jomini and clausewitz--their interaction.pdf

26/9/2015 JominiandClausewitzTheirInteraction

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm 1/10

JOMINIANDCLAUSEWITZ:THEIRINTERACTION

by

ChristopherBassford

Aneditedversionofapaperpresentedtothe23rdMeetingoftheConsortiumonRevolutionaryEurope

atGeorgiaStateUniversity26February1993.Copyright

ChristopherBassford.

PartofTheClausewitzHomepage

IntroductionClausewitzJominiFundamentalDifferencesBetweentheTwoTheoristsTheirInteractionConclusions:TheReturnofJominiNotesBibliography

AtleastthreeimportantmilitarytheoristsemergedfromtheexperienceofthewarsoftheFrenchRevolutionandNapoleon:TheAustrianArchdukeCharlestheSwisswriterAntoineHenriJominiandthePrussianCarlvonClausewitz.ThearchdukehashadverylittleinfluenceintheUnitedStatesorGreatBritain,sincehisworkwasnevertranslatedintoEnglish.*1ThemilitarytheoreticaltraditionsfoundedbyJominiandClausewitz,however,haveverydefinitelyhadanimpactonourmilitarythinking.

Mostfrequently,JominiistreatedasbeingsomehowtheoppositeofClausewitz:militaryeducatorsoftenhurltheepithets"Jominian"and"Clausewitzian"atoneanotherasifthosesinglewordssomehow



summeduptheiropponents'fallaciousworldviewsanddefectsofpersonalcharacter.Ontheotherhand,anumberofthoughtfulobservershaveconsideredthedifferencesbetweemJominiandClausewitztoberatherinconsequential.AlfredThayerMahanisacaseinpoint.Mahan'sfather,militaryeducatorDennisHartMahan,isgenerallyconsideredtohavebeenadevoutJominian,andsoishisson(thoughinfactbothwerecreativethinkersintheirownright,andcallingthem"Jominians"isanunfaircharacterization).TheyoungerMahaneventuallybecamefamiliarwithClausewitz,*2callinghim"oneofthefirstofauthorities."However,hefoundClausewitztobeinessentialagreementwithJominiinallsignificantrespects,*3sohecontinuedtoputforthhisargumentsinlargelyJominianterminology.*4ThegreatBritishClausewitzianSpenserWilkinsonthoughtthatMahanandClausewitzwereingeneralaccord.*5InGermany,AlbrechtvonBoguslawskialsoarguedthatJominiandClausewitzweresayingthesamething.Morerecently,USNavalWarCollegeProfessorMichaelHandelhassoughttoreconcilethetwotheorists.*6

ThusJominiandClausewitzoftenappeareitherasoppositesorastwins.Asusualwhenwearegivenachoicebetweentwosuchclearalternatives,neitherreallyprovestobeveryusefulandthetruthliessomewhereelse.Inreality,JominiandClausewitzsawmuchthesamethingsinwar,butsawthemthroughverydifferenteyes.Thesimilaritiesintheirmilitaryideas,whichareindeedverygreat,stemfromthreesources:

1.AcommonhistoricalinterestinthecampaignsofFredericktheGreat2.LongpersonalexperiencesintheNapoleonicWars,albeitusuallyondifferentsides3.Theyreadeachother'sbooks.

Despitehavingthesethingsincommon,theirapproachestomilitarytheorywerefundamentallydifferent,andthesourceofthesedifferencescanbefoundintheirverydifferentpersonalities.

Thisisnottheplacetodelveterriblydeeplyintothearcanetheoreticaldetailsofthesetwomen'swork.Instead,Iwanttofocusonthesourcesofourmoderndayconfusion:WhyisitthatJominiandClausewitzlooksoradicallydifferenttosomeobservers,yetsoverysimilartoothers?Iwillattributethisconfusiontoourfrequentlackofsensitivitytothedifferencesinthetwomen'sexperiencesandpersonalities,andtothewayinwhichtheyinteractedovertime.

CLAUSEWITZ

CarlvonClausewitz(17801831)wasaprofessionalsoldierfromtheageof12tohisdeathfromCholeraadiseaseheincurredonactivedutyattheageof51.Hefirstsawcombatin1794whenhewas13.HeexperiencedfirsthandPrussia'sdisastrousmilitaryhumiliationbyNapoleonin1806,wascaptured,andreturnedtoPrussiaapassionatemilitaryreformer.Asajuniorstaffofficer,heworkedcloselywiththegreatPrussianmilitaryreformersGerhardvonScharnhorst(whowashismentor)andAugustvonGneisenau(whobecamehisfriendandprotector).In1810,hewasappointedmilitarytutortothecrownprince,forwhomhewrote(in1812)amilitarytreatisewecallThePrinciplesofWar.*7Thesameyear,onamatterofhighprinciple,hegaveuphiscommissionandjoinedtheRussianarmytofightNapoleon.HefoughtthroughouttheRussiancampaignandonthroughtheWarsofLiberationof1813and1814.HewasPrussianIIICorpschiefofstaffduringthecampaignof1815.ItwasClausewitz'scorpswhichoutnumberedtwotooneheldGrouchy'sforcesatWavre,contributingdecisivelytoNapoleon'sdefeatatWaterloo.

