................................................................... IV-1• Considerations at the Outset of Combat ............................................................ IV-4• Sustained Combat Operations ............................................................................ IV-7

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• Joint Operations in the Littoral or Maritime Environment ............................. IV-17• Operations When Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Employed.................... IV-18• Considerations for Termination and Postconflict Operations ......................... IV-19

CHAPTER VMILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

• General ................................................................................................................ V-1• Role in the Strategic Security Environment ....................................................... V-1• Principles for Joint Operations Other Than War ................................................ V-2• Planning Considerations .................................................................................... V-4• Types of Operations Other Than War ................................................................. V-7

CHAPTER VIMULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

• General ............................................................................................................... VI-1• Considerations for Multinational Operations .................................................... VI-2• Considerations During the Planning and Execution of

Multinational Operations ................................................................................... VI-5

APPENDIX

A Principles of War ............................................................................................. A-1B The Estimate Process ....................................................................................... B-1C References ....................................................................................................... C-1D Administrative Instructions ............................................................................. D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I--Abbreviations and Acronyms ...................................................................GL-1Part II--Terms and Definitions..............................................................................GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Range of Military Operations............................................................................ I-2 I-2 National Strategic Direction .............................................................................. I-5 II-1 Principles of War............................................................................................. II-1 II-2 Unified Action................................................................................................. II-4 II-3 Chain of Command.......................................................................................... II-5 II-4 Combatant Command (Command Authority)................................................. II-6 II-5 Possible Components in a Joint Force..........................................................II-16 II-6 Operational Areas Within a Theater..............................................................II-18 II-7 Combat and Communications Zones............................................................II-20III-1 Contents of a Strategic Estimate .................................................................... III-3III-2 Fundamentals of Campaign Plans .................................................................. III-8III-3 Facets of Operational Art ............................................................................. III-10III-4 The Initial Plan ............................................................................................. III-24

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IV-1 Considerations Before Combat ...................................................................... IV-1 V-1 Principles for Joint Operations Other Than War............................................. V-2 V-2 Planning Considerations for Military Operations Other Than War ................ V-4 V-3 Types of Operations Other Than War ............................................................ V-7VI-1 Considerations for Multinational Operations................................................. VI-2VI-2 Combined Structure With National Integrity ................................................. VI-7VI-3 Coalition Command Relationships for Operations DESERT STORM ......... VI-8VI-4 Considerations in Multinational Logistics ................................................... VI-11

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

Discusses the Strategic Environment within which JointOperations take place

Lists the Fundamental Principles of Joint Operations

Covers Planning Guidelines for War and MilitaryOperations Other than War

Describes the Considerations for the Conduct of JointOperations During War

Provides Principles for Military Operations Other thanWar

Discusses Considerations for Multinational Operations

•

•

•

•

•

•

Range of Military Operations

The range of militaryoperations stretches fromwar

to

military operations otherthan war.

War. When other instruments of national power(diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable orinappropriate to achieve national objectives or protectnational interests, the US national leadership may employthe military instrument of national power to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations. In such cases, thegoal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties aspossible, achieving national objectives and concludinghostilities on terms favorable to the United States and itsmultinational partners.

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).Operations other than war are an aspect of militaryoperations that focus on deterring war and promotingpeace.

Military Operations Other Than War Involvingthe Use or Threat of Force. When other instrumentsof national power are unable to influence adeteriorating or potentially hostile situation, militaryforce may be required to demonstrate US resolveand capability, support the other instruments ofnational power, or terminate the situation on

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favorable terms. The general goals of US militaryoperations during such periods are to supportnational objectives, deter war, and return to a stateof peace. Such operations involve a greater risk thatUS forces could become involved in combat thanoperations conducted to promote peace.

Military Operations Other Than War NotInvolving the Use or Threat of Force. Use ofmilitary forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the thresholdof armed conflict and maintains US influence inforeign lands. These operations, by definition, donot involve combat, but military forces always needto be prepared to protect themselves and respond to achanging situation.

National security strategy and national military strategy,shaped by and oriented on national security policies, providestrategic direction for combatant commanders. Combatantcommanders, in turn, provide guidance and direction throughtheir combatant command strategies and plan for theemployment of military forces, in conjunction withinteragency and multinational forces, in the conduct ofmilitary operations.

National military strategy attempts to promote peace, deteraggression, and, failing that, fight and win. But in thelarger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarelysufficient to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis. Properlyconceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuringthat victories achieved with military force endure. Tofacilitate conception of effective termination criteria, USforces must be dominant in the final stages of an armedconflict. This principle holds true for both war and militaryoperations other than war.

Combatant commandersare a vital link in the chainof command.

In both war and militaryoperations other than war,proper conflict terminationcriteria ensure thatvictories endure.

National Strategic Direction

The Strategic Goal and Conflict Termination

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The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify thelinks between strategic objectives and tactical actions.Although there are no finite limits or boundaries betweenthem, the three levels are strategic, operational, andtactical. They apply to war and to operations other thanwar. The levels are defined based on their effect orcontribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tacticalobjectives.

To achieve assigned objectives, joint forces conductcampaigns and major operations. Functional and Servicecomponents of the joint force conduct subordinate andsupporting operations, not independent campaigns. Jointforce commanders (JFCs) synchronize the actions of air,land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achievestrategic and operational objectives through integrated, jointcampaigns and major operations. The goal is to increasethe total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily toinvolve all forces or to involve all forces equally.

To assist in coordination and deconfliction of joint action,JFCs may define operational areas or joint areas. Geographiccombatant commanders can employ the followingoperational areas:

Joint Operations Area. An area of land, sea, andairspace defined by a geographic combatant orsubordinate unified commander, in which a JFCconducts military operations.

Joint Special Operations Area. An area of land,sea, and airspace for use by a joint special operationscomponent or Joint Special Operations Task Forcefor the conduct of special operations.

Joint Rear Area. Facilitates the protection andoperation of bases, installations, and forces thatsupport combat operations.

The three levels of war(strategic, operational, andtactical) are doctrinalperspectives that clarifythe links between strategicobjectives and tacticalactions.

Joint forces conductcampaigns and majoroperations. Functionaland Service components ofthe joint force conductsubordinate andsupporting operations, notindependent campaigns.

Joint force commanders(JFCs) may defineoperational areas or jointareas that consist of:

Joint Operations Areas

Joint Special OperationsAreas

Joint Rear Areas

Organization of an Operational Area

Levels of War

Joint Warfare

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Amphibious ObjectiveAreas

Areas of Operations

Areas of Interest

Theaters of war andsubordinate theaters ofoperations.

JFCs develop concepts ofoperations and issuemission-type orders.

Campaigns are joint.They must synchronizeoperations, remain simple,and be focused on theobjective.

Amphibious Objective Area. An area that includesthe objectives to be secured by an amphibious taskforce. It needs to be large enough for necessary sea,air, land, and special operations.

Area of Operations (AOs). JFCs may define AOsfor land and naval forces. These areas do notencompass the entire operational area of the JFC, butshould be large enough for component commandersto accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

Area of Interest. JFCs designate areas of interest tomonitor enemy activities outside the operational area.

When warranted, geographic combatant commanders maydesignate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theatersof operations for each major threat. Geographic combatantcommanders may also establish combat zones andcommunications zones.

Planning for employment of joint teams begins witharticulating and understanding the objective, purpose ofthe operations, and commander’s intent (the commander’svision of the end state to be achieved). JFCs issue prioritizedmission-type orders to subordinate commanders and definecommand relationships to facilitate mission accomplishmentconsistent with their concept of operations.

A campaign is a series of related joint major operationsthat arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions toaccomplish strategic and operational objectives. A campaignplan describes how these operations are connected in time,space, and purpose.

Campaigns serve as the focus for the conduct of war andoften in operations other than war. A wartime campaign isthe synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and specialoperations—as well as interagency and multinationaloperations—in harmony with diplomatic, economic, andinformational efforts to attain national and multinationalobjectives. Campaigns, especially in multinational efforts,must be kept simple and focused on clearly definedobjectives.

Combatant Command Strategic Planning

The Campaign

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Synergy. Integrate and synchronize operations in a mannerthat applies force from different dimensions to shock,disrupt, and defeat opponents.

Simultaneity and Depth. Bring force to bear on theopponent’s entire structure in a near simultaneous mannerto overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and the enemy'swill to resist.

Anticipation . Remain alert for the unexpected and foropportunities to exploit the situation.

Balance. Refers to the appropriate mix of forces andcapabilities within the joint force, as well as the nature andtiming of operations conducted to disrupt an enemy'sbalance.

Leverage. Gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combatpower across all dimensions.

Timing and Tempo. Conduct operations at a tempo andpoint in time that best exploits friendly capabilities andinhibits the enemy.

Operational Reach and Approach. Basing, whether fromoverseas locations, sea-based platforms, or the continentalUnited States, directly affects operational reach. Inparticular, advanced bases underwrite the progressive abilityof the joint force to shield its components from enemy actionand deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasingpower and ferocity.

Forces and Functions. Campaigns and operations canfocus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or acombination of both.

Arranging Operations. The best arrangement will oftenbe a combination of simultaneous and sequential operationsto achieve the desired end state conditions quickly and atthe least cost in personnel and other resources.

Centers of Gravity. The essence of operational art lies inbeing able to mass effects against the enemy’s sources ofpower in order to destroy or neutralize them.

Planning for Joint Air Operations

Operational ArtOperational art ischaracterized by:

Synergy

Simultaneity and Depth

Anticipation

Balance

Leverage

Timing and Tempo

Operational Reach andApproach

Forces and Functions

Arranging Operations

Centers of Gravity

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Direct versus Indirect. To the extent possible, JFCs attackenemy centers of gravity directly. Where direct attack meansattacking into an opponent’s strength, seek an indirectapproach.

Decisive Points. (Usually geographic in nature) Correctlyidentifying and controlling decisive points can gain a markedadvantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcomeof an action.

Culmination . Synchronization of logistics with combatoperations can forestall culmination and help commanderscontrol the tempo of their operations.

Termination . Before forces are committed, JFCs must knowhow the NCA intends to terminate the operation and ensureits outcomes endure.

JFCs employ various maneuver and movement control andfire support coordinating measures to facilitate effectivejoint operations to include:

Boundaries. Boundaries define surface areas to facilitatecoordination and deconfliction of operations. In land andsea warfare, a boundary is a line by which areas betweenadjacent units or formations are defined. Theater air sorties

Direct versus IndirectApproach

Decisive Points

Culmination

Termination

Boundaries

Planning Considerations

Control and Coordinating Measures

KEY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

OTHER CONSIDERATIONSPRINCIPLECONSIDERATIONS

MISSION

COMMANDER'S INTENT

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

TARGETING

APPORTIONMENT

CONCEPT OF LOGISTICS

DISCIPLINED OPERATIONS

RISK

REHEARSALS

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE

DECEPTION

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

OPERATIONS SECURITY ANDMILITARY DECEPTION

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

CIVIL AFFAIRS

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are not constrained by land boundaries, per se. However,because the airspace above surface areas is used by allcomponents of the joint force, JFCs promulgate airspacecontrol measures to deconflict the multiple uses required ofthis space.

The fire support coordination line (FSCL) is a permissivefire control measure, established and adjusted by the landforce commander, in consultation with superior, subordinate,supporting, and affected commanders. It is not a boundary;synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL isthe responsibility of the establishing commander out to thelimits of the land force boundary. It applies to all fires ofair, land, or sea weapons systems using any type ofammunition against surface targets. Short of the FSCL,all fires are controlled by the land force commander. Beyondthe FSCL, coordination and restrictive measures are usedto avoid conflicting or redundant operations. Forcesattacking targets beyond the FSCL must inform all affectedcommanders to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide.

Land and naval force commanders designate the targetpriority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations withintheir AOs. These priorities, along with the JFC's theater-wide interdiction priorities are reflected in the apportionment(air) decision. The joint force air component commander(JFACC) will use these priorities to plan and execute thetheater-wide interdiction effort.

The JFACC is normally the supported commander for airinterdiction and counterair and may be the supportedcommander for strategic attack.

The joint force maritime component commander or Navycomponent commander is normally the supportedcommander for sea control operations.

Joint Operations in War

Fire Support CoordinationLine (FSCL)

Within their areas ofoperations, land and navalforce commanders areresponsible for thesynchronization ofmaneuver, fires, andinterdiction.

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PREPARING THE THEATER PROTECTION

ISOLATING THE ENEMY SPACE

MOVEMENT TO ATTAIN PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENTOPERATIONAL REACH

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

FORCE PROJECTION SPECIAL OPERATIONS

DIMENSIONAL SUPERIORITY PROTECTION

DIRECT ATTACK OF ENEMY STRATEGIC CENTERS OF GRAVITY

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

LINEAR AND NONLINEAR OPERATIONS

ATTACK OF ENEMY STRATEGIC CENTERS OF GRAVITY

SYNCHRONIZING MANEUVER AND INTERDICTION

INTERDICTION JOINT FIRE SUPPORT

COMBAT ASSESSMENT

JOINT OPERATIONS IN WAR

CONSIDERATIONS AT THEOUTSET OF COMBAT

SUSTAINED COMBAT

CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE

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Arms ControlCombatting TerrorismCounterdrug OperationsNation AssistanceNoncombatant Evacuation OperationsCivil Support OperationsPeace OperationsSupport to Insurgencies

ObjectiveUnity of EffortSecurityRestraintPerseveranceLegitimacy

Interagency OperationsCommand & ControlInformation GatheringConstraints & RestraintsTraining & EducationPost Conflict Operations

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

TYPES OF OPERATIONS

PLANNING

PRINCIPLES

Although military operations other than war are oftenconducted outside the United States, they also includemilitary support to US civil authorities.

Military operations otherthan war encompass awide range of activitieswhere the militaryinstrument of nationalpower is used for purposesother than the large-scalecombat operations usuallyassociated with war.

Military Operations Other Than War

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Multinational operations, both those that include combat andthose that do not, are conducted within the structure of analliance or coalition. An alliance is a result of formalagreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangementbetween two or more nations for common action.

US military operations areoften conducted with thearmed forces of othernations in pursuit ofcommon objectives.

Multinational Operations

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Rules of EngagementThe MediaLocal Law EnforcementCommand and ControlIntelligenceLogisticsProtection

National GoalsUnity of EffortDoctrine, Training, EquipmentCultural DifferencesManagement of ResourcesNational Communications

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONSCONSIDERATIONS

PLANNING & EXECUTIONCONSIDERATIONS

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Conclusion

This publication describes how to think about directing,planning, and conducting joint and multinational operations,as well as interagency operations, across the range of militaryoperations (war and operations other than war). It guidesthe planning and execution of combatant command strategy,campaigns, and joint operations.

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CHAPTER ITHE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

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1. Introduction

a. The above quote reflects the centralphilosophy necessary for successful jointoperations. Joint team success requiresunity of effort --common action throughoutthe joint force in pursuit of commonobjectives.

b. Joint Pub 3-0 provides guidance tojoint force commanders (JFCs) and theirsubordinates for the direction, planning,execution, and support of campaigns andoperations--in war and in operations otherthan war. This guidance includes:

• The strategic context within whichJFCs operate in supporting nationalsecurity policies and implementingnational military strategy.

• Principles, concepts, and othergeneral considerations that assistJFCs to integrate and synchronizeoperations and achieve unity of effort.

2. Security Environment

a. Contemporary threats faced by theArmed Forces of the United States are moreambiguous and regionally focused thanduring the Cold War. Combatant

commanders may confront a variety offactors that challenge the stability ofcountries and regions and threaten USnational interests and security within theirareas of responsibility (AORs). Theseinstabilities can lead to increased levels ofcompetition, a wide variety of attempts atintimidation, drug trafficking, insurgencies,regional conflicts, and civil war. It isdifficult to predict which nations or groupsmay threaten our interests and how andwhen such threats will emerge.

b. Even in a time of relative peace,geographic combatant commanders willbe challenged by regional factionsseeking to expand their influence bycoercion or force. Some of these potentialopponents have large, modern,conventional military forces equippedwith high-quality systems comparable tothose of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates. An adversary’s possession ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD);ballistic missiles; viable air, land, andnaval forces; and sophisticated specialoperations forces constantly challenge ageographic combatant commander’s abilityto deter armed conflict and, if necessary, tofight and win.

“The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. This doesnot mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Jointforce commanders choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea,space, and special operations forces at their disposal. The resulting teamprovides joint force commanders the ability to apply overwhelming force fromdifferent dimensions and directions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents.Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to enemyaction, while they rapidly and efficiently find and attack enemy weak points.Joint warfare is essential to victory.”

Joint Pub 1, “ Joint W arfare of the Armed Forces of the United States”

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c. Regional challenges will ofteninvolve an adversary whose system ofbeliefs interprets differently suchfundamental ideas as right and wrong, thevalue of human life, and the concept ofvictory and defeat. What appears to befanatical to US forces may be completelyrational to our opponent. Understandingcultural differences is important iffriendly forces are to establish the militaryconditions necessary to achieve strategicgoals.

3. Range of Military Operations

The United States acts to meet variouschallenges, protect national interests, andachieve strategic aims in a variety of waysdepending on the nature of the strategicenvironment. Figure I-1 shows the rangeof military operations.

a. War. When other instruments ofnational power (diplomatic, economic, andinformational) are unable or inappropriateto achieve national objectives or protectnational interests, the US national

leadership may decide to conductlarge-scale, sustained combat operationsto achieve national objectives or protectnational interests, placing the UnitedStates in a wartime state. In such cases,the goal is to win as quickly and with asfew casualties as possible, achievingnational objectives and concludinghostilities on terms favorable to the UnitedStates and its multinational partners.

b. Operations Other Than War.Operations other than war are an aspect ofmilitary operations that focus on deterringwar and promoting peace. Chapter V,“Military Operations Other Than War,”discusses operations other than war in moredetail.

• Military Operations Other ThanWar Involving the Use or Threat ofForce

•• In spite of efforts to promotepeace, conditions within a country orregion may result in armed conflict.When other instruments of national

Peace Enforcement / NEOStrikes / Raids / Show of Force

Counterterrorism / PeacekeepingCounterinsurgency

Deter War&

Resolve Conflict

PromotePeace

Antiterrorism / Disaster ReliefPeacebuilding

Nation AssistanceCivil Support / Counterdrug

NEO

MilitaryOperations

GeneralUS Goal Examples

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

War

OperationsOtherThanWar

Fight&

WinLarge-scale Combat Operations:

Attack / Defend / BlockadesCOMBAT

NONCOMBAT

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

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The Strategic Concept

power are unable to influence adeteriorating or potentially hostilesituation, military force may berequired to demonstrate US resolveand capability, support the otherinstruments of national power, orterminate the situation on favorableterms. The general goals of USmilitary operations during such periodsare to support national objectives,deter war, and return to a state ofpeace. Such operations involve agreater risk that US forces couldbecome involved in combat thanoperations conducted to promotepeace.

•• Combatant commanders, at thedirection of the National CommandAuthorities (NCA), may employ USforces to deter an adversary’s action.The physical presence of theseforces, coupled with their potentialemployment, can serve as a deterrentand facilitate achieving strategic aims.Should this deterrence fail, force maybe required to compel compliance,for example, in the form of raids orstrikes. Other such operations includepeace enforcement, counterterrorism,enforcement of sanctions, support toinsurgency and counterinsurgency,maritime interception, and evacuationof noncombatants.

•• At any point when force or thethreat of its use is contemplated, thoseresponsible for ordering, planning, orexecuting such action should rememberClausewitz’s dictum that the use offorce and violence introduces thefear, physical strain, and theuncertainty that are some of thehallmarks of the nature of warfare.Just as there are important political,diplomatic, and legal differencesbetween war and operations other than

war, there is also a singularlyimportant threshold where usingmilitary force of any kind or the threatof its use comes into play. In the rangeof military operations, this thresholdis the distinction between combatand noncombat operations.

• Military Operations Other ThanWar Not Involving the Use or Threatof Force. Use of military forces inpeacetime helps keep the day-to-daytensions between nations belowthe threshold of armed conflictand maintains US influence inforeign lands. Such operation include humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief, nation assistance,security assistance, foreign internaldefense, counterdrug operations,arms control, support to US domesticcivil authorities, evacuation ofnoncombatants, and peacekeeping.Such operations are typically jointin nature and may involve forward-presence forces or units deployed fromanother theater or continental UnitedStates (CONUS) or a combination ofboth. These operations, by definition,do not involve combat, but militaryforces always need to be prepared toprotect themselves and respond to achanging situation.

c. Simultaneous Nature of TheaterOperations

• Operations other than war caninvolve simultaneous actions withinan AOR. These actions may or maynot involve the use of force at times;part of the theater could also be in awartime state. In such situations,geographic combatant commandersshould pay particular attention tointegrating and coordinating theeffects and activities of forces toward

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a common purpose that supportsattaining theater, national, andmultinational strategic objectives.

• Some military operations may beconducted for one purpose. Disasterrelief operations, for example, arepeacetime military operations witha humanitarian purpose. A strikeor raid--such as Operation ELDORADO CANYON, the 1986 jointoperation to coerce Libya to conformwith international laws againstterrorism--can be an example of amilitary operation for a specificpurpose of compelling action ordeterrence. Often, however, militaryoperations will have multiplepurposes, such as the 1992-1993operations in Somalia (OperationsPROVIDE RELIEF and RESTOREHOPE) that combined humanitarianassistance efforts with peace enforce-ment operations.

• In war and operations other than war,combatan t commanders andsubordinate JFCs work with USambassadors, the Department ofState, and other agencies to bestintegrate the military with thediplomatic, economic, and infor-mational instruments of nationalpower.

4. National Strategic Direction

National security strategy and nationalmilitary strategy , shaped by and orientedon national security policies, providestrategic direction for combatantcommanders. Combatant commanders,in turn, provide guidance and directionthrough their combatant commandstrategies and plans for the employmentof military forces, in conjunction withinteragency and multinational forces, in theconduct of military operations. These

strategies integrate national and militaryobjectives (ends), national policies andmilitary concepts (ways), and nationalresources and military forces andsupplies (means). Figure I-2 illustratesnational strategic direction.

a. National Security Strategic Content.The United States approaches its globalcommitments with a strategy founded ondeterrence and buttressed by the capabilityto project power to safeguard its nationalinterests. Successful military operationsmay not, by themselves, achieve thedesired strategic end state. Militaryactivities across the full range of operationsneed to be synchronized with otherinstruments of national power andfocused on common national aims. (Seedefinition of national security strategy inglossary.)

b. National Military Strategy. (Seeglossary.) National military strategy isderived from the national security strategy.National military strategy attempts topromote peace, deter aggression, and,failing that, fight and win. But in thelarger context, defeating an enemy militaryforce is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, toensure a long-term solution to a crisis. Thenational military strategy and defensepolicy provide strategic guidance for theemployment of military forces. TheNational Military Strategy (NMS)provides advice of the Chairman, inconsultation with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff and the combatantcommanders, to the President, the NationalSecurity Council, and the Secretary ofDefense as to the recommended NMS andfiscally constrained force structure requiredto attain the national security objectives.The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan(JSCP) provides guidance for planningpurposes to the combatant commanders andthe Chiefs of the Services to accomplishtasks and missions based on current military

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capabilities. This guidance capitalizes onUS strengths and permits it to exploit theweaknesses of those who may threaten ournational interests. The JSCP provides acoherent framework for capabilities-basedmilitary advice provided to the NCA.

5. Executing National SecurityStrategy

In war and operations other than war,combatant commanders are the vital linkin the chain of command established bythe NCA (the President and Secretary ofDefense, or their duly deputized alternatesor successors). Directives flow from theNCA through the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff to the combatantcommanders, who plan and conduct the

operations that achieve national and allianceand/or coalition strategic objectives.

a. The Total Force

• To meet future requirements, theServices and US Special OperationsCommand (USSOCOM), underadditional authority established in title10, United States Code, section 167,have organized, trained, andequipped Active and Reservecomponent forces, military retirees,DOD civilian personnel, contractorp e r s o n n e l , a n d h o s t - n a t i o npersonnel. The Reserve and Activecomponents are fully integratedpartners in executing US militarystrategy. This total force policy

NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION

National Interests& Values

NATIONAL POLICIES

THEATERSTRATEGY

PLANS

NATIONAL SECURITYSTRATEGY

NATIONAL

NATIONAL MILITARYSTRATEGY

JOINT STRATEGICCAPABILITIES PLAN

Figure I-2. National Strategic Direction

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reinforces public support for USmilitary operations.

• Trained and ready forces that arerapidly and strategically deployableand initially self-sufficient arerequired for response to sponta-neous, unpredictable crises. Suchforces are usually drawn from theactive force structure and are tailoredinto joint organizations that capitalizeon the unique and complementarycapabilities of the Services andUSSOCOM. In many cases, Reservecomponent forces are required tofacilitate the deployment of such forcesor provide capabilities that arenecessary for a robust, versatile jointforce.

• Reserve component forces providethe Nation with unique andcomplementary capabilities in time ofwar or national emergency, or at suchother times as the national securityrequires. JFCs and their sub-ordinates should be knowledgeableof the capabilities and limitations ofboth Active and Reserve componentforces, blending them in such amanner as to maximize the overallcapability of the joint force. JFCs andtheir staffs need to be familiar withReserve component callup authorityand response times.

b. Military Operations as Part of aMultinational Force. Military operationsin regional crises may often involvecoalitions different from familiar,longstanding alliance structures. Jointforces should be prepared for combatoperations and operations other than warwith forces from other nations. Whenassessing the theater strategic environment,geographic combatant commanderscons ide r in te rna t iona l secur i t yagreements, formal and informal

command relationships with allies,collective security strategies, global andreg iona l s tab i l i t y , and reg iona linterrelationships. United Nationsresolutions may also provide the basis foruse of military force. See Chapter VI,“Multinational Operations” for moreinformation.

c . M i l i t a r y O p e r a t i o n s Wi t hNonmilitary Organizations

• Combatant commanders andsubordinate JFCs are likely tooperate with agencies representingother US instruments of nationalpower, with foreign governments, andw i t h n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l a n dinternational organizations in avariety of circumstances. Suchagencies and organizations oftenoperate employing “management” or“direction” rather than “command.”They may be the lead effort duringmany operations other than war, withmilitary organizations providingsupport. In the absence of a formalcommand structure, JFCs may berequired to build consensus toachieve unity of effort. In some cases,a lead agency is prescribed by law orregulation, or by agreement betweenthe agencies involved.

• The interagency environmentdoes not preclude establishingformal agreements between themilitary and civilian agencies ofgovernment. Such agreements cantake the form of memorandums ofunderstanding or terms of reference.Heads of agencies and authorizedmilitary commanders negotiateand co-sign plans. Robust liaisonfacilitates understanding, coordina-tion, and mission accomplishment.

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• Forces and supplies deploy into theoperational area in a timely mannerto support the JFC’s concept ofoperations.

e. Combatant Commands

• With the advice and assistance of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,the President, through the Secretaryof Defense, establishes combatant(unified or specified) commands forthe performance of military missionsand prescribes the force structure ofsuch commands. Commanders ofc o m b a t a n t c o m m a n d s a r eresponsible to the NCA for thepreparedness of their commands andfor the accomplishment of themilitary missions assigned to them.

• The NCA exercise authority andcontrol of the armed forces througha single chain of command with twodistinct branches. The first runsfrom the President, to the Secretaryof Defense, directly to thec o m m a n d e r s o f c o m b a t a n tcommands for missions and forcesassigned to their commands. Thesecond branch, used for purposesother than operational direction offorces assigned to the combatantcommands, runs from the Presidentthrough the Secretary of Defense tothe Secretaries of the MilitaryD e p a r t m e n t s. C o m b a t a n tcommanders are therefore the vitallink between those who determinenational security policy and strategyand the military forces that conductmilitary operations designed to achievenational strategic objectives.

• The term “combatant commander”refers to the commander in chief(CINC) of both geographically andfunctionally organized combatant

d. National Strategic Direction. TheNCA , through the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, direct the national effortthat supports combatant and subordinatecommanders to ensure:

“Our military forces are one team—inthe game to win regardless of whocarries the ball. This is no time for‘‘Fancy Dans” who won’t hit the line withall they have on every play, unless theycan call the signals. Each player onthis team—whether he shines in thespotlight of the backfield or eats dirt inthe line—must be an all-American.”

General Omar N. Bradley, USA:Statement to the House Armed

Services Committee,19 Oct 1949

• Milit ary objectives are defined,understood, and achievable.

• Active Service forces are ready forcombat and Reserve componentforces are appropriately mobilized andreadied to join active forces.

• Intelligence systems and efforts focuson the operational area, includingopposing nations and their armedforces.

• Strategic direction is current andtimely.

• Defense and other governmentalagencies support the JFC’semployment of forces.

• The CONUS base and othercombatant commands are ready toprovide needed support.

• Allies and coalition partners areavailable when appropriate.

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commands. The term “geographiccombatant commander” refers to acombatant commander with ageographic AOR assigned by the NCA.Functional combatant commanderssupport geographic combatantc o m m a n d e r s o r m a y c o n d u c toperations in direct support of theNCA.

• Based on guidance and direction fromthe NCA, combatant commandersp repar e s t ra teg ic es t imates ,strategies, and plans to accomplishthe missions assigned by higherauthority. Supporting combatantcommanders and their subordinatesensure that their actions are consistentwith the supported commander’sstrategy.

• Genera l respons ib i l i t i es fo rcomba tan t commande rs a reestablished by law (title 10, UnitedStates Code, section 164) andexpressed in the Unified CommandPlan and Joint Pub 0-2, “UnifiedAction Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

6. The Estimate Process andStrategy

a. The term “estimate” implies aone-sided evaluation of a two or more sidedissue where many of the pertinent facts areunknown or distorted. The estimate assistsin clarifying problems and devisingintegrated solutions to complex problems,thus reducing surprise and shock. Acontinuous estimate process provides aframework for disciplined reason evenunder the most trying circumstances. Theestimate is the central focus for strategic,operational, and tactical analysis that needsto be maintained over time and in the faceof continuing change. The first questionsin any estimate are the following: What isthe mission? What is the desired end state?

What has changed? What are the resultingpossibilities and consequences?

b. Combatant commanders developand modify strategic estimates based ontheir assigned tasks after reviewing thestrategic environment, the variousthreats, the nature of anticipatedoperations, national and alliancestrategic direction, and forces available.Func t i ona l l y o r i en ted comba tan tcommanders develop estimates for eachtheater they support. Operations in onetheater often affect other theaters. Theinterrelationships among theaters,therefore, are important in the assessmentof a theater’s strategic environment anddevelopment of the strategic estimate.

c. The estimate process is continuous,with the combatant commander’s staffcontributing to the product. The strategicestimate itself acts as the basis for strategy,plans, and actions that occur in responseto deliberate taskings or crises. Where asubordinate commander’s estimate of thesituation is typically used for near-termdecisions and may lead to an operation plan,the combatant commander’s strategicestimate results in operational conceptsand courses of action--broad statements ofwhat is to be accomplished. One of thecritical parts of the estimate process isdefining the strategic end state to beachieved.

d. Supported by the strategicestimate(s), combatant commandersdevelop strategies consistent withnational policy and plans. These strategiestranslate national and multinationaldirection into concepts to meet strategicand joint operation planningrequirements. Combatant commanders’plans provide strategic direction; assignmissions, tasks, forces, and resources;designate objectives; provide authoritativedirection; promulgate rules of engagement

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(ROE) (approved by the NCA); establishconstraints and restraints; and definepolicies and concepts to be integrated intosubordinate or supporting plans. ChapterIII, “Planning Joint Operations,” discussescombatant command strategic planning inmore detail. Appendix B, “The EstimateProcess,” provides a format for a strategicestimate.

7. The Strategic Goal andConflict Termination

a. Proper l y conce ived con f l i c ttermination criteria are key to ensuringthat victories achieved with militaryforce endure. To facilitate conception ofeffective termination criteria, US forcesmust be dominant in the final stages ofan armed conflict by achieving theleverage sufficient to impose a lastingsolution.

b. The design and implementation ofleverage and knowing how and when toterminate a conflict are involved inoperational art and are discussed inChapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.”Because the nature of the termination willshape the futures of the contesting nations,it is fundamentally important to understandthat conflict termination is an essentiallink between national security strategy,NMS, and posthostility aims--the desiredoutcome. This principle holds true for bothwar and military operations other than war.

• Political Considerations. There aretwo general means for obtainingobjectives by force. The first seeksdomination or overthrow of theopponent’s military strength andpolitical policy--an imposed settle-ment. The second seeks concessionthrough coordinated military andnegotiating actions. War is aninstrument of policy. Negotiatingpower in armed conflict springs from

two sources: military success andmilitary potential. Military successprovides military, geographic, political,psychological, or economic advantageand the quid pro quo for negotiations.Military potential establishes thethreat of further advantage accruing tothe possessor, which forces theopposing nation to consider anegotiated conclusion. Negotiating anadvantageous conclusion to conflictrequires time and power and thedemonstrated will to use both. Inaddition to imposed and negotiatedtermination, there is an armistice ort ruce , wh ich i s a negot ia tedintermission in hostilities, not a peace.In effect, it is a device to buy timepending negotiation of a permanentsettlement or resumption of hostilities.A nation needs to consider theadvantages accruing to a truce and theprospects for its supervision.

•• Even when pursuing an imposedtermination, the government requiressome means of communication withthe opponent(s). Declarations ofintentions, requirements, and minorconcessions may speed conflicttermination, as the enemy considers theadvantages of early termination versusextended resistance in the light offading leverage.

•• The issue of conflict terminationcenters on national will and freedomof action. Once the opponent’sstrategic aim shifts from maintainingor extending gains to reducing losses,the possibilities for negotiating anadvantageous termination improve.Military, economic, diplomatic, andinformational effort need to becoordinated toward causing that shiftand, once made, toward exploiting it.Conflict termination should beconsidered from the outset of

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planning and should be refined as theconflict moves toward advantageoustermination.

• Military Considerations

•• In its strategic context, militaryv i c t o r y i s m e a s u r e d i n t h eachievement of the overall politicalaim and associated terminationobjectives. Operational and tacticalvictory is measured by its contributionto strategic success. Military objectivesmay differ significantly for a negotiatedsettlement than for an imposed one.Military strategic advice to politicalauthorities regarding national militaryobjectives for termination shouldinclude estimates of militaryfeasibility, adequacy, and accept-ability and estimates of the time,

costs, and military forces required toachieve the objectives. Implementingmilitary commanders need tounderstand the overall political aim andmilitary objectives for termination andshould request clarification fromhigher authority in the absence of thepolitical authorities.

