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Nation-Building and Integration Policy in the PhilippinesKazuya Yamamoto

Journal of Peace Research2007 44: 195DOI: 10.1177/0022343307075122

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2007 Journal of Peace Research,vol. 44, no. 2, 2007, pp. 195-213Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhiand Singapore) http://jpr.sagepub.comDOI 10.1177/0022343307075122

Nation-Building and Integration Policy in the

Philippines*KAZUYA YAMAMOTOFuture Research Institute (WFI), Waseda University

The Philippines can be considered a country where successive governments have sought to create a sin-gle nation by implementing integration policies. In this article, two formal models are developed - themodernism model and the historicism (primordialism or essentialism) model - to suitably analyze thenational integration policy of the Philippines. The analysis reveals that (1) the post-independencenational integration policy of the Philippines cannot be regarded as being successful; (2) national integration in the Philippines will continue to be difficult; (3) no deterministic argument can be maderegarding the relationship between mobilization and national cleavage; and (4) the modern nationshould not be regarded as an extension of pre-modern ethnic groups but as a new identity group thatis formed through the process of modernization. In addition, the mathematical implications of the twomodels are derived. The modernism model implies that (1) in some cases, a ruling group that is in themajority at the time of independence can maintain its position even if it cannot assimilate a majorityof the underlying people after independence; (2) in some cases, a ruling group that is not in the majority at the time of independence cannot attain a majority even if it is able to assimilate a majority of the

underlying people after independence; and (3) a larger ruling group is not always capable of promot-

ing greater integration than a smaller one can. On the other hand, the historicism model implies thatthe size of the underlying ethnic group that will comprise the ruling group when mobilized is the keyto the success or failure of national integration.

IntroductionThis article investigates the success or fail-ure of the national integration policy in post-independence Philippines. The integrationpolicies implemented by states can be classi-fied into two types. The first type refers to thepolicies through which the ruling group in astate attempts to assimilate other ethnic groupsinto a single nation; this is usually done bycreating a common language and educationsystem and establishing modern political/social* I thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for theircomments and help in the development of this study. The

data used in this article can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. The author may be reached via e-mail [email protected].

institutions that destroy the traditional mech-anisms of coordination between ethnic groups.

The second type refers to the policies throughwhich the ruling group attempts to create sys-tems of power-sharing between ethnic groupsand/or the institutions that promote dialogueamong the leaders of these groups; this resultsin the coordination of the interests of eachgroup instead of coercive assimilation.

Although both of these types of policieshave been implemented in Asian and Africancountries, Southeast Asian countries that

achieved independence soon after World WarII implemented a number of the first type ofpolicies, which were reflective of their opti-mistic views on ethnic assimilation at that

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196 journal ofPEACERESEARCH

time. The Philippines, from among these,

was a country that had been administered bythe United States for approximately half a

century, with an interruption by Japanese

occupation, before its official independence in

1946. After independence, the Philippineswas governed by leaders who were stronglyinspired by American thoughts and ferventlypromoted assimilation policies, such as theestablishment of a national language.

In scholarly terms, the modernization the-ory (or political development theory) of theUnited States in the 1950s and 1960s pro-

vided theoretical grounds for the first type ofintegration policy. However, since the 1970s,this theory has lost its appeal, because manyof the newly independent countries were con-fronted with difficulties in assimilative inte-gration. As the defects in the modernizationtheory became obvious, political science grad-ually ceased to deal with this matter, and inter-est in how a single nation is formed in a state

was mainly taken up by sociology and historyin the 1980s.

During this decade, the arguments thattook place in sociology and history consider-ably enhanced the quality of studies on nation-formation in modern states. However, thecorrespondent formal models remain under-developed from the 1950s, the time thatDeutsch (1953/1966: 235-239) put forththe seminal model. Moreover, although theDeutsch model contains the basic elementsof nation-formation and is well formulated,

he did not formulate a state power itself inthe model. As a result, it becomes necessaryto modify his model to incorporate a statepower if the effect of the national integrationpolicy implemented by a state is to be assessed;this policy has firmly been implemented bycountries like the Philippines.

On the other hand, from the second halfof the 1970s, political science turned its atten-tion to new theories that were in support ofthe second type of integration policy (coor-dination policy), for example, consociational

volume 44 / number 2 / march 2007democracy (Lijphart, 1977). New theories

for the second type of integration policy weregreatly elaborated upon since the 1980s(Varshney, 2002), and, in contrast with thetheories for the first type of policy, many for-mal models were also constructed since the1990s, in particular (see also Miguel, 2004:330-331).

In order to investigate the integration pol-icy in the Philippines, therefore, I first developnew formal models that enable us to evaluatethe first type of assimilative policy imple-mented by states. Using these new models, Ithen examine the success or failure of the inte-gration policy in the Philippines in which thefirst type of policy has long been implementedby the government.

