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10 September 2001

Doctrine forJoint Operations

Joint Publication 3-0

This revised edition of JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, representsthe latest in a series of updates to joint doctrine. It reflects the most currentguidance for conducting joint and multinational activities across the range ofmilitary operations.

This vital keystone publication forms the very core of joint warfighting doctrineand establishes the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team.Often called the “linchpin” of the joint doctrine publication hierarchy, theoverarching concepts and principles contained in this publication provide acommon perspective from which to plan and execute joint, interagency, andmultinational operations. This comprehensive document addresses all key aspectsof joint warfighting in war and military operations other than war, where manyof today’s military activities are focused.

As our Nation moves briskly into the 21st Century, the guidance in thispublication will enable the current and future leaders of our Armed Forces toorganize, train, and execute worldwide missions as our forces transform tomeet emerging challenges.

I enjoin all commanders to study and understand the principles contained inthis publication and to teach these principles to their subordinates. Only thenwill we be able to fully exploit the remarkable military potential inherent in ourjoint teams. To that end, I request you ensure the widest possible distribution ofthis keystone joint publication. I further request that you actively promote theuse of all joint publications at every opportunity.

HENRY H. SHELTONChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication is the keystone documentof the joint operations series. It providesfundamental principles and doctrine that guidethe Armed Forces of the United States in theconduct of joint and multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders (JFCs) and prescribesdoctrine for joint operations and training. Itprovides military guidance for use by theArmed Forces in preparing their appropriateplans. It is not the intent of this publication torestrict the authority of the JFC fromorganizing the force and executing the missionin a manner the JFC deems most appropriateto ensure unity of effort in the accomplishmentof the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable andconsistent with US law, regulations, anddoctrine.

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Preface

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER ITHE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

• Introduction .............................................................................................................. I-1• Security Environment ............................................................................................... I-1• Range of Military Operations .................................................................................... I-2• National Strategic Direction ...................................................................................... I-4• Executing National Security Strategy ........................................................................ I-6• The Estimate Process and Strategy ............................................................................ I-9• The Strategic Goal and Termination of Operations .................................................. I-10

CHAPTER IIFUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

• General .................................................................................................................... II-1• The Levels of War .................................................................................................... II-2• Unified Action ......................................................................................................... II-3• Joint Warfare ............................................................................................................ II-4• Command Relationships .......................................................................................... II-5• Organization of Forces ........................................................................................... II-11• Command and Control ........................................................................................... II-17• Organization of an Operational Area ...................................................................... II-19• Joint Urban Operations .......................................................................................... II-22

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS

• General .................................................................................................................. III-1• The Link Between National and Combatant Command Strategies .......................... III-1• Combatant Command Strategic Planning ............................................................... III-1• The Campaign ........................................................................................................ III-4• Operational Art ...................................................................................................... III-9• Key Planning Considerations ................................................................................. III-25• Control and Coordinating Measures ....................................................................... III-41• Functional Combatant Command Support ............................................................... III-44

CHAPTER IVJOINT OPERATIONS IN WAR

• Considerations Before Combat ............................................................................... IV-1• Considerations at the Outset of Combat .................................................................. IV-3

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• Considerations for Sustained Combat Operations .................................................... IV-7• Joint Operations in Maritime and/or Littoral Areas .................................................. IV-17• Operations When Weapons of Mass Destruction are Employed ............................. IV-19• Considerations for Termination and Postconflict Operations ................................... IV-20

CHAPTER VMILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

• General ................................................................................................................... V-1• Role in the Strategic Security Environment ............................................................. V-1• Principles for Military Operations Other Than War ................................................. V-1• Planning Considerations .......................................................................................... V-4• Types of Military Operations Other Than War ......................................................... V-6

CHAPTER VIMULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

• General .................................................................................................................. VI-1• Command and Control of US Forces in Multinational Operations .......................... VI-2• Considerations for Multinational Operations .......................................................... VI-2• Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations .... VI-5

APPENDIX

A Principles of War .............................................................................................. A-1B The Estimate Process ......................................................................................... B-1C Joint Publication 3-0 Series Hierarchy ............................................................... C-1D References ........................................................................................................ D-1E Administrative Instructions ................................................................................ E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 Range of Military Operations .......................................................................... I-2I-2 National Strategic Direction ............................................................................ I-5I-3 Combatant Commanders’ Plans ..................................................................... I-10II-1 Principles of War ............................................................................................ II-1II-2 Unified Action ............................................................................................... II-4II-3 Chain of Command ........................................................................................ II-5II-4 Command Relationships ................................................................................. II-7II-5 Possible Components in a Joint Force ........................................................... II-18II-6 Operational Areas Within a Theater .............................................................. II-20II-7 Combat and Communications Zones ............................................................ II-21II-8 Examples of Recent Military Operations in Urban Areas .............................. II-23

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Table of Contents

III-1 Strategic Estimate .......................................................................................... III-3III-2 Fundamentals of Campaign Plans .................................................................. III-8III-3 Facets of Operational Art .............................................................................. III-10III-4 Phases - Joint Campaign ............................................................................... III-19III-5 The Initial Plan ............................................................................................. III-25III-6 Risk Management Process ........................................................................... III-37III-7 Fire Support Coordination Line ..................................................................... III-43IV-1 Considerations Before Combat ...................................................................... IV-1IV-2 Considerations at the Outset of Combat ........................................................ IV-4IV-3 Considerations for Sustained Combat Operations .......................................... IV-8V-1 Principles for Military Operations Other Than War .......................................... V-2V-2 Planning Considerations for Military Operations Other Than War .................... V-4V-3 Types of Military Operations Other Than War ................................................. V-6VI-1 Considerations for Multinational Operations ................................................. VI-2VI-2 Combined Structure with National Integrity ................................................... VI-7VI-3 Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM ................ VI-9VI-4 Considerations in Multinational Logistics ..................................................... VI-11

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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vii

The Strategic Context

Discusses the Strategic Environment Within Which JointOperations Take Place

Lists the Fundamental Principles of Joint Operations

Covers Planning Guidance for War and MilitaryOperations Other Than War

Describes the Considerations for the Conduct of JointOperations During War

Provides Principles for Military Operations Other Than War

Discusses Considerations for Multinational Operations

Contemporary threatsfaced by the Armed Forcesof the United States aremore ambiguous andregionally focused thanduring the Cold War.

The range of militaryoperations stretches fromwar to military operationsother than war.

Combatant commanders may confront a variety of factors thatchallenge the stability of countries and regions and threatenUS national interests and security within their areas ofresponsibility. These instabilities can lead to increased levelsof competition, a wide variety of attempts at intimidation, drugtrafficking, insurgencies, regional conflicts, weaponsproliferation, and civil war. It is difficult to predict whichnations or groups may threaten US interests and how andwhen such threats will emerge. Yet such predictions shouldbe attempted, and with a process that allows for rapiddissemination of strategic estimates.

When other instruments of national power (diplomatic,economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate toachieve national objectives or protect national interests, theUS national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale,sustained combat operations to achieve national objectivesor protect national interests, placing the United States in awartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quicklyand with as few casualties as possible, achieving national

Range of Military Operations

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Military activities acrossthe full range of militaryoperations need to besynchronized with otherinstruments of nationalpower and focused oncommon national goals.

Achieving unity of effort ininteragency operations canbe difficult.

objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to theUnited States and its multinational partners.

Operations other than war are an aspect of military operationsthat focus on deterring war and promoting peace.

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) involvingthe use or threat of force. When other instruments of nationalpower are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentiallyhostile situation, military force may be required to demonstrateUS resolve and capability, support the other instruments ofnational power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms.The general goals of US military operations during such periodsare to support national objectives, deter war, and return to astate of peace. Such operations involve a greater risk that USforces could become involved in combat than operationsconducted to promote peace.

Military operations other than war not involving the useor threat of force. Prudent use of military forces in peacetimehelps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groupsbelow the threshold of armed conflict and maintains USinfluence in foreign lands. These operations, by definition, donot involve combat, but military forces always need to beprepared to protect themselves and respond to a changingsituation.

National security strategy and national military strategy(NMS), shaped by and oriented on national security policies,provide strategic direction for combatant commanders.Combatant commanders, in turn, provide guidance anddirection through their combatant command strategies andplans for the employment of military forces, in conjunctionwith interagency and multinational forces, in the conduct ofmilitary operations.

Combatant commanders and subordinate joint forcecommanders (JFCs) are likely to operate with agenciesrepresenting other US instruments of national power; withforeign governments; and with nongovernmental andinternational organizations in a variety of circumstances. Theintrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands thatcommanders and joint force planners consider all

National Strategic Direction

Interagency Operations

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Executive Summary

Properly conceivedtermination criteria arekey to ensuring thatvictories achieved withmilitary forces endure.

Joint operations doctrinereflects the nature ofmodern warfare and thestrategic requirements ofthe Nation.

The three levels of war(strategic, operational, andtactical) are doctrinalperspectives that clarify thelinks between strategicobjectives and tacticalactions.

instruments of national power and recognize which agenciesare best qualified to employ these elements toward theobjective. Unity of effort is made more difficult by the agencies’different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, anddecisionmaking techniques.

To facilitate development of effective termination criteria,US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armedconflict by achieving sufficient leverage to impose a lastingsolution. Because the nature of the termination will shape thefutures of the contesting nations or groups, it is fundamentallyimportant to understand that termination of operations is anessential link between national security strategy, NMS, andend state goals — the desired outcome. This principle holdstrue for both war and MOOTW.

Joint operations doctrine is built on a sound base ofwarfighting theory and practical experience. It applies theprinciples of the fundamentals of joint warfare, and other keyconcepts consistent with the policies of the US Government.It seeks to provide JFCs with a broad range of options to defeatan adversary in war or to conduct MOOTW. It is a doctrinethat recognizes the fundamental and beneficial effects ofteamwork and unity of effort, and the synchronization andintegration of military operations in time, space, and purpose.The fundamental principle for employment of US jointforces is to commit decisive force to ensure achievement ofthe objectives established by the National CommandAuthorities (NCA) while concluding operations in the shortesttime possible and on terms favorable to the United States.

The levels of war, from a doctrinal perspective, clarify thelinks between strategic objectives and tactical actions.Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them,the three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. Theyapply to both war and MOOTW. Actions can be defined asstrategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect orcontribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tacticalobjectives.

The Strategic Goal and Conflict Termination

Fundamentals of Joint Operations

Levels of War

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Combatant commandersplay a pivotal role inunifying actions.

Joint forces conductcampaigns and majoroperations. Functionaland Service components ofthe joint force conductsupported, subordinate,and supporting operations,not independentcampaigns.

Joint force commandrelationships are an arrayof options that joint forcecommanders (JFCs) canuse to adapt theorganization of assignedforces to situationalrequirements and arrangecomponent operations intime, space, and purpose.

JFCs have full authority toassign missions, redirectefforts, and directcoordination amongsubordinate commanders.

The concept of unified action highlights the synergisticapplication of all of the instruments of national andmultinational power and includes the actions of nonmilitaryorganizations as well as military forces to achieve commonobjectives.

The integration of all US military capabilities, often inconjunction with forces from other nations, other US agencies,nongovernmental organizations, and United Nations forces andcapabilities, is required to generate decisive joint combat power.JFCs synchronize and integrate the actions of air, land, sea,space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic andoperational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns andmajor operations. The goal is to increase the total effectivenessof the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or toinvolve all forces equally.

The NCA exercise authority and control of the armed forcesthrough a single chain of command with two distinctbranches. One branch runs from the President, through theSecretary of Defense, directly to the commanders of combatantcommands for missions and forces assigned to their commands.The other branch, used for purposes other than operationaldirection of forces assigned to the combatant command, runsfrom the President through the Secretary of Defense to theSecretaries of the Military Departments.

Joint forces are specifically designated, composed ofsignificant elements, assigned or attached, of two or moreMilitary Departments, and commanded by a JFC with a jointstaff. The manner in which JFCs organize their forces directlyaffects the responsiveness and versatility of joint forceoperations. The first principle in joint force organizationis that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission basedon the JFCs’ vision and concept of operations. Unity of effort,centralized planning and direction, and decentralized executionare key considerations.

Unified Action

Joint Warfare

Command Relationships

Organization of Forces

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Executive Summary

Command and control isthe exercise of authorityand direction by a properlydesignated commanderover assigned and attachedforces in theaccomplishment of amission.

Joint urban operations arejoint operations plannedand conducted across therange of militaryoperations on or againstobjectives on atopographical complexand its adjacent naturalterrain, where manmadeconstruction and thedensity of noncombatantsare the dominant features.

JFCs issue prioritizedmission-type orders tosubordinate commandersand define commandrelationships to facilitatemission accomplishmentconsistent with theirconcept of operations.

Command includes both the authority and responsibility foreffectively using available resources to accomplish assignedmissions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating anddirecting people and organizations into action to accomplishmissions. Control is inherent in command. To control is toregulate forces and functions to execute the commander’sintent. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure,report, and correct performance.

Urbanized areas possess all of the characteristics of the naturallandscape, coupled with manmade construction and theassociated infrastructure, resulting in a complicated anddynamic environment that influences the conduct of militaryoperations in many ways. The most distinguishingcharacteristic of joint urban operations (JUO), however, isnot the infrastructure but the density of noncombatants thatfundamentally alters the character of combat and noncombatoperations.

JUO are not analogous to jungle, desert, or mountain operationsin that there are more than just terrain considerations. JUOare conducted in large, densely populated areas with problemsunique to clearing adversary forces while possibly restoringservices and managing major concentrations of people.During JUO, joint forces may not always focus only ondestruction of adversary forces but also may be required totake steps necessary to protect and support noncombatants andtheir infrastructure from which they receive services necessaryfor survival.

Planning for employment of joint teams begins with articulatingand understanding the mission, objective, purpose of theoperations, and commander’s intent. The Joint StrategicPlanning System provides strategic direction; assigns missions,tasks, forces, and resources; and designates objectives andrules of engagement. It also establishes constraints andrestraints and defines policies and concepts to be integratedinto combatant command strategies and plans. The ultimategoal of US military forces is to accomplish the objectives

Command and Control

Joint Urban Operations

Planning Joint Operations

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Combatant commandstrategic planning inpeacetime provides theframework for employingforces in peacetime and inresponse to crises.

A campaign is a series ofrelated major operationsthat arrange tactical,operational, and strategicactions to accomplishstrategic and operationalobjectives.

Operational art is the useof military forces toachieve strategic goalsthrough the design,organization, integration,and conduct of strategies,campaigns, majoroperations, and battles.

directed by the NCA. For joint operations, this will be achievedthrough full spectrum dominance — the ability of US forces,operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational andinteragency partners, to defeat any adversary or dominate anysituation across the full range of military operations.

Combatant command planners develop peacetimeassessments that ease transition to crisis or war as well as topostconflict. Peacetime intelligence and logistic assessments,for example, are essential for force projection and rapidtransition to combat operations.

When directed by the NCA to conduct military operations,the combatant commanders refine peacetime strategies andmodify existing plans or develop campaign plans asappropriate. The result, expressed in terms of militaryobjectives, military concepts, and resources (ends, ways, andmeans), provides guidance for a broad range of activities.

A campaign plan describes how these operations areconnected in time, space, and purpose. Campaigns are jointin nature and serve as the focus for the conduct of war andMOOTW. Campaigns must be kept simple and focusedon clearly defined objectives.

A wartime campaign is the synchronization and integrationof any necessary air, land, sea, space, and special operations— as well as interagency and multinational operations — inharmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational effortsto attain national and multinational objectives.

Operational art determines when, where, and for whatpurpose major forces will be employed and should influencethe adversary disposition before combat. It governs thedeployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawalfrom battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operationsto achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficientlyand effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides aframework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughtswhen designing campaigns and major operations. Operational

Combatant Command Strategic Planning

The Campaign

Operational Art

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Executive Summary

The initial plan establishesthe commander's intent,the concept of operations,and the initial tasks forsubordinate units.

Actions JFCs are able totake before the initiation ofhostilities can assist indetermining the shape andcharacter of futureoperations.

As combat operationscommence, JFCs need toexploit full dimensionalleverage to shock,demoralize, and disruptopponents immediately.

JFCs conduct sustainedoperations when a quickmilitary resolution is notpossible.

art helps commanders understand the conditions for victorybefore seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles.Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnectedengagements, with relative attrition the only measure of successor failure.

Key planning considerations include: mission, commander'sintent, commander's critical items of information, concept ofoperations, targeting, support, air apportionment, counteringair and missile threats, space support operations, concept oflogistics, force protection, environmental considerations, andcommand, control, communications, and computer systems.

JFCs should prepare the operational area, which involvesimplementing intelligence and counterintelligence operationsin order to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, andpossible actions of potential opponents as well as thegeography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of theoperational area. JFCs should also consider isolation of theadversary, movement to attain operational reach, specialoperations protection, space operations, and assessmentof the physical environment.

JFCs seek decisive advantage through the use of all availableelements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative,deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve his objectives, andgenerate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat.Actions that JFCs take include conducting force projection,seeking dimensional superiority, attacking adversarycenters of gravity, conducting special operations, andensuring force protection.

JFCs seek to extend operations throughout the breadth anddepth of the operational area. During sustained operations,JFCs simultaneously employ air, land, sea, space, andspecial operations forces. During a major operation, onecomponent or major category of operations might be the maineffort, with others in support. When conditions change, themain effort might shift to another component or function. Somefunctions (e.g., strategic attack, interdiction, and psychological

Key Planning Considerations

Considerations Before Combat

Considerations at the Outset of Combat

Considerations for Sustained Combat Operations

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Military operations otherthen war encompass awide range of activitieswhere the militaryinstrument of nationalpower is used for purposesother than the large-scalecombat operations usuallyassociated with war.

US military operationsoften are conducted withthe armed forces of othernations in pursuit ofcommon objectives.

operations) continue throughout the conflict, to deny theadversary sanctuary, freedom of action, or informationaladvantage. When prevented from concentrating, opponents canbe attacked, isolated at tactical and operational levels, anddefeated in detail. At other times, JFCs may cause theiropponents to concentrate their forces, facilitating their attackby friendly forces.

MOOTW usually involve a combination of air, land, sea,space, and special operations forces as well as the efforts ofgovernmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations,in a complementary fashion. Although these operations areoften conducted outside the United States, they also includemilitary support to US civil authorities.

Combatant commanders support national objectives throughcombatant command strategies and military operations, whichtranslate strategic intent into operational and tactical actions.Thus, joint MOOTW involve strategic, operational, andtactical considerations. Because the Department of State isfrequently the lead Federal agency and nearly always aprincipal player in joint MOOTW outside the continentalUnited States, JFCs should maintain a working relationshipwith the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area.

Planning considerations for MOOTW include interagencycoordination, command and control, intelligence andinformation collection, constraints and restraints, training andeducation, postconflict operations, and redeployment to othercontingencies.

Multinational operations, both those that include combat andthose that do not, are conducted within the structure of analliance, a result of formal agreements between two or morenations for broad, long-term objectives, or coalition, an adhoc arrangement between two or more nations for commonaction. Effectively planned and executed multinationaloperations should, in addition to achieving common objectives,facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of actionand preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support. Each

Military Operations Other Than War

Multinational Considerations

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Executive Summary

multinational operation is unique, and key considerationsinvolved in planning and conducting multinational operationsvary with the international situation and perspectives, motives,and values of the organization’s members.

Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles inmultinational operations — often as important as leading.However, US forces often will be the predominant and mostcapable force within an alliance or coalition and can beexpected to play a central leadership role, albeit one foundedon mutual respect. Stakes are high, requiring the militaryleaders of member nations to emphasize common objectivesas well as mutual support and respect.

Considerations for multinational operations includenational goals; unity of effort; doctrine, training, andequipment; cultural differences; management of resources; andnational communications. JFCs must also initiate actions andprovide guidance on the protection and sharing of sensitiveUS information and assets. Additionally, planned operationsmust take into account host nation policies and restrictions, aswell as participating countries specific national policiesregarding the use of force by their militaries employed outsidenational boundaries.

This publication is the keystone document of the jointoperations series. It provides fundamental principles anddoctrine that guide the Armed Forces of the United States inthe conduct of joint and multinational operations.

CONCLUSION

The Armed Forces of theUnited States should beprepared to operate withinthe framework of analliance or coalition underother-than-US leadership.

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CHAPTER ITHE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

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1. Introduction

The above quote reflects the centralphilosophy necessary for successful jointoperations. Joint team success requiresunity of effort — common action throughoutthe joint force in pursuit of commonobjectives. This publication providesguidance to joint force commanders (JFCs)and their subordinates for the direction,planning, execution, and support ofcampaigns and operations — in war and inmilitary operations other than war(MOOTW). This guidance includes:

a. The strategic context within whichJFCs operate in supporting national securitypolicies and implementing national militarystrategy (NMS).

b. Principles, concepts, and othergeneral considerations that assist JFCs tointegrate and synchronize operations andachieve unity of effort.

2. Security Environment

a. Contemporary threats faced by theArmed Forces of the United States are moreambiguous and regionally focused thanduring the Cold War. Combatantcommanders may confront a variety of

“Joint warfare is team warfare. The engagement of forces is not a series ofindividual performances linked by a common theme; rather, it is the integratedand synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities. The synergythat results from the operations of joint forces according to joint doctrinemaximizes combat capability in unified action. Joint warfare does not requirethat all forces participate in a particular operation merely because they areavailable. The joint force commander has the authority and responsibility totailor forces for the mission at hand, selecting those that most effectivelyand efficiently ensure success.”

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

factors that challenge the stability ofcountries and regions and threaten USnational interests and security within theirareas of responsibility (AORs). Theseinstabilities can lead to increased levels ofcompetition, a wide variety of attempts atintimidation, drug trafficking, insurgencies,regional conflicts, weapons proliferation, andcivil war. It is difficult to predict which nationsor groups may threaten US interests and howand when such threats will emerge. Yet suchpredictions should be attempted, and with aprocess that allows for rapid dissemination ofstrategic estimates.

b. Even in a time of relative peace,combatant commanders will be challengedby regional factions seeking to expand theirinfluence by coercion or force. Some ofthese potential opponents have large,modern, conventional military forcesequipped with high-quality systemscomparable to those of the Armed Forces ofthe United States. An adversary’s possessionof weapons of mass destruction (WMD);ballistic and cruise missiles (fixed andmobile) systems; hard and deeply buriedfacilities; and viable air, land, naval, space,and special operations forces andcapabilities will constantly challenge acombatant commander’s ability to deter armedconflict and, if necessary, to fight and win.

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JP 3-0

c. Regional challenges will often involvean adversary whose system of beliefs isfundamentally different to include corebeliefs such as right and wrong, the value ofhuman life, and the concept of victory anddefeat. What appears to be irrational orfanatical to US forces may be completelyrational to multinational partners oropponents.

d. Increasingly complex informationsystems are being integrated into traditionalwarfighting disciplines such as mobility;logistics; and command, control,communications, computers, and intelligence(C4I). Many of these systems are designedand employed with inherent vulnerabilitiesthat are, in many cases, the unavoidableconsequences of enhanced functionality,interoperability, efficiency, and convenienceto users. US dependence on information andinformation systems, and the resultantvulnerabilities this entails, exposes the UnitedStates to a wide range of threats. These threatsinclude but are not limited to computerhackers, criminals, vandals, terrorists, andopposing nation states and have brought focus

and compelling relevance to ourvulnerabilities to emerging technologies.

For additional guidance on the use ofinformation and information systems inoffensive and defensive informationoperations (IO), refer to Chapter III,“Planning Joint Operations,” and JointPublication (JP) 3-13, Joint Doctrine forInformation Operations.

3. Range of Military Operations

The United States acts to meet variouschallenges, protect national interests, andachieve strategic goals in a variety of waysdepending on the nature of the strategicenvironment. Figure I-1 shows the range ofmilitary operations.

a. War. When other instruments ofnational power (diplomatic, economic, andinformational) are unable or inappropriate toachieve national objectives or protect nationalinterests, the US national leadership maydecide to conduct large-scale, sustainedcombat operations to achieve national

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

Peace Enforcement /Noncombatant Evacuation

Operations (NEO)Strikes / Raids / Show of Force

Counterterrorism / PeacekeepingCounterinsurgency

Peace Enforcement /Noncombatant Evacuation

Operations (NEO)Strikes / Raids / Show of Force

Counterterrorism / PeacekeepingCounterinsurgency

Deter War&

Resolve Conflict

PromotePeace

&Support US Civil

Authorities

Antiterrorism / Disaster ReliefPeacebuilding

Nation AssistanceDomestic SupportCounterdrug / NEO

Deter War&

Resolve Conflict

PromotePeace

&Support US Civil

Authorities

Antiterrorism / Disaster ReliefPeacebuilding

Nation AssistanceDomestic SupportCounterdrug / NEO

MilitaryOperations

OtherThanWar

MilitaryOperations

GeneralUS Goal Examples

MilitaryOperations

GeneralUS Goal Examples

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

War

MilitaryOperations

OtherThanWar

Fight&

Win

Large-scale Combat Operations:Attack / Defend / Blockades

COMBAT

NONCOMBAT

I-3


objectives or protect national interests,placing the United States in a wartime state.In such cases, the goal is to win as quicklyand with as few casualties as possible,achieving national objectives and concludinghostilities on terms favorable to the UnitedStates and its multinational partners.

b. Military Operations Other Than War.Operations other than war are an aspect ofmilitary operations that focus on deterringwar and promoting peace. Chapter V,“Military Operations Other Than War,”discusses MOOTW in more detail.

• MOOTW Involving the Use or Threatof Force.

•• In spite of efforts to promote peace,conditions within a country or regionmay result in armed conflict. Whenother instruments of national power areunable to influence a deteriorating orpotentially hostile situation, militaryforce may be required to demonstrateUS resolve and capability, support theother instruments of national power, orterminate the situation on favorableterms. The general goals of US militaryoperations during such periods are tosupport national objectives, deter war,and return to a state of peace. Suchoperations involve a greater risk that USforces could become involved in combatthan operations conducted to promotepeace.

•• Combatant commanders, at thedirection of the National CommandAuthorities (NCA), employ US forcesto deter an adversary’s action. Thephysical presence of these forces,coupled with their potential employment,can serve as a deterrent and facilitateachieving strategic goals. Should thisdeterrence fail, force may be requiredto compel compliance; for example, inthe form of raids or strikes. Other such

operations include peace operations (PO),combatting terrorism, enforcement ofsanctions, enforcing exclusion zones,support to insurgency andcounterinsurgency, maritime interceptoperations, and noncombatant evacuationoperations (NEOs).

•• At any point when force iscontemplated, those responsible forordering, planning, or executing suchaction should remember Clausewitz’sdictum that the use of force and violenceintroduces the fear, physical strain, andthe uncertainty that are some of thehallmarks of the nature of warfare. Justas there are important political, diplomatic,and legal differences between war andMOOTW, there is also a singularlyimportant threshold where using militaryforce of any kind comes into play. In therange of military operations, thisthreshold is the distinction betweencombat and noncombat operations.

• MOOTW Not Involving the Use orThreat of Force. Prudent use ofmilitary forces in peacetime helps keepthe day-to-day tensions between nationsor groups below the threshold of armedconflict and maintains US influence inforeign lands. Such operations includeforeign humanitarian assistance (FHA)and disaster relief, nation assistance (toinclude security assistance, foreigninternal defense (FID), and foreignconsequence management (CM)),counterdrug operations, arms control,evacuation of noncombatants, andpeacekeeping. Such operations aretypically joint in nature and may involveforward-presence forces or unitsdeployed from another theater or thecontinental United States (CONUS) or acombination of both. These operations,by definition, do not involve combat;but as recent history has shown, ahumanitarian effort not involving the use

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or threat of force can quickly escalateinto armed conflict. Therefore, militaryforces always need to be prepared toprotect themselves and respond to achanging situation.

c. Simultaneous Nature of TheaterOperations

• MOOTW can involve simultaneousactions within an AOR. These actionsmay or may not involve the use of forceat times; part of the theater could also bein a wartime state. In such situations,geographic combatant commandersshould pay particular attention tosynchronizing and integrating theactivities of forces toward a commonpurpose that supports attaining national,theater, and multinational strategicobjectives.

• Some military operations may beconducted for one purpose. Disasterrelief operations, for example, arepeacetime military operations with ahumanitarian purpose. A strike or raid— such as Operation EL DORADOCANYON, the 1986 joint operation tocoerce Libya to conform withinternational laws against terrorism —is an example of a military operation fora specific purpose of compelling actionor deterrence. Often, however, militaryoperations will have multiple purposesas dictated by a fluid and changingsituation. Branch and sequel events mayrequire additional tasks by the joint force.During the 1992-1993 operations inSomalia (Operations PROVIDERELIEF and RESTORE HOPE), peaceenforcement operations evolved fromhumanitarian assistance efforts,challenging the command with multiplemissions. Joint forces should endeavorto meet such challenges with clearlydefined objectives addressing diversepurposes.

• In war and MOOTW, combatantcommanders and subordinate JFCswork with US ambassadors, theDepartment of State, and otheragencies to best integrate the militarywith the diplomatic, economic, andinformational instruments of nationalpower.

4. National Strategic Direction

National security strategy and NMS,shaped by and oriented on national securitypolicies, provide strategic direction forcombatant commanders. Combatantcommanders, in turn, provide guidance anddirection through their combatantcommand strategies and plans for theemployment of military forces, in conjunctionwith interagency and multinational forces, inthe conduct of military operations. Thesestrategies integrate national and militaryobjectives (ends), national policies andmilitary concepts (ways), and nationalresources and military forces and supplies(means). Figure I-2 illustrates nationalstrategic direction.

a. National Security Strategic Content.The United States approaches its globalcommitments with a strategy founded ondeterrence and buttressed by the capability toproject power to safeguard its nationalinterests. Successful military operationsmay not, by themselves, achieve the desiredstrategic end state. Military activities acrossthe full range of military operations need tobe integrated and synchronized with otherinstruments of national power and focusedon common national goals. (See definitionof national security strategy in glossary.)

b. National Military Strategy. NMSentails the art and science of distributing andapplying military power to attain nationalobjectives in peace and war. NMS is derivedfrom the national security strategy andattempts to promote peace, deter aggression

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and, failing that, fight and win. But in thelarger context, defeating an enemy militaryforce is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, toensure a long-term solution to a crisis. NMSand defense policy provide strategicguidance for the employment of militaryforces. The NMS provides advice of theChairman, in consultation with the othermembers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thecombatant commanders, to the President, theNational Security Council, and the Secretaryof Defense as to the recommended NMS andfiscally constrained force structure requiredto attain the national security objectives. TheJoint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)provides guidance for planning purposes tothe combatant commanders and the Chiefs ofthe Services to accomplish tasks and missionsbased on current military capabilities. Thisguidance capitalizes on US strengths and

permits it to exploit the weaknesses of thosewho may threaten US national interests. TheJSCP provides a coherent framework forcapabilities-based military advice provided tothe NCA.

c. Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). TheTEP is a strategic planning documentintended to link a combatant commander’sregional engagement activities withnational strategic objectives. The TEP isbased on planning guidance provided in theJSCP. The TEP identifies the prioritizationand integration and synchronization ofpeacetime military engagement activities ona regional basis and illustrates the efficienciesgained from regional combatant commandengagement activities that support nationalstrategic objectives. For planning purposes,combatant command TEP planners use

Figure I-2. National Strategic Direction

NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION

National Interests& Values

NATIONAL POLICIES

THEATERSTRATEGY

PLANS

NATIONAL SECURITYSTRATEGY

NATIONAL POLICYSTATEMENTS

NATIONAL MILITARYSTRATEGY

JOINT STRATEGICCAPABILITIES PLAN

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assigned forces, those rotationally deployedto the theater, and those forces that historicallyhave been deployed for engagement activities.Each geographic combatant commander’sTEP is forwarded to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff (CJCS) for review andintegration into the global family ofengagement plans.