ClausewitzhadareputationinthePrussianarmyasbothanidealistandasuperbstaffofficer,buthewasconsideredtemperamentallyunsuitableforcommand.NohintofpersonalscandalattachestoClausewitz,andhisintellectualintegritywasthedrivingforcebehindtheruthlessexaminationofmilitarytheoreticalideasthatwefindinhisgreatestbook,OnWar.However,whileheroseveryhighintheKing'sservice,hewaswidelyconsideredtooopentoliberalideastobealtogetherpoliticallyreliable.HisideasonwarareheavilyinfluencedbythemasspopularwarfareoftheFrenchRevolutionaryperiod,andthoseideaswereuncomfortabletoconservativearistocrats.

Clausewitz'srelationshiptoNapoleonisoftenmisunderstood.Althoughheisoftencalledthe"highpriestofNapoleon"(LiddellHart'sandJ.F.C.Fuller'stermforhim),itisimportanttonotethat,infact,ClausewitzrepresentsnottheideasofNapoleonbutratherthoseofhismostcapableopponent,the



PrussianmilitaryreformerGerhardvonScharnhorst.

JOMINI

ThemanwhodidclaimtointerpretNapoleontothemilitaryworldwasAntoineHenriJomini,laterBarondeJomini,aFrenchspeakingSwiss(17791869).*8Originallyheadedforacareerinbanking,youngJominigotcarriedawaybytheexcitementoftheFrenchRevolutionandjoinedtheFrencharmyin1798.HereturnedtobusinessinSwitzerlandafterthePeaceofAmiens(1802),wherehebeganwritingonmilitarysubjects.HisTraitdegrandetactiquewasfirstpublishedin1803.Hecontinuallyrevised,enlarged,andreissueditintothe1850s.

Rejoiningthearmyin1804,JominiwasacceptedasavolunteerstaffmemberbyMarshalNey(whohadloanedhimthemoneytopublishhisTraitdegrandetactique).*9HeservedintheAusterlitzandPrussiancampaigns,theninSpain.HefinallyreceivedanactualstaffcommissionintheFrencharmyatthebehestofNapoleonawhileafterAusterlitz.Heservedforawhileaschiefofstafftohislongtimementor,MarshalNey.Jomini'sarrogance,irascibility,andnakedambitionoftenledtofrictionwithhisfellowsandeventuallytoafallingoutwithNey.Eventually,however,Jominiwaspromotedtobrigadiergeneralandgivenasuccessionoffairlyresponsiblestaffpositions,mostlyawayfromactualtroops.FollowinghisrecoveryfromtherigorsoftheRussiancampaign,hewasreassignedtoNeyin1813.However,hewasshortlythereafterarrestedforsloppystaffwork.Hisambitionsthwartedbyrealorimaginedplotsagainsthimself,JominijoinedtheRussianarmyinlate1813.HespentmuchoftheremainderofhislongcareerintheRussianservice.

Duringhisactualmilitarycareer,"Jomini...[hadbeen]averyminorfigure,seldommentionedinordersordispatches,practicallyignoredinthememoirsoftheofficerswhohadservedwithhim."*10Nonetheless,hebecamebyfarthebestknownmilitarycommentatorofhisday,andmaintainedthatpositionthroughzealousselfpromotion.Hismostfamouswork,SummaryoftheArtofWar,waswritten,likeClausewitz'sPrinciplesofWar,foraroyalprincetowhomhewasmilitarytutor.Althoughlongsinceretired,headvisedCzarNicholasduringtheCrimeanWarandNapoleonIIIduringhisItaliancampaigns.EvenduringJomini'slifetime,however,thereweremanyprominentmilitarymenwhoviewedJominiwithgreatskepticism.TheDukeofWellingtonconsideredhimapompouscharlatan.*11

Inhismaturity,Jominigrewwaryoftherevolutionarypassionsthathadoriginallyinspiredhimtotakeuptheswordhimself.Perhapshisdependenceontheczar,oneofthemostconservativerulersinEurope,hadsomeinfluenceonhisattitude.ItisoneoftheironiesofhistorythatClausewitz,anofficeroftheconservativekingofPrussia,shouldbetheonetobasehistheoriesonthemostradicallegacyoftherevolutionaryperiod,whileNapoleon'sownstaffofficerandinterpreter,Jomini,shouldaimhistheoriesattheprofessionalofficercorpsofessentiallyeighteenthcenturystylearmies.

Jomini'smilitarywritingsareeasytounfairlycaricature:theywerecharacterizedbyahighlydidacticandprescriptiveapproach,conveyedinanextensivegeometricvocabularyofstrategiclines,bases,andkeypoints.*12Hisfundamentalprescriptionwassimple:placesuperiorpoweratthedecisivepoint.Inthetheoreticalworkforwhichhegainedearlyfame,chapterXXXVoftheTraitdegrandetactique,heconstantlystressedtheadvantagesofinteriorlines.