The next section reviews the literature onnational integration and highlights that theformal model for analyzing a single nation-formation by a state is insufficient, compared

with those for analyzing the second type ofpolicy. The third section draws attention tothe problem pertaining to the pioneering

Deutsch model as a model for analyzingnational-integration policies implementedby states. In the fourth section, I develop newmodels that are suitable for analyzing the

first type of integration policy by taking intoaccount the discussion of the literature reviewin the second section. Section five describesa short history of national integration in thePhilippines and demonstrates how the mod-els developed in this study are suitable for

analyzing national integration in the Philip-pines. Finally, in the sixth section, I investi-gate the national integration policy of the

Philippines by using the developed models.Theories of National IntegrationAs mentioned above, the modernization the-ory (or political development theory) in theUnited States was the primary proponent ofthe first type of policy in the 1950s and1960s. Nation-building in post-independence


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Kazuya Yamamoto NATION-BUILDING IN THEPHILIPPINES 197Southeast Asian countries was closely linked attempting various methodological approaches.to this theory (Berger, 2003). The core mem- Among other things, it should be emphasizedbers of this school were those who played that he formulated the pioneering mathe-important roles in the Committee on Com- matical model of nation-formation (Deutsch,parative Politics of the Social Science and 1953/1966: 235-239), although, regrettably,Research Council established in 1954, and he did not attempt to improve his crude modelmany studies conducted by this school focused thereafter, partly because he lacked the math-on Southeast Asia in particular (Pye, 1962; ematical knowledge necessary for the revision.Kahin, 1952; Almond & Coleman, 1960). Contrary to the expectations of the politi-

The political development theory was cal development theory, it became obviouspartly developed as a counter theory to Marx- in the second half of the 1960s that, post-ism, and the academic interests of this theory independence, many countries were con-

were diverted toward how the modern demo- fronted with the fact that modern democracycratic political system - which was thought and national integration could not progressto be more attractive than state socialism - smoothly; as a result, a number of criticismscould be established by economic develop- were conducted both inside and outside thisment. Accordingly, the problem of nation- school, such as the argument of political decaybuilding and nationalism itself tended to be by Huntington (1965, 1968) and the depen-regarded not as the primary problem but dency theory by Frank (1967) and Dos Santosrather as a secondary one that would inevi- (1970). Consequently, the political develop-tably accompany modernization. In those ment theory lost its influence and the researchdays, many political development theorists interests of political scientists shifted fromconsidered that the formation of a new sin- personality and society (Pye, 1962; Lerner,gle nation could be evolutionarily and uni- 1958) to state and institution (ODonnell,

versally achieved if political and economic 1973; Tilly, 1975; Linz & Stepan, 1978; see

modernization was pursued appropriately also Hagopian, 2000: 888-895).(Berger, 2003: 432-435). After this shift of the focus to state and

In contrast with these theorists, it was institution had reached its zenith through theDeutsch (1953/1966; 1963; 1969) who work of Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpoladdressed the problem of nation-building (1985), political scientists recovered theirand nationalism more directly. Connor (1972, interest in nation and ethnicity, particularly1994), a leading figure in the studies of ethno- since the second half of the 1980s. However,nationalism, later criticized Deutsch for hav- their interest at this time was different froming significantly influenced the modernization interests such as how a single nation could betheory and having provided the basis for an formed. Instead, the interests of political sci-optimistic argument on nation-building entists focused on the public policies thatby modernization. However, even in his ear- could control and coordinate ethnic relationslier studies, Deutsch was careful to argue in a country (i.e. the second type of integra-for national integration and clearly acknowl- tion policy). There are three types of studiesedged the dangers of modern mobilization - that can be included here: (1) those that it could not only result in integration but also explain ethnic conflict in post-colonial statesresult in differentiation and conflict between in terms of whether the structure of ethnic relationspeople in a state (e.g. Deutsch, 1953/1966: is ranked or unranked (Horowitz, 1985) or129-130). whether there exist political entrepreneurs who

More importantly, Deutsch considerably attempt to manipulate ethnic identitycontributed to the study of the nation by (Laitin, 1986; see Hagopian, 2000: 898); (2)


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those that state that ethnically diversecountries show low economic growth andpoor public policy performance and attemptto elucidate the causes of these low outcomes(Easterly & Levine, 1997; Miguel & Gugerty,

2005); and (3) those that empirically suggestthat the provision of public goods can be

promoted if governments adopt policiesencouraging cooperative relationships betweenethnic groups (Miguel, 2004). In addition,

the 1990s saw the development of corre-spondent formal models. While analysessuch as that by Fearon & Laitin (1996) usethe game theory, there has been advancementin the formal models for analyzing ethnic

relations, particularly in the agent-based mod-eling using simulation (Cederman, 1997: ch.7; Srbljinovic et al., 2003; Lustick, Miodownik& Eidelson, 2004).

On the other hand, while some political sci-entists continued to address the study of theformation of a single nation (e.g. Armstrong,1982; Anderson, 1983/1991), this area of studylargely shifted to sociology (Gellner, 1983;

Smith, 1986, 1991) and history (Hobsbawm& Ranger, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990) fromthe 1980s. However, their argument differedfrom the one that had been discussed by thepolitical development theory: the main debateamong these scholars particularly focused onthe origin of the nation. While modernistssuch as Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawmregarded nations as completely new identitygroups that were peculiar to the modern era

and formed by modern mobilization, histori-cists (or primordialists/essentialists), such asSmith and Armstrong, argued that, while recog-nizing that a nation was a group with modernfeatures, the origin of nations traced back topre-modern identity groups.1 Among other

volume 44 / number 2 / march 2007of numerous historical cases suggesting theperennial nature of nations, played an import-ant role in revitalizing the debate over the

nature of the nation, which, by that time,

was converging on modernism.Despite this theoretical development in

the 1980s, the correspondent formal modelsfor analyzing the formation of a single nationin a state remained underdeveloped after thepioneering Deutsch model. This is in sharpcontrast to the progress that has been madein the formal models of ethnic coordinationmentioned above.2 Therefore, in terms oftheoretical development as well as the casestudy of the Philippines, it is necessary to

develop formal models for the first type ofpolicy in order to bridge the gap that existsbetween the formal analyses of the twoaspects of national integration.Formal Model for Nation-FormationIn order to develop models that are suitable foranalyzing the national integration policy in the

