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DOI: 10.1177/1052562908319994

June 20082008 32: 792 originally published online 5Journal of Management Education

N.K. Napier, Michael Harvey and Kengo UsuiDream?

Management Education in Emerging Economies: The Impossible

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Journal of

Management Education

Volume 32 Number 6

December 2008 792-819

2008 Organizational

Behavior Teaching Society10.1177/1052562908319994

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792

Management Educationin Emerging Economies

The Impossible Dream?

N. K. NapierBoise State University

Michael HarveyUniversity of Mississippi

Kengo UsuiDIC Imaging Products USA, LLC

Providing management education in countries where poverty is rampant

seems a contradiction in terms. Yet it may help the country to develop stronger

competitiveness and economic development. The article proposes a tentative

framework to show how management education might be implemented in the

worlds poorest countries. The proposed framework integrates conditions andinfluences relating to management education, including country environ-

ment, with particular emphasis on stage and nature of poverty and openness

of educational practices to ideas from outside the country. Finally, the model

suggests that outcomes are hard to assess and face many obstacles. The arti-

cle primarily draws on a decade-long case study within one country in

Southeast Asia but also provides observations from other emerging countries

in Asia and Africa. The article discusses the challenges of the dream of pro-

viding management educationincluding the length of time and difficulties

of infusing concepts and behaviors into developing countries managementeducation institutions.

Keywords: management education; emerging economy; poverty

Catch a man a fish, and you can sell it to him. Teach a man to fish, and you

ruin a wonderful business opportunity.

Karl Marx

Marxs prophetic statement points to the growing conflict between devel-

oped and developing nations: What role should developed economies play

relative to economic development of emerging economies? Many journalists,

scholars, and educators recognize the unprecedented changes since the

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Napier et al. / Management Education in Emerging Economies 793

Berlin Walls fall in 1989 (e.g., Friedman, 2005; Kornai, 1992; Peng, 2000),

which symbolizes the unique opportunity for change in the global economy,

especially within emerging economies.Since 2000, such interest has only grown, most recently with a focus on

the worlds poorest countries. Economic development is increasingly viewed

as a way to eliminate (or decrease) poverty in developing and emerging

economy countries, where seven eighths of the worlds population lives and the

average daily income is $2 or less (Hart, 2005; Prahalad, 2005). Although

the average may be less than $2 per day, wide income disparities exist

even within countriesfrom rural to urban and within urban settings.

Nevertheless, even within the poorer sections of such countries, multina-tional and local firms are tapping those markets (Prahalad, 2005).

Developing economies have several characteristics differentiating them

from developed economies: (a) nearly twice the economic growth or devel-

opment rates, (b) higher rates of foreign direct investment, (c) rapid shifts

from agrarian to industrial segments, (d) higher proportions (30% to 40%)

of people younger than 20, (e) increased rates of urbanization, and (f) sig-

nificant increases in total global demand.

As emerging economies gravitate to market-based economies, theirgovernments and Western experts have recognized a needand opportunity

for management training (Clark, Lang, & Balaton, 2001; Pearce & Branyiczki,

1993; Puffer, 1996). Many Western professors and experts have been drafted

to train professors within those countries as well as managers. The motiva-

tion for Western governments and universities to provide such training

varies but typically includes anticipation of economic gains (e.g., building

a future trading partner, access to markets in the region, source for

resources), political benefits (e.g., access to military bases, building part-

nerships in a volatile region, helping to stabilize a country), or humanitarian

advances (e.g., seeking to improve health).

Finally, some external partners support development without major quid

pro quo economic, political, or strategic expectations. The Nordic countries

(Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland), for instance, are among the

highest per capita donors of aid money in the world, supporting recipient

countries where they can make a differencesuch as in Southeast Asia or

East Africarather than going to countries where their aid money would

be insignificant, such as China.Despite widespread activity in management education in many emerg-

ing economies, little documentation exists about those efforts, how they

were conducted, or the impact of such knowledge transfer in these coun-

tries. What little that does exist is primarily based on short-term visits by



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Western professors, not on long-term observation or on work by indigenous

researchers (Tsui, 2004). This lack of documentation is regrettable because

foreigners from industrialized countries could use lessons from them toinform future experiencesboth within emerging countries and in their

home settings.

To address that gap in documentation and knowledge, we draw on experi-

ence from a decade-long management education capacity-building project to

propose a tentative framework to understand how management education and

support might be implemented in poor countries. The context of emerging

economies makes the challenges of implementation of programs much differ-

ent than in the developed world; the framework seeks to take that into account.The article has three parts. First, we briefly review literature on emerg-

ing economies generally and on management education in particular. Then,

we suggest a tentative framework for management education capacity

building in emerging economies. We close the article with conclusions

about the challenges for such ventures.

Review of Literature on Emerging Economiesand Management Education

This section briefly reviews the literature on emerging economies and

management education.

Emerging Economies

The emerging economy literature offers several consistent findings. First,

countries that change political and economic systems simultaneously face

greater challenges than those, such as Vietnam and China, that change only

economic approaches (Boisot & Child, 1996; Han & Baumgarte, 2000;

Newman, 2000). Also, visible prosperity (e.g., cell phones, motorbikes) has

been relatively fast in many urban areas (Napier & Thomas, 2004). This eco-

nomic improvement accentuates the differences between urban or educated

and rural or uneducated portions of the populations. Therefore, progress

comes at a cost in the unevenness of growth and prosperity to its total popu-

lation that, if not addressed by the government, could create more problems.One finding should have surprised few but shocked many: Economic

changes take longer than expected. In discussing collective culture shock,

Fink and Feichtinger (1998) argued that, just as individuals experience cul-

ture shock, so does a society when shifting from a mind-set and behavior of

794 Journal of Management Education



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planned economics to market economics. Rather than months, collective

cultural shock could take a generation or longer (20 to 30 or more years).

Although little research exists on long-term impacts of transitions to con-firm the idea of collective cultural shock, general observations support it. In

Vietnam, for instance, official economic renovation began in 1986, but con-

sistent economic progress has emerged only in the past 4 years (almost 20

years later).