Jominiwasnofool,however.Hisintelligence,facilepen,andactualexperienceofwarmadehiswritingsagreatdealmorecredibleandusefulthansobriefadescriptioncanimply.OnceheleftNapoleon'sservice,hemaintainedhimselfandhisreputationprimarilythroughprose.HiswritingstyleunlikeClausewitz'sreflectedhisconstantsearchforanaudience.Hedealtatlengthwithanumberofpracticalsubjects(logistics,seapower)thatClausewitzhadlargelyignored.Elementsofhisdiscussion(hisremarksonGreatBritainandseapower,forinstance,andhissycophantictreatmentofAustria'sArchdukeCharles)areclearlyaimedatprotectinghispoliticalpositionorexpandinghisreadership.And,onemightadd,atminimizingClausewitz's,forheclearlyperceivedthePrussianwriterashischiefcompetitor.ForJomini,Clausewitz'sdeaththirtyeightyearspriortohisowncameasapieceofraregoodfortune.

FUNDAMENTALDIFFERENCESBETWEENTHETWOTHEORISTS



AsidefromtheirdifferingrelationshipstoNapoleon,thefundamentaldifferencesbetweenClausewitzandJominiarerootedintheirdifferingconceptsofthehistoricalprocessandofthenatureandroleofmilitarytheory.

Clausewitzsawhistoryinrelativeterms,rejectingabsolutecategories,standards,andvalues.Thepasthadtobeacceptedonitsownterms.Thehistorianmustattempttoenterintothemindsetsandattitudesofanygivenperiod,the"spiritoftheage."Historywasadynamicprocessofchange,drivenbyforcesbeyondthecontrolandoftenbeyondthecomprehensionofanyindividualorgroup.ThishistoricismisparticularlyobviousintwokeythemesofOnWarthataremissinginthe1812PrinciplesofWar.Thesearethefamousnotionthat"Warisacontinuationofpoliticswithanadmixtureofothermeans"(i.e.,organizedviolence)andtherecognitionthatwarcanvaryinitsformsdependingonthechangingnatureofpolicyandofthesocietywithinwhichitiswaged.

Incontrast,Jomini'sviewofhistoryandofwarwasstaticandsimplistic.Hesawwarasa"greatdrama,"astageforheroesandmilitarygeniuseswhosetalentswerebeyondthecomprehensionofmeremortals.Hesawtherevolutionarywarfareinwhichhehimselfhadparticipatedasmerelythetechnicalnearperfectionofafundamentallyunchangingphenomenon,tobemodifiedonlybysuperficialmatterslikethelistofdramatispersonae,technology,andtransientpoliticalmotivations.HedrewhistheoreticalandpracticalprescriptionsfromhisexperiencesintheNapoleonicwars.Thepurposeofhistheorywastoteachpracticallessonsto"officersofasuperiorgrade."

Accordingly,Jomini'saimwasutilitarianandhistonedidactic.Hiswritingthusappealedmorereadilytomilitaryeducators.Hislaterwork,SummaryoftheArtofWar(Precisdel'ArtdelaGuerre,1838),became,invarioustranslations,popularizations,andcommentaries,thepremiermilitaryeducationaltextofthemidnineteenthcentury.*13

MuchofthecontrastbetweenJominiandClausewitz*14canbetracedtosuchphilosophicalfactorsandtothefrequentabridgementofOnWar,whichmakesitappearmuchmoreabstractthanJomini'sworkwheninfacttheyoftendiscussedthesamepracticalsubjectmatter.Despitehisinsistencethattheorymustbedescriptiveratherthanprescriptiveinnature,Clausewitzfrequentlyprovidesinstructivediscussionsofcommonmilitaryproblemslikecontestedrivercrossings,thedefenseofmountainousareas,etc.

THEIRINTERACTION

Asthediscussionsofarhasindicated,thereweremanyparallelsandmanypointsofdivergenceinthepersonalities,militaryexperiences,andunderlyingphilosophiesofthesetwomen.Therewerealso,however,someratherinterestingpointsofintersection.JominiandClausewitzmayhavecaughtaglimpseofoneanotherfromoppositesidesduringthetragiccrossingoftheBeresinariverduringtheFrenchretreatfromMoscow,butthereisnoevidencethattheyevermet.Nonetheless,theyinteractedintellectually,influencingoneanother'sthinkingoveralongperiodoftime.

WhentheyoungClausewitzwrotehisPrinciplesofWar(1812)forhisstudentthePrussiancrownprince,heseemstohavebeenrathertakenwithJominiandhisargumentaboutinteriorlines.

"Instrategy,...thesidethatissurroundedbytheenemyisbetteroffthanthesidewhichsurroundsitsopponent,especiallywithequalorevenweakerforces....ColonelJominiwasrightinthis....*15

HealsousedagreatdealofJomini'sgeometricvocabularyofbases,lines,andpoints,andwas,likeJomini,positiveabouttheusefulnessofmountainsasdefensivelines.Later,inOnWar,hewouldbequiteskepticalonallthesematters.TheyoungClausewitzalsoacceptedJomini'sfundamentalstrategictheme:"Thetheoryofwarfaretriestodiscoverhowwemaygainapreponderanceofphysicalforcesandmaterialadvantagesatthedecisivepoint."Eventhisearlyinhisevolution,hethenwentontostresssomethingwethinkofasmoretypicallyClausewitzian:"Asthisisnotalwayspossible,theoryalsoteachesustocalculatemoralfactors:thelikelymistakesoftheenemy,theimpressioncreatedbyadaringaction,...yes,evenourowndesperation."*16

Giventwentyyearstothinkaboutsuchmatters,however,Clausewitzbecameextremelyskepticalof



Jomini.InOnWar,Clausewitz'ssweepingcritiqueofthestateofmilitarytheoryappearstohavebeenaimedinlargepartattheSwiss:

Itisonlyanalyticallythattheseattemptsattheorycanbecalledadvancesintherealmoftruthsynthetically,intherulesandregulationstheyoffer,theyareabsolutelyuseless.