Philippines, this section reviews the Deutschmodel and highlights two of its defects.The Deutsch Model forNation-Formation

The Deutsch model is simple. Deutschbegins by classifying the population into ninegroups (Deutsch, 1953/1966: 128-130). Thefirst group comprises the entire population P.

The entire population Pis classified by criterion(1) (mobilized/underlying) into two groups:mobilized peopleMand underlying people U.

Therefore, P =M +U. Pis again divided into2Alesina & Spolaore (2003) may be referred to as a relatedmodel. In terms of a cost-benefit relation between the het-erogeneity of individual preference and the benefit of the

arguments, Smiths argument, with examples size of a country, they develop a model that investigateshow the optimal size of a nation - which is synonymous

1To the best of my knowledge, Yoshino (1992: ch. 4) first usedhistoricism in this context, besides Smith (1984). Although

Yoshino distinguishes historicism from primordialism (essential-ism) (Shils, 1957; Geertz, 1963), I am using these terms inter-changeably, because it is not necessary to provide differentmeanings for the discussion in this article.

with the size of a state in their model - can be determined.Although their model is interesting and provocative, it canbe distinguished from the nation-formation model consid-ered here in that their model assumes fixed preferences ofindividuals (or fixed diversity of ethnicity) and does notaim to analyze the changes of ethnic identity itself.


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Kazuya Yamamoto NATION-BUILDING IN THEPHILIPPINES 199two groups using criterion (2) (assimilated/differentiated): assimilated people A anddifferentiated people D. Similarly, P=A+Dholds.

If the two axes are combined, Pcan be clas-sified into four groups: mobilized assimilatedpeopleN, mobilized differentiated people H,underlying assimilated peopleQ, and under-lying differentiated people R.Nand Hrepre-

purpose in developing this model was toobserve how the assimilated/differentiatedpopulation (Aand D) and the mobilized/underlying population (Mand U) vary withtime. Deutsch formulated the differential

equation model as follows (Deutsch, 1953/1966: 235-239):

dPsent nations that have awoken to modern

consciousness. Demands for self-determina-tion in the modern sense and the suppressionof those demands appear in the form of con-flict betweenNand H. These nine groups canbe summarized as shown in Table I.

In order to formulate the model, Deutschthen establishes six rates of change, which areas follows: the natural rate of increasepof theentire population P; the natural rate ofincrease bof the mobilized populationM; the

dtdAdt

dMdtdDdt

=pP (1)= (a+c)A (2)

= (b+m)M (3)= d D cA. (4)

mobilization rate mat which the underlyingpopulation Uis mobilized (i.e. UbecomesM);the natural rate of increase aof the assimilatedpopulation A; the assimilation rate cat which

the differentiated population Dis assimilated(i.e. Dbecomes A); and the natural rate ofincrease din the differentiated population D(Deutsch, 1953/1966: 148-152).

Using these groups and rates of change,Deutsch formulates a mathematical model ofnation-formation, which is detailed below.Formulation of the Deutsch Model and ItsDefects

As can be seen from the way the six rates ofchange were set, Deutschs primary analyticalTable I. National Integration and Differentiation

Using the above formulation, Deutsch attemptsto determine, for example, whether there willeventually come a time tkwhen the differen-tiated or underlying population disappears. I

will not go into any further details in describ-

ing Deutschs mathematical analysis itself.

However, for the purposes of this article (i.e.analyzing the effect of the national-integra-tion policy of the Philippines), his model

is inadequate because of the following twoshortcomings.

First, there is no formulation of the rela-tionships between mobilized groups. In termsof the model, Deutsch only goes so far as to

formulate assimilated/differentiated (A-D) andmobilized/underlying (M-U) relationships,

Assimilated/DifferentiatedAssimilated Differentiated Total

Mobilized/Underlying Mobilized N H MUnderlying Q R UTotal A D P

The table is a modification of Table III-2-1 in Yamakage (1994: 260).


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and does not provide any formulation forNand H(andQand R) in Table I (see Table II).However, it can be said that many difficultiesin the integration processes of new countries

were caused by mobilized ethnic groups being

awakened to modern consciousness and self-determination. Therefore, if we are to analyzethe effect of the integration policy imple-mented by a state, the analysis will have tofocus particularly on the relationship betweenmobilized groups; a formulation that allowsus to observe the relationship betweenNandHis essential.