For additional guidance on theaterengagement planning, refer to CJCSMemorandum 3113.01A, TheaterEngagement Planning.

5. Executing National SecurityStrategy

In war and MOOTW, combatantcommanders are the vital link in the chainof command established by the NCA (thePresident and Secretary of Defense, or theirduly deputized alternates or successors).Directives flow from the NCA through theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tothe combatant commanders, who plan andconduct the operations that achieve national andalliance and/or coalition strategic objectives.

a. The Total Force

• To meet future requirements, theServices, in addition to US SpecialOperations Command (USSOCOM)and under additional authorityestablished in title 10, United States Code(USC), section 167, organize, train, andequip Active and Reserve Componentforces, military retirees, Departmentof Defense (DOD) civilian personnel,contractor personnel, and selected hostnation (HN) personnel. The Reserveand Active Components are fullyintegrated partners in executing USmilitary strategy.

• Spontaneous, unpredictable crises callfor trained and ready forces that are eitherforward deployed or are rapidly and

globally deployable from CONUS.These forces should be initially self-sufficient and must possess the crediblecombat capabilities needed to effectivelyact in the US national interest or signalUS resolve prior to conflict. Such forcesare usually drawn from the active forcestructure and normally are tailored andintegrated into joint organizations thatcapitalize on the unique andcomplementary capabilities of theServices and USSOCOM. ReserveComponent (RC) individuals or forcesoften are required to facilitate thedeployment of such forces or providecapabilities that are necessary for arobust, versatile joint force.

• RC forces provide the Nation with uniqueand complementary capabilities in timeof war or national emergencies. JFCsand their subordinates must beknowledgeable of the capabilities andlimitations of both Active and ReserveComponent forces, blending them insuch a manner as to maximize the overallcapability of the joint force. JFCs andtheir staffs should be familiar with RCmobilization authority and responsetimes.

b. Military Operations as Part of aMultinational Force. Military operationsin regional crises often may involvecoalitions that differ from familiar,longstanding alliance structures. Jointforces should be prepared for combat andnoncombat operations with forces from othernations. When assessing the strategicenvironment, combatant commandersconsider international security agreements,formal and informal command relationshipswith allies, collective security strategies,global and regional stability, interoperability,cultural differences, and regionalinterrelationships. United Nations (UN)resolutions also may provide the basis for useof military force.

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See Chapter VI, “Multinational Operations,”for more information.

c. Military Operations with NonmilitaryOrganizations

• Combatant commanders andsubordinate JFCs are likely to operatewith agencies representing other USinstruments of national power; withforeign governments; and withnongovernmental and internationalorganizations in a variety ofcircumstances. The nature of interagencycoordination demands that commandersand joint force planners consider allinstruments of national power andrecognize which agencies are bestqualified to employ these elementstoward the objective. Such agencies andorganizations often operate employing“management,” “direction,” or“coordination” rather than “command.”They may be the lead effort during manyoperations other than war, with militaryorganizations providing support. Unityof effort is made more difficult by theagencies’ different and sometimesconflicting policies, procedures, anddecisionmaking techniques. In theabsence of a formal command structure,JFCs may be required to buildconsensus to achieve unity of effort. Insome cases, a lead agency is prescribedby law or regulation, or by agreementbetween the agencies involved.

• The interagency environment does notpreclude establishing formal agreementsbetween the military and civilianagencies of government. In someinstances, military and nongovernmentalor international organizations mayestablish short-term agreements. Suchagreements can take the form ofmemoranda of understanding or termsof reference. Heads of agencies ororganizations and authorized military

commanders negotiate and co-signplans. Robust liaison facilitatesunderstanding, coordination, andmission accomplishment.

• Increased involvement of military forcesin civil activity at home and abroad ismatched, in part, by an increase insituations — primarily overseas — inwhich civil agencies face emergingpost-Cold War factors and securitythreats not previously confronted. Manyorganizations are drawn closer to militaryforces because their missions may failwithout military support or protection.

• Complex operations, such as PO, mayrequire a high order of civil-militaryintegration. Presidential directives (suchas Presidential Decision Directive 56,Managing Complex ContingencyOperations) guide participation by all UScivilian and military agencies in suchoperations. Military leaders must workwith the other members of the nationalsecurity team in the most skilled, tactful,and persistent ways to promote unity ofeffort.

• US military forces will remain under theDOD command structure whilesupporting other agencies.

For additional guidance on interagencyoperations, refer to JP 3-08, InteragencyCoordination During Joint Operations.

“Response to the challenges facing theNation today most often requires amulti-agency, interdisciplinaryapproach that brings many diverseskills and resources of the FederalGovernment and other public andprivate organizations to bear.”

JP 3-08, Interagency CoordinationDuring Joint Operations

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d. National Strategic Direction. TheNCA, through the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, direct the national effort thatsupports combatant and subordinatecommanders to ensure the following.

• Military objectives are defined,understood, and achievable.

• Active Service forces are ready forcombat and RC forces are appropriatelymobilized and readied to join activeforces.

• Intelligence systems and efforts focuson the operational area, includingopposing nations and their armed forces.

• Strategic direction is current and timely.

• Defense and other governmentalagencies support the JFC’s employmentof forces.

• All required CONUS-based assets andother combatant commands are readyto provide needed support.

• Allies and coalition partners areavailable when appropriate.

• Forces and supplies deploy into theoperational area in a timely manner tosupport the JFC’s concept of operations.

e. Combatant Commands

• With the advice and assistance of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thePresident, through the Secretary ofDefense, establishes combatant(unified or specified) commands for theperformance of military missions andprescribes the force structure of suchcommands. Commanders of combatantcommands are responsible to the NCAfor the preparedness of theircommands and for the accomplishment

of the military missions assigned tothem.

• The NCA exercise authority andcontrol of the armed forces through asingle chain of command with twodistinct branches. The first branchruns from the President, through theSecretary of Defense, directly to thecommanders of combatant commandsfor missions and forces assigned to theircommands. The second branch, usedfor purposes other than operationaldirection of forces assigned to thecombatant commands, runs from thePresident through the Secretary ofDefense to the Secretaries of theMilitary Departments. Combatantcommanders are therefore the vitallink between those who determinenational security policy and strategy andthe military forces that conduct militaryoperations designed to achieve nationalstrategic objectives.

• The term “combatant commander”refers to the commander in chief of bothgeographically and functionallyorganized combatant commands. Theterm “geographic combatantcommander” refers to a combatantcommander with a geographic AORassigned by the NCA. Functionalcombatant commanders support (orcan be supported by) geographiccombatant commanders or may conductoperations in direct support of theNCA.

• Based on guidance and direction fromthe NCA, combatant commandersprepare strategic estimates, strategies,and plans to accomplish the missionsassigned by higher authority. Supportingcombatant commanders and theirsubordinates ensure that their actionsare consistent with the supportedcommander’s strategy.

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• General responsibilities for combatantcommanders are established by law(title 10, USC, section 164) andexpressed in the Unified Command Plan(UCP) and JP 0-2, Unified Action ArmedForces (UNAAF).

Responsibilities, capabilities, andcompetencies provided to a joint forceby Service component forces (includingthe US Coast Guard) and functionalunified commands are addressed in JP3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.

6. The Estimate Process andStrategy

a. Estimate is an analysis of a situation,development, or trend that identifies its majorelements, interprets the significance, andappraises the future possibilities and theprospective results of the various actions thatmight be taken. The estimate assists inclarifying problems and devisingintegrated solutions to complex problems,thus reducing surprise and shock. Acontinuous estimate process provides aframework for disciplined reason even underthe most trying circumstances. The estimateis the central focus for strategic, operational,and tactical analysis that needs to bemaintained over time and in the face ofcontinuing change. The first questions in anyestimate are the following: What is themission? What is the desired end state? Whathas changed? What are the resultingpossibilities and consequences?

b. Combatant commanders develop andmodify strategic estimates based on theirassigned tasks after reviewing the strategicenvironment, the analysis of the variousthreats, the nature of anticipatedoperations, national and alliance strategicdirection, and forces available. Functionallyoriented combatant commanders developestimates for each theater they support.

Operations in one theater often affect othertheaters. The interrelationships amongtheaters, therefore, are important in theassessment of a theater’s strategicenvironment and development of the strategicestimate.

c. The estimate process is continuous,with the combatant commander’s staff and thecomponent commanders and their staffscontributing to the product. The strategicestimate itself acts as the basis for strategy,plans, and actions that occur in response todeliberate taskings or crises. Where asubordinate commander’s estimate of thesituation may focus on near-term decisionsand influences operation plan (OPLAN)development, the combatant commander’sstrategic estimate results in operationalconcepts and courses of action (COAs) —broad statements of what is to beaccomplished. One of the critical parts ofthe estimate process is defining the militaryend state to be achieved.

d. Supported by the strategicestimate(s), combatant commandersdevelop strategies consistent with nationalpolicy and plans. These strategies translatenational and multinational direction intoconcepts to meet strategic and jointoperation planning requirements. Asshown in Figure I-3, combatant commanders’plans provide strategic direction; assignmissions, tasks, forces, and resources;designate objectives; provide authoritativedirection; promulgate rules of engagement(ROE); establish constraints and restraints;and define policies and concepts to beintegrated into subordinate or supportingplans.

Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,”discusses combatant command strategicplanning in more detail. Appendix B, “TheEstimate Process,” provides a format for astrategic estimate.

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7. The Strategic Goal andTermination of Operations

a. Properly conceived terminationcriteria are key to ensuring that victoriesachieved with military forces endure. Tofacilitate development of effectivetermination criteria, US forces must bedominant in the final stages of an armedconflict by achieving the leverage sufficientto impose a lasting solution.

b. The design and implementation ofleverage and the ability to know how andwhen to terminate operations are involved inoperational art and are discussed in ChapterIII, “Planning Joint Operations.” Because thenature of the termination will shape the futuresof the contesting nations or groups, it isfundamentally important to understand thattermination of operations is an essentiallink between national security strategy,NMS, and end state conditions — the

desired outcome. This principle holds truefor both war and MOOTW.

• Political Considerations. There aretwo general means for obtainingobjectives by force. The first seeksdomination of the opponent’s militarystrength or overthrow of the opponent’spolitical regime — an imposedsettlement. The second seeks concessionthrough coordinated military andnegotiating actions. Negotiating powerin armed conflict springs from twosources: military success and militarypotential. Military success providesmili tary, geographic, poli t ical ,psychological, or economic advantageand sets the stage for negotiations.Military potential establishes the threatof further advantage accruing to thepossessor, which forces the opposingnation or group to consider a negotiatedconclusion. Negotiating an advantageous

Figure I-3. Combatant Commanders’ Plans

Provide Strategic Direction

Assign Missions, Tasks, Forces, and Resources

Designate Objectives

Provide Authoritative Direction

Promulgate Rules of Engagement

Establish Constraints and Restraints

Define Policies and Concepts

Provide Strategic Direction

Assign Missions, Tasks, Forces, and Resources

Designate Objectives

Provide Authoritative Direction

Promulgate Rules of Engagement

Establish Constraints and Restraints

Define Policies and Concepts

COMBATANT COMMANDERS’PLANS

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conclusion to operations requires timeand power and the demonstrated will touse both. In addition to imposed andnegotiated termination, there may be anarmistice or truce, which is a negotiatedintermission in operations, not a peace.In effect, it is a device to buy timepending negotiation of a permanentsettlement or resumption of operations.A nation or group needs to consider theadvantages accruing to a truce and theprospects for its supervision.

•• Even when pursuing an imposedtermination, the government requiressome means of communication withthe opponent(s). Declarations ofintentions, requirements, and minorconcessions may speed conflicttermination, as the enemy considers theadvantages of early termination versusextended resistance in the light of fadingleverage.

•• The issue of termination centers onnational will and freedom of action.Once the opponent’s strategic objectiveshifts from maintaining or extendinggains to reducing losses, the possibilities

for negotiating an advantageoustermination improve. Military, economic,diplomatic, and informational efforts needto be coordinated toward causing thatshift and, once made, toward exploitingit. Termination of operations should beconsidered from the outset of planningand should be refined as operations movetoward advantageous termination.

• Military Considerations

•• In its strategic context, militaryvictory is measured in the achievementof the overall political goal andassociated termination objectives.Operational and tactical victory ismeasured by its contribution to strategicsuccess. Military objectives may differsignificantly for a negotiated settlementthan for an imposed one. Militarystrategic advice to political authoritiesregarding national military objectives fortermination should be reviewed formilitary feasibility, adequacy, andacceptability as well as estimates of thetime, costs, and military forces requiredto achieve the objectives. Implementingmilitary commanders need to understand

Coalition commanders communicate war termination to Iraqi militaryleadership during Operation DESERT STORM.

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the overall political goal and militaryobjectives for termination and shouldrequest clarification from higher authoritywhen required.

•• Another military consideration is thefollow-up political exploitation ofcompleted military action and the

military role in the transition to peace.This exploitation includes matters suchas military government, civil affairs (CA),and FHA, and requires early planning,liaison, and coordination both at thenational level and in the theater amongdiplomatic, military, and politicalleadership.

CHAPTER IIFUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

II-1

1. General

a. Joint operations doctrine shouldchange to reflect the nature of modernwarfare and the strategic requirements ofthe Nation. It is built on a sound base ofwarfighting theory and practical experience.It applies the principles of war (see FigureII-1 and Appendix A, “Principles of War”),the fundamentals of joint warfare (asdeveloped in Chapter III, “United StatesMilitary Power,” of JP 1, Joint Warfare of theArmed Forces of the United States), and otherkey concepts consistent with the policies ofthe US Government (USG). It seeks toprovide JFCs with a broad range of optionsto defeat an adversary in war or to conduct

“As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it issynonymous with joint warfare.”

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

MOOTW. It is a doctrine that recognizes thefundamental and beneficial effects ofteamwork and unity of effort, and thesynchronization and integration of militaryoperations in time, space, and purpose. Thefundamental principle for employment of USjoint forces is to take decisive action toensure achievement of the objectivesestablished by the NCA while concludingoperations in the shortest time possible andon terms favorable to the United States.

b. Advances in technology are likely tocontinue to increase the tempo, lethality,and depth of warfare. Joint doctrine shouldbe flexible enough to recognize the impactof emerging technologies and quicklyintegrate validated warfighting conceptsthat may provide the Armed Forces of theUnited States with a decisive advantage.

• Vulnerabilities arising out oftechnological advances also should beidentified and actions taken to protectthese vulnerabilities.

• The uneven application of fast-pacedtechnologies, even by key allies andcoali t ion partners, complicatesintegration and synchronization of HNactivities and multinational campaigns.

c. Asymmetric Environments. Many oftoday’s joint operations preclude conventionalforce-on-force operations. The JFC mustensure that forces are adequate and flexibleenough to recognize the impact of emergingasymmetric threats and quickly integrateappropriate responses to those threats.

Figure II-1. Principles of War

OFFENSIVE

MASS

ECONOMY OF FORCE

MANEUVER

UNITY OF COMMAND

SECURITY

SURPRISE

SIMPLICITY

OBJECTIVE

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

OFFENSIVE

MASS

ECONOMY OF FORCE

MANEUVER

UNITY OF COMMAND

SECURITY

SURPRISE

SIMPLICITY

OBJECTIVE

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2. The Levels of War

a. General

• The levels of war, from a doctrinalperspective, clarify the links betweenstrategic objectives and tactical actions.Although there are no finite limits orboundaries between them, the threelevels are strategic, operational, andtactical. They apply to both war andMOOTW.

• Levels of command, size of units, typesof equipment, or types and location offorces or components are notassociated with a particular level.National assets such as intelligence andcommunications satellites, previouslyconsidered principally in a strategiccontext, are an important adjunct totactical operations. Actions can bedefined as strategic, operational, or tacticalbased on their effect or contribution toachieving strategic, operational, or tacticalobjectives, but many times the accuracy ofthese labels can only be determined duringhistorical studies.

• Advances in technology, information agemedia reporting, and the compression oftime-space relationships contribute to thegrowing interrelationships betweenthe levels of war. The levels of war helpcommanders visualize a logical flow ofoperations, allocate resources, andassign tasks to the appropriatecommand. However, commanders atevery level must be aware that in a worldof constant, immediate communications,any single event may cut across thethree levels.

b. The Strategic Level

• The strategic level is that level of warat which a nation, often as a member ofa group of nations, determines national

or multinational (alliance or coalition)strategic security objectives andguidance and develops and uses nationalresources to accomplish these objectives.Strategy is the art and science ofdeveloping and employing armed forcesand other instruments of national powerin a synchronized and integrated fashionto secure national or multinationalobjectives. The NCA translate policyinto national strategic military objectives.These military objectives facilitatetheater strategic planning.

• Combatant commanders usuallyparticipate in discussions with the NCAthrough the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff and with allies and coalitionmembers. The combatant commandstrategy is thus an element that relates toboth US national strategy and operationalactivities within the theater. Militarystrategy, derived from policy, providesa framework for conductingoperations.

c. The Operational Level

• The operational level links the tacticalemployment of forces to strategicobjectives. The focus at this level is onoperational art — the use of militaryforces to achieve strategic goals throughthe design, organization, integration, andconduct of strategies, campaigns, majoroperations, and battles. Operational artdetermines when, where, and for whatpurpose major forces will be employedand should influence the adversarydisposition before combat. It governs thedeployment of those forces, theircommitment to or withdrawal frombattle, and the arrangement of battles andmajor operations to achieve operationaland strategic objectives.

• Operational art helps commanders useresources efficiently and effectively to

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achieve strategic objectives. It providesa framework to assist commanders inordering their thoughts when designingcampaigns and major operations.Operational art helps commandersunderstand the conditions for victorybefore seeking battle, thus avoidingunnecessary battles. Without operationalart, war would be a set of disconnectedengagements, with relative attrition theonly measure of success or failure.

• Operational art requires broad vision,the ability to anticipate, and effectivejoint, interagency, and multinationalcooperation. Operational art is practicednot only by JFCs but also by their staffofficers and subordinate commanders.Joint operational art looks not only at theemployment of military forces and thethreat but also at the arrangement oftheir efforts in time, space, and purpose.Joint operational art, in particular,focuses on the fundamental methodsand issues associated with thesynchronization and integration of air,land, sea, space, and special operationsforces. Operational art is discussed ingreater detail in Chapter III, “PlanningJoint Operations.”

• Among the many operationalconsiderations, operational art requirescommanders to answer the followingquestions.

•• What military (or related political andsocial) conditions must be produced inthe operational area to achieve thestrategic goal? (Ends)

•• What sequence of actions is mostlikely to produce that condition? (Ways)

•• How should the resources of the jointforce be applied to accomplish thatsequence of actions? (Means)

•• What is the likely cost or risk to thejoint force in performing that sequenceof actions?

•• What resources must be committed oractions performed to successfully executethe JFC’s exit strategy?

d. The Tactical Level. Tactics is theemployment of units in combat. It includesthe ordered arrangement and maneuver ofunits in relation to each other and/or to theadversary in order to use their full potential.An engagement is normally short induration and fought between small forces,such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat.Engagements include a wide variety of actionsbetween opposing forces in the air, in space,on and under the sea, or on land. A battleconsists of a set of related engagements.Battles typically last longer; involve largerforces such as fleets, armies, and air forces;and could affect the course of a campaign.

3. Unified Action

a. Whereas the term “joint operations” isprimarily concerned with the coordinatedactions of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates, the term “unified action” has a broaderconnotation. The concept of unified actionis illustrated in Figure II-2 and highlights thesynergistic application of all of theinstruments of national and multinationalpower and includes the actions of nonmilitaryorganizations as well as military forces.

b. All JFCs are responsible for unifiedactions that are planned and conducted inaccordance with the guidance and directionreceived from senior authorities (i.e., NCA,alliance or coalition leadership, and superiorcommander). JFCs should ensure that theirjoint operations are integrated andsynchronized in time, space, and purpose withthe actions of other military forces(multinational operations) and nonmilitary

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organizations (government agencies such asthe Agency for International Development;nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) andthe UN). Activities and operations with suchnonmilitary organizations can be complex andmay require considerable effort by JFCs, theirstaffs, and subordinate commanders,especially during MOOTW.

c. Combatant commanders play apivotal role in unifying actions (all of theelements and actions that comprise unifiedactions are normally present at the combatantcommander’s level). Subordinate JFCs alsointegrate and synchronize their operationsdirectly with the activities and operations ofother military forces and nonmilitaryorganizations in the operational area.

4. Joint Warfare

a. The integration of all US militarycapabilities — often in conjunction withforces from other nations, other US agencies,

NGOs, and UN forces and capabilities — isrequired to generate decisive joint combatpower. JFCs integrate and synchronize thesecapabilities and contributions in time, space,and purpose.

b. To achieve assigned objectives, jointforces conduct campaigns and majoroperations. Functional and Servicecomponents of the joint force conductsupported, subordinate, and supportingoperations, not independent campaigns.

c. The overarching operational concept inJP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces ofthe United States, is that JFCs integrate andsynchronize the actions of air, land, sea,space, and special operations forces toachieve strategic and operational objectivesthrough integrated, joint campaigns andmajor operations. The goal is to increasethe total effectiveness of the joint force, notnecessarily to involve all forces or to involveall forces equally. Campaigns reflect the

Figure II-2. Unified Action

UNIFIED ACTION

SUPPORTINGJOINT

OPERATIONS

MULTINATIONALOPERATIONS

OPERATIONS WITHUS GOVERNMENT

AGENCIES

OPERATIONS WITHNONGOVERNMENT

AGENCIES

UNITED NATIONSOPERATIONS

JOINTOPERATIONS

JOINTOPERATIONS

The concept of unified action highlights the integrated and synchronized activities of military forces andnonmilitary organizations, agencies, and corporations to achieve common objectives, though in commonparlance joint operations increasingly has this connotation (the "joint warfare is team warfare" context ofJoint Publication 1). Unified actions are planned and conducted by joint force commanders in accordancewith guidance and direction received from the National Command Authorities, multinational organizations,and superior commanders.

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nature of the operation directed by the NCA(strategic nuclear, peacekeeping, andconventional operations, among others).

5. Command Relationships

a. General

• The NCA exercise authority andcontrol of the armed forces through asingle chain of command with twodistinct branches, as shown in FigureII-3. One branch runs from thePresident, through the Secretary ofDefense, to the commanders ofcombatant commands for missions andforces assigned to their commands. Theother branch, used for purposes otherthan operational direction of forcesassigned to the combatant command,runs from the President through theSecretary of Defense to the Secretariesof the Military Departments. TheMilitary Departments, organizedseparately, each operate under the

authority, direction, and control of theSecretary of Defense. The Secretaries ofthe Military Departments exercise theauthority, direction, and control throughthe individual Chiefs of the Services oftheir forces that are not specificallyassigned to combatant commanders.

• The authority vested in the MilitaryDepartments in the performance of theirrole to “organize, train, equip, andprovide” forces runs from the Presidentthrough the Secretary of Defense tothe Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments. Then, to the degreeestablished by the Secretaries or specifiedin law, this authority runs through theService Chiefs to the Service componentcommanders assigned to the combatantcommands and to the commanders offorces not assigned to the combatantcommands. This administrative control(ADCON) recognizes the preparationof military forces and theiradministration and support, unless

Figure II-3. Chain of Command

CHAIN OF COMMAND

President

Secretary of Defense

Commanders of CombatantCommands

(for missions and forces assignedto their commands)

Chiefs of the Services(for forces not specifically assigned

to combatant commanders)

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments

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such responsibilities are specificallyassigned by the Secretary of Defense toanother component of the Departmentof Defense. The Secretaries of theMilitary Departments are responsible forthe administration and support of theforces assigned or attached to combatantcommands. They ful f i l l thei rresponsibilities by exercising ADCONthrough the commanders of the Servicecomponent commands assigned tocombatant commands. The responsibilitiesand authority exercised by the MilitaryDepartments are subject by law to theauthority provided to the commanders ofcombatant commands in their exercise oftheir combatant command (commandauthority) (COCOM).

• Unity of effort in joint operations isenhanced through the application ofthe flexible range of commandrelationships identified in JP 0-2,Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).Joint force command relationships are anarray of options JFCs can use to adaptthe organization of assigned forces tosituational requirements and arrangecomponent operations in time, space, andpurpose.

b. Combatant Command (CommandAuthority)

• COCOM is the command authorityover assigned forces vested only in thecommanders of combatant commandsby title 10, USC, section 164, or asdirected by the President in the UCP, andcannot be delegated or transferred.

• Basic Authority. As shown in FigureII-4, COCOM is the authority of acombatant commander to performthose functions of command overassigned forces involving organizingand employing commands and forces,

assigning tasks, designating objectives,and giving authoritative direction overall aspects of military operations, jointtraining (or in the case of USSOCOM,training of assigned forces), andlogistics necessary to accomplish themissions assigned to the command.COCOM should be exercised throughthe commanders of subordinateorganizations. Normally, this authorityis exercised through the subordinate JFCsand Service and/or functional componentcommanders. COCOM provides fullauthority to organize and employcommands and forces as the combatantcommander considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions.

• Combatant commanders may exerciseCOCOM in the following manner.

•• Through Service componentcommanders.

•• Through functional componentcommanders, if established for aparticular purpose, such as the specialoperations component.

•• Through a commander of asubordinate unified command (unifiedcommand only).

•• Through the commander of a jointtask force (JTF) reporting directly to thecombatant commander.

•• Through a single-Service forcecommander reporting directly to thecombatant commander. Normally,missions requiring operations of a single-Service force will be assigned to theapplicable Service componentcommander. A combatant commandermay establish a separate single-Serviceforce, but normally does so only underexceptional circumstances.

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•• Directly over specific operationalforces that, because of the missionassigned and the urgency of the situation,must remain immediately responsive tothe combatant commander.

• Directive Authority for LogisticMatters. Commanders of combatantcommands exercise directive authorityfor logistics and may delegate directiveauthority for a common supportcapability. The combatant commandermay delegate directive authority for asmany common support capabilities to asubordinate JFC as required toaccomplish the subordinate JFC’sassigned mission. The exercise ofdirective authority for logistics by acombatant commander includes theauthority to issue directives to

subordinate commanders, includingpeacetime measures, necessary toensure the following: effective executionof approved OPLANs; effectiveness andeconomy of operation; and preventionor elimination of unnecessary duplicationof facilities and overlapping of functionsamong component commands.

•• Under crisis action, wartimeconditions, or where critical situationsmake diversion of the normal logisticprocess necessary, the logistic andadministrative authority of combatantcommanders enables them to use allfacilities and supplies of all forcesassigned and/or attached to theircommands as necessary for theaccomplishment of their missions.

Figure II-4. Command Relationships

Budget and Planning, Programming,and Budgeting System Input

Assignment of subordinate commanders

Relations with Department of Defense Agencies

Convene courts-martial

Directive authority for logistics

Authoritative direction for all military operationsand joint trainingOrganize and employ commands and forces

Assign command functions to subordinates

Establish plans and requirements for intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance activities

Suspend from duty subordinate commanders

Combatant Command (command authority) (COCOM)(Unique to Combatant Commander)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Local direction andcontrol of movementsor maneuvers toaccomplish mission

Aid, assist, protect,or sustain anotherorganization

SUPPORTWhen

relationship isdelegated

When

is delegated

OPERATIONALCONTROL

When

is delegated

TACTICALCONTROL

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•• Under peacetime conditions, the scopeof the logistic authority exercised by thecommander of a combatant command willbe consistent with the peacetimelimitations imposed by legislation, DODpolicy or regulations, budgetaryconsiderations, local conditions, andother specific conditions prescribed bythe Secretary of Defense or the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where thesefactors preclude execution of a combatantcommander’s directive by componentcommanders, the comments andrecommendations of the combatantcommander, together with the commentsof the component commander concerned,normally will be referred to theappropriate Military Department forconsideration. If the matter is notresolved in a timely manner with theappropriate Military Department, it willbe referred by the combatant commander,through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.

For additional guidance on directiveauthority for logistics, refer to JP 0-2,Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

c. Operational Control (OPCON)

• OPCON may be exercised at anyechelon at or below the level of thecombatant command and can bedelegated. As shown in Figure II-4,OPCON is inherent in COCOM andis the authority to perform thosefunctions of command oversubordinate forces involvingorganizing and employing commandsand forces, assigning tasks, designatingobjectives, and giving authoritativedirection necessary to accomplish themission. OPCON includes authoritativedirection over all aspects of militaryoperations and joint training necessaryto accomplish assigned missions.

• OPCON should be exercised throughthe commanders of subordinateorganizations; normally, this authorityis exercised through subordinate JFCsand Service and/or functional componentcommanders. OPCON in and of itselfdoes not include authoritative directionfor logistics or matters of administration,discipline, internal organization, or unit

The commander of an amphibious task force may exerciseTACON over attached forces for specific operations.

II-9


training. OPCON does include theauthority to delineate functionalresponsibilities and geographic jointoperations areas of subordinate JFCs.

d. Tactical Control (TACON)

• TACON is the command authorityover assigned or attached forces orcommands, or military capability orforces made available for tasking, thatis limited to the detailed direction andcontrol of movements or maneuverswithin the operational area necessary toaccomplish assigned missions or tasks.TACON may be exercised bycommanders at any echelon at or belowthe level of combatant command. Asshown in Figure II-4, TACON does notprovide organizational authority orauthoritative direction for administrativeand logistic support; the commander ofthe parent unit continues to exercise thoseresponsibilities unless otherwisespecified in the establishing directive.

• TACON typically is exercised byfunctional component commandersover military capability or forces madeavailable for tasking.

e. Support

• Support is a command authority. Asupport relationship is established by asuperior commander betweensubordinate commanders when oneorganization should aid, protect,complement, or sustain another forceas shown in Figure II-4. Support may beexercised by commanders at any echelonat or below the level of combatantcommand. The NCA establish supportrelationships between the combatantcommands for the planning andexecution of joint operations. Thisensures that the tasked combatant

commander(s) receives the necessarysupport. JFCs may establish supportrelationships within the joint force toenhance unity of effort for givenoperational tasks, emphasize or clarifypriorities, provide a subordinate with anadditional capability, or combine theeffects of similar assets.

•• Mutual Support. Mutual support isthe action that units render each otheragainst an adversary because of theirassigned tasks, their position relative toeach other and to the adversary, and theirinherent capabilities.

•• General Support. General supportis the action that is given to the supportedforce as a whole rather than to a particularsubdivision thereof.

•• Direct Support. Direct support is amission requiring a force to supportanother specific force and authorizing itto answer directly the supported force’srequest for assistance.

•• Close Support. Close support is theaction of the supporting force againsttargets or objectives that are sufficientlynear the supported force as to requiredetailed integration or coordination of thesupporting action with fire, movement,or other actions of the supported force.

• Establishing supported andsupporting relationships betweencomponents is a useful option toaccomplish needed tasks. Within acombatant command, more than onesupported command may be designatedsimultaneously, and components maysimultaneously receive and providesupport in different mission areas,functions, or operations. For instance, ajoint force special operations componentmay be supported simultaneously for a

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direct action mission while providingsupport to a joint force land componentfor a deep operation. Similarly, a jointforce maritime component may besupported simultaneously for sea controlwhile supporting a joint force aircomponent to achieve air superiority overthe joint operational area. As defined inJP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF), “Unless limited by theestablishing directive, the commander ofthe supported force will have theauthority to exercise general direction ofthe supporting effort. General directionincludes the designation andprioritization of targets or objectives,timing and duration of the supportingaction, and other instructions necessaryfor coordination and efficiency.” Thesupporting commander has theresponsibility to ascertain the needs ofthe supported commander and takesuch action to fulfill them withinexisting capabilities and consistent withpriorities and requirements of otherassigned tasks.