Theyaimatfixedvaluesbutinwareverythingisuncertain,andcalculationshavetobemadewithvariablequantities.

Theydirecttheinquiryexclusivelytowardphysicalquantities,whereasallmilitaryactionisintertwinedwithpsychologicalforcesandeffects.

Theyconsideronlyunilateralaction,whereaswarconsistsofacontinuousinteractionofopposites....Anythingthatcouldnotbereachedbythemeagerwisdomofsuchonesidedpointsofviewwasheldtobebeyondscientificcontrol:itlayintherealmofgenius,whichrisesaboveallrules.

Pitythesoldierwhoissupposedtocrawlamongthesescrapsofrules,notgoodenoughforgenius,whichgeniuscanignore,orlaughat.Nowhatgeniusdoesisthebestrule,andtheorycandonobetterthanshowhowandwhythisshouldbethecase.*17

ThesepassagesimmediatelyfollowClausewitz'ssneersatthe"lopsidedcharacter"ofthetheoryofinteriorlines,commentsunquestionablydirectedatJomini.Asaresultofthesecomments,somewritershaveclaimedthatClausewitzwasanadvocateofconcentricattacks,incontrasttoJomini'sadvocacyof"interiorlines."Infact,ClausewitzspentmoretimediscussingconcentricoperationsinpartsimplybecausehefeltthatJominihadalreadydonesogoodajobexplainingtheoppositeapproach.Thechoiceofeitherwoulddepend,asalwaysinClausewitz'sreasoning,onthespecificsituation.*18

ThesecriticalcommentsbyClausewitzareasourceofmuchconfusion.AnyonewhoreadsJomini'smostfamousworkandifyouthinkfewpeopleactuallyreadOnWar,thereareevenfewerwhoreadtheSummarywillnoticequitereadilythatClausewitz'sremarksseemundulyharshandmisleading.Jomini'sprefatorycommentsseemquitereasonableandentirelycompatiblewithaClausewitzianunderstandingofwar,despiteJomini'spersonalbarbsatClausewitz.ThefrequentlyforgottenreasonforthisconfusionisthatClausewitz'scommentsareaimedatJomini'sTraitdegrandetactiqueandotherearlyworks.TheSummarywaswrittenafterJominihadreadOnWarandafterClausewitzwassafelydead.Clausewitz'scommentsthereforedonotreflectJomini'smodificationstohisearlierarguments,fortheSummarycontainsmanyadjustmentsclearlyattributabletoOnWar'sarguments.TheseincludeJomini'scommentsontheimportanceofmoraletheimpossibilityoffixedrules(saveperhapsintactics)theneedtoassignlimitstotheroleoftheoryskepticismofmathematicalcalculations(andadenialthatJomini'sownworkdespiteallthegeometricalterminologyanddiagramswasbasedonmath)thedisclaimerofanybeliefthatwaris"apositivescience"andthecleardifferentiationbetweenmeremilitaryknowledgeandactualbattlefieldskill.*19

JominiacknowledgedthetruthofClausewitz'sstrongconnectionbetweenpoliticsandwar.TheSummaryisfullofreferencesto"politique"thesametermasClausewitz'sPolitik.However,thissimilarityishiddenbythestandardEnglishtranslation,whichsubstitutestheterm"diplomacy"i.e.,onlythepoliticsthatoccursbetweenstates,notthatwithinthemaswell.OneexampleofadirectborrowingfromOnWar:"[T]hefirstcareofacommandershouldbetoagreewiththeheadofthestateuponthecharacterofthewar."ComparethiswithClausewitz:"Thefirst,thesupreme,themostfarreachingactofjudgmentthatthestatesmanandcommanderhavetomakeistoestablish...thekindofwaronwhichtheyareembarkingneithermistakingitfor,nortryingtoturnitinto,somethingthatisalientoitsnature."*20

ThesedirectbutunacknowledgedborrowingsfromOnWarconvincemanyreadersthatthetwotheoristswerethinkingonparalleltracks.Simultaneously,thetwowriters'overtmutualinsultstendtomakeotherreadersthosewhoarenotfamiliarwithbothworksassumeabasiccontradictionintheirviews.However,Jomini'srecognitionofthevalidityofmanyofClausewitz'spointsdidnotleadhimtogenuinelyadoptClausewitz'sphilosophy,foratleastthreereasons.First,hecorrectlydistinguishedhisownworkfromClausewitz'sbypointingtoitsexplicitlyinstructional(i.e.,doctrinal)purposes.Despitehisagreementthatwarwasessentiallyapoliticalact,hepointedtothepracticalimplicationsofthisdifferentfocus:"Historyatoncepoliticalandmilitaryoffersmoreattractions,butisalsomuchmoredifficulttotreatanddoesnotaccordeasilywiththedidacticspecies...."