The second shortcoming is that the

Deutsch model does not formalize politicalauthority for promoting national integra-tion. This makes it impossible to analyzethe roles played by and effectiveness oforganizations such as the government innational integration. Rather than analyzingthe national-integration policy itself, thepurpose of the Deutsch model was to delin-eate changes over time in the degree ofnation-formation and group distribution in

a certain state or region; thus, this type ofmodeling was sufficient for this purpose. Inthis sense, the Deutsch model is not an ana-lytic model of national integration (themeaning of which often includes policyintentions) but is an analytical model of themore neutral process of nation-formation.However, this article analyzes the success orfailure of the national-integration policy perse in the Philippines. Thus, it is necessary to

develop models that incorporate the role ofintegration-promoting power.Table II. Model Formulated by Deutsch

volume 44 / number 2 / march 2007In the following section, I develop mod-

els that take into account these two pointsand are suitable for analyzing the national-integration policy in the Philippines. Morespecifically, the developed models incorpo-rate two new components: (1) the Nand Hgroups, and (2) the power of integration.

The ModelIn the second section, I highlighted the lack offormal models corresponding to the theoreti-cal development of nation-formation, which

was advanced in the 1980s. Considering thissituation, I develop two models in this section:the first is called the modernism model andthe second is called the historicism model.The Modernism and Historicism Models

The modernism model formalizes the asser-tion that the underlying people are mobilizedin the process of modernization and become,in that process, members of a modern iden-tity group referred to as a nation. This situ-ation is illustrated in Figure 1. BothNand Hare modern nation groups; the difference isthat N is the ruling nation that promotes

national integration (assimilation), while Hrefers to all the other nations.

Prior to being mobilized (i.e. in the Ustate), it is still undetermined what sort of

modern nation people will be. In the processof mobilization, the people awaken to someparticular national identity, and which nation

that is depends on the circumstances at thetime of mobilization. For example, if the

Assimilated/DifferentiatedAssimilated Differentiated Total

Mobilized/Underlying Mobilized MUnderlying UTotal A D P

The table indicates that in the Deutsch model, only theA, D, M, U, andPrelationships are formulated.


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Kazuya Yamamoto NATION-BUILDING IN THEPHILIPPINES 201Figure 1. Modernism Model the two models. Next, I incorporate the power

of integration (another requirement for theAssimilated Differentiated

models) and mathematically formulate the mod-Mobilized N HUnderlying U

government promotes national integrationby means of education, and mobilizationoccurs while accepting the effects of that pro-

els. I then present the theoretical implications ofthe two models for national integration.The Modernism Model

The equations provided in (5) formulate themodernism model:

dNmotion, then people will be mobilized as anintegrated nationN. Conversely, if mobiliz-ation occurs under the influence of organiz-ations that are opposed to the government,people will be mobilized as H, which indi-cates differentiated nations. In other words,the same person may become eitherNor Hdepending on the situation that person is in.

dtdHdt

dUdt

where

=gN+ m U=gH+ (1 )m U (5)=gUmU

Thus, this modeling assumes the core asser-tion of modernism; that is, national identityis entirely a product of modernity, which isformed as a new phenomenon as a conse-quence of mobilization.

In contrast, formalization in the historicismmodel is shown in Figure 2. In this model,modeling is applied not only to the modernnation but to the so-called pre-modern or

traditional identity groups (i.e. Qand R),such as ethnic groups and tribes. Furthermore,a traditional identity group continues as is

even after mobilization and attains a modernnational identity. Thus, this formalization

models the basic assertion of historicism; that

is, pre-modern identity groups are the originof modern nations.

Thus far, theNand Hgroups, the first

0.0 1.0, 0.0 0.5, alarger number of Uis mobilized toN; if =0.5, Uis mobilized equally toNand H; andif


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condition and (2) an integration condition.The former is a condition to enable rulinggroupNto maintain or achieve a majority ofthe population. Specifically, this conditionenables N to retain or attain greater than

50%, as a proportion of the total mobilizedpopulationM, even after a sufficient passageof time.

On the other hand, by way of a standardindicating the progress of national integra-tion in a post-independence state, we can

consider integration to have progressed if theproportion corresponding to the ruling group,after a fixed period of time has elapsed sinceindependence, is larger than that correspond-ing to the ruling group at the time of inde-pendence. Thus, in this article, if, after asufficient period of time, the proportion of

N inM increases to a value that is greater

than it was at the time of independence, thennational integration is considered to have

progressed, and the condition satisfying thisis taken as the integration condition.

First, the dominance condition is given as

Equation (6) by solving the equations in (5)usingN(t0)=N0,H(t0)=H0, andU(t0)=U0(whereN0,H0, andU0>0) as initial condi-tions (see appendix for derivation):

N0- H0>(1 - 2)U0 (6)IfN0 H0, then, by assumption U0>0; thedominance condition is always satisfied pro-

vided >0.5. In other words, in this case,

the ruling groupNcan maintain its majorityprovided that mobilization to N is evenslightly greater than mobilization to H. Theinteresting thing here is the case whereN0>H0. The right-hand side of Equation (6) cantake on a positive value that exactly corre-sponds to the degree that theN0population

volume 44 / number 2 / march 2007Ucannot be mobilized to Nafter indepen-dence,Ncan continue to be the majority evenfrom the long-term perspective. Intuition

would tend to say that, even if the ruling grouphas a majority at the time of independence,

it will eventually become the minority if itdoes not assimilate a majority of the under-lying population through mobilization afterindependence. However, the result of theabove analysis is in conflict with this intu-ition; it implies that ifNaccounts for morethan half ofMat the time of independence,there will be cases in which the ruling Nwillmaintain its dominance even if it is not ableto integrate a majority.

