journal for the study of greek and latin philosophical traditions · beyond the work of nicole...
TRANSCRIPT
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Journal for the Study of Greek and Latin Philosophical
Traditions
1st INTERNATIONAL ISSUE
Institute of Philosophy
Academy of Sciences
of the Czech republic v.v.i.
Praha 2010
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Redakce časopisu Aithér Filosofický ústav AVČR
Jilská 1 Praha 1 110 00
www.aither.eu
ISSN 1803-7860 (Online) ISSN 1803-7879 (Print)
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Table of contents
Foreword....................................................................................... 5
1. Pavel Hobza............................................................................. 9
Ethics or Epistemology? Parmenides' Verse B 8.34
Reconsidered
2. Chiara Chinello...................................................................... 41
Oedipus, the Tragedy of Self Recognition
3. Jakub Jirsa............................................................................. 69
Value pluralism, Sophocles' Antigone and liberalism
4. Alice Pechriggl .................................................................... 107
Tragic ways of thinking the political. Some considerations
beyond the work of Nicole Loraux
5. Tomáš Hejduk....................................................................... 139
Bernard Williams and Ancient Greek Tragedy
6. Kryštof Boháček................................................................... 173
Between Truth and Beauty
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Dear readers,
Let me introduce the first international edition of our
journal, Aither International Issue 2010.
Aither is a journal devoted to European philosophical
traditions, as they were constituted and formulated in their
classic form of Greek and Latin writings. The journal is
primarily designed for the study of philosophical texts in
their original form from ancient Greece to the early Modern
Times (Latin). As well as for analysis, commentary and
interpretation of these texts, the magazine is open to the
broadest studies of cultural backgrounds and contexts, that
may in any way help to clarify or reinterpret Greek and
Latin philosophical thought. Reviews are also welcome, as
well as polemical articles and critical reflections on the
topic. The publisher of the journal Aither is the
Philosophical Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences.
Aither has been published bi-annually since 2009. The
International Issue will be issued once every two years.
Therefore, every fourth issue of Aither is international. The
Aither International Issue publishes articles in English,
German and French.
For more information, see the section forauthors.
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The first international issue is dedicated to the Attic tragedy
and Greek archaic thought. Tragic authors are now
generally regarded as the necessary basis for an alternative
or classical philosophical theories of Plato and Aristotle. In
any case, they represent to us contemporary common sense,
on the basis of which it were possible to formulate such
unique philosophical positions. Increasingly, however, the
works of tragic thinkers are interpreted directly as philo-
sophical texts, expressing an autonomous philosophical
position. Articles in our number are showing that the tragic
writers have great intellectual potential also for today's
philosophical debate, and that they were prominent figures
of ancient discussions. Furthermore, it appears that the topic
of tragic thought or tragic philosophy affects a wider group
of thinkers, than just tragic poets from Athens. Lastly, it
turns out that the inclusion of tragic texts in philosophical
literature requires some reflection on the concept of
philosophy in general. Such a new reflection on the
traditional reading of the text of the poem of Parmenides –
the highly respected epistemologist of the tradition – offers
the first paper, which in accordance with the main focus of
number suggests an ethical reading of Parmenides.
As a virtual magazine, we invite you on the first journey
into the world of classic thought. We hope that you will
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enjoy it and that our magazine will become for you a
reliable and perhaps even a permanent and freely available
guide for the future. Therefore, in awareness of the lack of
such a specifically oriented electronic journal, we chose the
name of the fifth element. Quintessence is unavailable for
our physical world, but acts as its persistent framework
which can be taken into account at all times and used to
better understand the world and ourselves. We hope that
some of the brilliance of Aither you will see in our
magazine.
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Pavel Hobza
Parmenides’ Verse B 8.34 and the Practical Meaning of
One of the most famous notions associated with
Parmenides is the relationship between thought and being.
Although in philosophical tradition this notion has been
understood as the notorious identity of thought and being,
the precise form of the relationship in Parmenides is a
matter of dispute, depending on syntactical construction of
Greek lines that seem to express this relationship, i.e. the
fragment B 3 () and
the line B 8.34 :
'
However, the interpretation of B 3 is essentially ambiguous
since could be taken either as a predicate or as a
subject. Although in B 8.34 could be taken to be as
problematic as in B 3, there is an important
difference between both lines. Whereas line B 8.34 occurs
within a clear context of the fragment B 8 that can – as we
shall see – help to settle its interpretation, the fragment B 3,
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not taking up the whole hexametric verse, appears alone; we
are thus short of clues on which it would be possible to
decide how to construe it. Because of the rather problematic
nature of the fragment B 3i we should concentrate merely
on line B 8.34.
Now, although the precise form of the relationship
between thought and being in B 8.34 is a matter of dispute,
there seems to be no disagreement on its theoretical or
epistemological character. However, it is the aim of this pa-
per to undermine this general agreement on the theoretical-
epistemological character of the line. Whereas, on the usual
interpretation, (or ) is understood in theoretical
terms as the act of, or the capacity for, , in interpreting
the line we should rather proceed from the ordinary, rather
practical meaning of as found, e.g., in the archaic lyric
poetry, where it meant a character, attitude, or even moral
self. On this interpretation, the line is to be understood in
practical or even ethical rather than epistemological terms.
Hence, its main message is practical-ethical and only
secondarily it has theoretical-epistemological implications.
i Sometimes it is even suspected that B 3 is not an authentic
quotation from Parmenides. Cf. Gadamer 1996, p. 154: ‗Inzwischen hat
mich Mansonner überzeugt, daß Fragment 3 überhaupt kein
Parmenides-Zitat ist, sondern eine von Platon selbst stammende
Formulierung, die (...) Clemens Parmenides zugeschrieben hat.‘
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I. Syntactical Considerations about B 8.34
As we have suggested, there is a problem of how
exactly to construe the line B 8.34 ('
). In general, there
are three main possibilities of how to construct it. They are
based primarily on the understanding of which can
function as predicate, subject, or attribute. The conjunction
can be also rendered in three ways: ‗therefore‘,
‗that‘ and ‗because‘. First of all, let us list some possible
constructions for each interpretational type:
A. ( as predicate)
1. Dasselbe aber ist Erkennen und das, woraufhin
Erkenntnis ist.i (Heitsch)
2. Penser et ce pourquoi la pensée est, sont la même chose.ii
(Cordero)
3. It is the same to think and the thought that [the object of
thought] exists.iii
(Tarán)
B. ( as subject)
i Heitsch 1974, p. 31.
ii Cordero 1984, p. 39.
iii Tarán 1965, p. 86.
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1. Das Selbige aber ist zu erkennen, und zugleich der
Grund, weshalb eine Erkenntnis seiend ist.i (Hölscher)
2. The same is to think and (is) wherefore [or ‚that‗] is (the)
thought [or ‚thinking‗].ii (Mourelatos)
C. ( as attribute)
Als Identisches kann es erkannt werden und weil die
Erkenntnis Bestand hat.iii
(Wiesner)
As to the (grammatical) suitability of the renderings
suggested, the type B (or C) is to be preferred on two
grounds: 1) Unlike type A, the grammatical construction
is used in its usual way: ‗it is (possible) to
think‘. 2) To interpret as subject fits better the
context of the fragment B 8 for in B 8.29 (only five lines
above our line) unambiguously appears in the
function of subject, being synonymous with . As
Hölscher puts it: ‗Es ist unwahrscheinlich, daß Parmenides
fünf Verse später, und wieder am Versanfang, dasselbe
Wort in einem anderen, unprägnanten Sinn gebraucht.‘iv
Or
as Mourelatos puts it: ‗The presumption is that
i Hölscher 1986, p. 25.
ii Mourelatos 1970, p. 165
iii Wiesner 1987, p. 176.
iv Hölscher 1986, p. 97-98.