Management Education

During the 1990s, rapid economic development and business opportuni-ties in emerging economies revealed the dearth of management education

materials and knowledge for managers and employees to take advantage of

the shifts toward market economies, increasing prosperity and economic

development. Many Western universities offered educational products and

services to hungry emerging economies undergoing rapid change (Gobeli,

Przybylowski, & Rudelius, 1998). Chinese and Vietnamese universities, for

instance, took advantage of opportunities offered by generous donors, such as

the European Community and the Scandinavian countries. Many Westernscholars trained both local professors and managers in the intricacies of

market economics; they usually taught over short periods (weeks or months)

and only in their expertise areas (vs. building capacity within the institutions).

Several findings have emerged on challenges when Western-style man-

agement education enters in developing countries: (a) the difficulty for local

managers to change mind-sets as the economy shifts (Soulsby, 2001); (b) how

infrastructure challenges, such as lack of power, water, or classroom equipment,

can affect education (Napier, Vu, Ngo, Nguyen, & Vu, 1997); (c) how hard it

is for foreigners and locals to connect when they lack shared language or

conceptual models (Michailova & Husted, 2003; Napier, 2006; Puffer, 1996;

Von Kopp, 1992; Vu & Napier, 2000); (d) difficulty in building equal rela-

tionships between local and foreign partners (Napier, Ngo, Nguyen, Nguyen,

& Vu, 2002); and (e) the impact of culture and technology on communication

and the communication infrastructure (Barrett, 2002).

The capacity to diffuse knowledge to emerging economies also depends

on differing cultures and political risk (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Effective

knowledge diffusion is bidirectional (Buckley & Carter, 2002), not just aone-way transfer. Instead, foreigners need to absorb local knowledge

formal and informal business practices, market and competitive conditions,

and relations with government, suppliers, customers, local universities, and

other stakeholders (Buckley & Carter, 2002).




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Significant knowledge transfer also needs to occur as emerging economy

business organizations learn to deal with regional and global business envi-

ronments and trade. African businesss heterogeneous environments, forexample, impose time pressure on the process of developing appropriately

adapted competitive strategies for African countries (Zaheer, Albert, &

Zaheer, 1999). African organizations focus heavily on the external competi-

tive environment in strategy formulation at the expense of heterogeneous

internal contexts (Kamoche, 1993) because of a lack of codification of local

knowledge about the volatile and inherently hostile external environment

(Kamoche, 1993; Munene, 1991). This confuses both Western and African

players because a firms specific strategic choices require unique, rare, andinimitable bundles of knowledge assets, significantly different from those in

the West, to effectively compete in African countries (Barney, 1991).

Foss and Pedersen (2002) found that such cluster-based knowledge is

more difficult to transfer than network and internally-generated knowledge.

But to help developing countries, knowledge must be transferred. So how is

it done? As suggested, little research exists about long-term projects; most

observations of cases are 1 to 3 years. Yet a short time horizon may limit

understanding stages of change (Fink & Feichtinger, 1998).

Tentative Framework for EncouragingManagement Education

This section offers a tentative framework of management education in

emerging economies. It is shaped by existing literature and our experiences,

ranging from Africa to Asia, largely drawing from a near decade-long capacity-

building project for management education in Vietnam. The longitudinal

ethnographic case examines the development of Vietnams first international

standard business school, housed within one of the countrys preeminent uni-

versities, the National Economics University (NEU) in Hanoi.

In the early 1990s, both the Vietnamese Ministry of Education and the

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) recognized

Vietnams need for trained managers to operate in a global economy.

Ultimately, a decade-long project, supported by Sweden, the United States,

and Vietnam, allowed NEU to develop more than 80 managers and facultymembers, curriculum, facilities, and processes for academic and research

programs that would provide Vietnamese managers with the knowledge and

skills they needed to conduct business in and beyond Vietnam. The train-the-

trainer program to develop faculty members assumed that they would (and




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they did) develop MBA programs for Vietnamese managers who worked in

domestic firms, worked in state-owned enterprises, or started their own

companies. MBA programs now exist in both Vietnamese and in English,with both now running several cohorts per year.

Participants in the train-the-trainer program were highly educated in that

they all had bachelor degrees but were not among the elite of the country;

they were mostly faculty members at the university who made about $30 to

$40 per month at the time, and thus their tuition and fees for the MBA

program were fully funded by the project. A few managers were supported

by their companies (e.g., Vietnam Airlines, the government news agency).

The case study involved participant observation by the foreign managersrunning the project, semistructured and informal interviews with more than

60 Vietnamese faculty members, managers, university administrators, and

more than 30 foreign visiting professors and administrators, and field notes,

documentation, and archival records.

The frameworks components comprise, first, the environmental context,

which may in turn affect educational practices, such as openness to ideas

from outside the country. These factors influence decisions of whether to

go it alone or join with external partners to develop and deliver managementeducation and training. If country can secure external supporters, two other

issues come into playthe nature of the partnerships and the type of

knowledge flow within the partnership. These factors may or may not all

work together to lead to successful outcomes. (see Figure 1).

Environmental Context

Emerging economies have environmental contexts that influence

poverty and practices of management education. Context includes factors,

such as politics, geography, and infrastructure, that may affect technology

development and, significantly, the stage and nature of poverty.

Politics

A governments politics may support economic development, external

involvement, and long-term growth, even when the politics are quite differentfrom those of the potential partners. For example, China and Vietnam have

strong communist political contexts, with a single-party system and controlled

media, yet the governments do allow changes in nonpolitical realmsfrom

education to economics. Other countries with similar restrictions, however,




9/30


such as Myanmar (Burma), may be less open to educational change (or less

attractive to donors). Although Myanmar has opened more schools and uni-

versities since the late 1980s, quality and consistency have been unstable

(Thien & Nyo, 1999), and the government has repeatedly closed and opened

universities during that time. Recently, it built new facilitiesdorms, class-

rooms, officesfar from urban areas, which some speculate was to reducepossible protests by dispersing faculty members and students. Perhaps also

for political expediency, the University of Distance Education is a major

delivery mechanism, serving nearly 200,000 students, compared to the tradi-

tional institutes, which may each have only 5,000 to 10,000 students (Thien

& Nyo, 1999).