In contrast, in the case whereN00.5) is, by itself, insufficient forthe group to attain a long-term majority, and,to the degree that theN0population is smallerthan H0, must become greater by that same

degree. Intuition would suggest that if the rul-

ing group assimilates a majority of the under-lying population after independence, a time

will eventually come (even though it may takea while) when the ruling group will have dom-inance over the differentiated groups in termsof population. However, the above analysisshows that if a minorityNattempts to becomea majority after independence through nationalintegration, in many cases,Nmust have a suf-ficiently strong integrative power to assimilatea population that is significantly larger thanthe majority.

On the other hand, the integration con-dition is given as follows (see Appendix forderivation):

is greater than H0; thus, the greater the dif-ference betweenN0andH0, the smaller willbe the values less than 0.5 that can take. In

> N0N0+H0 (7)

other words, in this case, even if we assume This implies that, to the degree that the rulingthat a majority of the underlying population groupNis dominant in terms of population


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Kazuya Yamamoto NATION-BUILDING IN THEPHILIPPINES 203in the initial state, it must have a greaterpower to promote integration. For example,let us assume that a region becomes an inde-pendent state and that, in this new state, theproportion of N in the already mobilized

populationMis 70%. In this case,Nrequires >0.7 to achieve greater national integra-tion and =0.7 to maintain its proportion.In other words, if a region gained indepen-dence in such a situation, ruling group N

would be unable to promote or even main-tain its proportion at the time of indepen-dence if it lacked the power to promote thenational integration of a fairly large portionof the population (i.e. in this case, a popu-lation larger than 70% of the underlyingpopulation U). An intuitive consideration

would suggest that the political, economic,and social influence of the ruling groupincreases with the degree of majority it enjoysin a certain newly independent country, thusfacilitating the integration of the remainingpeople. However, this is not always the case.

The larger ruling group often faces difficul-ties in maintaining its initial dominanceunless it possesses a greater integrative powerthat corresponds to its largeness; if not, itsproportion will decrease.The Historicism Model

The equations provided in (8) formulate thehistoricism model:

dN

In the historicism model, similar to the mod-ernism model, formulation can be doneusing the population group categories (N, H,

Q, andR) andg, m, and ; moreover, thelarger is, the greater is the integrative

power of ruling groupN. However, in con-trast with the modernism model, nations inthe historicism model are assumed to origi-nate from pre-modern identity groups, andthus the only people that the ruling groupNcan mobilize to N are those belonging to

groupQ, which is the origin ofN.Like the modernism model, the domi-

nance condition in the historicism model canbe obtained as follows (see the appendix forderivations of Equations (9) and (10)):

N0+Q0>H0+R0 (9)As can be seen from Equation (9), the dom-inance of the ruling groupNdepends on theinitial conditions, regardless of the integra-tive power . Furthermore, if the total popu-lation of the ruling groupNand its underlyinggroupQis even slightly greater than the total

population of Hand its underlying group Rat the time of independence, the ruling groupcan maintain its majority.

On the other hand, the integration con-dition is given as follows:

N0


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situation in which the ratio of N in themobilized populationM is sufficiently large,then the existence of Qwith a ratio higherthan that in the underlying population

becomes less of a possibility; thus, there is a

greater possibility thatNwill face difficultiesin promoting integration if the above situ-ation exists at the time of independence.Summary of ImplicationsHere, I summarize the implications of the

above for national integration.The Modernism Model (1) If the ruling

group that has seized authority at the time ofindependence is in the majority, there is a

possibility that this group will be able tomaintain its majority even if a majority of theunderlying population cannot be assimilatedinto the ruling group through the subsequentnational-integration policy. (2) If the rulinggroup that has seized authority at the time ofindependence is not in the majority, there isa possibility that this group will not be able

to achieve its majority even if a majority ofthe underlying population can be assimilatedinto the ruling group through the subsequentnational-integration policy. (3) It is not thecase that the greater the majority of the rul-ing group that has seized authority at the

time of independence, the easier it is to pro-mote further national integration.

The Historicism ModelIf we assume pre-modern ethnic groups to be the origin of mod-ern nations, the success or failure of nationalintegration can be determined according to thesize of the underlying ethnic group that is con-sidered to be the origin of the ruling group.

The History of National Integrationin the PhilippinesIn this section, I describe a short history of howpost-independence Philippines was confronted

with the problem of national integration and

volume 44 / number 2 / march 2007addressed it by attempting the first type ofintegration policy. In doing so, I show howthe models that were developed in the previoussection are useful for analyzing the success orfailure of the integration policy implemented

by the Philippine governments.The Philippines achieved official indepen-dence in 1946. It comprises 7,100 islands, andthe major indices for distinguishing betweenethnic groups are language and religion. Interms of religion, strong resistance by the

Muslims dates back to the era of Spanish rule.Since the 1970s, the radical activities of theMoro National Liberation Front (MNLF) andthe Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

were particularly conspicuous (George, 1980;Wurfel, 1988). More recent times have wit-nessed the extremist actions of the Islamic fun-damentalist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Onone hand, the post-independence govern-ments have often attempted to repress by forceboth non-violent and armed protests; how-ever, on the other hand, governments havealso adopted measures for reconciliation with

the Muslims, such as the establishment of theCommission on National Integration in 1957(Kawashima, 1989).