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refers back to the subject under discussion in B 8 as a whole
– , ―what-is‖; it must therefore function as subject in B
8.34, not as predicate.‘i
However, type B is not immune to objections since
its grammatical construction is not quite plausible. On this
interpretation, the line consists of two clauses which are
dependent on:
‗' (subject)
(first predicate)
(second predicate).‘ii
The main problem of this construction is not that it requires
supplying from the preceding clause before
but that the meaning of supplied differs from
the original one. The first means ‗it is (possible) to‘
whereas the second one has to be understood in the sense ‗it
is the reason‘.iii
Taking into account both the problems and the
advantages of types A and B, Wiesner suggests a new
i Mourelatos 1970, p. 165.
ii Mourelatos 1970, p. 166.
iii Wiesner 1987, p. 174: ‗Sie macht ja ein Zeugma insofern
erforderlich, als vor dem Infinitiv zunächst als ―es ist
(möglich) zu ..., kann‖ erscheint, dann aber vor dem -Satz als
―ist der Grund, ‖ zum anschließenden ―weshalb‖ oder ―wherefore‖
überleiten soll.‘
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interpretation of the line listed as type C. But his
interpretation is also susceptible to objections; for the
present, it suffices only to mention that it is superfluous and
(grammatically and factually) rather forced to construe
as attribute (see our considerations further below).
To reiterate, apart from the differences within each
particular interpretational type (depending largely on the
understanding of , there are three main
possibilities of how to interpret our line which are based on
. As to the grammatical construction, each type is
somewhat problematic. Hence the interpreters are seeking
to account for each type by virtue of factual reasons. I even
suspect that in construing the line, Wiesner was primarily
led by the alluring factual (i.e. ontological) considerations:
For to construe as attribute and as
‗because‘ entails two reasons why being (what-is) can be
thought: 1) Being can be thought only as identical, i.e.
because it is identical. 2) Being can be thought because
there is thought. According to Wiesner, this reason is
supported by the fact ‗daß Erkennen nur mit dem Seienden
anzutreffen ist (B 8,35-36), d.h. einem realen, sachhaltigen
Objekt.‘i Yet, most scholars see in the line different factual
or ontological implications. The advocates of the type A
interpret it as stating the identity of being and thought
i Wiesner 1987, p. 176.
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whereas the advocates of the type B interpret it as follows:
‗The two clauses are complementary. The first guarantees
the presence or the availability of a certain object. But it
posits no obligation for mind to seek it. The second posits
the obligation, but gives no guarantee of the object‘s
availability.‘i
Now, we seem to be moving in a circle since the
grammatical reasons are conditioned by the factual ones and
vice versa. How could we get out of this vicious circle? To
be sure, there is no perfect and indisputable solution of how
to understand our line since it is the destiny of all
interpretation to be captive in a circle – may we call it
vicious or hermeneutical. Nevertheless, despite (or rather
because of) the problems pertaining to the line B 8.34, we
should try to develop a new approach of how to interpret it.
Let us start by tentatively considering the best
grammatical construction. is best to be construed as
subject (see the reasons mentioned in favor of the type B).
However, unlike in the type B, we should avoid the
supplying of before, which seems too forced
and controversial. As to the rendering of which is
most problematic, von Fritz‘s remark is worth quoting: ―It
is true, as Fränkel points out, that in the overwhelming
i Mourelatos 1970, p. 168. Cf. also Hölscher 1968, p. 99: ‗es ist
das Denk-Mögliche und als solches der Grund für die Wahrheit des
Denkens.‘
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majority of the cases in which the word occurs in
Homer, it means either ‗because‘ or ‗that‘ (...). But, in spite
of this, it can hardly be denied that essentially and
originally is (‗on account of which‘). (...)
[I]ts origin from is so apparent that it is always
possible to revert to the original meaning. In Parmenides the
word occurs only once outside the passage
discussed, but in this case it certainly means ‗because of
which‘ or ‗therefore‘ (...).‖i In fact, for the meaning of
in our line, it is decisive how it is used ‗in the only
occurrence outside the passage discussed‘, i.e. two lines
above (in B 8.32), where – as von Fritz and the majority of
the interpreters concede – it has to be rendered as
‗therefore‘. Moreover, if we take into account that
Parmenides‘ poem belongs to oral culture and as such was
designed for listening to rather than reading, one may be
even prone to think that Parmenides used in B
8.32 (i.e. in a context where its meaning is unproblematic)
only in order to make its meaning clear, thus giving his
audience a clue of how to understand it two lines below.
Our considerations about the best grammatical
construction would, then, result in the following
preliminary rendering:
i von Fritz 1945, p. 237-238.
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PR (Preliminary Rendering)
What is in itself the same (i.e. ) is to think and
that is why there is thought.
The objection to this rendering is evident: it may be
grammatically most appropriate but factually it is very
problematic for it seems to be tautological. To say ‗Since it
is possible to think (being), there is thought‘ is trivial and as
such – we can suspect – it has nothing to do with the
elaborate and sophisticated argument of the fragment B 8.
Yet, before we reject this rendering on the grounds of its
triviality, we should consider whether it is not only the
translation into modern languages that is trivial and tauto-
logical. Since the alleged tautology of the line is based on
the conception of thought, we should first inquire into the
meaning of and its cognates.
II. The Meaning of
Since our understanding of and draws
largely upon Kurt von Fritz‘ brilliant study, let us start our
inquiry into this topic by summarizing and rethinking some
of his approaches and conclusions. His main contribution,
let us preliminarily remember, consists in proving that
whereas our concept of thought involves discursive activity
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as its constitutive element, the Greek word being
closely related to the sense of visioni is based on a passive
and receptive relation to the world.
Unlike the verbal form, the meaning of its
nominal cognate underwent extensive changes which
sometimes led even to the contradictory uses of this noun.
Whereas the original meaning of was ‗to realize or to
understand a situation‘,ii in Homer developed as
follows: ‗Since the same situation may have a different
―meaning‖ to persons of different character and circum-
stances of life, the notion develops that different persons or
nations have different . As these different meanings of
a situation evoke different reactions to it, and since these
reactions are more or less typical of certain persons,
sometimes implies the notion of a specific ―attitude‖.‘iii
In
opposition to many different another meaning of
gained ground: a notion of ‗the which penetrates
beyond the surface appearance [and] discovers the real truth
about the matter. There can, then, be no different in
this situation, as the in this case is obviously just
one.‘iv
In Hesiod further semantic shifts took place: ‗The
i Cf. von Fritz 1945, p. 223: ‗But in the stage of the semantic
development represented by the Homeric poems, the concept of is
more closely related to the sense of vision.‘
ii von Fritz 1945, p. 223.
iii von Fritz 1945, p. 223.
iv von Fritz 1945, p. 224.
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notion that different persons may have different has
been further developed in two opposite directions. On the
one hand, the same person may have a different at
different times. On the other hand, now can designate
not only a more or less permanent attitude, as in Homer, but
also a fixed moral character, so that the word is now often
connected with adjectives expressing moral praise or
blame.‘i
Having analyzed Homer and Hesiod with respect of
, von Fritz claims that ‗[w]ith the rise of philosophical
speculation in the narrower sense, common language and
philosophical terminology gradually begin to develop on
different lines.‘ii Nonetheless, that is I suggest the most
problematic move of von Fritz‘s analysis. For it is far from
evident to assume – as he does – a philosophical tradition or
line of thought based merely on such scanty evidence as
provided by Xenophanes, Heraclitus and Parmenides. We
cannot be even sure whether these thinkers were acquainted
with one another, let alone assume a continuous line of their
interdepending thoughts. So von Fritz appears to squeeze
these thinkers into narrow limits of an assumed philo-
sophical tradition that he takes to be determined by the
i von Fritz 1945, p. 225.
ii von Fritz 1945, p. 226-227.
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tendency of to be rare and exceptional among people.i
Although this notion of seems to obtain for
Xenophanes and Heraclitus in whom only few occurrences
of survived, it is not suitable for Parmenides. For in
his poem there is at least one occurrence of that is
unambiguously attributed to all men.ii
So if we want to understand how was used in
Parmenides, we should not close him up in a presumed or
prefabricated line of thought but, instead, situate him in a
wider contemporary language context (represented to us by
the surviving contemporary texts). Let us then shortly
survey the use of in the post-Homeric tradition as
found primarily in the archaic lyric poetry, which – on von
Fritz‘s account – represents the second (non-philosophical)
i Cf. von Fritz 1945, p. 230: ‗In any case, the notion that is
something exceptional which only few people possess becomes very
prevalent in the generation after Xenophanes, especially with
Heraclitus, though it can already be found in the poems of Semonides of
Amorgos. It is obvious that this implies a change in the character of the
insight which is supposed to be the result of genuine.‘
ii It is the notorious expression in B 6.6. This
is not rare and exceptional among men but rather widespread and
even ubiquitous. It is further significant that von Fritz takes this
expression to be mysterious and unintelligible: Cf. von Fritz 1945, p.