Geography and InfrastructureGeographical size, lack of infrastructure, and population may influence

policies relating to rural education. Some Southeast Asian and African coun-

tries have developed distance education or clustered centers in rural areas.

Cambodia and Myanmar, for instance, have learning centers and e-learning

institutions reaching more rural areas (Middleborg & Duvieusart, 2002).

Figure 1

Tentative Framework: Management Education

in Emerging Economies

Environment

PoliticsGeog/infrastructure

TechnologyStage

and natureof Poverty

Openness ofEducational

Institutions

Partnerships-Relationship stage

-Receptiveness-Competence

Partnerships-Relationship stage

-Receptiveness

-Competence

Knowledge flow-Passive/active

-Infusion of concepts

Knowledge flow-Passive/active

-Infusion of concepts

Outcomes

Outcomes

Developing

Mgt Education-Desire

-Funding-Partners

DevelopingMgt Education

-Desire-Funding

-Partners

Openness ofEducational

Institutions

Go it alone

Go it alone



10/30


Some countries use a staged or phased approach to regional education

focus. Vietnam, for instance, spent 20 years building the quality of its urban

university education, particularly at the nations top universities. In the past5 years, emphasis, in funding and supporting external visitors (e.g., Fulbright

scholars), has shifted to regions outside the major cities of Ho Chi Minh

City and Hanoi.

Stage and Nature of Poverty

For many emerging economies, poverty remains an overwhelming char-

acteristic. Elimination will come partly from economic development byindigenous firms and external support, which will help create jobs. But to

qualify for new job opportunities, inhabitants need skills and knowledge to

gain meaningful employment. Therefore, education plus jobs should help

reduce poverty levels in emerging economies.

The concept of poverty is not confined to emerging economies but is ubiq-

uitous and also relative. Those living in Beverly Hills feel that South-Central

Los Angles represents high-level poverty, whereas the poor of Bangladesh or

Somalia represent a standard of deprivation that makes South-Central LosAngeles mimic Beverly Hillswith electricity, running water, and educational

institutions. Although scholars have debated how to measure poverty (e.g.,

Bourguignon & Chakravarty, 2003; Chakravarty, 2001; Chakravarty &

Mukherjee, 1999; Shaohua, Gaurav, & Ravallion, 1994; Thon, 1979), few

disagree that it exists in all societies. The type and level of poverty need to be

explored to forecast how to appropriately address environmental context of

countries providing management education.

The nature of poverty in emerging economies comprises at least 10

indicators, used by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the International

Monetary Fund: (a) per capita income, (b) inhabitants per household,

(c) work-related expenses (i.e., house expenditures or costs related to

allowing individuals to work, such as child care), (d) level of compulsory

education, (e) average level of education (i.e., the percentage of the popula-

tion with education beyond government-mandated compulsory levels, (f) life

expectancy, (g) medical infrastructure (i.e., the number of hospital beds per

100,000 inhabitants, as a quasi indicator of societys supporting medical

infrastructure, (h) social or cultural institutions as constraints (i.e., the levelof influence of religious and educational institutions), (i) government poli-

cies and/or programs that address poverty, and (j) NGOs and their impact

on poverty in the country (see Figure 2).



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An understanding of relative poverty indicators (Figure 2) helps policy

makers, educators, and partners frame the type or nature of poverty in a

country to devise strategies for management education and needed organi-

zational changes. Second, poverty indicators, when ranked, show the likely

importance or impact on organizations and managers and on strategies they

use. Third, countries and organizations need a plan with timelines to deter-

mine if poverty is decreasing and at what rate. Fourth, review and modifi-

cation of the importance of poverty indicators need to be undertaken, given

changes in other environmental conditions. Such concerns may also con-

tribute to a countrys willingness and ability to be open to new ideas about

education.

Figure 2

Classification of the Level or Degree of Poverty

Per Capita Income

Poverty Indicatiors

Inhabitants perHousehold

Work RelatedExpenses

CompulsoryEducation

Average Level ofEducation

Life Expectancy

MedicalInfrastructure

Social/CulturalInstitutions asConstraints

Govt PoliciesPrograms Relative

to AddressingPoverty

NGOs & TheirImpact on Poverty

in the Country

7-8 Years

Less Than $600 perAnnum

Greater than 12Inhabitants

Less than 5% ofAnnual Household

Income

None

Less than 3 years

Less than 45 Years

Less than 100 Bedsper 100,000

Extremely High Levelof Interference

Limited Govt PoliciesDirected at Poverty

No NGO Impact

$600-1000 perAnnum

12-9Inhabitants

5-10% of AnnualHousehold Income

3-5 Years

4-5 Years

45-50 Years

100-250 Beds per100,000

High Level ofInterference

Low Level of GovtPolicies Directed at

Poverty

Limited Level of NGOImpact

$1,000-2000 perAnnum

8-6Inhabitants


5-7 Years

5-6 Years

51-55 Years

250-500 Beds per100,000

Medium Level ofInterference

Medium Level ofGovt Policies

Directed at Poverty

Moderate Level ofNGO Impact

$2,000-6,000 perAnnum

5-4Inhabitants


8-9 Years

7-8 Years

56-60 Years

500-1,000 Beds per100,000

Low Level ofInterference

High Level of GovtPolicies Directed at

Poverty

High Level of NGOImpact

Greater than $6,000per Annum

Less than 4Inhabitants

Greater than 20% ofHousehold Income

Greater than 9 Years

Greater than 8 Years

Grater than 60 Years

Greater than 1000Beds per 100,000

Extremely Low Levelof Interference

Extremely High Levelof Govt Policies

Directed TowardsPoverty

Extremely High Levelof NGO Impact

Stage 1 Levelof Poverty







12/30

Openness of Educational Practices

A critical decision is the extent to which a country seeks external supportand partnerships in developing management educational institutions, practices,

and content. Because some Western ideas may clash with internal policies

and philosophies, this decision is major. For instance, given Karl Marxs

description of Kapitalismus as a (quite evil) political system, not just an

economic system, the Vietnamese opposed accepting more than just the

economic aspects. Thus, doi moi, or economic renovation, was officially

called moving toward a market-oriented economy under socialist guid-

ance, allowing Vietnam to allow market economics concepts to be taughtwhile adjusting them to fit local conditions.