Although religious cleavage is prominentin the Philippines, over 90% of the totalpopulation is in fact Christian (84% of thetotal population is Catholic), and Muslimscomprise only 4% of the population (manyof them live on islands in the south, such asthe Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao). Con-trary to popular belief, therefore, the Philip-pines can be regarded as a rather homogeneouscountry with respect to religion.

On the other hand, there is no large lin-guistic group that is equivalent to the Christianor Catholic group in the country (see Table III).More than 100 language groups exist in thePhilippines, making communication betweenthese groups difficult. This division intosmall groups has long made it difficult for thePhilippine governments to integrate languagegroups. In the Philippines, therefore, linguistic


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Kazuya Yamamoto NATION-BUILDING IN THEPHILIPPINES 205Table III. Language Groups in the Philippines 1987 - under the Aquino administration -(1990) that Filipino began to become more consol-

idated as the national language.Number %

Tagalog 16,910,595 27.9Cebuano 14,710,199 24.3

Ilocano 5,923,842 9.8Hiligaynon 5,647,928 9.3Bikol 3,519,165 5.8Waray 2,433,300 4.0Pampango 1,897,319 3.1Pangasinan 1,164,267 1.9Other 8,339,705 13.8

Source: Data from United Nations (1995).cleavage can be considered to be a moresignificant obstacle to the creation of a largeunified nationhood.

Manila, located in Luzon, is the political andeconomic center of the Philippines, and thelanguage spoken in this area is Tagalog. Againstthis background, as will be detailed below,the Philippine governments have attemptedto implement national language policies that

pursue the creation of a common languagethat is based on Tagalog and education poli-cies associated with this language.

The first policy implemented by thePhilippines for the purpose of integration

was the establishment of a common nationallanguage. Successive Philippine governmentshave addressed this task repeatedly. The firstenactment of the national language that influ-enced the contemporary Philippines dates back

to the era of the commonwealth, the periodthat was regarded as a preparation period forindependence. In 1937, Quezon, the first

president of the Philippine Commonwealth,declared Tagalog as the basis of the nationallanguage. After independence, Education

Department Order No. 7 in 1959 mandatedthat the national language would be referredto as Pilipino. Although the 1973 constitu-tion by Marcos adopted Filipino as the com-mon national language, it was only by the

promulgation of the new constitution in

Although the governments of the pre-independence era tended to force non-Tagalog

groups to accept Tagalog as the commonlanguage and the post-independence govern-ments gradually attempted to construct a moreneutral language, the successive national lan-guages were in fact not very different fromeach other in content. Tagalog and Pilipinoare essentially the same language. In fact, the1959 mandate stating that the national lan-guage would thenceforth be referred to asPilipino was issued with the aim of strength-ening the impression of the national language(Pilipino) as the language of nationhood(Gonzalez, 1980: 102). Although Filipino wasre-established in the 1987 constitution withmore emphasis on the ideal that the nationallanguage should be based not only on Tagalogbut also on other languages, there was noessential difference between Tagalog and

Filipino.At the same time, in order to promotenational integration, the Philippine govern-

ments implemented the education policy byusing the national language. There are twotypes of education policies in which languageis utilized for national integration. The firsttype of policy is that the national languageitself is taught as a subject of study and thesecond is that the national language is usedas a medium of instruction for other subjects.

The education of Tagalog (Pilipino/Filipino)as a subject was consistently implementedsince independence. On the other hand,

Tagalog (Pilipino/Filipino) as a medium ofinstruction was incorporated into the edu-cation system by the promulgation of the

Bilingual Education Policy, under the MarcosAdministration in 1973.3While the education3Strictly speaking, the Board of National Education passeda resolution in 1969 that prescribed Pilipino as a medium

of instruction. However, this was never fully implementedbecause of lack of teachers and materials (Gonzalez, 1980:102).


13/20


of students in grades one and two before 1973was taught by using their indigenous languagesand English was used for upper grades, Pilipino(Filipino) was used thereafter as a medium ofinstruction for all subjects except those

related to the natural sciences and Englishthroughout primary and secondary school.

Although the policy that prohibited the useof indigenous languages as mediums of instruc-tion was relaxed by the new policy under the

Aquino administration, which again permit-ted the use of indigenous languages duringthe first two grades, the basic policy wasmaintained (Fujita, 1993: 185-198; Ohue,

1997: 53-54).In addition to these policies, the migration

policy also played an important role in inte-gration. For example, as part of the develop-ment policy, Marcos made compulsory themassive migration of people from the northernarea, where Tagalog was spoken, to the south.The migration of Bisayans and Mountain

Province groups to urban areas also promotedthe dissemination of the national language to

volume 44 / number 2 / march 2007and quantitatively elucidate the success or

failure of national integration in the Philip-pines. Second, I depict the future trajectoryof national integration in the Philippines byusing the model that best fits in the analysis

of the first point. Third, by using the modelthat best fits and the Philippine experience, Iaddress the controversial hypothesis that rapidmobilization does not bring about integra-tion but results in division.Application of the Models to the Data

Table IV shows the population compositionof the Philippines in 1948 and 1990.