237: ‗But a very real difficulty, which has never been solved and
perhaps does not admit a perfect solution, is created by the fact that in
some instances Parmenides seems to assert that and are
always and necessarily connected with and and therefore with
the truth, which seems to imply that the cannot err.‘ For the
alternative interpretation of see the third and fourth
sections of our paper.
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line of the semantic development of he is not
interested in. This survey reveals two main semantic trends
of : 1) The is sometimes attributed to gods,
thereby appearing to retreat out of range of ordinary
people.i To attribute the to gods does not however
necessarily involve denying it completely to ordinary men.
It is only more difficult for them to possess it. It is this use
of that the von Fritz analysis finds in Xenophanes and
Heraclitus. Yet, this meaning of is quite rare in our
extant texts. 2) As a number of occurrences of in our
extent texts suggests, meant above all a character or
even a kind of moral self. So the original Homeric notion of
as a character or attitude was not only preserved and
strengthened but also morally deepened and developed
towards a kind of men‘s moral fundament or self. The
frequent connection of with a moral attribute testifies
to this sweeping trend.ii
i Cf. Semonides: ' ' (fr. 1.3, Diehl);
Solon: ' (fr. 17,
Diehl); Theognis: (v.
142).
ii In Solon occurs eight times. Only once it is ascribed to
God (cf. preceding note), the other occurrences testifies to the meaning
‗character or attitude‘. Moreover, since it is used five times with a moral
attribute, it is possible to conclude that in Solon this (practical) meaning
of is emphasized by its connection with the moral domain; cf.
(fr. 3.7, Diehl); (fr. 4.7); (fr.
5.10); (fr. 8.6); (fr. 23.15). For a similar
account see Theognis; cf. (v. 74, cf. v. 88);
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By the way, either semantic use of seems to
have quite different a relationship to the original verbal
form . For whereas in the former use might (as a
kind of divine insight or plan) be related to the act of,i
the in the latter use seems to be lacking all relations
with the verbal form, meaning just a moral character.
III. in Parmenides
Let us now look at how is used in Parmenides.
Preliminarily, it could be submitted that whereas was
– as the majority of its occurrences in the contemporary
texts suggests – usually used in moral-practical terms
(meaning a character or even moral self), Parmenides seems
to have used it quite differently. Since Parmenides‘ poem is
usually understood as an ontological exposition, it is sus-
(v. 89); v. 109); (v.
196); (v. 223) etc.
i This use of could be rendered either way (i.e. as an
insight or a plan/intention) corresponding to the original Homeric
meaning of as ‗realizing or understanding a situation‘, cf. von
Fritz 1945, p. 223-224: ‗A dangerous situation, or a situation which
otherwise deeply affects the individual realizing it, often immediately
calls forth or suggest a plan to escape from, or to deal with, the
situation. The visualization of this plan, which, so to speak, extends the
development of the situation into the future, is then also considered a
function of the, so that the terms and can acquire the
meaning of ―plan‖ or ―planning‖.‘
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pected that the meaning of is theoretical rather than
moral-practical. For as the expressions like
(‗Observe through your mind‘, B 4.1) or
, ‗hold
back your mind from this way of inquiry‘, B 7.2) suggest,
Parmenides seems to conceive of the meaning of in
theoretical terms. So there seems to be a considerable
difference in how was used in usual colloquial
language, on the one hand, and in Parmenides, on the other
hand. That deserves not only our attention, but also an
explanation.
First of all, it is a question why we are so easily
prone to understand in Parmenides in theoretical rather
than practical terms. For although in the expressions
mentioned above seems to have theoretical meaning, it is
not difficult to imagine another constructions (e.g. ‗Observe
by virtue of your character‘, ‗Hold back your character from
this way of inquiry‘). There are I suggest at least two rea-
sons for its theoretical construction: 1) The usual onto-
logical or theoretical understanding of Parmenides‘ poem
seems to play an important role in it. For if one expects to
find in the poem an ontological exposition, they are also
prone to understand as a basis of, or a capacity for,
this ontological or theoretical activity. 2) Probably a more
important reason for its theoretical construction involves
our assumption or even prejudice to construe by
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means of its connection to . As to , it is actually
to be construed in theoretical terms since it is an activity of
seeing, contemplating, or thinking. Moreover, in
Parmenides it seems even to be explicitly connected with
(cf. ‗without ... you won‘t find B 8.35-36).
Since is supposed to be an ontological (i.e. highly
theoretical) concept, the connection of to seems
to only stress the original theoretical meaning of .
Now, since there is an etymological or linguistic
connection between and , we are prone to
assume that – similarly to our words ‗to think‘ and
‗thought‘ – there must be also a functional or semantic con-
nection between both Greek words. As we have however
suggested at the end of second section of our paper, the
functional or semantic connection between and
is largely at odds with the contemporary usual and most
frequent meaning of . For if was then construed in
moral-practical terms as a character, it seems to have been
discharged of most of its connections to . So although
we can find it evident to functionally or semantically
connect to (in particular because of the con-
nection of our own words ‗to think‘ and ‗thought‘), in the
contemporary language it did not seem to hold. In any case,
in assuming the functional or semantic connection between
and , we could be inclined to render as an
act of, or a capacity for, , thereby understanding it in
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theoretical terms. To reiterate, if means a character or
a moral self, it is rather difficult to see how it could bear
upon the verbal form, the meaning of which is the activity
of seeing or contemplating.
If the theoretical meaning of largely depends
on its functional or semantic connection to , we can
ask whether this connection is explicitly to be found in the
poem or whether it is only vaguely implied on the analogy
of our words ‗to think‘ and ‗thought‘. There is at least one
place in the poem where both words seem to occur in a very
close connection. This connection seems to be somehow
established in the line B 8.34; but since it is this line we are
dealing with and since we have not so far arrived at its
interpretation, we had now better pass it over. Another
place where the connection appears to be established im-
mediately follows lines B 8.35-36 that (by means of the
particle ) give reason for the line B 8.34: ‗For ()
without being () on which it (i.e. ) once revealed
dependsi you won‘t find contemplation ().‘ (B 8.35-
i I construe the clause in keeping
with Mourelatos‘ interpretation: ‗The key to the phrase is, I believe, not
in the participle (from a rare verb, the semantics of
which are unavoidably obscure) but in the phrases. The
usual translation assumes that has vaguely locative or instrumental
force. It has been overlooked that the together with can have
an idiomatic sense ―to depend on, to rely upon, to be under the authority
of‖.‘ (Mourelatos 1970, p. 171) The subject of the clause is
supplied from the preceding line, being just the attribute.
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36) As these lines suggest, and (or )i are
linked by virtue of ii
since both and are
thought to be closely related to .iii
Although the theoretical implications of in
Parmenides‘ poem seems to be very strong and con-
spicuous, there still remain two questions to ask: 1) Do
i Although is sometimes distinguished from by the
reference to the grammatical fact that the nouns with the ending
designate the result of an action (cf. Stenzel 1989, p. 221), in
Parmenides and mean the same (cf. von Fritz 1945, p. 241,
n. 95). See also uses of in Xenophanes and Theognis: In
fragment B 23 Xenophanes says that God is totally different from
mortal beings in shape () and . The contrast with God‘s
outer shape makes it clear that means his inner nature or
character, and not (only) his thought. In three of all four occurrences (v.