Conversely, some countries may seek to become part of the regional and

global marketplace, but they may not be welcomed into the international

business community, sometimes for reasons they may not be able to control.

Ghana, for example, a relatively stable West African country in political and

economic terms, has sought foreign investment and support for years

(Brown & Masten, 1998). But Africa has an image problem. In the past,

many investors and donors painted much of Africa, including Ghana, witha similar brush, assuming it to be too risky for various business ventures.

But recently, with UN and World Bank support and more insight into dif-

ferences across the continent, countries such as Ghana are receiving more

positive attention and educational support. In contrast, however, Myanmar

continues to face isolation. The government seeks investment and business

from outside the country, but its negative image has led to sanctions and

anti-investment feelings, which eliminate it from most investor and donor

consideration. Both countries desperately need management education, but

their chances of receiving it vary dramatically.

Developing Management Education

Three factors affect an emerging economys decision to seek external

support in developing management education: (a) country desire and ability

to seek help, (b) availability of sufficient funding from private or public or

governmental sources, and (c) availability of appropriate partners.As suggested, even if a country wishes to work with outside partners,

funding and partnerships may be limited. Myanmar, facing sanctions from

much of the developed world, receives limited support from a few countries,

including Japan and the United Kingdom. Its political isolation makes the




13/30

educational process more tenuous. Elsewhere (e.g., North Korea), the lead-

erships willingness to allow outsiders in to assist is limited, precluding

efforts to educate future managers.For countries considered strategically, politically, or commercially impor-

tant, funding is frequently available. Sometimes funding may exist, but the

recipient country may resist taking it, which happened in Vietnam. The

NEU projects first 7 years were funded by the Swedish government. For

the final 2 years, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

offered funding, and the Vietnamese delayed 9 months before accepting it.

Although U.S. senators and congressmen were baffled at the delay, its sen-

sitivity stemmed from concerns about whether the funding had politicalrequirements attached to it.

Finally, a country seeking management education needs partners that are

appropriate (have the ability and commitment) to work with it. Again, at

one point the NEU business school approached five U.S., three Australian,

and two British universities to be possible partners. For various reasons,

none of the universities were acceptable as partners. The reasons ranged

from concern about bureaucracy, to commitments to other projects, to

financial requirements that were above what an aid development projectcould sustain.

Partnerships

If a country is able to garner outside assistance, then two factors become

important in helping the management education development succeed: the

nature of the partnerships with external supporters and knowledge flow and

arrangement between the partners.

Partnerships between an educational institution and its supporter or sup-

porters encompass three key factors: (a) nature of relationship (Napier &

Thomas, 2004), (b) receptiveness of both partners to offer and receive infor-

mation, knowledge, and skills (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Michailova &

Husted, 2003), and (c) competence of each partner to know how to use the

information to reach the desired outcomes for their partnership (Napier, 2005).

Development stages of relationship between partners. The nature of a

relationship appears to go through four stages: establishing contact, encoun-tering critique, finding convergence, and determining how to continue the

relationship. Key characteristics of the stages follow (adapted from Napier

& Thomas, 2004, pp. 83-84). As the description and graphic suggest, the

acceptance of foreigner influence is not always consistent but rather starts




14/30

high, dips severely, and then works back up, visible over longitudinal obser-

vation (Figure 3):

Contact (Years 1 to 3): At first, when we foreigners showed up, the

Vietnamese treated us like gods. People wanted to hear what we had to

say, to learn and to work with us, even though they were really wary.

Theyd grown up hearing government people talk about the evil foreigners

so a number of people didnt want to spend much time with usespecially

away from workbut they wanted to learn. They thought that since we

came from the outside world we knew it all. Then they moved to a point

where they became less cautious, wanted more from us, but they wanted

to know why and how we did things. They still accepted what we said, butjust wanted to understand our reasoning.

Critique (Years 3 to 5): Later, things shifted. . . . Much of it was subtle

people didnt respond as enthusiastically as before or they said something

wouldnt work because of the special conditions in Vietnambut other

times it was more blatant. The local managers became more confident,

believed they had learned what they needed from the foreigners, and just

wanted us to give them money and leave. The attitude was weve gotten

from you what we want, you can just leave now. Its our country and our

organization, we dont want outsiders telling us what to do. This shift inbehavior and how they interacted was tough to get used tosome of the

foreigners couldnt adjust to being questioned and challenged.

Convergence (Years 6 to 9): But those of us who stuck with it (or had to since

our projects werent finished) tried to adjust. And slowly, the attitude

changed once more. Our Vietnamese colleagues seemed to realize that

there was a lot they could learn, and perhaps just as important, we started to

realize that we could learn from them. It was sort of a stage of becoming

colleagues more than mentors or feeling like we werent needed. We all

recognized that we had to work together, had to complete the job andwanted to do it well. So we found ways to work togethereach of us

adjusting.

Continue (Years 9+): Were now at a point where our work is coming to a

closeat least on this projectand we have to decide and find a new

future path as partners. We might just stay in touch, or we might find

some way to collaborate that is quite new and unusual. But we made it

through the rough spots and know that if we want to continue, we can.

Receptiveness of partners to information and competence to use or apply

it. As the relationship changes over time, so does willingness to receive infor-

mation and the ability or competence to use it (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990;

Napier, 2005). During the contact stage, knowledge flow is mainly one way:

from foreigners to locals. Although the Vietnamese accepted information,




15/30


they did not always understand it and hence were sometimes unable toapply it. They heard about concepts such as supply and demand, working

capital, and human resource management, but they lacked a context for the

concepts, and thus they were simply pieces of data to memorize. For instance,

because Vietnam has been a cash-based society, no one used (or trusted)

banks; hence, there was no concept of credit. To facilitate understanding

of a concept such as credit, a finance instructor had to be receptive to the

Vietnamese context. As locals moved from complete acceptance to greater

understanding, their ability to use information increased.