• The establishing directive indicates thepurpose in terms of the effect desired andthe scope of the action to be taken. Italso should include:

•• The forces and resources allocated tothe supporting effort;

•• The time, place, level, and durationof the supporting effort;

•• The priority of the supportingmission relative to the other missions ofthe supporting force;

•• The authority, if any, of thesupporting force to modify thesupporting effort in the event ofexceptional opportunity or anemergency; and

•• The degree of authority granted to thesupported commander over thesupporting effort.

• The land and naval force commandersare the supported commanders within theareas of operations (AOs) designated bythe JFC. Within their designated AOs,land and naval force commandersintegrate and synchronize maneuver,fires, and interdiction. To facilitate thisintegration and synchronization, suchcommanders have the authority todesignate target priority, effects, andtiming of fires within their AOs. Withina theater and/or joint operations area(JOA), all missions must contribute tothe accomplishment of the overallobjective.

•• Synchronization of efforts within landor naval AOs with theater- and/or JOA-wide operations is of particularimportance. To facilitate synchronization,the JFC establishes priorities that will beexecuted throughout the theater and/orJOA, including within the land and navalforce commanders’ AOs.

•• In coordination with the land and/ornaval force commander, thosecommanders designated by the JFC toexecute theater- and/or JOA-widefunctions have the latitude to plan andexecute these JFC prioritized operationsand attack targets within land and navalAOs. If those operations would haveadverse impact within a land or navalAO, the commander must either readjustthe plan, resolve the issue with theappropriate component commander, orconsult with the JFC for resolution.

f. Other Authorities

• ADCON. ADCON is the direction orexercise of authority over subordinate

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or other organizations in respect toadministration and support includingorganization of Service forces, control ofresources and equipment, personnelmanagement, unit logistics, individualand unit training, readiness, mobilization,demobilization, discipline, and othermatters not included in the operationalmissions of the subordinate or otherorganizations. ADCON is synonymouswith administration and supportresponsibilities identified in title 10,USC. This is the authority necessary tofulfill Military Department statutoryresponsibilities for administration andsupport. ADCON may be delegated toand exercised by commanders ofService forces assigned to a combatantcommander at any echelon at or belowthe level of Service componentcommand. ADCON is subject to thecommand authority of combatantcommanders.

• Coordinating Authority. Coordinatingauthority is a consultation relationshipbetween commanders, not an authorityby which command may be exercised.Coordinating authority may be exercisedby commanders or individuals at anyechelon at or below the level ofcombatant command. Coordinatingauthority is the authority delegated toa commander or individual forcoordinating specific functions andactivities involving forces of two or moreServices, two or more joint forcecomponents, or two or more forces of thesame Service. The commander orindividual has the authority to requireconsultation between the agenciesinvolved but does not have theauthority to compel agreement. Thecommon task to be coordinated will bespecified in the establishing directivewithout disturbing the normalorganizational relationships in other

matters. Coordinating authority is moreapplicable to planning and similaractivi t ies than to operations.Coordinating authority is not in any waytied to force assignment. It will beassigned based on the missions andcapabilities of the commands ororganizations involved.

• D i r e c t L i a i s o n A u t h o r i z e d(DIRLAUTH). DIRLAUTH is thatauthority granted by a commander (anylevel) to a subordinate to directly consultor coordinate an action with acommand or agency within or outsideof the granting command. DIRLAUTHis more applicable to planning thanoperations and always carries with it therequirement of keeping the commandergranting DIRLAUTH informed.DIRLAUTH is a coordinationrelationship, not an authority throughwhich command may be exercised.

For additional and more detailedguidance on command relationships,refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action ArmedForces (UNAAF).

6. Organization of Forces

a. General

• JFCs have full authority to assignmissions, redirect efforts, and directcoordination among subordinatecommanders. JFCs should allowService tactical and operationalgroupings to function generally as theywere designed. The intent is to meet theneeds of JFCs, while maintaining thetactical and operational integrity ofService organizations.

• Joint forces are specifically designated,composed of significant elements(assigned or attached) of two or more

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Mil i tary Depar tments , andcommanded by a JFC with a jointstaff. Joint forces include combatantcommands, subordinate unifiedcommands, and JTFs. An appropriateorder assigns or attaches personnel andunits to joint forces.

• The manner in which JFCs organizetheir forces directly affects theresponsiveness and versatility of jointforce operations. The first principlein joint force organization is that JFCsorganize forces to accomplish themission based on the JFCs’ vision andconcept of operations. Unity of effort,centralized planning and direction,and decentralized execution are keyconsiderations. JFCs may elect tocentralize selected functions within thejoint force, but should strive to avoidreducing the versatility, responsiveness,and initiative of subordinate forces.

• Organization of joint forces also needsto take into account interoperabilitywith multinational forces. Complex orunclear command relationships andorganizations can be counterproductiveto developing synergy amongmultinational forces. Simplicity andclarity of expression are critical.

b. Combatant Commands

• A combatant command is a unified orspecified command with a broadcontinuing mission under a singlecommander established and sodesignated by the President, through theSecretary of Defense, and with the adviceand assistance of the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff. Combatantcommands typically have geographicor functional responsibilities.

• The UCP defines geographic AORs forselected combatant commands,

including all associated land, water areas,and airspace. Such AORs are referred toas theaters. The NCA decentralizesoperations by delegating to establishedgeographic combatant commands(theater commands), the authority toplan, prepare, and conduct militaryoperations within that theater to thegeographic combatant commander,consistent with strategic guidance anddirection.

• Other combatant commanders areassigned functional responsibilitiessuch as transportation, special operations,space operations, or strategic nuclearoperations. Functionally orientedcombatant commands can operateacross all geographical regions and canprovide forces for assignment to othercombatant commanders. These combatantcommands also can conduct operationswhile reporting directly to the NCA.

• Combatant commanders receivestrategic direction from the NCAthrough the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff and are responsible to theSecretary of Defense for accomplishingassigned missions.

• Combatant commanders may directlycontrol the conduct of militaryoperations or may delegate thatauthority and responsibility to asubordinate commander. Such anarrangement allows the subordinatecommander to control operations whilethe combatant commander supports theoperation with forces and resources. Thisrelationship is frequently referred to as atwo-tiered system, and was successfullyemployed in Operations JUST CAUSE(Panama, 1989) and UPHOLDDEMOCRACY (Haiti, 1994).

• The combatant commander exercisesCOCOM over forces assigned or

II-13


reassigned by the NCA and normallyexercises OPCON over forces attachedby the NCA.

• The two types of combatant commandsare “unified” and “specified.”

c. Unified Commands

• Unified commands are typicallyestablished when a broad continuingmission exists requiring execution bysignificant forces of two or moreMi l i tary Depar tments andnecessitating single strategic directionor other criteria found in JP 0-2, UnifiedAction Armed Forces (UNAAF) are met.

• The commanders of unifiedcommands may establish thefollowing.

•• Subordinate unified commands,when authorized through the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conductoperations on a continuing basis.

•• Functional component commands,when such a command structure

enhances the overall capability toaccomplish the mission of theestablishing commander. Functionalcomponent commands also may beestablished by commanders ofsubordinate unified commands and JTFs.

•• JTFs, to accomplish missions withspecific, limited objectives and which donot require overall centralized control oflogistics. JTFs also may be establishedby the Secretary of Defense andcommanders of subordinate unifiedcommands and existing JTFs.

• Unique Roles of US Joint ForcesCommand (USJFCOM). USJFCOMhas roles as the joint force trainer,integrator, and provider of assignedforces. Serving as the lead agent for jointforce training, USJFCOM is responsibleto the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff for managing the combatantcommands’ portion of the CJCS exerciseprogram, conducting and assessing jointand multinational training and exercisesfor assigned forces, assisting the othercombatant commanders and ServiceChiefs in their preparation for joint and

US Central Command forces conducting training operations in theirgeographic area of responsibility.

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multinational operations, and providingjoint training for combatant commandbattlestaffs, JTF headquarters staffs, andJTF functional component commandersand their staffs. As the joint forceprovider of assigned CONUS-basedforces, USJFCOM is also responsiblefor deploying trained and ready jointforces in response to the requirementsof supported combatant commanders.USJFCOM maintains a schedulingdeconfliction role for these forces topreclude operations tempo and personneltempo problems for the participatingunits.

d. Specified Commands

• Specified commands normally arecomposed of forces from one MilitaryDepartment, but may include units andstaff representation from other MilitaryDepartments.

• The commander of a specified commandhas the same authority andresponsibilities as the commander ofa unified command, except that noauthority exists to establish subordinateunified commands.

e. Subordinate Unified Commands.When authorized by the NCA through theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,commanders of unified commands mayestablish subordinate unified commands(also called subunified commands) toconduct operations on a continuing basis inaccordance with the criteria set forth forunified commands. A subordinate unifiedcommand may be established on a geographicarea or functional basis. Commanders ofsubordinate unified commands havefunctions and responsibilities similar tothose of the commanders of unifiedcommands, and exercise OPCON of assignedcommands and forces and normally over

attached forces within the assigned JOA orfunctional area.

f. Joint Task Forces

• A JTF is a joint force that is constitutedand so designated by the Secretary ofDefense, a combatant commander, asubordinate unified commandcommander, or an existing JTFcommander. A JTF may be establishedon a geographic or functional basis.

• Commanders of JTFs are responsibleto the JTF-establishing authority andexercise OPCON over assigned forcesand normally exercise OPCON overattached forces. JTF staffs normally areaugmented with representatives fromcomponent commands of the establishingheadquarters.

• JTF operations normally are operationalin nature, conducted to achieveoperational-level objectives.

• A JTF is dissolved by the properauthority when the purpose for which itwas created has been achieved or whenit is no longer required.

• JTF headquarters basing depends onthe JTF mission, operationalenvironment, and available capabilitiesand support. JTF headquarters basingoptions include the following.

•• Land-based.

•• Land-based, then moves afloat whileretaining control.

•• Sea-based.

•• Initially sea-based, then transitions toa different land-based staff.

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•• Initially sea-based, then moves ashorewhile retaining control.

g. Service Components

• All joint forces include Servicecomponents. Administrative andlogistic support for joint operations isprovided through Service componentcommands. The internal structure ofService component organizations are atthe discretion of the individual Services.As a minimum, the senior officercommanding each Service componentshould be clearly identified to the JFC.The JFC also may conduct operationsthrough the Service componentcommanders or, at lower echelons,Service force commanders. Thisrelationship is appropriate when stability,continuity, economy, ease of long-rangeplanning, and scope of operations dictateorganizational integrity of Servicecomponents for conducting operations.

• Conducting operations throughService components has certainadvantages which include clear anduncomplicated command lines.Logistics remain a Service responsibility,with the exception of arrangementsdescribed in Service support agreementsand memoranda of agreement or asotherwise directed by the combatantcommander.

• Responsibilities of the Servicecomponent commander include thefollowing.

•• Making recommendations to theJFC on the proper employment of theforces of the Service component.

•• Accomplishing such operationalmissions as may be assigned.

•• Selecting and nominating specificunits of the parent Service componentfor assignment to subordinate forces.Unless otherwise directed, these unitsrevert to the control of the Servicecomponent commander when suchsubordinate forces are dissolved.

•• Other responsibilities as discussedin JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF).

• Regardless of the organizational andcommand arrangements within jointcommands, Service componentcommanders retain responsibility forcertain Service-specific functions andother matters affecting their forces,including internal administration,training, logistics, and Serviceintelligence operations.

• The relationship between commandersof Service forces is determined by theJFC. In addition to logistic supportarrangements, one component maysupport another with forces or operationsin a variety of command relationships aspreviously described.

h. Functional Components

• The JFC can establish functionalcomponent commands to conductoperations. Functional componentcommands can be appropriate whenforces from two or more MilitaryDepartments must operate in the samedimension or medium or there is a needto accomplish a distinct aspect of theassigned mission. These conditionsapply when the scope of operationsrequires that the similar capabilitiesand functions of forces from more thanone Service be directed toward closelyrelated objectives and unity of

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command and effort are primaryconsiderations. For example, when thescope of operations is large, and JFCsneed to divide their attention betweenmajor operations or phases of operationsthat are functionally dominated — it maybe useful to establish functionallyoriented commanders responsible for themajor operations. JFCs may conductoperations through functionalcomponents or employ them primarilyto coordinate selected functions.(NOTE: Functional componentcommands are component commands ofa joint force and do not constitute a“joint force” with the authorities andresponsibilities of a joint force asdescribed in this document, even whencomposed of forces from two or moreMilitary Departments.)

• Functional componency can beappropriate when forces from two ormore Military Departments operate inthe same dimension or medium. (Ajoint force land component commander(JFLCC) is one example.) Functionalcomponent staffs should be joint, withService representation appropriate to thelevel and type of support to be provided.Functional component staffs requireadvanced planning, appropriatetraining, and frequent exercises forefficient operations. Liaison elementsfrom and to other componentsfacilitate coordination.

• The nature of operations, Service forcewith the preponderance of availablespecific functional component assets,command and control (C2) capabilities,and training and resources available tostaff and support functional componentcommands are normally primaryfactors in selecting the functionalcomponent commander . Theestablishment of a functional componentcommander must not affect the

command relationships between Servicecomponent commanders and the JFC.

• Functional component commanders— such as the joint force air componentcommander (JFACC), the JFLCC, thejoint force maritime componentcommander, and the joint force specialoperations component commander(JFSOCC) — have the responsibilitiesof both superior and subordinatecommanders as described in JP 0-2,Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

• The commander of a functionalcomponent command is responsible formaking recommendations to theestablishing commander on the properemployment of the military capabilitymade available to accomplish theassigned responsibilities.

• When a functional component commandwill employ forces and/or militarycapabilities from more than one Service,the functional component commander’sstaff should reflect the composition of thefunctional component command toprovide the commander with theexpertise needed to effectively employthe forces and/or military capability madeavailable. Staff billets for the neededexpertise and the individuals to fill thosebillets should be identified and used whenthe functional component staffs areformed for exercises and actualoperations. The number of personnel onthis staff should be kept to the minimumand should be consistent with the taskperformed. The structure of the staffshould be flexible enough to expand orcontract under changing conditionswithout a loss in coordination orcapability.

• The JFC must designate the forcesand/or military capabilities that willbe made available for tasking by the

II-17


functional component commanderand the appropriate commandrelationship(s) that the functionalcomponent commander will exerciseover that military capability (e.g., aJFSOCC normally has OPCON ofassigned forces and a JFACC normallyis delegated TACON of the sorties orother military capabilities madeavailable, except for land forces thatprovide supporting fires which normallyare tasked in a direct support role). JFCsalso may establish a supporting and/or supported relationship betweencomponents to facilitate operations.Regardless, the establishing JFCdefines the authority and responsibilitiesof functional component commandersbased on the concept of operations andmay alter their authority andresponsibilities during the course of anoperation.

i. Combination

• Most often, joint forces are organizedwith a combination of Service andfunctional components with operationalresponsibilities.

• Joint forces organized with Army, Navy,Marine Corps, and Air Force componentsnormally have special operationsforces (SOF) organized as a functionalcomponent. However, SOF may beassigned under the OPCON or TACONor in support of other Service orfunctional component commanders.Specific command arrangements shouldbe determined by the nature of themission and the objectives to beaccomplished. It is essential that SOFnot be used as a substitute forconventional forces, but as a necessaryadjunct to existing conventionalcapabilities. Commanders must ensurethat missions identified, nominated, andselected are appropriate and compatible

with SOF capabilities. Successfulexecution of special operations (SO)require centralized, responsive, andunambiguous C2; therefore, it isimperative that SOF assets are assignedor attached with the SOF chain ofcommand intact. Organizationalstructures established for employment ofSOF and C2 through the SOF chain ofcommand are described in JP 3-05,Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

• JFCs normally will designate aJFACC , w h o s e a u t h o r i t y a n dresponsibilities are defined by theestablishing JFC based on the JFC’sconcept of operations.

j. Figure II-5 depicts possible componentsin a joint force. It is presented as an exampleonly.

For additional and more detailed guidanceon the organization of joint forces, refer to JP0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

7. Command and Control

a. C2 is the exercise of authority anddirection by a properly designatedcommander over assigned and attachedforces in the accomplishment of a mission.Command, in particular, includes both theauthority and responsibility for effectivelyusing available resources to accomplishassigned missions.

b. Command at all levels is the art ofmotivating and directing people andorganizations into action to accomplishmissions. Command requires visualizing thecurrent state of friendly and adversary forces,then the future state of those forces that mustexist to accomplish the mission, thenformulating concepts of operations to achievethat state. JFCs influence the outcome ofcampaigns and major operations byperforming the following.

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• Defining the commander’s intent.

• Assigning missions.

• Designating the priority effort(s).

• Prioritizing and allocating resources.

• Assessing risks to be taken.

• Deciding when and how to makeadjustments.

• Committing reserves.

• Staying attuned to the needs ofsubordinates and seniors.

• Guiding and motivating the organizationtoward the desired end.

c. Control is inherent in command. Tocontrol is to regulate forces and functionsto execute the commander’s intent. Controlof forces and functions helps commanders andstaffs compute requirements, allocate means,and integrate efforts. Control is necessary todetermine the status of organizationaleffectiveness, identify variance from setstandards, and correct deviations from thesestandards. Control permits commanders toacquire and apply means to accomplish theirintent and develop specific instructions fromgeneral guidance. Ultimately, it providescommanders a means to measure, report,and correct performance.

Figure II-5. Possible Components in a Joint Force

POSSIBLE COMPONENTS IN A JOINT FORCE

ARMY FORCES(ARFOR)

ARMYCOMPONENT

AIR FORCE FORCES(AFFOR)

AIR FORCECOMPONENT

MARINE CORPSFORCES

(MARFOR)

MARINE CORPSCOMPONENT

FORCES/CAPABILITYMADE AVAILABLE




JOINT FORCESPECIAL OPERATIONS

COMPONENT

JOINT FORCE LANDCOMPONENT

JOINT FORCE MARITIMECOMPONENT

JOINT FORCE AIRCOMPONENT

OPERATIONAL CONTROL(OPCON)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP(S)DETERMINED BY JFC

(1) A joint force contains Service components (because of logisticand training responsibilities), even when operations are conductedthrough functional components.

(2) All Service and functional components are depicted; any mixof the above components can constitute a joint force.

(3) There may also be a Coast Guard component in a joint force.

NOTES:

NAVY FORCES(NAVFOR)

COAST GUARDFORCES(CGFOR)

NAVYCOMPONENT

JOINT FORCECOMMANDER

II-19


d. Control allows commanders freedom tooperate, delegate authority, placethemselves in the best position to lead, andintegrate and synchronize actionsthroughout the operational area. JFCsexercise authority and direction through andwith the assistance of a C2 system. The C2system consists of the facilities, equipment,communications, procedures, and personnelessential to a commander for planning,directing, and controlling operations ofassigned forces pursuant to the missionsassigned. Moreover, the C2 system needs tosupport the ability of commanders to adjustplans for future operations, even whilefocusing on current operations. Skilled staffswork within command intent to assist in thedissemination of direction and control of unitsand resource allocation to support the desiredend. They also are alert to spotting adversaryor friendly situations that may require changesin command relationships or organization andadvise the commander accordingly.

e. The related tools for implementingcommand decisions include communications,computers, and intelligence systems, as wellas inputs from surveillance andreconnaissance systems. Space-basedsystems provide commanders with criticalsupport in communications, navigation,intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance,ballistic missile warning, and environmentalsensing that greatly facilitate command. Theprecision with which these systems operatesignificantly improves the speed andaccuracy of the information thatcommanders exchange, both vertically andlaterally, thereby enhancing the situationalawareness of commanders at all levels.

f. Effective command at varyingoperational tempos requires timely, reliable,secure, interoperable, and sustainablecommunications. Communicationsplanning increases options available toJFCs by providing the communicationssystems necessary to collect, transport,

process, and disseminate critical informationat decisive times. These communicationsystems permit JFCs to exploit tacticalsuccess and facilitate future operations.Nonetheless, command style is dictated by thecommander, not by the supportingcommunication system.

g. Liaison is an important aspect of jointforce C2. Liaison teams or individuals maybe dispatched from higher to lower, lower tohigher, laterally, or any combination of these.They generally represent the interests ofthe sending commander to the receivingcommander, but can greatly promoteunderstanding of the commander’s intent atboth the sending and receiving headquartersand should be assigned early in the planningstage of joint operations.

For additional and more detailed guidanceon C2 of joint forces, refer to JP 0-2, UnifiedAction Armed Forces (UNAAF).

8. Organization of anOperational Area

a. To assist in the coordination anddeconfliction of joint action, JFCs maydefine operational areas. The size of theseareas and the types of forces employed withinthem depend on the scope and nature of thecrisis and the projected duration of operations.When warranted, geographic combatantcommanders may designate theaters of warand, perhaps, subordinate theaters ofoperations for each major threat (illustratedin Figure II-6). Geographic combatantcommanders can elect to directly controloperations in the theater of war or theater ofoperations, or may establish subordinatejoint forces for that purpose, allowingthemselves to remain focused on the broadertheater (i.e., the AOR).

• Theater of War. In time of war, theNCA or a geographic combatantcommander may elect to define a

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theater of war within the geographiccombatant commander’s AOR. Thetheater of war is that area of air, land,and water that is, or may become,directly involved in the conduct of thewar. A theater of war does not normallyencompass the geographic combatantcommander’s entire AOR and maycontain more than one theater ofoperations.

• Theater of Operations. A theater ofoperations is a wartime measure andmay not be established without theprevious establishment of a theaterof war. Geographic combatantcommanders may further define oneor more theaters of operations — that

area required to conduct or supportspecific combat operations — within thetheater of war. Different theaters ofoperations within the same theater of warwill normally be geographicallyseparate and focused on differentadversary forces. Theaters of operationsare usually of significant size, allowingfor operations in depth and over extendedperiods of time. Theaters of operationsare not operational areas that may beassociated with MOOTW.

• Combat Zones and CommunicationsZones (COMMZs). Geographiccombatant commanders also mayestablish combat zones and COMMZs,as shown in Figure II-7. The combat

Figure II-6. Operational Areas Within a Theater

THEATER OF WAR

THEATERS OFOPERATIONS

OPERATIONAL AREAS WITHIN A THEATER

This example depicts a combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR), also known asa theater. Within the AOR, the combatant commander has designated a theater of war withtwo subordinate theaters of operations. Also within the theater of war is a joint specialoperations area (JSOA). To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the combatantcommander has established a joint operations area (JOA), within which a joint task force willoperate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or theaters of operations.

JOAJSOA

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zone is an area required by forces toconduct large-scale combatoperations. It normally extends forwardfrom the land force rear boundary. TheCOMMZ contains those theaterorganizations, lines of communications(LOCs), and other agencies requiredto support and sustain combat forces.The COMMZ usually includes the rearportions of the theaters of operations andtheater of war and reaches back to theCONUS base or perhaps to a supportingcombatant commander’s AOR. TheCOMMZ includes airports andseaports that support the flow of forces

and logistics into the operational area. Itis usually contiguous to the combatzone but may be separate — connectedonly by thin LOCs — in very fluid,dynamic situations.

b. For operations somewhat limited inscope and duration, JFCs can employ thefollowing operational areas.

• Joint Operations Area. A JOA is anarea of land, sea, and airspace, definedby a geographic combatant commanderor subordinate unified commander, inwhich a JFC (normally a JTF

Figure II-7. Combat and Communications Zones

SEAPORT

AOR OR THEATER

THEATER OFOPERATIONS

COMBAT AND COMMUNICATIONS ZONES

COMBAT ZONE

COMMZ

Connecting to CONUSor other supportingtheaters

This example depicts a combatant commander's AOR in which a theater of war and atheater of operations have been designated. The combat zone includes that arearequired for the conduct of combat operations. The COMMZ in this example iscontiguous to the combat zone.

AIRPORT

AOR area of responsibilityCONUS continental United States

Legend

COMMZ communications zone

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commander) conducts militaryoperations to accomplish a specificmission. JOAs are particularly usefulwhen operations are limited in scope andgeographic area. JOAs also areappropriate when operations are to beconducted on the boundaries betweentheaters.

• Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA).A JSOA is an area of land, sea, andairspace, defined by a JFC who hasgeographic responsibilities, for use by ajoint special operations component orjoint special operations task force for theconduct of SO. JFCs may use a JSOAto delineate and facilitate simultaneousconventional and SO in the same generaloperational area.

For additional guidance on JSOAs, referto JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint SpecialOperations.

• Joint Rear Area (JRA). A JRA is aspecific land area within a JFC’soperational area designated by theJFC to facilitate protection andoperation of installations and forcessupporting the joint force. JRAs are notnecessarily contiguous with areasactively engaged in combat. JRAs mayinclude intermediate support bases andother support facilities intermixed withcombat elements. The JRA is particularlyuseful in nonlinear combat situations.

For additional guidance on JRAs, referto JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear AreaOperations.

• Amphibious Objective Area. Theamphibious objective area is ageographical area within which islocated the objective(s) to be securedby an amphibious force. It needs to belarge enough for necessary sea, air, land,and special operations.

For additional guidance on amphibiousobjective areas, refer to JP 3-02, JointDoctrine for Amphibious Operations.

• Area of Operations. JFCs may defineAOs for land and naval forces. AOstypically do not encompass the entireoperational area of the JFC, but shouldbe large enough for componentcommanders to accomplish theirmissions and protect their forces.Component commanders with AOstypically designate subordinate AOswithin which their subordinate forcesoperate. These commanders employ thefull range of joint and Service controlmeasures and graphics as coordinatedwith other component commanders andtheir representatives to delineateresponsibilities, deconflict operations,and promote unity of effort.

For more information, refer to associateddiscussion of “supported and supportingrelationships” in this chapter and“boundaries” in Chapter III, “PlanningJoint Operations.”

• Area of Interest (AOI). JFCs at alllevels can designate AOIs to focusnational agency support formonitoring adversary and potentialadversary activities outside theoperations area. An AOI is usuallylarger in size than the operational areaand encompasses areas from which theadversary can act to affect current orfuture friendly operations.

9. Joint Urban Operations

Joint urban operations (JUO) are jointoperations planned and conducted across therange of military operations on, or againstobjectives on, a topographical complex andits adjacent natural terrain where manmadeconstruction and the density of noncombatantsare the dominant features. The prospect of

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US joint forces operating in urban areas issteadily increasing. As shown in Figure II-8,US forces have conducted military operationsin urban areas more and more frequently inthe recent past.

a. Urbanized areas possess all of thecharacteristics of the natural landscape,coupled with manmade construction and theassociated infrastructure, resulting in acomplicated and dynamic environment thatinfluences the conduct of military operationsin many ways. The most distinguishingcharacteristic of JUO, however, is not theinfrastructure but the density ofnoncombatants that fundamentally alters thecharacter of combat and noncombatoperations.

b. JUO are not analogous to jungle, desert,or mountain operations in that there are morethan just terrain considerations. JUO areconducted in large, densely populated areaswith problems unique to clearing adversaryforces while possibly restoring services andmanaging major concentrations of people.During JUO, joint forces may not alwaysfocus only on destruction of adversary forcesbut also may be required to take stepsnecessary to protect and supportnoncombatants and their infrastructure fromwhich they receive services necessary forsurvival. As such, ROE during JUO may bemore restrictive than for other types ofoperations.

Figure II-8. Examples of Recent MilitaryOperations in Urban Areas

EXAMPLES OF RECENTMILITARY OPERATIONS

IN URBAN AREAS

Panama City (1989)

Baghdad (1991)

Kuwait City (1991)

Mogadishu (1991 and1992-1993)

Sarajevo (1992-1996)

Port au Prince (1994)

Monrovia (1996)

Freetown (1997)

Tirana (1997)

Belgrade (1999)

c. When planning JUO, JFCs shouldconsider the impact of military operations onnoncombatants and their infrastructure,thereby approaching JUO with a concept thatviews the urban area as a dynamic entity —not solely as terrain.

For additional guidance on JUO, refer to JP3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS

III-1

1. General

a. Planning for employment of jointforces begins with articulating andunderstanding the mission, objective,purpose of the operations, andcommander’s intent (the commander’svision of the end state to be achieved).Combatant commanders and subordinateJFCs reporting directly to the NCA receiveguidance and direction from the NCA throughthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Combatant commanders review their TEPsand refine the guidance and direction forsubordinate JFCs. Subordinate JFCs translatethis guidance and theater strategy as outlinedin the appropriate TEP into clearly definedand attainable objectives and then conductcampaigns and operations to accomplish theseobjectives.

b. JFCs issue prioritized mission-typeorders to subordinate commanders and definecommand relationships to facilitate missionaccomplishment consistent with their conceptof operations. Missions are assigned tosubordinate commanders, not staff officers orcoordination authorities. With receipt of themission goes the authority and responsibilityto conduct operations in accordance with thesuperior commander’s intent and concept ofoperations.

2. The Link Between Nationaland Combatant CommandStrategies

a. In peacetime, national policy, nationalsecurity strategy, defense policy, and NMSare sources of guidance for combatant

“Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well-prepared plan.”

Napoleon I, 1769-1821

commanders and Chiefs of the Services. TheJoint Strategic Planning System providesstrategic direction; assigns missions, tasks,forces, and resources; and designatesobjectives and ROE. It also establishesconstraints and restraints and defines policiesand concepts to be integrated into combatantcommand strategies and plans.

b. US and alliance and/or coalitionstrategic objectives are the basis forcombatant command strategies. Combatantcommanders design strategic concepts anddevelop plans to accomplish theseobjectives within their geographic orfunctional areas. Combatant commandersplan against specific tasks in the JSCP andalso strive to anticipate additionalconditions when employment of US forcesmay be necessary. In those cases, combatantcommanders may develop and maintain theframework of plans, even in peacetime. Thenature of regional instabilities, however, issuch that some plans might be formulated justbefore or even concurrently with theemployment of US forces.

3. Combatant CommandStrategic Planning

a. General

• Combatant command strategicplanning in peacetime provides theframework for employing forces inpeacetime and in response to crises.Combatant command planners developpeacetime assessments that easetransition to crisis or war as well as topostconflict. Peacetime intelligence and

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logistic assessments, for example, areessential for force projection and rapidtransition to combat operations.

• When directed by the NCA to conductmilitary operations, the combatantcommanders refine peacetimestrategies and modify existing plans ordevelop campaign plans as appropriate.The result, expressed in terms of militaryobjectives, military concepts, andresources (ends, ways, and means),provides guidance for a broad rangeof activities.

b. Determining the Strategic End Stateand Supporting Military Conditions

• An end state is the set of requiredconditions that achieve the strategicobjectives. The desired end stateshould be clearly described by theNCA before Armed Forces of theUnited States are committed to anaction; however, combatant commandersmust be prepared to carry outimmediate taskings even though theend state is still being clarified. Theremay be a preliminary end state —described by a set of military conditions— when military force is no longer theprincipal means to the strategic objective.There also may be a broader end statethat typically involves returning to a stateof peace and stability and may include avariety of diplomatic, economic,informational, and military conditions.The relative emphasis among theseinstruments of national power will varyaccording to the nature of the crisis.

• Although military end state conditionsnormally will represent what combatantcommanders want their campaigns toachieve, commanders are rarely concernedwith only those conditions. Often,combatant commanders may be required

to support the other instruments of nationalpower as directed by national andmultinational leaders.

• Defining the end state, which maychange as the operation progresses, is thecritical first step in the estimate andplanning process. Additionally, clearlydefining the desired end state reduces thewasting of scarce resources and helpsclarify (and may reduce) the riskassociated with the operation. Toclearly describe the desired end state,planners should consider what may benecessary to end the operation and thelikely period of follow-on activities.Commanders at all levels should havea common understanding of theconditions that define success beforeinitiation of the operation.