435, 1083, and 1149) Theognis uses synonymously with
(meaning character). Only in v. 985 it seems to be used in the meaning
‗as swift as thought‘, but even this use of is more appropriately
to be understood in terms of the swiftness of spirit that can immediately
see even the most distant places and times (cf. von Fritz 1945, p. 224:
‗In this connection seems to designate the imagination by which
we can visualize situations and objects which are remote in space and
time.‘), and not in terms of the swiftness of thought as a particular act of
thinking.
ii See e.g. von Fritz 1945, p. 237: ‗Parmenides seems to assert
(my italics) that and are always and necessarily connected
with and ‘. Cf. also Wiesner‘s statement quoted in part above
where the connection between and is also just supposed
without being accounted for: ‗Der zweite Grund ―weil die Erkenntnis
Bestand hat‖ wird dadurch gestützt, daß Erkennen nur mit dem
Seienden anzutreffen ist (B 8,35-36), d.h. einem realen, sachhaltigen
Objekt.‘ (Wiesner 1987, p. 176).
iii Cf. 1) the relationship between and (‗without
you will not find‘) and 2) the dependence of (or ) as
the subject of the clause on .
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really all occurrences of in the poem unambiguously
testify to theoretical meaning? 2) Even if there is a unique.
all uses of in Parmenides are completely lacking all
practical implications had in the contemporary
colloquial usage?
As to the first question, we can answer it in the
negative. For there is at least one occurrence of in the
poem that unambiguously testifies to the colloquial
practical meaning of as a character. It is the occu-
rrence of in the line B 6.6. But before embarking on its
interpretation, we should remember the context in which it
occurs. As the survey of the contemporary, primarily lyric
texts suggest, the main part of the fragment B 6 works up
the traditional views about men and their relation to gods,
which can be taken to be a kind of archaic anthropology.i
Given its almost stereotypical use in the lyrics, the archaic
anthropology could be considered to be a standard lyric
motive. As the fragment B 6 taking up the traditional lyric
vocabulary of the archaic anthropology states, in
comparison with the omnipotent and omniscient gods, men
appear to be not-knowing (cf. , B 6.4),
helpless (cf. , B 6.5), straying (cf. , B
6.5), deaf and blind (cf. , B 6.7) etc.
i Cf. Mansfeld 1964, p. 1-41.
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Now, it is significant that within Parmenides‘
exposition of the archaic anthropology the word
occurs, being attributed to ordinary men who are helpless,
not-knowing, deaf and blind. Its relationship to ordinary
men is further stressed by the attribute (‗straying‘,
B 6.6) by which it is accompanied. In other words, (as
a ) is here explicitly understood as straying,
i.e. erroneous, labile, or changing. Now, if we take into
account our preliminary survey of the uses of in the
poem that largely accord with its usual theoretical
understanding, the use of in B 6.6 seems to be quite
unique, even anomalous. For – as we have seen – the usual
meaning of in the poem seems to be construed by
means of its connection to being, the appears to
exclude any kind of error or lability; indeed it is hardly
conceivable that what is essentially connected with the
unchanging steady being could be labile. So, on this
interpretation, the very notion of a straying or labile
has to be dismissed as a unique or even anomalous use of
in Parmenides.i
i Cf. von Fritz 1945, p. 237: ‗But a very real difficulty, which
has never been solved and perhaps does not admit a perfect solution, is
created by the fact that in some instances Parmenides seems to assert
that and are always and necessarily connected with
and and therefore with the truth, which seems to imply that the
cannot err.‘
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29
Now, as to our first question, we can submit that
there is indeed one occurrence of in the poem that
unambiguously testifies to its colloquial practical meaning
(to be rendered as a character). For if, within the exposition
of the archaic anthropology, is attributed to ordinary,
i.e. helpless and not-knowing men, it is first to be expected
that it has practical rather than theoretical meaning. This
colloquial practical meaning further explains why the
can be straying, i.e. labile or erroneous. For it allows us not
to construe by means of its apparently essential
connection to being so that its straying or labile nature
would no longer be suspicious or even problematic.
Let us now turn to our second question, i.e. whether
other occurrences of in the poem could also have
some practical implications. To reiterate, our preliminary
survey, that is in accord with the usual interpretation of
suggested that in the poem should be construed
in theoretical terms. Nevertheless, if there is one
unambiguous practical use of in the poem (as it is in B
6.6), then excluding all practical implications from other
occurrences of would involve assuming two quite
distinct and incompatible uses of in the poem.
Although one usually tends to understand in this way,
it would be nevertheless more plausible to assume that there
is only one conception of in the poem. If so,
should have both theoretical and practical meaning. In other
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30
words, each occurrence of should be understood as
having both theoretical and practical implications.
Moreover, if we considered the occurrence of
in the fragment B 6 to be unique or even anomalous, not
only its very occurrence would be strange and incidental
but, consequently, the whole exposition of the archaic
anthropology in fragment B 6 would become rather
superfluous and futile. However, given the central role of
fragment B 6 for Parmenides‘ (ontological) argumenti, we
have to take everything in the fragment to essentially
contribute to Parmenides‘ argument or his narrative
strategy.ii
i The first two lines are usually considered to essentially
contribute to an assumed ontological argument of the poem: Parmenides
first relates being to and (given the difficult syntax of the
first sentence, the precise form of the relationship is however a matter
of dispute among the interpreters) and second makes a vital contention
that whereas there is being, nothing is not (cf. B 6.1-2). Sometimes the
fragment B 6 or rather its first two lines are taken to constitute a part of
a continuous ontological argument containing the fragments B 2, B 3,
and B 6.
ii As we have suggested in the previous note, only the first two
lines of B 6 are usually considered to relevantly contribute to
Parmenides‘ intrinsic (ontological) argument, and the rest of the
fragment where there is the exposition of the archaic anthropology is
taken to be a mere poetical or metaphorical pendant to the intrinsic
(ontological) argument.
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31
IV. Interpretation of B 8.34
After these general considerations about in
Parmenides‘ poem, let us return to the line B 8.34. In the
first section of our paper we have considered its most
plausible syntactical construction and arrived at the
following preliminary rendering (PR): ‗What is in itself the
same (i.e. ) is to think and that is why there is thought.‘
Yet, despite its syntactical plausibility, its (philosophical)
meaning appeared problematic. For, on this rendering, the
line amounts to saying ‗Since it is possible to think (being),
there is thought‘. So the line seems to be trivial or even
tautological. Yet, having clarified the meaning of and
in particular that of (or ), we can now translate
its rendering as follows:
B 8.34
What is in itself the same (i.e. ) is to contemplate
and that is why the mind/character () is true.
The line involves two statements: 1) being () is
to contemplate () and 2) the contemplation of being
makes mind/character true; as to the truthfulness of mind, I
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take to be used in the veridical meaning.i The usual
interpretation assumes that the intimate connection
between and (seemingly supported, e.g., by the B
8.35-36 ‗Without being () (...) you won‘t find
contemplation ().‘) the truthfulness of mind would be
indeed trivial, for it is first assumed that there is a semantic
or functional similarity between and or
( so is thus understood as an act of, or a capacity for,
), so that – because of its connection to – is
secondly supposed to be always true and steady. But if, on
the contrary, the very nature of is labile and erroneous
(and as the expression in B 6.6 clearly
suggests it is), then the line puts forward a very nontrivial
and even revolutionary idea, i.e. that the truthfulness of
mind/character is possible only by means of the
contemplation of being. In other words, in order for the line
to be nontrivial, it has to presuppose the colloquial practical
meaning of .
i If we take the lability and erroneousness of the (as it is
corroborated by the expression ) seriously, we have to
construe in the veridical meaning. For if we interpreted it, e.g., in
the existential meaning, the line would read as follows: The very
existence of the is conditioned by the act of the contemplation of
being; so if someone is not able to contemplate being, they do not have
the , which entails its nonexistence. Yet since in B 6 is
unambiguously attributed to ordinary, i.e. helpless and not-knowing,
men, who confuse being and nonbeing (cf. B 6.8-9), the contemplation
of being cannot itself guarantee the existence of the , as it is usually
supposed.
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33
Therefore the line has to be interpreted on two
levels:
1) The line makes sense only on the assumption that
the is by itself labile and erroneous. This meaning of
is not only clearly stated in B 6 but – as we found out
in the second section of our paper – it was its ordinary
colloquial meaning. Now, as we have suggested and as we
would see more clearly in connection with the second level
of interpretation, it might have been Parmenides‘ intention
to get over this exclusively practical meaning of
towards a more philosophically promising and relevant one.