Of the two candidates for explaining themechanism of nation-formation, I begin withthe modernism model. I regard 1948 as thetime of independence, and let 1948 be t0and1990 be t42.4Substituting the data from TableIV into the model, the rate of increase of thepopulationg, the mobilization rate m, and thenational integration rate are obtained:

log(N42+H42+U42) log(N0+H0+U0)g=

non-Tagalogs (Gonzalez, 1980: 103).Thus, the Philippines can be seen as a 0.0273.country that has repeatedly implemented the

42 (11)

first type of integration policy. Taking into m=account these integration policies, the mod-els that were developed in the previous sec-tion would be very useful in evaluating the =

log(U0) log(U42)42

N42N0 e42g+g 0.0436. (12)

0.4318. (13)U0 e42gU0 e42

(gm)policy implemented in the Philippines. Next,I use these models and investigate quantita-tively how the policies in the Philippines

were successful.Evaluation of the National-Integration Policy in the PhilippinesIn this section, I evaluate the national-inte-gration policy of the Philippines after inde-pendence using the models developed in thefourth section. First, I apply both the mod-ernism and historicism models to data per-

taining to the Philippines. In doing so, I

As pointed out in the fourth section, when >

0.5 in the models, it implies that the rul-

ing groupNis able to promote (is promot-ing) national integration into its own group.In the application of the modernism modelto the Philippines,


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Kazuya Yamamoto NATION-BUILDING IN THEPHILIPPINES 207Table IV. Changes in Composition of the Philippine Population

1948 1990Illiteracy rate (%): 40.0* 6.4*

N H M N H M2,238,017 9,302,492 11,540,509 15,828,317 40,843,039 56,671,356

Q R U Q R U1,492,011 6,201,662 7,693,673 1,082,278 2,792,686 3,874,964

A D P A D P3,730,028* 15,504,154* 19,234,182* 16,910,595* 43,635,725* 60,546,320** Data indicated with asterisks represents actual statistical data (obtained from United Nations, 1956; United Nations,1995; UNESCO, 1966; UNESCO, 1993). The distinction between assimilated (A) and differentiated (D) is establishedby lettingAbe the Tagalog-speaking population, and Dthe population speaking other languages. The composition ofthe mobilized/underlying population is calculated from the illiteracy rate in the table. The literate population is taken tobe the mobilized population (M) and the illiterate population is taken to be the underlying population (U). Althoughthere may be other indices that can be used for distinguishing betweenMand U, it would be most plausible to adopt

the illiteracy rate as the index for this study, because the Philippine governments have eagerly implemented languagepolicy and education associated with it. The illiteracy rate in the table is data for the population overall and is notilliteracy data obtained by surveying each group (Groups Aand D). Therefore, the mobilized/underlying populations inboth GroupsAand Dare calculated from the same overall illiteracy rate for the Philippines as a whole. governments of the Philippines eagerly pur-sued integration policies such as language,education, and migration, as described in theprevious section, we can dismiss the secondinterpretation. Furthermore, apart from state

policy, many studies have pointed out thatthe most influential factor in national inte-gration/differentiation of the Philippines isthe role of the mass media, which haveencouraged the dissemination of Tagalog: themedia, such as the press, radio, television,cinema, and, particularly since the 1980s,

comic strips that are written or spoken in

Tagalog (or Tagalog-based national language),have played an influential role in disseminat-ing the language to people nationwide (delMundo, 1986; Suzuki, 1989). Taking into

account these factors, the analysis implies thatthe integration policies of the successivegovernments were not effective even undercircumstances favorable for the dissemination

Dominance condition (DP): > DP 0.9591.

(14)Integration condition (IP):

> IP 0.1939.From Equation (13) and the inequalities in(14), we find that national integration in thePhilippines satisfies only the integration con-dition (i.e. IP <


15/20

Population

ofNa

nd

H

208 journal ofPEACERESEARCHwill increase from 19.4% at the time of inde-pendence (1948 in this study) to approxi-mately 28.9% in the long term. Figure 3shows the changes in the population distri-bution when the data in Table IV are applied

to the modernism model.Next, let us examine the historicism model.In this model, too, we need to find g, m, andthat match the data, as was the case with themodernism model. However, in contrast to themodernism model, there does not exist a realsolution forg, m, and that simultaneouslysatisfies the data. In other words, the histori-cism model does not fit the data. Although amore comprehensive comparison of manycountries might be necessary to support theseresults with more conviction (and this may notbe an easy task because of the limitations ondata), the findings in this study suggest that thegroups referred to as modern nations should beunderstood not so much as the continuationof pre-modern identity groups but rather asgroups that are newly formed in the process ofmodernization. The results can also be inter-preted as supporting the modernists in theirdebate with the historicists, from the perspec-tive of the formal method.

volume 44 / number 2 / march 2007The Future of Philippine Integration

Thus far, only the modernism model has beenshown to fit the actual data for the Philippines.Next, I investigate the changes in the configu-ration of the Philippine nationhood in the

future by using the modernism model andforecast data for the Philippine population upto 2050. Figure 4 displays the results.