During the critique stage, the receptiveness and competence of individuals

varied significantly. In general, the Vietnamese receptiveness and competence

began to outstrip that of many foreigners, who could not, or did not, realize

the need to move from the role of expert to that of colleague with local

partners. Thus, although the Vietnamese absorbed and used knowledge,

some foreigners were stuck in an outdated view of the relationship. Locals

criticized foreigners and said they had learned all they needed to, and thus

their receptiveness to new information suffered as well.

Funding for most capacity-building projects ends after 2 to 4 years. Hadthis happened at the NEU, the relationship would have ended with the critique

stage. Yet the project lasted a decade, allowing the partnership to mature.

Each side realized the other had knowledge and value to contribute and thus

settled into a more collegial relationship. Thus, receptiveness and competence

Figure 3

Acceptance of Foreigner Influence by

Vietnamese During Relationship Stages

Contact

Low

High

Critique Converge Continue?



16/30

increased; knowledge flow was bidirectional (Napier, 2006) because each

side had the willingness and ability to learn from the other (Jovanovic &

Rob, 1989).The final stage, whether and how to continue, is still in progress. Although

there is no formal relationship with the primary partners, the Vietnamese

institution has developed and maintained business partnerships with some

universities to deliver very specific programs.

Knowledge Flow

The nature of the relationship among partners, as suggested, may influencereceptiveness of and ability to use knowledge that comes from each partner.

Those in turn relate to the ways and speed that knowledge flows: (a) passive

versus active and (b) infusion of the innovations.

Passive and Active Flow

Passive flow refers to each side absorbing knowledge in ways that happen

with little explicit action (Napier, 2006). Participating in meetings, social

occasions, or informal discussions where tacit information and knowledgeemerge forms the basis of passive knowledge flow. Cultural understanding can

increase during such encounters. For example, several Vietnamese faculty

and staff members lived in houses that flooded during the yearly monsoon

season, and yet they accepted the inconvenience and damage as an

inevitable part of the cycle of life. Such acceptance of the uncontrollable

helped explain some reactions to institutional situations, such as rules about

pay, travel, or job expectations. Foreigners who learned from such events

gained insights about thinking and norms and how to better interact with

their counterparts.

Active knowledge flow happens when each side explicitly offers (or

receives) information and may apply it. For instance, one evening after

work early in the project, a senior Vietnamese university administrator con-

fidentially told the two foreign project managers that the university sought

approval from the Ministry of Education and Training to establish Vietnams

first international standard business school, a highly sensitive and potentially

contentious move. The foreigners recognized the sensitivity because of

their long association with and knowledge of the institution and the country.Thus, active knowledge transfer in a meaningful way (after hours) revealed

much about governmental bureaucracy, concern about the impact of the

news, and the growing level of trust between the partners. It was another 4

years before the school was allowed to open.




17/30

Infusion of Management Education Concepts

Emerging economies may have unique needs and approaches to manage-

ment education innovations and knowledge. Although Western managersand educators may assume that organizations adopting innovations follow

common patterns of diffusion (Majahan, Muller, & Bass, 1990), such assump-

tions may not hold in emerging economies and thus should be examined

(Brown & Hagel, 2005; Lieberthal & Prahalad,2003; Postrel, 2002; Tsui, 2004).

The longitudinal capacity-building project in Vietnam provides some insight

into whether and which management education concepts and innovations

could be adopted by emerging country institutions.

In this section of the article, we examine adoption (or lack thereof) of threemanagement education concepts and practices: (a) infrastructure-related

components, (b) student-centered teaching techniques, and (c) creating a

research culture. The figures suggest that the adoption (or adaptation) of

international standard practices ranged from high (widely used and

adopted) to low (very little used). Typically a low ranking means that

the existing (or former) Vietnamese practice continued.

Infrastructure-related components. Infrastructure-related componentscomprise four aspectstechnology, updated classrooms, updated library, and

policies relating to administration of the institution (e.g., finance, accounting,

human resources). Figure 4 illustrates the adoption of various infrastructure

components over time. Of these components, threetechnology, classrooms,

and financial or accounting policieswere adopted; library and human

resource practices were not.

The information technology components (e.g., computers in a lab, com-

puters for professors, access to the Internet) began slowly but grew quite

rapidly for at least three reasons. First, donor funding for computer tech-

nology was available at various points during the project. Second, over the

projects lifetime, two staff people taught themselves about technology and

(pirated) software and, in turn, became the support staff for the business

school. Finally, faculty members became increasingly aware of what was

available beyond their institution as they traveled abroad (Figure 4).

Financial and accounting practices were also adopted and improved on

over time, although not extensively until two capable (and willing to learn)

staff persons joined the project in 1999. One of them, in particular, has con-tinued to improve the routines and process. In 1993, the designated project

classroom was updated to include a wall-mounted air conditioner, an over-

head projector, 16 two-person desks, chairs, and a flip-chart easel. Flip-chart

paper was brought from Hong Kong or custom made in Hanoi. In 1999, two




18/30


additional rooms were updated, and the school purchased a computer projector.

Since 2003, another three rooms have been updated, and each has an in-room

computer in a locked cabinet for PowerPoint presentations.

Two infrastructure-related areas where Western concepts were not

adopted were the library and human resource practices. The library was

mostly built by donations from visiting professors of texts and used books

they brought into Vietnam. In 1997, the project purchased an annual sub-

scription to a business periodicals index, but the university did not renew it.

Part of the difficultly with library infrastructure adoption was the resistance

to the fundamental idea of a librarywhere materials can be borrowed and

then are returned for others to use. Rather than returning materials, faculty

members kept them in their bookshelves so they could be sure they (alone)

would have access. Thus, the library became a musty storage room for old

newspapers.