Still, in interpreting the line we have to proceed from the
ordinary practical meaning. For it was this meaning which
Parmenides had at his disposal when he composed his poem
and from which he had to proceed by conceiving of in
a new way. Moreover, if we take account of his audience,
that was at that time constituted by listeners rather than
readers, it is hardly conceivable that Parmenides would
have utterly ignored its expectations and possibilities of
understanding and used one of his key philosophical terms
in a rather solipsistic manner. Indeed, it is hardly
conceivable that he (or any other author) would have run
the risk of being totally misunderstood by his audience.i
i Of course, it could be at once objected that Parmenides was a
philosopher who ignored the contemporary audience and
uncompromisingly elaborated his visions and arguments. Although
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34
However, against the background of the ordinary
practical meaning of , the line not only becomes
intelligible, but also receives a new important dimension.
For whereas the line has so far been usually understood in
(theoretical) terms of epistemology (i.e. as somehow
relating or to ), its practical and even ethical
dimension now becomes evident. On this practical or
ethical interpretation, the first part of the line (‗What is in
itself the same is to contemplate‘) is to be understood as an
appeal to contemplating being, whereas the second one
(‗that is why the mind/character is true‘) states what one can
expect as the fulfillment of the appeal, i.e. truthfulness and
steadiness of one‘s own character. Hence, by contemplating
being, our mind/character becomes true and steady; in other
words, by contemplating being, we can hope to overcome
the lability and erroneousness of our character or even our
human nature.
2) As to the first level of interpretation, it largely re-
presents the way of how contemporary audiences would
have proceeded by interpreting the line. Yet, as we have
suggested, it might have been Parmenides‘ intention to
philosophers could be seen that way, in the case of Parmenides that kind
of philosophic arrogance is out of place. As we have suggested, his
audience was listeners rather than readers. Unlike the readers, who –
because of their repeated reading – have the time and possibility to
rethink their usual notions, the listeners have to immediately grasp the
meaning of what they are listening to.
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35
achieve the essential link between and and,
consequently, construe in theoretical terms. It is the
lines B 8.34-36 that seem to testify to this effort: ‗What is in
itself the same (i.e. ) is to contemplate and that is why
the mind/character () is true. For () without being
() on which it depends (i.e. ), once revealed you
won‘t find contemplation ().‘ The theoretical
construction of or the functional connection between
and seems to be established by virtue of ; for
both and are here thought to be closely related
to .i
It is, however, significant that the connection of
and to (and thereby the theoretical
construction of ) is not argued for but rather
rhetorically or poetically invoked. One can be of course
inclined to refuse this interpretation as not philosophically
relevant, for philosophy is supposed to proceed by ar-
guments and justifications. Still, before doing so, we should
realize that, on the usual interpretation, the connection of
and to is also very vague, being merely
assumed, i.e. not only not argued for, but not explained
either. So, in comparison with the usual interpretation that
is based on a mere assumption, our interpretation provides
i Cf. 1) the relationship between and (‗without
you won‘t find‘) and 2) the dependence of (or ) as the
subject of clause on .
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an explanation. If we take into account that we are dealing
with a poem, it is not so surprising that there are non-
argumentative narrative strategies and procedures there. At
any rate, it is also significant that in philosophical tradition
this interpretation, that is only secondary, has become not
only prevalent, but the only possible.
V. Conclusion
Unlike the usual approach that construes the line B
8.34 in terms of epistemology, we should proceed from the
ordinary practical meaning of as a character. In our
interpretation, the line is then to be understood both as an
ethical appeal and as Parmenides‘ effort to redefine or
extend the colloquial practical meaning of towards a
more theoretical or epistemological one. If we, on the other
hand, discarded the relevance of the ordinary practical
meaning of for the interpretation of the poem, we
would not only run the risk of misconstruing it but we
would not be able to correctly appreciate Parmenides‘
innovative genius and his contribution to philosophy; in
other words, we would miss how he established the fun-
ctional connection between and or how he
conceived in theoretical terms.
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37
In our interpretation of line B 8.34, there further
seems to be an important (practical or ethical) alternative
between two sorts of human attitude or character () in
Parmenides‘ poem: the one , we can call philosophical,
is characterized by its truthfulness and steadiness (being
dependent on ), whereas the other, peculiar to ordinary
men as characterized by the archaic anthropology, is
straying, erroneous and labile. This interpretation may have
some consequences for the understanding of the poem as a
whole. For whereas it is usually seen as a kind of theoretical
treatise on ontology or epistemology, it now turns out to
have important practical implications. In fact, it is what one
would expect from the very fact that it is a poem composed
in Homeric hexameters and using the Homeric and the old
lyric vocabulary and phraseology (e.g., the motive of
archaic anthropology).
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38
Bibliography:
Cordero, N.-L., 1984, Les deux chemins de Parménide,
Paris.
Fritz, K. von, 1945, ―Nous, Noein, and Their Derivatives in
Pre-Socratic Philosophy (excluding Anaxagoras): Part I.
From the Beginnings to Parmenides‖, in: Classical
Philology, p. 223-242.
Gadamer, H.-G., 1996, Der Anfang der Philosophie,
Stuttgart.
Heitsch, E., 1974, Parmenides. Die Anfänge der Ontologie,
Logik und Naturwissenschaft, München.
Hölscher, U., 1968, Anfängliches Fragen, Göttingen.
Hölscher, U., 1986, Parmenides. Vom Wesen des Seienden,
Frankfurt a.M.
Mansfeld, J., 1964, Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und
die Menschliche Welt, Assen.
Mourelatos, A. P. D., 1970, The Route of Parmenides, New
Haven, London.
Stenzel, J., 1989, ―Zur Entwicklung des Geistesbegriffes in
der griechischen Philosophie‖, in: H.-G. Gadamer, (ed.),
Um die Begriffswelt der Vorsokratiker, Darmstadt, p. 214-
245.
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39
Tarán, L., 1965, Parmenides. A Text with Translation,
Commentary, and Critical Essays, Princeton, New Persey.
Wiesner, J., 1987, ―Überlegungen zu Parmenides B 8,34‖,
in: P. Aubenque (ed.), Études sur Parménide II. Paris.
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40
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41
Chiara Chinello
Oedipus, the Tragedy of Self Recognition
My intent in this article is to show how, according to
Ricoeur, the tragedy of Oedipus can be read as a tragedy of
self recognition. In order to do that, we need to view
Oedipus‘ story as a whole. This means that we should read
Oedipus Rex in light of Oedipus at Colonus. This will help
us to understand that two identities will be reached at the
end of the story, the identity of a man, Oedipus, and the
identity of a state institution, Athens. So this tale has
political value, as well.
We can read this story as a whole. As it is symbolic,
it needs two opposite developments to be understood; a
retrospective quest, which goes towards its origins and
towards the birth of tragedy in general, to reconstruct its
past and an anticipating quest, which permits a new
meaning to emerge. To follow these developments in the
story of Oedipus, we must use two different perspectives:
the archaeological interpretation, which goes back to the
past and reaches the unconscious by overcoming the border
of repressed instincts, and the teleological construction,
which offers the opportunity to solve the conflict of the
interpretations of the self by walking the path of truth. This
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42
implies that we should follow two different magistri
through this path: Freud and Hegel. We are going to start
with Freud.
The Freudian interpretation of tragedy
According to Freud (1900), tragedy has its own source in
the same primitive heritage on which we draw liberally.
‗His destiny (that of Oedipus) moves us only because it
might have been ours […].‘ And then he adds: ‗King
Oedipus […] merely shows us the fulfilment of our own
childhood wishes.‘i This tragedy consists of a process of
revealing ‗that Oedipus himself is the murderer of Laius,
but further, that he is the son of the murdered man and of
Jocasta.‗ii The pleasure we feel seeing his misadventures
derives from two processes: the identification with Oedipus,
which the spectator experiences, and the distance that he
knows divides him from the character on stage. To
understand why we see ourselves in Oedipus as if we were
looking at ourselves in a mirror, we need to investigate this
primitive heritage and to find the reason for the pleasure we
feel by means of the enjoyment that takes place.
In his essay: Psychopatische Personen auf der
i 261.
ii 262.