• Achieving the desired military endstate seldom, if ever, ends US nationalefforts to protect interests in asituation. The term “end state” simplyrepresents the set of conditions necessaryto resolve a crisis and transition frompredominant use of the militaryinstrument of national power to otherinstruments.

c. The Strategic Estimate

• The strategic estimate is a toolavailable to combatant commandersand subordinate JFCs as they developcampaign plans and subordinatecampaign and operation plans. JFCs usestrategic estimates developed inpeacetime to facilitate the employmentof military forces across the range ofmilitary operations. The strategicestimate is more comprehensive inscope than estimates of subordinatecommanders, encompasses all strategicconcepts, and is the basis for combatantcommand strategy.

III-3


• In the strategic estimate, commandersfocus on the threat and consider othercircumstances affecting the militarysituation as they develop and analyzeCOAs. Items contained in the strategicestimate are shown in Figure III-1.

• The result of the estimate is avisualization of the current adversaryand friendly situation, includingopportunities available for exploitation.The estimate includes a visualization ofwhat is required to accomplish themission and a clear expression ofalternatives to achieve that state.Commanders employ the estimate toconsider the adversary’s likely intent and

COAs and compare friendly alternativesthat result in a decision.

• The strategic estimate process iscontinuous and based on directionfrom national and multinationalleaders. Estimates for the currentoperation often can provide the basis forestimates for future operations.

• Combatant commanders developstrategic estimates after reviewing thestrategic environment, potential threats,the nature of anticipated operations, andnational strategic direction. Thestrategic estimate process helps clarifythe strategic end state and supportingmilitary conditions. Both supported andsupporting combatant commandersprepare strategic estimates based onassigned tasks. Combatant commanderswho support other combatantcommanders prepare estimates for eachsupporting operation.

• Appendix B, “The Estimate Process,”provides a format for the strategicestimate.

d. Theater Strategic Concepts

• Theater strategic concepts arestatements of intent as to what, where,and how operations are to beconducted in broad, flexible terms.These statements must incorporate avariety of factors, including nuclear andconventional deterrence, current orpotential alliances or coalitions, forcesavailable, C2 capabilities, intelligenceassets, anticipated postconflict measures,mobilization, deployment, andsustainability. Theater strategic conceptsallow for the employment of theaternuclear forces, conventional and specialoperations forces, space assets, militaryassistance from all Services andFigure III-1. Strategic Estimate

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

Assigned objectives from nationalauthorities.

Translation of national objectives toobjectives applicable to thecombatant command or theater.

Visualization of the strategicenvironment and how it relates tothe accomplishment of assignedobjectives.

Assessment of the threats toaccomplishment of assignedobjectives.

Assessment of strategicalternatives available, withaccompanyinganalysis, risks, and therequirements for plans.

Considerations of availableresources, linked toaccomplishment of assignedobjectives.

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JP 3-0

supporting commands, and interagencyand multinational forces in each COA.

• Theater strategic concepts should providefor unity of effort and strategicadvantage. Strategic advantage is thefavorable overall relative powerrelationship that enables one nation orgroup of nations to effectively control thecourse of politico-military events toensure the accomplishment of objectivesthrough national, international, andtheater efforts.

• Combatant commanders use theadvantages and capabilities ofassigned, attached, and supportingmilitary forces, as well as alliance,coalition, and interagency relationshipsand military assistance enhancements intheater as the basis of military power.Combatant commanders also considerthe other instruments of national powerfor their contribution to gaining andmaintaining strategic advantage.

• Though geographic and functionalresponsibilities of the combatantcommanders may differ, there are severalcommon strategic considerations.Strategic concepts must integrate ends,ways, and means and consider thefollowing.

•• Protection of US citizens, forces, andinterests and implementation of nationalpolicies.

•• Integration of deterrence measuresand transition to combat operations.

•• Adjustments for multinational,interagency, or UN circumstances.

•• Identification of conflict terminationcriteria and postconflict objectives andmeasures.

•• Identification of potential militaryrequirements across the range of militaryoperations.

•• Support for security assistance ornation assistance.

•• Inputs to higher strategies orsubordinate planning requirements.

4. The Campaign

a. General

• A campaign is a series of related majoroperations that arrange tactical,operational, and strategic actions toaccomplish strategic and operationalobjectives. A campaign plan describeshow these operations are connected intime, space, and purpose. Within acampaign, major operations consist ofcoordinated actions in a single phaseof a campaign and usually decide thecourse of the campaign.

• Campaigns are joint in nature. Theyserve as the focus for the conduct of warand MOOTW. A campaign is thesynchronization and integration ofnecessary air, land, sea, space, andspecial operations — as well asinteragency and multinational operations— in harmony with diplomatic,economic, and informational efforts toattain national and multinationalobjectives.

• Based on strategy adopted during thecrisis action planning process,combatant commanders designcampaigns to accomplish national ormultinational strategic militaryobjectives. They plan and executecampaigns by applying operational art.How commanders apply operational artwill vary with the nature of operational

III-5


THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of theworld, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action.On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principalobjectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw fromKuwait. The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutionscalling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing “all necessary means,”including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to forceIraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign toaccomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of majoroperations. These operations employed the entire capability of the internationalmilitary coalition and included operations in war and operations other thanwar throughout.

The campaign — which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERTSTORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations — can be viewedin the following major phases.

• DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP (to include crisis action planning,mobilization, deployment, and deterrence)

• DEFENSE (with deployment and force buildup continuing)

• OFFENSE

• POSTWAR OPERATIONS (to include redeployment)

DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP. While diplomats attempted to resolvethe crisis without combat, the coalition’s military forces conducted rapidplanning, mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World WarII. One of the earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shippingof items of military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. TheCommander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), balanced the arrivalof these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logisticcapability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growingforce. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout thisphase.

DEFENSE. While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture,a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air,land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forcescontinued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational militarydeceptions, and operational psychological operations were used to influenceIraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degradetheir abilities to resist USCINCCENT’s selected course of action beforeengaging adversary forces. This phase ended on 17 January 1991, whenOperation DESERT STORM began.

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OFFENSE. Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort—from both land and sea—against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and navalforces; logistic infrastructure; and command and control (C2). Land and specialoperations forces supported this air effort by targeting forward-based Iraqi airdefense and radar capability. The objectives of this phase were to gainsupremacy in the air, significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information toadversary commanders, destroy adversary forces and infrastructure, and denyfreedom of movement. This successful air operation would establish theconditions for the attack by coalition land forces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forcesrepositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensiveOPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to theadversary. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short timeto positions from which they could attack the more vulnerable western flanksof Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces threatened to attack from easternseaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive effort in thatdirection.

On 24 February, land forces attacked Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks.Under a massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forcesclosed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. Tothe extent that it could, the Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of thestart of the land force attack, the coalition achieved its strategic objectivesand a cease-fire was ordered.

POSTWAR OPERATIONS. Coalition forces consolidated their gains andenforced conditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to prevent theIraqi military from taking retribution against its own dissident populace. TaskForce Freedom began operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. Thecoalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief,security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, andhumanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush announcedthe beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. By 7 April, USaircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the Iraqi border. Severalthousand Service personnel who had participated in Operation DESERTSTORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint andmultinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with theredeployment and demobilization of forces.

VARIOUS SOURCES

conditions, the nature of the strategicobjectives, the time and space availablein the theater, and the number and typeof forces involved.

• Campaigns, especially in multinationalefforts, must be kept simple and focusedon clearly defined objectives. The morecomplex the campaign or the more

III-7


players involved, the more time and effortit takes to plan and coordinate. Wheneverpossible, JFCs at all levels should planfar enough in advance to allowsubordinates sufficient time to react toguidance and conduct their own planningand rehearsals.

• JFCs consider the strategicenvironment during the estimate andplanning process in order to determinepotential constraints. Constraints mayinclude the availability and capability offorces, sustainment, or ROE. Theseconstraints often limit the JFC’s freedomof action and influence the timing andform of the campaign.

• Once mi l i t a ry opera t ions a recontemplated, planning for campaignsand major operations becomes acontinuous process. Before initiationof combat operations, commanders alsomust focus on future operations. Duringoperations, commanders must refine theirfocus on future operations by assessingthe outcome of current operations.

• Campaigns and major operations canspan a wide variety of situations,from quick-hitting, limited-objectiveoperations to broad-based, long-termoperations. Planning and, indeed,doctrine and tactics, techniques, andprocedures should accommodate thisvariety of potential scenarios andshould provide JFCs a flexible range ofcapabilities and options from which toorganize forces and plan and conductoperations.

• Campaign planning, like all jointoperation planning, is based on evolvingassumptions. It is characterized by theneed to plan for related, simultaneous,and sequential operations and theimperative to accomplish strategic

objectives through these operations.Campaign planning is as much a way ofthinking about warfare as it is a type ofplanning.

b. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans

• Campaign plans are unique, withconsiderations that set them apart fromother plans. These plans, which maybe required by the size, complexity,and anticipated duration of militaryinvolvement, synchronize andintegrate operations by definingobjectives; establishing commandrelationships among subordinatecommands; describing concepts ofoperations and sustainment; arrangingoperations in time, space, and purpose;assigning tasks; organizing forces; andsynchronizing and integrating air, land,sea, space, information, and specialoperations. Fundamentals of campaignplans are shown in Figure III-2.

• Although not formally part of the JointOperation Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES), campaign planningencompasses both the deliberate andcrisis action planning processes. If thescope of contemplated operationsrequires it, campaign planning beginswith or during deliberate planning. Itcontinues through crisis action planning,thus unifying both planning processes.The degree to which the amount of workaccomplished in deliberate planning mayserve as the core for a campaign plan isdirectly dependent on the particulartheater and objectives. Based on thecampaign plan, appropriate elementsthen are translated into the operationorder format of JOPES for execution.Although not formally submitted underJOPES, campaign plans may requirereview by the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff.

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For additional guidance on thecampaign planning process, refer to JP5-0, Doctrine for Planning JointOperations, and JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrinefor Campaign Planning.

c. Campaign plans form the basis fordeveloping subordinate campaign plansand supporting plans and, under uncertaincircumstances, the framework of a series ofOPLANs for phases of campaigns.

Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainmentfor achieving multinational, national, and theater strategicobjectives.

Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.

Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and specialoperations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational,nongovernmental, or United Nations forces, as required.

Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic intent andoperational focus.

Identify any forces or capabilities the enemy has in the area.

Identify the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravityand provide guidance for defeating them.

Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravityand provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.

If required, sequence a series of related major joint operationsconducted simultaneously throughout the area of responsibilityand/or joint operations area.

Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designatecommand relationships.

Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly definewhat constitutes success, including conflict terminationobjectives and potential posthostilities activities.

Provide strategic direction; operational focus, and major tasks,objectives, and concepts to subordinates.

Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons asrequired and authorized by the National Command Authorities.

Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainmentfor achieving multinational, national, and theater strategicobjectives.

Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.

Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and specialoperations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational,nongovernmental, or United Nations forces, as required.

Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic intent andoperational focus.

Identify any forces or capabilities the enemy has in the area.

Identify the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravityand provide guidance for defeating them.

Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravityand provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.

If required, sequence a series of related major joint operationsconducted simultaneously throughout the area of responsibilityand/or joint operations area.

Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designatecommand relationships.

Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly definewhat constitutes success, including conflict terminationobjectives and potential posthostilities activities.

Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and major tasks,objectives, and concepts to subordinates.

Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons asrequired and authorized by the National Command Authorities.

FUNDAMENTALS OF CAMPAIGN PLANS

Figure III-2. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans

III-9


• Subordinate Campaign Plans.Subordinate JFCs may developsubordinate campaign plans orOPLANs that accomplish (orcontribute to the accomplishment of)theater strategic objectives. Thus,subordinate unified commands typicallydevelop campaign plans to accomplishassigned missions. Also, JTFs candevelop and execute campaign plans ifmissions require military operations ofsubstantial size, complexity, andduration. Subordinate campaign plansare consistent with the strategy,guidance, and direction developed bythe combatant commander andcontribute to achieving combatantcommand objectives.

• Supporting Plans

•• Supporting plans are prepared bysubordinate and supporting commandersto satisfy the requirements of thesupported commander’s plan.Typically, supporting commands’ plansprovide augmentation forces, forceenhancements, or functional support suchas logistics and communications.

•• Supporting plans address suchdiscrete operations as nuclearoperations, mobilization, deploymentand redeployment operations, forceprotection, and Service supportoperations, as well as plans for generatingand focusing national resources in oneor more theaters.

•• When the NCA, through theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,directs a combatant command toconduct specified military operations,other combatant commands areidentified to support those operations.For example, during OperationsDESERT SHIELD and DESERTSTORM, US Central Command was

designated the supported command, withmost other combatant commandsproviding support.

5. Operational Art

JFCs employ operational art, in concertwith strategic guidance and direction receivedfrom superior leaders, in developingcampaigns and operations . Thefundamental elements of operational art areshown in Figure III-3 and discussed below.

a. Synergy

• JFCs employ air, land, sea, space, andspecial operations forces in a widevariety of operations in war andMOOTW. JFCs not only attack theadversary’s physical capabilities, butalso the adversary’s morale and will. JP1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces ofthe United States, contains the basis forthis multidimensional concept — one thatdescribes how JFCs can apply alldimensions of joint capability toaccomplish their mission.

• When required to employ force, JFCsseek combinations of forces andactions to achieve concentration invarious dimensions, all culminating inattaining the assigned objective(s) inthe shortest time possible and withminimal casualties. JFCs arrangesymmetrical and asymmetrical actionsto take advantage of friendly strengthsand adversary vulnerabilities and topreserve freedom of action for futureoperations. Engagements with theadversary may be thought of assymmetrical if forces, technologies, andweapons tend to be similar orasymmetric; if forces, technologies, andweapons are different; or if a resort toterrorism and rejection of moreconventional ROE is the norm. As JP 1,Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the

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United States, indicates, JFCs areuniquely situated to seize opportunitiesfor asymmetrical action and must beespecially alert to exploit the tremendouspotential combat power of such actions.See the discussion of leverage.

• It is difficult to view the contributionsof air, land, sea, space, and specialoperations forces in isolation. Eachmay be critical to the success of thejoint force, and each has certain uniquecapabilities that cannot be duplicated byother types of forces. Given theappropriate circumstances, anydimension of combat power can bedominant — and even decisive — incertain aspects of an operation or phaseof a campaign, and each force can supportor be supported by other forces. Thecontributions of these forces will varyover time with the nature of the threatand other strategic, operational, and

tactical circumstances. The challenge forsupported JFCs is to integrate andsynchronize the wide range ofcapabilities at their disposal into full-dimensional operations against theadversary.

• The synergy achieved by integratingand synchronizing the actions of air,land, sea, space, and special operationsforces in joint operations and in multipledimensions enables JFCs to projectfocused capabilities that present noseams or vulnerabilities to an adversaryto exploit. JFCs are especially suited todevelop and project joint synergy giventhe multiple unique and complementarycapabilities available only within jointforces.

• The synergy of the joint force dependsin large part on a shared understandingof the operational situation. JFCs

OPERATIONALART

ANTICIPATION

BALANCE

LEVERAGE

TIMING ANDTEMPO

OPERATIONALREACH

ANDAPPROACHFORCES AND

FUNCTIONS

ARRANGINGOPERATIONS

TERMINATION

CENTERS OFGRAVITY

DIRECT VERSUSINDIRECT

DECISIVE POINTS

CULMINATION

SYNERGYSIMULTANEITY AND

DEPTH

FACETS OF OPERATIONAL ART

OPERATIONALART

ANTICIPATION

BALANCE

LEVERAGE

TIMING ANDTEMPO

OPERATIONALREACH

ANDAPPROACHFORCES AND

FUNCTIONS

ARRANGINGOPERATIONS

TERMINATION

CENTERS OFGRAVITY

DIRECT VERSUSINDIRECT

DECISIVE POINTS

CULMINATION

SYNERGYSIMULTANEITY AND

DEPTH

Figure III-3. Facets of Operational Art

III-11


integrate and synchronize operations ina manner that applies force from differentdimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeatopponents. The JFC’s vision of howoperations will be conducted includes notonly how to arrange operations but alsoa clear understanding of the desired endstate.

b. Simultaneity and Depth. The conceptsof simultaneity and depth are foundations ofjoint operations theory. The goal is tooverwhelm and cripple adversarycapabilities and adversary will to resist.

• Simultaneity is a key characteristic of theAmerican way of war. It refers to thesimultaneous application of poweragainst key adversary capabilities andsources of strength. The goal ofsimultaneity in joint force operationscontributes directly to an adversary’scollapse by placing more demands onadversary forces and functions than canbe handled. This does not mean that allelements of the joint force are employedwith equal priority or that even allelements of the joint force will beemployed. It refers specifically to theconcept of attacking appropriateadversary forces and functions in sucha manner as to cause confusion anddemoralization. For example, following38 days of intensive and highlysynchronized and integrated coalition airoperations, land forces initiated twomajor, mutually supporting, offensivethrusts against defending Iraqi forces inKuwait and Iraq. Simultaneously,amphibious forces threatened an assaultfrom the sea, creating confusion withinthe adversary leadership structure andcausing several Iraqi divisions to orienton the amphibious threat. The orientationof these divisions on the sea facilitatedtheir defeat in detail by other air and landforces striking into the heart of Kuwait.Concurrently, coalition air operations

continued the relentless attack ondeployed troops, C2 nodes, and thetransportation infrastructure. The resultwas a swift conclusion to the Gulf War,culminated by simultaneous andintegrated and synchronized operationsby all elements of the coalition.

• Simultaneity also refers to theconcurrent conduct of operations atthe tactical, operational, and strategiclevels. Tactical commanders fightengagements and battles, understandingtheir relevance to the operational plan.JFCs set the conditions for battles withina major operation to achieve operationaland strategic objectives. Geographiccombatant commanders integrate theaterstrategy and operational art. At the sametime, they remain acutely aware of theimpact of tactical events. Because of theinherent inter-relationships between thevarious levels of war, commanderscannot be concerned only with eventsat their respective echelon.

• The evolution of warfare and advancesin technology have continuouslyexpanded the depth of operations.Airpower can maneuver at greaterdistances, while surface forces are ableto maneuver more rapidly and projecttheir influence at increasing depths. Tobe effective, JFCs should not allow anadversary sanctuary or respite. Jointforce operations should be conductedacross the full breadth and depth ofthe AOR and/or JOA, creatingcompeting and simultaneous demandson adversary commanders and resources.The concept of depth seeks tooverwhelm the adversary throughoutthe AOR and/or JOA from multipledimensions, contributing to its speedydefeat or capitulation. Interdiction, forexample, is one manner in which JFCsuse depth to conduct operations.

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• The concept of depth applies to time aswell as to space (geographically).Operations extended in depth, in time aswell as space (geographically), shapefuture conditions and can disrupt anopponent’s decision cycle.

• Depth contributes to protection of theforce by destroying adversary potentialbefore its capabilities can be realized andemployed.

• Simultaneity and depth place a premiumon shared, common situationalawareness at the operational level. JFCsshould exploit the full capabilities of thejoint force and supporting capabilities todevelop and maintain a commonoperational picture (COP) of events inthe operational area as well as theirlinkage to future operations andattainment of strategic objectives.

• Advances in technology positively affectsimultaneity and depth by promotingenhanced situational awareness.Unfortunately, advances in technologysometimes adversely affect simultaneityand depth by presenting different and

competing operational pictures to JFCsand their forces.

c. Anticipation

• Anticipation is key to effective planning.JFCs should remain alert for theunexpected and for opportunities toexploit the situation. JFCs consider whatmight happen and look for the signs thatmay bring the possible event to pass.They continually gather information bypersonally observing and communicatingwith subordinates, higher headquarters,other forces in the operational area, andallies and coalition members. JFCs avoidsurprise by gaining and maintainingthe initiative at all levels of commandand staff, thus forcing the adversaryto react rather than plan; and bythoroughly and continuouslywargaming to identify probableadversary reactions to joint forceactions. JFCs also should realize theimpact of operations on the adversary,mult inat ional partners , andnoncombatants and prepare for theirresults, such as the surrender of largenumbers of opposing forces.

Victorious coalition forces during Operation DESERT STORM attacked,overwhelmed, and continued with relentless pressure on the retreating opposition.

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• Situational awareness is a prerequisitefor commanders and planners to beable to anticipate opportunities andchallenges. Knowledge of friendlycapabilities; adversary capabilities,intentions, and likely COAs; and locationand status of displaced persons andrefugees enables commanders to focusjoint efforts where they can best, andmost directly, contribute to achievingobjectives.

• Joint intelligence preparation of thebattlespace (JIPB) assists JFCs indefining likely or potential adversaryCOAs, as well as the indicators thatsuggest the adversary has embarked ona specific COA. As such, JIPBsignificantly contributes to a JFC’s abilityto anticipate and exploit opportunities.

• JIPB is a process which enables JFCs andtheir staffs to visualize the full spectrumof capabilities and potential COAs acrossall dimensions of the battlespace. Thisprocess, combined with the COP, otherinformation, and intelligence productsprovides the JFC with the tools necessaryto achieve situational awareness. A jointforce produces a COP by using manydifferent products to include theoperational pictures of lower, lateral, andhigher echelons.

For additional guidance on JIPB, referto JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Joint IntelligencePreparation of the Battlespace.

• Anticipation is not without risk.Commanders and planners that tend tolean in anticipation of what they expectto encounter are more susceptible tooperational military deception efforts byan opponent. Therefore, commandersand planners should carefully considerall available information upon which

decisions are being based. Wherepossible, multiple or redundant sourcesof information from various dimensionsshould be employed to assure theaccuracy and relevance for use in thedecisionmaking process.

d. Balance

• Balance is the maintenance of theforce, its capabilities, and its operationsin such a manner as to contribute tofreedom of action and responsiveness.Balance refers to the appropriate mixof forces and capabilities within thejoint force as well as the nature andtiming of operations conducted.

• JFCs strive to maintain friendly forcebalance while aggressively seeking todisrupt an adversary’s balance bystriking with powerful blows fromunexpected directions or dimensions andpressing the fight. Military deception,special operations, offensive informationoperations, direct attack of adversarystrategic centers of gravity (COGs),interdiction, and maneuver all convergeto confuse, demoralize, and destroy theopponent. Denial of adversaryreconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance,and target acquisition activitiescontributes to the protection of friendlyforces. Even as the joint force defeatsone adversary force, it prepares to turnand strike another. High-tempo jointoperations set the conditions for battle.JFCs prepare to shift as conditionschange and new challenges are presented.Through continuous planning andwargaming, the commander strives neverto be without options.

• JFCs designate priority efforts andestablish appropriate commandrelationships to assist in maintaining thebalance of the force.

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• Preserving the responsiveness ofcomponent capabilities is central tooperational art. Combinations ofoperations and organization of the jointforce should maintain or expand forceresponsiveness, not inhibit it.Decentralization of authority cancontribute to responsiveness byreducing the distance in time and spacebetween decision makers and ongoingoperations.

e. Leverage

• JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forcesof the United States, describes achievingleverage (that is, gaining, maintaining,and exploiting advantages in combatpower across all dimensions) among theforces available to JFCs as “thecenterpiece of joint operational art.”JFCs gain decisive advantage over theadversary through leverage. Thisleverage can be achieved in a variety ofways. Asymmetrical actions that pit jointforce strengths against adversaryweaknesses and maneuver in time andspace can provide decisive advantage.Synergy from the concentration andintegration of joint force actions alsoprovides JFCs with decisive advantage.Leverage allows JFCs to impose theirwill on the adversary, increase theadversary’s dilemma, and maintainthe initiative. Force interaction withrespect to friendly force commandrelationships generally can becharacterized as supported (the receiverof a given effort) or supporting (theprovider of such an effort). Thecommand relationships that provide theframework for arranging for such supportare discussed extensively in jointdoctrine, including elsewhere in thispublication. A principal JFCresponsibility is to assess continuouslywhether force relationships enhance to

the fullest extent possible the provisionof fighting assistance from and to eachelement of the joint force in alldimensions. Support relationshipsafford an effective means to weight(and ensure unity of effort for) variousoperations, each component typicallyreceiving and providing support at thesame time. The potentially large numberof such relationships requires the closeattention not only of JFCs, but also oftheir components to plan and execute.

• Force interaction with regard toadversary forces is another way forJFCs to achieve concentration in thevarious dimensions. JFCs arrangesymmetrical and asymmetrical actionsto take advantage of friendly strengthsand adversary vulnerabilities and topreserve freedom of action for futureoperations. The history of jointoperations highlights the enormouslethality of asymmetrical operations andthe great operational sensitivity to suchthreats. Asymmetrical operations areparticularly effective when appliedagainst adversary forces not postured forimmediate tactical battle but insteadoperating in more vulnerable aspects —operational deployment and/ormovement, extended logistic activity(including rest and refitting), ormobilization and training (includingindustrial production). Thus, JFCsaggressively seek opportunities to applyasymmetrical force against an adversaryin as vulnerable an aspect as possible —air attacks against adversary groundformations in convoy (the air and SOFinterdiction operations against Germanattempts to reinforce its forces inNormandy), naval air attacks againsttroop transports (US air attacks againstJapanese surface reinforcement ofGuadalcanal), and land operationsagainst adversary naval, air, or missile

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bases (allied maneuver in Europe in 1944to reduce German submarine bases andV-1 and V-2 launching sites). There areliterally dozens of potential modes ofattack to be considered as JFCs plan theapplication of air, land, sea, space, andspecial operations forces against thevarious aspects of adversary capabilities.

• As a final part of force interaction, JFCsmust take action to protect or shield allelements of the joint force fromadversary symmetrical andasymmetrical action. This function ofprotection has particular relevance injoint warfare as JFCs seek to reduce thevulnerability of their forces and enhancetheir own freedom of action.

• Dimensional superiority, isolation ofthe adversary, and attack of adversaryCOGs can contribute to joint forceleverage and are addressed in Chapter IV,“Joint Operations in War.”

f. Timing and Tempo

• The joint force should conduct operationsat a tempo and point in time that bestexploits friendly capabilities andinhibits the adversary. With propertiming, JFCs can dominate the action,remain unpredictable, and operatebeyond the adversary’s ability to react.In its 1940 attack on France, for instance,Germany combined the speed, range, andflexibility of aircraft with the power andmobility of armor to conduct operationsat a pace that surprised and overwhelmedFrench commanders, disrupting theirforces and operations. France capitulatedin little more than a month.

• The tempo of warfare has increasedover time as technological advancementsand innovative doctrines have beenapplied to military requirements. While

in many situations JFCs may elect tomaintain an operational tempo thatstretches the capabilities of bothfriendly and adversary forces, on otheroccasions JFCs may elect to conductoperations at a reduced pace. Duringselected phases of a campaign, JFCs mayelect to reduce the pace of operations,frustrating adversary commanders whilebuying time to build a decisive force ortend to other priorities in the operationalarea such as relief to displaced persons.During other phases, JFCs may conducthigh-tempo operations designedspecifically to overwhelm adversarydefensive capabilities.

• Just as JFCs carefully select whichcapabilities of the joint force to employ,so do they consider the timing of theapplication of those capabilities. WhileJFCs may have substantial capabilitiesavailable, they selectively apply suchcapabilities in a manner that integratesand synchronizes their application intime, space, and purpose. Definingpriorities assists in the timing of operations.

• Timing refers to the effects achieved aswell as to the application of force. JFCsplan and conduct operations in a mannerthat integrates and synchronizes theeffects of operations so the maximumbenefit of their contributions are felt bythe opponent at the desired time.Although some operations of the jointforce can achieve near-immediate impact,JFCs may elect to delay their applicationuntil the contributions of other elementscan be brought to bear in an integratedand synchronized manner. Additionally,commanders and planners strive toensure that objectives achieved throughcombat operations build toward decisiveresults, but are not unduly orinappropriately felt by opponents longafter their defeat.

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g. Operational Reach and Approach

• On the first page of On War, Clausewitzlikens war to a duel. In joint operationalart, effective symmetrical attack (fullysupported by all components of the jointforce) and asymmetrical attack constitutethe dueler’s sword; the actions of air, land,sea, space, and special operations forcesto protect each other is the dueler’s shield;and, in its broadest sense, logistics andbasing are the dueler’s footing, affectingthe reach of the sword and the strengthand resiliency of the shield. Basing,whether from overseas locations,sea-based platforms, or CONUS, directlyaffects operational reach. Likewise,logistic support sustains combatoperations and is a component ofoperational reach.

• Operational reach is the distance overwhich military power can mass effectsand be employed decisively. Reach maybe influenced by the geographysurrounding and separating theopponents. It may be extended bylocating forces, reserves, bases, andlogistics forward; by increasing the rangeof weapon systems; by conducting aerialrefueling; by maximizing use of HN andcontract support; by including spacesupport capabilities; and by improvingtransportation availability and theeffectiveness of LOCs and throughput.

• Thus, basing in the broadest sense isan indispensable foundation of jointoperational art, directly influencing thecombat power that the joint force iscapable of generating by affecting suchcritical factors as sortie and resupplyrates. In particular, the arrangementand successive positioning of advancedbases (often in austere, rapidly emplacedconfigurations) underwrites theprogressive ability of the joint force toshield its components from adversary

action and deliver symmetric andasymmetric blows with increasingpower and ferocity. Basing often isaffected directly by political anddiplomatic considerations and, as such,can become a critical junction wherestrategic, operational, and tacticalconsiderations interact. US force basingoptions span the spectrum frompermanently basing forces in mature,strategically important theaters totemporary sea-basing during crisisresponse in littoral areas of instability.Bases (including the flexible andresponsive capability of sea-basing) aretypically selected to be withinoperational reach of the opponent,where sufficient infrastructure is in placeor can be fabricated to support theoperational and sustaining requirementsof deployed forces, and where they canbe assured of some degree of securityfrom adversary attacks. Basing thusplays a vital role in determining theoperational approach, which may beconceived in terms of lines of operations.

• Lines of operations define thedirectional orientation of the force in timeand space in relation to the adversary.They connect the force with its base ofoperations and its objectives.

• A force operates on interior lines whenits operations diverge from a central pointand when it is therefore closer to separateadversary forces than the latter are to oneanother. Interior lines benefit a weakerforce by allowing it to shift the maineffort laterally more rapidly than theadversary. A force operates on exteriorlines when its operations converge on theadversary. Successful operations onexterior lines require a stronger or moremobile force, but offer the opportunityto encircle and annihilate a weaker or lessmobile opponent.

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• In modern war, lines of operation attaina three-dimensional aspect. JFCs usethem to focus combat power toward adesired end. JFCs apply combat powerthroughout the three dimensions of spaceand over time in a logical design thatintegrates the capabilities of the jointforce to converge on and defeat adversaryCOGs.

h. Forces and Functions

• Commanders and planners can designcampaigns and operations that focuson defeating either adversary forces orfunctions, or a combination of both.Typically, JFCs structure operations toattack both adversary forces andfunctions concurrently to create thegreatest possible contact area betweenfriendly and adversary forces andcapabilities. These types of operationsare especially appropriate when friendlyforces enjoy technological and/ornumerical superiority over an opponent.

• JFCs can focus on destroying anddisrupting critical adversary functionssuch as C2, logistics, and air and missiledefense. Attack of an adversary’sfunctions normally is intended to destroyadversary balance, thereby creatingvulnerabilities to be exploited.Destruction or disruption of criticaladversary functions can createuncertainty, confusion, and even panic inadversary leadership and forces and maycontribute directly to the collapse ofadversary capability and will. Theappropriateness of functional attack asthe principal design concept frequentlyis based on time required and availableto cripple adversary critical functions aswell as the adversary’s current actionsand likely response to such attacks.

i. Arranging Operations

• General

•• The ultimate goal of US militaryforces is to accomplish the objectivesdirected by the NCA. For joint operations,this will be achieved through fullspectrum dominance — the ability of USforces, operating unilaterally or incombination with multinational andinteragency partners, to defeat anyadversary or dominate any situationacross the full range of military operations.The joint force must be flexible to reactto changes in the strategic environment,adversary changes, and fluid operationalconditions, both in combat and noncombatsituations. Joint forces must be able toconduct prompt, sustained,synchronized, and integrated operationswith combinations of forces tailored formissions across the range of militaryoperations throughout the battlespace.