Human resource practices common in the developed world, such as

recruitment, selection, performance appraisal, and compensation systems,

were unacceptable in Vietnam, partly because of political sensitivities. In acommunist country such as Vietnam, individuals must apply for permission

to move to a new city, travel or study abroad, or publish articles in interna-

tional journals. Selection and promotion link closely with seniority and

political factors, and compensation is typically based on seniority rather

Figure 4

Adoption of Infrastructure-Related Components:

Technology, Updated Classrooms, Policies for Finance,Accounting, and HR, and Updated Library

Updated

Classrooms

1993 2000

Updated Library

HR practices

Fin &acctg policies

Technology

LevelofAdoption

Lo

Hi

1995 1997 1999 2003 2006



19/30


than performance. The project administrators tried twice (1998, 2001) to

help the Vietnamese implement some aspects they requested (performance

appraisal), but the effort was halfhearted and abandoned.

Student-centered teaching techniques. A second management education

innovation introduced in the Vietnamese university was the notion of alter-

natives to lecture-based teaching. The capacity-building project encouraged

professors to learn about and use cases, small-group discussions, role-

plays, team projects, simulations, student presentations, and the like. By the

projects end, the adoption of techniques was fair but had fallen, as several

of the stronger users left the business school for other jobs in the university

or outside.

Because the project involved three cohorts of faculty members going

through an MBA program, the first group experienced (1993 to 1995) and

then applied the methods, first through bicultural team teaching (1995 to

1999) and then on their own in Vietnamese- and English-language graduate

programs (Figure 5). Many faculty members continue to use student-centeredtechniques, but few have learned or created their own new techniques. For

example, several remaining instructors use more in-class discussion, cases,

and short incidents than they did prior to the projects start. One strategy

professor, for instance, has begun using in-class games and puzzles where

Figure 5

Adoption of Student-Centered Teaching Techniques

(e.g., cases, projects, discussion)

1993 2000

Using Student centered

Teaching Techniques

Bi-cultural team

teaching

Experiencing

And learning

About new methods Independent teaching

Level of Adoption

Low

Med

High

1995 1997 1999 2003 2006



20/30


they help illustrate some concepts. Such practices would have been unheard

of before the project.

Developing a research culture. A key goal of the capacity-building pro-

ject was to instill a research culture among Vietnamese faculty members

(Figure 6) using several approaches: funding doctoral studies for faculty

members, including Vietnamese faculty members in research projects con-

ducted by foreigners, and educating Vietnamese administrators in the value

of faculty-driven, analytical, peer-reviewed research. The long-term impact

was negligible.Over 6 years, the project funded 27 faculty members pursuing advanced

PhD or masters degrees from universities in the United States, Australia,

England, and Singapore. Of those, 19 completed their degrees. In addition,

the NEU supported 10 to 12 faculty members in its doctoral program, and

4 others pursued international programs in Thailand, Denmark, and Japan.

In addition, throughout the project, visiting foreign professors invited local

professors to join them in research projects. By the end of the project, all

Vietnamese business school faculty members had participated with foreignerson at least one project; several had been involved in more than one and had

attended conferences, presented papers, or published in international peer-

reviewed journals. Some have continued to do research for international

conferences and (a few) journals with foreign colleagues, but rarely on their

own. Several publish in the universitys journal.

Figure 6

Adoption of Research Culture (e.g., learning how,

conducting research for international publications)

1993 2000

Group A. 4 int l PhDs

Group B. 1 int l PhD

completed; 14 Mastersof Research completed Group C. 10 -12 Local PhDs

(from own university)

Level of Adoption

High

Med

Low

Getting MBA

Degrees: I, II, III

1995 1997 1999 2003 2006



21/30


A final way of building a research culture was to help Vietnamese univer-

sity administrators understand how international standard research works, in

contrast to the Vietnamese way. In general, research in Vietnam follows a pre-scribed pattern. Some ministry provides a research topic and question (e.g.,

How many and what kind of farmers work in the Red River Valley?). The

ministry provides funding to a university to conduct the study and often has

a say in who will lead the research. The senior researcheror the university

administratorsdesignates instructors or students to carry out the research.

The lead researchers name appears first in a publication, and (sometimes) the

others are listed afterward. The report appears in a Vietnamese-language jour-

nal, typically published by the university that conducted the research.Thus, many ideas accepted in international research institutions were

new and controversial for Vietnamese administrators and faculty members.

Such ideas included (a) faculty members choosing research topics rather

than being assigned them from government ministries, (b) faculty members

choosing their research partners rather than being assigned to a project, (c)

faculty members conducting analytical, rather than descriptive, research,

and (d) faculty members jointly contributing to research rather than a few

doing the work with no (or little) acknowledgement. When he first heardabout the notion of blind reviews and competitive research proposals, a

senior administrator summarily dismissed it. Hence, to introduce and explain

the ideas, two groups of Vietnamese senior administrators visited the U.S.

partners university campus and met counterpart administrators. They spent

2 hours with the director of the Office of Research Administration, who

explained the international standard review process, the value of blind-reviewed

proposals and manuscripts, and the importance of faculty members choosing

and pursuing their own research interests.

Foreigners talk about an informal 18-month rule in Vietnam: the length

of time it takes for an idea to gain credibility. Indeed, after about 18 months

of continuing discussion, one Vietnamese administrator came up with an

innovative idea: Faculty members should pick research topics they wanted

to pursue, write proposals, and submit them for competitive review.

Of all the management education concepts that foreigners tried to convey,

the research culture was the most disappointing failure. Ultimately, Vietnamese

administrators and many faculty members were unable or unwilling to rec-

ognize the value of research to an institution. Some Vietnamese administratorssaw publishing in international journals as boosting only the researchers repu-

tation, not that of the institution. In a communist and Confucian society, where

people are discouraged from standing out, those who published were not

celebrated. With no funding or incentive, and sometimes active discouragement,

the embryonic research culture fizzled.



22/30

In sum, even a decade-long capacity-building project encompassing more

than 100 Vietnamese, more than 80 foreigners, and more than $8 million in

financial support was marginally successful at fully implementing a manage-ment education program. We discuss some of the challenges more generally

in the next section.

Is There Hope for Management Educationin Emerging Economies?

Scholars, journalists, donors, and investors alike are acknowledging thepotential importance of emerging economies. The sample case study suggests

that it is possiblealbeit frustratingto implement at least some management

education concepts in a developing country.