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43
Bühne, Psychopathic Characters on the Stage, Freud says
that the purpose of drama consists of:
opening up sources of pleasure or enjoyment in our
emotional life, just as, in the case of intellectual
activity, joking or fun open up similar sources, many
of which that [intellectual] activity had made
inaccessible.i
These sources are normally closed, having been
madeunreachable for our consciousness. But they have not
been erased. They are still there in our unconscious and,
sometimes, they find a way to reveal themselves. This is
possible thanks to the play, intended in both its meanings as
a piece acted on stage and as a child‘s game.
Freud explains that the performance has the same
function for adults as the play has for children. To be more
exact, we could say that they obtain an opposite effect:
while playing, children act as if they were adults, and they
are able to imagine their future; whilst seeing a drama,
adults relive that childhood feeling of being able to do
anything, and they are able to recall their past. In both
cases, what emerges is will power, a desire to reshape the
world and their destiny in their own image. Briefly, we
i Freud, S. (1905 or 1906). 305.
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could say that spectators enjoy the drama because in this
way their narcissism is gratified. By identifying themselves
with the characters on stage, they become heroes. The
‗pleasure principle‘ here overcomes the ‗reality principle‘.
Moreover, drama allows some dangerous feelings to
emerge from our subconscious, without our being
compromised by them. Their catastrophic consequences are
suffered by someone else, and after all it is all an illusion,
which lets us watch what happens without any danger. So
this character identification is neither definitive nor
permanent; it is instead revocablei: when the ludus
scaenicus finishes, spectators put themselves back in their
own shoes again and restart their ‗normal‘ life. Drama gives
‗an enjoyable shape even to forebodings of misfortune.‗ii
Pleasure derives from the awareness of the aesthetic
distance which separates the audience from the violence
performed. It is an experience of suffering which can be
lived without dying, thanks to character identification.
Though tragedy shows all the aspects of suffering, it
involves a principle of compensation as well and the
possibility of pleasure. This is its greatest ἀποπία.
This is also true of Oedipus. In a letter to his friend Fliess,
dated October 15th
, 1897, Freud writes that Oedipus
i Cf. Lavagetto, M. (1985). Freud, Literature and Other. 359.
Torino: Einaudi. [In Italian].
ii Freud, S. (1905 or 1906). 306.
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represents the fulfilment of a desire, which comes from our
own childhood. There is a difference between us and him,
as well. We are happier than he is, because we have
separated our sexual impulses from our mother and we have
forgotten our envy towards our father. The horror we feel
towards his story is caused by the primal repression of our
desires. The poet obliges us to face our inner selves, where
they still survive.
The desire is not attainable in itself: its only access
consists of semantics: the symbolism is the mathematics of
instinct. By means of symbols, desire and impulses are
articulated and acquire meaning which must be subjected to
constant interpretation. Only in this way do we not lose the
vital and changing afflatus of the longing for existence of
which they are expressions. As lava tends to solidify upon
contact with air, so does sentiment, which runs the risk of
being fossilized when emerging at the level of discourse;
the symbol is the only institution capable of preserving its
fluidity.
Pleasure in drama is related as well to the sacrifice
which men were obliged to make by the need to enter
society. They had to accept the reality principle and
sacrifice part of their narcissism. This process caused those
discontents of civilization which gave name to one of
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Freud‘s most famous textsi. There is also something more.
Tragedies and their representations give vent to that primary
drive which, according to Freud, is as fundamental as Eros:
the death drive, Todestrieb or Thanatos. Tragedy offers an
advantage to society: this drive can be satisfied by means of
performance so that it does not need to be actualized.
Furthermore, the origins of drama should not be
forgotten: its birth belongs in a religious context. In the
beginning, dramatisations were performed during religious
ceremonies, and their origin probably can be traced back to
sacrificial rites.
In Psychopathic Characters on the Stage Freud says
that a hero is someone who rebels against God and the
presence of suffering in the world, ‗and pleasure is derived,
as it seems, from the affliction of a weaker being in the face
of divine might.‘ii So the origins of drama can be found in a
rebellion against God and society and in fact, according to
Freud, there are three kinds of drama: religious drama,
social drama and drama of character, which differ only in
the domain of action.iii
In Totem and Taboo, Freud says that
this rebellion against the Father-God led to a sense of guilt.
This tragic guilt is borrowed by the hero, who must suffer
and take the guilt out on himself ‗in order to relieve the
i Cf. Freud, S. (1930). 59-145.
ii Freud, S. (1905 or 1906). 89.
iii Cf. Freud, S. (1905 or 1906). 90-91.
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Chorus from theirs.‗i He is that Father-God and his death
has to be reproduced on stage. This scene is hypocritical,
because in reality the members of the Chorus were those
who had committed the crime, who had rebelled against
authority; now they commiserate with the hero whom at the
same time they had condemned to suffer.
Κάθαπζιρ is not only an aesthetic phenomenon, it
also has religious and anthropological genesis, because it is
the expiation of a sin which was truly committed.
According to Freud, the sin being the father‘s killing and
the consequent violation of the incest prohibition. The
tragedy of Oedipus shows the origins of religion and
society. However, this tragedy also shows something more
interesting: it contains evidence of something else and its
way of proceeding is similar to that of psychoanalysis. The
spectators‘ reaction to it derives from acknowledging
themselves in Oedipus. They see that beyond God and fate,
their subconscious is hidden. They discover their identity by
watching this tragedy.
i Freud, S. (1913). 156.
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Ricoeur’s mimesis 3 and its capability to rebuild
the world
Following Freud‘s analysis of the tragedy of Oedipus to
this point, we have explored the origins of drama and the
cause of the pleasure it generates. We have discovered that
in drama we find again our past as individuals and species;
we have recognized a part of our own story in Oedipus‘
story. Ricoeur goes further and interprets the story of
Oedipus as a tragedy of self-consciousness, as the
explication of the Delphic motto ‗γνῶθι ζεαςηόν‟, ‗know
thyself‘. Tragedy helps us to recognize our true identity and
to elaborate upon it. It is a symptom as well as a treatment.
Every tragedy teaches us who we are and which
consequences our actions will have. It teaches how to be
happy. ‗Every tragedy stages the relationship between
action and happiness or unhappiness, through virtue and
vices.‗i The pleasure we feel is the pleasure of learning and
the pleasure of recognition. This pleasure which derives
from fear and pity and which is what Aristotle called
κάθαπζιρ, leads to the level which Ricoeur calls mimesis 3ii.
He draws on the Aristotelian idea of narration as an
imitation of actions, mimesis, to explain how narration can
give a new meaning to the world in which we inhabit. To do
i Cf. Ricoeur, P (1984). Interview.
ii Cf. Ricoeur, P. (1984). 50.
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so he uses Gadamers‘ Hermeneutic Circle, which he
transforms into another circle, the Circle of Mimesis.
According to Ricoeur, we can distinguish three kinds of
mimesis:
Mimesis 1, the field of ππᾶξιρ, always already
prefigured and pre-interpreted. At this level ethics is
not yet a rule, but it is an intuition of the models of
actions which constitute what Hegel calls
Sittlichkeit, the ethical substance of society. It
creates a normative dimension which becomes
paradigmatic to confront and value actions. Ricoeur
(1984) says that there are no stories which do not
arouse approval or disapproval when confronted
with a hierarchy of values, whose poles are
goodness and wickedness.
Mimesis 2, the level in which actions are configured
in a story; they receive an order, a new and deeper
sense. ‗C‘est dans la mesure où l‘action en tant que
telle a une dimension éthique, que le récit, qui en est
la mimèsis, a lui aussi une dimension éthique.‘i
Mimesis 3, where the story in the form of a text can
re-enter the world to be inhabited by readers and to
re-shape the world of actions. ‗What is
communicated, in the final analysis, is, beyond the
i Ricoeur, P. (1996). 656.
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sense of a work, the world it projects and that
constitutes its horizon.‘i
At this stage, tragedy is able to enter the world of human
actions again, and to change it. ‗The thought experiments
we conduct in the great laboratory of the imaginary are also
explorations in the realm of good and evil.‘ii Once
have discovered themselves in Oedipus, they cannot avoid
rethinking their own life too. This aspect is not owned only
by tragedies; instead it is characteristic to every text. The
text offers its readers the possibility of finding themselves
within it. It helps them to see themselves as the starting
points of a series of actions. ‗Discourse in action and in use
refers backwards and forwards, to a speaker and a world'iii
.