Second,andincommonwithanumberofClausewitz'slaterdetractors,hefoundthePrussian'sapproachintellectuallyarrogant,overlymetaphysical,andsimplytoodamneddifficulttodigest.Joministressedsimplicityandclarityovera"pretentious"searchfordeepertruths.Further,heobjectedtowhathesawasClausewitz'sextremeskepticism("incrdulit")ofallmilitarytheorysavethatinOnWar.ForClausewitztorejectJomini'sapproachtotheorywhiledefendinghisownseemedsomehowhypocritical.

Third,therewasastrongpersonalelementinJomini'scritiqueofClausewitz.Clearly,hedidonsomelevelgreatlyadmireClausewitz'swork.HeregrettedthatthePrussianhadnotbeenabletoreadhisownSummary,"persuadedthathewouldhaverenderedtoitsomejustice."HewasthusdeeplywoundedbythecriticismsinOnWar.Heexpressedhisbitternessinanumberofsneers(e.g.,"TheworksofClausewitzhavebeenincontestablyuseful,althoughitisoftenlessbytheideasoftheauthorthanbythecontraryideastowhichhegivesbirth")andinaccusationsofplagiarism("Thereisnotoneofmyreflections[onthecampaignof1799]whichhehasnotrepeated").Theseinsults,becausetheyrefertothePrussianbyname,havemoremeaningtoreadersunfamiliarwithOnWarthandotheSummary'sconcessionsontheoreticalissues.

CONCLUSIONS:THERETURNOFJOMINI

Thesignificanceofallthis,asidefromwhateverantiquarianinterestitmayarouse,liesincertainrecentattemptstoreviveJomini.TheseattemptsarepartofareactionagainstthepredominanceofClausewitziantheoryinthiscountrysincetheVietnamwar.OvertheyearsClausewitzhasperiodicallybeendeclaredobsolete,onlytoreemergemoreinfluentialthanever.Suchargumentsoftenfocusontheproblemofnuclearwar,butitseemsincreasinglylikelythatitisthenucleartheorists,notClausewitz,whohavebeenrenderedobsolescent.*21Therehavealsobeencomplaintsbymilitarytraditionalistsabouttheexcessiveinfluenceof"Clausewitznuts"andbytheoreticalpuristsofthe"theprostitutionofClausewitzsince1981,particularlyin[theU.S.Army's]FM1005anditsvariousdegenerateoffspring."*22Bothcomplaintshavesomejustification.TheeclecticismofAngloSaxonmilitarythoughtisrootedinthesamespiritastheLatinwarning,"Caveabhomineuniuslibri"("Bewarethemanofonebook"):anarrowrelianceonClausewitzisinconsistentwiththephilosopher'sownteaching.Ontheotherhand,usingOnWarasamerestockpileofjuicyquotesinsupportofthisdoctrinalpositionorthatisalsoanabuse.

Inlargepart,however,criticismofthenewClausewitzianismissimplyreaction.WouldbecompetitorshavelittlechoicebuttoseektodislodgethePrussianphilosopherfromhispostVietnamprimacy.And,ofcourse,somepeoplearesimplytiredofhearingaboutthislongdeadgenius.AsDavidChandlerhasputit,"Clausewitz'sairyKantiangeneralizationshaveheldswaylongenough."*23Itisalsopossiblethatinaworldseeminglyfreedoffundamentalideological(thoughobviouslynotnationalist)conflict,inaperiodinwhichsomewouldseriouslysupposean"endtoHistory,"Clausewitz'sstrifedrivenworldviewmightcometoseemlessrelevant.*24Chandler'ssuggestionthat"BaronAntoineJomini'srival(andmoreprosaic)approach...isunderseriousreconsideration"maybeasymptomofsuchatrendthoughonemaywellask,"bywhom?"SuchatrendmaybefurtherencouragedbywhatseemstosomeinforgetfulretrospecttohavebeentheunClausewitzian"simplicity"ofthePersianGulfWar.PerhapstheveryClausewitziancomplexityofthatwar'saftermathwillsquelchtheefforttorenewJomini'sclaimtoGurustatus.

MyownargumentisthatmostofwhatJominihadtocontributethatwasofrealvaluewhichwasagreatdealhaslongsincebeenabsorbedintothewaywewritepracticaldoctrine.Clausewitz'scontributions,ontheotherhand,havenot.*25Indeed,giventhebrillianceandsubtletyofmanyofClausewitz'sconcepts,itishardtoseehowtheycouldeverbecomethe"conventionalwisdom."Jominiisimportantinapurelyhistoricalsense.Incultivatingourownunderstandingofwar,past,present,andfuture,wemustturntoClausewitz.