•• JFCs must determine the bestarrangement of major operations toachieve dimensional superiority. Thisarrangement often will be a combinationof simultaneous and sequentialoperations to dominate and achieve thedesired end state conditions, quickly,with the least cost in personnel and otherresources. Commanders consider avariety of factors when determining thisarrangement, including geography of theoperational area, available strategic lift,changes in command structure, forceprotection, logistic buildup andconsumption rates, adversaryreinforcement capabilities, and publicopinion. Thinking about the bestarrangement helps determine tempo ofactivities in time, space, and purpose.Critical to the success of the entireoperation is timely and accurate time-phased force and deployment data.

•• The dynamic nature of modernwarfare that includes projection of forces

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complicates decisions concerning howto best arrange operations. During forceprojection, for example, a rapidlychanging adversary situation may causethe commander to alter the plannedarrangement of operations even as forcesare deploying. The arrangement that thecommander chooses should not foreclosefuture options.

•• Normally, a single battle orengagement may not attain theoperational goal. Likewise, theaccomplishment of a strategic goalthrough integrated operations withcombinations of forces organized andtailored for missions across the range ofmilitary operations in all mediums — air,land, sea, and space usually requires theconduct of several major operations.Consequently, the design of a theater orsubordinate campaign or a majoroperation normally provides for relatedphases implemented over time. Phasesmay occur simultaneously, as well assequentially. In a campaign, each phasecan represent a single or several majoroperations, while in a major operation aphase normally consists of severalsubordinate operations or a series ofrelated activities. The main purpose ofphasing is to integrate and synchronizea group of related operations into moremanageable parts, thereby allowing forflexibility in execution while enhancingunity of effort.

• Phases

•• Phasing operations is a tool commonlyused by commanders to organizeoperations. The commander’s vision ofhow a campaign or major operationshould unfold drives subsequentdecisions regarding phasing. Phasing,in turn, assists the commander in framinghis or her intent and assigning tasks tosubordinate commanders. By arranging

campaign activities into phases, thecommander can better integrate andsynchronize subordinate operations intime, space, and purpose. Campaigns areplanned and executed for the full rangeof military operations and aresuccessfully completed when political,strategic, and operational objectives areachieved. As such, a phase represents adefinitive stage during which a largeportion of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involvedin similar or mutually supportingactivities. Phases are initiated as theoperation evolves and terminated whenthe JFC determines dimensionaldominance within a phase is achieved.

•• Phases present options to the JFC.Actual phases used will vary with theoperation and be determined by the JFC.During planning, commanders establishconditions, objectives, or events fortransitioning from one phase to anotherand plan sequels and branches forpotential contingencies. Phases may beconducted sequentially or concurrentlyand may overlap. The commanderadjusts the phases to exploitopportunities presented by the adversaryor operational situation or to react tounforeseen conditions.

•• Phasing is a basic tenet of campaignplan design. Phasing assistscommanders and staffs to visualize andthink through the entire operation orcampaign and to define requirements interms of forces, resources, time, space,and purpose. The primary benefit ofphasing is that it assists commanders inachieving major objectives, that cannotbe attained all at once, by planningmanageable subordinate operations.Phasing can be used to gain progressiveadvantages and assist in achieving majorobjectives as quickly and effectively aspossible. Phasing also provides a

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framework for assessing risk to portionsof an operation or campaign, by whichplans to mitigate this risk may bedeveloped. Sustainment and accessoperations underpin the entirecampaign.

•• Although the commander willdetermine the actual phases used duringa campaign, use of the following phasesprovides a flexible model to arrange thefull spectrum of combat and noncombatoperations. The notional example atFigure III-4 reflects potential phases acombatant commander can use whileplanning and conducting a campaign insupport of strategic and operational goalsand objectives. The phases can beapplied throughout the range of militaryoperations. The text box below the

phases depicts potential actions to beaccomplished during each phase enablingholistic, end to end planning. The phasesreflected in Figure III-4 are: deter/engage;seize initiative; decisive operations; andtransition. Using this model, combatantcommanders can plan and conductcampaigns and major operations acrossthe full range of military operations.

•• Deter/Engage. This phase may be fordeterring aggression or taking actionagainst threats to national or multinationalinterests. Effective crisis responsedepends on gaining early warning ofpotential situations that may requiremilitary action. Early warning can bestbe accomplished through knowledge ofconditions in the AOR and by thefrequent interaction and liaison with allies,

PHASES - JOINT CAMPAIGN

Actions to AssureFull Spectrum Dominance

DETER/ENGAGE

CRISIS

DEFINED

SEIZEINITIATIVE

SEIZE INITIATIVE/

ASSURE FRIENDLY

FREEDOM OF ACTION/

ACCESS THEATER

INFRASTRUCTURE

DECISIVEOPERATIONS

ESTABLISH DOMINANT

FORCE CAPABILITIES/

ACHIEVE FULL

SPECTRUM DOMINANCE

TRANSITION

ESTABLISH CIVIL

CONTROL AND RULE

OF LAW

REDEPLOY

Figure III-4. Phases - Joint Campaign

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coalition partners, and potentialchallengers. Actions during a deter/engage phase may require mobilizationand other predeployment activities to setthe terms and conditions for operations.During predeployment activities, JFCsexercise Flexible Deterrent Options andtailor forces for deployment. The mission-tailored C4I, force protection, and logisticrequirements of the force must bedeveloped during the deter/engagephase in order to support the JFCconcepts of operations. Intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)assets are employed during this phase toprovide real-time and near-real-timesituational awareness. Additionally,when in-place forces are not sufficientand/or are not appropriate for theenvisioned operation, early determinationof the forces required and the order inwhich they are needed (based on theJFC’s concepts of operations) assists inidentifying the time required to deploythe force. Sealift, airlift, and prepositioncapabilities are critical to JFC concepts.Combatant commanders also take actionsto engage multinational partners, therebyproviding the basis for future crisis

response. Liaison teams andcoordination with non-militaryorganizations and other agencies assistin setting conditions for future militaryoperations. During this phase, thecombatant commander expandspartnerships, enhances relationships, andconducts actions to prepare for potentialcrises.

•• Seize Initiative. JFCs seek to seizethe initiative in combat and noncombatsituations through the application ofappropriate joint force capabilities. Incombat operations this involvesexecuting offensive operations at theearliest possible time, forcing theadversary to offensive culmination andsetting the conditions for decisiveoperations. Rapid application of jointcombat power may be required to delay,impede, or halt the adversary’s initialaggression and to deny the initialobjectives. If an adversary has achievedits initial objectives, the early and rapidapplication of offensive combat powercan dislodge adversary forces from theirposition, creating conditions for theexploitation, pursuit, and ultimate

Quick and decisive deployment of combat forces may stabilize the situationand obviate actual hostilities.

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destruction of both those forces and theirwill to fight during the decisive operationsphase. During this phase, operations togain access to theater infrastructure andto expand friendly freedom of actioncontinue while the JFC seeks to degradeadversary capabilities with the intent ofresolving the crisis at the earliestopportunity. In noncombat operations,the JFC establishes conditions forstability by providing immediateassistance to relieve conditions thatprecipitated the crisis.

•• Decisive Operations. The decisiveoperations phase continues with fullspectrum employment of joint forcecapabilities and the appropriatesequencing of forces into the operationalarea as quickly as possible. In combatsituations this phase focuses on drivingthe adversary to culmination andachieving the objectives defined by theNCA and JFC. Operations in this phasedepend upon overmatching forcecapabilities with the C2 and logistics baserequired to achieve the desired End State.Decisive operations focus on winningthrough full spectrum dominance. Innoncombat situations, the JFC seeks todominate the situation with decisiveoperations designed to establishconditions for an early, favorableconclusion, setting the conditions for thetransition phase.

•• Transition. The transition phaseenables the JFC to focus onsynchronizing and integrating joint forceactivities to bring operations to asuccessful conclusion, typicallycharacterized by self-sustaining peaceand the establishment of the rule of law.Part of this phase may be to ensure thatthe threat (military and/or political) is notable to resurrect itself or, in noncombatsituations, to ensure where possible that

the situation leading to the original crisisdoes not reoccur. During this phase, jointforces may conduct operations in supportof other governmental,nongovernmental, and internationalagencies. JFCs continuously assess theimpact of current operations on thetermination objectives. The outcome ofmilitary operations should not conflictwith the long-term solution to the crisis.During this phase, JFCs may retainresponsibility for operations or they maytransfer control of the situation toanother authority and redeploy theirforces. JFCs should identifyredeployment requirements as early aspossible.

• Other Considerations

•• Logistics is crucial to phasing. JFCsand joint force planners considerestablishing logistic bases, opening andmaintaining LOCs, establishingintermediate logistic bases to supportnew phases, and defining priorities forservices and support. Logistics, then, iskey to arranging the operations ofcampaigns and should be planned andexecuted as a joint responsibility.

•• Force protection also is crucial tophasing. JFCs and joint force plannersconduct JIPB and determine forcevulnerabilities. Based on missionrequirements during each phase,commanders should implement essentialforce protection measures.

•• Changes in phases at any level canrepresent a period of vulnerability forthe force. At this point, missions andtask organizations often change. Thecareful planning of branches and sequelscan reduce the risk associated withtransition between phases.

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• Branches and Sequels

•• Many OPLANs require adjustmentbeyond the initial stages of the operation.Commanders build flexibility into theirplans to preserve freedom of action inrapidly changing conditions. Branchesand sequels directly relate to the conceptof phasing. Their proper use can addflexibility to a campaign or majoroperation plan.

•• Branches. Branches are options builtinto the basic plan. Such branches mayinclude shifting priorities, changing unitorganization and command relationships,or changing the very nature of the jointoperation itself. Branches add flexibilityto plans by anticipating situations thatcould alter the basic plan. Such situationscould be a result of adversary action,availability of friendly capabilities orresources, or even a change in theweather or season within theoperational area.

•• Sequels. Sequels are subsequentoperations based on the possibleoutcomes of the current operation —victory, defeat, or stalemate. At thecampaign level, phases can be viewed asthe sequels to the basic plan.

j. Centers of Gravity

• COGs are the foundation of capability— what Clausewitz called “the hub ofall power and movement, on whicheverything depends . . . the point at whichall our energies should be directed.”They are those characteristics,capabilities, or sources of power fromwhich a military force derives itsfreedom of action, physical strength,or will to fight. At the strategic level,COGs might include a military force, analliance, national will or public support, aset of critical capabilities or functions, or

national strategy itself. COGs also mayexist at the operational level.

• The COGs concept is useful as ananalytical tool while designingcampaigns and operations to assistcommanders and staffs in analyzingfriendly and adversary sources ofstrength as well as weaknesses andvulnerabilities. Analysis of COGs, bothadversary and friendly, is a continuousprocess throughout an operation.

• The essence of operational art lies inbeing able to mass effects against theadversary’s sources of power in order todestroy or neutralize them. In theory,destruction or neutralization ofadversary COGs is the most directpath to victory. However, COGs canchange during the course of an operationand, at any given time, COGs may notbe apparent or readily discernible. Forexample, the COG might concern themass of adversary units, but that massmight not yet be formed. In such cases,determining the absence of a COG andkeeping it from forming could be asimportant as defining it.

• Identification of adversary COGsrequires detailed knowledge andunderstanding of how opponentsorganize, fight, and make decisions aswell as their physical and psychologicalstrengths and weaknesses. JFCs and theirsubordinates should be alert tocircumstances that may cause COGs tochange and should adjust friendlyoperations accordingly.

• Adversary COGs frequently will bewell protected, making direct attackdifficult and costly. This situation mayrequire joint operations that result inindirect attacks until conditions areestablished that permit successful directattacks.

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• It is also important to identify friendlyCOGs so they can be protected. USability to project power from CONUS orsupporting theaters can represent a COG.National will also can be a COG, as it wasfor the United States during the Vietnamand Persian Gulf Wars.

k. Direct versus Indirect. To the extentpossible, JFCs attack adversary COGs directly.Where direct attack means attacking intoan opponent’s strength, JFCs should seekan indirect approach. For example, if the COGis a large adversary force, the joint force mayattack it indirectly by isolating it from its C2,severing its LOCs (including resupply), anddefeating or degrading its air defense andindirect fire capability. When vulnerable, theadversary force can be attacked directly byappropriate elements of the joint force. In thisway, JFCs will employ an integrated andsynchronized combination of operations toexpose and attack adversary COGs throughweak or vulnerable points — seams, flanks,specific forces or military capabilities, rearareas, and even military morale and publicopinion and support.

l. Decisive Points

• By correctly identifying and controllingdecisive points, a commander can gaina marked advantage over the adversaryand greatly influence the outcome of anaction. Decisive points are usuallygeographic in nature, such as aconstricted sea lane, a hill, a town, or anair base and could include other elementssuch as command posts, criticalboundaries, airspace, or communicationsand/or intelligence nodes. In some cases,specific key events also may be decisivepoints, such as attainment of air or navalsuperiority or commitment of theadversary’s reserve. In still other cases,decisive points may be systemic, suchas C2 systems and refueling orammunition storage capability. Decisive

points are not COGs; they are the keysto attacking protected COGs.

• There normally will be more decisivepoints in an operational area than JFCscan control, destroy, or neutralize withavailable resources. Accordingly,planners must analyze potential decisivepoints and determine which points enableeventual attack of the adversary’s COGs.The commander designates the mostimportant decisive points as objectivesand allocates resources to control,destroy, or neutralize them.

• Geographic, key event, or systemicdecisive points that assist commandersto gain or maintain the initiative arecrucial. Controlling these points in theattack assists commanders to gainfreedom of operational maneuver. Theythus maintain the momentum of theattack and sustain the initiative. If adefender controls such a point, it canhelp exhaust the attacker’s momentumand facilitate the defender’scounterattack.

m. Culmination

• Culmination has both offensive anddefensive application. In the offense,the culminating point is the point in timeand space at which an attacker’s combatpower no longer exceeds that of thedefender. Here the attacker greatly riskscounterattack and defeat and continuesthe attack only at great peril. Success inthe attack at all levels is to secure theobjective before reaching culmination. Adefender reaches culmination when thedefending force no longer has thecapability to go on the counter-offensiveor defend successfully. Success in thedefense is to draw the attacker tooffensive culmination, then conduct anoffensive to expedite emergence of theadversary’s defensive culmination.

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• Integration and synchronization oflogistics with combat operations canforestall culmination and helpcommanders control the tempo of theiroperations. At both tactical andoperational levels, theater logisticplanners forecast the drain on resourcesassociated with conducting operationsover extended distance and time. Theyrespond by generating enough militaryresources at the right times and places toenable their commanders to achievestrategic objectives before reaching theirculminating points. If the commanderscannot generate these resources, theyshould rethink their concept ofoperations.

n. Termination

• Knowing when to terminate militaryoperations and how to preserve achievedadvantages is a component of strategyand operational art. Before forces arecommitted, JFCs must know how theNCA intend to terminate the operationand ensure its outcomes endure, and thendetermine how to implement thatstrategic design at the operational level.In war, termination design is driven inpart by the nature of the war itself. Warsover territorial disputes or economicadvantage tend to be interest-based andlend themselves to negotiation,persuasion, and coercion. Wars foughtin the name of ideology, ethnicity, orreligious or cultural primacy tend to bevalue-based and reflect demands that areseldom negotiable. Often, wars are aresult of both value- and interest-baseddifferences.

• The underlying causes of a particularwar — such as cultural, religious,territorial, or hegemonic — mustinfluence the understanding ofconditions necessary for terminationof hostilities and resolution of conflict.

Ideally, national and allied or coalitiondecision makers will seek the advice ofsenior military leaders concerning howand when to end combat operations.Passing the lead from the military to otheragencies to achieve final strategic goalsfollowing conflict usually requires theparticipation of JFCs.

• Military operations typically concludewith attainment of the strategic endsfor which the NCA committed forces.In some cases, these goals will be militarystrategic goals that, once achieved, allowtransition to other instruments of nationalpower and agencies as the means toachieve broader goals. The end of WorldWar II and the transition from war to othermeans to achieve a free and independentEurope is an example.

• Commanders strive to end combatoperations on terms favorable to theUnited States and its allies or coalitionpartners. The basic element of this goalis gaining control over the adversary inthe final stages of combat. When friendlyforces can freely impose their will on theadversary, the opponent may have toaccept defeat, terminate active hostilities,or revert to other types of conflict suchas geopolitical actions or guerrillawarfare. Nonetheless, a hasty orill-designed end to the operation maybring with it the possibility that relateddisputes will arise, leading to furtherconflict. There is a delicate balancebetween the desire for quick victory andtermination on truly favorable terms.

• JFCs and their subordinate commandersconsider the conditions necessary tobring operations to a favorable end. Theytranslate NCA political goals intostrategy and operational design. Theyprovide decision makers with criticalinformation on adversary intent,objectives, strategy, and chances of

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success in obtaining desired goals. JFCsand subordinate commanders considerthe nature and type of conflict, theobjective of military force, the plans andoperations that will most affect theadversary’s judgment of cost and risk, andthe impact on alliance and coalition warfare.

• If the conditions have been properly setand met for ending the conflict, thenecessary leverage should exist toprevent the adversary from renewinghostilities. Moreover, the strategic goalsfor which the United States foughtshould be secured by the leverage thatUS and multinational forces have gainedand can maintain. Wars are fought forpolitical goals. Wars are successful onlywhen political goals are achieved andthese goals endure.

• A period of postconflict activities existsfrom the immediate end of the conflictto the redeployment of the last USService member. A variety of MOOTWoccur during this period. Theseoperations involve all instruments ofnational power and include those actionswhich ensure that political objectives areachieved and sustained. Part of this effortmay be to ensure the threat (military and/or political) does not resurrect itself. Theeffort focuses on ensuring that the resultsachieved endure and the conditions thatresulted in the conflict do not recur.

• Even as forces transition from combatoperations to postconflict activities,requirements for humanitarianassistance will emerge. Working withDOD and other USG agencies, as wellas nongovernmental and internationalorganizations, JFCs prepare to meet therequirements of humanitarian support,including the provisioning of food andshelter and the protection of variousgroups against the depredations ofopposing groups.

• During postconflict operations, JFCs maytransfer control to other authorities andredeploy forces. JFCs should identifypostconflict requirements as early aspossible so as to facilitate transition andto permit the simultaneous redeploymentof forces no longer required.

6. Key Planning Considerations

The elements of operational art discussedabove form the basis for plans and ordersand set the conditions for successful battle.As shown in Figure III-5, the initial planestablishes the commander’s intent, theconcept of operations, and the initial tasksfor subordinate units. It allows the greatestpossible operational and tactical freedom forsubordinate leaders. It is flexible enough topermit leaders to seize opportunities consistentwith the commander’s intent, thus facilitatingquick and accurate decisionmaking duringoperations. The initial plan not only affectsthe current operation, but also sets the stagefor future operations. As commanders prepareto conduct military operations, they shouldremember that all military operations have a

Figure III-5. The Initial Plan

THE INITIAL PLAN

ESTABLISHES

AFFECTS

Commander's intent

Concept of operations

Initial tasks forsubordinate units

Commander’s CriticalInformation Requirements

Current operations

Future operations

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psychological effect on all parties concerned— friendly, neutral, and hostile. Supportingpsychological operations (PSYOP) and otherinformational activities designed to induce orreinforce favorable foreign attitudes andbehavior must be integrated into all plans atthe initial stages of planning to ensuremaximum effect.

a. Mission. The mission statement is theimpetus for the detailed planning that follows.It is the JFC’s expression of what the jointforce must accomplish and why. Orderscontain both specified and implied tasks.During mission analysis, commanderstranslate these tasks into missions for theirsubordinates. Commanders do so byanalyzing the mission statement and conceptof operations, understanding the intent ofsenior commanders, assessing the currentsituation, and organizing all resourcesavailable to achieve the desired end. Clarityof the mission statement and its understandingby subordinates, before and during theoperation, is vital to success.

b. Commander’s Intent

• The commander’s intent describes thedesired end state. It is a conciseexpression of the purpose of theoperation, not a summary of theconcept of operations. It may includehow the posture of units at that end statefacilitates transition to future operations.It also may include the commander’sassessment of the adversarycommander’s intent.

• JFCs begin to form their intent as they analyzethe mission assigned by a superiorcommander. Together, with the higherheadquarters’ order, the JFC’s intent is theinitial impetus for the entire planningprocess. JFCs initially provide their intentverbally to the staff with the restated missionand planning guidance. JFCs refine theirintent as they consider staff estimates and

complete the commander’s estimate. Theintent statement also may contain anassessment of where and how thecommander will accept risk during theoperation.

• The JFC’s intent helps subordinatespursue the desired end state withoutfurther orders, even when operations donot unfold as planned. Thus, thecommander’s intent provides focus forall subordinate elements.

• The intent statement is usually written, butcould be verbal when time is short. It shouldbe concise and clear. The intent should beable to focus subordinate commanders onthe purpose of the operation and describehow it relates to future operations. A JFC’sorder should contain the intent statementof the next senior commander in the chainof command.

c. Commander’s Critical InformationRequirements

• The JFC should provide commander’scritical information requirements (CCIR)to the joint force staff and components.

• CCIR are a comprehensive list ofinformation requirements identified bythe commander as being critical infacilitating timely informationmanagement and the decisionmakingprocess that affects successful missionaccomplishment.

• The two key subcomponents are criticalfriendly force information and priorityintelligence requirements.

• CCIR result from the analysis ofinformation requirements against amission and the commander’s intent andare normally limited in number.

d. Concept of Operations

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• The concept of operations describes howthe JFC visualizes the operation willunfold based on the selected COA. Thisconcept expresses what, where, and howthe joint force will affect the adversary orthe situation at hand. The commanderprovides sufficient detail for the staff andsubordinate commanders to understandwhat they are to do without furtherinstructions. In the concept of operations,JFCs describe the overall objectives ofthe joint force, the missions assigned tocomponents of the force, and how thecomponents will work together toaccomplish the mission.

• To reinforce intent and priorities,commanders typically designate amain effort (for each phase, if thecampaign has more than one phase). Thisdesignation is as true in the offense as itis in the defense and also applies inMOOTW. These designations providefocus to the operation, set priorities anddetermine risks, promote unity of effort,and facilitate an understanding of thecommander’s intent.

• Concept of Fires. This conceptdescribes how tactical, operational, andstrategic fires are integrated andsynchronized to support the concept ofoperations. The JFC determines theadversary’s COGs and how theapplication of fires can assist in theirdestruction or neutralization. Whilesome fires will support operational andtactical movement and maneuver by air,land, maritime, amphibious, and specialoperations forces, other fires are independentof maneuver and orient on achieving specificoperational and strategic effects thatsupport the JFC’s objectives. Fires are theeffects of lethal or nonlethal weapons.Joint fires are fires produced during theemployment of forces from two or morecomponents in coordinated action towarda common objective. Joint fire support is

joint fires that support air, land, maritime,amphibious, and special operationsforces to move, maneuver, and controlterritory, populations, airspace, and keywaters.

For additional guidance on joint firesand joint fire support, refer toparagraph 7 below and JP 3-09,Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

• The combatant commanders shouldconsider conducting joint strategicattacks when feasible. A joint strategicattack is a combatant commanderdirected offensive action against a vitaltarget(s) whether military, political,economic, or other, that is specificallyselected in order to achieve NCA orcombatant commander’s strategicobjectives.

e. Targeting

• Targeting is the process of selectingtargets and matching the appropriateresponse to them, taking account ofoperational requirements andcapabilities. As with all actions of thejoint force, targeting and attack functionsare accomplished in accordance withinternational law and the ROE approvedby the NCA for the operation. Militarycommanders, planners, and legal advisorsmust consider the desired end state,political goals, and legal constraintswhen making targeting decisions.

• Targeting occurs at all levels ofcommand within a joint force and isperformed at all levels by forces capableof delivering fires or attacking targetswith both lethal and nonlethal disruptiveand destructive means. Targeting iscomplicated by the requirement todeconflict duplicative targeting andprevent fratricide by different forces ordifferent echelons within the same force

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and to integrate and synchronize theattack of those targets with otheractivities of the joint force.

• Targeting and the Campaign Plan. JFCsestablish broad planning objectives andguidance for attack of adversary strategicand operational COGs and interdictionof adversary forces as an integral part ofjoint campaigns and major operations.With the advice of subordinatecommanders, JFCs set priorities, providetargeting guidance, and determine theweight of effort to be provided to variousoperations. Subordinate commandersrecommend to JFCs how to use theircombat power more effectively to achievethe objective. Weight of effort for anyaspect of joint targeting, for instance, maybe expressed as follows.

•• By assigning priorities for resourcesused with respect to the other aspects ofthe theater campaign or operation.

•• In terms of percentage of totalavailable resources.

•• As otherwise determined by theJFC.

• Time-Sensitive Targets. Time-sensitivetargets (TSTs) include air, land, or seabased targets of such high priority tofriendly forces that the JFC designatesthem as requiring immediate responsebecause they pose (or will soon pose) adanger to friendly forces or are highlylucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.

Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine forTargeting, for more detailed informationand guidance on TSTs.

• Targeting Process

•• The targeting process is cyclical.The joint targeting process has six

phases: (1) Commander’s Objectives,Guidance, and Intent; (2) TargetDevelopment, Va l i da t i on ,Nomination, and Prioritization; (3)Capabilities Analysis; (4) Commander’sDecision and Force Assignment; (5)Mission Planning and Force Execution;and (6) Combat Assessment.

•• Targeting mechanisms should existat multiple levels. Joint forcecomponents identify requirements,nominate targets that are outside theirboundaries or exceed the capabilities oforganic and supporting assets (based onthe JFC’s apportionment andsubapportionment decisions), andconduct execution planning. After theJFC provides targeting guidance andapportionment decisions, componentsplan and execute assigned missions.

•• JFCs may establish and task anorganization within their staffs toaccomplish these broad targetingoversight functions or may delegate theresponsibility to a subordinatecommander. Typically, JFCs organizejoint targeting coordination boards(JTCBs). If the JFC so designates, aJTCB may be an integrating center forthis effort or a JFC-level reviewmechanism. In either case, it needs tobe a joint activity comprised ofrepresentatives from the staff, allcomponents and, if required, theirsubordinate units. JFCs task subordinatecommanders or staff officers with theJTCB function based on the JFC’sconcept of operations and the individuals’experience, expertise, and situationalawareness.

•• The JFC defines the role of theJTCB. Typically, the JTCB reviewstarget information, develops targetingguidance and priorities, and mayprepare and refine joint target lists.

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The JTCB also should maintain acomplete list of prohibited andrestricted targets, targets deemedsensitive due to collateral damagepotential, and areas where SOF areoperating to avoid endangering currentor future operations.

•• In multinational operations, theJTCB may be subordinate to amultinational targeting coordinationboard, with JFCs or their agentsrepresenting the joint force on themultinational board.

•• JFCs normally will delegate theauthority to conduct executionplanning, coordination, anddeconfliction associated with targetingand will ensure that this process is also ajoint effort involving applicablesubordinate commands. Whoever isdesignated this responsibility mustpossess or have access to a sufficient C2infrastructure, adequate facilities, andready availability of joint planningexpertise. Should such an agency becharged with joint functional commandresponsibilities, a joint targetingmechanism also is needed to facilitate theprocess at this level. All componentsnormally are involved in targeting andshould establish procedures andmechanisms to manage the targetingfunction.

For additional targeting guidance, referto JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting.

f. Component commanders makecapabilities or forces available to the JFC fortasking to support the joint force as a wholebased on assigned component missions andJFC guidance. When directed by the JFC,component commanders make capabilities orforces available for tasking by othercomponent commanders to achieve joint forceobjectives.

g. Air Apportionment. Air apportionmentis the determination and assignment of thetotal expected effort by percentage and/orpriority that should be devoted to the variousair operations for a given period of time. Thetotal expected effort made available to theJFACC is determined by the JFC inconsultation with component commandersbased on the assigned objectives and theconcept of operations.

• Air apportionment assists JFCs to ensurethe weight of the joint force air effortis consistent with campaign phases andobjectives.

• Given the many airpower capabilities, itstheater-wide application, and its abilityto rapidly shift from one function toanother, JFCs pay particular attentionto its apportionment. JFCs normallyapportion by priority or percentage ofeffort against assigned mission-typeorders and/or by categories significant forthe campaign. These categories caninclude strategic attack, interdiction,counterair, reconnaissance, maritimesupport, and close air support. Afterconsulting with other componentcommanders, the JFACC makes the airapportionment recommendation.

• Following the JFC air apportionmentdecision, the JFACC allocatesapportioned air sorties to the functionsand/or missions they support.

For additional guidance on airapportionment, refer to JP 3-56.1,Command and Control for Joint AirOperations.

h. Countering Air and Missile Threats

• Air superiority delivers a fundamentalbenefit to the joint force. It preventsadversaries from interfering withoperations of air, space, or surface forces

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and assures freedom of action andmovement. Control of the air is a criticalenabler for the joint force because itallows US forces both freedom fromattack and freedom to attack. Usingboth defensive and offensiveoperations , the JFC employscomplementary weapon systems andsensors to achieve air superiority.These operations not only protect againstattack, but also ensure that US forces canstrike potential threats prior to launch.Unity of effort is vital for counteringthreats with an engagement window ofperhaps a matter of minutes. In thistime-sensitive environment, the JFCmust ensure that component systemsare integrated and interoperable toachieve air superiority.

• The degree of control may vary fromair supremacy to local air superiority,depending on the overall situation andthe JFC’s concept of operations. It maybe needed for different lengths of time,ranging from a few minutes to theduration of the conflict, and also varywith geographic areas. The JFCnormally seeks to gain and maintaincontrol of the air dimension as quicklyas possible to allow friendly forces tooperate without prohibitive interferencefrom adversary air threats. US militaryforces must be capable of counteringthe air and missile threat from initialforce projection through redeploymentof friendly forces. These threats includeadversary aircraft (manned orunmanned), ballistic missiles, and cruisemissiles (air, land, or sea launched). Theproliferation of theater missiles andadvances in missile technologies,coupled with WMD, make theatermissiles a particularly difficult anddangerous threat. Joint theater missiledefense is an integral part of counterairoperations.

• Air superiority is achieved through thecounterair mission, which integratesboth offensive and defensiveoperations from all components tocounter the air and missile threat.These operations may use aircraft,surface-to-surface and surface-to-airmissiles, artillery, SOF, and elements ofIO to counter the threat. Joint forcesmust be integrated to exploit themutually beneficial effects of offensiveand defensive operations to destroy,neutralize, or minimize air and missilethreats, both before and after launch.

• Defensive Counterair. As an elementof counterair, defensive counterair alsocontributes to force protection throughdetecting, identifying, intercepting, anddestroying or negating enemy forcesattempting to attack or penetrate thefriendly air environment.

•• Active Air Defense. Active airdefense is direct defensive action takento destroy, nullify, or reduce theeffectiveness of hostile air and missilethreats against friendly forces and assets.It includes the use of aircraft, air defenseweapons, electronic warfare, and otheravailable weapons. The JRA coordinatorcoordinates with the area air defensecommander to ensure that air defenserequirements for the JRA are integratedinto air defense plans.

•• Passive Air Defense. Passive airdefense includes all measures, other thanactive air defense, taken to minimize theeffectiveness of hostile air and missilethreats against friendly forces and assets.These measures include camouflage,concealment, deception, dispersion,reconstitution, redundancy, detection andwarning systems, and the use ofprotective construction.