Texts are written discourses which address themselves to a
cogito so that he could reshape his world. For this reason
they always contain an ethical connotation, which can be
enlightened by a science of interpretation: the hermeneutics.
The ethical aspect of hermeneutics is that it offers the
possibility to build a world which can be inhabited.
Between narration and life there is a gap emphasized by
symbols and metaphors. This gap prevents us from an
immediate apprehension of reality and helps us to discover
new meanings within it, thanks to the emergence of
i Ricoeur, P. (1984). 77.
ii Ricoeur, P. (1992). 164.
iii Ricoeur, P. (1976). 22.
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meaning to which symbols and metaphors give hospitality.
Otherwise we would have a perfect coincidence between
reality and our apprehension of it and due to this univocity,
no ethics would be possible.
Comme un texte, l‘action humaine est une œuvre
ouverte, dont la signification est «en suspens». C‘est
parce qu‘elle «ouvre» de nouvelles références et en
reçoit une pertinence nouvelle que les actes humains
sont aussi en attente d‘interprétation nouvelles
décidant de leur signification.i
This assumption is possible because here Ricoeur
entwines Aristotle‘s conception of mimesis with the
Kantian conception of the aesthetic, which has a unifying
function given by the faculty of judgement. At the level of
the tragedy, mimesis 2 according to Ricoeur‘s
classification, the Kantian reflective judgement is at work in
order to give a new succession to the events which take
place but, by doing so, a new meaning is given to the story
as a whole and to those events as single happenings. They
assume a sense in relation to a subject who has to take
charge of those new implications and of those new
meanings. This is an ethical task. ‗Le récit, jamais
i Ricoeur, P. (1986). 220.
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éthiquement neutre, est le premier laboratoire du jugement
moral.‘i
Hegel and the way of teleology
To understand how this is possible and to interpret
the drama of Oedipus properly, we need the help of another
magister: Hegel. We said that the tragedy of Oedipus is
symbolic, and its true meaning can be found only in light of
what comes next. Oedipus rex can be read as the ‗tragedy of
truth,‗ii if examined in the light of the subsequent Oedipus
Colonus. The Oedipus trilogy is really a tragedy of self
recognition, according to Ricoeur: Oedipus‘ guilt is his
ὕβπιρ, his claim to be in possession of truth. This ὕβπιρ of
truth is also owned by the spectators. The ὕβπιρ of truth
must be purified in order to obtain the real knowledge of
self. This can be reached only by means of poetic replica,
the only figure which is capable of keeping together the
ἀποπίαι, which constitute human identity and which cannot
be solved by choosing only one of the alternatives: Oneself
as another is the secret of human identity. This identity can
only be told by constructing a plot and that is what Oedipus
does: while he discovers the truth about his identity, he tells
i Ricoeur, P. (1990). 197.
ii Ricoeur, P. (1974). 112.
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the story of himself and he becomes an adult. Hence this is
also what the spectators do while watching Oedipus‘ story.
The blind Tiresias is the real representative of truth, and for
this reason Oedipus persecutes him. The conflict played out
by this tragedy is the conflict between the human pretension
of owning the totality of truth and the accepted blindness of
the seer. Oedipus will end his days blind: he decides to
blind himself, because when he could see, he was not able
to see the real truth. By putting out his eyes, he lets his
inner and intellectual eye see the real light of truth. This
meaning of Oedipus Rex can be understood only in the light
of Oedipus at Colonus. The archaeological hermeneutics of
Freud is no longer sufficient, as it explores the symbolism
of this story to retrace the past of mankind. Here, we need a
new hermeneutics, the teleological hermeneutics, which
interprets one figure in the light of the next one. This means
that we should read the first tragedy considering the end of
the story, which is told in the second tragedy.
Thus there are indeed two types of hermeneutics. One
is oriented towards the resurgence of archaic symbols
and the other towards the emergence of new symbols
and ascending figures, all absorbed into the final
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stage, which, as in the Phenomenology of Spirit, is no
longer a figure but as knowledge.i
Oedipus is not the voluntary author of his first
actions. He suffers his destiny. However, the end of his
story shows that there is still something that he can do: he
can carry upon his shoulders that unwilling guilt, by
acknowledging himself as the starting point of his actions.
He is able to acknowledge his responsibility in this
initiative. The initiative is the external proof that we can
start something new, that a new series of events can begin.
So Ricoeur can say: „la promesse (…) est l‘éthique de
l‘initiative.‗ii The initiative is ‗an intervention of the agent
action into the course of the world, an intervention that
effectively causes changes in the world.‗iii
The recognition, ἀναγνώπιζιρ, is defined by
Aristotle as a transition from ignorance to knowledge;
Aristotle himself sees the best example of it in the tragedy
of Oedipusiv
. Having arrived at Colon, Oedipus can de-
termine which crime he has really committed, he can
evaluate his acts. He now comprehends his innocence. ‗I am
charged with a crime, stranger;‗ says Oedipus, ‗yes, I am so
i Ricoeur, P. (1974). 114.
ii Ricoeur, P. (1986). 301.
iii Ricoeur, P. (1992). 109.
iv Aristotle, Poetics, 1452 a 33.
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charged in spite of myself; let the gods know, I wanted
nothing of this (421-422).‗i No one else but Oedipus has
killed his father and married his mother, and he feels regret,
but he can also feel relief because of his ignorance and
innocence. According to Ricoeur, the tragedy of Oedipus is
the best example of a Bildungsroman: by following his
story, we can understand what the Freudian motto: Wo es
war, soll ich werden means.
This tragedy can also be read in the light of the
latest book by Ricoeur: The Course of Recognition.
Following the indications given by Ricoeur in this book, we
can say that Oedipus completes a course of recognition. At
the end of Oedipus Rex, Oedipus reaches the first level of
recognition; he discovers his natural ties, that is, he finally
knows who his real parents are and to which family he
belongs. Those natural ties which were denied to him are
now restored. Oedipus at Colonus, furthermore, shows
Oedipus being accepted in a social and political context,
entering this way the second and third level of recognition.
According to Ricoeur, recognition can be classified as a
relation of reciprocity, understood in the Kantian Critique
of Pure Reason‘s sense: ‗All substances, in so far as they
can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thoroughgoing
reciprocity.‘ The principle of reciprocal action can be
i Cf. Ricoeur, P. (2005). 78.
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called, this way, a principle of community.i To complete the
the self recognition, the institutional recognition appears as
essential and necessary.
Oedipus, a political tragedy
My personal opinion is that this reading of Oedipus,
when put into perspective, gives us something more, which
we should investigate further. From my point of view, it is
not only Oedipus‘ identity which is discovered at the end of
the story. This tragedy also has political value. However, let
us take it one step at a time and see how the story ends.
Finally, Oedipus‘ suffering comes to an end. His condition
as a persecuted being and a reject from society finds a
conclusion. He eventually finds peace and is at last received
into a political community. His isolation ends. This can
happen because finally Oedipus understands. What happens
here is that Oedipus is now conscious of not being king. His
kingdom has led to only pity and suffering, being based on
ignorance of his true identity and arrogance of being master
of his destiny. His desire for totality has been put in doubt
and mortally wounded. His damned progeny is condemned
to perish and end without successors. Thebes is destined to
be torn apart by civil war. The desire for dominion and
i Ricoeur, P. (2005), 153.
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complete possession, which distinguishes Oedipus‘ race,
will be humiliated and defeated. Here the real nature of man
and of political dimension emerges.
Man is essentially desire, but this desire has the
character of a subversive and potentially dangerous Trieb, a
drive full of aggression: ‗Men are not gentle creatures, who
want to be loved, and who at the most can defend them-
selves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary,
creatures among whose instinctual endowments are to be
reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness‘ said Freud,
and further: ‗Homo homini lupus [man is wolf to man].
Who in the face of all his experience of life and of history
will have the courage to dispute this assertion?‘i
Civilization has been built in accordance with
utilitarian purposes: to guarantee the survival of humanity.