SeealsoChristophM.V.Abegglen,"TheInfluenceofClausewitzonJomini'sPrcisdel'ArtdelaGuerre,"DissertationforanMAinWarStudiesKing'sCollegeLondon,2003.[Superviser:Dr.JanWillemHonig]

NOTES



1.Lincoln'schiefofstaffGeneralHenryW.HalleckisgenerallyconsideredaJominian.HewasalsodefinitelyawareofClausewitzandpresumablyhadsomenotionastohisideas.Hisgreatestsourceofinspirationmay,however,havebeenneitherJomininorClausewitz,buttheArchdukeCharles.SeeThomasL.ConnellyandArcherJones,ThePoliticsofCommand:FactionsandIdeasinConfederateStrategy(BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,1973,2728,30,104,176.RussellF.WeigleyadoptsthisviewoftheArchdukeCharles'sinfluenceonHalleckinhisarticle"AmericanStrategyfromItsBeginningsthroughtheFirstWorldWar,"inPeterParet,ed.,MakersofModernStrategy:FromMachiavellitotheNuclearAge(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1986),41617itdidnotappearinhisearlierchapteronHalleckinTowardsanAmericanArmy:MilitaryThoughtfromWashingtontoMarshall(NewYork:1962),inwhichhesawHalleckasamoreoriginalthinker,albeitheavilyinfluencedbyJomini.

2.MahanhadbecomefamiliarwithatleastthebroadoutlinesofClausewitz'sthoughtbythe1890s.Thisistheviewoftwonavalhistorians,Captain(USN)WilliamDillworthPuleston,Mahan:TheLifeandWorkofCaptainAlfredThayerMahan,U.S.N.(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1939),295,andSpector,ProfessorsofWar,121.TheeditorofMahan'spapers,however,isnotsurethatMahaneverreadClausewitz,andifhedid,placesitaround1910.SeeRobertSeager,AlfredThayerMahan:TheManandhisLetters(Annapolis:USNavalInstitutePress,1978),552,683,n.11.Iaminclinedtoagreewiththisassessment,althoughthisdoesnoteliminatethepossibilitythatMahanknewthebroadoutlinesofOnWaratanearlierdate.Mahan'sinterestisfurtherevidencedbyhismarginalnotesinacopyofMajorStewartMurray's1909condensationofOnWar,TheRealityofWar(London:HughRees,1909).Mahan'sowncopyhasbeenlost,buthismarginalnotesweretranscribedintoacopydonatedtotheNavalWarCollegebyPuleston,Mahan'sbiographer.

3.AlfredThayerMahan,NavalStrategyComparedandContrastedwiththePrinciplesandPracticeofMilitaryOperationsonLand:LecturesDeliveredattheNavalWarCollege,Newport,R.I.,betweentheYears1887and1911(Boston:Little,Brown,andCompany,1911reprintedWestport,Conn.:GreenwoodPress,1975),containstwoexplicitreferencestoClausewitz.Oneisafootnotereference(120)toClausewitz'ssarcasticdiscussionof"keys,"(BookVI,Chapter23ofOnWar).Theother(inwhichMahanreferstoClausewitzas"oneofthefirstofauthorities")isareferencetoCorbettcitingOnWarontherelativestrengthsofdefenseandoffense(279).Thisispartofanextendeddiscussionofsomeimportance,inthatMahaniscomparingthenavalandlandaspectsofstrategy,andheisclearlydiscussingtheClausewitzianinterpretationwithoutidentifyingitassuch.[HeusedvirtuallythesamephrasinginhisdiscussionofsomenavalwargamesinalettertoRaymondP.Rogers,4March1911,inAlfredThayerMahan,eds.RobertSeegerIIandDorisD.Maguire,LettersandPapersofAlfredThayerMahan(Annapolis:NavalInstitutePress,1975.)]Mahanalsodiscusses"endsandmeans"atsomelength(esp.p5),inamannerstronglyreminiscentofClausewitz.

4.SeePuleston,295Spector,121.

5.WhilehethoughtthattheequallygreatBritishClausewitzianJulianCorbettwaswildlywronginhisinterpretations.

6.MichaelI.Handel,MastersofWar:SunTzu,ClausewitzandJomini(London:FrankCass,1992).

7.CarlvonClausewitz,trans.HansW.Gatzke,PrinciplesofWar(Harrisburg,PA:TheMilitaryServicePublishingCompany,1942)reprintedinStackpoleBooks,RootsofStrategy:Book2,3MilitaryClassics.Harrisburg,PA:StackpoleBooks,1987.[Originally"DiewichtigstenGrundsatzedesKriegfuhrenszurErganzungmeinesUnterrichtsbeiSr.KoniglichenHoheitdemKronprinzen"(writtenin1812trans.fromthe1936Germanedition).]AnothertranslationappearsasanappendixtoJ.J.Graham's1873translationofOnWar.

8.OnJomini,seeCraneBrinton,GordonA.Craig,andFelixGilbert,"Jomini,"inEdwardMeadEarle,ed.,MakersofModernStrategy:MilitaryThoughtfromMachiavellitoHitler(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1944)MichaelHoward,"JominiandtheClassicalTradition,"inMichaelHoward,ed.,TheTheoryandPracticeofWar(NewYork:Praeger,1966)JohnShy,"Jomini,"inPeterParet,ed.,MakersofModernStrategy:FromMachiavellitotheNuclearAge(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1986).