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For additional guidance on air andmissile defense, refer to paragraph 6 habove and JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine forCountering Air and Missile Threats.

For additional guidance on counteringair and missile threats, refer to JP 3-01,Joint Doctrine for Countering Air andMissile Threats.

i. Space Operations. While onceconsidered merely an extension of terrestrialoperations (air, land, and sea operations),space power has become an integratedoperational capability — a critical enabler thatmay be used to support all joint warfare areas.Likewise, commanders must anticipate hostileactions that attempt to deny friendly forcesaccess to or use of space capabilities.Commanders also should anticipate theproliferation and increasing sophistication ofspace capabilities and products with militaryutility that could be used by an adversary forhostile purposes. Space control operations areconducted by joint and allied and/or coalitionforces to gain and maintain space superiority.Space superiority enables friendly access tospace-based capabilities while denyingadversary forces similar support. To ensurethe robustness of friendly space capabilities,US Space Command (USSPACECOM)conducts space control, force enhancement,space support, and space force application.Direct in-theater space support is provided byresident theater and Service-specific spaceweapons officers and technicians, in additionto some augmenting space support teams fromUSSPACECOM.

For more information on space operations,refer to JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for SpaceOperations.

j. Force Protection. Force protectionincludes actions taken to prevent or mitigatehostile actions against DOD personnel (toinclude family members), resources, facilities,

and critical information. These actionsconserve the force’s fighting potential so itcan be applied at the decisive time and placeand incorporates the integrated andsynchronized offensive and defensivemeasures to enable the effective employmentof the joint force while degradingopportunities for the adversary. Forceprotection does not include actions to defeatthe adversary or protect against accidents,weather, or disease. Force protection is “fulldimensional” and is achieved through thetailored selection and application ofmultilayered active and passive measures,within the domains of air, land, sea, space,and information across the range of militaryoperations with an acceptable level of risk.Elements of force protection include, but arenot limited to, the following.

• Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical(NBC) Defense. NBC defense measuresprovide defense against attack by WMDand the capability to sustain operationsin WMD environments using theprinciples of avoidance of NBC hazards,particularly contamination; protection ofindividuals and units from unavoidableWMD hazards; and decontamination.

For additional guidance on NBCdefense, refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrinefor Operations in Nuclear, Biological,and Chemical (NBC) Environments.

• Antiterrorism. Antiterrorism programssupport force protection by establishingmeasures that reduce the vulnerability ofindividuals and property to terrorist acts.These measures may include limitedresponse and containment by localmilitary forces. They also consist ofdefensive measures to protect Servicemembers, civilian employees, familymembers, facilities, information, andequipment.

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For additional guidance onantiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forAntiterrorism.

• Defensive IO. See IO guidance inparagraph 6n below.

• Security. Security of forces and meansenhances force protection by identifyingand reducing friendly vulnerability tohostile acts, influence, or surprise.Security operations protect flanks andrear areas in the operational area.Physical security measures deter, detect,and defend critical installations, facilities,information, and systems against threatsfrom terrorists, criminals, andunconventional forces. Measures includefencing and perimeter stand-off space,lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers,blast protection, intrusion detectionsystems and electronic surveillance, andaccess control devices and systems.Physical security measures, like anydefense, should be overlapping anddeployed in depth.

For additional guidance on physicalsecurity measures, refer to JP 3-10, JointDoctrine for Rear Area Operations, andJP 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Base Defense.

• Operations Security. Effectiveoperations security (OPSEC) measuresminimize the “signature” of joint forceactivities, avoid set patterns, and employdeception when patterns cannot bealtered. OPSEC measures are an integralelement of IO. Although strategicOPSEC measures are important, the mosteffective methods manifest themselves atthe lowest level. Terrorist activity isdiscouraged by varying patrol routes,staffing guard posts and towers atirregular intervals, and conductingvehicle and personnel searches and

identification checks on a set butunpredictable pattern.

• Law Enforcement. Law enforcementaids in force protection through theprevention, detection, response, andinvestigation of crime. A cooperativepolice program involving military andcivilian and/or HN law enforcementagencies directly contributes to overallforce protection.

• Security of High-Risk Personnel.Security of high-risk personnel (HRP)safeguards designated individuals who,by virtue of their rank, assignment,symbolic value, vulnerabilities, location,or specific threat are at a greater risk thanthe general population. There are twolevels of HRP. Level 1 HRP are thoseindividuals who have such a significantlyhigh potential as terrorist or criminaltargets as to warrant assignment of full-time protective services. Level 2 HRPdo not warrant full-time protectiveservices but require additional office,residential, and travel security measures.The levels of protection and types ofsecurity measures afforded to HRP aredetermined by threat and vulnerabilityassessment.

• Personal Security. Personal securitymeasures consist of common-sense rulesof on- and off-duty conduct for everyService member. They also include useof individual protective equipment (IPE),use of hardened vehicles and facilities,employment of dedicated guard forces,and use of duress alarms.

• Planning for Force Protection

•• JFCs a n d t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t ecommanders must address forceprotection during all phases of deliberateand crisis action planning. All aspectsof force protection must be considered

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and threats minimized to ensure maximumoperational success. JFCs and theirsubordinate commanders must implementforce protection measures appropriate toall anticipated threats, to includeterrorists.

•• Supported and supportingcommanders must ensure that deployingforces receive thorough briefingsconcerning the threat and personnelprotection requirements prior to and uponarrival in the operational area.

•• In addition, JFCs and their subordinatecommanders must evaluate thedeployment of forces and each COA forthe impact of terrorist organizationssupporting the threat and those notdirectly supporting the threat but seekingto take advantage of the situation.

For additional guidance on forceprotection and related matters andconsiderations, refer to risk managementand OPSEC guidance in paragraph 6nbelow and JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures forAntiterrorism, and JP 3-54, JointDoctrine for Operations Security.

k. Concept of Logistics

• The JFC’s concept of logistics is a keypart of the integration andsynchronization of the joint effort.Through the logistic concept, JFCsenable the deployment, entry, buildup,application, sustainment, reconstitution,and redeployment of joint forces. JFCsidentify and reinforce prioritiesbetween combat and logisticrequirements. Logistic considerationsare key to the commander’s estimateprocess, will greatly impact on thedevelopment of COAs, and may dictateCOA selection.

• COCOM gives combatant commandersauthoritative direction over all aspectsof logistics necessary to accomplish themission. Within their commands,combatant commanders use this authorityto ensure effectiveness and economy inoperations and to prevent or eliminate theunnecessary duplication of facilitiesand the overlap of functions amongService components. In criticalsituations, combatant commanders maymodify the normal logistic process withintheir commands. They may use allfacilities and supplies of all assigned andattached forces to accomplish themission.

• Combatant commanders ensure thatthe concept of logistics supports theconcept of operations. The logisticconcept of the campaign plan does thisby establishing a base of operations,opening and maintaining LOCs,providing intermediate bases ofoperations to support phasing andsustainment, and establishing prioritiesfor service and support for each phaseof a campaign. The logistic concept alsouses available host-nation support(HNS).

• Disposal Considerations. DefenseLogistics Agency support to theServices and geographic Servicecomponent commands includes thecapability to receive and dispose ofmateriel in a theater. The DefenseReutilization and Marketing Serviceelement in theater establishes theater-specific procedures for the reuse,demilitarization, or disposal offacilities, equipment, and supplies, toinclude hazardous materiel and waste.

• Environmental Considerations. Logisticsupport should be planned andconducted with appropriateconsideration of the environment in

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accordance with applicable internationaltreaties and conventions, USenvironmental laws, policies, andregulations and HN agreements. Earlyplanning is essential to ensure that allappropriate environmental reviews havebeen completed prior to initiatinglogistic support activities.

For more information on logisticplanning, refer to JP 4-0, Doctrine forLogistic Support of Joint Operations, JP4-01.4, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint Theater Distribution,and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for CivilEngineering Support.

l. Environmental Considerations. Whilecomplete protection of the environmentduring military operations may not always bepossible, careful planning should addressenvironmental considerations in jointoperations, to include legal aspects. JFCs areresponsible for protecting the environment inwhich US military forces operate to thegreatest extent possible. In this regard, JFCsshould be responsible for the following.

• Demonstrate proactive environmentalleadership during all phases of jointoperations across the range of militaryoperations; instill an environmental ethicin subordinate commands and promoteenvironmental awareness throughout thejoint force.

• Ensure that environmentalconsiderations are an integral part in theplanning and decisionmaking processes.

• Identify specific organizationalresponsibilities and specific joint forceenvironmental requirements. Theseresponsibilities should have clearlydefined goals, strategies, and measuresof success.

• Ensure compliance, as far as practicablewithin the confines of missionaccomplishment, with all applicableenvironmental laws and agreements,including those of the HN. The goal ofcompliance is to minimize potentialadverse impacts on human health and theenvironment while maximizing readinessand operational effectiveness.

For additional guidance onenvironmental considerations, refer to JP3-34, Engineer Doctrine for JointOperations, and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrinefor Civil Engineering Support.

m. Command, Control, Communications,and Computers (C4) Systems Planning. TheC4 system provides the JFC the means tocollect, transport, process, disseminate, andprotect information. The mission andstructure of the joint force determine specificinformation flow and processingrequirements. In turn, the informationrequirements dictate the general architectureand specific configuration of the C4 system.Therefore, C4 system planning needs to beintegrated and synchronized with operationalplanning. Through effective C4 systemplanning, the JFC is able to maintain unity ofeffort to apply capabilities at the critical timeand place for mission success.

For additional guidance on C4 systemsplanning, refer to JP 6-0, Doctrine forCommand, Control, Communications, andComputer (C4) Systems Support to JointOperations.

n. Other Considerations

• Disciplined Operations

•• Joint forces operate in accordancewith applicable ROE, conduct warfarein compliance with international laws,

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and fight within restraints andconstraints specified by superiorcommanders. Objectives are justified bymilitary necessity and attained throughappropriate and disciplined use of force.

•• Exercising discipline in operationsincludes limiting collateral damage —the inadvertent or secondary damageoccurring as a result of actions initiatedby friendly or adversary forces. JFCsapply the combat power necessary toensure victory against combatants, butare careful to limit unnecessary injury tononcombatants and damage, especiallyto protected or sacred sites.

•• JFC use of force includes the propertreatment of enemy prisoners of war,civilians and other noncombatants. Lawsof war are intended to reduce casualtiesand enhance fair treatment ofcombatants and noncombatants alike.

•• ROE, which specify thecircumstances and limitations underwhich forces conduct MOOTW or beginor continue combat, are promulgated bythe NCA. US forces will always complywith the law of armed conflict (LOAC).In those circumstances when armedconflict, under international law, does notexist, LOAC principles nevertheless maybe applied as a matter of national policy.If armed conflict occurs, the actions ofUS forces will be governed by both theLOAC and ROE. Many factors influenceROE, including national commandpolicy, mission, operational environment,commander’s intent, and internationalagreements regulating conduct. ROEalways recognize the inherent right ofunit and individual self-defense.Properly developed ROE must be clear,tailored to the situation, reviewed for legalsufficiency, and included in training. ROE

typically will vary from operation tooperation and may change during anoperation.

For further guidance on ROE, refer toCJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01A,Standing Rules of Engagement for USForces, and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task ForcePlanning Guidance and Procedures.

• Combat Identification

•• Combat identification measures mustbe established early in the planning cycle.

•• Combat identification measuresmust be consistent with ROE and notinterfere unduly with unit and individualrights and responsibilities to engageadversary forces.

•• Combat identification considerationsplay an important role in forceprotection and must be included inplanning combat identification measures.

For additional guidance on combatidentification, refer to JP 5-00.2, JointTask Force Planning Guidance andProcedures.

• Risk Management

•• Risk is inherent in militaryoperations. Risk management assistscommanders in (1) conserving lives andresources and avoiding unnecessary risk,(2) making an informed decision toexecute a mission, (3) identifying feasibleand effective control measures wherespecific standards do not exist, and (4)providing reasonable alternatives formission accomplishment.

•• Risk management should be appliedto all levels of war and across the full

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range of military operations. In addition,risk management should be applied to allphases of an operation, and shouldinclude any branches and sequels to anoperation.

•• In peacetime operations, commandersand their staffs consider a variety ofrisks — such as the implications of failureto national prestige or to joint forcemorale, risk to the safety and forceprotection of individual joint forcemembers, loss of expensive equipment,or damage to the environment.

•• In combat or potential combatsituations, commanders and theirstaffs carefully identify conditions thatconstitute success — both for theenvisioned end state and for the majoroperations or stages that lead to that endstate. To the extent that theseconditions are met, commandersreduce the risk. When these conditionsare not met, or only partially met,commanders and their staffs identify therisk associated with continuing. Toalleviate or reduce risk, commanders mayapply additional force — by reallocatingcombat forces or by shifting supporting

operations, for example — or they maydecide the risk is acceptable.

•• Commanders and their staffs considermany factors as they identify risk incombat or potential combat situations.As in peacetime operations, commandersconsider the risk to joint force members.It is for this reason, in part, that an indirectapproach to adversary COGs, attackingadversary vulnerabilities rather thanstrengths, is important in the design ofcampaigns and major operations.

•• Risk management does not (1) inhibitcommanders’ flexibility and initiative;(2) remove risk altogether (or support azero defects mindset); (3) require a GO/NO-GO decision; (4) sanction or justifyviolating the law; or (5) remove thenecessity for development of standingoperating procedures.

•• To assist in risk management,commanders and their staffs may developor institute a risk management processtailored to their particular mission and/or AOR or JOA. Figure III-6 is a genericmodel that contains the likely elementsof a risk management process.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN DESERT STORM, 1991

Before the beginning of the air operation, operations security (OPSEC) anddeception had already begun to affect the Iraqi leadership’s perception of whatthe coalition intended to do. The opening phase of the air operation focusedon destroying or disrupting the Iraqi command and control system, limitingthe leadership’s ability to gather accurate information and to transmit itsdecisions. During the air operation, OPSEC and deception continued to hidethe preparations for the actual land operation while using maneuver forcesand air strikes to portray a false intention to make the main attack into Kuwait.Psychological operations, supported by B-52 strikes, targeted the front-lineIraqi soldier’s confidence in Iraqi leadership. The result of this integrated useof these capabilities was the decreased ability of the Iraqi leadership to respondeffectively to the land operation when it began.

VARIOUS SOURCES

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• Rehearsals. Rehearsal is the process oflearning, understanding, and practicinga plan in the time available before actualexecution. Rehearsing key combat andlogistics actions allows participants tobecome familiar with the operationand to visualize the plan. This processassists them in orienting themselves totheir surroundings and to other unitsduring execution. Rehearsals alsoprovide a forum for subordinate leadersto analyze the plan, but caution must beexercised in adjusting the plan in orderto prevent errors in integration andsynchronization. While rehearsals withcombat units usually occur at the tacticallevel, headquarters at the operationallevel can rehearse key aspects of a planusing command post exercises, typicallysupported by computer-aidedsimulations. While the joint force maynot be able to rehearse an entireoperation, the JFC should identify keyelements for rehearsal.

• Information Operations. IO are actionstaken to affect adversary information andinformation systems, while defendingone’s own information and informationsystems. IO require the close, continuousintegration of offensive and defensivecapabilities and activities, as well aseffective design, integration, andinteraction of C2 with intelligencesupport.

For further guidance on informationoperations, refer to JP 3-13, JointDoctrine for Information Operations.

• Military Deception

•• Military deception, as executed byJFCs, targets adversary decision makers(opposing commanders) through theadversary intelligence collection,analysis, and dissemination systems.This deception requires a thoroughknowledge of opponents and their

RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

IDENTIFYHAZARDS

ASSESSHAZARDS

DEVELOPCONTROLS

IMPLEMENTCONTROLS

SUPERVISEAND

EVALUATE

Figure III-6. Risk Management Process

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decisionmaking processes. Anticipationis key. During the formulation of thecommander’s concept, particularattention is placed on defining how theJFC would like the adversary to act atcritical points in the battle. Those desiredadversary actions then become the goalof military deception operations. Militarydeception is focused on causing theopponents to act in a desired manner,not simply to be misled in their thinking.The purpose is to cause opposingcommanders to form inaccurateimpressions about friendly forcecapabilities or intentions, misappropriatetheir intelligence collection assets, or fail

to employ combat or support units totheir best advantage. Military deceptionoperates at the strategic, operational, ortactical levels as an integral andsystematic component of IO.

•• Military deception operations are anintegral element of joint operations.Planning for military deceptionoperations is top-down, in the sense thatsubordinate deception plans support thehigher level plan.

•• Commanders at all levels can planmilitary deception operations. Strategicor operational plans may include the

MILITARY DECEPTION IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense Forceby attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a significantfoothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined defense andcounterattack drove them back.

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception operationsof strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit Israeli weaknesses.At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that they would not attackwithout both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to neutralize the Israeli AirForce, and that tactical preparations were merely in response to feared Israeliretaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forcesportrayed their mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of theirannual exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the canalwere repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and therefore didnot react when the actual attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forcesexpertly camouflaged their equipment, denying information to Israeli observersand creating a false impression of the purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the operationaland strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers reportedwith increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were significant.Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces exploited thesevulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day ofAtonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli forces would bereduced.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations ofthe force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forcesin the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

VARIOUS SOURCES

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employment of lower-level units,although subordinate commanders maynot know of the overall deception effort.It is therefore essential for commandersto coordinate their military deceptionplans with their senior commander toensure overall unity of effort.

•• Military deception operationsdepend on intelligence to identifyappropriate deception targets, to assist indeveloping a credible story, to identifyand orient on appropriate receivers (thereaders of the story), and to assess theeffectiveness of the deception effort.

•• Military deception operations arenot without cost, but are a powerful toolin full-dimensional operations. Forcesand resources must be committed to thedeception effort to make it believable,possibly to the short-term detriment ofsome aspects of the campaign. OPSECfor military deception operations maydictate that only a select group of seniorcommanders and staff officers in the jointforce know which actions are purelydeceptive in nature. This situation cancause confusion within the force andmust be closely monitored by JFCs andtheir staffs.

For additional guidance on militarydeception, refer to JP 3-58, Joint Doctrinefor Military Deception.

• Psychological Operations

•• PSYOP are actions to conveyselected information and indicators toforeign audiences. They are designedto influence the emotions, motives,reasoning and, ultimately, thebehavior of foreign governments,organizations, groups, and individuals.PSYOP have strategic, operational, andtactical applications, including support todeception operations.

•• PSYOP can contribute to all aspectsof joint operations through the followingfive primary missions: (1) Advising thesupported commander through thetarget ing process regardingpsychological actions, psychologicalenabling actions, and targetingrestrictions to be executed by the militaryforce; (2) Providing support tohumanitarian activities that easesuffering and restore or maintain civilorder; (3) Serving as the supportedcommander’s voice to foreignpopulations by conveying the JFC’sintent; (4) Countering adversarypropaganda, misinformation,disinformation, and opposing informationduring overseas operations to correctlyportray friendly intent and actions, whiledenying others the ability to polarizepublic opinion and effect the political willof multinational partners within anoperational area; and (5) Influencingforeign populations by expressinginformation subjectively in order toinfluence attitudes and behavior and toobtain compliance or non-interferencewith friendly military operations.

•• PSYOP forces assigned to a joint forcewill provide PSYOP planning and C2 forPSYOP units. They also developPSYOP programs and products tofacilitate the JFC’s mission by producing,distributing, and disseminating PSYOPmedia.

For additional guidance on PSYOP, referto JP 3-53, Doctrine for JointPsychological Operations.

• Operations Security

•• OPSEC is a process of planning andaction to gain and maintain essentialsecrecy about the JFC’s actualcapabilities, activities, and intentions.

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•• History has shown the value and needfor reliable, adequate, and timelyintelligence, and the harm that results fromits inaccuracies and absence. It istherefore vital and advantageous todeny the opposing force commandersthe critical information they need(essential secrecy) and cause them toderive inaccurate, timely appreciationsthat influence their actions (desiredappreciations).

•• OPSEC is applied to all militaryactivities at all levels of command. TheJFC should provide OPSEC planningguidance to the staff at the time of thecommander’s decision and, subsequently,to subordinate and supportingcommanders in the chain of command.By maintaining liaison and coordinatingthe OPSEC planning guidance, the JFCwill ensure unity of effort in gaining andmaintaining the essential secrecyconsidered necessary for success.

For additional guidance on OPSEC,refer to JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine forOperations Security.

• Electronic Warfare (EW)

•• EW is any military action involvingthe use of electromagnetic and directedenergy to control the electromagneticspectrum or to attack the adversary.Control of the electromagnetic spectrumranges from protecting friendly systemsto countering adversary systems. Thiscontrol is not limited to radio or radarfrequencies, but includes optical andinfrared regions as well as those regionsin which directed-energy weapons mightfunction.

•• The three major subdivisions of EWare electronic attack, electronicprotection, and EW support, which may

overlap. Some EW actions may be bothoffensive and protective in nature andmay inherently use electronicsurveillance in their execution.

•• EW should be employed to attack theadversary according to establishedprinciples of warfare. The decision toemploy EW should be based not only onoverall joint campaign objectives, butalso on the risks of possible adversaryresponses and other effects on thecampaign effort.

•• The JFC should ensure maximumcoordination among EW and otheroperations, activities, and intelligenceand communications (includingfrequency management) supportactivities for maximum effect. Thiscoordination is necessary to ensureeffective exchange of information,eliminate undesirable duplication ofeffort, and provide for mutual support.

For additional EW guidance, refer to JP3-51, Electronic Warfare in Joint MilitaryOperations.

• Public Affairs (PA). JFCs conduct PAoperations to communicate unclassifiedinformation about joint force activitiesto internal, domestic, and internationalaudiences. When supporting deployedoperations, personnel engaged in PAshould be sent early into a theater insufficient strength to begin effectiveoperations. Dramatic media coverage atthe outset of a military action can rapidlyinfluence public and political opinion andaffect strategic decisionmaking. Therelease of information concerningoperations should be integrated into thebranches, sequels, and phases of theplanning effort. Without preplanning,release of information is often incompleteand too late to have an impact through

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fast-acting world media organizations.Since each branch, sequel, or phasenormally is based on some measurableevent, PA planning should includedevelopment and subsequent delivery ofmedia releases by spokespersonsthoroughly familiar with objectives of theoperations. With effective preplanningof information release, the effects of othercampaign efforts may be amplified andadversary media releases may be madeless effective. PA also assistscommanders by providing trustedcounsel; enhancing morale and readiness;fostering public trust and support; andleveraging global influence anddeterrence.

For additional guidance on PA, refer toJP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs inJoint Operations.

• Civil-Military Operations (CMO).CMO is a broad term used to denote theactivities of a commander thatestablish, maintain, influence, orexploit relations between militaryforces and civil authorities, bothgovernmental and nongovernmental,and the civilian populace in a friendly,neutral, or hostile operational area tofacilitate military operations andconsolidate strategic, operational, ortactical objectives. CMO may includeactivities and functions normally theresponsibility of the local government.These activities may occur prior to,during, or subsequent to other militaryactions. They also may occur, if directed,in the absence of other militaryoperations.

For additional guidance on CMO, referto JP 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations.

7. Control and CoordinatingMeasures

JFCs employ various maneuver andmovement control and fire supportcoordinating measures to facilitate effectivejoint operations. These measures includeboundaries, phase lines, objectives,coordinating altitudes to deconflict airoperations, air defense areas, amphibiousobjective areas, submarine operating patrolareas, and minefields. Boundaries and firesupport coordinating measures are discussedbelow.

a. Boundaries

• Boundaries define surface areas tofacilitate coordination and deconflictionof operations. In land and sea warfare,a boundary is a line by which areasbetween adjacent units or formationsare defined. A naval boundary may bedesignated for seas adjacent to the areaof land conflict to enhance coordinationand execution of naval operations.

• JFCs may use lateral, rear, and forwardboundaries to define AOs for land andnaval forces. Such areas are sized,shaped, and positioned to enable land ornaval force commanders to accomplishtheir mission while protecting deployedforces.

• Theater-wide air sorties are notconstrained by surface boundaries,per se. However, because the airspaceabove surface areas is used by allcomponents of the joint force, theairspace control authority, on behalfof the JFC, promulgates airspacecontrol measures to deconflict themultiple uses required of this space. Inaddition, delivery of air weapons insidesurface boundaries normally requires

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coordination with the surface forcecommanders.

For additional airspace controlguidance, refer to JP 3-52, Doctrine forJoint Airspace Control in the CombatZone.

• Boundaries may require relativelyfrequent adjustment based on the actualand projected rate of maneuver and theoperational environment.

For additional guidance on integrationand synchronization of joint efforts withinland and naval AOs, refer to Chapter II,“Fundamentals of Joint Operations.”

b. Joint Fire Support Coordination

• Joint fire support is the synergisticproduct of three subsystems: targetacquisition, C2, and attack resources.The successful application of joint firesupport depends on the closecoordination of these subsystems. Jointfire support must function in acoordinated and integrated manner tosupport the commander’s objectives. Thefunction of joint fire support binds firesupport resources together so that themultiple effects of each asset areintegrated and synchronized to supportthe commander’s intent and concept ofoperation.

• Joint fire support coordination is acontinuous process of planning andexecuting fires. Joint fire supportcoordination involves operational,tactical, and technical considerations andthe exercise of fire support command,control, and communications. Firesupport coordination includes efforts todeconflict attacks, avoid fratricide,reduce duplication of effort, and assist inshaping the battlespace. Coordinationprocedures must be flexible and

responsive to the ever-changingdynamics of warfighting. Simplifiedarrangements for approval orconcurrence should be established.Coordination is reflected in the conceptof operations and in the sequencing andtiming of actions to achieve objectives.Coordination is enhanced when firesupport personnel clearly understand thecommander’s intent. A very importantpart of the coordination process is theidentification of potential fratricidesituations and the necessary coordinationmeasures to positively manage andcontrol the attack of targets.

• Fire Support Coordination Line(FSCL)

•• An FSCL is a fire supportcoordinating measure that isestablished and adjusted byappropriate land or amphibious forcecommanders within their boundariesin consultation with superior,subordinate, supporting, and affectedcommanders. An FSCL facilitates theexpeditious attack of targets ofopportunity beyond the coordinatingmeasure.

•• The FSCL is a term oriented to air-land operations; there is no similar termused at sea.

•• An FSCL does not divide an AO bydefining a boundary between close anddeep operations or a zone for close airsupport (see Figure III-7).

•• The FSCL applies to all fires of air,land, and sea-based weapons systemsusing any type of ammunition.

•• Forces attacking targets beyond anFSCL must inform all affectedcommanders in sufficient time to allownecessary reaction to avoid fratricide.

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Supporting elements attacking targetsbeyond the FSCL must ensure that theattack will not produce adverse attackson, or to the rear of, the line.

•• Short of an FSCL, all air-to-groundand surface-to-surface attack operationsare controlled by the appropriate land oramphibious force commander.

•• The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features.

•• Coordination of attacks beyond theFSCL is especially critical to

commanders of air, land, and specialoperations forces. In exceptionalcircumstances, the inability to conductthis coordination will not preclude theattack of targets beyond the FSCL.However, failure to do so may increasethe risk of fratricide and could wastelimited resources.

•• The FSCL is not a boundary — theintegration and synchronization ofoperations on either side of the FSCL isthe responsibility of the establishingcommander out to the limits of the landor amphibious force boundary.

Figure III-7. Fire Support Coordination Line

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE

XX XX

XX

ForwardBoundary

Objective

On-OrderFSCL

FSCL

Enhances the expeditious attack of targets and sets the stage forfuture operations.Established by appropriate level commander in consultation withsuperior, subordinate, and supporting commanders.Forces attacking targets beyond a fire support coordination line(FSCL) must inform all affected commanders.

Not ABoundary

PERMISSIVEFire SupportCoordinatingMeasure

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•• Placement of the FSCL should strike abalance so as not to unduly inhibitoperational tempo while maximizing theeffectiveness of organic and joint forceinterdiction assets. Establishment of theFSCL too far forward of friendly forcescan limit the responsiveness of airinterdiction sorties and could undulyhinder expeditious attack of adversaryforces.

•• To avoid fratricide, changes to theFSCL must be thoroughly coordinatedand allow for sufficient time for completedissemination.

For additional guidance on joint firesupport, refer to JP 3-09, Doctrine forJoint Fire Support.

8. Functional CombatantCommand Support

Functional combatant commands providesupport to and may be supported by geographiccombatant commands and other functionalcombatant commands as directed by higherauthority, normally as indicated in the JSCPand other CJCS-level documents. The NCAmay, in special circumstances, personally directwhat specific support and to whom suchsupport will be provided from functionalcombatant commands. When a functionalcombatant commander is the supportedcommander and operating within ageographic combatant commander’s AOR,close coordination and communicationbetween the affected combatant commandersis paramount.

a. United States Transportation Command.United States Transportation Command(USTRANSCOM) is responsible for thefollowing.

• Provides strategic air, land, and seatransportation, including common-userterminal services, to deploy, employ, and

sustain military forces to meet nationalobjectives.

• Provides liaison officers to allgeographic combatant commands toassist in coordination of strategicmobility issues that may arise.

• Oversees a global transportationplanning and execution systemsupported by communications andcomputer networks and is the DODmanager of the Defense TransportationSystem.

• Provides a central point of contact foragencies preparing to supportdeployment, to include patient movementrequirements.

USTRANSCOM normally will focus on thefirst 3 to 7 days of strategic air movement and30 days of sea movement, including surfacemovement to aerial and seaports ofembarkation.

For additional guidance onUSTRANSCOM capabilities andrequesting movement via USTRANSCOM,see JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the DefenseTransportation System, JP 3-33, Joint ForceCapabilities, JP 3-35, Joint Deployment andRedeployment Operations, and DODRegulation 4500.9R, DefenseTransportation Regulation.

b. United States Space Command.USSPACECOM’s responsibilities include thefollowing.

• Supporting the North AmericanAerospace Defense Command (NORAD)by providing missile warning and spacesurveillance.

• Providing warning of missile attack onCONUS, Hawaii, Alaska, and Canada andwarning assessment of space attack.

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• Advocating space operations (forceenhancement, space control, spacesupport including spacelift, on-orbitoperations, and force application) as wellas missile warning requirements of allcombatant commanders.

• Conducting space operations, includingsupport of strategic missile defense forthe United States.

• Planning and developing requirementsfor strategic ballistic missile defense,space-based support for tactical ballisticmissile defense, and space operations.

• Providing integrated tactical warning andattack assessment of space, missile, andair attacks on CONUS, Alaska, andCanada should NORAD be unable toaccomplish the assessment mission.

• Serving as single point of contact formilitary space operational matters, toinclude communications in accordancewith CJCSI 6250.01, SatelliteCommunications.

• Providing representation to US nationalagencies and commercial andinternational agencies for matters relatedto space operations.

• Planning and implementation of securityassistance related to military spaceoperations, in conjunction withgeographic combatant commanders.

• Coordinating and conducting spaceoperations planning.

• Providing the military point of contactfor countering the proliferation of WMDin space in support of nonproliferationpolicies, activities, and taskings.

• Serving as military lead for computernetwork defense (CND) and computer

network attack (CNA), to includeadvocating and supporting the CND andCNA requirements of all combatantcommanders, conducting CND and CNAoperations, and planning and developingnational CND and CNA requirements.

• USSPACECOM supports JFCs byproviding space products and services,to include:

•• Space force enhancement, to includeISR; tactical warning and attackassessments; command, control, andcommunications (C3); position, velocity,time and navigation; and environmentalmonitoring;

•• Space support, to include launchingand deploying space vehicles;maintaining and sustaining spacevehicles in-orbit; and de-orbiting andrecovering space vehicles, if required;and

•• Space control, to include surveillanceof space; protection of US and friendlyspace systems; prevention of anadversary’s ability to use space systemsand services for purposes hostile to USnational security interests; and directsupport to battle management command,control, communications, andintelligence.