•• Another military consideration isthe follow up political exploitation ofcompleted military action and themilitary role in the transition topeace. This exploitation includesmatters such as military government,civil affairs, and humanitarianassistance and requires earlyplanning and coordination bothat the national level and in theateramong diplomatic, military, andpolitical leadership.

Coalition commanders communicate war termination conditions to Iraqimilitary leadership during Operation DESERT STORM.

II-1

CHAPTER IIFUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

“As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it issynonymous with joint warfare.”

Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States”

1. General

a. Joint operations doctrine reflects thenature of modern warfare and thestrategic requirements of our nation. Itis built on a sound base of warfightingtheory and practical experience. It appliesthe principles of war (Figure II-1 andAppendix A, “Principles of War”), thefundamentals of joint warfare (asdeveloped in Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfareof the Armed Forces of the United States,”Chapter III), and other key conceptsconsistent with the policies of ourgovernment. It seeks to provide JFCs witha broad range of options to defeat an enemyin war or to conduct operations other thanwar. It is a doctrine that recognizes thefundamental and beneficial effects ofteamwork and unity of effort , and thesynchronization of military operations intime, space, and purpose. The firstfundamental for employment of UnitedStates joint forces is to achieve strategicaims as rapidly as possible, with the leastpossible loss of American lives.

b. Advances in technology are likelyto continue to increase the tempo,lethality, and depth of warfare. Jointdoctrine should be flexible enough torecognize the impact of emergingtechnologies and integrate emergingadvances that may provide the ArmedForces of the United States with a decisiveadvantage.

2. The Levels of War

a. General

• The levels of war are doctrinalperspectives that clarify the linksbetween strategic objectives andtactical actions. Although there are nofinite limits or boundaries betweenthem, the three levels, in general, arestrategic, operational, and tactical.They apply to both war and operationsother than war.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

OFFENSIVE

MASS

ECONOMY OF FORCE

MANEUVER

UNITY OF COMMAND

SECURITY

SURPRISE

SIMPLICITY

OBJECTIVE

Figure II-1. Principles of War

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• Levels of command, size of units,types of equipment, or types of forcesor components are not associatedwith a particular level . Nationalassets such as intelligence andcommunications satellites, previouslyconsidered principally in a strategiccontext, are an important adjunct totactical operations. Actions can bedefined as strategic, operational, ortactical based on their effect orcontribution to achieving strategic,operational, or tactical objectives,but many times the accuracy of theselabels can only be determined duringhistorical studies.

• Advances in technology, informationage media reporting, and the com-pression of time-space relationshipscontribute to the growing inter-relationships between the levelsof war. The levels of war helpcommanders visualize a logical flowof operations, allocate resources, andassign tasks to the appropriatecommand. However, commanders atevery level must be aware thatin a world of constant, immediatecommunications, any single eventmay cut across the three levels.

b. The Strategic Level

• The strategic level is that level of warat which a nation, often as a memberof a group of nations, determinesnational or multinational (alliance orcoa l i t i on ) s t ra teg ic secur i t yobjectives and guidance and developsand uses national resources toaccomplish these objectives. Strategyis the art and science of developing andemploying armed forces and otherinstruments of national power in asynchronized fashion to secure nationalor multinational objectives. The NCAtranslate policy into national strategic

military objectives. These militaryobjectives facilitate theater strategicplanning.

• A geographic combatant commanderusually participates in discussions withthe NCA through the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff and with allies andcoalition members. The theaterstrategy is thus an element that relatesto both US national strategy andoperational activities within the theater.Strategy, derived from policy, is thebasis for all operations.

c. The Operational Level

• The operational level links thetactical employment of forces tostrategic objectives. The focus at thislevel is on operational art--the use ofmilitary forces to achieve strategicgoals through the design, organization,integration, and conduct of strategies,campaigns, major operations, andbattles. Operational art determineswhen, where, and for what purposemajor forces will be employed andshould influence the enemy dispositionbefore combat. It governs thedeployment of those forces, theircommitment to or withdrawal frombattle, and the arrangement of battlesand major operations to achieveoperational and strategic objectives.

• Operational art helps commandersuse resources ef ficiently andeffectively to achieve strategicobjectives. It provides a framework toassist commanders in ordering theirthoughts when designing campaignsand major operations. Operational arthelps commanders understand theconditions for victory before seekingbattle, thus avoiding unnecessarybattles. Without operational art, warwould be a set of disconnected

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engagements, with relative attrition theonly measure of success or failure.

• Operational art requires broad vision,the ability to anticipate, and effectivejoint and multinational cooperation.Operational art is practiced not onlyby JFCs but also by their seniorstaff officers and subordinatecommanders. Joint operational artlooks not only at the employment ofmilitary for ces but also at thearrangement of their efforts in time,space, and purpose. Joint operationalart , in particular, focuses on thefundamental methods and issuesassociated with the synchronization ofair, land, sea, space, and specialoperations forces. Operational art isdiscussed in greater detail in ChapterIII, “Planning Joint Operations.”

• Among many considerations,operational art requires commanders toanswer the following questions:

•• What military (or related politicaland social) conditions must beproduced in the operational area toachieve the strategic goal? (Ends)

•• What sequence of actions is mostlikely to produce that condition?(Ways)

•• How should the resources of thejoint force be applied to accomplishthat sequence of actions? (Means)

•• What is the likely cost or risk tothe joint force in performing thatsequence of actions?

d. The Tactical Level. Tactics is theemployment of units in combat. Itincludes the ordered arrangement andmaneuver of units in relation to each other

and/or to the enemy in order to use theirfull potential. An engagement is normallyshort in duration and fought betweensmall forces, such as individual aircraft inair-to-air combat. Engagements include awide variety of actions between opposingforces in the air, on and under the sea, or onland. A battle consists of a set of relatedengagements. Battles typically lastlonger; involve larger forces such as fleets,armies, and air forces; and could affect thecourse of a campaign.

3. Unified Action

a. Whereas the term “joint operations”is primarily concerned with the coordinatedactions of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates, the term “unified action” has abroader connotation. The concept ofunified action (sometimes referred to asunified operations) is illustrated in FigureII-2 and highlights the synchronizedapplication of all of the instruments ofnational and multinational power andincludes the actions of nonmilitaryorganizations as well as military forces.

b. All JFCs are responsible for unifiedactions that are planned and conducted inaccordance with the guidance and directionreceived from senior authorities (i.e., NCA,alliance or coalition leadership, superiorcommander). JFCs should ensure thattheir joint operations are synchronizedin time, space, and purpose with theactions of other military forces(multinational operations) and nonmilitaryorganizations (government agencies suchas the Agency for InternationalDevelopment (AID), nongovernmentalorganizations such as religious reliefagencies, corporations, internationalagencies such as the International RedCross, and even the United Nations).Activities and operations with suchnonmilitary organizations can be complex

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capabilities--is required to generatedecisive joint combat power. JFCssynchronize these capabilities andcontributions in time, space, and purpose.

b. To achieve assigned objectives, jointforces conduct campaigns and majoroperations. Functional and Servicecomponents of the joint force conductsubordinate and supporting operations,not independent campaigns.

“Campaigns represent the art of linkingbattles and engagements in anoperational design . . . oriented on theenemy’s strategic and operationalcenters of gravity . . . They serve asthe unifying focus for our conduct ofwarfare . . . Campaigns of the ArmedForces of the United States are joint.”

Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of theArmed Forces of the United

States”

and may require considerable effort byJFCs, their staffs, and subordinatecommanders, especially during operationsother than war.

c. Combatant commanders typicallyplay a pivotal role in unifying actions (allof the elements and actions that compriseunified actions are normally present at theCINC’s level). Subordinate JFCs alsosynchronize their operations directly withthe activities and operations of otherm i l i t a r y f o r c e s a n d n o n m i l i t a r yorganizations in the operational area.

4. Joint Warfare

a. The integration of all US militarycapabilities--often in conjunction withforces from other nations, other USagencies, nongovernmental organizations,and United Nations forces and

UNIFIED ACTION

SUPPORTINGJOINT

OPERATIONS

MULTINATIONALOPERATIONS

OPERATIONS WITHUS GOVERNMENT

AGENCIES

OPERATIONS WITHNONGOVERNMENT UNITED NATIONS

OPERATIONS

JOINTOPERATIONS

The concept of unified action highlights the integrated and synchronized activities of military forces andnonmilitary organizations, agencies, and corporations to achieve common objectives, though in commonparlance joint operations increasingly has this connotation (the "joint warfare is team warfare" context ofJoint Pub 1). Unified actions are planned and conducted by joint force commanders in accordance withguidance and direction received from the National Command Authorities, multinational organizations, andsuperior commanders.

Figure II-2. Unified Action

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c. The overarching operational conceptin Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the ArmedForces of the United States,” is that JFCssynchronize the actions of air, land, sea,space, and special operations forces toachieve strategic and operationalobjectives through integrated, jointcampaigns and major operations. Thegoal is to increase the total effectiveness ofthe joint force, not necessarily to involveall forces or to involve all forces equally.Campaigns reflect the nature of theoperation directed by the NCA (strategicnuclear, peacekeeping, and conventionaloperations, among others).

5. Command Relationships

For detailed guidance, refer to Joint Pub0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF).”

a. General

• The NCA exercise authority andcontrol of the armed forces througha single chain of command with twodistinct branches, as shown in FigureII-3. The first runs from thePresident, to the Secretary ofDefense, directly to the commandersof combatant commands for missionsand forces assigned to their commands.The second branch, used for purposesother than operational direction offorces assigned to the combatantcommand, runs from the President tothe Secretary of Defense to theSecretaries of the MilitaryD e p a r t m e n t s. T h e M i l i t a r yDepartments, organized separately,each operate under the authority,direction, and control of the Secretary

CHAIN OF COMMAND

President

Secretary of Defense

Commanders of CombatantCommands

(for missions and forces assignedto their commands)

Chiefs of the Services(for forces not specifically assigned

to combatant commanders)

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments

Figure II-3. Chain of Command

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of Defense. The Secretaries of theMilitary Departments exercise theauthority, direction, and controlthrough the individual Chiefs of theServices of their forces that are notspecifically assigned to combatantcommanders.

• The authority vested in the MilitaryDepartments in the performance oftheir role to “organize, train, equip, andprovide” forces runs from thePresident to the Secretary of Defenseto the Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments to the Chiefs of theServices forces. This administrativecontrol recognizes the preparationof military forces and theiradministration and support, unlesssuch responsibilities are specificallyassigned by the Secretary ofDefense to another component ofthe Department of Defense. Theresponsibilities and authority exercisedby the Military Departments are subjectby law to the authority provided to thecommanders of combatant commandsin their exercise of their combatantcommand authority.

• Unity of effort in joint forces isenhanced through the application ofthe flexible range of commandrelationships identified in Joint Pub0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF).” Joint force commandrelationships are an array of optionsJFCs can use to adapt the organizationof assigned forces to situationalrequirements and arrange componentoperations in time, space, and purpose.

b. Combatant Command (CommandAuthority) (COCOM)

• COCOM is the command authorityover assigned forces vested only inthe commanders of combatant

commands by title 10, US Code,Section 164, or as directed by thePresident in the Unified CommandPlan, and cannot be delegated ortransferred.

• Basic Authority. As shown in FigureII-4, COCOM is the authority of acombatant commander to performthose functions of command overassigned forces involving organizingand employing commands and forces,assigning tasks, designating objectives,and giving authoritative direction overall aspects of military operations, jointtraining (or in the case of USSOCOM,training of assigned forces), andlogistics necessary to accomplish themissions assigned to the command.COCOM should be exercised throughthe commanders of subordinateorganizations. Normally, this authorityis exercised through the subordinateJFCs, Service, and/or functionalcomponent commanders. COCOMprovides full authority to organizeand employ commands and forces as

COMBATANT COMMAND(COMMAND AUTHORITY)

BASIC AUTHORITY

Organizing and employingcommands and forces.

Assigning tasks.

Designating objectives.

Directing military operations,joint training, and logistics.

Figure II-4. Combatant Command(Command Authority)

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the combatant commander considersnecessary to accomplish assignedmissions.

• Combatant commanders mayexercise COCOM:

•• Through Service componentcommanders.

•• Through functional componentcommanders, if established for aparticular purpose, such as the specialoperations component.

•• Through a commander of asubordinate unif ied command(unified command only).

•• Through the commander of a jointtask force (JTF) reporting directly tothe CINC.

•• Through a single-Service forcecommander reporting directly to theCINC. Normally, missions requiringoperations of a single-Service forcewill be assigned to the applicableService component commander. ACINC may establish a separatesingle-Service force but normallydoes so only under exceptionalcircumstances.

•• Directly over specific operationalforces that, because of the missionassigned and the urgency of thesituation, must remain immediatelyresponsive to the CINC.

• Directive Authority for LogisticMatters. Commanders of combatantcommands may exercise directiveauthority for logistics (or delegatedirective authority for a common-support capability). The exercise ofdirective authority for logistics by a

combatant commander includes theauthority to issue directives tosubordinate commanders, includingpeacetime measures, necessary toensure the following: effectiveexecution of approved operation plans;effectiveness and economy ofoperation; and prevention orelimination of unnecessary duplicationof facilities and overlapping offunctions among the Servicecomponent commands.

c. Operational Control (OPCON)

• OPCON may be exercised at anyechelon at or below the level of thecombatant command and can bedelegated or transferred. OPCONis inherent in COCOM and is theauthority to perform those functionsof command over subordinate forcesinvolving organizing and employingcommands and forces, assigningtasks, designating objectives, andgiving authoritat ive directionnecessary to accomplish the mission.OPCON includes authoritativedirection over all aspects of militaryoperations and joint training necessaryto accomplish assigned missions.

• OPCON should be exercised throughthe commanders of subordinateorganizations; normally, this authorityis exercised through subordinate JFCsand Service and/or functionalcomponent commanders. OPCON inand of itself does not includeauthoritative direction for logistics ormatters of administration, discipline,internal organization, or unit training.OPCON does include the authorityto delineate functional respon-sibilities and geographic jointoperations areas of subordinate JFCs.

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d. Tactical Control (TACON)

• TACON is the command authorityover assigned or attached forcesor commands, or military capabilityor forces made available for tasking,that is limited to the detailed andusually local direction and control ofmovements or maneuvers necessaryto accomplish assigned missions ortasks. TACON may be exercisedby commanders at any echelon at orbelow the level of combatantcommand. TACON does not provide

organizational authority or authori-tative direction for administrative andlogistic support; the commander of theparent unit continues to exercise thoseresponsibilities unless otherwisespecified in the establishing directive.

• TACON is typically exercised byfunctional component commandersover military capability or forces madeavailable for tasking.

e. Support

• Support is a command authority. Asupport relationship is established bya superior commander betweensubordinate commanders when oneorganization should aid, protect,complement, or sustain another force.Support may be exercised bycommanders at any echelon at or belowthe level of combatant command. TheNCA establish such relationshipsbetween combatant commanders whendeployment and execution orders are

issued to ensure the combatantcommander tasked to achieve nationalobjectives receives the support neededfrom other combatant commanders.JFCs may establish supportrelationships within the joint forceto enhance unity of effort for givenoperational tasks, emphasize or clarifypriorities, provide a subordinate withan additional capability, or combine theeffects of similar assets.

The commander of an Amphibious Task Force may exercise tacticalcontrol over attached forces for specific operations.

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•• Mutual Support . Mutual supportis the action that units render each otheragainst an enemy because of theirassigned tasks, their position relativeto each other and to the enemy, andtheir inherent capabilities.

•• General Support. General supportis the action that is given to thesupported force as a whole rather thanto a particular subdivision thereof.

•• Direct Support. Direct support isa mission requiring a force to supportanother specific force and authorizingit to answer directly the supportedforce’s request for assistance.

•• Close Support. Close support is theaction of the supporting force againsttargets or objectives that aresufficiently near the supported force asto require detailed integration orcoordination of the supporting actionwith fire, movement, or other actionsof the supported force.

• Establishing supported and sup-porting relationships betweencomponents is a useful option toaccomplish needed tasks. Eachsubordinate element of the joint forcecan support or be supported by otherelements.

• As defined in Joint Pub 0-2, “UnifiedAction Armed Forces (UNAAF),”“Unless limited by the establishingdirective, the commander of thesupported force will have the authorityto exercise general direction of thesupporting effort. General directionincludes the designation andprioritization of targets or objectives,timing and duration of the supportingaction, and other instructions necessaryfor coordination and efficiency.” Thesupporting commander has the

responsibility to ascertain the needsof the supported commander andtake such action to fulfill them as iswithin existing capabilities, consistentwith priorities and requirements ofother assigned tasks.

• The establishing directive indicatesthe purpose in terms of the effectdesired and the scope of the action tobe taken. It also should include:

•• The forces and resources allocatedto the supporting effort.

•• The time, place, level, and durationof the supporting effort.

•• The priority of the supportingmission relative to the other missionsof the supporting force.

•• The authority , if any, of the sup-porting force to modify the supportingeffort in the event of exceptionalopportunity or an emergency.

•• The degree of authority grantedto the supported commander over thesupporting effort.

f. Other Authorities

• Administrative Control (ADCON).ADCON is the direction or exerciseof authority over subordinate orother organizations in respect toadmin i s t ra t i on a n d suppor tincluding organization of Serviceforces, control of resources andequipment, personnel management,unit logistics, individual and unittraining, readiness, mobilization,demobilization, and discipline andother matters not included in theoperational missions of the subordinateor other organizations. ADCON issynonymous with administration and

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support responsibilities identified intitle 10, US Code. This is the authoritynecessary to fulfill MilitaryDepartment statutory responsibilitiesfor administration and support.ADCON may be delegated to andexercised by commanders of Serviceforces assigned to a combatantcommander at any echelon at or belowthe level of Service componentcommand. ADCON is subject to thecommand authority of combatantcommanders.

• C o o r d i n a t i n g A u t h o r i t y .Coordinating authority is aconsultation relationship betweencommanders, not an authority bywhich command may be exercised.Coordinating authority may beexercised by commanders orindividuals at any echelon at or belowthe level of combatant command.Coordinating authority is theauthority delegated to a commanderor individual for coordinatingspecific functions and activitiesinvolving forces of two or moreServices, functional components, ortwo or more forces of the same Service.The commander or individual has theauthority to require consultationbetween the agencies involved butdoes not have the authority tocompel agreement. The common taskto be coordinated will be specified inthe establishing directive withoutdisturbing the normal organizationalrelationships in other matters.Coordinating authority is moreapplicable to planning and similaractivities than to operations.Coordinating authority is not in anyway tied to force assignment. It willbe assigned based on the missions andcapabilities of the commands ororganizations involved.

• D i re c t L i a i s o n A u t h o r i z e d(DIRLAUTH). DIRLAUTH is thatauthority granted by a commander (anylevel) to a subordinate to directlyconsult or coordinate an action witha command or agency within oroutside of the granting command.DIRLAUTH is more applicable toplanning than operations and alwayscarries with it the requirement ofkeeping the commander grantingDIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTHis a coordination relationship, not anauthority through which commandmay be exercised.

6. Organization of Forces

For detailed guidance, refer to Joint Pub0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF).”

a. General

• JFCs have full authority to assignmissions, redirect efforts, and directcoordination among subordinatecommanders. JFCs should allowService tactical and operationalgroupings to function generally as theywere designed. The intent is to meetthe needs of JFCs, while maintainingthe tactical and operational integrity ofService organizations.

• Joint forces are specificallydesignated, composed of significantelements, assigned or attached, oftwo or more Military Departments,and commanded by a JFC with ajoint staff. Joint forces includecombatant commands, subordinateunified commands, and joint taskforces. An appropriate order assignsor attaches personnel and units to jointforces.

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• The manner in which JFCs organizetheir forces directly af fects theresponsiveness and versatility ofjoint force operations. The firstprinciple in joint force organization isthat JFCs organize forces toaccomplish the mission based on theJFCs’ vision and concept of operations.Unity of effort, centralized planning,and decentralized execution are keyconsiderations. JFCs may elect tocentralize selected functions withinthe joint force, but should striveto avoid reducing the versatility,responsiveness, and initiative ofsubordinate forces.

• Organization of joint forces also needto take into account interoperabilitywith multinational forces. Complexor unclear command relationships andorganizations can be counterproductiveto developing synergy amongmultinational forces. Simplicity andclarity of expression are critical.

b. Combatant Commands

• A combatant command is a unifiedor specified command with a broadcontinuing mission under a singlecommander established and sodesignated by the President, throughthe Secretary of Defense, and with theadvice and assistance of the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Combatant commands typically haveg e o g r a p h i c o r f u n c t i o n a lresponsibilities.

• The UCP defines geographic AORsfor selected combatant commands,including all associated land, waterareas, and airspace. Such AORs arereferred to as theaters. By establishinggeographic combatant commands(theater commands), the NCA

decentralize the authority to plan,prepare, and conduct militaryoperations within that theater to thegeographic combatant commander,consistent with strategic guidance anddirection.

• Other combatant commanders areassigned functional responsibilitiessuch as transportation, specialoperations, or strategic operations.Functionally oriented combatantcommands can operate across allgeographic regions or can provideforces for assignment to othercombatant commanders. Thesecombatant commands can also conductoperations while reporting directly tothe NCA.

• Combatant commanders receivestrategic direction from the NCAthrough the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff and are responsible tothe Secretary of Defense foraccomplishing assigned missions.

• Combatant commanders maydirectly control the conduct ofmilitary operations or may delegatethat authority and responsibility toa subordinate commander. Such anarrangement allows the subordinatecommander to control operations whilethe combatant commander supports theoperation with forces and resources.This relationship is frequently referredto as a two-tiered system, and wassuccessfully employed in OperationsURGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983),JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989), andUPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti,1994).

• The two types of combatan tcommands are unified and specified.

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c. Unified Commands

• Unified commands are typicallyestablished when a broad continuingmission exists requiring execution

by significant forces of two ormore Military Departments andnecessitating single strategicdirection or other criteria found inJoint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action ArmedForces (UNAAF),” are met.

• The commanders of unifiedcommands may establish:

•• Subordinate unified commandswhen authorized through the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conductoperations on a continuing basis.

•• Functional component commandswhen such a command structureenhances the overall capability toaccomplish the mission of theestablishing commander. Functionalcomponent commands may also beestablished by commanders ofsubordinate unified commands andJTFs.

•• JTFs to accomplish missions withspecific, limited objectives and whichdo not require overall centralizedcontrol of logistics. JTFs may also beestablished by the Secretary of Defense

and commanders of subordinate unifiedcommands and existing JTFs.

d. Specified Commands

• Specified commands are normallycomposed of forces from oneMilitary Department , but mayinclude units and staff representationfrom other Military Departments.

• The commander of a specifiedcommand has the same authority andresponsibilities as the commander ofa unified command except that noauthority exists to establish subordinateunified commands.

e. Subordinate Unified Commands.When authorized through the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders ofunified commands may establishsubordinate unified commands (alsocalled subunified commands) to conduct

US Central Command forces conducting training operationsin geographic area of responsibility.

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operations on a continuing basis inaccordance with the criteria set forth forunified commands. A subordinate unifiedcommand may be established on ageographic area or functional basis.Commanders of subordinate unifiedcommands have functions and respon-sibilities similar to those of thecommanders of unified commands andexercise OPCON of assigned commandsand forces within the assigned jointoperations area (JOA) or functional area.

f. Joint Task Forces

• A JTF is a joint force that isconstituted and so designated by theSecretary of Defense, a combatantcommander, a subordinate unifiedcommand commander, or an existingJTF commander.

• Commanders of JTFs (CJTFs) areresponsible to the JTF-establishingauthority and exercise OPCON overassigned forces and normally exerciseOPCON over attached forces. JTFstaffs are normally augmented withrepresentatives from componentcommands of the establishingheadquarters.

• JTF operations are normallyoperational in nature, conducted toachieve operational-level objectives.

• A JTF is dissolved by the properauthority when the purpose for whichit was created has been achieved orwhen it is no longer required.

g. Service Components

• All joint forces include Servicecomponents. Administrative andlogistic support for joint forcesare provided through Service

components. The JFC also mayconduct operations through theService component commanders, orat lower echelons, Service forcecommanders. Service forces may beassigned or attached to subordinatejoint forces without the formal creationof a Service component of that jointforce. This relationship is appropriatewhen stability, continuity, economy,ease of long-range planning, and scopeof operations dictate organizationalintegrity of Service components.These conditions apply when most ofthe required functions in a particulardimension are unique to a single-Service force, or when Service forcecapabilities or responsibilities do notsignificantly overlap.

• Conducting operations throughService components has certainadvantages, which include clearand uncomplicated commandlines. Logistics remain a Serviceresponsibility, with the exception ofarrangements described in Servicesupport agreements or as otherwisedirected by the combatant commander.

• Responsibilities of the Servicecomponent commander include:

•• Making recommendations to theJFC on the proper employment of theforces of the Service component.

•• Accomplishing such operationalmissions as may be assigned.

•• Selecting and nominating specificunits of the parent Service componentfor assignment to subordinate forces.Unless otherwise directed, these unitsrevert to the control of the Servicecomponent commander when suchsubordinate forces are dissolved.

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•• Other responsibilities as discussedin Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified ActionArmed Forces (UNAAF).”

• Regardless of the organizational andcommand arrangements within jointcommands, Service componentcommanders retain responsibilityfor certain Service-specific functionsand other matters affecting their forces,including internal administration,training, logistics, and Serviceintelligence operations.

• T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e ncommanders of Service forces isdetermined by the JFC. In additionto logistic support arrangements, onecomponent may support another withforces or operations in a variety ofcommand relationships as previouslydescribed.

h. Functional Components

• JFCs may establish functionalcomponents to provide centralizeddirection and control of certainfunctions and types of operationswhen it is feasible and necessary to fixresponsibility for certain normal,continuing functions, or when it isappropriate and desirable to establishthe authority and responsibility of asubordinate commander. Theseconditions apply when the scope ofoperations requires that the similarcapabilities and functions offorces from more than one Servicebe directed toward closelyrelated objectives and unity ofcommand and effort are primaryconsiderations. For example, whenthe scope of operations is large, andJFCs need to divide their attentionbetween major operations or phases ofoperations that are functionallydominated--and synchronize those

operations--it may be useful toestablish functionally orientedcommanders responsible for the majoroperations. JFCs may conductoperations through functionalcomponents or employ themprimarily to coordinate selectedfunctions. (NOTE: Functionalcomponent commands are componentcommands of a joint force and do notconstitute a “joint force” with theauthorities and responsibilities of ajoint force as described in thisdocument even when composed offorces from two or more Services.)

• Functional componency can beappropriate when forces from two ormore Services operate in the samedimension or medium. A joint forceland component commander (JFLCC)i s one examp le . Func t i ona lcomponent staffs should be joint withService representation in approximateproportion to the mix of subordinateforces. Functional component staffsrequire advanced planning forefficient operations. Joint staff billetsfor needed expertise and individuals tofill those billets should be identified.Such individuals should be used whenjoint staffs are formed for exercises andactual operations. Liaison elementsfrom and to other componentsfacilitate coordination.

• The nature of operations, mix ofService forces, and command andcontrol capabilities are normallyprimary factors in selecting thefunctional component commander.

• Functional component commanders-- such as the joint force air componentcommander (JFACC), the JFLCC, thejoint force maritime componentcommander (JFMCC), and thejoint force special operations

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component commander (JFSOCC) --have the responsibilities ofboth superior and subordinatecommanders as described in JointPub 0-2, “Unified Action ArmedForces (UNAAF).”

• The JFC must designate the militarycapability that will be made avail-able for tasking by the functionalcomponent commander and theappropriate command relation-ship(s) the functional com-ponentcommander will exercise over thatmilitary capability (e.g., a JFSOCCnormally has OPCON of assignedforces and a JFACC is normallydelegated TACON of the sorties orother military capability madeavailable). JFCs may also establisha supporting and/or supportedrelationship between components tofacilitate operations. Regardless, theestablishing JFC defines theauthority and respon-sibilities offunctional component commandersbased on the concept of operations

and may alter their authority andresponsibilities during the course ofan operation.

i. Combination

• Most often, joint forces are organizedwith a combination of Serviceand functional components withoperational responsibilities.

• Joint forces organized with Army,Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Forcecomponents will still have specialoperations forces organized as afunctional component.

• JFCs will normally designate aJFACC, whose authority and respon-sibilities are defined by the establishingJFC based on the JFC’s concept ofoperations.

j. Figure II-5 depicts possible compo-nents in a joint force. It is presented as anexample only.

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7. Command and Control

a. Command and control (C2) is theexercise of authority and direction by aproperly designated commander overassigned and attached forces in theaccomplishment of a mission. Command,in particular, includes both the authority andresponsibility for effectively using availableresources to accomplish assigned missions.

b. Command at all levels is the art ofmotivating and directing people andorganizations into action to accomplishmissions. Command requires visualizingthe current state of friendly and enemyforces, then the future state of those forcesthat must exist to accomplish the mission,then formulating concepts of operations toachieve that state. JFCs influence the

outcome of campaigns and majoroperations by:

• Assigning missions.

• Designating the priority effort(s).

• Prioritizing and allocating resources.

• Assessing risks to be taken.

• Deciding when and how to makeadjustments.

• Committing reserves.

• Staying attuned to the needs ofsubordinates and seniors.

• Guiding and motivating theorganization toward the desired end.

POSSIBLE COMPONENTS IN A JOINT FORCE

JOINT FORCECOMMANDER

FORCES/CAPABILITYMADE AVAILABLE



JOINT FORCE SPECIALOPS COMPONENT

JOINT FORCE LANDCOMPONENT

JOINT FORCE AIRCOMPONENT

OPERATIONAL CONTROL(OPCON)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP(S)DETERMINED BY JFC

(1) A joint force contains Service components (because of logistic and training responsibilities),even when operations are conducted through functional components.(2) All Service and functional components are depicted, any mix of the above componentscan constitute a joint force.(3) There may also be a Coast Guard component in a joint force.

NOTES:


JOINT FORCE MARITIMECOMPONENT

ARMY FORCES AIR FORCE FORCESMARINE CORPS

FORCES NAVY FORCES

ARMYCOMPONENT

(ARFOR)

AIR FORCECOMPONENT

(AFFOR)

MARINE CORPSCOMPONENT

(MARFOR)

NAVYCOMPONENT

(NAVFOR)

Figure II-5. Possible Components in a Joint Force

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c. Control is inherent in command. Tocontrol is to regulate forces and functionsto execute the commander’s intent.Control of forces and functions helpscommanders and staffs computerequirements, allocate means, and integrateefforts. Control is necessary to determinethe status of organizational effectiveness,identify variance from set standards, andcorrect deviations from these standards.Control permits commanders to acquire andapply means to accomplish their intent anddevelop specific instructions from generalguidance. Ultimately, it providescommanders a means to measure, report,and correct performance.

d. Control serves its purpose if it allowscommanders freedom to operate, delegateauthority , place themselves in the bestposition to lead, and synchronize actionsthroughout the operational area. Moreover,the C2 system needs to support the abilityof commanders to adjust plans for futureoperations, even while focusing on currentoperations. Skilled staffs work withincommand intent to direct and control unitsand resource allocation to support thedesired end. They also are alert to spottingenemy or friendly situations that mayrequire changes in command relationshipsor organization and advise the commanderaccordingly.

e. The related tools for implementingcommand decisionsinclude communi-cations, computers, and intelligence.Space-based systems provide commanderscapabilities such as surveillance,navigation, and location that greatlyfacilitate command. The precision withwhich these systems operate significantlyupgrades the speed and accuracy of theinformation that commanders exchange,both vertically and laterally.

f. Effective command at varyingoperational tempos requires reliable,

secure, and interoperable communi-cations. Communications planningincreases options available to JFCs byproviding the communications systemsnecessary to pass critical information atdecisive times. These communicationsystems permit JFCs to exploit tacticalsuccess and facilitate future operations.Nonetheless, command style is dictated bythe commander, not by the supportingcommunication system. Joint Pub 3-56,“Command and Control Doctrine for JointOperations,” discusses C2 of jointoperations.

g. Liaison is an important aspect ofjoint force C2. Liaison teams orindividuals may be dispatched from higherto lower, lower to higher, laterally, or anycombination of these. They generallyrepresent the interests of the sendingcommander to the receiving commander,but can greatly promote understanding ofthe commander’s intent at both the sendingand receiving headquarters.

8. Organization of anOperational Area

a. To assist in the coordination anddeconfliction of joint action, JFCs maydefine operational areas or joint areas.The size of these areas and the types offorces employed within them depend on thescope and nature of the crisis and theprojected duration of operations. Foroperations somewhat limited in scope anddura t ion , geograph ic combatantcommanders can employ the followingoperational areas (illustrated in FigureII-6):

• Joint Operations Area (JOA). AJOA is an area of land, sea, andairspace, defined by a geographiccombatant commander or subordinateunified commander, in which aJFC (normally a JTF commander)

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conducts military operations toaccomplish a specific mission. JOAsare particularly useful when operationsare limited in scope and geographicarea. JOAs are also appropriate whenoperations are to be conducted on theboundaries between theaters.

• Joint Special Operations Area(JSOA). A JSOA is an area of land,sea, and airspace, defined by a JFCwho has geographic responsibilities,for use by a joint special operationscomponent or joint special operationstask force for the conduct of specialoperations. JFCs may use a JSOA todelineate and facilitate simultaneousconventional and special operations inthe same general operational area.

• Joint Rear Area (JRA). The JRAfacilitates the protection andoperation of bases, installations, andforces that support combat operations.JRAs are not necessarily contiguouswith areas actively engaged in combat.JRAs may include intermediate supportbases and other support facilitiesintermixed with combat elements. TheJRA is particularly useful in nonlinearcombat situations.

• Amphibious Objective Area. Theamphibious objective area includesthe objectives to be secured by anamphibious task force. It needs to belarge enough for necessary sea, air,land, and special operations. Refer to

Figure II-6. Operational Areas Within a Theater

THEATER OF WAR

THEATERS OFOPERATIONS

OPERATIONAL AREAS WITHIN A THEATER

This example depicts a combatant commander's AOR, also known as a theater. Within theAOR, the CINC has designated a theater of war with two subordinate theaters of operations.Also within the theater of war is a JSOA. To handle a situation outside the theater of war, theCINC has established a JOA, within which a JTF will operate. JOAs could also beestablished within the theater of war or theaters of operations.

JOAJSOA

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Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine forAmphibious Operations,” for furtherinformation and guidance.