9.ThebestEnglishlanguagediscussionofJomini'smilitarycareercanbefoundinJohnR.Elting,"Jomini:DiscipleofNapoleon?"MilitaryAffairs,Spring1964,1726.UnlikemostbiographicaldiscussionsoftheSwiss,whicharebasedonhisownhighlycoloredreminiscencestopeoplehewishedtoimpress,Elting'sstudyisbasedonXavierdeCourville,Jomini,oudeleDevindeNapoleon(Paris,1935)."WrittenbyJomini'sdescendants,fromhispersonalpapers,itisthemostimpartialofhisbiographies."

10.Elting,"Jomini:DiscipleofNapoleon?"

11.[FrancisEgerton,LordEllesmere],"Marmont,Siborne,andAlison,"QuarterlyReview,v.LXXVI(JuneandSeptember1845),204247,ajointventureofJohnGurwood,Egerton,andWellingtonhimself.SeeArchivesoftheJohnMurrayCompany,manuscriptindextov.LXXVI,QuarterlyReviewJ.H.Stocqueler(pseud.),TheLifeofFieldMarshaltheDukeofWellington(London:Ingram,Cooke,andCompany,1853),v.II,330.

12.See,forexample,ArticlesXVIIIXXIIoftheSummary.



13..ForJomini'stheoreticalwritingsinEnglishtranslation,seeAntoineHenriJomini,trans.Col.S.B.Holabird,U.S.A.,TreatiseonGrandMilitaryOperations:orACriticalandMilitaryHistoryoftheWarsofFredericktheGreatasContrastedwiththeModernSystem,2vols.(NewYork:D.vanNostrand,1865)BarondeJomini,trans.MajorO.F.WinshipandLieut.E.E.McLean,TheArtofWar(NewYork:G.P.Putnam,1854).ImportantderivativeworksincludeDennisHartMahan'sinstructionalworksforWestPointHenryWagerHalleck,ElementsofMilitaryArtandScience(NewYork:D.AppletonandCompany,1846)EdwardBruceHamley(182493),TheOperationsofWarExplainedandIllustrated(London:WilliamBlackwoodandSons,1866).

14..MostdiscussionsofJominicomparehimtoClausewitz.Forexpliciteffortstodoso,seeDepartmentofMilitaryArtandEngineering,USMA,Clausewitz,Jomini,Schlieffen(WestPoint,1951[rewritten,inpart,byColonel[USA]JohnR.Elting,1964])J.E.Edmonds,"JominiandClausewitz"[atreatmentextremelyhostiletotheGerman],CanadianArmyJournal,v.V,no.2(May1951),6469JosephL.Harsh,"BattleswordandRapier:Clausewitz,Jomini,andtheAmericanCivilWar,"MilitaryAffairs,December1974,133138Major[USAF]FrancisS.Jones,"AnalysisandComparisonoftheIdeasandLaterInfluencesofHenriJominiandCarlvonClausewitz,"Paper,MaxwellAirForceBase,AL:AirCommandandStaffCollege,April1985Colonel[USA]RichardM.Swain,"`TheHedgehogandtheFox':Jomini,Clausewitz,andHistory,"NavalWarCollegeReview,Autumn1990,98109.

15.Gatzke,PrinciplesofWar,49(p39inCochenhausen,Grundsatze).

16.Clausewitz,Gatzkeed.,PrinciplesofWar,12Cochenhausen,Grundsatze,9.Seealsopp22/17).

17..OnWar,BookTwo,Chapter2.

18.InlaterversionsoftheTreatise,Jominidroppedhisinsistenceoninteriorlines,acknowledginglaClausewitzthatthevalueofinteriororconcentriclinesdependedonthesituation.(Holabird,450451).

19..ThesepointsaremosteasilyfoundinthebibliographicalessaywhichopenedtheoriginalFrencheditionoftheSummary,"Notice:surlathorieactuelledelaguerreetsursonutilit"("OnthePresentTheoryofWarandofItsUtility").Thisessayismissingfrom(orseverelyeditedin)mostEnglishlanguageeditions,althoughitispresentinthe1854Americantranslation.

20.Jomini,trans.MendellandCraighill,Summary,66Clausewitz,OnWar,8889.

21.JohnE.Shephard,Jr.,makesarecentcaseforClausewitz'spartialobsolescencein"OnWar:IsClausewitzStillRelevant?"SeealsoBruceR.Nardulli,"ClausewitzandtheReorientationofNuclearStrategy,"JournalofStrategicStudies,December1982,494510.

22.Achenbach,"WarandtheCultofClausewitz,"quotingColonel(USA,retired)ArthurLykke,aseniorprofessorofstrategyattheArmyWarCollegeColonel[USA,ret.]LloydMatthews,editorofParameters,letter17July1989.

23.DavidG.Chandler,inanenthusiasticreviewofWeigley'sAgeofBattles,JournalofMilitaryHistory,April1992,294295.