For additional guidance onUSSPACECOM capabilities andc o o rd i n a t i n g s u p p o r t f ro mUSSPACECOM, refer to JP 3-33, JointForce Capabilities, and JP 3-14, JointDoctrine; Tactics Techniques, andProcedures for Space Operations.

c. United States Special OperationsCommand.

• USSOCOM capabilities include directaction, special reconnaissance, FID,

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unconventional warfare, combattingterrorism, PSYOP, CA,counterproliferation of WMD, and IO.

• USSOCOM provides trained and combat-ready SOF to the geographic combatantcommanders and, when directed by theNCA, conducts selected SO.

• The Commander in Chief, US SpecialOperations Command exercises COCOMof all active and reserve SOF, US ArmyPSYOP, and CA forces (except for MarineCorps Reserve CA Groups) stationed inCONUS.

• Most SO within a geographic combatantcommander’s AOR are conducted by thedesignated theater SO command or a jointSO task force formed temporarily toconduct SO in a specific operational areaor to accomplish a special operation orprosecute SO in support of a theatercampaign or other operations.

For further guidance on USSOCOMcapabilities and coordinating supportfrom USSOCOM, refer to JP 3-05,Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, JP3-53, Doctrine for Joint PsychologicalOperations, and JP 3-57, Doctrine forJoint Civil-Military Operations.

d. United States Strategic Command(USSTRATCOM).

• USSTRATCOM provides the planning,targeting, and wartime employment ofall US Air Force and US Navy strategicnuclear forces and/or capabilities.

• USSTRATCOM’s mission is to posturestrategic forces in a manner to deter amilitary attack on the United States, USforces, and its allies. Should deterrencefail, strategic forces will be employedwhen directed by the NCA and authorizedby the President.

• USSTRATCOM conducts worldwideairborne reconnaissance in support ofstrategic force employment, ensureseffective C4I for strategic forceemployment, and provides support toother combatant commanders.

• Upon request, USSTRATCOM providesgeographic combatant commanders witha team of advisors skilled in nuclearplanning and coordination. This theaterplanning response cell advises andassists the geographic combatantcommander in crisis action planning andacts as a liaison between the geographiccombatant commander andUSSTRATCOM.

For further guidance on USSTRATCOMcapabilities and coordinating supportfrom USSTRATCOM, refer to JP 3-33,Joint Force Capabilities.

CHAPTER IVJOINT OPERATIONS IN WAR

IV-1

1. Considerations BeforeCombat

Considerations before combat are shownin Figure IV-1.

a. General. Actions JFCs are able to takebefore the initiation of hostilities can assist indetermining the shape and character of futureoperations. Most inclusive is preparing theoperational area, which involves intelligenceand counterintelligence operations tounderstand clearly the capabilities, intentions,and possible actions of potential opponents,as well as the geography, weather,

“Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”

Clausewitz: On War, 1812

demographics, and culture(s) of theoperational area. Additionally, theinfrastructure required to deploy and supportcombat operations must be identified andemplaced as appropriate. In many cases, theseactions enhance bonds between futurecoalition partners, increase understanding ofthe region, help ensure access when required,and strengthen future multinational militaryoperations.

b. Preparing the Operational Area

• Intelligence

•• At the advent of a crisis or otherindication of potential military action,JFCs examine available intelligenceestimates. As part of the JIPB process,JFCs, through early involvement oftheir Intelligence Directorates (J-2s) inthe planning process, focus intelligenceefforts to determine enemy COGs andrefine estimates of enemy capabilities,dispositions, intentions, and probableCOAs within the context of the currentsituation. They look for specificindications and warning of imminentenemy activity that may require animmediate response or an acceleration offriendly decision cycles.

•• JFCs use a broad range ofsupporting capabilities to develop acurrent intelligence picture. Thesesupporting capabilities include nationalintelligence and combat supportagencies (for example, National SecurityAgency, Central Intelligence Agency,Defense Intelligence Agency, andNational Imagery and Mapping Agency),Figure IV-1. Considerations Before Combat

CONSIDERATIONSBEFORE COMBAT

Joint Force Commander'sactions include...

Preparation of the Theater

Isolation of the Enemy

Movement to AttainOperational Reach

Special Operations

Protection of Forcesand their Freedom ofAction

Control of Space

Constant Assessmentof Physical Environment

IV-2

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which are coordinated in support of theJFC by the National Military JointIntelligence Center. J-2s shouldintegrate these supporting capabilitieswith the efforts of the joint intelligencecenter. Liaison personnel from thevarious agencies provide access to theentire range of capabilities resident intheir agencies and can focus thosecapabilities on the JFC’s intelligencerequirements.

For additional guidance on intelligencesupport to joint operations, refer to theJP 2-0 series.

• Organizing and Training Forces.Preparing the operational area alsoincludes organizing and, wherepossible, training forces to conductoperations throughout the operationalarea. When it is not possible to trainforces in the theater of employment, aswith CONUS-based forces with multipletaskings, maximum use should be madeof regularly scheduled and ad hocexercise opportunities. JTFs andcomponents that are likely to beemployed in theater operations should beexercised regularly during peacetime.Staffs should be identified and trained forplanning and controlling joint operations.JFCs and the composition of theirstaffs should reflect the composition ofthe joint force to ensure that thoseresponsible for employing joint forceshave thorough knowledge of theircapabilities and limitations. Thetraining focus for all forces and the basisfor exercise objectives should be thecombatant commander’s joint missionessential task list.

• Maintaining Operational Area Access.JFCs establish and maintain access tooperational areas in which they arelikely to operate, ensuring forward

presence, basing, freedom ofnavigation, and cooperation withallied and/or coalition nations. In part,this effort is national or multinational,involving maintenance of intertheater(between theaters) air and sea LOCs.Supporting combatant commanders cangreatly enhance this effort. Either at theoutset or as operations progress, JFCsestablish and secure intratheater (withinthe theater) LOCs through the applicationof appropriate joint force.

• Logistic Support and Sustainment.Thorough logistic planning fordeployment , d is t r ibut ion, andsustainment during operations isparticularly critical. If possible, planningshould include active participation by alldeploying and in-theater US andmultinational forces.

c. Isolating the Enemy

• With NCA guidance and approval andwith national support, JFCs strive toisolate enemies by denying them alliesand sanctuary. The intent is to stripaway as much enemy support or freedomof action as possible, while limiting theenemy’s potential for horizontal orvertical escalation. JFCs also may betasked to support diplomatic, economic,and informational actions as directed bythe NCA.

• The JFC seeks to isolate the main enemyforce from its strategic leadership and itssupporting infrastructure. This isolationis accomplished by PSYOP and byinterdicting sources of sustainingresources and transportation networks.This step serves to deny the enemyboth physical and psychologicalsupport and may separate the enemyleadership and military from their publicsupport.

IV-3

Joint Operations in War

d. Movement to Attain Operational Reach

• Forces, sometimes limited to those thatare forward-deployed, can be positionedwithin operational reach of enemyCOGs or decisive points to achievedecisive force at the appropriate location.At other times, CONUS-basedmobilization and strategic deploymentsystems can be called up to begin themovement of reinforcing forces fromCONUS or other theaters to redress anyunfavorable balance of forces and toachieve decisive force at the appropriatelocation.

• JFCs carefully consider the movementof forces in such situations. At times,movement of forces can contribute to theescalation of tension, while at othertimes its deterrent effect can reducethose tensions. Movement of forcesmight even be sufficient to stop adversaryaggression or movement.

e. Special Operations. Duringprehostilities, SOF can provide powerfuloperational leverage. Among their potentialcontributions, SOF can be employed to gathercritical information, undermine a potentialopponent’s will or capacity to wage war,or enhance the capabilities of multinationalforces. SOF can gain access and influencein nations where the presence of conventionalUS forces is unacceptable or inappropriate.They also can improve or relieve theunderlying conditions that are provokinga crisis in an effort to preclude open hostilitiesfrom occurring. These advantages should beweighed against the risk of SOF exposure orcapture.

f. Protection. JFCs must protect theirforces and their freedom of action. Thisprotection dictates that JFCs be aware of andparticipate as appropriate in regional politicaland diplomatic activities. JFCs, in concert

with US ambassadors, may spend as muchtime on regional political and diplomaticefforts as on direct preparation of their forcesfor combat. Chapter III, “Planning JointOperations,” provides expanded guidance onforce protection.

g. Space. JFCs continue to exploit theadvantages that space operations provide.Space forces are maneuvered or activated asnecessary to contribute to a JFC’s accurateand timely appraisal of the current situation,as well as the ability to respond rapidly toevents and directives from the combatantcommander or from higher authority.

h. Physical Environment. Seasonaleffects on terrain, weather, and sea conditionscan significantly affect operations andlogistic support of the joint force and shouldbe carefully assessed before and duringoperations. Mobility of the force, integrationand synchronization of operations, and abilityto employ precision munitions can be affectedby degraded conditions. Climatological andhydrographic studies and long-range forecastshelp JFCs understand the most advantageoustime and location for operations.

2. Considerations at the Outsetof Combat

As combat operations commence, JFCsneed to exploit full dimensional leverageto shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponentsimmediately. JFCs seek decisive advantagethrough the use of all available elements ofcombat power to seize and maintain theinitiative, deny the enemy the opportunity toachieve its objectives, and generate in theenemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat(see Figure IV-2).

a. Force Projection

• The NCA may direct combatantcommanders to resolve a crisis quickly,

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employing immediately availableforward-presence forces and appropriateflexible deterrent options in order topreclude escalation of the crisis. Whenthis response is not enough, theprojection of forces from CONUS oranother theater may be necessary. Whenopposed, force projection can beaccomplished rapidly by forcible entrycoordinated with strategic air mobility,sealift, and forward-deployed forces. Forexample, the ability to generate highintensity combat power through long-range air operations or from the sea canprovide for effective force projection inthe absence of timely or unencumberedaccess.

• Force projection usually begins as arapid response to a crisis by forward-deployed or forward-based forces,where available. Alert may come withlittle or no notice, bringing with ittremendous stress on personnel andsystems, accompanied by requests from

the media for information. In any event,rapid, yet measured, response is critical.

• Joint forces participate in forceprojection in both war and MOOTW.Force projection may be eitherunopposed or opposed by anadversary. JFCs sequence, enable, andprotect the arrival of forces to achieveearly decisive advantage. An example ofenabling and protecting the arrival offorces when access is initially unavailableis the seizure and defense of lodgmentareas by naval forces, which would thenserve as initial entry points for thecontinuous and uninterrupted flow ofadditional forces and materiel into thetheater. To accomplish this decisiveadvantage, forcible entry operations maybe required at the onset. When opposed,force projection can be accomplishedrapidly by forcible entry coordinated withstrategic air mobility, sealift, and pre-positioned forces. Both types ofoperations demand a versatile mix offorces that are organized, trained,equipped, and poised to respond quickly.

•• Opposed operations require a viableforcible entry capability with forcesprepared to fight immediately upon entry.When the adversary can limit the entryof friendly forces, initial operations maybe designed to suppress these enemy anti-access capabilities. Forcible entry isdiscussed in more detail later in thischapter.

•• Unopposed operations may afford anopportunity, following arrival in theoperational area, to continue to buildcombat power, train, rehearse, acclimate,and otherwise establish the conditions forsuccessful operations. In unopposedentry, JFCs arrange the flow of forces thatbest facilitates the buildup of forcesnecessary for the envisioned operations.

Figure IV-2. Considerations at theOutset of Combat

CONSIDERATIONSAT THE OUTSET OF

COMBAT

Conducting ForceProjection

Seeking DimensionalSuperiority

Attacking EnemyCenters of Gravity

Conducting SpecialOperations

Ensuring ForceProtection

IV-5


Logistic capability may be a higherpriority than combat capability, whichcould be initially limited to that neededfor protection.

• During early entry operations, US forcesand ports of debarkation often will befriendly COGs that must be protected.Therefore, early entry forces shoulddeploy with sufficient organic andsupporting capabilities to preserve theirfreedom of action and protect personneland equipment from potential or likelythreats.

• JFCs introduce forces in a manner thatenables rapid force buildup into thestructure required for anticipatedoperations and simultaneous protectionof the force. From a C2 perspective,echelon is essential. Early entry forcesshould include the C2 capability to assessthe situation, make decisions, andconduct initial operations.

• Operations with allies and coalitionmembers often require a robust liaisonand communications capability.Linguists must be capable of

communicating warfighting conceptsbetween military forces of diversecultures. Also, additional sufficientcommunications equipment may berequired for non-US forces to enableinteroperable communications.

b. Dimensional Superiority

• Dimensional superiority is thecumulative effect of dominance in the air,land, sea, space, electromagnetic, andinformation domains that permits theconduct of joint operations withouteffective opposition or prohibitiveinterference. JFCs seek superiority inthese domains to shape the battlespaceand to accomplish the mission as rapidlyas possible. The JFC may have to initiallyfocus all available joint forces on seizingthe initiative. A delay at the outset ofcombat may lead to lost coalition support,lost credibility, and incentives for otheradversaries to begin conflicts elsewhere.This initial focus will be much moreeffective with full dimensionalsuperiority, but may very well have to beexecuted before that is achieved.

Battle groups and task forces deployed worldwide provide combat power fromthe sea able to respond rapidly to crisis situations.

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• JFCs normally strive to achieve air andsea superiority early. Air superiorityallows joint forces to conduct operationswithout prohibitive interference fromenemy air or missile attacks. Seasuperiority facilitates rapid deploymentof joint force personnel, equipment, andsupplies. History has shown that theestablishment of air and sea superioritycan be pivotal factors to mission success.For example, air superiority (OperationPOINT BLANK) and control of theEnglish Channel were consideredprerequisites to the success of the WorldWar II Allied landings at Normandy.

• Land forces can move quickly into an areato deter the enemy from inserting forces,thereby precluding the enemy from gainingan operational advantage. Through theconduct of sustained operations, land forcescan control people and land, contribute todefeat of an adversary, and establishpostconflict stability.

• Early superiority in the space,electromagnetic, and informationdomains also is vital in joint operations.Space superiority must be achieved earlyto ensure freedom of action. Spacesuperiority allows the JFC access tocommunications, weather, andintelligence assets while denying theenemy use of space-based resources.G a i n i n g s u p e r i o r i t y i n t h eelectromagnetic and informationdomains degrades the enemy’s C2 whileallowing the JFC to maximize friendlyC2 capabilities. Superiority in the space,electromagnetic, and informationdomains also allows the JFC to betterunderstand the enemy’s intentions,capabilities, and actions and influenceforeign attitudes and perceptions of theoperation.

• Dimensional superiority is essential tojoint force mission success. Air, land,

sea, space, electromagnetic, andinformation superiority are criticalaspects in the conduct of decisiveoperations. For example, the achievementof air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic,and information superiority in OperationsDESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORMset the stage for the successful liberationof Kuwait.

c. Attack of Enemy Centers of Gravity

• Also as part of achieving decisiveadvantages early, joint force operationsmay be directed immediately againstCOGs. These operations may beconducted concurrently with otheroperations in other phases of thecampaign or major operation. Wherepossible, specific operations may beconducted to attack COGs by land, sea,air, space, or SO capabilities. Allcomponents possess capabilities to attackCOGs.

• There are several purposes to theseattacks. They may in themselves bedecisive. If they are not, they beginthe offensive operation throughout theenemy’s depth that can cause paralysisand destroy cohesion.

d. Special Operations. SO enhance thepower and scope of full dimensionaloperations and tend to be asymmetrical intheir application. Innovative SO can directlyand indirectly attack enemy COGs that maybe difficult to reach by conventional action.SOF frequently require support from otherforces, but can support other forces inoperations such as intelligence gathering,target acquisition and designation, andinterdiction. SOF capabilities are diverse, butthey need to be employed judiciously so asnot to negate their effectiveness. SOF are acomplement to, not a substitute for,conventional forces.

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e. Other Factors. JFCs strive to conservethe fighting potential of the joint force.

• Protection from the Enemy’s Fires andManeuver. JFCs counter the enemy’sfires and maneuver by making personnel,systems, and units difficult to locate,strike, and destroy. They protect theirforce from enemy maneuver and fires,including the effects of WMD. Air,space, and maritime superiorityoperations; defensive IO; and protectionof airports and seaports, LOCs, andfriendly force lodgment all contribute toforce protection. OPSEC and militarydeception are key elements of protection.

• Health, Welfare, Morale, andMaintenance. JFCs keep personnelhealthy and maintain their fightingspirit. This protection includes guardingequipment and supplies from loss ordamage. JFCs ensure that systems are inplace for adequate medical care, quickreturn of minor casualties to duty, andpreventive medicine.

JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health ServiceSupport in Joint Operations, discusseshealth support for joint operations.

• Safety. JFCs make safety an integralpart of all joint training andoperations. Sustained, high-tempooperations put personnel at risk.Command interest, discipline, andtraining lessen those risks. Safety intraining, planning, and operations iscrucial to successful combat operationsand the preservation of combat power.

• Prevention of Fratricide. JFCs makeevery effort to reduce the potential forfratricide — the unintentional killing orwounding of friendly personnel byfriendly fire. The destructive powerand range of modern weapons, coupledwith the high intensity and rapid tempo

of modern combat, increase thepotential for fratricide. Commandersmust be aware of those situations thatincrease the risk of fratricide and instituteappropriate preventative measures.The primary mechanisms for reducingfratricide are command emphasis,disciplined operations, closecoordination among componentcommands, rehearsals, and enhancedsituational awareness. Commandersshould seek to minimize fratricide whilenot limiting boldness and initiative incombat.

3. Considerations for SustainedCombat Operations

JFCs seek to extend operations throughoutthe breadth and depth of the operational area.JFCs conduct sustained operations when a“coup de main” is not possible. Duringsustained operations, JFCs simultaneouslyemploy air, land, sea, space, and specialoperations forces. During a major operation,joint forces provide the JFC options toeffectively apply military power. The JFCmay designate one component or majorcategory of operations to be the main effort,with others providing assets in support, or theJFC may have a main effort with othercomponents and functions performingoperations in their own mission areas. Whenconditions change, the main effort and focusof the operation might shift to anothercomponent or function. Some functions, likejoint strategic attack, interdiction, and PSYOP,continue throughout to deny the enemysanctuary, freedom of action or informationaladvantage. These functions, when executedconcurrently with other main operations,degrade enemy morale and physical cohesionand bring the enemy closer to culmination.When prevented from concentrating,opponents can be attacked, isolated at tacticaland operational levels, and defeated in detail.At other times, JFCs may cause theiropponents to concentrate their forces,

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facilitating their attack by friendly forces (seeFigure IV-3).

a. The Relationship Between Offenseand Defense

• Although defense may be the strongerform of war, it is the offense that isnormally decisive. In striving to achievestrategic objectives most quickly and atleast cost, JFCs normally will seek theearliest opportunity to conductdecisive offensive operations.

• Joint operations normally will includeelements of both offense and defense.JFCs strive to apply the many dimensionsof combat power simultaneously acrossthe depth, breadth, and height of theoperational area. To conduct suchoperations, JFCs normally achieveconcentration in some areas or in specificfunctions and require economy of forcein others. During initial entry operations,entry forces may be required to defendwhile force buildup occurs. Even insustained offensive operations, selectedelements of the joint force may need topause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute,while other forces continue the attack.Further, force protection includes certaindefensive measures throughout thecampaign. Forces at all levels within thejoint force must possess the agility torapidly transition between offense anddefense and vice versa.

• The relationship between offense anddefense, then, is an enabling one.Defensive operations, where required,enable JFCs to conduct or prepare fordecisive offensive operations.

b. Linear and Nonlinear Operations

• As technology and doctrines haveexpanded the lethality, tempo, and depthof operations, the potential forconventional forces to conduct nonlinearoperations has increased. Linearity refersprimarily to the conduct of operationsalong lines of operations with identifiedforward lines of own troops. In linearoperations, emphasis is placed onmaintaining the position of the land forcein relation to other friendly forces. Fromthis relative positioning of forces,security is enhanced and massing offorces can be facilitated. Also inherentin linear operations is the security of rearareas, especially LOCs between

Figure IV-3. Considerations forSustained Combat Operations

CONSIDERATIONS FORSUSTAINED COMBAT

OPERATIONS

Relationship Between OffenseAnd Defense

Linear and NonlinearOperations

Air, Naval, Space, andInformation Superiority

Attack of Enemy Centers ofGravity

Maneuver

Interdiction

Synchronizing and/orIntegrating Maneuver andInterdiction

Joint Fires

Sustainment

Combat Assessment

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sustaining bases and fighting forces.World Wars I and II offer multipleexamples of linear operations.

• Nonlinear operations emphasizesimultaneous operations alongmultiple lines of operations fromselected bases (ashore or afloat).Operation JUST CAUSE is an excellentexample of a nonlinear operation. In suchan operation, joint forces orient moreon their assigned objectives (forexample, destroying an enemy force orseizing and controlling critical terrain orpopulation centers) and less on theirgeographic relationship to otherfriendly forces. To protect themselves,individual forces conducting nonlinearoperations rely more on situationalawareness, mobility advantages, andfreedom of action than on mass.Nonlinear operations place a premium onC4I, mobility, and innovative means forsustainment.

c. Air, Naval, Space, and InformationSuperiority. Air, naval, space, andinformation superiority allow JFCs additionalopportunities to conduct sustained combatoperations with more operational and logisticsflexibility. In addition, air, naval, space, andinformation superiority may contributesignificantly to both adequate logistic buildupand overall force protection in the AOR and/or JOA.

d. Attack of Enemy Centers of Gravity.As described earlier in this chapter, JFCs seekto attack enemy COGs, employing theappropriate forces and capabilities of the jointforce. Such operations typically continuethroughout the overall joint operation. JFCstime their effects to coincide with effects ofother operations of the joint force and viceversa. As with all operations of the joint force,attacks of enemy COGs should be designedto support the JFCs’ objectives and concept

of operations, while limiting their potentialnegative effects on posthostilities efforts.

e. Maneuver

• The principal purpose of maneuver isto place the adversary in a position ofdisadvantage through the flexibleapplication of combat power. The focusof air, land, and naval maneuver is torender opponents incapable of resistingby shattering their morale and physicalcohesion (their ability to fight as aneffective, coordinated whole) rather thanto destroy them physically throughattrition. This condition may be achievedby attacking enemy forces andcontrol l ing terr i tory, a i rspace,populations, key waters, and LOCs (inall dimensions). Air, land, and navalmaneuvers are required to controlpopulation, territory, key waters, andairspace.

• There are multiple ways to attainpositional advantage. A navalexpeditionary force with airpower, cruisemissile firepower, and amphibiousassault capability, within operationalreach of an enemy’s COG, has positionaladvantage. In like manner, land and airexpeditionary forces that are withinoperational reach of an enemy’s COG andthat have the means and opportunity tostrike and maneuver on such a COG alsohave positional advantage. Maintainingdimensional superiority contributes topositional advantage by facilitatingfreedom of action.

• Maneuver of forces relative to enemyCOGs can be key to the JFC’scampaign or major operation.Maneuver is the means of concentratingforces at decisive points to achievesurprise, psychological shock, andphysical momentum. Maneuver also

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may exploit the effects of massed and/orprecision firepower.

• JFCs consider the contribution of SOin attaining positional advantage.Through special reconnaissance, directaction, or support of insurgent forces,SOF may expose vulnerabilities andattack the enemy at tactical, operational,and strategic levels.

• At all levels of war, successfulmaneuver requires not only fire andmovement but also agility andversatility of thought, plans, operations,and organizations. It requires designatingand then, if necessary, shifting the maineffort and applying the principles of massand economy of force.

•• At the strategic level, deploying units toand positioning units within an operationalarea are forms of maneuver if such movementseeks to gain positional advantage.Strategic maneuver should place forces inposition to begin the phases or majoroperations of a campaign.

•• At the operational level, maneuveris a means by which JFCs set the termsof battle by time and location, declinebattle, or exploit existing situations.Operational maneuver usually takes largeforces from a base of operations to anarea where they are in position to achieveoperational objectives. As shown by theCommander in Chief, US CentralCommand’s concept of operations inOperation DESERT STORM, the abilityto maneuver must be a trait not only ofcombat forces but also of the logisticresources that support them. Theobjective for operational maneuver isusually a COG or decisive point.

•• Once forces are deployed into theoperational area, maneuver typically isconsidered tactical in nature.

• The concept for air, land, and navalmaneuver needs to be articulated in theJFC’s concept of operations and shouldinclude timing, sequencing, and methodand location of entry into the operationalarea. Types of joint force maneuversinclude forcible entry, sustained actionat sea and from the sea, sustainedaction on land, and sustained airoperations. JFCs and their staffs shouldbe familiar with Service doctrine on air,land, and naval maneuver.

• Forcible Entry

•• Forcible entry is seizing and holdinga military lodgment in the face of armedopposition. In some situations, forcibleentry may be the only method for gainingaccess into the operational area or forintroducing decisive forces into theregion. Forcible entry capabilities giveJFCs unique opportunities for altering thenature of the situation, such as theopportunity for gaining the initiative atthe outset of combat operations. Forcibleentry operations can strike directly atenemy COGs and can open newavenues for military operations.Forcible entry operations can escalatethe operation horizontally, exceedingthe enemy’s capability to respond.

•• Forcible entry operations are normallyjoint operations and may include airborne,amphibious, and air assault operations, orany combination thereof.

•• Forcible entry is normally complexand risky. These operations requireextensive intelligence and detailedcoordination. Forces are tailored for themission and echeloned to permits imul taneous deployment andemployment. Forcible entry forces needto be prepared to fight immediately uponarrival and require robust C4I capabilitiesto move with forward elements.

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•• OPSEC and deception are critical tosuccessful forcible entry. Forcible entryrelies on speed and surprise and is almostalways employed in coordination withSO. Forcible entry usually requiressupport from naval surface fire supportand/or aviation assets. Follow-on forcesneed to be prepared to expand theoperation, sustain the effort, andaccomplish the mission.

•• SOF may precede forcible entry forcesto identify, clarify, and modify conditionsin the area of the lodgment. SOF mayconduct the assaults to seize small, initial

lodgments such as airfields or ports. Theymay provide fire support and conductother operations in support of the forcibleentry. They may conduct specialreconnaissance and interdictionoperations well beyond the lodgment.

•• The sustainment requirements andchallenges for forcible entryoperations can be formidable, but mustnot be allowed to become such anoverriding concern that the forcible entryoperation itself is jeopardized. JFCscarefully balance the introduction oflogistic forces needed to support initial

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander in Chief, USSouthern Command, Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama, conducted multiple,simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. Byparachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen MilitaryAirfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF)base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and tolaunch immediate assaults against the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerousother operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. Theparachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times fromcontinental United States bases, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slowerC-130 transport planes. One large formation experienced delays from a suddenice storm at the departure airfield — its operations and timing were revised inthe air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligencethat indicated a possible compromise. Special operations forces (SOF)reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information onwidely dispersed targets.

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and airelements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets — most of themin the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that joint forcecommanders organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, theJTF commander employed land and SOF to attack strategic targets and stealthaircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attackagainst enemy command and control facilities and key units, seized theinitiative and paralyzed enemy decision making. Most fighting was concludedwithin 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main.

VARIOUS SOURCES

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combat with combat forces required toestablish, maintain, and protect thelodgment.

•• Forcible entry has been conductedthroughout the history of the ArmedForces of the United States. Forcible

BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA2-4 March 1943

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea is an outstanding example of the application offirepower at the operational level — in this case, air interdiction.

During the first part of 1943, the Japanese high command attempted to establisha line of defense in the Southwest Pacific, to run from Northeast New Guinea,through New Britain to the northern Solomon Islands. After a defeat at Wau,New Guinea (the intended right flank of this line), the Japanese command atRabaul decided to reinforce its garrison at Lae, in the Huon Gulf of New Guinea.Relying on inclement weather to cover its move, a convoy of 8 destroyers and8 transports carrying over 8,700 personnel and extensive cargo departedRabaul at midnight of 28 February.

General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) intelligence had identifiedthe likelihood of this reinforcement. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney’sAllied Air Forces, SWPA, had stepped up long-range reconnaissance, forwardpositioning of air forces, and training in low-level strikes against shipping.

Late on 1 March the convoy was spotted moving westward off the northerncoast of New Britain. Early on 2 March Lieutenant General Kenney’s air forcesattacked as the convoy was moving into the Dampier Strait. Multiple formationsof B-17s attacked throughout the day, sinking two transports and damagingseveral others. By the morning of 3 March the convoy was nearing the HuonPeninsula on New Guinea. It was now within range of all of Kenney’sPapuan-based aircraft. Clearing midmorning skies exposed the convoy. In asynchronized attack, 13 B-17 heavy bombers, 31 B-25 medium bombers, 12A-20 light bombers, 28 P-38 fighters, and 13 Australian Beaufighters unleashedtheir firepower on the vulnerable Japanese ships. The attack continuedthroughout the day as more planes roared off the Moresby and Milne runwaysto join the fight. Before nightfall, over 330 allied aircraft had participated and,except for 4 destroyers that had fled to the north, all ships were sunk, sinking,or badly damaged. During the night and the next day, bombers and PT boatsfinished the job.

MacArthur was jubilant. His press release stated, in part, “Our decisive successcannot fail to have the most important results on the enemy’s strategic andtactical plans. His campaign, for the time being at least, is completelydislocated.” Looking back on SWPA operations, MacArthur, in 1945, stillregarded the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as “the decisive aerial engagement”of the war in his theater. The Japanese high command was shocked andaborted its second projected offensive against Wau, New Guinea. By relyingon Kenney’s aggressive airmen, MacArthur demonstrated the major impact ofinterdiction on a theater campaign.

VARIOUS SOURCES

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entry is usually a complex operation andshould therefore be kept as simple aspossible in concept. Schemes ofmaneuver and coordination betweenforces need to be clearly understoodby all participants. When airborne,amphibious, and air assault operationsare combined, unity of effort is vital.Rehearsals are a critical part ofpreparation for forcible entry.

For additional and detailed guidance onforcible entry operations, refer to JP3-02, Joint Doctrine for AmphibiousOperations, JP 3-18, Joint Doctrine forForcible Entry Operations, andapplicable Service publications.

f. Joint Strategic Attack. The combatantcommander should consider conducting jointstrategic attacks when feasible. A jointstrategic attack is a combatant commanderdirected offensive action against a vitaltarget(s), whether military, political,economic, or other, that is specifically selectedin order to achieve NCA or combatantcommander’s strategic objectives. Theseattacks seek to weaken the adversary’s abilityor will to engage in conflict or continue anaction and as such, could be part of acampaign, major operation, or conductedindependently as directed the NCA.Additionally, these attacks may directly orindirectly achieve strategic objectives withoutnecessarily having to achieve operationalobjectives as a precondition. These targetsmay include but are not limited to enemystrategic COGs. All components of a jointforce may have capabilities to conduct jointstrategic attacks. The combatantcommander’s staff and component staffspropose targets and plans for conducting jointstrategic attacks for the combatantcommander’s approval.

g. Interdiction

• Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs.Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, ordestroys the enemy’s surface militarypotential before it can be used effectivelyagainst friendly forces. The JFACC isthe supported commander for the JFC’soverall air interdiction effort, while landand naval component commanders aresupported commanders for interdictionin their AOs.

• Interdiction-capable commandersrequire access to C2 systems able totake advantage of real-time and near-real-time intelligence. Such intelligence isparticularly useful in dealing with targetsof near or immediate effect on surfaceforces or whose location was notpreviously known with sufficientaccuracy.