It has conveyed the burden of sublimation of impulses and
narcissism upon itself to uphold this guarantee. It offers
comfort and protection and rewards the sacrifice of the
impulse of aggression towards others made by the indi-
vidual by means of art, science, and religion; the
constructions of culture. According to Freud, civilization is
an order suspended over evil: the potential violence of indi-
vidualistic and amoral libido is suspended and sublimated,
but it is not overcome.
i Freud, S. (1930), 63.
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Society consists of only the discovery that the greatest
strength of an individual could be overcome by the union of
the weaker people:
Violence could be broken by union, and the power of
those who were united now represented law in
contrast to the violence of the single individual. Thus
we see that right is the might of a community. It is
still violence, ready to be directed against any
individual who resists it; it works by the same
methods and follows the same purposes. The only real
difference lies in the fact that what prevails is no
longer the violence of an individual but that of a
community.i
Even the evangelical precept: love thy neighbour as thyself,
hides a perversion: that person whom I love by loving my
neighbour is myself. Therefore, altruism is a narcissistic and
selfish sentiment, a critique already applied to Christianity
by Nietzsche.
Can this really be the only key to understanding the
social phenomenon? According to Ricoeur, no, it cannot,
and to demonstrate this he uses the concept developed by
the young Hegel in Jena, that of man as desire for others‘
i Freud, S. (1932). 204-205.
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desire, which is expressed in the political and social sphere
by the need for respect, the basis of the process of
recognition, thus, becoming: ‗the desire to live well with
and for others in just institutions.‘i The same Ricoeurian
attempt to integrate the archaeology of the subject by Freud
with the Hegelian teleology of self-consciousness can be
read as an effort to rediscover the presence of the other even
in the roots of man's desire to be, which constitutes identity.
But the political dream of a state where it would be
possible to live in peace and in accordance with law and
justice is neither death nor destined to be defeated even in
the tragedy of Oedipus. Oedipus has a heritage to deliver: a
dream of a new political dimension which is begun by
Theseus. Theseus offers the gift of hospitality to Oedipus
and requires nothing in return. Thebes is destined to
succumb because of its fratricidal hate. Athens will offer a
new political dimension of justice. When legal systems are
developed in human communities, there is the need to dis-
tinguish between different degrees of culpability, in order to
give just punishment, proportionate to the crime committed.
Athens can be proud of its Aeropagus and of its justice.
i Ricoeur, P. (1994). 180.
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A new identity, which must be found through the
ἀπορία.
This is why in this case it is not only Oedipus who
finds his identity: it is also Athens. The identity of a
community is based on a temporal continuity projected
towards the future. We can make a parallel between the
identity of the individual and the identity of a society. Both
are founded on what we can call persistence of the self,
which assures the permanence of sameness both in
individuals and in societies and makes their stories continue
in the present tense. Both can be defined as a ‗narrative‘, as
they can be described as the story of a self who understands
himself by composing the events of his life in a narrative
structure. Athens discovers its identity by watching the
discovery of his true identity made by Oedipus. While
following Oedipus‘ story, Athens reaches a better
understanding of itself.
All this can be obtained only by means of enlarged
metaphors, which the tragedy is, since symbols, metaphors
and dramas give hospitality to that explosive event of
meaning called ἀποπία. The ἀποπία, far from being an
obstacle that makes it difficult to carry on philosophical
reflection, when not preventing completely its development
and forcing it to halt in front of its difficulties, instead,
according to Ricoeur, represents the heart of philosophical
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discovery, the centre button of the activity of thought,
which allows philosophy to maintain its dynamic structure
and productivity. The ἀποπία is a real and genuine choice of
methodology, deliberately and constantly preserved as
stimulus to think and rejection of the possibility of lingering
in what can be considered as a final solution.
Tragedy provokes thought, since it invites thought
to hold the contradictions which it proposes. The possibility
of multiple possible interpretations of tragedies, sometimes
in conflict with one another and equally valid, must be
preserved as a constant supply of new beginnings for
philosophy. Philosophy is called to re-think critically the
contents of tragedy. Tragedy offers its contradiction to a
cogito, whose judgement is called into question. ‗A partir
de la donation, la position‘, Ricoeur (1959). The cogito be-
comes guarantor of the truth of the interpretation given to
the tragedy and the responsibility to look for it belongs to
cogito. The cogito is called to be responsible and to become
a theoretical structure of certitude. This cogito is no longer
the Cartesian cogito, already put into question by those
whom Ricoeur calls the masters of suspicion: Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud. They have definitively discovered
and destroyed its pretension to be a real and self sufficient
foundation for knowledge. With their disruptive analysis,
ἀποπία appears as insuperable. However, we must not be
scared of it; on the contrary, we must stay within this
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contradiction. Only this way can we discover the real
human nature, which is rooted in desire. This root can be
reached only by metaphors and drama.
Here we find a new conception of identity, accord-
ing to Ricoeur at last: it derives from a new model of
cogito, which he defines as brisé. Brisé means broken, in
fact it is just by being broken that it is able to meet the
other. This cogito brisé is able to remember but also to
forget, after the Freudian work of mourning. ‗The past is in-
destructible, but we cannot be destroyed by it,‘i said
Ricoeur in an interview. It is not about erasing, it is about
restoring. This new cogito is reconciliation. Its identity is
not a starting point but a goal attainable by composing the
incoherencies of memory. The ego of the ego cogito
requires an interpretation. As the word being, with which
Hegel's Science of Logic begins, this ego is as true as it is
abstract and empty. It requires filling: Erfüllung. Through
the appropriation of meaning within the symbol, we are
called to regain possession of our essence, which is our
effort to exist and our desire for being. We are distracted by
that situation of divertissement in which we are situated
from the very beginning of our being in the world. This
Erfüllung is given by actual experience, the works in which
our essence appears, as Hegel said. Becoming ourselves
i Mele, F. (2001). 78.
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implies an ethical task, it is not an acquisition previously
possessed. All that we have said can be told for Oedipus,
who discovers his real being along his path.
Narrative helps this work using μίμηζιρ, in the
Aristotelian sense of μίμηζιρ ππάξεωρi, whose object is
action and which consists of construction. It organizes the
events into a system and permits the creation of a new
identity: the narrative identity, subjected to a constant
interpretation. Ricoeur speaks about mimesis 3: this is the
power which a text possesses to change the world. The
power owned by tragedy is that it can be told. Telling a
story helps the possibility to find a sense in what happens
and to disclose new possibilities. A new concept of imagi-
nation, the Kantian productive imagination, comes into
relevance here. It involves a fictional dimension, as an
opening to what is possible, and it opens the doors to the
expression of desire, to its representationii.
The narration of a tale and its construction in
intrigue help reason to find a way of interpretation through
the conflicts which actions always take with themselves.
Oedipus‘ tragedy can be put into a number of stories: ‗qui
offrent à l'expérience morale à la fois la singularité et
l'exemplarité de leur configuration.‗iii
The pleasure Oedipus
i Aristotle, Poetics, 50 b 3.
ii Cf. Ricoeur, P. (2002). 66.
iii Ricoeur, P. (1999).
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offers is a pleasure of self knowledge and of a new
beginning. No more tyrannies: Athens is the land of
Εὐμενίδερ, and of democracy. Theseus is its king, but he
helps Oedipus, promising him refuge and a grave. Oedipus
will compensate for this unconditional offer by assuring
prosperity to Athens. The gods have decided that his body
will be sacred and will assure perpetual protection to the
city which is ready to receive him. He finally disappears,
letting his destiny and the place of his burial be known only
to Theseus, the only man who can understand the pain of
wandering, since he was a foreigner and a refugee too.
Conclusion
Following Ricoeur and his interpretation of
Oedipus‘ tragedy through Freud and Hegel, we have inter-
preted Oedipus as a tragedy of recognition. This recognition
is that of Oedipus, who finds himself by knowing his story
and by being hosted by Theseus, and that of Athens, which
finds its political identity: that of a fair and welcoming state
entity. These identities can be reached only by means of the
narration of their story: they are narrative identities which
carry upon their shoulders the responsibility for the con-
struction of a new world .
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Aristotle considers the ‗as if‘ of metaphor an instrument
by which language can find another order in the world,
because the ‗reference of metaphorical utterance brings
being as actuality and a