24.MartinvanCreveldattemptedinTheTransformationofWar(NewYork:FreePress,1991)"toconstructadifferent,nonClausewitzianandnonstrategic,frameworkforthinkingaboutwar."HearguesthatwarinthepostColdWareraisdrivenbyforcesoutsidethenationstatesystemandbeyondtherationalboundariesallegedlyemphasizedinOnWar.Thepatternofconflictinthepost1945worldnolongeryieldstothe"Clausewitzianassumptionthatwarisrational."Inthisview,the"Clausewitzianuniverse"isobsoletebecauseitiscenteredonwarmakingbythe"state"Clausewitz'sallegedtrinityofgovernment,army,andpeopleisthereforenotapplicabletoEuropebeforetheTreatyofWestphalianortotheworldemergingfromtheColdWarera.

25.BernardBrodieoftenmadepuzzledreferences,e.g.,"TheContinuingRelevanceofOnWar,"50,tothefailureofmodernmilitarythoughttoincorporateandsupersedeClausewitz,inthemannerinwhich,say,AdamSmith'scontributiontoeconomicshasbeen.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brinton,Crane,GordonA.Craig,andFelixGilbert."Jomini."EdwardMeadEarle,ed.MakersofModernStrategy:MilitaryThoughtfromMachiavellitoHitler.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1944.

Clausewitz,Carlvon,trans.ColonelJ.J.[JamesJohn]Graham.OnWar.London:N.Trhbner,1873.

Clausewitz,Carlvon,trans.HansW.Gatzke.PrinciplesofWar.Harrisburg,PA:TheMilitaryServicePublishingCompany,1942reprintedinStackpoleBooks,RootsofStrategy:Book2,3MilitaryClassics.Harrisburg,PA:StackpoleBooks,1987.[Originallywritten1812:CarlvonClausewitz,GeneralFriedrichvonCochenhausen,ed."DiewichtigstenGrundsatzedesKriegfuhrenszurErganzungmeinesUnterrichtsbeiSr.K`niglichenHoheitdemKronprinzen.Berlin:JhnkerundDhnnhaupt



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Clausewitz,Carlvon,eds./trans.MichaelHowardandPeterParet.OnWar.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1976.

Courville,Xavierde.Jomini,oudeleDevindeNapoleon.Paris,1935.

DepartmentofMilitaryArtandEngineering,USMA.Clausewitz,Jomini,Schlieffen.WestPoint,1951.[Rewritten,inpartbyColonel[USA]JohnR.Elting,1964.]

Elting,JohnR."Jomini:DiscipleofNapoleon?"MilitaryAffairs,Spring1964,1726.

Edmonds,BrigadierGeneralSirJ.E."JominiandClausewitz."CanadianArmyJournal,v.V,no.2(May1951),6469.

Harsh,JosephL."BattleswordandRapier:Clausewitz,Jomini,andtheAmericanCivilWar."MilitaryAffairs,December1974,133138.

Hattaway,Herman,andArcherJones.HowtheNorthWon:AMilitaryHistoryoftheCivilWar.Urbana:UniversityofIllinoisPress,1983.

Hattendorf,JohnB."SirJulianCorbettontheSignificanceofNavalHistory."TheAmericanNeptune,v.XXXI,no.4,1971.

Hittle,BrigadierGeneral[USMC]J.D.,ed.JominiandhisSummaryoftheArtofWar:ACondensedVersion.Harrisburg,PA:1947reprintedinStackpoleBooks,RootsofStrategy:Book2,3MilitaryClassics.Harrisburg,PA:StackpoleBooks,1987.

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Jomini,Henri.Traitdegrandetactique,ou,Relationdelaguerredeseptans,extraitedeTempelhof,commenteatcompareauxprincipalesoprationsdeladernireguerreavecunrecueildesmaximeslesplusimportantdel'artmilitaire,justifiesparcesdiffrentsvenments.Paris:GiguetetMichaud,1805.

Jomini,LeBaronde.Prcisdel'ArtdelaGuerre:DesPrincipalesCombinaisonsdelaStratgie,delaGrandeTactiqueetdelaPolitiqueMilitaire.Brussels:Meline,CansetCopagnie,1838.

Jomini,Baronde,trans.MajorO.F.WinshipandLieut.E.E.McLean[USA].TheArtofWar.NewYork:G.P.Putnam,1854.

Jomini,Baronde,trans.Capt.G.H.MendellandLieut.W.P.Craighill[USA].TheArtofWar.Philadelphia:J.B.Lippincott,1862reprinted,Westport,CT:GreenwoodPress,1971reprinted,withanewintroductionbyCharlesMessenger,London:GreenhillBooks,1992.

Jomini,AntoineHenri,trans.Col.S.B.Holabird,U.S.A.TreatiseonGrandMilitaryOperations:orACriticalandMilitaryHistoryoftheWarsofFredericktheGreatasContrastedwiththeModernSystem,2vols.NewYork:D.vanNostrand,1865.

Jones,Archer."JominiandtheStrategyoftheAmericanCivilWar:AReinterpretation."MilitaryAffairs,XXXIV,December1970,127131.

Jones,Major[USAF]FrancisS."AnalysisandComparisonoftheIdeasandLaterInfluencesofHenriJominiandCarlvonClausewitz."Paper,MaxwellAirForceBase,AL:AirCommandandStaffCollege,April1985.

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