• Area of Operations. JFCs maydefine areas of operations (AOs) forland and naval forces. AOs do nottypically encompass the entireoperational area of the JFC, butshould be large enough forc o m p o n e n t c o m m a n d e r s t oaccomplish their missions andprotect their forces. Componentcommanders with AOs typicallydesignate subordinate AOs withinwhich their subordinate forces operate.These commanders employ the fullrange of joint and Service doctrinalcontrol measures and graphics todelineate responsibilities, deconflictoperations, and promote unity of effort.Refer to associated discussion of“boundaries” in Chapter III, “PlanningJoint Operations.”

• Area of Interest (AI). JFCs at alllevels can designate AIs to monitorenemy activities outside theoperations area. An AI is usuallylarger in size than the operational areaand encompasses areas from which theenemy can act to affect current or futurefriendly operations.

b. When warranted, geographiccombatant commanders may designatetheaters of war and, perhaps,subordinate theaters of operations foreach major threat. Geographic combatantcommanders can elect to directly controloperations in the theater of war or theaterof operations, or may establish subordinatejoint forces for that purpose, allowingthemselves to remain focused on thebroader theater (i.e., the AOR).

• Theater of War. In time of war, theNCA or a geographic combatant

commander may elect to define atheater of war within the geographiccombatant commander’s AOR. Thetheater of war is that area of air,land, and water that is, or maybecome, directly involved in theconduct of the war. A theater of wardoes not normally encompass thegeographic combatant commander’sentire AOR and may contain more thanone theater of operations.

• Theater of Operations. Geographiccombatant commanders may furtherdefine one or more theaters ofoperations--that area required toconduct or support specific combatoperations--within the theater of war.Different theaters of operations withinthe same theater of war will normallybe geographically separate andfocused on different enemy forces.Theaters of operations are usually ofsignificant size, allowing foroperations over extended periods oftime. Subordinate unified commandersare typically assigned theaters ofoperations.

• Combat and CommunicationsZones (COMMZ). Geographiccombatant commanders may alsoes tab l i sh comba t zones a n dCOMMZs , as shown in Figure II-7.The combat zone is an area requiredby forces to conduct large-scalecombat operations. It normallyextends forward from the land forcerear boundary. The COMMZ containsthose theater organizations, lines ofcommunication (LOCs), and otheragencies required to support andsustain combat forces. The COMMZusually includes the rear portions of thetheaters of operations and theater ofwar and reaches back to the CONUSbase or perhaps to a supporting

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combatant commander’s AOR. TheCOMMZ includes airports andseaports that support the flow of forcesand logistics into the operational area.

It is usually contiguous to the combatzone but may be separate--connectedonly by thin LOCs--in very fluid,dynamic situations.

SEAPORT

AOR/THEATER

THEATERS OFOPERATIONS

COMBAT AND COMMUNICATIONS ZONES

COMBAT ZONE

COMMZ

Connecting to CONUS or

This example depicts a CINC's AOR in which a theater of operations has been designated.The combat zone includes that area required for the conduct of combat operations. TheCOMMZ in this example is contiguous to the combat zone.

AIRPORT

Figure II-7. Combat and Communications Zones

III-1

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS

“Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well prepared plan”

Napoleon I, 1769-1821

1. General

a. Planning for employment of jointteams begins with articulating andunderstanding the objective, purpose ofthe operations, and commander’s intent(the commander’s vision of the end stateto be achieved). CINCs and JFCs reportingdirectly to the NCA receive guidance anddirection from the NCA through theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.CINCs refine the guidance and direction forsubordinate JFCs. Subordinate JFCs thentranslate this guidance and theater strategyinto clearly defined and attainableobjectives. JFCs then conduct campaignsand operations to accomplish theseobjectives.

b. JFCs issue prioritized mission-typeorders to subordinate commanders anddefine command relationships to facilitatemission accomplishment consistent withtheir concept of operations. Missions areassigned to subordinate commanders, notstaff officers or coordination authorities.With receipt of the mission goes theauthority and responsibility to conductoperations in accordance with the superiorcommander’s intent and concept ofoperations.

2. The Link Between Nationaland Combatant CommandStrategies

a. In peacetime, national policy,national security strategy, defense policy,and NMS are sources of guidance forcombatant commanders and Chiefs of theServices. The Joint Strategic PlanningSystem provides strategic direction; assignsmissions, tasks, forces, and resources; anddesignates objectives and ROE. They alsoestablish constraints and restraints anddefine policies and concepts to be integratedinto combatant command strategies andplans.

b. US and alliance and/or coalitionstrategic objectives are the basis forcombatant command st ra teg ies .Combatant commanders design strategicconcepts and develop plans to accomplishthese objectives within their geographic orf u n c t i o n a l a r e a s . C o m b a t a n tcommanders plan against specific tasksin the JSCP and also strive to anticipateadditional conditions when employmentof US forces may be called for. In thosecases, combatant commanders may developand maintain the framework of plans evenin peacetime. The nature of regionalinstabilities, however, is such that someplans might be formulated just beforeemployment of US forces or evenconcurrently.

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3. Combatant CommandStrategic Planning

a. General

• Combatant command strategicplanning in peacetime provides theframework for employing forces inpeacetime and in response to crises.Combatant command planners developpeacetime assessments that easetransition to crisis or war as well asto postconflict. Peacetime intelligenceand logistic assessments, for example,are essential for force projectionoperations and rapid transition tocombat operations.

• When directed by the NCA to conductmilitary operations, the combatantcommanders refine peacetimestrategies and modify existing plansor develop campaign plans asappropriate. The result, expressed interms of military objectives, militaryconcepts, and resources (ends, ways,and means), provides guidance for abroad range of activities.

b. Determining the Strategic End Stateand Supporting Military Conditions

• The desired end state should beclearly described by the NCA beforeArmed Forces of the United States arecommitted to an action. An end stateis the set of required conditions thatachieve the strategic objectives.There may be a preliminary endstate--described by a set of militaryconditions--when military force is nolonger the principal means to thestrategic aim. There may also be abroader end state that typicallyinvolves returning to a state of peaceand stability and may include

a variety of diplomatic, economic,informational, and military conditions.The relative emphasis among theseinstruments of national power will varyaccording to the nature of the crisis.

• Although military end state con-ditions normally will represent whatcombatant commanders want theircampaigns to achieve, commandersare rarely concerned with only thoseconditions. Often, combatant com-manders may be required tosupport the other instruments ofnational power as directed by nationaland multinational leadership.

• Defining the end state, which maychange as the operation progresses,and ensuring it supports achievingnational objectives are the criticalfirst steps in the estimate andplanning process. Additionally,clearly defining the desired end statereduces the wasting of scarceresources and helps clarify (and mayreduce) the risk associated with theoperation. In order to clearly describethe desired end state, planners shouldconsider what may be necessary to endthe armed conflict and the period ofpostconflict activities likely to follow.Commanders at all levels shouldhave a common understanding of theconditions that define success beforeinitiation of the operation.

• Achieving the desired end stateseldom, if ever, ends US nationalefforts to protect interests in asituation. The term “end state” simplyrepresents the set of conditionsnecessary to resolve a crisis andtransition from predominant use of themilitary instrument of national powerto other instruments.

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Planning Joint Operations

c. The Strategic Estimate

• The strategic estimate is a toolavailable to combatant commandersand subordinate JFCs as theydevelop campaign plans andsubordinate campaign and operationplans. JFCs use strategic estimatesdeveloped in peacetime to facilitatethe employment of military forcesacross the range of military operations.The strategic estimate is morecomprehensive in scope thanestimates of subordinate commanders,en-compasses all strategic concepts,and is the basis for combatantcommand strategy.

• In the strategic estimate, commandersfocus on the threat and consider othercircumstances affecting the militarysituation as they develop and analyzecourses of action. Items contained instrategic estimate are shown in FigureIII-1.

• The result of the estimate is avisualization of the current enemyand friendly situation , includingopportunities available for exploitation.The estimate includes a visualizationof what these states must look like toaccomplish the mission and a clearexpression of alternatives to achievethat state. Commanders employ theestimate to consider the enemy’s likelyintent and courses of action (COAs)and compare friendly alternatives thatresult in a decision.

• The strategic estimate process iscontinuous and based on directionfrom national and multinationalleadership. Estimates for the currentoperation can often provide the basisfor estimates for future operations.

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

Assigned objectives from nationalauthorities.

Translation of national objectives toobjectives applicable to the combatantcommand or theater.

Visualization of the strategicenvironment and how it relates to theaccomplishment of assignedobjectives.

Assessment of the threats toaccomplishment of assignedobjectives.

Assessment of strategic alternativesavailable, with accompanyinganalysis, risks, and the requirementsfor plans.

Considerations of available resources,linked to accomplishment of assignedobjectives.

Figure III-1. Contents of aStrategic Estimate

• JFCs develop strategic estimatesafter reviewing the strategic environ-ment, potential threats, the nature ofanticipated operations, and nationalstrategic direction. The strategicestimate process helps clarify thestrategic end state and supportingmilitary conditions. Both supportedand supporting JFCs prepare strategicestimates based on assigned tasks.Combatant commanders who supportmultiple JFCs prepare estimates foreach supporting operation.

• Appendix B, “The Estimate Process,”provides a format for the strategicestimate.

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d. Theater Strategic Concepts

• Theater strategic concepts arestatements of intent as to what,where, and how operations are to beconducted in broad, flexible terms.These statements must incorporate avariety of factors, including nuclearand conventional deterrence, current orpotential alliances or coalitions, forcesavailable, C2 capabilities, intelligenceassets, anticipated postconflictmeasures, mobilization, deployment,and sustainability. Theater strategicconcepts allow for the employment oftheater nuclear forces, conventionaland special operations forces, spaceassets, military assistance from allServices and supporting commands,and interagency and multinationalforces in each COA.

• Theater strategic concepts shouldprovide for unity of effort andstrategic advantage. Strategicadvantage is the favorable overallrelative power relationship thatenables one nation or group of nationsto effectively control the course ofpolitico-military events to ensure theaccomplishment of objectives throughnational, international, and theaterefforts.

• Combatant commanders use theadvantages and capabilities ofassigned, attached, and supportingmilitary forces , as well as alliance,coalition, and interagency relationshipsand military assistance enhancementsin theater as the basis of militarypower. Combatant commanders alsoconsider the other instruments ofnational power for their contribution togaining and maintaining strategicadvantage.

• Though geographic and functionalresponsibilities of the combatantcommanders may differ, there ares e v e r a l c o m m o n s t r a t e g i cconsiderations. Strategic conceptsmust integrate ends, ways, and meansand consider:

•• Protection of US citizens, forces,and interests and implementation ofnational policies.

•• Integration of deterrence measuresand transition to combat operations.

•• Adjustments for multinational,interagency, or United Nationscircumstances.

•• I d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f c o n f l i c ttermination criteria and postconflictobjectives and measures.

•• Identification of potential militaryrequirements across the range ofmilitary operations.

•• Support for security assistance ornation assistance.

•• Inputs to higher strategies orsubordinate planning requirements.

4. The Campaign

a. General

• A campaign is a series of relatedmajor operations that arrangetactical, operational, and strategicactions to accomplish strategic andoperational objectives. A campaignplan describes how these operations areconnected in time, space, and purpose.Within a campaign, major operations

III-5


consist of coordinated actions in asingle phase of a campaign andusually decide the course of thecampaign.

• Campaigns are joint. They serve asthe focus for the conduct of warand often in operations other thanwar. A wartime campaign is thesynchronization of air, land, sea,space, and special operations--as wellas interagency and multinationaloperations--in harmony with diplo-matic, economic, and informationalefforts to attain national andmultinational objectives.

• Based on strategy adopted during thecrisis action planning procedures,combatant commanders designcampaigns to accomplish national ormultinational strategic militaryobjectives. They plan and executecampaigns by applying operationalar t . How commanders app lyoperational art will vary with the natureof operational conditions, the nature ofthe strategic objectives, the time andspace available in the theater, and thenumber and type of forces involved.

• Campaigns, especially in multi-national efforts, must be kept simpleand focused on clearly definedobjectives. The more complex thecampaign or the more players involved,the more time and effort it takes to planand coordinate. Whenever possible,JFCs at all levels should plan farenough in advance to allowsubordinates sufficient time to react toguidance and conduct their ownplanning and rehearsals.

• JFCs consider the strategicenvironment during the estimate andplanning process in order to determinepotential constraints. Constraintsmay include the availability andcapability of forces, sustainment orROE. These constraints often limit theJFC’s freedom of action and influencethe timing and form of the campaign.

• Once military operations arec o n t e m p l a t e d ,p l a n n i n g f o rcampaigns and major operationsbecomes a continuous process.Before initiation of combat operations,commanders must also focus on futureoperations. During operations,commanders must refine their focus onfuture operations by assessing theoutcome of current operations.

• Campaigns and major operationscan span a wide variety of situations,from quick-hitting, limited-objectiveoperations to much more extensiverequirements. Planning and, indeed,doctrine and tactics, techniques, andprocedures should accommodate thisvariety of potential scenarios andshould provide JFCs a flexible rangeof capabilities and options fromwhich to organize forces and plan andconduct operations.

• Campaign planning, like all jointoperation planning, is based one v o l v i n g a s s u m p t i o n s . I t i scharacterized by the need to plan forrelated, simultaneous, and sequentialoperations and the imperative toaccomplish strategic objectivesthrough these operations. Campaignplanning is as much a way of thinkingabout warfare as it is a type of planning.

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THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of theworld, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action.On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principalobjectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw fromKuwait. The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutionscalling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing “all necessary means,”including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to forceIraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign toaccomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of majoroperations. These operations employed the entire capability of the internationalmilitary coalition and included operations in war and operations other thanwar throughout.

The campaign--which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERTSTORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations--can be viewedin the following major phases:

- DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP (to include crisis action planning,mobilization, deployment, and deterrence).- DEFENSE (with deployment and force buildup continuing).- OFFENSE.- POSTWAR OPERATIONS (to include redeployment).

Deployment and Force Buildup. While diplomats attempted to resolve thecrisis without combat, the coalition’s military forces conducted rapid planning,mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World War II. One ofthe earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of itemsof military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. TheCommander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), balanced the arrivalof these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logisticcapability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growingforce. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout thisphase.

Defense. While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture,a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air,land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forcescontinued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational militarydeceptions, and operational psychological operations were used to influenceIraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degradetheir abilities to resist USCINCCENT’s selected COA before engaging enemyforces. This phase ended on 17 January 1991, when Operation DESERT STORMbegan.

Offense. Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort--fromboth land and sea--against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and naval forces;logistic infrastructure; and C2. Land and special operations forces supported

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b. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans

• Campaign plans are unique, withconsiderations that set them apart fromother plans. These plans synchronizeoperations by establishing commandrelationships among subordinatecommands, by describing the conceptof operations, by assigning tasks andobjectives, and by task-organizingassigned forces. Fundamentals of

campaign plans are shown in FigureIII-2.

• Although not formally part of the JointOperation Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES), campaign planningencompasses both the deliberate andcrisis action planning processes. Ifthe scope of contemplated operationsrequires it, campaign planning beginswith or during deliberate planning. It

this air effort by targeting forward-based Iraqi air defense and radar capability.The objectives of this phase were to gain supremacy in the air, significantlydegrade Iraqi C2, deny information to enemy commanders, destroy enemyforces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. This successfulair operation would establish the conditions for the attack by coalition landforces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forcesrepositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensiveOPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to theenemy. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short time topositions from which they could attack the more vulnerable western flanks ofIraqi forces. US amphibious forces threatened to attack from eastern seawardapproaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive effort in that direction.

On 24 February, land forces attacked into Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks.Under a massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forcesclosed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. Tothe extent that it could, the Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of thestart of the land force attack, the coalition achieved its strategic objectivesand a cease-fire was ordered.

Postwar Operations. Coalition forces consolidated their gains and enforcedconditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to prevent the Iraqi militaryfrom taking retribution against its own dissident populace. Task Force Freedombegan operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. Thecoalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief,security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, andhumanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush announcedthe beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. By 7 April, USaircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the Iraqi border. Severalthousand Service personnel who had participated in Operation DESERTSTORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint andmultinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with theredeployment and demobilization of forces.

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continues through crisis actionplanning, thus unifying both planningprocesses. The degree to which theamount of work accomplished indeliberate planning may serve as thecore for a campaign plan is directlydependent on the particular theater andobjectives. (Joint Pubs 5-0, “Doctrinefor Planning Joint Operations,” and5 - 0 0 . 1 , “ J T T P f o r C a m p a i g n

Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainmentfor achieving multinational, national, and theater strategicobjectives.

Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.

Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and specialoperations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational,nongovernmental , private voluntary, or United Nations forces, asrequired.

Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic intent andoperational focus.

Identify any special forces or capabilities the enemy has in thearea.

Identify the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravityand provide guidance for defeating them.

Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravityand provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.

Sequence a series of related major joint operations conductedsimultaneously in depth.

Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designatecommand relationships.

Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly definewhat constitutes success, including conflict terminatioobjectives and potential posthostilities activities.

Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and major tasks,objectives, and concepts to subordinates.

Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons asrequired and authorized by the National Command Authorities.

FUNDAMENTALS OF CAMPAIGN PLANS

Figure III-2. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans

Planning,” can be used to assist in thisprocess.) Based on the campaign plan,appropriate elements are thentranslated into the operation orderformat of JOPES for execution.Although not formally submitted underJOPES, campaign plans may requirereview by the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff.

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c. Campaign plans form the basis fordeveloping subordinate campaign plansand supporting plans and, under uncertaincircumstances, the framework or a series ofoperation plans for phases of campaigns.

• Subordinate Campaign Plans.Subordinate JFCs may developsubordinate campaign plans oroperation plans that accomplish (orcontribute to the accomplishment of)theater strategic objectives. Thus,subordinate unified commandstypically develop campaign plans toaccomplish assigned missions. Also,JTFs can develop and executecampaign plans if missions requiremilitary operations of substantialsize, complexity, and duration.Subordinate campaign plans shouldbe consistent with the strategy,guidance, and direction developed bythe combatant commander and shouldcontribute to achieving combatantcommand objectives.

• Supporting Plans

•• Supporting plans are preparedby subordinate and supportingc o m m a n d e r s t o s a t i s f y t h erequirements of the supportedcommander’s plan. Typically,supporting commands’ plans provideaugmentation forces, force en-hancements, or functional supportsuch as logistics, communications,and transportation.

•• Supporting plans address suchdiscrete operations as nuclear andchemical operations, mobilization,deployment and redeploymentoperations, and Service supportoperations, as well as plans forgenerating and focusing nationalresources in one or more theaters.

•• When the NCA, through theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,direct a combatant command toc o n d u c t s p e c i f i e d m i l i t a r yoperat ions, o ther combatantcommands are identified to supportthose operations. For example, duringOperations DESERT SHIELD andDESERT STORM, US CentralCommand was designated thesupported command, with most othercombatant commands providingsupport.

5. Operational Art

JFCs employ operational art, in concertwith strategic guidance and directionreceived from superior leaders, indeveloping campaigns and operations.The fundamental elements of operational artare shown in Figure III-3 and discussedbelow.

a. Synergy

• JFCs employ air, land, sea, space,and special operations forces in awide variety of operations in war andin operations other than war. JFCs notonly attack the enemy’s physicalcapabilities but also the enemy’smorale and will . Joint Pub 1, “JointWarfare of the Armed Forces of theUnited States,” contains the basis forthis multidimensional concept--onewhich describes how JFCs can applyall dimensions of joint capability toaccomplish their mission.

• When required to employ force, JFCsseek combinations of forces andactions to achieve concentration invarious dimensions, all culminating inattaining the assigned objective(s) inthe shortest time possible and with

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minimal casualties. JFCs arrangesymmetrical and asymmetricalactions to take advantage of friendlystrengths and enemy vulnerabilities andto preserve freedom of action for futureoperations. Engagements with theenemy may be thought of assymmetrical, if our force and theenemy force are similar (for example,land versus land) or asymmetric, ifforces are dissimilar (for example, airversus sea, sea versus land). As JointPub 1. “Joint Warfare of the ArmedForces of the United States,” indicates,JFCs are uniquely situated to seizeopportunities for asymmetrical actionand must be especially alert to exploitthe tremendous potential combat powerof such actions. See discussion ofleverage below.

• It is difficult to view the contributionsof air, land, sea, space, and specialoperations forces in isolation. Eachmay be critical to the success of the

joint force , and each has certainunique capabilities that cannot beduplicated by other types of forces.Given the appropriate circumstances,any dimension of combat power canbe dominant--and even decisive--incertain aspects of an operation or phaseof a campaign, and each force cansupport or be supported by other forces.The contributions of these forces willvary over time with the nature of thethreat and other strategic, operational,and tactical circumstances. Thechallenge for supported JFCs is tointegrate and synchronize the widerange of capabilities at their disposalinto full dimensional operations againstthe enemy.

• T h e s y n e r g y a c h i e v e d b ysynchronizing the actions of air, land,sea, space, and special operationsforces in joint operations and inmultiple dimensions enables JFCs toproject focused capabilities that

FACETS OF OPERATIONAL ART

OPERATIONALART

ANTICIPATION

BALANCE

LEVERAGE

TIMING ANDTEMPO

OPERATIONALREACH

AND APPROACHFORCES ANDFUNCTIONS

ARRANGINGOPERATIONS

TERMINATION

CENTERS OFGRAVITY

DIRECT VERSUSINDIRECT

DECISIVE POINTS

CULMINATION

SYNERGYSIMULTANEITY AND

DEPTH

Figure III-3. Facets of Operational Art

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present no seams or vulnerabilities toan enemy to exploit. JFCs areespecially suited to develop and projectjoint synergy given the multiple uniqueand complementary capabilitiesavailable only within joint forces.

• The synergy of the joint force dependsi n l a r g e p a r t o n a s h a r e dunderstanding of the operationalsituation . JFCs integrate andsynchronize operations in a mannerthat applies force from differentdimensions to shock, disrupt, anddefeat opponents. The JFC’s vision ofhow operations will be conductedincludes not only how to arrangeoperations but also a clearunderstanding of the desired end state.

b. Simultaneity and Depth. Theconcepts of simultaneity and depth arefoundations of deep operations theory. Theintent is to bring force to bear on theopponent’s entire structure in a nearsimultaneous manner that is within thedecisionmaking cycle of the opponent. Thegoal is to overwhelm and cripple enemycapabilities and enemy will to resist.

• Simultaneity is a key characteristic ofthe American way of war. It refers tothe simultaneous application ofcapability against the full array ofenemy capabilities and sources ofstrength. This does not mean that allelements of the joint force areemployed with equal priority or thateven all elements of the joint force willbe employed. It refers specifically tothe concept of attacking appropriateenemy forces and functions in such amanner as to cause confusion anddemoralization. Simultaneity injoint force operations contributesdirectly to an enemy’s collapse byplacing more demands on enemy forcesand functions than can be handled. For

example, following 38 days ofintensive and highly synchronizedcoalition air operations, land forcesinitiated two major, mutuallysupporting, offensive thrusts againstdefending Iraqi forces in Kuwait andIraq. Simultaneously, amphibiousforces threatened an assault from thesea, creating confusion within theenemy leadership structure and causingseveral Iraqi divisions to orient on theamphibious threat. The orientation ofthese divisions on the sea facilitatedtheir defeat in detail by other landforces striking into the heart of Kuwait.Concurrently, coalition air operationscontinued the relentless attack againstC2 nodes and the transportationinfrastructure. The result was a swiftconclusion to the Gulf War, culminatedby simultaneous and synchronizedoperations by all elements of thecoalition.

• Simultaneity also refers to theconcurrent conduct of operations atthe tactical, operational, andstrategic levels. Tactical commandersfight engagements and battles,understanding their relevance to theoperational plan. JFCs set theconditions for battles within a majoroperation to achieve operational andstrategic objectives. Geographiccombatant commanders integratetheater strategy and operational art. Atthe same time, they remain acutelyaware of the impact of tactical events.B e c a u s e o f t h e i n h e r e n tinterrelationships between the variouslevels of war, commanders cannot beconcerned only with events at theirrespective echelon.

• The evolution of warfare and advancesin technology have continuouslyexpanded the depth of operations.Airpower can be projected at greater

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distances while surface forces are ableto maneuver more rapidly and projecttheir influence at increasing depths. Tobe effective, JFCs should not allow an

enemy sanctuary or respite. Jointforce operations should be conductedacross the full breadth and depth ofthe operational area, creatingcompet ing and simul taneousdemands on enemy commanders andresources. Just as with simultaneity,the concept of depth seeks tooverwhelm the enemy throughoutthe battle area from multipledimensions, contributing to its speedydefeat or capitulation. Interdiction, forexample, is one manner in which JFCsadd depth to operations.

• The concept of depth applies to timeas well as to space (geographically).Operations extended in depth, intime as well as space (geographically),shape future conditions and candisrupt an opponent’s decision cycle.

• Depth contributes to protection of theforce by destroying enemy potentialsbefore its capabilities can be realizedand employed.

• Simultaneity and depth place apremium on situational awareness atthe operational level. JFCs shouldexploit the full capabilities of the joint

force and supporting capabilities todevelop and maintain a clear picture ofevents in the operational area as wellas their linkage to future operations andattainment of strategic objectives.

c. Anticipation

• Anticipation is key to effectiveplanning. JFCs should remain alertfor the unexpected and foropportunities to exploit the situation.JFCs consider what might happenand look for the signs that maybring the possible event to pass.They continually gather informationby personally observing andcommunicating with subordinates,higher headquarters, other forces in theoperational area, and allies andcoalition members. JFCs avoidsurprise by monitoring operations asthey unfold and signaling to their staffand subordinate units the actions theyare to take to stay in control of eventsas much as possible. JFCs also realize

Victorious coalition forces during Operation DESERT STORM attacked,overwhelmed, and continued with relentless pressure on the retreating opposition.

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the impact of operations and preparefor their results , such as the surrenderof large numbers of opposing forces.

• Situational awareness is aprerequisite for commanders andplanners to be able to anticipateopportunities and challenges.Knowledge of friendly capabilities andenemy capabilities, intentions, andlikely COAs enables commanders tofocus joint efforts where they best andmost directly contribute to achievingobjectives.

• Intelligence preparation of thebattlespace (IPB) can assist JFCs indefining likely or potential enemyCOAs, as well as the indicators thatsuggest the enemy has embarked on aspecific COA. As such, IPB cansignificantly contribute to a JFC’sability to anticipate and exploitopportunities.

• Anticipation is not without risk.Commanders and planners that tend tolean in anticipation of what they expectto encounter are more susceptible tooperational military deception effortsb y a n o p p o n e n t . T h e r e f o r e ,commanders and planners shouldcarefully consider the informationupon which decisions are beingbased. Where possible, multiple orredundant sources of information fromvarious dimensions should beemployed in the decisionmakingprocess.

d. Balance

• Balance is the maintenance ofthe force, its capabilities, and itsoperations in such a manner as tocontribute to freedom of action andresponsiveness. Balance refers to theappropriate mix of forces and

capabilities within the joint force aswell as the nature and timing ofoperations conducted.

• JFCs strive to maintain friendlyforce balance while aggressivelyseeking to disrupt an enemy’sbalance by striking with powerfulblows from unexpected directions ordimensions and pressing the fight.Deception, special operations,manipulation of the electromagneticspectrum, direct attack of enemys t r a t e g i c c e n t e r s o f g r a v i t y,interdiction, and maneuver allconverge to confuse, demoralize, anddestroy the opponent. Denial ofenemy reconnaissance, intelligence,surveillance, and target acquisitionactivities contributes to the protectionof friendly forces. Even as the jointforce defeats one enemy force, itprepares to turn and strike another.High-tempo joint operations set theconditions for battle. JFCs prepare toshift as conditions change and newchallenges are presented. Throughcontinuous planning and wargaming,the commander strives never to bewithout options.

• JFCs designate priority efforts andestablish appropriate commandrelationships to assist in maintainingthe balance of the force.

• Preserving the responsiveness ofcomponent capabilities is central tooperational art. Combinations ofoperations and organization of the jointforce should maintain or expandforce responsiveness, not inhibit it.Decentralization of authority cancontribute to responsiveness byreducing the distance in time and spacebetween decisionmakers and ongoingoperations.

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e. Leverage

• Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare for ArmedForces of the United States,” describesachieving leverage (that is, gaining,ma in ta in ing , and exp lo i t i ngadvantages in combat power acrossall dimensions) among the forcesavailable to JFCs as “the centerpieceof joint operational art.” Forceinteraction with respect to friendlyforce relationships can be generallycharacterized as supported (thereceiver of a given effort) orsupporting (the provider of such aneffort). The command relationshipsthat provide the framework forarranging for such support arediscussed extensively in joint doctrine,including elsewhere in this publication.A principal JFC responsibility is toassess continuously whether forcerelationships enhance to the fullestextent possible the provision offighting assistance from and to eachelement of the joint force in alldimensions. Support relationshipsafford an effective means to weight(and ensure unity of effort for) variousoperations, each component typicallyreceiving and providing support at thesame time. For example, a landcomponent may be supported for adeep maneuver, a JFACC for theatercounterair and direct attack of enemycenters of gravity, a maritimecomponent for sea control and anamphibious forcible entry, and a specialoperations component for direct actionand other missions. The potentiallylarge number of such relationshipsrequires the close attention not only ofJFCs but also their components to planand execute.

• Force interaction with regard toenemy forces is another way for JFCsto achieve concentration in the various

dimensions. JFCs arrange sym-metrical and asymmetrical actions totake advantage of friendly strengthsand enemy vulnerabilities and topreserve freedom of action for futureoperations. The history of jointoperations highlights the enormouslethality of asymmetrical operationsand the great operational sensitivity tosuch threats. Asymmetrical actionsthat pit joint force strengths againstenemy weaknesses and maneuver intime and space can provide decisiveadvantage. Asymmetrical operationsare particularly effective when appliedagainst enemy forces not postured forimmediate tactical battle but insteadoperating in more vulnerableaspects--operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity(including rest and refitting), ormobilization and training (includingindustrial production). Thus, JFCsaggressively seek opportunities toapply asymmetrical force against anenemy in as vulnerable an aspect aspossible--air attacks against enemyground formations in convoy (the airand SOF interdiction operationsagainst German attempts to reinforceits forces in Normandy), naval attacksagainst troop transports (US attacksagainst Japanese reinforcement ofGuadalcanal), and land operationsagainst enemy naval, air, or missilebases (allied maneuver in Europe in1944 to reduce German submarinebases and V-1 and V-2 launching sites).There are literally dozens of potentialmodes of attack to be considered asJFCs plan the application of air, land,sea, space, and special operationsforces against the various aspects ofenemy capabilities.

• As a final part of force interaction,JFCs must take action to protect orshield all elements of the joint force

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from enemy symmetrical andasymmetrical action. This functionof protection has particular relevancein joint warfare, as JFCs seek to reducethe vulnerability of their forces andenhance their own freedom of action.

• JFCs gain decisive advantage overthe enemy through leverage. Thisleverage can be achieved in a varietyof ways. Asymmetrical actions that pitjoint force strengths against enemyweaknesses and maneuver in time andspace can provide decisive advantage.Synergy from the concentration andintegration of joint force actions alsoprovides JFCs with decisive advantage.Leverage allows JFCs to imposetheir will on the enemy, increase theenemy’s dilemma, and maintain theinitiative.

• Dimensional superiority, isolation ofthe enemy, and attack of enemystrategic centers of gravity cancontribute to joint force leverage andare addressed in Chapter IV, “JointOperations in War.”

f. Timing and Tempo

• The joint force should conductoperations at a tempo and point in timethat best exploits friendly capabilitiesand inhibits the enemy. With propertiming, JFCs can dominate the action,remain unpredictable, and operatebeyond the enemy’s ability to react.In its 1940 attack on France, forinstance, Germany combined thespeed, range, and flexibility of aircraftwith the power and mobility of armorto conduct operations at a pace thatsurprised and overwhelmed Frenchcommanders, disrupting their forcesand operations. France capitulated inlittle more than 1 month.

• The tempo of warfare has increasedo v e r t i m e a s t e c h n o l o g i c a ladvancements and innovative doctrineshave been appl ied to mi l i taryrequi rements. Whi le in manysituations JFCs may elect to maintainan operational tempo that stretchesthe capabilities of both friendly andenemy forces, on other occasions JFCsmay elect to conduct operations at areduced pace. This reduced pace maybe particularly appropriate whenenemy forces enjoy a mobilityadvantage or when friendly forces arenot yet able to conduct decisiveoperations.

• JFCs may vary the tempo ofoperations. During selected phases ofa campaign, JFCs may elect to reducethe pace of operations, frustratingenemy commanders while buying timeto build a decisive force or tend to otherpriorities in the operational area suchas relief to displaced persons. Duringother phases, JFCs may conducthigh-tempo operations designedspec i f i ca l l y to exceed enemycapabilities.

• Just as JFCs carefully select whichcapabilities of the joint force to employ,so do they consider the timing of theapplication of those capabilities.Timing refers to the effects achievedas well as to the application of force.While JFCs may have substantialcapabilities available, they selectivelyapply such capabilities in a mannerthat synchronizes their applicationin time, space, and purpose. Definingpriorities assists in the timing ofoperations.

• Timing refers to the effects achievedas well as to the application of force.JFCs plan and conduct operations in a

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manner that synchronizes the effects ofoperations so that the maximum benefitof their contributions are felt by theopponent at the desired time. Althoughsome operations of the joint force canachieve near-immediate effects, JFCsmay elect to delay their applicationuntil the contributions of otherelements can be brought to bear in asynchronized manner. Additionally,commanders and planners strive toensure that effects achieved throughcombat operations build towarddecisive results but are not unduly orinappropriately felt by opponents longafter their defeat.

g. Operational Reach and Approach

• On the first page of On War,Clausewitz likens war to a duel. Injoint operational art, effectivesymmetrical attack (fully supported byall components of the joint force) andasymmetrical attack constitute thedueler’s sword; the actions of air, land,sea, space, and special operationsforces to protect each other is thedueler’s shield; and, in its broadestsense, basing is the dueler’s footing,affecting the reach of the sword and thestrength and resiliency of the shield.Basing, whether from overseaslocations, sea-based platforms, orCONUS, directly affects operationalreach.

• Operational reach is the distanceover which military power can beconcentrated and employeddecisively. Reach is influenced by thegeography surrounding and separatingthe opponents. It is extended bylocating forces, reserves, bases, andlogistics forward, by increasing therange of weapon systems, and byimproving transportation availability

and the effectiveness of lines ofcommunication and throughput.Nevertheless, for any given operation,there is a finite range beyond which thejoint force cannot prudently operate ormaintain effective operations.