If we accept that progress is a basic tenet of free trade and economic

development, we must understand the challenges of effectively engaging

the emerging economies, especially relating to education, and potential

negative outcomes of awakening them. In the next section, we review

issues facing management education groupsboth within the emergingeconomies and those seeking to support them.

Aid Policies: Boon or Boondoggle?

Aid programs in developing and emerging economies are often the pariah

of scholars and politicians (Sachs, 2005) anxious to find ways to solve

poverty and bypass the dangers of mismanaged, misguided development

programs. Others have argued that too often aid programs are designed without

the recipient fully participating in decisions regarding needs and implemen-

tation (Chambers, 1997; Rist, 1999). At base, questions arise as to whether

aid programs, such as the capacity-building project in Vietnam, are a boon or

a boondoggle for participants (from both sides).

We argue that there may be a bit of both in aid projects. The boondoggle

aspect certainly included some travel that may not have been critical for

daily operations, such as trips for senior administrators (on both sides) to

visit their counterparts in partner universities, but which ultimately did help

understanding and relationships that allowed those in the trenches toaccomplish project goals.

One potential boondoggle candidate, involving a senior administrator

from the U.S. university partner, turned into a major unexpected boon,

which later paid off in a large way in project management. Because the




23/30

fourth phase of the project was funded by USAID, U.S. university admin-

istrators wanted to use an American bank (rather than the ANZ Bank, which

had been the project bank for the first 7 years). So the project manageropened an account with one of the two U.S. banks in Vietnam. When the

U.S. universitys top financial officer visited Hanoi to get an overview of

the project, she stepped into a quagmire, unusual for her, not unusual for

Vietnam. She learned on Day 1 of her visit that the projects U.S. bank had

left Hanoi and thus the project would need to open an account with the

other U.S. bank. Opening a bank accountsimple in the United States, not

so simple in Vietnam. She spent 3 hours every afternoon during her 5 days

in Hanoi trying to open that elusive bank account because the bank requireddifferent and new information each day. The U.S. bank was used to corpo-

rate accounts, not aid projects, and its requirements for funds in the

account, use of the account, and related activities became too cumbersome

for the relatively small aid project. Eventually, the project returned its

accounts to ANZ Bank. The serendipity of having a senior U.S. adminis-

trator go through the frustration of the simple process of opening a bank

account was more than worth the cost of her trip. The project managers had

no difficulties with that administrator on financial issues during the projectbecause she understood the challenges faced in the country.

The bigger question, though, is whether an aid project is a boon to the par-

ticipants, the institutions, and the country as a whole. Despite its many frail-

ties and rockiness, the capacity-building project on the whole has benefitted

all three groups. The NEU business school has sustainable graduate programs

in business administration (in Vietnamese and English), accountancy, and

finance. It has begun initiating undergraduate business programs as well.

By 2007, more than half of the faculty MBA participants had attained

PhDs and were teaching in the NEU or other Vietnamese institutions; three

hold academic positions outside of Vietnam (in the United States, Australia,

and Macau). Some left the university to join international development

programs (e.g., United Nations Development Programme, World Bank) or

to start their own consulting firms. Slightly fewer than half of those who

started the business school remain there; others have moved to different

areas of the university, so the NEU has gained additional expertise through-

out its other divisions and units. Thus, the NEU has built its human capital,

has improved and strengthened its curriculum and teaching approaches, andhas (a few) faculty members who continue to conduct international stan-

dard research with foreign colleagues.

Furthermore, the NEU has dramatically expanded its worldwide net-

work of partner universities and the networks that individual faculty




24/30

members have developed through their studies abroad and research. This only

complements its already strong connections within the countrys govern-

mental and party components: Several previous rectors have been NationalAssembly members or have served on high-ranking committees. In some

ways, the NEU has become a model for other universities within Vietnam

seeking to build capacity.

Finally, in unexpected ways, the project was a boon for Vietnams visibility

as it was beginning to enter the world economic stage. In the early 1990s,

the Asian Wall Street Journal had a front page article about the program,

and the program received national U.S. media attention in 1995 when

President Clinton established diplomatic relationson National PublicRadio, on CNN radio, and in theNew York Times. The NEU received visits

from top universities worldwide, many seeking partnerships, generating

more connections for the NEU with the broader academic community.

Adoption, Adaptation, or Rejection of

International Standard Practices: Bending Bamboo

One of the basic questions of our article is, Why were some practicesaccepted and others were not? In the Vietnam case, as our discussion and the

figures suggest, some practices were rejected outright, some were adapted to

fit the local conditions, and some were adopted in a form comparable to what

one would find anywhere. The form and level of acceptance seemed to vary

in part because of whether the new ideas clashed with existing modes of

practice or models of thinking. A key difference, then, is the extent to which

the new knowledge or model of thinking or behavior challenged core belief

systems of the Vietnamese recipients (Leonard & Swap, 2005).

In some cases, there was a type of vacuum in which no existing model

for behavior or practice existed. For example, before the capacity-building

project, the university and business school had few computers; yet once

faculty members had access to the technology and understood what they

could do with it, the technology was easy to accept and adopt.

With regard to research culture, though, an existing heavyweight model

remained as an undercurrent, even while the international standard model

was imported. So when the foreigners left, the traditional model reemerged

throughout most of the university. In that case, the heavyweight wasultimately incompatible with the international standard approach.

Adaptationrather than outright adoption or rejectionhappened when

the Vietnamese saw value in parts of an innovation or idea, even when local

and international standard ideas clashed somewhat. For example, the




25/30

Vietnamese faculty members liked the idea of group projects yet could not

accept peer evaluation of group members as part of the process. Several for-

eigners saw peer evaluation as a way to control for the slacker problem(i.e., when one person or people do not carry a fair share of the work). In

Vietnam, however, such peer evaluation is uncomfortable and thus was not

accepted, although the idea of group projects in general was.

Throughout the project, this willingness to adopt, adapt, and reject fit the

way the Vietnamese describe themselves. We are like bending bamboo,

they say. Very strong and tough, but when bamboo is wet, it can bend into

many different shapes. Their reshaping and changing, then, raise the next

question, whether and what standard makes sense to use in such a developingcountry?