As can be seen from Figure 4, the pro-portion of the ruling groupNin the mobil-ized population M for the year 2050 isapproximately 28.8%, and the nation distri-bution of the Philippines remains stable at this

value. In other words, even in the analysisusing population forecast data, the proportioncorresponding to the mobilized Tagalog-speaking population continues to remain at alevel below 30%. From the perspective ofnational integration, therefore, the analysispredicts that in the Philippines, national inte-gration based on language will be no easier inthe future than it has been in the past.Does Mobilization Bring AboutIntegration or Cleavage?Regarding the national-integration policy,

the most debatable and unsettled issue sinceFigure 3. Changes in Nations in the Philippines According to the Modernism Model

4.50E+07 0.34.00E+07

0.253.50E+073.00E+07 0.22.50E+07

0.152.00E+071.50E+07 0.11.00E+07

0.055.00E+060.00E+00 0

1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988N H N/M


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Population

ofNa

ndH

Kazuya Yamamoto NATION-BUILDING IN THEPHILIPPINES 209Figure 4. Changes in Nations in the Philippines up to 2050

1.00E+08 0.359.00E+07

0.38.00E+077.00E+07 0.256.00E+07

0.25.00E+074.00E+073.00E+072.00E+071.00E+070.00E+00

1948 1968 1988N

0.150.10.050

2008 2028 2048H N/M

United Nations population forecast data for the Philippines were used (United Nations, 2003: 372). These data forecastpopulation at five-year intervals starting from the year 2005. (Values up to the year 2000 are actual statistics.) In theanalysis, I kept the rates of increase of population fixed over a five-year period and calculated the rates of increase ofpopulation for that period from the population forecast values (medium forecast values). The calculated rates of increaseof population were applied to the equations in (5), and these equations were repeatedly solved (numerically solved bythe Runge-Kutta-Gill method). To calculate the change in population, it is assumed that and mdo not change fromthe values calculated from Table IV.the heyday of the political development the-ory may be the argument over whether rapidmobilization leads to national integration orcauses cleavage between ethnic groups. Asmentioned in the second section, Deutschnoted that rapid mobilization might bring

about division between groups in a state. Mymodel and the Philippine experience also

illuminate this issue.In the modernism model, the condition

that at a certain time tk, higher mobilization(m + m) brings about more divisions amongnations (i.e. lower value ofN/M) than doeslower mobilization (m) is given as follows

(see Appendix for derivation):N0 (16)

Therefore, the analysis implies that whetherrapid mobilization leads to integration or cleav-age depends on the specific situation of the indi-

vidual country at the time of independence.Thus, we cannot arrive at any deterministicassertion about the relationship betweenmobilization and integration/ cleavage.

With regard to the case of the Philippines,since Equation (16) is not satisfied, owing toEquation (13) and the data from Table IV, theanalysis here implies that, notwithstandingDeutschs concern for cleavage, a more integrated

Tagalog-speaking nation might have been builtif the successive governments of the Philippineshad been able to promote more rapid mobiliz-ation through some effective means.


17/20


investigates the effectiveness of the policiesimplemented by the Philippine government.

First, the analysis suggests that national-integration in the Philippines after indepen-dence was not successful. The Philippine

governments have long implemented thefirst type of integration policy, and the massmedia have also promoted an environmentfavoring Tagalog (Pilipino/Filipino). Takingthese facts into account, the result that thenational-integration rate in the model was


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Kazuya Yamamoto NATION-BUILDING IN THEPHILIPPINES 211N(t) =-U0*e(g-m)(t-t0)

+(N0+ U0)eg(t-t0)H(t) = -(1 - )U0 * e(g-m)(t-t0)

+(H0 +(1 - )U0)eg(t-t0)U(t) =U0*e(g-m)(t-t0)

where

H(t) = -R0 *e(g-(1-)m)(t-t0)+(H0+R0)eg(t-t0)

(A1) R(t) =R0*e(g-(1-)m)(t-t0).Take the limit ofN/M:

( )lim N(t) 0

= N0+Q

0.To investigate the dominance condition

(and the integration condition), it is necess-ary to examine the proportion of N in Mafter a sufficient period of time has elapsed.

Thus, set t0=0 and let t + and letN/Mapproach a limit:

( )

t+ N(t) +H(t) N0+H0+Q0+R0Then, Equations (9) and (10) can be obtainedin a manner similar to the modernism modeldescribed above.A.4 Derivation of Equation 16)

lim (N(t)) =lim N(t) According to Equations (A1),N/Mat mandtk ist+ M(t)

=t+ N(t) +H(t)

N0+U0N0+H0+U0

(A2)f(m,tk) = N0 + U0 U0 emtk

N0+H0+U0U0 emtk (A3)

Since the dominance condition is the con-dition of maintaining or achieving a major-ity when a sufficient period of time haselapsed, this condition is given as follows:

N0+U0

Since the condition that rapid mobilizationbrings about cleavage isf (m, tk) >f (m + m,tk), this condition can be given as

N0+H0+U0 >0.5. f(m,tk) f(m+ m,tk)(N0 N0 H0) (e

mtke(m+m)tk)U0

=By rewriting, Equation (6) is obtained.A.2 Derivation of Equation 7)

(N0+H0+U0U0 emtk) (N0+H0

+U0U0 e(m+m)tk) >0.

The integration condition is satisfied if thelimit of Equation (A2) becomes larger thanthe initial value ofN/M:

The above inequality is satisfied if N0 -N0- H0 >0, owing to the condition onconstants and variables; by rewriting,Equation (16) is obtained.

N0+U0

N0+H0+U0 > N0N0+H0 ReferencesBy rewriting, Equation (7) is obtained.A.3 Derivation of Equations 9) and10)

First, find a particular solution for the equa-tions in (8):

N(t) =-Q 0* e(g-m)(t-t0)

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