• Thus, basing in the broadest sense isan indispensable foundation of jointoperational art, directly affecting thecombat power that the joint force iscapable of generating by affecting suchcritical factors as sortie and resupplyrates. In particular, the arrangementand successive positioning ofadvanced bases (often in austere,rapidly emplaced configurations)underwrites the progressive ability ofthe joint force to shield its componentsfrom enemy action and deliversymmetric and asymmetric blowswith increasing power and ferocity.Basing is often directly affected bypolitical and diplomaticconsiderations and as such canbecome a critical junction wherestrategic, operational, and tacticalconsiderations interact. US forcebasing options span the spectrum frompermanently basing forces in mature,strategically important theaters totemporary sea-basing during crisisresponse in littoral areas of instability.Bases (including the flexible andresponsive capability of sea-basing) aretypically selected to be withinoperational reach of the opponent,where sufficient infrastructure is inplace or can be fabricated to supportthe operational and sustainingrequirements of deployed forces, andwhere they can be assured of somedegree of security from enemy attacks.Basing thus plays a vital role indetermining the operationalapproach, which may be conceived ofin terms of lines of operations.

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• Lines of operations define thedirectional orientation of the force intime and space in relation to the enemy.They connect the force with its base ofoperations and its objectives.

• A force operates on interior lines whenits operations diverge from a centralpoint and when it is therefore closer toseparate enemy forces than the latterare to one another. Interior lines benefita weaker force by allowing it to shiftthe main effort laterally more rapidlythan the enemy. A force operates onexterior lines when its operationsconverge on the enemy. Successfuloperations on exterior lines require astronger or more mobile force, but offerthe opportunity to encircle andannihilate a weaker or less mobileopponent.

• In modern war, lines of operation attaina three-dimensional aspect and pertainto more than just maneuver. JFCs usethem to focus combat power effectstoward a desired end. JFCs applycombat power throughout the threedimensions of space and over time in alogical design that integrates thecapabilities of the joint force toconverge on and defeat enemy centersof gravity.

h. Forces and Functions

• Commanders and planners candesign campaigns and operationsthat focus on defeating either enemyforces or functions, or a combinationof both. Typically, JFCs structureoperations to attack both enemyforces and functions concurrently inorder to create the greatest possiblecontact area between friendly andenemy forces and capabilities. Thesetypes of operations are especially

appropriate when friendly forces enjoytechnological and/or numericalsuperiority over an opponent.

• JFCs can focus on destroying anddisrupting critical enemy functionssuch as C2, resupply, and air defense.Attack of an enemy’s functions isnormally intended to destroy enemybalance, thereby creatingvulnerabilities to be exploited.Destruction or disruption of criticalenemy functions can create uncertainty,confusion, and even panic in enemyleadership and forces and maycontribute directly to the collapse ofenemy capability and will. Theappropriateness of functional attackas the principal design conceptfrequently is based on time requiredand available to cripple enemy criticalfunctions as well as the enemy’scurrent actions and likely responseto such attacks.

i. Arranging Operations

• General

•• JFCs must determine the bestarrangement of major operations.This arrangement will often be acombination of simultaneous andsequential operations to achieve thedesired end state conditions quicklyand at the least cost in personnel andother resources. Commanders considera variety of factors when determiningthis arrangement, including geographyof the operational area, availablestrategic lift, changes in commandstructure, logistic buildup andc o n s u m p t i o n r a t e s , e n e m yreinforcement capabilities, and publicopinion. Thinking about the bestarrangement helps determine tempo ofactivities in time and space.

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•• The dynamic nature of modernwarfare that includes projection offo rces compl ica tes dec is ionsconcerning how to best arrangeoperations. During force projectionoperations, for example, a rapidlychanging enemy situation may causethe commander to alter the plannedarrangement of operations even asforces are deploying. The arrangementthat the commander chooses should notforeclose future options.

• Phases

•• The arrangement of majoroperations relates directly to thecommander’s decision on phasing. Aphase represents a period during whicha large portion of the forces areinvolved in similar or mutuallysupporting activities (deployment, forexample). A transition to anotherphase--such as a shift from deploymentto defensive operations--indicates ashift in emphasis. World War II’sOperation OVERLORD contained sixphases: buildup, rehearsals,embarkation, assault, buildup, andbreakout.

•• Phasing may be sequential orconcurrent. Phases may overlap.The point where one phase stops andanother begins is often difficult todefine in absolute terms.

•• During planning, commandersestablish conditions for transitioningfrom one phase to another. Thecommander adjusts the phases toexploit opportunities presented by theenemy or to react to unforeseensituations.

•• Phasing assists commanders tothink through the entire operationand to define requirements in terms

of forces, resources, and time. Theprimary benefit of phasing is that itassists commanders in achievingmajor objectives, which cannot beattained all at once, by planningmanageable subordinate operationsto gain progressive advantages, and soachieving the major objectives asquickly and affordably as possible.Campaign phasing should consideraspects such as prehostilities (includingpredeployment activities), lodgment,decisive combat and stabilization,follow-through, and posthostilities(including redeployment).

•• Actions during a prehostilitiesphase may be for deterrence or to seekto set the terms for battle and enhancefriendly and limit enemy freedom ofaction. The friendly force should notseek battle until it has set the terms orestablished the conditions for battle inits favor and should avoid being rushedinto battle before such conditions areestablished, if possible. Duringpredeployment activities, JFCs tailorforces for deployment. The command,control, communications, computers,and intelligence (C4I) and logisticrequirements of the force must bedeveloped during the predeploymentphase in order to support JFC conceptsof operations. When in-place forcesare not sufficient and/or are notappropriate for the envisionedoperation, early determination of theforces required and the order in whichthey are needed, based on the JFC’sconcept of operations, assists inidentifying the time required to deploythe force. Sealift and airlift capabilitiesare critical to JFC concepts.

•• A lodgment phase allows themovement and buildup of a decisivecombat force in the operational area.In operations during peacetime,

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deployment will normally includemovements to host-nation air or seaports. In operations conducted beforeand during combat, initial deploymentmay require forcible entry, followed bythe occupation and expansion oflodgment areas.

•• A decisive combat and stabili-zation phase initially focuses onthe rapid buildup of joint forcecapabi l i t ies . The appropr ia te

sequencing of forces into theoperational area can contribute greatlyto the stabilization of the situation.Further, deployment of forces mayserve as a deterrent to hostilities, but ifdeterrence fails, deployment willpermit JFCs to build up fulldimensional capabilities rapidly toconduct decisive action as early aspossible. Such decisive action focuseson winning, that is, achieving theobjectives defined by the NCA andJFC, and may include control of enemyterritory and population anddestruction of the enemy’s ability andwill to continue.

•• During a follow-through phase,JFCs synchronize joint force activities

to bring the operation to a successfulconclusion. Follow-through includesthose actions that ensure the politicalobjectives are achieved and sustained.Part of this phase may be to ensure thethreat (military and/or political) is notable to resurrect itself. In essence, sucha phase focuses on ensuring that theresults achieved endure. During thisphase, joint forces may conductoperations in support of othergovernmental agencies. JFCs

continuously assess the impact ofcurrent operations during hostilities onthe termination objectives. Theoutcome of military operations shouldnot conflict with the long-term solutionto the crisis.

•• During the posthostilities andredeployment phase, JFCs may retainresponsibility for operations or theymay transfer control of the situation toanother authority and redeploy theirforces. JFCs should identifyposthostilities requirements as early aspossible to best accomplish thesemissions and simultaneously redeployassets no longer needed to resolve thecrisis.

Quick and decisive deployment of fighter forces may stabilizethe situation and obviate actual hostilities.

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•• Logistics is crucial to phasing.Joint force planners considerestablishing logistic bases, opening andmaintaining LOCs, establishingintermediate logistic bases to supportnew phases, and defining priorities forservices and support. Logistics, then,is key to arranging the operations ofcampaigns and should be planned andexecuted as a joint responsibility.

•• Changes in phases at any level canrepresent a period of vulnerabilityfor the force. At this point, missionsand task organizations often change.The careful planning of branchesand sequels can reduce the riskassociated with transition betweenphases.

• Branches and Sequels

•• No plan of operations can beprojected with confidence muchbeyond the initial stages of theoperat ion. Commanders bui ldflexibility into their plans to preservefreedom of action in rapidly changingconditions. Branches and sequelsdirectly relate to the concept ofphasing. Their proper use can addflexibility to a campaign or majoroperation plan.

•• Branches. Branches are optionsbuilt into the basic plan. Suchbranches may include shiftingpriorities, changing unit organizationand command relationships, orchanging the very nature of the jointoperation itself. Branches addflexibility to plans by anticipatingsituations that could alter the basicplan. Such situations could be a resultof enemy action, availability offriendly capabilities or resources, oreven a change in the weather or seasonwithin the operational area.

•• Sequels. Sequels are subsequentoperations based on the possibleoutcomes of the current operation--victory, defeat, or stalemate. At thecampaign level, phases can be viewedas the sequels to the basic plan.

j. Centers of Gravity

• Centers of gravity are the foundationof capability--what Clausewitz called“the hub of all power and movement,on which everything depends . . . thepoint at which all our energies shouldbe directed.” They are thosecharacteristics, capabilities, orlocations from which a military forcederives its freedom of action,physical strength, or will to fight. Atthe strategic level, centers of gravitymight include a military force, analliance, national will or publicsupport, a set of critical capabilities orfunctions, or national strategy itself.

• The centers of gravity concept is usefulas an analytical tool, while designingcampaigns and operations to assistcommanders and staffs in analyzingfriendly and enemy sources of strengthas well as weaknesses andvulnerabilities. Analysis of centers ofgravity , both enemy and friendly, is acontinuous process throughout anoperation.

• The essence of operational art lies inbeing able to mass effects against theenemy’s sources of power in order todestroy or neutralize them. In theory,destruction or neutralization ofenemy centers of gravity is the mostdirect path to victory . However,centers of gravity can change duringthe course of an operation, and, at anygiven time, centers of gravity may notbe apparent or readily discernible.For example, the center of gravity

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might concern the mass of enemy units,but that mass might not yet be formed.In such cases, determining the absenceof a center of gravity and keeping itfrom forming could be as important asdefining it.

• Identification of enemy centers ofgravity requires detailed knowledgeand understanding of how opponentsorganize, fight, make decisions, andtheir physical and psychologicalstrengths and weaknesses. JFCs andtheir subordinates should be alert tocircumstances that may cause centersof gravity to change and adjust friendlyoperations accordingly.

• Enemy centers of gravity willfrequently be well protected, makingdirect attack difficult and costly. Thissituation may require joint operationsthat result in indirect attacks untilconditions are established that permitsuccessful direct attacks.

• It is also important to identify friendlycenters of gravity so that they can beprotected. Long sea and air LOCsfrom CONUS or supporting theaterscan represent a center of gravity.National will can also be a center ofgravity, as it was for the United Statesduring the Vietnam and Persian GulfWars.

k. Direct versus Indirect. To the extentpossible, JFCs attack enemy centers ofgravity directly. Where direct attackmeans attacking into an opponent’sstrength, JFCs should seek an indirectapproach. For example, if the center ofgravity is a large enemy force, the joint forcemay attack it indirectly by isolating it fromits C2, severing its LOCs (includingresupply), and defeating or degrading its airdefense and indirect fire capability. Whenvulnerable, the enemy force can be

attacked directly by appropriate elementsof the joint force. In this way, JFCs willemploy a synchronized combination ofoperations to expose and attack enemycenters of gravity through weak orvulnerable points--seams, flanks, specificforces or military capabilities, rear areas,and even military morale and public opinionand support.

l. Decisive Points

• By correctly identifying andcontrolling decisive points, acommander can gain a markedadvantage over the enemy and greatlyinfluence the outcome of an action.Decisive points are usually geographicin nature, such as a constricted sealane, a hill, a town, or an air base. Theycould also include other elements suchas command posts, critical boundaries,airspace, or a communications node.Decisive points are not centers ofgravity; they are the keys toattacking protected centers ofgravity.

• There normally will be more decisivepoints in an operational area than JFCscan control, destroy, or neutralize withavailable resources. Accordingly,planners must analyze potentialdecisive points and determine whichpoints enable eventual attack of theenemy’s centers of gravity. Thecommander designates the mostimpor tant decis ive points asobjectives and allocates resources tocontrol, destroy, or neutralize them.

• Geographic decisive points that assistcommanders to gain or maintain theinitiative are crucial. Controlling thesepoints in the attack assists commandersto gain freedom of operationalmaneuver. They thus maintain themomentum of the attack and sustain the

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initiative. If a defender controls sucha point, it can help exhaust theattacker’s momentum and facilitate thedefender’s counterattack.

m. Culmination

• Culmination has both offensive anddefensive application. In the offense,the culminating point is the point intime and space at which an attacker’scombat power no longer exceeds thatof the defender. Here the attackergreatly risks counterattack and defeatand continues the attack only at greatperil. Success in the attack at alllevels is to secure the objectivebefore reaching culmination. Adefender reaches culmination whenthe defending force no longer hasthe capability to go on the counter-offensive or defend successfully.Success in the defense is to draw theattacker to culmination, then strikewhen the attacker has exhaustedavailable resources and is ill-disposedto defend successfully.

• Synchronization of logistics withcombat operations can forestallculmination and help commanderscontrol the tempo of their operations.At both tactical and operational levels,theater logistic planners forecast thedrain on resources associated withconducting operations over extendeddistance and time. They respond bygenerating enough military resourcesat the right times and places to enabletheir commanders to achieve strategicobjectives before reaching theirculminating points. If the commanderscannot do so, they should rethink theirconcept of operations.

n. Termination

• Knowing when to terminate militaryoperations and how to preserveachieved advantages is a component ofstrategy and operational art. Beforeforces are committed, JFCs must knowhow the NCA intend to terminate theoperation and ensure its outcomesendure, and then determine how toimplement that strategic design at theoperational level. In war, terminationdesign is driven in part by the natureof the war itself. Wars over territorialdisputes or economic advantage tendto be interest-based and lendthemselves to negotiation, persuasion,and coercion. Wars fought in the nameof ideology, ethnicity, or religious orcultural primacy tend to be value-basedand reflect demands that are seldomnegotiable. Often, wars are a result ofboth value and interest-baseddifferences.

• The underlying causes of aparticular war --such as cultural,religious, territorial, or hegemonic--mustinfluence the understanding ofconditions necessary for terminationof hostilities and resolution ofconflict. Ideally, national and alliedor coalition decisionmakers will seekthe advice of senior military leadersconcerning how and when to endcombat operations. Passing the leadfrom the military to other agencies toachieve final strategic aims followingconflict usually requires theparticipation of JFCs.

• Military operations typicallyconclude with attainment of thestrategic ends for which the NCAcommitted forces. In some cases,

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these aims will be military strategicaims that, once achieved, allowtransition to other instruments ofnational power and agencies as themeans to achieve broader aims. WorldWar II and the transition from the endof the war to other means to achieve afree and independent Europe is anexample.

• Commanders strive to end combatoperations on terms favorable to theUnited States and its allies orcoalition partners. The basic elementof this goal is gaining control over theenemy in the final stages of combat.When friendly forces can freely imposetheir will on the enemy, the opponentmay have to accept defeat, terminateactive hostilities, or revert to othertypes of conflict such as geopoliticalac t i ons or gue r r i l l a wa r fa re .Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed endto the operation may bring with it thepossibility that related disputes willarise, leading to further conflict. Thereis a delicate balance between the desirefor quick victory and termination ontruly favorable terms.

• J F C s a n d t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t ecommanders consider the conditionsnecessary to bring operations to afavorable end. They translate politicalaims into strategy and operationaldesign. They provide decisionmakerswith critical information on enemyintent, objectives, strategy, and chancesof success in obtaining desired goals.JFCs and subordinate commandersconsider the nature and type of conflict,the objective of military force, the plansand operations that will most affect theenemy’s judgment of cost and risk andthe impact on alliance and coalitionwarfare.

• If the conditions have been properly setand met for ending the conflict, thenecessary leverage should exist toprevent the enemy from renewinghostilities. Moreover, the strategicaims for which the United Statesfought should be secured by theleverage that US and multinationalforces gained and can maintain. Warsare fought for political aims. Wars areonly successful when political aimsare achieved and these aims endure.

• A period of postconflict activitiesexists from the immediate end of theconflict to the redeployment of thelast US Service member. A varietyof operations other than war occurduring this period. These operationsinvolve all instruments of nationalpower and include those actions thatensure political objectives are achievedand sustained. Part of this effort maybe to ensure the threat (military and/orpolitical) does not resurrect itself. Theeffort focuses on ensuring that theresults achieved endure and theconditions that resulted in the conflictdo not recur.

• Even as forces transition from combatoperations to postconflict activities,requirements for humanitarianassistance will emerge. Working withDOD and other US Governmentagencies, as well as nongovernmentalorganizations, JFCs prepare to meet therequirements of humanitarian support,including the provisioning of food andshelter and the protection of variousgroups against the depredations ofopposing groups.

• During postconflict operations, JFCsmay transfer control to other authoritiesand redeploy forces. JFCs should

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identify postconflict requirements asearly as possible so as to facilitatet r a n s i t i o n a n d t o p e r m i t t h esimultaneous redeployment of forcesno longer required.

6. Key Planning Considerations

The elements of operational art discussedabove form the basis for plans and ordersand set the conditions for successfulbattle. As shown in Figure III-4, the initialplan establishes the commander’s intent,the concept of operations, and the initialtasks for subordinate units. It allows thegreatest possible operational and tacticalfreedom for subordinate leaders. It isflexible enough to permit leaders to seizeopportunities consistent with thecommander’s intent, thus facilitating quickand accurate decisionmaking duringoperations. The initial plan not only affectsthe current operation but also sets the stagefor future operations. As commandersprepare to conduct military operations, theyshould remember that all militaryoperations have a psychological effect onall parties concerned--friendly, neutral,and hostile. Supporting psychological

operations (PSYOP) designed to induce orreinforce favorable foreign attitudes andbehavior must be integrated into all plansat the initial stages of planning to ensuremaximum effect.

a. Mission. The mission statement is theimpetus for the detailed planning thatfollows. It is the JFC’s expression of whatthe joint force must accomplish and why.Orders contain both specified and impliedtasks . Dur ing miss ion ana lys is ,commanders translate these tasks intomissions for their subordinates.Commanders do so by analyzing themission statement and concept ofoperations, understanding the intent ofsenior commanders, assessing the currentsituation, and organizing all resourcesavailable to achieve the desired end. Clarityof the mission statement and itsunderstanding by subordinates, before andduring the operation, is vital to success.

b. Commander’s Intent

• The commander’s intent describesthe desired end state. It is a conciseexpression of the purpose of theoperation, not a summary of theconcept of operations. It may includehow the posture of units at that end statefac i l i ta tes transi t ion to futureoperations. It may also include thecommander’s assessment of the enemycommander’s intent.

• JFCs begin to form their intent as theyanalyze the mission assigned by asuperior commander. Together, withthe higher headquarters’ order, theJFC’s intent is the initial impetus forthe entire planning process. JFCsinitially provide their intent verbally tothe staff with the restated mission andplanning guidance. JFCs refine theirintent as they consider staff estimatesand complete the commander’sFigure III-4. The Initial Plan

ESTABLISHES

AFFECTS

Commander's intent

Concept of operations

Initial tasks forsubordinate units

Current operations

Future operations

THE INITIAL PLAN

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estimate. The intent statement mayalso contain an assessment of whereand how the commander will acceptrisk during the operation.

• The JFC’s intent helps subordinatespursue the desired end state withoutfurther orders, even when operationsdo not unfold as planned. Thus, thecommander’s intent provides focus forall subordinate elements.

• The intent statement is usuallywritten , but could be verbal when timeis short. It should be concise and clear.The intent should be able to focussubordinate commanders on thepurpose of the operation and describehow it relates to future operations. AJFC’s order should contain the intentstatement of the next seniorcommander in the chain of command.

c. Concept of Operations

• The concept of operations describeshow the JFC visualizes the operationwill unfold based on the selected COA.This concept expresses what, where,and how the joint force will affect theenemy or the situation at hand. Thecommander provides sufficient detailfor the staff and subordinatecommanders to understand what theyare to do without further instructions.In the concept of operations, JFCsdescribe the overall objectives of thejoint force, the missions assigned tocomponents of the force, and how thecomponents will work together toaccomplish the mission.

• To reinforce intent and priorities,commanders typically designate amain effort (for each phase, if thecampaign has more than one phase).This designation is as true in theoffense as it is in the defense and also

applies in operations other than war.These designations provide focus to theoperation, set priorities and determinerisks, promote unity of effort, andfacilitate an understanding of thecommander’s intent.

d. Targeting

• Targeting is the process of selectingt a r g e t s a n d m a t c h i n g t h eappropriate response to them takingaccount of operational requirementsand capabilities. As with all actions ofthe joint force, targeting and attackfunctions are accomplished inaccordance with international law, thelaw of war, and internationalagreements and conventions, as well asROE approved by the NCA for thepart icular operat ion. Mi l i tarycommanders, planners, and legalexperts must consider the desired endstate and political aims when makingtargeting decisions.

• Targeting occurs at all levels ofcommand within a joint force and isperformed at all levels by forcescapable of delivering fires or attackingtargets with both lethal and nonlethaldisruptive and destructive means.Targeting is complicated by therequirement to deconflict duplicativetargeting by different forces ordifferent echelons within the sameforce and to synchronize the attackof those targets with other dimensionsof the joint force.

• Targeting and the Campaign Plan.JFCs establish broad planningobjectives and guidance for attack ofenemy strategic and operational centersof gravity and interdiction of enemyforces as an integral part of jointcampaigns and major operations. Withthe advice of subordinate commanders,

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JFC makes the targeting andapportionment decisions, componentsplan and execute assigned missions.

•• JFCs may establish and task anorganization within their staffs toaccomplish these broad targetingoversight functions or may delegatethe responsibility to a subordinatecommander. Typically, JFCs organizeJoint Targeting CoordinationBoards (JTCBs). If the JFC sodesignates, a JTCB may be anintegrating center for this effort or aJFC-level review mechanism. In eithercase, it needs to be a joint activitycomprised of representatives from thestaff, all components, and, if required,their subordinate units. JFCs taskcommanders or staff officers with theJTCB function based on the JFC’sconcept of operations and theindividual’s experience, expertise, andsituational awareness appropriate to thesituation.

•• The JFC defines the role of theJTCB. Typically, the JTCB reviewstarget information , developstargeting guidance and priorities,and may prepare and refine jointtarget lists. The JTCB should alsomaintain a complete list of restrictedtargets and areas where specialoperations forces (SOF) are operatingto avoid endangering current or futureoperations.

•• In multinational operations, theJTCB may be subordinate to am u l t i n a t i o n a l Ta r g e t i n gCoordination Board, with JFCs ortheir agents representing the joint forceon the multinational board.

•• JFCs will normally delegate theauthority to conduct executionp lann ing , coord ina t ion , and

JFCs set priorities, provide targetingguidance, and determine the weightof effort to be provided to variousoperations. Subordinate commandersrecommend to JFCs how to use theircombat power more effectively toachieve the objective. Weight of effortfor any aspect of joint targeting, forinstance, may be expressed:

•• In terms of percentage of totalavailable resources.

•• By assigning priorities forresources used with respect to theother aspects of the theater campaignor operation.

•• As otherwise determined by theJFC.

• Targeting Process. (See Joint Pub2-01.1, “JTTP for Intelligence Supportto Targeting.”)

•• The targeting process is cyclic. Itbegins with guidance and prioritiesissued by the NCA, JFCs, orheadquarters senior to JFCs andcontinues with identification ofrequirements by components, theprioritization of these requirements, theacquisition of targets or target sets, theattack of targets by components, theassessment of the effects of thosemissions by both components andJFCs, and continuing guidance fromJFCs on future fires or attack of targets.

•• Targeting mechanisms shouldexist at multiple levels. Joint forcecomponents identify requirements,nominate targets that are outside theirboundaries or exceed the capabilitiesof organic and supporting assets (basedon JFC’s apportionment andsubapportionment decisions), andconduct execution planning. After the

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deconf l ic t ion associated withtargeting and will ensure that thisprocess is also a joint effort involvingapplicable subordinate commands.Whoever is designated thisresponsibility must possess or haveaccess to a sufficient C2 infrastructure,adequate facilities, and readyavailability of joint planning expertise.Should such an agency be chargedwith joint functional commandresponsibilities, a joint targetingmechanism is also needed to facilitatethis process at this level. Allcomponents are normally involved intargeting and should establishprocedures and mechanisms tomanage the targeting function.

e . A i r A p p o r t i o n m e n t . A i rapportionment is the determination andassignment of the total expected effort bypercentage and/or priority that should bedevoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period oftime. The total expected effort madeavailable to the JFACC is determined bythe JFC in consultation with componentcommanders based on the assignedobjectives and the concept of operations.

• Air apportionment assists JFCs toensure the weight of the JFACC aireffort is consistent with campaignphases and objectives.

• Given the many functions thatairpower can perform , its theater-wide application, and its ability torapidly shift from one function toanother, JFCs pay particularattention to its apportionment. JFCsnormally apportion by priority orpercentage of effort into geographicareas, against assigned mission-typeorders, and/or by categories significantfor the campaign. These categories can

include strategic attack, interdiction,counterair, maritime support, and closeair support. After consulting with othercomponent commanders, the JFACCmakes the a i r appo r t i onmen trecommendation.

• Following the JFC air apportionmentdecision, the JFACC allocatesapportioned air sorties to thefunctions, areas, and/or missions theysupport.

f. Concept of Logistics

• The JFC’s concept of logistics is a keypart of the synchronization of thejoint effort. Through the logisticconcept, JFCs enable the deployment,entry , buildup , application, andredeployment of joint forces. JFCsidentify and reinforce prioritiesbe tween comba t and log i s t i crequirements. Logistic considerationsare key to the commander’s estimateprocess, will greatly impact on thedevelopment of COAs, and may dictateCOA selection.

• C O C O M g i v e s c o m b a t a n tcommanders authoritative directionover all aspects of logistics necessaryto accomplish the mission. Withint h e i r c o m m a n d s , c o m b a t a n tcommanders use this authority toensure effectiveness and economy inoperations and to prevent or eliminatethe unnecessary duplication offacilities and the overlap of functionsamong Service components. In criticalsituations, combatant commanders maymodify the normal logistic processwithin their commands. They may useall facilities and supplies of all assignedand attached forces to accomplish themission.

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• Combatant commanders ensure thatthe concept of logistics supports theconcept of operations. The logisticconcept of the campaign plan does thisby establishing a base of operations,opening and maintaining LOCs,providing intermediate bases ofoperations to support phasing, andestablishing priorities for service andsupport for each phase of acampaign. The logistic concept alsouses available host-nation support.Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for LogisticSupport of Joint Operations,” providesmore information on the theater logisticsystem and logistic planning.

g. Other Considerations

• Disciplined Operations

•• Joint forces operate in accordancewith applicable ROE, conductwarfare in compliance withinternational laws, and fight withinrestraints and constraints specifiedby superior commanders. Objectivesare justified by military necessity andattained through appropriate anddisciplined use of force.

•• Exercising discipline in operationsi n c l u d e s l i m i t i n g c o l l a t e r a ldamage--the inadvertent or secondarydamage occurring as a result of actionsinitiated by friendly or enemy forces.JFCs apply the combat powernecessary to ensure victory againstcombatants, but are careful to limitunnecessary injury and damage.

•• JFC use of forces includes theproper treatment of enemy prisonersof war, noncombatants, and civilians.Laws of war are intended to reducecasualties and enhance fair treatmentof combatants and noncombatantsalike.

•• ROE, which specify the circum-stances and limitations under whichforces conduct operations other thanwar or begin or continue combat, arepromulgated by the NCA. Manyfactors influence ROE, includingnational command policy, mission,operational environment, commander’sintent, and international agreementsregulating conduct. ROE alwaysrecognize the inherent right ofself-defense. Properly developed ROEare clear and tailored to the situation.ROE will typically vary from operationto operation and may change during anoperation.

• Risk

•• Risk is inherent in militaryoperations. In peacetime operations,commanders consider a variety ofrisks--such as the implications offailure to national prestige or to jointforce morale, or risk to the safety ofindividual joint force members.

•• In combat or potential combatsituations, commanders carefullyidentify conditions that constitutesuccess--both for the envisioned endstate and for the major operations orstages that lead to that end state. Tothe extent that these conditions aremet, commanders reduce the risk.When these conditions are not met, oronly partially met, commandersidentify the risk associated withcontinuing. To alleviate or reducerisk, commanders may apply additionalforce--by reallocating combat forces orby shifting supporting operations, forexample. Or they may decide the riskis acceptable.

•• Commanders consider manyfactors as they identify risk in combator potential combat situations. As in

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peacetime operations, commandersconsider the risk to joint forcemembers. It is for this reason, in part,that an indirect approach to enemycenters of gravity, attacking enemyvulnerabilities rather than strengths, isimportant in the design of campaignsand major operations.

• Rehearsals. Rehearsal is the processof learning, understanding, andpracticing a plan in the time availablebefore actual execution. Rehearsingkey combat and logistic actionsallows participants to becomefamiliar with the operation and tovisualize the plan. This process assiststhem in orienting themselves to theirsurroundings and to other units duringexecution. Rehearsals also provide aforum for subordinate leaders toanalyze the plan, but caution must beexercised in adjusting the plan in orderto prevent errors in synchronization.While rehearsals with combat unitsusually occur at the tactical level,headquarters at the operational levelcan rehearse key aspects of a plan usingcommand post exercises, typicallysupported by computer-aidedsimulations. While the joint force maynot be able to rehearse an entireoperation, JFCs should identify keyelements for rehearsal.

• Command and Control Warfare(C2W). (For additional information,see Joint Pub 3-13, “Joint Doctrine forInformation Warfare.”)

•• C2W seeks to deny the enemy theeffective use of its C2 capabilitieswhile at the same time protectingf r iendly C2 funct ions. C2Wintegrates the use of OPSEC, militarydeception, PSYOP, electronic warfare(EW), and physical destruction,mutually supported by intelligence.C2W accomplishes its objectives bydenying the adversary the informationit needs to make effective decisions(OPSEC), influencing the decisionsthat the adversary makes (deceptionand PSYOP), and degrading ordestroying the adversary’s C2 systems(EW and physical destruction).

•• The synergistic effects of thecoordinated use of the five elementsof C2W provide the JFC with thepotential to deliver a decisive blowagainst an adversary before theoutbreak of armed conflict or duringits initial period. It does so by allowingJFCs to think, plan, communicate, andact faster than their opponents. C2Wassists JFCs to seize the initiative andcauses the enemy to react to the JFCs’actions.

C2W in DESERT STORM, 1991

Before the beginning of the air operation, OPSEC and deception had alreadybegun to affect the Iraqi leadership’s perception of what the coalition intendedto do. The opening phase of the air operation focused on destroying ordisrupting the Iraqi C2 system, limiting the leadership’s ability to gatheraccurate information and to transmit its decisions. During the air operation,OPSEC and deception continued to hide the preparations for the actual landoperation while using maneuver forces and air strikes to portray a falseintention to make the main attack into Kuwait. PSYOP, supported by B-52strikes, targeted the front-line Iraqi soldier’s confidence in Iraqi leadership.The result of this integrated use of the elements of C2W was the decreasedability of the Iraqi leadership to respond effectively to the land operation whenit began.

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•• To be effective, C2W needs to befully integrated into thecommander’s concept of theoperation and synchronized withother operations. The synchro-nization of these actions will requirerapid and reliable intelligencesupport and communications. JFCsshould ensure that the C2W objectivesare part of the planning guidance andpriorities .

•• C2W considerations will play animportant role in the targetingprocess. Targets will be selected orprotected to support C2W objectives.The timing of strikes against specifictargets may be determined by the JFC’sC2W objectives. For example, anadversary’s signals intelligence sitewould not be targeted for destructionif the deception operation was using itas one of the means to insert falseinformation into the adversary’sintelligence system.

• Deception

•• Military deception , as executed byJFCs, targets enemy decisionmakers(opposing commanders) through theenemy intelligence collection,

analysis, and dissemination systems.This deception requires a thoroughknowledge of opponents andtheir decisionmaking processes.Anticipation is key. During theformulation of the commander’sconcept, particular attention is placedon defining how the JFC would like theenemy to act at critical points in thebattle. Those desired enemy actionsthen become the goal of deceptionoperations. Deception is focused oncausing the opponents to act in adesired manner, not simply to be misledin their thinking. The purpose is tocause opposing commanders to forminaccurate impressions about friendlyforce capabilities or intentions,misappropriate their intelligencecollection assets, or fail to employcombat or support units to their bestadvantage. Deception operates at thestrategic, operational, or tactical levelsas an integral and systematiccomponent of C2W.

•• Deception operations are anintegral element of joint operations.Planning for deception operations istop-down, in the sense that subordinatedeception plans support the higherlevel plan.

Deception in the Yom Kippur War, 1973

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense Forceby attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a significantfoothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined defense andcounterattack drove them back.

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception operationsof strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit Israeli weaknesses.At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that they would not attackwithout both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to neutralize the Israeli AirForce, and that tactical preparations were merely in response to feared Israeliretaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forcesportrayed their mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of theirannual exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the canalwere repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and therefore did

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not react when the actual attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forcesexpertly camouflaged their equipment, denying information to Israeli observersand creating a false impression of the purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the operationaland strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers reportedwith increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were significant.Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces exploited thesevulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day ofAtonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli forces would bereduced.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations ofthe force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forcesin the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

•• Commanders at all levels can plandeception operations. Strategic oroperational plans may include theemployment of lower-level units,although subordinate commanders maynot know of the overall deceptioneffort. It is therefore essential forcommanders to coordinate theirdeception plans with their seniorcommander to ensure overall unity ofeffort .

•• Deception operations depend onintelligence operations to identifyappropriate deception targets, to assistin developing a credible story, toidentify and orient on appropriatereceivers (the readers of the story), andto assess the effectiveness of thedeception effort.

•• Deception operations are notwithout cost, but are a powerful toolin full dimensional operations.Forces and resources must becommitted to the deception effort tomake it believable, possibly to theshort-term detriment of some aspectsof the campaign. OPSEC fordeception operations may dictate thatonly a select group of seniorcommanders and staff officers in thejoint force know which actions are

purely deceptive in nature. Thissituation can cause confusion withinthe force and must be closelymonitored by JFCs and their staffs.Joint Pub 3-58, “Joint Doctrine forMi l i tary Decept ion,” prov idesadditional detail.