Why and what International Standard?

Most aid projects in developing economies assume that knowledge flow

moves from the developed to the developing country participants. They further

assume, especially in an area such as management education, that an inter-

national standard exists and is appropriate.But perhaps a more fundamental question is whether the notion of an

international standard makes sense in an emerging economy, and, if so,

which international standard?

It is interesting that in the Vietnamese university case we examined, the

university administrators picked the standard. When the project began, they

requested that a North American university accredited by the Association to

Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) oversee the delivery of

the MBA program. At the time (early 1990s), only four in North America met

that criterionall were in Canada, because the United States had an embargo

against Vietnam and thus could do no official business or trade. According to

the initial contractors, the Vietnamese administrators had no idea what

AACSB was or what accreditation meant other than reputation. Later,

when the program shifted to an American partner, accreditation was still

important to the Vietnamese, and thus the new partner was acceptable.

Thus, the initial questions of whether to follow a standard and which

standard came from the recipients rather than the deliverers. Later, as chal-

lenges throughout the program delivery emerged (e.g., plagiarism, academicstandards of performance), the foreign university could rely on the accredita-

tion requirements, which made some decisions more straightforward.

Even though the delivering school had (highly American-driven) AACSB

accreditation, the project managers, university administrators, and Swedish




26/30

funders used the phrase international standard throughout the project. Not

North American, not British, not Japanese standard. International standard.

That was important for two reasons. First, it gave a clear signal that theNEU was open to and welcomed more than a single standard approach

to teaching, administrative practices, study-abroad programs, doctoral

research approaches. In fact, it was not until the latter phases of the project

that a majority of foreign faculty members involved came from the United

States. To that point, the range of regions and countries represented was

wide, including, for example, Europe (e.g., Scotland, Denmark, and England),

North America (e.g., Canada and the United States), and Asia (e.g.,

Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines). Even though theresearch culture was generally common across professors from developed

countries, differences still existed in areas such as what constituted valuable

topics, what methods should be used, how to adapt to Vietnam, and the like.

Of course, into this mix entered the Vietnamese way. Often, as we sug-

gested, the Vietnamese would adapt, rather than adopt, some approach to fit

their conditions, whether that be ways to lead a discussion in a class, deal

with management issues within the university, or carry out a research sur-

vey (hand delivered and collected rather than phoned or mailed).Thus, the questions of which standards and how to apply them are still

somewhat unsettled. As developing countries become more adept at learn-

ing what the rest of the world has to offer, they will inevitably find their

own paths. The Vietnamese university certainly has taken from its foreign

visitors what works and what it wanted to use but has adjusted and tossed

those innovations that do not fit or make sense. The programs, the business

school, and their operations belong to them and thus must be made for and

by them.

Management Education and EconomicDevelopment: Is It a Dream?

The Nordic country aid agencies are known in Southeast Asia for their

willingness to collaborate, for working in catalyst countries where they

can make a difference rather than being a small drop in a large bucket, as

they would be in China, and for their patience. When the Vietnam projectbegan, Sweden made a 2-year commitment to provide the MBA degree to

a set of 30 faculty members. At the end of the first phase, both the Swedes

and the Vietnamese governments recognized that 2 years was not long

enough. Thus, Swedens involvement continued for 7 more years. The




27/30

USAID funded portion lasted 2, extremely short, years. Even an evaluator

of the final phase of the project commented that 2 years was too short to see

any direct impact of the U.S. aid involvement.So how long does it take to see if such a project matters for economic

development of a country?

Representatives of Sida, which funded the Vietnam capacity-building

project, often told a story about a Sida-funded forestry project some 25 years

earlier. The logging mill, in the mountains of Vietnam, was a model aid

project in its first several years. Workers and managers on both sides touted

the productivity, efficiency, and success of the plant. But when the Swedes

moved onto another project, the forestry project became an embarrassing fail-ure: Productivity fell, safety records plummeted, and the Swedes reluctantly

admitted that, 10 years on, the project was an unfortunate venture.

Twenty-five years after the project began, a Swedish representative visited

the site. His surprising story became an urban (or perhaps in this case

countryside) legend within Sida. The factory had survived and in fact

turned around completely. It was highly productive, employed several

Vietnamese from the area, and was more successful than anyone had hoped

for, even during its early good years. The moral was that the time framefor aid projects is longer than even the patient Swedes had expected.

Thus, an evaluation of the management education and its link to economic

development in Vietnam is ongoing, informally if not formally, even 14 years

after it began. Some tangible results achieved are highly encouraging, if

anecdotal. Several manager MBA graduates have started their own compa-

nies; one of those firms employs more than 100 people and exports products

regionally and does business for customers in North America. Others work

for foreign companies, for state-owned enterprises, or abroad. One has

become the director of a competing business school, which has a strong U.S.

partner and English-language and executive MBA programs. About one third

have sent their children abroad to study; half travel abroad themselves for

business and academic purposes. Several within the university have moved to

higher-level administrative positionshead of the business school, head of a

small business development center, head of the graduate school. Finally, the

NEU Business School has completed at least six 45-person cohorts in its

English-language MBA program, more than 20 of its Vietnamese-language

program. Training and consulting for such firms as IBM, KMPG, and BritishPetroleum have been ongoing for more than a decade.

Even so, as we suggested earlier, some of the academic innovations and

practices followed a somewhat jerky, Sisyphian process in terms of accep-

tance: a few steps forward, several back. Perhaps part of the jerkiness




28/30


stemmed from too much, too fast. Certainly, Vietnam has wrestled with

the too much, too fast challenges. At varying times, the government puts

brakes on the development, and at other times it encourages it.Finding the balance and having the patience to see what transpires are

critical. The Vietnam case certainly suggests that even a decade spent cre-

ating a business school and its culture is just a scratch on the surface. Thus,

engaging emerging economies in economic-development activities, such as

management education, is a multigenerational, multidecade process.

So, Is Management education and economic development in emerging

countries a dream?

Yes, of a sort. But one with promise.We see it as a long running dream, with active and deep sleep phases,

that is neither a fantasy nor a nightmare but something still emerging.

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