• Psychological Operations

•• PSYOP are actions to conveyselected information and indicatorsto foreign audiences. They aredesigned to influence the emotions,motives, reasoning, and, ultimately,the behavior of foreign governments,organizations, groups, and individuals.PSYOP have strategic, operational, andtactical applications, including supportto deception operations.

•• At the strategic level, PSYOP maytake the form of political or diplomaticpositions, announcements, orcommuniques. At the operationallevel, PSYOP can include thedistribution of leaflets, loudspeakerbroadcasts, and other means oft ransmi t t i ng in fo rmat ion tha tencourage enemy forces to defect,desert, flee, or surrender. Persistentattacks can have a synergistic effectwith PSYOP, accelerating the

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degradation of morale and furtherencouraging desertion. At the tacticallevel, PSYOP include the use ofloudspeakers to promote fear ordissension in enemy ranks.

•• P S Y O P c a n c o n t r i b u t esignificantly to all aspects of jointoperations. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrinefor Joint Psychological Operations,”provides additional detail.

• Operations Security

•• OPSEC is a process of planningand action to gain and maintainessential secrecy about the JFCs actualcapabilities, activities, and intentions.

•• History has shown the value andneed for reliable, adequate, and timelyintelligence, and the harm that resultsfrom its inaccuracies and absence. Itis therefore vital and advantageous tod e n y t h e o p p o s i n g f o r c ecommanders the critical informationthey need (essential secrecy) and causethem to derive inaccurate, timelyappreciations that influence theiractions (desired appreciations).

•• OPSEC is applied to all militaryactivities at all levels of command.The JFC should provide OPSECplanning guidance to the staff at thetime of the commander’s decision and,subsequently, to subordinate andsupporting commanders in the chain ofcommand. By maintaining liaison andcoordinating the OPSEC planningguidance, the JFC will ensure unity ofeffort in gaining and maintaining theessential secrecy considered necessaryfor success. Joint Pub 3-54, “JointDoctrine for Operations Security,”provides additional detail.

• Electronic Warfare

•• EW is any military actioninvolving the use of electromagneticand directed energy to control theelectromagnetic spectrum or toattack the enemy. Control of theelectromagnetic spectrum ranges fromprotecting friendly systems tocountering enemy systems. Thiscontrol is not limited to radio or radarfrequencies, but includes optical andinfrared regions as well as thoseregions in which directed-energyweapons might function.

•• The three major subdivisions of EWare electronic attack, electronicprotection, and electronic warfaresupport, which may overlap. SomeEW actions may be both offensive andprotective in nature and may inherentlyuse electronic surveillance in theirexecution.

•• EW should be employed to attackthe enemy according to establishedprinciples of warfare. The decisionto employ EW should be based not onlyon overall joint campaign objectivesbut also the risks of possible enemyresponses and other effects on thecampaign effort.

•• The JFC should ensure maximumcoordination among EW and otheroperations activities, and intelligenceand communications (includingfrequency management) supportactivities for maximum effect. Thiscoordination is necessary to ensureeffective exchange of information,eliminate undesirable duplication ofeffort, and provide for mutual support.See the glossary for definitions ofelectronic warfare terms and Joint Pub

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3-51, “Electronic Warfare in JointMilitary Operations,” for additionalguidance.

• Civil Affairs. Civil affairs are thoseinterrelated military activities thatembrace the relationship betweenmilitary forces and civil authoritiesand populations. Civil affairsmissions include civil-militaryoperations and civil administration .JFCs integrate civil affairs andsynchronize their effects with combatoperations to minimize civilianinterference with military operationsand safeguard noncombatants andtheir property. Joint Pub 3-57,“Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs,”describes civil affairs operations.

7. Control and CoordinatingMeasures

JFCs employ various maneuver andmovement control and fire supportcoordinating measures to facilitateeffective joint operations. These measuresinclude boundaries, phase lines, objectives,coordinating altitudes to deconflict airoperations, air defense areas, amphibiousobjective areas, submarine operating patrolareas, and minefields. Boundaries and firesupport coordinating measures arediscussed below.

a. Boundaries

• Boundaries define surface areas tof a c i l i t a t e c o o r d i n a t i o n a n ddeconfliction of operations. In landand sea warfare, a boundary is a lineby which areas between adjacentunits or formations are defined. Anaval boundary may be designated forseas adjacent to the area of land conflictto enhance coordination and executionof naval operations.

• JFCs may use lateral , rear , andforward boundaries to define AOs forland and naval forces. Such areas aresized, shaped, and positioned to enableland or naval force commanders toaccomplish their mission whileprotecting deployed forces.

• T h e a t e r a i r s o rt i e s a re n o tconstrained by land boundaries, perse. However, because the airspaceabove surface areas is used by allcomponents of the joint force, JFCspromulgate airspace controlmeasures to deconflict the multipleuses required of this space (see JointPub 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint AirspaceControl in the Combat Zone”).

• Boundaries may require relativelyfrequent adjustment based on theactual and projected rate of maneuverand the operational environment.

b . F i re Support Coord ina t ingMeasures

• Joint fire support coordinatingmeasures and the proceduresassociated with those measures assistin the C2 of joint forces. Within theirA O s , l a n d a n d a m p h i b i o u scommanders employ permissive andrestrictive fire support coordinatingmeasures to enhance the expeditiousattack of targets; protect forces,populations, critical infrastructure, andsites of religious or culturalsignificance; and set the stage for futureoperations. Commanders position andadjust fire support coordinatingmeasures consistent with theoperational situation and inc o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h s u p e r i o r ,subordinate, supporting, and affected

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c o m m a n d e r s . F i r e s u p p o r tcoordinating measures are addressed inJoint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint FireSupport.”

• Fire Support Coordination Line(FSCL)

•• FSCLs are permissive fire supportcoordinating measures. They areestablished and adjusted byappropriate land or amphibiousforce commanders within theirboundaries in consultation withsuperior, subordinate, supporting, anda ffected commanders.Forcesattacking targets beyond an FSCLm u s t i n f o r m a l l a f f e c t e dcommanders in sufficient time toallow necessary reaction to avoidfratricide, both in the air and on theground. FSCLs fac i l i ta te theexpeditious attack of targets ofopportunity beyond the coordinatingmeasure. Supporting elements mayattack targets beyond the FSCL,provided the attack will not produceadverse effects on, or to the rear of, theline. The FSCL is not aboundary--the synchronization ofoperations on either side of the FSCLis the responsibility of the establishingcommander out to the limits of the landor amphibious force boundary.

•• The decision on where to place oreven whether to use an FSCL requirescareful consideration. If used, itslocation is based on estimates of thesituation and concept of operations.L o c a t i o n o f e n e m y f o r c e s,anticipated rates of movement,weapons capabilities, and tempo ofthe operation are considered in thecommander’s estimate, as well as otherfactors deemed appropriate. The FSCLis normally positioned closer to the

forward line of own troops (FLOT) inthe defense than in the offense;however, the exact positioning issituationally dependent.

•• By establishing an FSCL atsufficient depth so as to not limithigh-tempo maneuver, land oramphibious force commanders easethe coordination requirements forattack operations within their AOs byforces not under their control, such asnaval gunfire or air interdiction. TheFSCL applies to all fires of air, land,or sea weapon systems using any typeof ammunition against surface targets.(The FSCL is a term oriented toair-land operations; there is no similarterm used at sea.)

•• An associated benefit of employingan FSCL is the reduction in potentialfor fratricide . Short of an FSCL, allair-to-ground and surface-to-surfaceattack operations are controlled by theappropriate land or amphibious forcecommander. Commanders employrestrictive measures to enhance theprotection of friendly forces operatingbeyond an FSCL.

•• Coordination of attacks beyondthe FSCL is especially critical tocommanders of air, land, and specialoperations forces. Their forces maynow be operating beyond an FSCL ormay plan to maneuver on that territoryin the future. Such coordination isalso important when attacking forcesare employing wide-area munitionsor munitions with delayed effects.Finally, this coordination assists inavoiding conflicting or redundantattack operations. In exceptionalcircumstances, the inability to conductthis coordination will not preclude theattack of targets beyond the FSCL.

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However, failure to do so may increasethe risk of fratricide and could wastelimited resources.

•• The land or amphibious forcecommander adjusts the location of theFSCL as required to keep pace withoperations. In high-tempo maneuveroperations, the FSCL may changefrequently , such as every severalhours. The establishing commander

quickly transmits the change to higher,lower, adjacent, and supportingheadquarters to ensure attacko p e r a t i o n s a r e a p p r o p r i a t e l ycoordinated by controlling agencies.Anticipated adjustments to thelocation of the FSCL are normallytransmitted to other elements of thejoint force sufficiently early toreduce potential disruptions in theircurrent and near-term operations.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVJOINT OPERATIONS IN WAR

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“Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult”

Clausewitz: On War, 1812

1. Considerations BeforeCombat

Considerations before combat are shownin Figure IV-1.

a. General. Actions JFCs are able totake before the initiation of hostilities canassist in determining the shape andcharacter of future operations. Mostinclusive is preparing the theater,which involves intelligence andcounterintelligence operations tounderstand clearly the capabilities,intentions, and possible actions of potentialopponents, as well as the geography,weather, demographics, and culture(s) of

the operational area. Additionally, theinfrastructure required to deploy andsupport combat operations must beidentified and emplaced as appropriate. Inmany cases, these actions enhance bondsbetween future coalition partners, increaseunderstanding of the region, help ensureaccess when required, and strengthen futuremultinational military operations.

b. Preparing the Theater

• Intelligence

•• At the advent of a crisis or otherindication of potential military action,JFCs examine available intelligenceestimates. As part of the IPB process,JFCs then focus intelligenceefforts to refine estimates of enemycapabilities, dispositions, intentions,and probable actions within the contextof the current situation. They look forspecific indications and warning ofimminent enemy activity that mayrequire an immediate response or anacceleration of friendly decisioncycles.

•• JFCs direct reconnaissance,surveillance, and target acquisitionoperations by elements of the jointforce to further develop the situationand gain information critical todecisionmaking. In some cases, suchinformation can be gained by passiveor unobtrusive means. In other cases,elements of the joint force may haveto fight to gain the information desired.Armed reconnaissance operations

CONSIDERATIONSBEFORE COMBAT

Preparing the Theater

Isolating the Enemy

Movement to AttainOperational Reach

Special Operations

Protection of Forcesand their Freedom ofAction

Control of Space

Constant Assessmentof Physical Environment

Joint Force Commander'sactions include...

Figure IV-1. Considerations Before Combat

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conducted by manned systems have thepotential to fight for information aswell as process the information on site,providing commanders with real-timeintelligence. SOF can be employed forspecial reconnaissance or otherHUMINT operations.

•• JFCs use a broad range ofsupporting capabilities to develop acurrent intelligence picture. Thesesupporting capabilities includenational intelligence and combatsupport agencies (for example,National Security Agency, CentralIntelligence Agency, Central ImageryOffice, Defense Intelligence Agency,and Defense Mapping Agency), whichare coordinated in support of the JFCby the National Military JointIntelligence Center. J-2s shouldintegrate these supporting capabilitieswith the efforts of the jointintelligence center. Liaison personnelfrom the various agencies provideaccess to the entire range of capabilitiesresident in their agencies and can focusthose capabilities on the JFC’sintelligence requirements. Intelligenceoperations serve to reduce uncertainty.

•• The joint publications in the 2-0series discuss intelligence support tojoint operations.

• Organizing and Training Forces.Preparing the theater also includesorganizing and, where possible,training forces to conduct operationsthroughout the theater. When it isnot possible to train forces in the theaterof employment, as with CONUS-basedforces with multiple taskings,maximum use should be made ofregularly scheduled and ad hoc exerciseopportunities. JTFs and componentsthat are likely to be employed in theateroperations should be exercised

regularly during peacetime. Staffsshould be identified and trained forplanning and controlling jointoperations. JFCs and the compositionof their staffs should reflect thecomposition of the joint force to ensurethose responsible for employing jointforces have thorough knowledge oftheir capabilities and limitations. Thetraining focus for all forces and thebasis for exercise objectives should bethe combatant commander’s jointmission essential task list.

• Maintaining Theater Access. JFCsestablish and maintain access(including exercises, basing, transit,and overflight rights) to operationalareas in which they are likely tooperate. In part, this effort is nationalo r m u l t i n a t i o n a l , i n v o l v i n gmaintenance of intertheater (betweentheaters) air and sea LOCs. Supportingcombatant commanders can greatlyenhance this effort. Either at the outsetor as operations progress, JFCsestablish and secure intratheater(within the theater) LOCs through theapplication of appropriate joint force.

c. Isolating the Enemy

• With NCA guidance and approval andwith national support, JFCs strive toisolate enemies by denying themallies and sanctuary. The intent is tostrip away as much enemy support orfreedom of action as possible, whilelimiting the enemy’s potential forhorizontal or vertical escalation. JFCsmay also be tasked to supportd i p l o m a t i c , e c o n o m i c , a n dinformational actions as directed by theNCA.

• JFC seeks to isolate the main enemyforce from its strategic leadership andits supporting infrastructure. This

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isolation is accomplished by PSYOPand by interdicting critical C2 nodes,sources of sustaining resources, andtransportation networks. This stepserves to deny the enemy bothphysical and psychological supportand may separate the enemy leadershipand military from their public support.

d. Movement to Attain OperationalReach

• Forces, sometimes limited toforward-presence forces, can bepositioned within operational reachof enemy centers of gravity to achievedecisive force at the appropriatelocation. At other times, mobilizationand strategic deployment systemscan be called up to begin themovement of reinforcing forces fromCONUS or other theaters to redressany unfavorable balance of forces andto achieve decisive force at theappropriate location.

• JFCs carefully consider themovement of forces in such situations.At times, movement of forces cancontribute to the escalation of tension,while at other times its deterrent effectcan reduce those tensions.

e . Specia l Operat ions. Duringprehostilities, SOF can provide powerfuloperational leverage. Among theirpotential contributions, SOF can beemployed to gather critical information ,undermine a potential opponent’s will orcapacity to wage war, or enhance thecapabilities of multinational forces. SOFcan gain access and influence in foreign

nations where the presence of conventionalUS forces is unacceptable or inappropriate.They can also ameliorate the underlyingconditions that are provoking a crisis inan effort to preclude open hostilities fromoccurring.

f. Protection. JFCs must protect theirforces and their freedom of action. Thisprotection dictates that JFCs be aware ofand participate as appropriate in regionalpolitical and diplomatic activities. JFCs,in concert with US ambassadors, may spendas much time on regional political anddiplomatic efforts as on direct preparationof their forces for combat.

g. Space. Throughout all prebattleoperations, JFCs continue to exploit theadvantages that control of spaceprovides. Intelligence and communicationssystems are maneuvered or activated asnecessary to provide JFCs with an accurateand timely appraisal of the current situation,as well as the ability to respond rapidly toevents and directives from the CINC orfrom higher authority.

h. Physical Environment. Seasonaleffects on terrain, weather, and seaconditions can significantly affectoperations of the joint force and shouldbe carefully assessed before and duringoperations. Mobility of the force,synchronization of operations, and abilityto employ precision munitions can beaffected by degraded conditions.Climatological and hydrographic studiesand long-range forecasts help JFCsunderstand the most advantageous time andlocation for operations.

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2. Considerations at the Outsetof Combat

As combat operations commence, JFCsneed to exploit full dimensional leverageto shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponentsimmediately. JFCs seek decisive advantagequickly, before close combat if possible.

a. Force Projection

• The NCA may direct combatantcommanders to resolve a crisisquickly , employing immediatelyavailable forward-presence forces, and,at the lowest level possible, to precludeescalation of the crisis. When thisresponse is not enough, the projectionof forces from CONUS or anothertheater may be necessary. Whenopposed, force projection can beaccomplished rapidly by forcible entrycoordinated with strategic airlift andsealift, and prepositioned forces. Forexample, the ability to generate highintensity combat power from the seacan provide for effective forceprojection operations in the absence oftimely or unencumbered access.

• Force projection usually begins as arapid response to a crisis. Alert maycome with little or no notice, bringingwith it tremendous stress on personneland systems, accompanied by requestsfrom the media for information. In anyevent, rapid, yet measured, response iscritical.

• Joint forces participate in forceprojection operations in both warand operations other than war.These operations may be eitherunopposed or opposed by anadversary. JFCs sequence, enable,and protect the arrival of forces toachieve early decisive advantage. Anexample of enabling and protecting thearrival of forces when access is initiallyunavailable is the seizure and defenseof lodgment areas by naval forces,which would then serve as initial entrypoints for the continuous anduninterrupted flow of additional forcesand materiel into the theater. Toaccomplish this decisive advantage,forcible entry operations may berequired at the onset. When opposed,force projection can be accomplished

Battle groups and task forces deployed worldwide provide combat powerfrom the sea able to respond rapidly to crisis situations.

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rapidly by forcible entry coordinatedwith strategic airlift and sealift, andpre-positioned forces. Both types ofoperations demand a versatile mix offorces that are organized, trained,equipped, and poised to respondquickly.

•• Opposed operations require aviable forcible entry capability withforces prepared to fight immediatelyupon entry. Forcible entry is discussedin more detail later in this chapter.

•• Unopposed operations may affordan opportunity, following arrival in theoperational area, to continue to buildcombat power, train, rehearse,acclimate, and otherwise establish theconditions for successful operations. Inunopposed entry, JFCs control the flowof forces that best facilitates the buildupof forces necessary for the envisionedoperations. Logistic capability may bea higher priority than combatcapability, which could be initiallylimited to that needed for protection.

• The protection of forces will often bea friendly center of gravity duringearly entry operations. Therefore, earlyentry forces should deploy withsufficient organic and supportingcapabilities to preserve their freedomof action and protect personnel andequipment from potential or likelythreats.

• JFCs introduce forces in a manner thatenables rapid force buildup into thestructure required for anticipatedoperations and simultaneous protectionof the force. From a C2 perspective,echelonment is essential. Early entryforces should include the C2 capabilityto assess the situation, make decisions,and conduct initial operations.

• Operations with allies and coalitionmembers often require a robust liaisonand communications capability .Linguists must be capable of communi-cating warfighting concepts betweenmilitary forces of diverse cultures.Also, additional sufficient communi-cations equipment may be required fornon-US forces to enable interoperablecommunications.

b. Dimensional Superiority

• JFCs will normally seek to secure airand maritime superiority early in theconduct of joint operations. Air andmaritime superiority enable andenhance joint operations in alldimensions. Although air and maritimesuperiority are not ends in themselves,history shows that control of the seaand/or the air has been a pivotalwartime factor . World War II’sOperation POINT BLANK establishedair superiority, which was considereda prerequisite for OperationOVERLORD. The Navy componentcommander or JFMCC is normally thesupported commander for sea controloperations, and the JFACC is normallythe supported commander forcounterair operations.

• Superiority battles are not limited to theair and maritime environments. JFCsseek to achieve superiorityimmediately in command, control,communications, computers, andintelligence (C4I)--space control is anecessary precursor to this superiority.They seek to lay open the enemy’sintentions, capabilities, and actions toobservation and assessment, whilesimultaneously depriving the enemy ofsimilar information about the friendlyforce and deceiving the enemy as to theveracity of the information obtainedabout the friendly force.

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• As another example of seeking earlysuperiority before close combat, landcommanders may seek to firstachieve counterbattery or indirectfire superiority , thereby enhancingprotection of their forces. Additionally,JFCs can seek to achieve a mobilitydifferential by selectively attacking keyenemy forces and transportationnetworks to degrade enemy maneuver.

c. Direct Attack of Enemy StrategicCenters of Gravity

• Also as part of achieving decisiveadvantages early, joint forceope ra t i ons may b e d i r ec tedimmediately against enemy centersof gravity. Where possible, specificoperations may be conducted todirectly attack strategic centers ofgravity by air, missile, specialoperations, and other deep-rangingcapabilities. When air operationsconstitute the bulk of the capabilityneeded to directly attack enemystrategic centers of gravity or toconduct air superiority operations,JFCs will normally task JFACCs, assupported commanders, to conductsuch operations.

• There are several purposes to theseattacks. They may in themselves bedecisive. If they are not, they beginthe offensive operation throughout theenemy’s depth that can cause paralysisand destroy cohesion.

d. Special Operations. Specialoperations enhance the power and scopeof full dimensional operations and tendto be asymmetrical in their application.Innovative special operations can directlyand indirectly attack enemy centers ofgravity that may be difficult to reach byconventional action. SOF frequentlyrequire support from other forces, but can

support other forces in operations such asintelligence gathering, target acquisitionand designation, and interdiction. SOFcapabilities are diverse, but they need to beemployed judiciously so as not to negatetheir effectiveness. They are a complementto, not a substitute for, conventional forces.

e. Protection. JFCs strive to conservethe fighting potential of the joint force.

• Protection from the Enemy’sFirepower and Maneuver. JFCscounter the enemy’s firepower andmaneuver by making personnel,systems, and units difficult to locate,strike, and destroy. They protect theirforce from enemy maneuver andfirepower, including the effects ofweapons of mass destruction. Air andmaritime superiority operations; airdefense; and protection of airports andseaports, LOCs, and friendly forcelodgment all contribute to forceprotection. OPSEC and militarydeception are key elements ofprotection.

• Health, Welfare, Morale, andMaintenance. JFCs keep personnelhealthy and maintain their fightingspirit . This protection includesguarding equipment and supplies fromloss or damage. JFCs ensure systemsare in place for adequate medical care,quick return of minor casualties to duty,and preventive medicine. Joint Pub4-02, “Doctrine for Health ServiceSupport in Joint Operations,” discusseshealth support for joint operations.

• Safety. JFCs make safety an integralpart of all joint training andoperations. Sustained, high-tempooperations put personnel at risk.Command interest, discipline, andtraining lessen those risks. Safety intraining, planning, and operations is

IV-7


crucial to successful combat operationsand the preservation of combat power.

• Prevention of Fratricide. JFCs makeevery effort to reduce the potentialfor fratricide --the unintentionalkilling or wounding of friendlypersonnel by friendly fire. Thedestructive power and range ofmodern weapons, coupled with thehigh intensity and rapid tempo ofmodern combat, increase the potentialfor fratricide. Commanders must beaware of those situations that increasethe risk of fratricide and instituteappropriate preventative measures.The primary mechanisms for limitingfratricide are command emphasis,disciplined operations, closecoordination among componentcommands, rehearsals, and enhancedsituational awareness. Commandersshould seek to minimize the potentialfor fratricide while not limitingboldness and audacity in combat.

3. Sustained CombatOperations

JFCs seek to extend operations through-out the breadth and depth of the operationalarea. JFCs conduct sustained operationswhen a “coup de main” is not possible.During sustained operations, JFCssimultaneously employ air, land, sea,space, and SOF. During one majoroperation, one component or majorcategory of operations, such as airoperations, might be the main effort, withothers in support. When conditions change,the main effort might shift to anothercomponent or function. Strategic attackand interdiction continue throughout todeny the enemy sanctuary or freedomof action. When prevented fromconcentrating, opponents can be attacked,

isolated at tactical and operational levels,and defeated in detail. At other times, JFCsmay cause their opponents to concentrate,facilitating their attack by friendly forces.

a. The Relationship Between Offenseand Defense

• Although defense may be the strongerform of war, it is the offense that isnormally decisive. In striving toachieve strategic objectives mostquickly and at least cost, JFCs willn o r m a l l y s e e k t h e e a r l i e s topportunity to conduct decisiveoffensive operations.

• Joint operations will normallyinclude elements of both offense anddefense. JFCs strive to apply the manyd imens ions of comba t powersimultaneously across the depth,breadth, and height of the operationalarea. To conduct such operations, JFCsnormally achieve concentration insome areas or in specific functions andrequire economy of force in others.During initial entry operations, entryforces may be required to defend whileforce buildup occurs. Even in sustainedoffensive operations, selected elementsof the joint force may need to pause,defend, resupply, or reconstitute, whileother forces continue the attack.Further, force protection includescertain defensive measures throughoutthe campaign. Commanders at alllevels must possess the mental agilityto rapidly transition between offenseand defense and vice versa.

• The relationship between offense anddefense, then, is an enabling one.Defensive operations, where required,enable JFCs to conduct or preparefor decisive offensive operations.

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b. Linear and Nonlinear Operations

“The full dimensional joint campaign isin major respects ‘nonlinear.’ That is,the dominant effects of air, sea, space,and special operations may be feltmore or less independently of the frontline of ground troops. The impact ofthese operations on land battles,interacting with the modern dynamicsof land combat itself, helps obtain therequired fluidity, breadth, and depth ofoperations. In the same way, landoperations can provide or protectcritical bases for air, land, sea, andspace operations and enable theseoperations to be supported andextended throughout the theater”

Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of theArmed Forces of the United

States”

• As technology and doctrines haveexpanded the lethality, tempo, anddepth of operations, the potential forconventional forces to conductnonlinear operations has increased.Linearity refers primarily to theconduct of operations along lines ofoperations with identified FLOTs. Inlinear operations, emphasis is placedon maintaining the position of theland force in relation to otherfriendly forces. From this relativepositioning of forces, security isenhanced and massing of forces can befacilitated. Also inherent in linearoperations is the security of rear areas,especially LOCs between sustainingbases and fighting forces. World WarsI and II offer multiple examples oflinear operations.

• In the land context, nonlinearoperations tend to be conducted fromselected bases of operations (ashoreor afloat), but without clearly definedlines of operations. Because rear areasare likewise not clearly defined, theirsecurity as well as that of LOCs are not

priority concerns. Operation JUSTCAUSE is an excellent example of anonlinear operation. In such anoperation, land forces orient more ontheir assigned objectives (forexample, destroying an enemy force orseizing and controlling critical terrainor population centers) and less on theirgeographic relationship to otherfriendly forces. Maritime operations,special operations, and the operationsof insurgent forces tend to be nonlinear.To protect themselves, individualforces conducting nonlinear operationsrely more on situational awareness,mobility advantages, and freedom ofaction than on mass. Nonlinearoperations place a premium on C4I,mobility, and innovative means forsustainment.

c. Attack of Enemy Strategic Centersof Gravity. As described earlier in thischapter, JFCs seek to attack enemystrategic centers of gravity, employing theappropriate forces and capabilities of thejoint force. Such operations typicallycontinue throughout the overall jointoperation. JFCs time their effects tocoincide with effects of other operations ofthe joint force and vice versa. As with alloperations of the joint force, attacks ofenemy strategic centers of gravity shouldbe designed to support the JFCs’ objectivesand concept of operations, while limitingtheir potential negative effects onposthostilities efforts.

d. Maneuver

• The principal purpose of maneuveris to gain positional advantagerelative to enemy centers of gravityin order to control or destroy thosecenters of gravity. The focus of bothland and naval maneuver is to renderopponents incapable of resisting byshattering their morale and physical

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cohesion (their ability to fight as aneffective, coordinate whole) ratherthan to destroy them physicallythrough attrition. This condition maybe achieved by attacking enemyforces and controlling territory,populations, key waters, and LOCs(in all dimensions). Land and navalmaneuver (which includes the actionof air assets organic to the surfaceforce) is required to control population,territory, and key waters.

• There are multiple ways to attainpositional advantage. A navalexpeditionary force with airpower,cruise missile firepower, andamphibious assault capability, withinoperational reach of enemy centersof gravity, has positional advantage.Land force attack aviation, if able tostrike at the opponent’s centers ofgravity, also has positional advantage.Maintaining dimensional superioritycontributes to positional advantageby facilitating freedom of action.

• Maneuver of forces relative to enemycenters of gravity can be key to theJFC’s campaign or major operation.Maneuver is the means of concen-trating forces at decisive points toachieve surprise, psychologicalshock, and physical momentum.Maneuver may also exploit the effectsof massed and/or precision firepoweror WMD.

• JFCs consider the contribution ofspecial operations in attainingpositional advantage. Through specialreconnaissance, direct action, orsupport of insurgent forces, SOF mayexpose vulnerabilities and attack theenemy at tactical, operational, andstrategic levels.

• At all levels of war, successfulmaneuver requires not only fire andmovement but also agility andversatility of thought, plans,operations, and organizations. Itrequires designating and then, ifnecessary, shifting the main effort andapplying the principles of mass andeconomy of force.

•• At the strategic level, deployingunits to and positioning units within anoperational area are forms of maneuverif such movement seeks to gainpositional advantage. Strategicmaneuver should place forces inposition to begin the phases or majoroperations of a campaign.

•• At the operational level, maneuveris a means by which JFCs set the termsof battle by time and location, declinebattle, or exploit existing situations.Operational maneuver usually takeslarge forces from a base of operationsto an area where they are in position toachieve operational objectives. Asshown by USCINCCENT’s concept ofoperations in Operation DESERTSTORM, the ability to maneuver mustbe a trait not only of combat forces butalso of the logistic resources thatsupport them.

•• Once deployed into battleformations into the operational area,maneuver is typically consideredtactical in nature.

• The concept for maneuver, both navaland land, needs to be articulated in theJFC's concept of operations includestiming, sequencing, and method andlocation of entry into the operationalarea. Types of joint force maneuversinclude forcible entry, sustainedaction at sea and from the sea, andsustained action on land.

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• Forcible Entry

•• Forcible entry is seizing andholding a military lodgment in theface of armed opposition. In manysituations, forcible entry is the onlymethod for gaining access into theoperational area or for introducingdecisive forces into the region.Forcible entry capabilities give JFCsunique opportunities for altering thenature of the situation, such as theopportunity for gaining the initiativeat the outset of combat operations.Forcible entry operations can strikedirectly at enemy centers of gravityand can open new avenues formilitary operations . Forcible entryoperations can horizontally escalatethe operation, exceeding the enemy’scapability to respond. For moreinformation, see Joint Pubs 3-02, “JointDoctrine for Amphibious Operations,”and 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for ForcibleEntry Operations.”

•• Forcible entry operations arenormally joint operations and mayinclude airborne , amphibious,and air assault operations, or anycombination thereof. Subordinatejoint and Service publications providedetails on these operations.

•• Forcible entry is normallycomplex and risky. These operationsrequire detailed intelligence andunity of effort . Forces are tailoredfor the mission and echeloned topermit simultaneous deploymentand employment. Forcible entryforces need to be prepared to fightimmediately upon arrival and requirerobust C4I capabilities to move withforward elements.

•• OPSEC and deception are criticalto successful forcible entry. Forcible

entry relies on speed and surprise andis almost always employed incoordination with special operations.Forcible entry usually requires supportfrom naval gunfire and/or aviationassets. Follow-on forces need to beprepared to expand the operation,sustain the effort, and accomplish themission.

•• SOF may precede forcible entryforces to identify, clarify, and modifyconditions in the area of the lodgment.SOF may conduct the assaults to seizesmall, initial lodgments such asairfields or ports. They may providefire support and conduct otheroperations in support of the forcibleentry. They may conduct specialreconnaissance and interdictionoperations well beyond the lodgment.

•• The sustainment requirementsand challenges for forcible entryoperations can be formidable, butmust not be allowed to become suchan overriding concern that the forcibleentry operation itself is jeopardized.JFCs carefully balance the introductionof logistic forces needed to supportinitial combat with combat forcesrequired to establish, maintain, andprotect the lodgment.

•• Forcible entry has been conductedthroughout the history of the ArmedForces of the United States. Forcibleentry is usually a complex operationand should therefore be kept as simpleas possible in concept. Schemes ofmaneuver and coordination betweenforces need to be clearly understoodby all participants. When airborne,amphibious, and air assault operationsare combined, unity of effort is vital .Rehearsals are a critical part ofpreparation for forcible entry.

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• JFCs and their staffs should be familiarwith Service doctrine on land and navalmaneuver.

e. Interdiction

• Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs.Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays,or destroys the enemy’s surfacemilitary potential before it can beused effectively against friendlyforces. Interdiction-capable forcesinclude land- and sea-based fighter andattack aircraft and bombers; ships andsubmarines; conventional airborne, airassault, or other ground maneuverforces; SOF; amphibious raid forces;surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles,

Operation JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander in Chief, USSouthern Command, JTF Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcibleentry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forcesseized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and InternationalAirport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTFused these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaultsagainst the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerousother operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. Theparachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from CONUSbases, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. Onelarge formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departureairfield--its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was evenadjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possiblecompromise. SOF reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets.

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and airelements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets--most of themin the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that JFCs organize andapply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employedland and SOFs to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tacticaland operational-level targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attackagainst enemy C2 facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzedenemy decisionmaking. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours.Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main.

rockets, munitions, and mines; artilleryand naval gunfire; attack helicopters;EW systems; antisatellite weapons; andspace-based satellite systems orsensors. The JFACC is the supportedcommander for the JFC’s overall airinterdiction effort.

• Interdiction-capable commandersrequire access to C2 systems able totake advantage of real and near realtime intelligence. Such intelligence isparticularly useful in dealing withtargets of near or immediate effect onsurface forces or whose location wasnot previously known with sufficientaccuracy.

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• Interdiction operations can beconducted by many elements of thejoint force and can have tactical,operational, and strategic effects. Air ,land, sea, space, and specialoperations forces can conductinterdiction operations as part of their

larger or overall mission. For example,naval expeditionary forces chargedwith seizing and securing a lodgmentalong a coast may include theinterdiction of opposing air, land, andnaval forces as part of the overallamphibious plan.

BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA2-4 March 1943

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea is an outstanding example of the application offirepower at the operational level--in this case, air interdiction.

During the first part of 1943, the Japanese high command attempted to establisha line of defense in the Southwest Pacific, to run from Northeast New Guinea,through New Britain to the northern Solomon Islands. After a defeat at Wau,New Guinea (the intended right flank of this line), the Japanese command atRabaul decided to reinforce its garrison at Lae, in the Huon Gulf of New Guinea.Relying on inclement weather to cover its move, a convoy of 8 destroyers and8 transports carrying over 8,700 personnel and extensive cargo departedRabaul at midnight of 28 February.

General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) intelligence had identifiedthe likelihood of this reinforcement. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney’sAllied Air Forces, SWPA, had stepped up long-range reconnaissance, forwardpositioning of air forces, and training in low-level strikes against shipping.

Late on 1 March the convoy was spotted moving westward off the northerncoast of New Britain. Early on 2 March Lieutenant General Kenney’s air forcesattacked as the convoy was moving into the Dampier Strait. Multiple formationsof B-17s attacked throughout the day, sinking two transports and damagingseveral others. By the morning of 3 March the convoy was nearing the HuonPeninsula on New Guinea. It was now within range of all of Kenney’sPapuan-based aircraft. Clearing midmorning skies exposed the convoy. In asynchronized attack, 13 B-17 heavy bombers, 31 B-25 medium bombers, 12A-20 light bombers, 28 P-38 fighters, and 13 Australian Beaufighters unleashedtheir firepower on the vulnerable Japanese ships. The attack continuedthroughout the day as more planes roared off the Moresby and Milne runwaysto join the fight. Before nightfall, over 330 allied aircraft had participated and,except for 4 destroyers that had fled to the north, all ships were sunk, sinking,or badly damaged. During the night and the next day, bombers and PT boatsfinished the job.

MacArthur was jubilant. His press release stated, in part, “Our decisive successcannot fail to have the most important results on the enemy’s strategic andtactical plans. His campaign, for the time being at least, is completelydislocated.” Looking back on SWPA operations, MacArthur, in 1945, stillregarded the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as “the decisive aerial engagement”of the war in his theater. The Japanese high command was shocked andaborted its second projected offensive against Wau, New Guinea. By relyingon Kenney’s aggressive airmen, MacArthur demonstrated the major impact ofinterdiction on a theater campaign.

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• For more discussion of jointinterdiction operations, refer to JointPub 3-03, “Doctrine for JointInterdiction Operations.”

f. Synchronizing Maneuver andInterdiction

• Synchronizing interdiction andmaneuver (both land and sea)provides one of the most dynamicconcepts available to the joint force.Interdiction and maneuver should notbe considered separate operationsagainst a common enemy, but rathercomplementary operations designedto achieve the JFC’s campaignobjectives. Moreover, maneuver byland or naval forces can be conductedto interdict enemy surface potential.Potential responses to synchronizedmaneuver and interdiction can createan agonizing dilemma for the enemy.If the enemy attempts to counter themaneuver, enemy forces can beexposed to unacceptable losses frominterdiction. If the enemy employsmeasures to reduce such interdictionlosses, enemy forces may not be ableto counter the maneuver. The synergya c h i e v e d b y i n t e g r a t i n g a n dsynchronizing interdiction andmaneuver assists commanders inoptimizing leverage at the operationallevel.

• As a guiding principle, JFCs shouldexploit the flexibility inherent in jointforce command relationships, jointtargeting procedures, and othertechniques to resolve the issues thatcan arise from the relationshipbetween interdiction and maneuver.When maneuver is employed, JFCsneed to carefully balance doctrinalimperatives that may be in tension,including the needs of the maneuverforce and the undesirability of

fragmenting theater/JOA air assets.The JFC’s objectives, intent, andpriorities, reflected in missionassignments and coordinatingarrangements, enable subordinates toexploit fully the military potential oftheir forces while minimizing thefriction generated by competingrequirements. Effective targetingprocedures in the joint force alsoalleviate such friction. As an example,interdiction requirements will oftenexceed interdiction means, requiringJFCs to prioritize requirements. Landand naval force commandersresponsible for synchronizingmaneuver and interdiction withintheir AOs should be knowledgeableof JFC priorities. Componentcommanders aggressively seek the bestmeans to accomplish assignedmissions. JFCs alleviate this frictionthrough clear statements of intent fortheater/JOA-level interdiction (that is,interdiction effort conducted relativelyindependent of surface maneuveroperations). In doing this, JFCs relyon their vision as to how the majorelements of the joint force contributeto accomplishing strategic objectives.The campaign concept articulates thatvision. JFCs then employ a flexiblerange of techniques to assist inidentifying requirements and applyingresources to meet them. JFCs defineappropriate command relationships,establish effective joint targetingprocedures, and make apportionmentdecisions.

• Interdiction is not limited to anyparticular region of the joint battle, butgenerally is conducted forward of orat a distance from friendly forces.Interdiction may be planned tocreate advantages at any level fromtactical to strategic with correspondingimpacts on the enemy and the speed

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with which interdiction affectsfront-line enemy forces. Interdictiondeep in the enemy’s rear area can havebroad theater strategic or operationaleffects; however, deep interdictionnormally has a delayed effect on landand naval combat which will be a directconcern to the JFC. Interdiction closerto land and naval combat will be ofmore immediate operational andtactical concern to maneuver forces.Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis uponinterdiction operations and surfacemaneuvers depending on thestrategic and operational situationconfronting them.

• JFCs may choose to employinterdiction as a principal means toachieve the intended objective (withother components supporting thecomponent leading the interdictioneffort).

• Where maneuver is part of the JFC’sconcept, JFCs may synchronize thatmaneuver and interdiction. For thejoint force campaign level, JFCssynchronize maneuver and interdictionto present the enemy with the dilemmapreviously discussed. Indeed, JFCsmay employ a scheme of maneuver thatenhances interdiction operations orvice versa. For instance, actual orthreatened maneuver can force anenemy to respond by attempting rapidmaneuver or resupply. These reactionscan provide excellent and vulnerabletargets for interdiction.

• All commanders should considerhow their capabilities and operationscan complement interdiction inachieving campaign objectives andvice versa. These operations mayinclude actions such as deception

operations, withdrawals, lateralrepositioning, and flanking movementsthat are likely to cause the enemy toreposition surface forces making thembetter targets for interdiction.

• Likewise, interdiction operations needto conform to and enhance the JFC’sscheme of maneuver during thecampaign. JFCs need to properlyintegrate maneuver and interdictionoperations to place the enemy in theoperational dilemma of eitherdefending from disadvantageouspositions or exposing forces tointerdiction strikes during attemptedrepositioning.

• JFCs are responsible for the conductof theater/JOA operations. To facilitatethese operations, JFCs may establishboundaries within the theater/JOAfor the conduct of operations. Withinthe joint force theater of operations, allmissions must contribute to theaccomplishment of the overallobjective. Synchronization of effortswithin land or naval AOs is ofparticular importance.

•• Land and naval commanders aredirectly concerned with those enemyforces and capabilities that can affecttheir near-term operations (currentoperations and those requiredto facilitate future operations).Accordingly, that part of interdictionwith a near-term effect on land andnaval maneuver normally supports thatmaneuver to enable the land or navalcommander to achieve the JFC’sobjectives. In fact, successfuloperations may depend on successfulinterdiction operations, for instance, toisolate the battle or weaken the enemyforce before battle is fully joined.

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•• The size, shape, and positioningof land or naval force AOs will beestablished by JFCs based on theirconcept of operations and the land ornaval force commander’s requirementfor depth to maneuver rapidly and tofight at extended ranges. Within theseAOs, land and naval operationalforce commanders are designatedthe supported commander and areresponsible for the synchronization ofmaneuver, fires, and interdiction. Tofacilitate this synchronization, suchcommanders designate the targetpriority, effects, and timing ofinterdiction operations within theirAOs.

•• The supported commandershould articulate clearly the visionof maneuver operations to thosecommanders that apply interdictionforces within the supportedcommander’s boundaries to attack thedesignated interdiction targets oro b j e c t i v e s . T h e s u p p o r t e dcommanders should clearly state howthey envision interdiction enabling orenhancing their maneuver operationsand what they want to accomplish withinterdiction (as well as those actionsthey want to avoid, such as thedestruction of key transportation nodesor the use of certain munitions in aspecific area). However, supportedcommanders should providesupporting commanders as muchlatitude as possible in the planning andexecution of their operations.

•• Once they understand what thesupported commanders want toaccomplish and what they want toa v o i d , i n t e r d i c t i o n - c a p a b l ecommanders can normally plan andexecute their operations with only

that coordination required withsupported commanders.

•• Joint force operations in maritimeareas often require a higher degreeof coordination among commandersbecause of the highly specialized natureof some naval operations, such assubmarine and mine warfare. This typeof coordination requires that theinterdiction-capable commandermaintain communication with thenaval commander. As in all operations,lack of close coordination amongcommanders in naval operating areascan result in fratricide and failedmissions, especially in those areasadjacent to naval forces. The sameprinciple applies concerning joint forceair component mining operations inareas where land or naval forces maymaneuver.

• Interdiction target priorities withinthe land or naval force boundaries areconsidered along with theater/JOA-wide interdiction priorities byJFCs and reflected in theapportionment decision. The JFACCwill use these priorities to plan andexecute the theater/JOA-wideinterdiction effort.

•• JFCs need to pay particularattention to, and give priority to,activities impinging on andsupporting the maneuver of allforces. In addition to normal targetnomination procedures, JFCs establishprocedures through which land or navalforce commanders can specificallyidentify those interdiction targets theyare unable to strike with organic assetswithin their boundaries that couldaffect planned or ongoing maneuver.These targets may be identified,individually or by category, specified

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geographically, and/or tied to desiredeffects and time periods. The purposeof these procedures is to afford addedvisibility to, and allow JFCs to givepriority to, targets directly affectingplanned maneuver by land or navalforces.

g. Joint Precision Interdiction. JFCshave at their disposal a wide range of jointoperational tactics, techniques, andprocedures to influence the conduct ofactions. As another example, JFCs mayelect to use the technique of Joint PrecisionInterdiction (JPI), which orients onestablishing an advantageous mobilitydifferential over a hostile force. Thisadvantage permits the judicious use ofresources for decisive engagements at thetime and place a JFC chooses. The majoraspects of JPI (locating the enemy deep,blinding enemy sensors, adversely affectingenemy mobility, and preparing the enemyfor closure and attack by friendly forces)seek to protect the JFC’s freedom ofmaneuver while attacking the hostilemobility-producing potential. Doctrinalprinciples for planning and executinginterdiction operations and appropriatetactics, techniques, and procedures,including those associated with JPI, areprovided in Joint Pub 3-03, “Doctrine forJoint Interdiction Operations.”

h. Joint Fire Support. Joint firesupport includes those fires that assistland and amphibious forces to maneuverand control territory, populations, andkey waters. Joint fire support can includethe lethal or destructive operations of closeair support (by both fixed- and rotary-wingaircraft), naval gunfire, artillery, mortars,rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethalor disruptive operations such as EW. JointPub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support,”provides additional information andguidance.

i. Combat Assessment

• With the increasing complexity ofmodern warfare and its effects,the traditional bomb damageassessment has evolved throughbattle damage assessment (BDA) tocombat assessment (CA). CA is thedetermination of the overalleffectiveness of force employmentduring military operations. BDA isone of the principle subordinateelements of CA.

• At the JFC level, the CA effort shouldbe a joint program, supported at alllevels, designed to determine if therequired effects on the adversaryenvisioned in the campaign plan arebeing achieved by the joint forcecomponents to meet the JFC’s overallconcept. The intent is to analyze withsound military judgment what isknown about the damage inflicted onthe enemy to try to determine: whatphysical attrition the adversary hassuffered; what effect the efforts havehad on the adversary’s plans orcapabilities; and what, if any, changesor additional efforts need to take placeto meet the objectives of the currentmajor operations or phase of thecampaign. CA requires constantinformation flows from all sources andshould support all sections of the JFCstaff and components.

• CA is done at all levels in the jointforce. JFCs should establish a dynamicsystem to support CA for allcomponents. Normally, the joint forceJ-3 will be responsible forcoordinating CA, assisted by the jointforce J-2.

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• J F C s a p p o r t i o n j o i n t f o r c ereconnaissance assets to supportthe CA intelligence effort thatexceeds the organic capabilities ofthe component forces. The componentcommanders identify their require-ments and coordinate them withthe joint force J-3 or designatedrepresentative.

4. Joint Operations in theLittoral or MaritimeEnvironment

a. Depending on the situation, JFCs mayconduct operations in the littoral toachieve or support joint force objectives.The littoral area contains two parts. Firstis the seaward area from the open oceanto the shore, which must be controlled tosupport operations ashore. Second is thelandward area inland from the shore thatcan be supported and defended directlyfrom the sea. Control of the littoral areais often essential to dimensionalsuperiority. Naval operations in the littoralcan provide for the seizure of an adversary’sport, naval base, or coastal air base to allowentry of other elements of the joint force.

b. Controlled littorals often offer thebest positions from which to begin,sustain, and support joint operations,especially in operational areas with poorinfrastructure for supporting operationsashore . Sea-based a i rpower andsea-launched land combat power areformidable tools that JFCs can use to gainand maintain initiative. Naval forcesoperating in littoral areas can dominatecoastal areas to mass forces rapidly andgenerate high intensity offensive power attimes and in locations required by JFCs.Naval forces’ relative freedom of actionenables JFCs to position these capabilitieswhere they can readily strike opponents.Naval forces’ very presence, if madeknown, can pose a threat that the enemycannot ignore.

c. Even when joint forces arefirmly established ashore, l ittoraloperations provide JFCs with excellentopportunities to achieve leverage over theenemy by operational maneuver from thesea. Such operations can introducesignificant size forces over relatively greatdistances in short periods of time into therear or flanks of the enemy. The mobility

Destroyers can provide a dominating presence, which joint forcecommanders can use in the littoral area to achieve objectives.

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of naval forces at sea, coupled with theability to rapidly land operationallysignificant forces, can be key to achievingJFC objectives. These capabilities arefurther enhanced by operational flexibilityand the ability to identify and takeadvantage of fleeting opportunities.

d. JFCs can operate from aheadquarters platform at sea. Dependingon the nature of the joint operations, a navalcommander can serve as the JFC orfunction as a JFACC while the operation isprimarily maritime, and shift thatcommand ashore if the operation shiftslandward in accordance with the JFC’sconcept of operations. In other cases, anaval headquarters may serve as the baseof the joint force headquarters, or another-than-naval JFC may use C4I facilitiesaboard ship. Naval air and missile defensecan project that coverage inland, duringboth entry operations and sustainedoperations ashore.

e. Transferring C2 from sea to shorerequires coordination throughout thejoint force in order to maintainuninterrupted C2 for current operations.Such a transition may involve a simplemovement of flags and supportingpersonnel, or it may require a completechange of joint force headquarters. The newjoint force headquarters may use personneland equipment, especially communicationsequipment, from the old headquarters, or itmay require augmentation from differentsources. One technique is to transfer C2in several stages. Another technique is forthe JFC to satellite off the capabilities ofone of the components ashore until thenew headquarters is fully prepared.Whichever way the transition is done, staffsshould develop detailed checklists toaddress all of the C2 requirements and thetiming of transfer of each. The value ofjoint training in this transition is evident.

5. Operations When Weaponsof Mass Destruction AreEmployed

a. As WMD proliferate, the likelihoodof their use against friendly forcesincreases not only in war but also inoperations other than war. An enemy’s useof such weapons can quickly change thenature of a campaign, perhaps evenaffecting the combatant commander’sstrategic objectives. The use or the threatof use of these weapons can causelarge-scale shifts in strategic andoperational objectives, phases, andCOAs. Thus, planning for the possibilityof both friendly and enemy use is importantto campaign design.

b. It may not be the sheer killing powerof these weapons that represents the greatesteffect. It is the strategic, operational,psychological, and political impacts oftheir use that can affect strategicobjectives and campaign design.

c. The effective combination ofconventional offensive and defensiveoperations can help reduce theeffectiveness or success of an enemy’s useof WMD. Offensive measures includeraids, strikes, and operations designed tolocate and neutralize the threat of suchweapons. JFCs implement defensivenuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)measures and plan for effective air andtheater missile defense with differentsystems. For more information, see JointPub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear,Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.”

d. Multinational operations becomemore complicated with the threat ofemployment of these weapons. An enemymay use WMD against other coalitionmembers, especially those with no or littledefense against these weapons, todisintegrate the coalition.

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e. Intelligence systems and plannersadvise JFCs of an opponent’s capabilityto employ WMD and under what conditionsthat opponent is most likely to do so. Thisadvice includes an assessment of theenemy’s willingness and intent to employthese weapons. It is important to ensurethat friendly force dispositions do notprovide lucrative targets for enemy WMD.

f. When directed by the NCA, JFCs planfor the employment of theater nuclearweapons by US forces in a mannerconsistent with national policy and strategicguidance. The employment of suchweapons signifies an escalation of the warand is an NCA decision. The Commanderin Chief, US Strategic Command’scapabilities to assist in the planning of allnuclear missions are available to supportnuclear weapon employment.

g. If directed to plan for the use oftheater nuclear weapons, JFCs typicallyhave two escalating objectives:

• The first is to deter or prevent anenemy attack that employs WMD.To make opponents understand thatfriendly forces possess and will usesuch weapons, JFCs may simplycommunicate that to the enemy, usingPSYOP or other means. Regardless,JFCs implement measures to increasereadiness and preserve the option torespond, including the alert andforward positioning, if required, ofappropriate systems. Attempts at

prevention or denial may includetargeting and attacking enemy WMDcapability by conventional and specialoperations forces.

• If deterrence fails, JFCs respondappropriately , consistent with nationalpolicy and strategic guidance, toenemy aggression while seeking tocontrol the intensity and scope ofconflict and destruction. Thatresponse could be conventional innature, but may include theemployment of WMD. Moreinformation can be found in the JointPub 3-12 series.

h. Force protection is imperative inthis environment. The joint force cansurvive use of WMD by anticipating theiremployment. Commanders can protecttheir forces in a variety of ways, includingtraining , PSYOP, OPSEC, dispersion offorces, use of protective clothing,inoculation, and proper use of terrain forshielding against effects. Enhancement offorce protection by using all availablemeasures reduces incentives for a first strikeby an enemy with NBC weapons.

6. Considerations forTermination and PostconflictOperations

See the information provided in ChapterI, “The Strategic Concept,” and Chapter III,“Planning Joint Operations.”

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CHAPTER VMILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

V-1

1. General

a. Military operations other than warencompass a wide range of activities wherethe military instrument of national poweris used for purposes other than thelarge-scale combat operations usuallyassociated with war. Although theseoperations are often conducted outside theUnited States, they also include militarysupport to US civil authorities. Militaryoperations other than war usually involvea combination of air , land, sea, space, andspecial operations forces as well as theefforts of governmental agencies andnongovernmental organizations, in acomplementary fashion. This chapteraddresses key operational-level conceptsand types of operations.

b. For detailed guidance on specificmilitary operations other than war, refer tothe Joint Pub 3-07 series.

2. Role in the Strategic SecurityEnvironment

a. Combatant commanders supportnational objectives through combatantcommand strategies and militaryoperations, which translate strategic intentinto operational and tactical actions. Thus,joint operations other than war involvestrategic, operational, and tacticalconsiderations. Because the Departmentof State is a principal player in jointoperations other than war outside theCONUS, JFCs should maintain a workingrelationship with the chiefs of the USdiplomatic missions in their area.

b. Many US Government agencies,other than the Department of Defense, canbe involved in operations other than war,including the Department of State; theDepartment of Agriculture; the Departmentof Commerce; the Department of Justice;the Department of Transportation; theDisaster Assistance Response Team(DART) within the Office of ForeignDisaster Assistance (OFDA); and theFederal Emergency Management Agency.Both DART and OFDA are offices withinAID. Nongovernmental organizationssuch as the American Red Cross and theSave the Children Fund are also frequentlyinvolved. Examples of internationalorganizations that can be involved in suchoperations include the United Nations(UN), the International Committee of theRed Cross, and the UN High Commissionerfor Refugees. These organizations mayassume the lead to coordinate actions forother nongovernmental agencies. Militaryplanners should therefore establish contactwith lead nongovernmental agencies toensure coordinated efforts.

c. The instruments of national powermay be applied in any combination toachieve national strategic goals inoperations other than war. The manner inwhich they are employed is determined bythe nature of each situation. For operationsother than war, the military instrument istypically tasked to support the diplomaticand work with the economic andinformational instruments .

"Peace hath her victories -- no less renowned than war."

John Milton to Lord General Oliver Cromwell, 1652

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3. Principles for JointOperations Other Than War

As shown in Figure V-1, there are sixprinciples applicable for joint operationsother than war.

a. Objective

• Direct every military operationtoward a clearly defined, decisive,and attainable objective.

• This principle of war applies also tooperations other than war. A clearlydefined and attainable objective--witha precise understanding of whatconstitutes success--is critical when theUnited States is involved in operationsother than war. Military commandersshould also understand what specificconditions could result in missiontermination, as well as those that yieldfailure. JFCs must also understand thestrategic aims, set appropriateobjectives, and ensure that these aimsand objectives contribute to unity ofeffort with other agencies.

b. Unity of Effort

• Seek unity of effort in everyoperation.

• The principle of unity of command inwar also applies to operations otherthan war; but, in operations other thanwar, this principle may be moredifficult to attain. In these operations,other government agencies may oftenhave the lead. Commanders mayanswer to a civilian chief, such as anambassador, or may themselvesemploy the resources of a civilianagency. Command arrangements mayoften be only loosely defined and manytimes will not involve commandauthority as understood within themilitary. This arrangement may causecommanders to seek an atmosphere ofcooperation to achieve objectives byunity of effort. Military commandersneed to consider how their actionscontribute to initiatives that are alsod i p l o m a t i c , e c o n o m i c , a n dinformational in nature. Becauseoperations other than war will often beconducted at the small unit level, it isimportant that all levels understand themilitary-civilian relationship to avoidunnecessary and counter-productivefriction.

c. Security

• Never permit hostile factions toacquire an unexpected advantage.

• In joint operations other than war,security deals principally with forceprotection against virtually any person,element, or group hostile to ourinterests. These could include aterrorist, a group opposed to theoperation, and even looters after anatural disaster. JFCs also should beready constantly to counter activity that

PRINCIPLES FORJOINT OPERATIONSOTHER THAN WAR

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

Figure V-1. Principles for JointOperations Other Than War

V-3


could bring significant harm to unitsor jeopardize mission accomplishment.Inherent in this responsibility is theneed to be capable of rapid transitionfrom a peaceful to a combat postureshould the need arise. The inherentright of self-defense from the unit tothe individual level applies to alloperations.

d. Restraint

• App l y app r op r i a te m i l i t a rycapability prudently.

• The actions of military personnel andunits are framed by the disciplinedapplication of force, including specificROE. In operations other than war,

these ROE will often be morerestrictive, detailed, and sensitive topolitical concerns than in war.Moreover, these rules may changefrequently during operations.Restraints on weaponry, tactics, andlevels of violence characterize theenvironment. The use of excessiveforce could adversely affect efforts togain or maintain legitimacy and impedethe attainment of both short- andlong-term goals. This concept does notpreclude the application ofoverwhelming force, when appropriate,to display US resolve and commitment.The reasons for the restraint often needto be understood by the individualService member because a single actcould cause critical politicalconsequences.

e. Perseverance

• P r e p a r e f o r t h e m e a s ur e d ,protracted application of militarycapability in support of strategicaims.

• Some operations other than war maybe short, others protracted. Peacetimeoperations may require years to achievethe desired effects. Underlying causesof confrontation and conflict rarelyhave a clear beginning or a decisiveresolution. It is important to assesscrisis response options against theircontribution to long-term strategicobjectives. This assessment does notpreclude decisive military action butdoes require careful, informed analysisto choose the right time and place forsuch action. Commanders balancetheir desire to attain objectives quicklywith a sensitivity for the long-termstrategic aims and the restraints placedon operations. Therefore, the patient,resolute, and persistent pursuit ofnational goals and objectives, for as

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower passes through theSuez Canal during Operation DESERT SHIELD.Such action shows US resolve and providesJFCs the ability to apply measured applicationof military capabilities.

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long as necessary to achieve them, isoften the requirement for success.

f. Legitimacy

• Sustain the willing acceptance by thepeople of the right of the governmentto govern or of a group or agency tomake and carry out decisions.

• This principle focuses on inter-nationally sanctioned standards, as wellas the perception that authority of agovernment to govern is genuine,effective, and uses proper agencies forreasonable purposes. Joint forceoperations need to sustain thelegitimacy of the operation and of thehost government. During operationswhere a government does not exist,extreme caution should be used whendealing with individuals andorganizations to avoid inadvertentlylegitimizing them. PSYOP canenhance both domestic and inter-national perceptions of the legitimacyof an operation.

4. Planning Considerations

Planning considerations for militaryoperations other than war are shown inFigure V-2.

a. Interagency Coordination. Inherentin operations other than war is the need forthe military to work with other agencies ofthe US Government as well as other nations’governments. Consensus building is aprimary task and can be aided byunderstanding each agency’s capabilitiesand limitations as well as any constraintsthat may preclude the use of a capability.The goal--to develop and promote theunity of effort needed to accomplish aspecific mission--can be achieved byestablishing an atmosphere of trust andcooperation.

b. Command and Control. Eachoperation other than war can be unique.There is no single C2 option that works bestfor all such operations. JFCs and theirsubordinates should be flexible inmodifying standard arrangements to

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Military operations other than war can involve threatsthat...

May be subtle and indirect.

Are normally regional in nature.

May develop quickly.

May or may not be long term.

May or may not involve conflict.

May have serious implications forsafeguard of friendly interests.

Figure V-2. Planning Considerations for Military Operations Other Than War

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meet the specific requirements of eachsituation and promote unity of effort .

c. Intelligence and InformationGathering. Force protection can besignificantly improved with the propermix of intelligence and informationgathering. As soon as practical after anoperation is declared, JFCs and plannersdetermine the intelligence requirementsneeded to support the operation.Intelligence planners also consider thecapability for a unit to receive externalintelligence support, the capability to storeintelligence data, the timeliness ofcollection systems, the availability ofon-the-shelf intelligence publications, andthe possibility of using other agencies andorganizations as intelligence sources. Insome military operations other than war(such as peacekeeping), the term“information gathering” is used rather thanthe term “intelligence” because of thesensitivity of the operation.

d. Constraints and Restraints. Acommander tasked with conducting a jointoperation other than war may facenumerous restrictions in addition to thenormal restrictions associated with ROE.For example, international acceptance ofeach operation may be extremely importantnot only because military forces may beused to support international sanctions butalso because of the probability ofinvolvement by international organizations.As a consequence, legal rights ofindividuals and organizations and fundingof the operation should be addressed by thecombatant commander’s staff. Also,constraints and restraints imposed on anyagency or organization involved in theoperation should be understood by otheragencies and organizations to facilitatecoordination.

e. Training and Education. The ArmedForces of the United States may be directed

to conduct joint operations other than warwith very little notice. Therefore, trainingand education programs focusing onjoint, multinational, and interagencyoperations should be developed andimplemented for individuals and units.Personnel from other US Governmentagencies and nongovernmental andinternational organizations should beinvited to participate in these programs.

f. Postconflict Operations

• Planning for postconflict operationsshould begin as early as possible, andpreferably before the conflict begins.As combat operations are nearingtermination, military forces shouldprepare to transition to operationsother than war. Refugee control,reestablishing civil order and publicservices, medical assistance, and otherpostconflict activities may be done bestby military forces during this turbulentperiod. Postconflict activities typicallybegin with significant militaryinvolvement, then move increasinglytoward civilian dominance as thethreat wanes and civil infrastructuresare reestablished.

• The military’s presence and its abilityto operate in crisis environments andunder extreme conditions may give itthe de facto lead in operationsnormally governed by other agencies.Military forces need to workcompetently in this environment whileproperly subordinating military forcesto the agency in charge. To beeffective, planning and conductingpostconflict activities require a varietyof perspectives and expertise and thecooperation and assistance ofgovernmental agencies, other Services,and alliance or coalition partners.Typical postconflict activitiesinclude:

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•• Transition to Civil Authorities.This transaction could be to localgovernments or host nations afternatural disasters, to a UN peacekeepingoperation after peace-enforcementoperations, or through the UN HighCommissioner for Refugees to anongovernmental agency in support ofrefugees.

•• Support to Truce Negotiations.This support may include providingintelligence, security, transportationand other logistic support, andlinguistics for all participants.

•• SOF Activities. These activitiesinclude civil affairs support toreestablish a civil government,additional training for host-nationarmed forces, PSYOP to foster

continued peaceful relations, andintelligence gathering.

•• Public Affairs Operations. Theseoperations include commandinformation programs, media support,and international informationcampaigns.

•• Redeployment. Redeploymentmay include waste disposal, portoperations, closing of financialobligations, clearing and marking ofminefields and other explosiveordnance disposal activities, andensuring appropriate units remain inplace until their missions are complete.Redeployment must be planned andexecuted in a manner that facilitates theuse of redeploying forces and suppliesto meet new missions or crises.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

As the Gulf War’s fighting ended on 28 February 1991, a Kurdish rebellionerupted in northern Iraq. Iraqi forces attacked the Kurds. People fled fromcities and towns. Worldwide television showed cold, wet Kurds suffering fromhunger and disease and dying in the hills of northern Iraq and southern Turkey.

On 6 April 1991, Commander in Chief, US European Command (USCINCEUR)established JTF Provide Comfort. Initial objectives were to providehumanitarian relief by airdropping food and other necessities, establishingrelief centers, supervising distribution of food and water, and improvingsanitation and medical care. JTF Provide Comfort included USAF airlift, aspecial operations command, and an amphibious ready group (with anembarked Marine expeditionary unit). When it became apparent that operationswould significantly increase in complexity and duration, USCINCEUR expandedthe organization of the JTF, changed commanders to reflect the changed natureand increasing complexity of the operation, and established the JTFheadquarters at Incirlik, Turkey.

The new JTF commander established two subordinate JTFs: JTF ALFA, aspecial operations task force, at Silopi, Turkey; and JTF BRAVO at Zakhu,Iraq. JTF BRAVO’s mission was to provide security in its operational areainside Iraq, build refugee camps, and move displaced persons into thesecamps. JTF BRAVO forces included the Marine expeditionary unit, a BritishCommando Brigade, a French Parachute Regiment, a Spanish ParachuteRegiment, and US Army airborne infantry and attack helicopter battalions aswell as PSYOP and civil affairs units. Ultimately, JTF BRAVO included combatand combat support units from US and coalition member nations, including

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an Italian Composite Special Forces Airborne Brigade, a Dutch Marine CombatBattalion, and an Infantry Rifle Platoon from Luxembourg.

Air Force forces operated from Incirlik and established and maintained an airexclusion zone over the protected area and coordinated air delivery. Armyand non-US cargo helicopters were OPCON to Commander, Air Force Forces(COMAFFOR). Army forces (less those in JTF BRAVO) were also based atIncirlik. COMARFOR was also designated commander of a multinationalsupport command, with OPCON of Army, Air Force, and Marine logistic unitsto support its multinational force.

PROVIDE COMFORT was a coalition effort. The United Kingdom, Spain, France,the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Luxembourg, Canada, Germany, andthe United States contributed forces. The operation also encompassed UnitedNations relief assistance. The JTF became Combined Task Force ProvideComfort.

Especially in its early weeks, PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrated the remarkableagility and flexibility of a team-oriented effort. The CJTF and subordinatecommanders used Service capabilities where they were needed. They assignedclear (although not easy) missions; gave direct, simple guidance; andestablished command relationships that facilitated mission accomplishment.It was an outstanding example of the complexity of the end state andposthostilities operations.

Arms Control

Combatting Terrorism

Department of DefenseSupport to CounterdrugOperations

Nation Assistance

Noncombatant EvacuationOperations

Civil Support Operations

Peace Operations

Support to Insurgencies

TYPES OF OPERATIONSOTHER THAN WAR

Figure V-3. Types of Operations Other Than War

5. Types of Operations OtherThan War

As illustrated in Figure V-3, operationsother than war include, but are not limitedto, the following:

a. Arms Control. The main purpose ofarms control is to enhance nationalsecurity. Although it may be viewed as adiplomatic mission, the military can playa vital role. For example, US militarypersonnel may be involved in verifying anarms control treaty; may seize WMD; mayescort authorized deliveries of weapons andother materials (such as enriched uranium)to preclude loss or unauthorized use of theseassets; or may dismantle or destroy weaponswith or without the consent of the hostnation. All of these actions help reducethreats to regional stability.

b. Combatting Terrorism. Thesemeasures are both offensive (counter-terrorism) and defensive (antiterrorism)in nature. The former typically occursoutside the territory of the United States,

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while the latter may occur anywhere in theworld. The Department of Justice, theFederal Bureau of Investigation, and theFederal Aviation Administration areactively involved in antiterrorismoperations. See Joint Pub 3-07.2, “JTTPfor Antiterrorism,” for more information.

c. DOD Support to CounterdrugOperations.

• The national drug control strategy(NDCS) is issued by the Presidentpursuant to the Antidrug Abuse Act of1988. The antidrug plans andprograms of the Department ofDefense are an integral part of theNDCS and include detection andmonitoring; support to cooperativeforeign governments; support forinterdiction; support to drug lawenforcement agencies; internal drugprevention and treatment programs;research and development; and C4Isupport. See Joint Pub 3-07.4, “JointCounterdrug Operations,” for moreinformation.

• The National Defense AuthorizationAct of 1989 assigned three majorcounterdrug responsibilities to theDepartment of Defense:

•• Acting as the single lead agency fordetecting and monitoring aerial andmaritime transit of illegal drugs into theUnited States.

•• Integrating the command, control,communications, and technicalintelligence assets of the United Statesthat are dedicated to interdicting themovement of illegal drugs into theUnited States.

•• Approving and funding Stategovernors’ plans for expanded use ofthe National Guard to support drug

in te rd i c t i on and en fo rcemen toperations of law enforcementagencies.

d. Nation Assistance. The mainobjective of nation assistance is to assist ahost nation with internal programst o p r o m o t e s t a b i l i t y , d e v e l o psustainability, and establish institutionsresponsive to the needs of the people.Security assistance and foreign internaldefense are the primary means of providingnation assistance.

• Security Assistance. Securityassistance refers to a group ofprograms that provide defensearticles and services, includingtraining, to eligible foreign countriesand international organizations thatfurther US national security objectives.Public law prohibits personnelproviding security assistance services(including mobile training assistance)from performing combatant duties.

• Foreign Internal Defense. Foreigninternal defense (FID) supports ah o s t - n a t i o n ’s f i g h t a g a i n s tlawlessness, subvers ion, andinsurgency. US military support toforeign internal defense should focuson assisting host-nation personnel toanticipate, preclude, and counter thesethreats. Emphasis on internal defenseand development programs whenorganizing, planning, and executingmilitary support to FID programs isessential. Specific tools used inexecuting the DOD component of FIDprograms may include multinationalexercises, exchange programs,civil-military operations, intelligenceand communications sharing, logisticsupport of security assistance, andcombat operations. See Joint Pub3-07.1, “JTTP for Foreign InternalDefense,” for more information.

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e. Noncombatant Evacuation Oper-ations (NEOs). The purpose of NEOs isto safely and quickly remove civiliannoncombatants from an area outside theUnited States where they are, or may be,threatened. Although NEOs are principallyconducted for US citizens, Armed Forcesof the United States may also evacuatecitizens from host, allied, or friendlynations if the NCA determine it to be in

the best interest of the United States. TheDepartment of State has the lead inconducting NEOs. US ambassadors orchiefs of diplomatic missions areresponsible for planning for NEOs bypreparing emergency action plans to beimplemented when NEOs are required. SeeJoint Pub 3-07.5, “JTTP for NoncombatantEvacuation Operations,” for moreinformation.

Operation EASTERN EXIT

On 1January 1991, the United States Ambassador to Somalia requested militaryassistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign nationalshad sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day as the reign of Somalidictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused battle for control ofMogadishu.

The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated. Despite the priorities ofthe Gulf War, SOF helicopters were put on alert, Air Force C-130 transportaircraft were deployed to Kenya, and two Navy amphibious ships with elementsof a Marine expeditionary brigade embarked were sent south from the NorthArabian Sea toward Somalia. Initial plans called for evacuation of theendangered Americans through Mogadishu’s international airport, utilizing AirForce aircraft staged in Kenya. The situation in Mogadishu rapidly worsenedand aircraft, even those of the United States Air Force, could not land safely atthe airport. It seemed unlikely in any case that those sheltered at the Embassycould travel safely through the embattled city to the airport.

By 4 January, it had become apparent that the Embassy’s only hope lay withthe two ships still steaming south at flank speed. At 0247, two CH-53Ehelicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for the466-mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC-130 aircraft,the helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 armed Somalistood with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into the compound, theSomali scattered. Shortly after the helicopters touched down, a specialoperations AC-130 gunship arrived overhead to provide fire support, if needed.The CH-53Es unloaded the security force, embarked 61 evacuees, and took offfor the 350-mile return flight.

The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout theday. The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the shipshad arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the security forcewere extracted during the night.

EASTERN EXIT, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people--from 30 differentcountries--from a bloody civil war, was the result of the synergistic employmentof widely dispersed joint forces that rapidly planned and conducted a NEO inthe midst of the Gulf War.

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f. Other Civil Support Operations

• These operations encompass world-wide humanitarian assistance,military support to civil authorities,and military assistance for civildisturbances. Worldwide humani-tarian assistance operations fallunder the umbrella of civil-militaryoperations. They include disasterrelief, support to displaced persons aswell as humanitarian and civicassistance. Included in support to civilauthorities are US domestic actionsapplicable to disaster-related civilemergencies and civil defense forattacks directed against the territory

of the United States. Included inassistance for civil disturbances aremilitary support to US domestic lawenforcement agencies, protection of lifeand federal property, and prevention ofdisruptions to federal functions.

• The Armed Forces of the UnitedStates can augment domesticgovernments of the United States.Such operations can include supportto education systems, medicalfacilities, emergency response, andtransportation systems in remote ordepressed areas. Some of theseoperations directly contribute tomilitary readiness; others do not.

JTF Andrew

At 0500 on 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and causedextensive damage. The Governor of Florida requested Federal assistance.The Secretary of the Army, as the President’s executive agent, directed initiationof disaster relief operations in support of the Federal response plan. As partof those operations, the Commander in Chief, Forces Command, directed theSecond US Army to form JTF Andrew and begin humanitarian relief operations.Eventually composed of elements of all Services and both Active and Reserveforces, JTF Andrew began operations on 28 August 1992.

JTF Andrew’s mission was to provide humanitarian support by establishingfield feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transferoperations, local and line haul transfer operations, and other logistic supportto the populace in affected areas. Commander, JTF Andrew, defined successas getting life support systems in place and relieving immediate hardshipsuntil non-DOD Federal, state, and local agencies could reestablish normaloperations. Operations were conducted in three phases. Immediate reliefprovided life support systems--food, water, shelter, medical supplies andservices, information, sanitation, and transportation. A recovery phase ensuredsustainment of services provided in Phase I while assisting Federal, state,and local authorities to reestablish public services. Finally, a reconstitutionphase continued to reestablish services under Federal, state, and local control,while JTF forces redeployed.

During these operations, 1,014 sorties were flown, carrying over 19,000 tonsof mission support materials. Almost 900,000 meals were served. Over 80,000tons of humanitarian supplies were moved into the area by sea and over land.Almost 2,000 tons were moved by air. Over 67,000 patients received medicaltreatment, and over 1,000 tents were erected. A mobile radio station wasestablished to provide emergency information to the local population and toprovide route information to assist convoys as they arrive. Four life supportcenters were constructed, providing mass care for 2,400 people per day for

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UN equipment is loaded on a C-5 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia bound for Kigali,Rwanda in support during Operation SUPPORT HOPE peace operations.

approximately 2 months. Over 6 million cubic yards of debris were removed,and 98 schools were repaired.

JTF Andrew coordinated with multiple Federal, state, and private agencies.These included the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Civil AirPatrol, the American Red Cross, the General Services Administration, the PublicHealth Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the BoyScouts of America, and numerous religious relief organizations.

This disaster relief effort demonstrated the versatility of the Armed Forces ofthe United States. The training for war that developed and promoted initiative,ingenuity, and flexibility in leadership and conduct of operations, served theNation well in a noncombat situation.

g. Peace Operations

• This term encompasses three generala reas : d ip lomat ic , t rad i t iona lpeacekeeping, and forceful militaryactions. Therefore, it may be helpfulto view these types of operations withonly three terms: peacemaking(diplomatic actions), peacekeeping(noncombat military operations), andpeace enforcement (coercive use ofmilitary force). Peace operations arenot typically conducted within theterritory of the United States. For moreinformation, see Joint Pub 3-07.3,“JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations.”

• The UN has been the most frequentsponsor of classical peacekeepingac t i v i t i es; however, reg iona lorganizations such as the Organizationof American States, the Organizationof African Unity, and the Arab Leaguehave also acted in similar fashion toprevent, halt, or contain conflict in theirrespective regions.

• The objective of peace operations isto achieve a peaceful settlementamong belligerent parties, primarilythrough diplomatic action. Militaryoperations may be necessary ifdiplomatic actions are insufficient orinappropriate.

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Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE

Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE demonstrated thecomplexity of integrating peace support operations with other types ofoperations and provided a glimpse of a new style of post-Cold War militaryoperations. By the middle of 1992, after years of civil war, drought, and famine,the situation in the southern half of Somalia had reached such a tragic statethat humanitarian organizations launched a worldwide appeal for help. Inresponse to this outcry, the President of the United States directed, inmid-August 1992, an airlift of food and supplies for starving Somalis (OperationPROVIDE RELIEF).

US forces immediately initiated the airlift of relief supplies from Mombassa,Kenya, but continued instability in Somalia prevented safe passage of theflights. Relief workers in Somalia operated in this unsafe environment underconstant threat. Distribution of relief supplies was haphazard and subject tobanditry and obstruction by local warlords. The people of Somalia continuedto suffer.

Based on the continued suffering and the realization that the United Stateswas the only nation capable of decisive action, the President directedUSCINCCENT to plan a larger scale humanitarian relief operation. On3 December the President directed USCINCCENT to execute OperationRESTORE HOPE. In broad terms, it was an effort to raise Somalia from thedepths of famine, anarchy, and desperation in order to restore its nationalinstitutions and its hope for the future. Conducted under the auspices of theUnited Nations, Operation RESTORE HOPE was a multinational humanitarianassistance operation that ultimately involved more than 38,000 troops from 21coalition nations, with an additional 9 nations providing funding, support, andfacilities vital to the operation.

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia was formed with forces from France,Italy, Canada, Belgium, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, aswell as other nations. On 9 December 1992, under UN auspices, US SOF andamphibious forces assaulted and secured the airport at Mogadishu and theseaport soon thereafter. Arriving supplies could now be off-loaded safely.

The task force methodically expanded throughout the capital city of Mogadishuand into the countryside. As land forces were added to the task force, controlwas pushed inland. The airlift of supplies increased significantly as air baseswere secured. Over the next 3 months, the coalition expanded into the southernhalf of Somalia, establishing and securing relief centers and escorting supplyconvoys.

The operation was made more complex by continued uncertainty and instabilityin the Somali political situation. The task force, working closely with the USDepartment of State and eventually more than 50 humanitarian relieforganizations, assisted in establishing an environment in which reliefoperations could proceed. Because of the proliferation of weapons throughoutthe country during the many years of civil war, relief efforts included theidentification of individuals and groups that posed immediate threats and theremoval of visible weapons from circulation. A radio station and newspaper

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were established to inform the public regarding the UN force objectives, aswell as public service information to enhance security.

As the situation was brought under control by military forces, priority shiftedto diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain a lasting truce betweencompeting factions. UNITAF Somalia was amended to include relief-in-placeby forces assigned to the United Nations Operation in Somalia, now designatedUNOSOM II. The distribution of relief supplies continued while great care wastaken to ensure a seamless transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II forces.

h. Support to Insurgencies

• Insurgencies attempt to exploitactual or perceived governmentalweaknesses, such as failure to maintainlaw and order; inability to respondadequately to disasters; overreaction tocivil disturbances; or failure to meeteconomic, political, ethnic, or socialexpectations.

• Organizational structures for USsupport to insurgencies can be overt,

low visibility , clandestine, or covert.Each support program is conducted asa special activity within the meaningof section 3.4(h) of Executive Order12333, 4 December 1981, “USIntelligence Activities,” and is subjectto approval by the US Congress.

• The US military principally trainsand advises insurgent forces inunconventional warfare tactics,techniques, and procedures. Theseactions should be integrated with theprograms of the other instruments ofnational power.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIMULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

VI-1

1. General

a. US military operations are oftenconducted with the armed forces of othernations in pursuit of common objectives.

b. Multinational operations, both thosethat include combat and those that do not,are conducted within the structure of analliance or coalition:

• An alliance is a result of formalagreements between two or morenations for broad, long-term object-ives. The North Atlantic TreatyOrganization is one example. Thesealliance operations are technicallycombined operations, though incommon usage combined is often usedas synonym for all multinationaloperations.

• A coalition is an ad hoc arrangementbetween two or more nations forcommon action, for instance, thecoalition that defeated Iraqi aggressionagainst Kuwait in the Gulf War,1990-1991.

c. Joint operations as part of an allianceor coalition require close cooperationamong all forces and can serve to massstrengths, reduce vulnerabilities, andprovide legitimacy. Effectively planned andexecuted multinational operations should,in addition to achieving common objectives,facilitate unity of effort without

diminishing freedom of action and preserveunit integrity and uninterrupted support .

d. Each multinational operation isunique, and key considerations involvedin planning and conducting multi-national operations vary with theinternational situation and perspectives,motives, and values of the organization’smembers. Whereas alliance memberstypically have common national politicaland economic systems, coalitions oftenbring together nations of diverse culturesfor a limited period of time. As long as thecoalition members perceive theirmembership and participation as advancingtheir individual national interests, thecoalition can remain intact. At the pointthat national objectives or priorities diverge,the coalition breaks down.

e. The Armed Forces of the UnitedStates should be prepared to operatewithin the framework of an alliance orc o a l i t i o n u n d e r o t h e r - t h a n - U Sleadership. Following, contributing, andsupporting are important roles inmult inat ional operat ions--of ten asimportant as leading. However, US forceswill often be the predominant and mostcapable force within an alliance or coalitionand can be expected to play a centralleadership role, albeit one founded onmutual respect. Stakes are high, requiringthe military leaders of member nations toemphasize common objectives as well asmutual support and respect.

“Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States ithas been as a member of -- most often to lead -- coalition operations.”

General Robert W. RisCassi, USA: "Principles for Coalition W arfare",Joint Force Quarterly: Summer 1993

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2. Considerations forMultinational Operations

Considerations are shown in Figure VI-1and discussed below.

a. National Goals. No two nations shareexactly the same reasons for entering acoalition or alliance. To some degree,participation within an alliance or coalitionrequires the subordination of nationalautonomy by member nations. The gluethat binds the multinational force isagreement, however tenuous, on commongoals and objectives. However, differentnational goals, often unstated, cause eachnation to measure progress in its own way.Each nation, therefore, can producediffering perceptions of progress. JFCsshould strive to understand each nation’sgoals and how those goals can affect conflicttermination and the desired end state.

Maintaining cohesion and unity of effortrequires understanding and adjusting to theperceptions and needs of member nations.

b. Unity of Effort

• Motivations of member nations maydiffer, but multinational objectivesshould be attainable, clearly definedby the commander or leadershipstructure of the multinational force,and supported by each membernation. Commanders of multinationalforces should carefully consider thetypes of missions assigned to memberforces. Capabilities will often differsubstantially between national forces,but sensitivity to and consideration ofnational honor, pride, and prestige willoften be as important to final successas the contributions and capabilities ofthe national forces themselves. Small

CONSIDERATIONS FORMULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

NATIONAL GOALS

UNITY OF EFFORT

DOCTRINE, TRAINING,EQUIPMENT

Reach agreement oncommon goals andobjectives to bindmultinational forces.

Multinational objectives mustbe supported by eachmember nation.

Improve other nationalforces through training,assistance, and sharing ofresources.

CULTURALDIFFERENCES

MANAGEMENT OFRESOURCES

NATIONALCOMMUNICATIONS

Employ linguistics and areaexperts to assist with culturaland language challenges.

Support forces of membernations with national assetsor through the coalition.

Have direct and immediatecommunications capability torespective leaderships.

Figure VI-1. Considerations for Multinational Operations

VI-3


decisions, such as which nationalforces are involved in the main effortor perhaps play the lead role at the startof an offensive, can have majorconsequences in multinationaloperations.

• Coordinated policy, particularly onsuch matters as alliance or coalitioncommanders’ authority over nationallogistics (including infrastructure) andtheater intelligence, is required.Coordinated planning for rules ofengagement, fratricide prevention,deception, EW, communications,s p e c i a l w e a p o n s , s o u r c e a n demployment of reserves, and timing ofoperations is essential for unity ofe f f o r t . A c t i o n s t o i m p r o v einteroperability and the ability to shareinformation need to be addressed early(as early as the development of militarysystems for formal alliances). Nationsshould exchange qualified liaisonofficers at the earliest opportunity toensure mutual understanding and unityof effort.

• Planning is often complicated byparticipation of all members.Multinational force commanders andstaffs should seek to involve allmember nations in the decision-making process, consistent withthe terms established at the foundingof the alliance or coalition.Member recommendations shouldbe sought continuously by multi-national force commanders, butespecially during development ofCOAs and ROE, assignment ofmissions to national forces, andestablishment of priorities of effort.

• JFCs should establish a workingrapport with leaders of other

national forces. A personal, directrelationship can often overcome manyof the difficulties associated withmultinational operations. Respect,trust , and the ability to compromiseare essential to building andmaintaining a strong team.

c. Doctrine, Training, and Equipment

• Doctrines, operational competenceas a result of training and experience,and types and quality of equipmentcan vary substantially among themilitary forces of member nations.

• When the situation permits, JFCs seekopportunities to improve thecontributions of other national forcesthrough training assistance and sharingof resources consistent with US andalliance or coalition terms of reference,such as the loan of Americanequipment (for example, radios,vehicles, or weapons).

• JFCs implement measures to assess thecapabilities, strengths, and weaknessesof member forces to facilitatematching missions with capabilities.

• Where member forces have unique orspecial capabilities, they should beappropriately exploited.

• Joint and multinational exercises arekey components of joint training anddoctrine refinement. Types ofexercises include command postexercises and field training exercises.Simulation can complement mostexercises. Distributed simulation is ameans to enhance training betweenremotely separated forces.

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d. Cultural Differences

• Each partner in multinationaloperations possesses a uniquecultural identity --the result oflanguage, values, religious systems,and economic and social outlooks.Even seemingly minor differences,such as dietary restrictions, can havegreat impact. Commanders shouldstrive to accommodate religiousholidays, prayer calls, and other uniquecultural traditions important to alliesand coalition members, consistent withthe situation.

• Language differences often presentthe most immediate challenge.Specifying an official coalitionlanguage can be a sensitive issue.US forces cannot assume thatthe predominant language willautomatically be English. Informationloss during translation can behigh, and misunderstandings andmiscommunications can havedisastrous effects.

• To assist with cultural and languagechallenges, JFCs employ linguists andarea experts, often available within orthrough the Service components orfrom other US agencies. In someinstances, members of Service forcesmay be especially familiar with theoperational area, its cultures, andlanguages as a result of previousassignments or heritage.

e. Management of Resources. Forcesof member nations must be supported eitherby national assets or through the coalition.Resource contributions will vary betweenmembers . Some may cont r ibu telogistically, while others contribute militaryforces. Some may be able to do both.Commanders of multinational forces shouldseek to ensure that member forcesare appropriately supplied and thatcontributions of member nations areconsistent with national capabilities and theterms established at the formation of thealliance and/or coalition. Frequently, JFCswill rely on national political leadership andrepresentatives from such agencies as theDepartment of State to effect suchcoordination with the leadership ofmember nations.

A US aircrew member coordinates loading procedures with UN loading crewsthrough an Ethiopian translator during Operation SUPPORT HOPE.

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f. National Communications

• JFCs should anticipate that someforces from alliance or coalitionmember nations will have direct andnear immediate communicationscapability from the operational area totheir respective national politicalleadership. This communicationscapability can facilitate coordination ofissues, but it can also be a source offrustration as leaderships external to theoperational area may be issuingguidance directly to their deployednational forces.

• JFCs should have a responsive andreliable link to appropriate USagencies and political leadership.Where senior JFCs are in the chain ofcommand between the deployed JFCand the NCA, provisions should bemade for bypassing intermediatepoints in the chain of commandfor exceptional and emergencysituations. The conditions andsupporting communications systemsfor such bypassing should beestablished by the appropriate militaryand political leadership early.

3. Considerations During thePlanning and Execution ofMultinational Operations

a. Rules of Engagement

• JFCs should give early attention todeveloping ROE that areappropriate to the situation and canbe employed by all member forces.This task is often difficult, requiring theparticipation and cooperation of seniorpolitical and military representativesfrom member nations. Completeconsensus or standardization of ROE

may not be achievable because ofindividual national values andoperational employment concepts.However, JFCs should strive todevelop and implement simple ROEthat can be tailored by member forcesto their particular situation.

• In many cases, commanders ofdeployed member forces may lackthe authority to speak on behalf oftheir nation in the ROE developmentprocess. This lack of authority mayrequire considerable support fromcoalition political leadership bothwithin and outside the operationalarea to coordinate and implementappropriate ROE.

b. The Media

• Though not directly related to theconduct of operations, JFCs seekto facilitate the activities ofnational and international pressorganizations, consistent withrequirements for operational security.

• This task is complicated in amultinational situation where presscorps from each member nation mayhave their own standards andrequirements. JFCs cannot hope toimpose control over such efforts and,instead, should seek to work closelywith leaders of member forces and theirnational press elements to develop anopen and collegial environment.Simple ground rules should beestablished by the senior politicaland military representatives of thealliance or coalition at the earliestpossible moment to avoid incidents thatcould jeopardize the operation ordetract from coalition cohesion.

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c. Local Law Enforcement. US forceswill often not have the authority orcapability to enforce local laws in theoperational area. JFCs should seek clearguidance from the alliance or coalitionpolitical leadership during the planningphase of multinational operations. Wherelocal law enforcement organizations arepresent and capable, JFCs establishsystems and procedures to optimize thecontributions of indigent law enforcementpersonnel in facilitating operations andprotecting lives and property in theoperational area. Where local lawenforcement systems and organizationsare not available, JFCs should considerdeploying appropriate US forces early inthe deployment flow as well as exploitingthe capabilities of other member nations.

d. Command and Control

• Successful multinational operationscan center on achieving unity of effortfrom the outset. Participating nationsneed to provide the multinationalf o rc e commande r su ff i c i en tauthority over their national forcesto achieve this unity. In turn,multinational force commanders andstaffs exercise their authority to unifythe efforts of the multinational forcetoward common objectives. Suchauthority, however, is seldom absolute.Consensus and compromise areimportant aspects of decisionmaking inmultinational organizations.

• Alliances typically have developedC2 structures, systems, andprocedures. Alliance forces typicallymirror their alliance composition, withthe predominant nation providingthe alliance force commander. Staffsare integrated, and subordinatecommands are often led by seniorrepresentatives from member nations.Doctrine, standardization agreements,

and a certain political harmonycharacterize alliances. Figure VI-2provides an example of a commandstructure within an alliance.

• Coalitions are typically formed onshort notice and can include forces notaccustomed to working together.Establishing command relationshipsand operating procedures within themu l t i na t iona l f o rce i s o f tenchallenging. It involves complexissues that require a willingness tocompromise in order to best achieve thecommon objectives. National prideand prestige can limit options fororganization of the coalition command,as many nations prefer to notsubordinate their forces to those ofother nations. Though many C2structures can be employed, coalitionsare most often characterized by oneof two basic structures: parallelcommand or lead nation command.

•• Parallel command exists whennations retain control of theirdeployed forces. If a nation within thecoalition elects to exercise autonomouscontrol of its force, a parallel commandstructure exists. Such structures canbe organized with: (1) Nations alignedin a common effort, each retainingnational control and (2) Nationsaligned in a common effort, someretaining national control, with otherspermitting control of their forces by acentral authority or another memberforce. Parallel command is thesimplest to establish and often theorganization of choice. Coalitionforces control operations throughexisting national chains of command.Coalition decisions are made througha coordinated effort of the political andsenior military leadership of membernations and forces. It is common forother command structures to emerge as

VI-7


coalitions mature, but the parallelmodel is often the starting point.Figure VI-3 depicts the commandrelationships developed and employedby coalition forces for OperationDESERT STORM. These relation-ships represented a parallel commandstructure, with coordinationfacilitated by the Coalition Coor-dination, Communications, andIntegration Center (C3IC). The C3ICwas specifically established to facilitateexchange of intelligence andoperational information, ensurecoordination of operations amongcoalition forces, and provide a forumwhere routine issues could be resolvedinformally and collegially among staff

officers.

•• Lead Nation Command. In thisarrangement, the nation providing thepreponderance of forces andresources typically provides thecommander of the coalition force.The lead nation can retain its organicC2 structure, employing other nationalforces as subordinate formations. Morecommonly, the lead nation commandis characterized by some integration ofstaffs. The composition of staffs isdetermined by the coalition leadership.

•• Combination. Lead nation andparallel command structures canexist simultaneously within a

COMBINED STRUCTURE WITHNATIONAL INTEGRITY

USNCA

ALLIED NATIONCOMMAND

ALLIED NATIONCOMPONENTS

US UNIFIEDCOMMAND

US SERVICECOMPONENTS

SUBORDINATE

StrategicDirection

Coordination

This diagram shows a variation of the parallel combined command structure. A formal,longstanding alliance will normally form a combined command headquarters with acombined staff and a single combined commander. Subordinate national commands,however, maintain national integrity.

Strategic Direction

MULTINATIONALALLIANCE

AUTHORITY

Combined Command

National COCOM

COMBINEDCOMMAND

Figure VI-2. Combined Structure with National Integrity

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NATIONAL COMMANDAUTHORITIES OFUNITED STATES

NATIONAL LDRSOF FRANCE

NATIONAL LDRS OFARAB/ISLAMIC

NATIONS

BRITISHFORCE COMMANDER

UNITED STATESFORCE COMMANDER

(CINCCENT) FRENCH FORCECOMMANDER

JOINT FORCE/THEATEROF OPS COMMANDER

(SAUDI)

C IC

GROUNDCOMMANDER

GROUNDCOMMANDER

AIRCOMMANDER

AIRCOMMANDER

ARMYCOMMANDER

(ARCENT)

AIR FORCECOMMANDER

(CENTAF)

NAVYCOMMANDER

(NAVCENT)

JOINT FORCEGROUND

COMMANDER(SAUDI)

JOINT FORCEAIR

COMMANDER(SAUDI)

SPECIAL OPERATIONFORCES COMMANDER

(SOCCENT)

3

NATIONAL OPERATIONALCOMMAND

TACTIC CONTROL

COORDINATION

MARINECOMMANDER(MARCENT)

COALITION COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOROPERATION DESERT STORM

The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf conflict provides an example of a parallel commandstructure within which coalition capabilities were unified toward a common goal.Coalition leaders demonstrated flexibility and innovation in devising and workingwithin this ad hoc structure.

NATIONAL LDRS OFUNITED KINGDOM

Figure VI-3. Coalition Command Relationships forOperation DESERT STORM

coalition. This combination occurswhen two or more nations serve ascontrolling elements for a mix ofinternational forces, such as thecommand arrangement employed bythe Gulf War coalition. Westernnational forces were aligned under USleadership, while Arabic nationalforces were aligned under Saudileadership.

• Coordination and Liaison

•• Regardless of the commands t ruc tu re , coa l i t i ons requ i resignificant coordination and liaison.Differences in language, equipment,

capabilities, doctrine, and proceduresare some of the interoperabilitychallenges that mandate closecooperation. Coordination and liaisonare important considerations inalliances as well.

•• Robust liaison is critical todeveloping and maintaining unity ofeffort in coalition operations. Liaisonexchange should occur between seniorand subordinate commands andbetween lateral or like forces, such asbetween national SOF units or navalforces.

VI-9


• Plans and Procedures

•• Plans in multinational operationsshould be kept simple and focused onclearly defined objectives. The morecomplex the operation or the moreplayers involved, the more time andeffort it takes to plan and coordinatethe operation. Plans should be issuedfar enough in advance to allowsufficient time for member forces toconduct their own planning andrehearsals. Some alliance or coalitionmember forces may not have theplanning and execution dexterity and

flexibility characteristic of US forces.Accordingly, JFCs should ensure thatthe tempo of planning and executiondoes not exceed the capabilities ofnational forces. Effective liaison andreliable communications can facilitatesubordinate planning and execution.

•• Commanders and liaison teamsrequire reliable communications,appropriate to the operational area andthe coalition’s concept of operations.JFCs often deploy robust liaison teamswith sufficient communicationsequipment to permit instantaneouscommunication between national forcecommanders. This communication isespecially important during the earlystages of coalition formation andplanning. JFCs should appropriatelyprioritize their liaison requirementsduring deployment into the operationalarea to facilitate communications assoon as possible.

•• L i a i s o n o f f i c e r s b e t w e e nmultinational forces should beoperationally proficient, innovative,and tenacious, but at the same timediplomatic and sensitive to themultinational forces with whom theyare detailed. They should have theauthority to speak for their JFCs ornational force commanders.

Operation SUPPORT HOPE Joint Task Force (JTF) officers explain airlift controlelement operations at Entebbe airport to the President of Uganda. A JTF,assembled in Entebbe, coordinated Ugandan support to the United Nationshumanitarian relief effort to Rwanda.

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•• To the extent possible, proceduresshould be standardized within themultinational force , especially ifmistakes can result in failed missionsor fratricide. Procedures such ascontrol of attacking aircraft, maneuvercontrol and fire support coordinatingmeasures, and requests for supportingfires should be standardized. Wherethis is not possible, liaison teamsshould be tasked to facilitatecoordination and deconflict operations.JFCs should fully exploit allcapabilities available to them tocoordinate operations, includingMarine air/naval gunfire liaisoncompanies and/or teams and Air Forcetactical air control parties.

•• Commanders may elect toorganize the operational area thatsupports the command’s organization.For example, when a parallel commandstructure is employed, there areadvantages to assigning AOs tonational forces. This assignmentpermits relative autonomy ofoperations and can significantlydeconflict operations. This techniquewas successfully employed by JTFBravo during Operation PROVIDECOMFORT, where American, British,French, and Spanish forces operated inan area approximately 170 by 70kilometers in size.

e. Intelligence

• The collection, production, anddissemination of intelligence can bea major challenge. Alliance orcoalition members normally operateseparate intelligence systems insupport of their own policy andmilitary forces. These national systemsmay vary widely in sophistication andfocus. Members may not havecapabilities similar to the United States

to collect and process intelligence.N o n e t h e l e s s , e a c hn a t i o n ’ scontributions and capabilities should beappropriately incorporated andexploited. JFCs should rapidlyestablish a system that optimizes eachnation’s contributions and providesmember forces a common intelligencepicture, tailored to their requirementsand consistent with disclosure policiesof member nations.

• JFCs need to determine whatintelligence may be shared with theforces of other nations early in theplanning process. The limits ofintelligence sharing and the proceduresfor doing so need to be determinedduring initial coordination andnegotiation between senior politicaland military representatives frommember nations.

• The National Disclosure Policyprovides initial guidance. Itpromulgates national policy andprocedures in the form of specificdisclosure criteria and limitations,definitions of terms, releasearrangements, and other guidance. Ita l s o e s t a b l i s h e s i n t e r a g e n c ymechanisms and procedures for theeffective implementation of the policy.In the absence of sufficient guidance,JFCs should share only thatinformation that is mission essential,affects lower-level operations, and isperishable.

f. Logistics

• Multinational logistics is a majorchallenge. Potential problem areas, asshown in Figure VI-4, includedifferences in logistic doctrine;stockage levels; logistic mobility;interoperabil i ty; infrastructure;competition between Services and

VI-11


alliance and/or coalition members forcommon support; and national resourcelimitations. Nonetheless, JFCs needto coordinate the use of facilities suchas highways, rail lines, ports, andairfields in a manner that supportsmission accomplishment. The notionthat logistics is primarily a nationalresponsibility cannot supplant detailedlogistic planning in the operationala r e a . J F C s t y p i c a l l y f o r mmultinational logistic staff sectionsearly to facilitate logistic coordinationand support multinational operations.

• Standardization of logistic systemsand procedures can ease the logisticchallenges. Interoperability ofequipment, especially in adjacent orsubordinate multinational units, isdesirable and is considered byoperational planners during conceptdevelopment. Significant logisticoperations include acquisition anddistribution of food stuffs, fuels,ammunition, and spare parts;transportation; field services; andhealth service support.

• Contracting. Contracting for varioustypes of support, especially labor,facilities, common supplies, andtransportation, is a significant aspectof many military operations.Procurement of materiel and servicesin the joint force’s operational area isdone either through contracting on theopen market or when the host nationoffers support through specificgovernment agencies. The host nationmay also restrict the joint force’scontracting ability as it managesessential services for the hostpopulation. Requirements for materieland services should be consolidatedand validated as operationally requiredby the JFC’s staff. A determination ofappropriate source for meeting therequirements should then be conducted(for example, supply system, host-nation support, or contracting). Ifcontracting is deemed appropriate,JFCs should ensure that sufficient,qualified contracting officers areavailable from the outset to leveragethe capabilities available within theoperational area. When required,contracting officers should be pairedwith linguists and should be preparedto operate in currencies or commoditiesother than US dollars.

CONSIDERATIONS INMULTINATIONAL

LOGISTICS

Difference in LogisticDoctrine.

Stockage Levels.

Logistic Mobility.

Interoperability.

Infrastructure.

Competition betweenService, Alliances,and/or coalitionmembers for commonsupport.

National ResourceLimitations.

Potential Problem AreasInclude...

Figure VI-4. Considerations inMultinational Logistics

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• Host-Nation Support. Nationshosting US joint forces may offerlogistic support or limit the ability ofthe joint force to contract support onlythrough host-government agencies.JFCs can consider centralizing host-nation support functions so thatrequirements are both identified andsupported, consistent with missionaccomplishment. Nations might agreeto have certain common supplies andsupport provided by member nationsto other alliance or coalition forces.Nations might also agree on whether amultinational commander will have theauthority to conclude host-nationsupport arrangements on behalf ofparticipating nations.

• Integration of Multinational Units.If some level of force integration isnecessary to conduct operations,planners should determine wherethe integration of units andheadquarters needs to occur. Suchdecisions affect the deploymentpriorities and schedules for personneland equipment. If integration is tooccur at an intermediate staging baseor port of debarkation, its impact on

those bases or ports can be significantand needs to be addressed andaccounted for by base and/or portcommanders and staffs.

g. Protection

• Protection measures that apply tojoint operations are appropriate also formultinational situations. JFCsconsider, for example, air defense,defensive counterair, reconnaissanceand surveillance, and securitymeasures for the multinational force.These considerations extend to NBCwarning and decontamination.

• Avoidance of fratricide, especiallybetween member forces, is importantbecause of its potential negativeimpact on alliance or coalition unityand trust between member forces.JFCs should carefully assess the risksof fratricide between member forcesinvolved in COAs being consideredand actively seek to minimize thefratricide potential through acombination of operational andtechnological solutions and expedients.

APPENDIX APRINCIPLES OF WAR

Principles of War. The principles of warguide warfighting at the strategic,operational, and tactical levels. They arethe enduring bedrock of US militarydoctrine.

a. Objective

• The purpose of the objective is todirect every military operation towarda clearly defined, decisive, andattainable objective.

• The objective of combat operationsis the destruction of the enemy armedforces’ capabilities and will to fight.The objective of an operation otherthan war might be more difficult todefine; nonetheless, it too must beclear from the beginning. Objectivesmust directly, quickly, andeconomically contribute to thepurpose of the operation. Eachoperation must contribute to strategicobjectives. Avoid actions that do notcontribute directly to achieving theobjective.

b. Offensive

• The purpose of an offensive action isto seize, retain, and exploit theinitiative.

• Offensive action is the most effectiveand decisive way to attain a clearlydefined object ive. Offensiveoperations are the means by which amilitary force seizes and holds theinitiative while maintaining freedomof action and achieving decisiveresults. The importance of offensive

action is fundamentally true across alllevels of war.

• Commanders adopt the defensiveonly as a temporary expedient andmust seek every opportunity to seizeor reseize the initiative. An offensivespirit must therefore be inherent in theconduct of all defensive operations.

c. Mass

• The purpose of mass is to concentratethe effects of combat power at theplace and time to achieve decisiveresults.

• To achieve mass is to synchronizeappropriate joint force capabilitieswhere they will have decisive effectin a short period of time. Mass mustoften be sustained to have the desiredeffect. Massing effects, rather thanconcentrating forces, can enable evennumerically inferior forces to achievedecisive results and minimize humanlosses and waste of resources.

d. Economy of Force

• The purpose of the economy of forceis to allocate minimum essentialcombat power to secondary efforts.

• Economy of force is the judiciousemployment and distribution offorces. It is the measured allocationof available combat power to suchtasks as limited attacks, defense,delays, deception, or even retrogradeoperations in order to achieve masselsewhere at the decisive point andtime.

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A-2 Joint Pub 3-0

e. Maneuver

• The purpose of maneuver is to placethe enemy in a position ofdisadvantage through the flexibleapplication of combat power.

• Maneuver is the movement of forcesin relation to the enemy to secure orretain positional advantage, usuallyin order to deliver—or threatendelivery of—the direct and indirectfires of the maneuvering force.Effective maneuver keeps the enemyoff balance and thus also protects thefriendly force. It contributesmaterially in exploiting successes,preserving freedom of action, andreducing vulnerability by continuallyposing new problems for the enemy.

f. Unity of Command

• The purpose of unity of command isto ensure unity of effort under oneresponsible commander for everyobjective.

• Unity of command means that allforces operate under a singlecommander with the requisiteauthority to direct all forces employedin pursuit of a common purpose.Unity of effort, however, requirescoordination and cooperation amongall forces toward a commonlyrecognized objective, although theyare not necessarily part of the samecommand structure. In multinationaland interagency operations, unity ofcommand may not be possible, butthe requirement for unity of effortbecomes paramount. Unity ofe f for t—coord inat ion throughcooperation and common interests—is an essential complement to unityof command.

g. Security

• The purpose of security is to neverpermit the enemy to acquireunexpected advantage.

• Security enhances freedom of actionby reducing friendly vulnerability tohostile acts, influence, or surprise.Security results from the measurestaken by commanders to protect theirforces. Staff planning and anunderstanding of enemy strategy,tactics, and doctrine will enhancesecurity. Risk is inherent in militaryoperations. Application of thisprinciple includes prudent riskmanagement, not undue caution.Protecting the force increases friendlycombat power and preserves freedomof action.

h. Surprise

• The purpose of surprise is to strikethe enemy at a time or place or in amanner for which it is unprepared.

• Surprise can help the commandershift the balance of combat power andthus achieve success well out ofproportion to the effort expended.Factors contributing to surpriseinclude speed in decisionmaking,information sharing, and forcemovement; effective intelligence;deception; application of unexpectedcomba t power ; OPSEC; andvariations in tactics and methods ofoperation.

i. Simplicity

• The purpose of simplicity is toprepare clear, uncomplicated plansand concise orders to ensure thoroughunderstanding.

A-3

Principles of War

• Simplicity contributes to successfuloperations. Simple plans and clear,c o n c i s e o r d e r s m i n i m i z emisunderstanding and confusion.When other factors are equal, thesimplest plan is preferable.Simplicity in plans allows betterunderstanding and execution

planning at all echelons. Simplicityand clarity of expression greatlyfacilitate mission execution in thestress, fatigue, and other complexitiesof modern combat and are especiallycritical to success in combinedoperations.

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Intentionally Blank

B-1

APPENDIX BTHE ESTIMATE PROCESS

1. General

The estimate process is central toformulating and updating military actionto meet the requirements of any situation.The estimate process should be used bycommanders and staffs at all levels.Though its central framework fororganizing inquiry and decision isessentially the same for any level ofcommand, specific detailed questionswithin each part of this framework willvary depending on the level and type ofoperation. This framework is presentedbelow. Specific material appropriate tojoint force operations, especially fortheaters of war and theaters of operations,has been added to flesh out the basicframework for readers of this publication.

2. Mission

a. Mission Analysis

• Determine the higher command’spurpose. Analyze national securityand national military strategicdirection as well as appropriateguidance in alliance and coalitiondirections, including long- and short-term objectives for conflicttermination. Conflict terminationobjectives should include the militaryobjectives that will provide the basisfor realizing the political aimregardless of whether an imposed ornegotiated termination is sought.

• Determine specified and impliedtasks. If multiple, determinepriorities.

b. Mission Statement

• Express in terms of who, what, when,where (task parameters), and why(purpose).

• Frame as a clear, concise statementof the essential tasks to beaccomplished and the purpose to beachieved.

3. Situation and Courses ofAction

a. Situation Analysis

• Geostrategic Context

•• Domestic and internationalcontext: political and/or diplomaticlong- and short-term causes ofconflict; domestic influences,including public will, competingdemands for resources, and political,economic, legal, and moralconstraints; international interests(reinforcing or conflicting with USinterests, including positions ofparties neutral to the conflict),international law, positions ofinternational organizations, and othercompeting or distracting internationalsituations.

•• Characteristics of the operationalarea, including: military geography(topography, hydrography, climate,and weather); transportation;telecommunications; economics(organization, industrial base,mobilization capacity); socialconditions; science and technologyfactors affecting the operational area.

Appendix B

B-2 Joint Pub 3-0

• Analysis of the Enemy. Enemysituation, including capabilities andvulnerabilities (at the theater level,commanders will normally haveavailable a formal intelligenceestimate):

•• Broad military COAs being takenand available in the future.

•• Political and military intentionsand objectives (to extent known).

•• Military strategic and operationaladvantages and limitations.

•• Possible external military support.

•• Center(s) of gravity (strategic andoperational).

•• Specific operational char-acteristics: strength, composition,location and disposition, rein-forcements, logistics, time andspace factors (including basingutilized and available), andcombat efficiency (including pro-ficiency in joint operations).

• Friendly Situation. Should follow thesame pattern used for the analysis ofthe enemy. At the theater level,commanders will normally haveavai lable speci f ic support ingestimates, including personnel,l og i s t i cs , and C4 es t ima tes ;multinational operations requirespecific analysis of alliance orcoa l i t ion par tner ob jec t ives ,capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

• Restrictions. Those limitations to theuse or threat of use of force that areimposed or necessary to support otherworldwide strategic requirements andassociated diplomatic, economic, andinformational efforts.

• Assumptions. Assumptions areintrinsically important factors onwhich the conduct of the operation isbased and must be noted as such.

• Deductions. Deductions from aboveanalysis should yield estimates ofrelative combat power, includingenemy capabilities that can affectmission accomplishment.

b. Courses of Action Analysis. COAsdevelopment (based on the above analysisand a creative determination of how themission will be accomplished). EachCOA must be adequate, feasible, andacceptable. State all practical COAs opento the commander that, if successful, willaccomplish the mission. Generally, at thetheater level, each COA will constitute atheater strategic or operational conceptand should outline:

• Major strategic and operational tasksto be accomplished in the order inwhich they are to be accomplished.

• Forces required.

• Logistic concept.

• Deployment concept.

• Estimate of time required to reachtermination objectives.

• Concept for maintaining a theaterreserve.

4. Analysis of OpposingCourses of Action

a. Determine the probable effect ofpossible enemy COAs on the success ofeach friendly COA.

B-3

The Estimate Process

b. Conduct this analysis in an orderlymanner: by time phasing, geographiclocation, and functional event. Considerthe potential actions of subordinates twoechelons down.

c. Consider conflict termination issues;think through own action, enemy reaction,counterreaction.

d. Conclude with revalidation ofsuitability, adequacy, and feasibility;determine additional requirements, if any;make required modifications; listadvantages and disadvantages of eachCOA.

5. Comparison of OwnCourses of Action

a. Evaluate the advantages anddisadvantages of each COA.

b. Compare with respect to governingfactors:

• Fixed values for joint operations (theprinciples of war, the fundamentalsof joint warfare, and the elements ofoperational art).

• Other critical factors (for example,political constraints).

• Mission accomplishment.

c. If appropriate, merge elements ofdifferent COAs into one.

6. Decision

Translate the selected COA into aconcise statement of what the force, as awhole, is to do and explain, as may beappropriate, the following elements:when, where, how, and why.

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX CREFERENCES

Joint Pub 3-0 is based on the following primary references:

1. The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.

2. DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its MajorComponents.”

3. Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.”

4. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces.”

5. Joint Pub 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and AssociatedTerms.”

6. CM-1502-92, 23 November 1992, “A Doctrinal Statement of Selected JointOperational Concepts.”

C-1

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C-2 Joint Pub 3-0

Intentionally Blank

D-1

APPENDIX DADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication tothe Joint Warfighting Center/Doctrine Division, Ingalls Road, Bldg 100, 3rd Floor,Attn: Doc Div, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization) and writing and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsorfor this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-FDQ//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Appendix D

D-2 Joint Pub 3-0

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments orforeign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense AttacheOffice) to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington,D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate JointCommands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply OfficeDistribution Division (Code 03443)5801 Tabor AvePhiladelphia, PA 19120-5000

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-REP)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

ADCON administrative controlAFFOR Air Force forces (a Service component of a joint force)AI air interdictionAID Agency for International DevelopmentAO area of operationsAOR area of responsibilityARCENT US Army component, US Central CommandARFOR Army forces (a Service component of a joint force)ATF amphibious task force

C2 command and controlC2W command and control warfareC3IC Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration

CenterC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCA combat assessmentCENTAF US Air Force component, US Central Command (9th AF)CINC commander in chief of a combatant commandCJTF commander of a joint task forceCOA course of actionCOCOM combatant command (command authority)COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces (a Service component

commander)COMMZ communications zoneCONUS continental United States

DART Disaster Assistance Response TeamDIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized

EW electronic warfare

FID foreign internal defenseFLOT forward line of own troopsFSCL fire support coordination line

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace

JFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJFLCC joint force land component commanderJFMCC joint force maritime component commanderJFSOCC joint force special operations component commander

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-0

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJRA joint rear areaJSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities PlanJSOA joint special operations areaJTCB Joint Targeting Coordination BoardJTF joint task forceJTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

LOC lines of communications

MARCENT US Marine Corps component, US Central CommandMARFOR US Marine Corps forces (a Service component of a joint force)

NAVCENT US Navy component, US Central CommandNAVFOR US Navy forces (a Service component of a joint force)NBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCA National Command AuthoritiesNDCS national drug control strategyNEO noncombatant evacuation operationNMS National Military Strategy

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster AssistanceOPCON operational controlOPSEC operations security

PDF Panamanian Defense ForcesPSYOP psychological operations

ROE rules of engagement

SOC special operations componentSOCCENT Special Operations component, US Central CommandSOF special operations forcesSWPA Southwest Pacific Area

TACON tactical control

UN United NationsUNAAF Unified Action Armed ForcesUNITAF unified task forceUNOSOM II United Nations Operation in SomaliaUSCINCCENT Commander in Chief, US Central CommandUSCINCEUR US Commander in Chief, EuropeUSSOCOM US Special Operations Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-3

Glossary

PART II--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

air interdiction. Air operations conductedto destroy, neutralize, or delay theenemy’s military potential before it canbe brought to bear effectively againstfriendly forces at such distance fromfriendly forces that detailed integrationof each air mission with the fire andmovement of friendly forces is notrequired. (Joint Pub 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense,distribution for planning of limitedresources among competingrequirements. Specific apportionments(e.g., air sorties and forces for planning)are described as apportionment of airsorties and forces for planning, etc. (JointPub 1-02)

apportionment (air). The determinationand assignment of the total expectedeffort by percentage and/or by prioritythat should be devoted to the various airoperations and/or geographic areas for agiven period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations. An operational areadefined by the joint force commander forland and naval forces. Areas of operationdo not typically encompass the entireoperational area of the joint forcecommander, but should be large enoughf o r c o m p o n e n t c o m m a n d e r s toaccomplish their missions and protecttheir forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographicalarea associated with a combatantcommand within which a combatantcommander has authority to plan andconduct operations. 2. In naval usage, apredefined area of enemy terrain forwhich supporting ships are responsiblefor covering by fire on known targets ortargets of opportunity and by observation.Also called AOR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

battle damage assessment. The timely andaccurate estimate of damage resultingfrom the application of military force,either lethal or non-lethal, against apredetermined objective. Battle damageassessment can be applied to theemployment of all types of weaponsystems (air, ground, naval, and specialforces weapon systems) throughout therange of military operations. Battledamage assessment is primarily anintelligence responsibility with requiredinputs and coordination from theoperators. Battle damage assessment iscomposed of physical damageassessment , func t iona l damageassessment, and target system assessment.Also called BDA. See also combatassessment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

boundary. A line which delineates surfaceareas for the purpose of facilitatingcoordination and deconfliction ofoperations between adjacent units,formations, or areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign. A series of related militaryoperations aimed at accomplishing astrategic or operational objective withina given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series ofrelated military operations aimed toachieve strategic and operationalobjectives within a given time and space.(Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign planning. The process wherebycombatant commanders and subordinatejoint force commanders translate nationalor theater strategy into operationalconcepts through the development ofcampaign plans. Campaign planning maybegin during deliberate planning whenthe actual threat, national guidance, andavailable resources become evident, but

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Joint Pub 3-0

is normally not completed until after theNational Command Authorities select thecourse of action during crisis actionplanning. Campaign planning isconducted when contemplated militaryoperations exceed the scope of a singlemajor joint operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics,capabilities, or localities from which amilitary force derives its freedom ofaction, physical strength, or will to fight.(Joint Pub 1-02.)

civil affairs. The activities of a commanderthat establish, maintain, influence, orexploit relations between military forcesand civil authorities, both governmentaland nongovernmental, and the civilianpopulace in a friendly, neutral, or hostilearea of operations in order to facilitatemilitary operations and consolidateoperational objectives. Civil affairs mayinclude performance by military forcesof activities and functions normally theresponsibility of local government.These activities may occur prior to,during, or subsequent to other militaryactions. They may also occur, if directed,in the absence of other militaryoperations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

close air support. Air action by fixed- androtary-wing aircraft against hostile targetswhich are in close proximity to friendlyforces and which require detailedintegration of each air mission with thefire and movement of those forces. Alsocalled CAS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coalition force. A force composed ofmilitary elements of nations that haveformed a temporary alliance for somespecific purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination ofthe overall effectiveness of forceemployment during military operations.

Combat assessment is composed of threemajor components, (a) battle damageassessment, (b) munitions effectsa s s e s s m e n t , a n d ( c ) r e a t t a c krecommendations. The objective ofcombat assessment is to identifyrecommendations for the course ofmilitary operations. The J-3 is normallythe single point of contact for combatassessment at the joint force level,assisted by the joint force J-2. Also calledCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command. A unified orspecified command with a broadcontinuing mission under a singlecommander established and so designatedby the President, through the Secretaryof Defense and with the advice andassistance of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. Combatant commandstypically have geographic or functionalresponsibilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (commandauthority). Nontransferable commandauthority established by title 10 (“ArmedForces”), United States Code, section164, exercised only by commanders ofunified or specified combatant commandsunless otherwise directed by the Presidentor the Secretary of Defense. Combatantcommand (command authority) cannot bedelegated and is the authority of acombatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assignedforces involving organizing andemploying commands and forces,assigning tasks, designating objectives,and giving authoritative direction over allaspects of military operations, jointtraining, and logistics necessary toaccomplish the missions assigned to thecommand. Combatant command(command authority) should be exercisedthrough the commanders of subordinateorganizations. Normally this authority isexercised through subordinate joint force

GL-5

Glossary

commanders and Service and/orfunctional component commanders.Combatant command (commandauthority) provides full authority toorganize and employ commands andforces as the combatant commanderconsiders necessary to accomplishassigned missions. Operational controlis inherent in combatant command(command authority). Also calledCOCOM. See also combatant command;operational control; tactical control.(Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control warfare. Theintegrated use of operations security( O P S E C ) , m i l i t a r y d e c e p t i o n ,psychological operations (PSYOP),electronic warfare (EW), and physicaldestruction, mutually supported byintelligence, to deny information to,influence, degrade, or destroy adversarycommand and control capabilities, whileprotecting friendly command and controlcapabilities against such actions.Command and control warfare appliesacross the operational continuum and alllevels of conflict. Also called C2W.C2W is both offensive and defensive: a.counter-C2—To prevent effective C2 ofadversary forces by denying informationto, influencing, degrading, or destroyingthe adversary C2 system. b. C2-protection—To maintain effectivecommand and control of own forces byturning to friendly advantage or negatingadversary efforts to deny information to,influence, degrade, or destroy the friendlyC2 system. See electronic warfare;military deception; operations security;psychological operations. (Joint Pub1-02)

commander’s estimate of the situation.A logical process of reasoning by whicha commander considers all thecircumstances affecting the militarysituation and arrives at a decision as to a

course of action to be taken to accomplishthe mission. A commander’s estimatewhich considers a military situation sofar in the future as to require majorassumptions, is called a commander’slong-range estimate of the situation.(Joint Pub 1-02)

command relationships. The interrelatedresponsibilities between commanders, aswell as the authority of commanders inthe chain of command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphicstatement, in broad outline, of acommander’s assumptions or intent inregard to an operation or series ofoperations. The concept of operationsfrequently is embodied in campaign plansand operation plans; in the latter case,particularly when the plans cover a seriesof connected operations to be carried outsimultaneously or in succession. Theconcept is designed to give an overallpicture of the operation. It is includedprimarily for additional clarity ofpurpose. Also called commander’sconcept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency. An emergency involvingmilitary forces caused by naturaldisasters, terrorists, subversives, or byrequired military operations. Due to theuncertainty of the situation, contingenciesrequire plans, rapid response and specialprocedures to ensure the safety andreadiness of personnel, installations, andequipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander orindividual assigned responsibility forcoordinating specific functions oractivities involving forces of two or moreMilitary Departments or two or moreforces of the same Service. Thecommander or individual has theauthority to require consultation betweenthe agencies involved, but does not have

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Glossary

Joint Pub 3-0

the authority to compel agreement. Inthe event that essential agreement cannotbe obtained, the matter shall be referredto the appointing authority. Coordinatingauthority is a consultation relationship,not an authority through which commandmay be exercised. Coordinating authorityis more applicable to planning and similaractivities than to operations. (Joint Pub1-02)

counterdrug. Those active measures takento detect, monitor, and counter theproduction, trafficking, and use of illegaldrugs. Also called CD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coup de main. An offensive operation thatcapitalizes on surprise and simultaneousexecution of supporting operations toachieve success in one swift stroke. (JointPub 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving athreat to the United States, its territories,citizens, military forces, possessions, orvital interests that develops rapidly andcreates a condition of such diplomatic,economic, pol i t ica l , o r mi l i taryimportance that commitment of USmilitary forces and resources iscontemplated to achieve nationalobjectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

economy of force theater. Theater inwhich risk is accepted to allow aconcentration of sufficient force in thetheater of focus. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic warfare. Any military actioninvolving the use of electromagnetic anddirected energy to control theelectromagnetic spectrum or to attack theenemy. Also called EW. The three majorsubdivisions within electronic warfareare: electronic attack, electronicprotection, and electronic warfaresupport. a. electronic attack—Thatdivision of electronic warfare involving

the use of electromagnetic or directedenergy to attack personnel, facilities, orequipment with the intent of degrading,neutralizing, or destroying enemy combatcapability. Also called EA. EA includes:1) actions taken to prevent or reduce ane n e m y ’ s e f f e c t i v e u s e o f t h eelectromagnetic spectrum, such asjamming and electromagnetic deception,and 2) employment of weapons that useeither electromagnetic or directed energyas their primary destructive mechanism(lasers, radio frequency weapons, particlebeams). b. electronic protection—Thatdivision of electronic warfare involvingactions taken to protect personnel,facilities, and equipment from any effectsof friendly or enemy employment ofelectronic warfare that degrade,neutralize, or destroy friendly combatcapability. Also called EP. c. electronicwarfare support—That division ofelectronic warfare involving actionstasked by, or under direct control of, anoperational commander to search for,intercept, identify, and locate sources ofintentional and unintentional radiatedelectromagnetic energy for the purposeof immediate threat recognition. Thus,electronic warfare support providesinformation required for immediatedecisions involving electronic warfareoperations and other tactical actions suchas threat avoidance, targeting, andhoming. Also called ES. Electronicwarfare support data can be used toproduce signals intelligence (SIGINT),both communications intelligence(COMINT), and electronics intelligence(ELINT). (Joint Pub 1-02)

expedition. A military operation conductedby an armed force to accomplish aspecific objective in a foreign country.(Joint Pub 1-02.)

expeditionary force. An armed forceorganized to accomplish a specific

GL-7

Glossary

objective in a foreign country. (Joint Pub1-02)

fire support coordination line. A lineestablished by the appropriate land oramphibious force commander to ensurecoordination of fire not under thecommander’s control but which mayaffect current tactical operations. The firesupport coordination line is used tocoordinate fires of air, ground, or seaweapons systems using any type ofammunition against surface targets. Thefire support coordination line shouldfollow well-defined terrain features. Theestablishment of the fire supportcoordination line must be coordinatedwith the appropriate tactical aircommander and other supportingelements. Supporting elements mayattack targets forward of the fire supportcoordination line without priorcoordination with the land or amphibiousforce commander provided the attack willnot produce adverse surface effects on orto the rear of the line. Attacks againstsurface targets behind this line must becoordinated with the appropriate land oramphibious force commander. Alsocalled FSCL. (Approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

fire support coordinating measure. Ameasure employed by land or amphibiouscommanders to facilitate the rapidengagement of targets and simultaneouslyprovide safeguards for friendly forces.(Joint Pub 1-02)

functional component command. Acommand normally, but not necessarily,composed of forces of two or moreMilitary Departments which may beestablished across the range of militaryoperations to perform particularoperational missions that may be of short

duration or may extend over a period oftime. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. Programsconducted to relieve or reduce the resultsof natural or manmade disasters or otherendemic conditions such as human pain,disease, hunger, or privation that mightpresent a serious threat to life or that canresult in great damage to or loss ofproperty. Humanitarian assistanceprovided by US forces is limited in scopeand duration. The assistance provided isdesigned to supplement or complementthe efforts of the host nation civilauthorities or agencies that may have theprimary responsibility for providinghumanitarian assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

in extremis. A situation of such exceptionalurgency that immediate action must betaken to minimize imminent loss of lifeor catastrophic degradation of thepolitical or military situation. (Joint Pub1-02)

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt,delay, or destroy the enemy’s surfacemilitary potential before it can be usedeffectively against friendly forces. (JointPub 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to aforce composed of significant elements,assigned or attached, of two or moreMilitary Departments, operating under asingle joint force commander. (Joint Pub1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatan t command (commandauthority) or operational control over ajoint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub1-02)

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Glossary

Joint Pub 3-0

joint force air component commander.The joint force air componentcommander derives authority from thejoint force commander who has theauthority to exercise operational control,assign missions, direct coordinationamong subordinate commanders, redirectand organize forces to ensure unity ofeffort in the accomplishment of theoverall mission. The joint forcecommander will normally designate ajoint force air component commander.The joint force air componentcommander’s responsibilities will beassigned by the joint force commander(normally these would include, but notbe limited to, planning, coordination,allocation, and tasking based on the jointforce commander’s apportionmentdecision). Using the joint forcecommander’s guidance and authority, andin coordination with other Servicecomponent commanders and otherassigned or supporting commanders, thejoint force air component commanderwill recommend to the joint forcecommander apportionment of air sortiesto various missions or geographic areas.Also called JFACC. (Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint force land component commander.The commander within a unifiedcommand, subordinate unified command,or joint task force responsible to theestablishing commander for makingrecommendations on the properemployment of land forces, planning andcoordinating land operations, oraccomplishing such operational missionsas may be assigned. The joint force landcomponent commander is given theauthority necessary to accomplishmissions and tasks assigned by theestablishing commander. The joint forceland component commander willnormally be the commander with thepreponderance of land forces and therequisite command and control

capabilities. Also called JFLCC. (JointPub 1-02)

joint force maritime componentcommander. The commander within aunified command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or joint task force responsibleto the establishing commander formaking recommendations on the properemployment of maritime forces andassets, planning and coordinatingmaritime operations, or accomplishingsuch operational missions as may beassigned. The joint force maritimecomponent commander is given theauthority necessary to accomplishmissions and tasks assigned by theestablishing commander. The joint forcemaritime component commander willnormally be the commander with thepreponderance of maritime forces and therequisite command and controlcapabilities. Also called JFMCC. (JointPub 1-02)

joint force special operations componentcommander. The commander within aunified command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or joint task force responsibleto the establishing commander formaking recommendations on the properemployment of special operations forcesand assets, planning and coordinatingspecial operations, or accomplishing suchoperational missions as may be assigned.The joint force special operationscomponent commander is given theauthority necessary to accomplishmissions and tasks assigned by theestablishing commander. The joint forces p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s c o m p o n e n tcommander will normally be thecommander with the preponderance ofspecial operations forces and the requisitecommand and control capabilities. Alsocalled JFSOCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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Glossary

joint operations. A general term todescribe military actions conducted byjoint forces, or by Service forces inrelationships (e.g., support, coordinatingauthority), which, of themselves, do notcreate joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land,sea, and airspace, defined by a geographiccombatant commander or subordinateunified commander, in which a joint forcecommander (normally a joint task forcecommander) conducts military operationsto accomplish a specific mission. Jointoperations areas are particularly usefulwhen operations are limited in scope andgeographic area or when operations areto be conducted on the boundariesbetween theaters. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint special operations area. A restrictedarea of land, sea, and airspace assignedby a joint force commander to thecommander of a joint special operationsforce to conduct special operationsactivities. The commander of jointspecial operations forces may furtherassign a specific area or sector within thejoint special operations area to asubordinate commander for missionexecution. The scope and duration of thespecial operations forces’ mission,friendly and hostile situation, andpolitico-military considerations allinfluence the number, composition, andsequencing of special operations forcesdeployed into a joint special operationsarea. It may be limited in size toaccommodate a discrete direct actionmission or may be extensive enough toallow a continuing broad range ofunconventional warfare operations. Alsocalled JSOA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

lines of operations. Lines which definethe directional orientation of the force intime and space in relation to the enemy.They connect the force with its base of

operations and its objectives. (Joint Pub1-02)

military deception. Actions executed todeliberately mislead adversary militarydecisionmakers as to friendly militarycapabilities, intentions, and operations,thereby causing the adversary to takespecific actions (or inactions) that willcontribute to the accomplishment of thefriendly mission. The five categories ofmilitary deception are: a. strategicmilitary deception—Military deceptionplanned and executed by and in supportof senior military commanders to resultin adversary military policies and actionsthat support the originator’s strategicmilitary objectives, policies, andoperations. b. operational militarydeception—Military deception plannedand executed by and in support ofoperational-level commanders to result inadversary actions that are favorable to theoriginator’s objectives and operations.Operational military deception is plannedand conducted in a theater of war tosupport campaigns and major operations.c. tactical military deception—Militarydeception planned and executed by andin support of tactical commanders toresult in adversary actions that arefavorable to the originator’s objectivesand operations. Tactical militarydeception is planned and conducted tosupport battles and engagements. d.Service military deception—Militarydeception planned and executed by theServices that pertain to Service supportto joint operations. Service militarydeception is designed to protect andenhance the combat capabilities ofService forces and systems. e. militarydeception in support of operationssecurity (OPSEC)—Military deceptionplanned and executed by and in supportof all levels of command to support theprevention of the inadvertent compromiseof sensitive or classified activities,

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Glossary

Joint Pub 3-0

capabilities, or intentions. DeceptiveOPSEC measures are designed to distractforeign intelligence away from, orprovide cover for, military operations andactivities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mission type order. 1. Order issued to alower unit that includes theaccomplishment of the total missionassigned to the higher headquarters. 2.Order to a unit to perform a missionwithout specifying how it is to beaccomplished. (Joint Pub 1-02)

multinational operations. A collectiveterm to describe military actionsconducted by forces of two or morenations, typically organized within thestructure of a coalition or alliance. (JointPub 1-02)

national military strategy. The art andscience of distributing and applyingmilitary power to attain nationalobjectives in peace and war. (Joint Pub1-02)

national security strategy. The art andscience of developing, applying, andcoordinating the instruments of nationalpower (diplomatic, economic, military,and informational) to achieve objectivesthat contribute to national security. Alsocalled national strategy or grand strategy.(Joint Pub 1-02)

operational art. The employment ofmilitary forces to attain strategic and/oroperational objectives through the design,organization, integration, and conduct ofstrategies, campaigns, major operations,and battles. Operational art translates thejoint force commander’s strategy intooperational design, and, ultimately,tactical action, by integrating the keyactivities of all levels of war. (Joint Pub1-02)

operational authority. That authorityexercised by a commander in the chainof command, defined further ascombatan t command (commandauthority), operational control, tacticalcontrol, or a support relationship. (JointPub 1-02)

operational control. Transferablecommand authority that may be exercisedby commanders at any echelon at orbelow the level of combatant command.Operational control is inherent incombatan t command (commandauthority). Operational control may bedelegated and is the authority to performthose functions of command oversubordinate forces involving organizingand employing commands and forces,assigning tasks, designating objectives,and giving authoritative directionnecessary to accomplish the mission.Operational control includes authoritativedirection over all aspects of militaryoperations and joint training necessary toaccomplish missions assigned to thecommand. Operational control should beexercised through the commanders ofsubordinate organizations. Normally thisauthority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Operational controlnormally provides full authority toorganize commands and forces and toemploy those forces as the commanderin operational control considers necessaryto accomplish assigned missions.Operational control does not, in and ofitself, include authoritative direction forlogistics or matters of administration,discipline, internal organization, or unittraining. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub1-02)

operational level of war. The level of warat which campaigns and major operationsare planned, conducted, and sustained to

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Glossary

accomplish strategic objectives withintheaters or areas of operations. Activitiesat this level link tactics and strategy byestablishing operational objectivesneeded to accomplish the strategicobjectives, sequencing events to achievethe operational objectives, initiatingactions, and applying resources to bringabout and sustain these events. Theseactivities imply a broader dimension oftime or space than do tactics; they ensurethe logistic and administrative support oftactical forces, and provide the means bywhich tactical successes are exploited toachieve strategic objectives. (Joint Pub1-02)

operations security. A process ofidentifying critical information andsubsequently analyzing friendly actionsattendant to military operations and otheractivities to:

a. Identify those actions that can beobserved by adversary intelligencesystems.

b. Determine indicators adversaryintelligence systems might obtain thatcould be interpreted or pieced togetherto derive critical information in time tobe useful to adversaries.

c. Select and execute measures thateliminate or reduce to an acceptable levelthe vulnerabilities of friendly actions toadversary exploitation. Also calledOPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peace operations. The umbrella termencompassing peacekeeping, peaceenforcement, and any other military,paramilitary, or nonmilitary action takenin support of a diplomatic peacemakingprocess. (Joint Pub 1-02)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actions,taken in advance of a predictable crisis,

aimed at resolving disputes beforeviolence breaks out. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives,objective reasoning, and ultimately thebehavior of foreign governments,organizations, groups, and individuals.The purpose of psychological operationsis to induce or reinforce foreign attitudesand behavior favorable to the originator’sobjectives. Also called PSYOP. (JointPub 1-02)

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken toobtain, by visual observation or otherdetection methods, information about theactivities and resources of an enemy orpotential enemy; or to secure dataconcern ing the meteoro log ica l ,h y d r o g r a p h i c , o r g e o g r a p h i ccharacteristics of a particular area. (JointPub 1-02)

Service component command. Acommand consisting of the Servicecomponent commander and all thoseService forces, such as individuals, units,de tachments , organ iza t ions andinstallations under the commandincluding the support forces, that havebeen assigned to a combatant command,or further assigned to a subordinateunified command or joint task force.(Joint Pub 1-02)

specified command. A command that hasa broad, continuing mission, normallyfunctional, and is established and sodesignated by the President through theSecretary of Defense with the advice andassistance of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It normally is composedof forces from a single MilitaryDepartment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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strategic estimate. The estimate of thebroad strategic factors that influence thedetermination of missions, objectives,and courses of action. The estimate iscontinuous and includes the strategicdirection received from the NationalCommand Authorities or the authoritativebody of an alliance or coalition. (JointPub 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war atwhich a nation, often as a member of agroup of nations, determines national ormultinational (alliance or coalition)strategic security objectives andguidance, and develops and uses nationalresources to accomplish these objectives.Activities at this level establish nationaland multinational military objectives;sequence initiatives; define limits andassess risks for the use of military andother instruments of national power;develop global plans or theater war plansto achieve those objectives; and providemilitary forces and other capabilities inaccordance with strategic plans. (JointPub 1-02)

strike. An attack which is intended toinflict damage on, seize, or destroy anobjective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force whichaids, protects, complements, or sustainsanother force in accordance with adirective requiring such action. 2. A unitwhich helps another unit in battle.Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire maybe used as a support for infantry. 3. Apart of any unit held back at the beginningof an attack as a reserve. 4. An elementof a command which assists, protects, orsupplies other forces in combat. (JointPub 1-02)

supported commander. The commanderhaving primary responsibility for allaspects of a task assigned by the Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan or other jointoperation planning authority. In thecontext of joint operation planning, thisterm refers to the commander whoprepares operation plans or operationorders in response to requirements of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.(Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting commander. A commanderwho provides augmentation forces orother support to a supported commanderor who develops a supporting plan.Includes the designated combatantcommands and Defense agencies asappropriate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

surveillance. The systematic observationof aerospace, surface or subsurface areas,places, persons, or things, by visual,aural, electronic, photographic, or othermeans. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority overassigned or attached forces or commands,or military capability or forces madeavailable for tasking, that is limited to thedetailed and, usually, local direction andcontrol of movements or maneuversnecessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. Tactical control is inherent inoperational control. Tactical control maybe delegated to, and exercised at any levelat or below the level of combatantcommand. Also called TACON. (JointPub 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war atwhich battles and engagements areplanned and executed to accomplishmilitary objectives assigned to tacticalunits or task forces. Activities at this levelfocus on the ordered arrangement andmaneuver of combat elements in relationto each other and to the enemy to achievecombat objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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Glossary

theater of focus. A theater in whichoperations are most critical to nationalinterests and are assigned the highestpriority for allocation of resources. (JointPub 1-02)

theater of operations. A subarea within atheater of war defined by the geographiccombatant commander required toconduct or support specific combatoperations. Different theaters ofoperations within the same theater of warwill normally be geographically separateand focused on different enemy forces.Theaters of operations are usually ofsignificant size, allowing for operationsover extended periods of time. (Joint Pub1-02)

theater of war. Defined by the NationalCommand Authorities or the geographiccombatant commander, the area of air,land, and water that is, or may become,directly involved in the conduct of thewar. A theater of war does not normallyencompass the geographic combatantcommander’s entire area of responsibilityand may contain more that one theater ofoperations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

theater strategy. The art and science ofdeveloping integrated strategic conceptsand courses of action directed towardsecuring the objectives of national andalliance or coalition security policy andstrategy by the use of force, threateneduse of force, or operations not involvingthe use of force within a theater. (JointPub 1-02)

unified action. A broad generic term thatdescribes the wide scope of actions(including the synchronization ofactivities with governmental and non-governmental agencies) taking placewithin unified commands, subordinateunified commands, or joint task forcesunder the overall direction of thecommanders of those commands. (JointPub 1-02)

unified command. A command with abroad continuing mission under a singlecommander and composed of significantassigned components of two or moreMilitary Departments, and which isestablished and so designated by thePresident, through the Secretary ofDefense with the advice and assistanceof the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff. Also called unified combatantcommand. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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Joint Pub 3-0

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is the keystone joint operations publication. The diagrambelow illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-0

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0 JOINT PUB 2-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

JOINT PUB 4-0JOINT PUB 3-0

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