• Interdiction operations can beconducted by many elements of thejoint force and can have tactical,operational, and strategic effects. Air,land, sea, and special operations forcescan conduct interdiction operations aspart of their larger or overall mission. Forexample, naval expeditionary forcescharged with seizing and securing alodgment along a coast may include theinterdiction of opposing land and navalforces and the conduct of counterairoperations as part of the overallamphibious plan.

For more guidance on joint interdictionoperations, refer to JP 3-03, Doctrine forJoint Interdiction Operations.

h. Synchronizing and/or IntegratingManeuver and Interdiction

• Synchronizing and/or integratinginterdiction and maneuver (air, land,and sea) provides one of the most

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dynamic concepts available to the jointforce. Interdiction and maneuver shouldnot be considered separate operationsagainst a common enemy, but rathercomplementary operations designed toachieve the JFC’s campaign objectives.Moreover, maneuver by air, land, or navalforces can be conducted to interdictenemy surface potential. Potentialresponses to integrated and synchronizedmaneuver and interdiction can create anagonizing dilemma for the enemy. If theenemy attempts to counter the maneuver,enemy forces can be exposed tounacceptable losses from interdiction. Ifthe enemy employs measures to reducesuch interdiction losses, enemy forcesmay not be able to counter the maneuver.The synergy achieved by integratingand synchronizing interdiction andmaneuver assists commanders inoptimizing leverage at the operationallevel.

• As a guiding principle, JFCs shouldexploit the flexibility inherent in jointforce command relationships, jointtargeting procedures, and othertechniques to resolve the issues thatcan arise from the relationshipbetween interdiction and maneuver.When interdiction and maneuver areemployed, JFCs need to carefullybalance doctrinal imperatives thatmay be in tension, including the needsof interdiction and maneuver forces andthe undesirability of fragmenting theaterand/or JOA air assets. The JFC’sobjectives, intent, and priorities, reflectedin mission assignments and coordinatingarrangements, enable subordinates toexploit fully the military potential of theirforces while minimizing the frictiongenerated by competing requirements.Effective targeting procedures in thejoint force also alleviate such friction. Asan example, interdiction requirementswill often exceed interdiction means,

requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements.Land and naval force commandersresponsible for integrating andsynchronizing maneuver andinterdiction within their AOs should beknowledgeable of JFC priorities and theresponsibilities and authority assignedand delegated to commandersdesignated by the JFC to execute theater-and/or JOA-wide functions. Componentcommanders aggressively seek the bestmeans to accomplish assigned missions.JFCs alleviate this friction through clearstatements of intent for theater and/orJOA-level interdiction (that is,interdiction effort conducted relativelyindependent of surface maneuveroperations). In doing this, JFCs rely ontheir vision as to how the major elementsof the joint force contribute toaccomplishing strategic objectives. Thecampaign concept articulates that vision.JFCs then employ a flexible range oftechniques to assist in identifyingrequirements and applying resources tomeet them. JFCs define appropriatecommand relationships, establisheffective joint targeting procedures, andmake apportionment decisions.

• Interdiction is not limited to anyparticular region of the joint battle, butgenerally is conducted forward of orat a distance from friendly surfaceforces. Interdiction may be plannedto create advantages at any level fromtactical to strategic with correspondingimpacts on the enemy and the speed withwhich interdiction affects front-lineenemy forces. Interdiction deep in theenemy’s rear area can have broad theaterstrategic or operational effects; however,deep interdiction normally has a delayedeffect on land and naval combat, whichwill be a direct concern to the JFC.Interdiction closer to land and navalcombat will be of more immediateoperational and tactical concern to

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surface maneuver forces. Thus, JFCsvary the emphasis upon interdictionoperations and surface maneuvers,depending on the strategic andoperational situation confronting them.

• JFCs may choose to employ interdictionas a principal means to achieve theintended objective (with othercomponents supporting the componentleading the interdiction effort).

• JFCs must synchronize and integratemaneuver and interdiction. For thejoint force campaign level, JFCssynchronize and integrate maneuver andinterdiction to present the enemy with thedilemma previously discussed. Indeed,JFCs may employ a scheme of maneuverthat enhances interdiction operations orvice versa. For instance, actual orthreatened maneuver can force an enemyto respond by attempting rapid maneuveror resupply. These reactions can provideexcellent and vulnerable targets forinterdiction.

• All commanders should consider howtheir capabilities and operations cancomplement interdiction in achievingcampaign objectives and vice versa.These operations may include actionssuch as military deception operations,withdrawals, lateral repositioning, andflanking movements that are likely tocause the enemy to reposition surfaceforces, making them better targets forinterdiction.

• Likewise, interdiction operations need toconform to and enhance the JFC’sscheme of maneuver during thecampaign. JFCs need to properlysynchronize and integrate maneuver andinterdiction operations to place theenemy in the operational dilemma ofeither defending from disadvantageouspositions or exposing forces to

interdiction strikes during attemptedrepositioning.

• JFCs are responsible for the conduct oftheater and/or JOA operations. Tofacilitate these operations, JFCs mayestablish boundaries within the theaterand/or JOA for the conduct ofoperations. Within the theater and/orJOA, all missions must contribute to theaccomplishment of the overall objective.Synchronization and integration ofefforts within land or naval AOs is ofparticular importance, particularly whenJFCs designate commanders to executetheater- and/or JOA-wide functions.

•• Air, land, and naval commandersare directly concerned with thoseenemy forces and capabilities that canaffect their current and futureoperations. Accordingly, that part ofinterdiction with a near-term effect on air,land, and naval maneuver normallysupports that maneuver to enable the air,land, or naval commander to achieve theJFC’s objectives. In fact, successfuloperations may depend on successfulinterdiction operations; for instance, toisolate the battle or weaken the enemyforce before battle is fully joined.

•• JFCs may establish land and navalforce AOs to prevent interferencebetween component operations. Thesize, shape, and positioning of land ornaval force AOs will be based on theirconcept of operations and the land ornaval force commanders’ requirementsto accomplish their missions, and protecttheir forces. This facilitates rapidmaneuver and ability to fight at extendedranges. Within these AOs, land andnaval operational force commandersare designated the supportedcommander and are responsible for theintegration and synchronization ofmaneuver, fires, and interdiction. To

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facilitate this, such commandersdesignate the target priority, effects, andtiming of interdiction operations withintheir AOs.

•• The supported commander shouldarticulate clearly the vision ofmaneuver operations to thosecommanders that apply interdictionforces within the supported commander’sboundaries to attack the designatedinterdiction targets or objectives. Thesupported commanders should clearlystate how they envision interdictionenabling or enhancing their maneuveroperations and what they want toaccomplish with interdiction (as well asthose actions they want to avoid, such asthe destruction of key transportationnodes or the use of certain munitions ina specific area). However, supportedcommanders should provide supportingcommanders as much latitude as possiblein the planning and execution of theiroperations.

•• Once they understand what thesupported commanders want toaccomplish and what they want to avoid,interdiction-capable commandersnormally can plan and execute theiroperations with only that coordinationrequired with supported commanders.

•• Joint force operations in maritimeand/or littoral areas often require ahigher degree of coordination amongcommanders because of the highlyspecialized nature of some navaloperations, such as submarine and minewarfare. This type of coordinationrequires that the interdiction-capablecommander maintain communicationwith the naval commander. As in alloperations, lack of close coordinationamong commanders in naval operatingareas can result in fratricide and failedmissions, especially in those areas

adjacent to naval forces. The sameprinciple applies concerning joint forceair component mining operations in areaswhere land or naval forces maymaneuver.

• Interdiction target priorities within theland or naval force boundaries areconsidered along with theater and/orJOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCsand reflected in the apportionmentdecision. The JFACC will use thesepriorities to plan and execute the theater-and/or JOA-wide air interdiction effort.

•• JFCs need to pay particularattention to, and give priority to,activities impinging on and supportingthe maneuver of all forces. In additionto normal target nomination procedures,JFCs establish procedures through whichland or naval force commanders canspecifically identify those interdictiontargets they are unable to strike withorganic assets within their boundariesthat could affect planned or ongoingmaneuver. These targets may beidentified, individually or by category,specified geographically, and/or tied to adesired effect and/or time periods. Thepurpose of these procedures is to affordadded visibility to, and allow JFCs to givepriority to, targets directly affectingplanned maneuver by air, land, or navalforces.

i. Joint Fires. Joint fires are fires producedduring the employment of forces from two ormore components in coordinated actiontoward a common objective. Joint firesupport includes joint fires that assist air,land, maritime, amphibious, and specialoperations forces to move, maneuver, andcontrol territory, populations, airspace, andkey waters. Joint fires and joint fire supportmay include, but are not limited to, the lethaleffects of close air support by fixed- androtary-wing aircraft, naval surface fire support,

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artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as wellas nonlethal effects such as EW. Integrationand synchronization of joint fires and jointfire support with the fire and maneuver of thesupported force is essential.

For additional guidance on joint fire support,refer to Chapter III, “Planning JointOperations,” and JP 3-09, Doctrine for JointFire Support.

j. Sustainment. Sustainment is theprovision of personnel, logistics, and othersupport required to maintain and prolongoperations or combat until successfulaccomplishment or revision of the mission orof the national objective. Sustainment playsa key role in both offensive and defensivecombat operations. JFCs normally seek tobegin building sustainment during the earliestphases of a campaign or operation. As withachieving air and naval superiority and landdominance, sustainment provides JFCs withflexibility to develop any required branchesand sequels and to refocus joint force effortsas required.

k. Combat Assessment

• With the increasing complexity ofmodern warfare, the traditional bombdamage assessment has evolved throughbattle damage assessment (BDA) tocombat assessment. Combat assessmentis the determination of the overalleffectiveness of force employmentduring military operations. BDA isone of the principal subordinate elementsof combat assessment.

• At the JFC level, the combat assessmenteffort should be a joint program,supported at all levels, designed todetermine if the required effects on theadversary envisioned in the campaignplan are being achieved by the jointforce components to meet the JFC’soverall concept. The intent is to analyze

with sound military judgment what isknown about the damage inflicted onthe enemy to try to determine: whatphysical and/or psychological attritionthe adversary has suffered; what effectthe efforts have had on the adversary’splans or capabilities; and what, if any,changes or additional efforts need to takeplace to meet the objectives of the currentmajor operations or phase of thecampaign. Combat assessment requiresconstant information flows from allsources and should support all sectionsof the JFC staff and components.

• Combat assessment is done at all levelsin the joint force. JFCs should establisha dynamic system to support combatassessment for all components.Normally, the joint force OperationsDirectorate (J-3) will be responsible forcoordinating combat assessment,assisted by the joint force J-2.

• JFCs apportion joint forcereconnaissance assets to support thecombat assessment intelligence effortthat exceeds the organic capabilities ofthe component forces. The componentcommanders identify their requirementsand coordinate them with the joint forceJ-3 or designated representative.

4. Joint Operations in Maritimeand/or Littoral Areas

a. Depending on the situation, JFCs mayconduct operations in the littoral area toachieve or support joint force objectives. Thelittoral area contains two parts. First is theseaward area from the open ocean to theshore, which must be controlled to supportoperations ashore. Second is the landwardarea inland from the shore that can besupported and defended directly from the sea.Control of the littoral area is often essentialto dimensional superiority. Navaloperations conducted in the littoral area can

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facilitate the entry of other elements of thejoint force through the seizure of anadversary’s port, naval base, or air base toallow entry and movement of other elementsof the joint force.

b. Controlled littoral areas often offer thebest positions from which to begin, sustain,and support joint operations, especially inoperational areas with poor infrastructure forsupporting operations ashore. Sea-basedairpower and sea-launched land combat powerare formidable tools that JFCs can use to gainand maintain initiative. Naval forces operatingin littoral areas can dominate coastal areas tomass forces rapidly and generate highintensity offensive power at times and inlocations required by JFCs. Naval forces’relative freedom of action enables JFCs toposition these capabilities where they canreadily strike opponents. Naval forces’ verypresence, if made known, can pose a threatthat the enemy cannot ignore.

c. Even when joint forces are firmlyestablished ashore, littoral operationsprovide JFCs with excellent opportunitiesto achieve leverage over the enemy byoperational maneuver from the sea. Suchoperations can introduce significant size

forces over relatively great distances in shortperiods of time into the rear or flanks of theenemy. The mobility of naval forces at sea,coupled with the ability to rapidly landoperationally significant forces, can be keyto achieving JFC objectives. Thesecapabilities are further enhanced byoperational flexibility and the ability to identifyand take advantage of fleeting opportunities.

d. JFCs can operate from aheadquarters platform at sea. Dependingon the nature of the joint operations, a navalcommander can serve as the JFC orfunction as a JFACC while the operation isprimarily maritime, and shift that commandashore if the operation shifts landward inaccordance with the JFC’s concept ofoperations. In other cases, a navalheadquarters may serve as the base of the jointforce headquarters, or an other-than-naval JFCmay use C4I facilities aboard ship. Naval airand missile defense can project that coverageinland, during both entry operations andsustained operations ashore.

e. Transferring C2 from sea to shorerequires detailed planning, active liaison,and coordination throughout the joint forceto maintain uninterrupted C2 for current

Destroyers can provide a dominating presence, which joint forcecommanders can use in the littoral area to achieve objectives.

IV-19


operations. Such a transition may involve asimple movement of flags and supportingpersonnel, or it may require a complete changeof joint force headquarters. The new jointforce headquarters may use personnel andequipment, especially communicationsequipment, from the old headquarters, or itmay require augmentation from differentsources. One technique is to transfer C2 inseveral stages. Another technique is for theJFC to satellite off the capabilities of oneof the components ashore until the newheadquarters is fully prepared. Whicheverway the transition is done, staffs shoulddevelop detailed checklists to address all ofthe C2 requirements and the timing of transferof each. The value of joint training in thistransition is evident.

5. Operations When Weaponsof Mass Destruction areEmployed

a. As WMD proliferate, the likelihoodof their use against friendly forces increasesnot only in war but also in MOOTW. Anenemy’s use of such weapons can quicklychange the nature of a campaign, perhaps evenaffecting the combatant commander’sstrategic objectives. The use or the threatof use of these weapons can causelarge-scale shifts in strategic andoperational objectives, phases, and COAs.Thus, planning for the possibility of enemyuse is important to campaign design.

b. It may not be the sheer killing power ofthese weapons that represents the greatesteffect. It is the strategic, operational,psychological, and political impacts of theiruse that can affect strategic objectives andcampaign design.

c. The effective combination ofconventional offensive and defensiveoperations can help reduce the effectivenessor success of an enemy’s use of WMD.Offensive measures include raids, strikes, and

operations designed to locate and neutralizethe threat of such weapons. JFCs implementdefensive NBC measures and plan foreffective air and theater missile defense withdifferent systems.

For additional guidance on defensive NBCmeasures, refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine forOperations in Nuclear, Biological, andChemical (NBC) Environments.

d. Multinational operations becomemore complicated with the threat ofemployment of these weapons. An enemymay use WMD against other alliance orcoalition members, especially those with littleor no defense against these weapons, todisintegrate the alliance or coalition.

e. Intelligence systems and plannersadvise JFCs of an opponent’s capability toemploy WMD and under what conditions thatopponent is most likely to do so. This adviceincludes an assessment of the enemy’swillingness and intent to employ theseweapons. It is important to ensure that friendlyforce dispositions do not provide lucrativetargets for enemy WMD.

f. When directed by the NCA, combatantcommanders plan for the employment ofnuclear weapons by US forces in a mannerconsistent with national policy and strategicguidance. The employment of such weaponssignifies an escalation of the war and is anNCA decision. The Commander in Chief,USSTRATCOM’s capabilities to assist in theplanning of all nuclear missions are availableto support nuclear weapon employment.

g. If directed to plan for the use ofnuclear weapons, JFCs typically have twoescalating objectives.

• The first is to deter or prevent anenemy attack that employs WMD. Tomake opponents understand that friendlyforces possess and will use such

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weapons, JFCs may simply communicatethat to the enemy, using PSYOP or othermeans. Regardless, JFCs implementmeasures to increase readiness andpreserve the option to respond, includingthe alert and forward positioning, ifrequired, of appropriate systems.Attempts at prevention or denial mayinclude targeting and attacking enemyWMD capability by conventional andunconventional (e.g., IO and SO) forces.

• If deterrence fails, JFCs respondappropriately, consistent with nationalpolicy and strategic guidance, to enemyaggression while seeking to control theintensity and scope of conflict anddestruction. That response could beconventional in nature, but may includethe employment of nuclear weapons.

For additional guidance on employmentof nuclear weapons, refer to the JP 3-12series.

h. Force protection is imperative in thisenvironment. The joint force can survive useof WMD by anticipating their employment.Commanders can protect their forces in avariety of ways, including training, PSYOP,

OPSEC, dispersion of forces, use of IPE, andproper use of terrain for shielding againstblast and radiation effects. Enhancement ofNBC defense capabilities reduces incentivesfor a first strike by an enemy with WMD. Seealso “force protection” in Chapter III,“Planning Joint Operations.”

6. Considerations forTermination and PostconflictOperations

a. Planning for termination of operationsmust be ongoing during all phases of COAdevelopment, deployment of forces, andexecution of operations.

b. In most cases, operations will beterminated in their own right when statedobjectives have been met.

For further guidance on considerations fortermination and postconflict operations, referto Chapter I, “The Strategic Concept,”Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,”Chapter V, “Military Operations Other ThanWar,” JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for CampaignPlanning, and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task ForcePlanning Guidance and Procedures.

CHAPTER VMILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

V-1

1. General

MOOTW encompass a wide range ofactivities where the military instrument ofnational power is used for purposes otherthan the large-scale combat operationsusually associated with war. Although theseoperations are often conducted outside theUnited States, they also include militarysupport to US civil authorities. MOOTWusually involve a combination of air, land,sea, space, and SO forces as well as the effortsof governmental agencies and NGOs, in acomplementary fashion. This chapteraddresses key operational-level concepts andtypes of operations.

For detailed guidance on specific MOOTW,refer to the JP 3-07 series.

2. Role in the Strategic SecurityEnvironment

a. Combatant commanders supportnational objectives through combatantcommand strategies and military operations,which translate strategic intent intooperational and tactical actions. Thus, jointMOOTW involve strategic, operational,and tactical considerations. Because theDepartment of State frequently is the leadFederal agency and nearly always is aprincipal player in joint MOOTW outsideCONUS, JFCs should maintain a workingrelationship with the chiefs of the USdiplomatic missions in their area.

b. Many USG agencies other than theDepartment of Defense can be involved inMOOTW, including the Department of State,the Department of Agriculture, the

“Peace hath her victories — no less renowned than war.”

John Milton to Lord General Oliver Cromwell, 1652

Department of Commerce, the Department ofJustice, the Department of Transportation, theDisaster Assistance Response Team within theOffice of Foreign Disaster Assistance(OFDA), and the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency. OFDA is an officewithin the United States Agency forInternational Development. NGOs such asthe American Red Cross and the Save theChildren Fund also are frequently involved.Examples of international organizationsthat can be involved in such operations includethe UN, the International Committee of theRed Cross, and the UN High Commissionerfor Refugees. These organizations mayassume the lead to coordinate actions forthe NGO community. These organizationsmay assume the lead to coordinate actionsfor other nongovernmental andinternational organizations depending onthe nature of the humanitarian crisis.Military planners therefore should establishcontact with lead nongovernmental and/orinternational organizations to ensurecoordinated efforts.

c. The instruments of national power maybe applied in any combination to achievenational strategic goals in MOOTW. Themanner in which they are employed isdetermined by the nature of each situation.For MOOTW, the military instrumenttypically is tasked to support the diplomaticinstrument and work with the economic andinformational instruments.

3. Principles for MilitaryOperations Other Than War

As shown in Figure V-1, there are sixprinciples applicable for MOOTW.

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a. Objective

• Direct every military operation towarda clearly defined, decisive, andattainable objective.

• This principle of war also applies toMOOTW. A clearly defined andattainable objective — with a preciseunderstanding of what constitutes success— is critical when the United States isinvolved in MOOTW.

• Military commanders should understandwhat specific conditions could result inmission termination, as well as those thatyield failure.

• JFCs must understand the strategic goals,set appropriate objectives, and ensure thatthese goals and objectives contribute tounity of effort with other organizations.

b. Unity of Effort

• Seek unity of effort in every operation.

• The principle of unity of command in waralso applies to MOOTW; but inMOOTW, this principle may be moredifficult to attain. In these operations,other government agencies often mayhave the lead. Commanders may answerto a civilian chief, such as an ambassador,or may themselves employ the resourcesof a civilian organization. Commandarrangements often may be only looselydefined and many times will not involvecommand authority as understood withinthe military. This arrangement mayrequire commanders to seek anatmosphere of cooperation to achieveobjectives by unity of effort.

• Military commanders need to considerhow their actions contribute to initiativesthat are also diplomatic, economic, andinformational in nature. BecauseMOOTW often will be conducted at thesmall unit level, it is important that alllevels understand the military-civilianrelationship to avoid unnecessary andcounterproductive friction.

c. Security

• Never permit hostile factions toacquire an unexpected advantage.

• In joint MOOTW, security dealsprincipally with force protection againstvirtually any person, element, or grouphostile to US interests. These couldinclude activists, a group opposed to theoperation, looters after a natural disaster,and terrorists. Forces will have to be evenmore alert to force protection and securitymatters after a WMD incident. JFCs alsoshould be constantly ready to counteractivity that could bring significant harmto units or jeopardize missionaccomplishment. Inherent in thisresponsibility is the need to be capableof rapid transition from a peaceful to acombat posture should the need arise.

Figure V-1. Principles for MilitaryOperations Other Than War

PRINCIPLES FOR

MILITARY OPERATIONS

OTHER THAN WAR

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

V-3


• The inherent right of self-defense fromthe unit to the individual level applies toall operations. However, securityrequirements should be balanced with theoperation’s nature and objectives. Insome operations, the use of certainsecurity measures, such as carrying arms,wearing helmets and flak vests, or usingsecure communications may causemilitary forces to appear morethreatening than intended, which maydegrade the force’s legitimacy and hurtrelations with the HN population.

d. Restraint

• Apply appropriate military capabilityprudently.

• The actions of military personnel andunits are framed by the disciplinedapplication of force, including specificROE. In MOOTW, these ROE often willbe more restrictive, detailed, andsensitive to political concerns than in war.Moreover, these rules may changefrequently during operations. Restraints onweaponry, tactics, and levels of violencecharacterize the environment. The use ofexcessive force could adversely affectefforts to gain or maintain legitimacy andimpede the attainment of both short- andlong-term goals.

• This concept does not preclude theapplication of overwhelming force, whenappropriate, to display US resolve andcommitment. The reasons for therestraint often need to be understood bythe individual Service member, becausea single act could cause adverse politicalconsequences.

e. Perseverance

• Prepare for the measured, protractedapplication of military capability insupport of strategic goals.

• Some MOOTW may be short, othersprotracted. Peacetime operations mayrequire years to achieve the desired endstate. Underlying causes of confrontationand conflict rarely have a clear beginningor a decisive resolution. It is importantto assess crisis response options againsttheir contribution to long-term strategicobjectives. This assessment does notpreclude decisive military action, butdoes require careful, informed analysisto choose the right time and place for suchaction.

• Commanders balance their desire toattain objectives quickly with asensitivity for the long-term strategicgoals and the restraints placed onoperations. Therefore, the patient,resolute, and persistent pursuit of nationalgoals and objectives for as long asnecessary to achieve them often is therequirement for success.

f. Legitimacy

• Sustain the willing acceptance by thepeople of the right of the governmentto govern or of a group or agency tomake and carry out decisions.

• This principle focuses on internationallysanctioned standards, as well as theperception that authority of a governmentto govern is genuine and effective anduses proper agencies for reasonablepurposes. Joint operations need to sustainthe legitimacy of the operation and of thehost government.

• During operations where a governmentdoes not exist, extreme caution shouldbe used when dealing with individualsand organizations to avoid inadvertentlylegitimizing them. Effective IO canenhance both domestic and internationalperceptions of the legitimacy of anoperation.

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4. Planning Considerations

Planning considerations for MOOTW areshown in Figure V-2.

a. Interagency Coordination. Inherent inMOOTW is the need for the military to workwith other agencies of the USG as well asother nations’ governments. Consensusbuilding is a primary task and can be aidedby understanding each agency’s capabilitiesand limitations as well as any constraints thatmay preclude the use of a capability. The goal— to develop and promote the unity ofeffort needed to accomplish a specificmission — can be achieved by establishingan atmosphere of trust and cooperation.

b. Command and Control. Each typeof MOOTW can be unique. There is nosingle C2 option that works best for all suchoperations. JFCs and their subordinatesshould be flexible in modifying standardarrangements to meet the specificrequirements of each situation andpromote unity of effort.

c. Intelligence and Information Collection.MOOTW are significantly improved with theproper mix of intelligence and informationcollection. As soon as practical after anoperation is declared, JFCs and plannersdetermine the intelligence requirementsneeded to support the operation. Intelligenceplanners also consider the capability for a unitto receive external intelligence support, thecapability to store intelligence data, thetimeliness of collection systems, the availabilityof intelligence publications, and the possibilityof using other agencies and organizations asintelligence sources. In some MOOTW (suchas peacekeeping), the term “informationcollection” is used rather than the term“intelligence” because of the sensitivity of theoperation.

d. Constraints and Restraints. Acommander tasked with conducting a jointMOOTW may face numerous restrictionsin addition to the normal restrictionsassociated with ROE. For example,international acceptance of each operationmay be extremely important, not only because

Figure V-2. Planning Considerations for Military Operations Other Than War

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

May be subtle and indirect

Are normally regional in nature

May develop quickly

May be long term

May involve conflict

May have serious implications forsafeguard of friendly interests

V-5


military forces may be used to supportinternational sanctions, but also becauseof the probability of involvement byinternat ional organizat ions . As aconsequence, legal rights of individuals andorganizations and funding of the operationshould be addressed by the combatantcommander’s staff. Also, constraints andrestraints imposed on any agency ororganization involved in the operation shouldbe understood by other agencies andorganizations to facilitate coordination.

e. Training and Education

• The Armed Forces of the United Statesmay be directed to conduct jointMOOTW with very little notice.Therefore, training and educationprograms focusing on joint,multinational, and interagencyoperations should be developed andimplemented for individuals and units.Personnel from other USG agencies andnongovernmental and internationalorganizations should be invited toparticipate in these programs.

• Participation in and/or the operationalenvironment of certain types ofMOOTW may preclude normalmission-related training. For example,infantry units or fighter squadronsconducting certain protracted PO maynot have the time, facilities, orenvironment in which to maintainindividual or unit proficiency fortraditional missions. Commandersshould develop programs that enabletheir forces to maintain their combatskills to the maximum extent possible.Upon redeployment, such units orindividuals may require refreshertraining prior to reassuming moretraditional roles and missions.

f. Postconflict Operations

• Planning for postconflict operationsshould begin as early as possible, andpreferably before the operations begin.As combat operations are nearingtermination, military forces shouldprepare to transition to noncombatMOOTW. Refugee control, reestablishingcivil order and public services, medicalassistance, and other postconflictactivities may be done best by militaryforces during this turbulent period.Postconflict activities typically beginwith significant military involvement,then move increasingly toward civiliandominance as the threat wanes and civilinfrastructures are reestablished.

• The military’s presence and its ability tooperate in crisis environments and underextreme conditions may give it the defacto lead in operations normallygoverned by other agencies. Militaryforces need to work competently inthis environment while properlysubordinating military forces to theagency in charge. To be effective,planning and conducting postconflictactivities require a variety of perspectivesand expertise and the cooperation andassistance of governmental agencies,other Services, and alliance or coalitionpartners. Typical postconflict activitiesinclude, but are not limited to, thefollowing.

•• Transition to Civil Authorities. Thistransaction could be to local governmentsor HNs after natural disasters, to a UNpeacekeeping operation after peaceenforcement operations, or through theUN High Commissioner for Refugees toa nongovernmental agency in support ofrefugees.

•• Support to Truce Negotiations. Thissupport may include providingintelligence, security, transportation and

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JP 3-0

other logistic support, and linguistics forall participants.

•• SOF Activities. These activitiesinclude CA support to reestablish a civilgovernment, additional training for HNarmed forces, PSYOP to foster continuedpeaceful relations, and intelligencegathering.

•• Public Affairs Operations. Theseoperations include command informationprograms, media support , andinternational information programs.

•• Redeployment. Redeployment mayinclude waste disposal, port operations,closing of financial obligations, clearingand marking of minefields and otherexplosive ordnance disposal activities,and ensuring that appropriate unitsremain in place until their missions arecomplete. Redeployment must beplanned and executed in a manner thatfacilitates the use of redeploying forcesand supplies to meet new missions orcrises. Redeploying individuals or unitsalso may require refresher training.

g. Redeployment to Other Contingencies.Forces deployed for MOOTW may be calledupon to rapidly redeploy to another theater.Planners should consider how they wouldextricate forces and ensure that they areprepared for the new contingency. This mightinclude such things as a prioritizedredeployment schedule, identification of aerialports for linking intra- and intertheater airlift,and some consideration to achieving theobjectives of the original contingency throughother means.

5. Types of Military OperationsOther Than War

The primary types of MOOTW aredescribed briefly in the followingsubparagraphs and are illustrated in Figure

V-3. Additional information about these typesof MOOTW may be found in JP 3-07, JointDoctrine for Military Operations Other ThanWar, and other joint publications as indicatedbelow.

a. Arms Control. Arms control is aconcept that connotes any plan, arrangement,or process resting upon explicit or implicitinternational agreement. Arms controlgoverns any aspect of the numbers, types, andperformance characteristics of weapon

Figure V-3. Types of MilitaryOperations Other Than War

TYPES OF MILITARY

OPERATIONS OTHER

THAN WAR

Arms Control

Combatting Terrorism

Consequence Management

Department of Defense Support toCounterdrug Operations

Domestic Support Operations

Enforcement of Sanctions andMaritime Intercept Operations

Enforcing Exclusion Zones

Ensuring Freedom of Navigationand Overflight

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Nation Assistance

Noncombatant EvacuationOperations

Peace Operations

Protection of Shipping

Recovery Operations

Show of Force Operations

Strikes and Raids

Support to Insurgency

Support to Counterinsurgency

V-7


systems, and the numerical strength,organization, equipment, deployment, oremployment of the armed forces retained bythe parties. Although it may be viewed as adiplomatic mission, the military can play avital role. For example, US military personnelmay be involved in verifying an arms controltreaty; may seize WMD; may escortauthorized deliveries of weapons and othermaterials (such as enriched uranium) topreclude loss or unauthorized use of theseassets; or may dismantle or destroy weaponswith or without the consent of the HN. All ofthese actions help reduce threat to regionalsecurity.

b. Combatting Terrorism. Combattingterrorism involves actions taken to opposeterrorism from wherever the threat exists.It includes antiterrorism (defensivemeasures taken to reduce vulnerability toterrorist acts) and counterterrorism(offensive measures taken to prevent, deter,and respond to terrorism). The USG mayprovide antiterrorism assistance to foreigncountries. The Department of Defenseprovides specially trained personnel andequipment in a supporting role togovernmental lead agencies.

For further guidance on combattingterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

c. Consequence Management. CMinvolves planning actions and preparationstaken to identify, organize, equip, and trainemergency response forces and to developand execute plans implemented in responseto radiological accidents or accidentsinvolving WMD, as well as the actions takenfollowing such an accident to mitigate andrecover from the effect of the accident. CMmay be planned and executed for locationswithin US-owned territory at home andabroad and in foreign countries as directedby the NCA. Support for domestic CM willbe provided through USJFCOM as militarysupport to civil authorities. The Departmentof State is designated the lead Federal agencyin foreign CM. US military support to foreignCM normally will be provided to the foreigngovernment through the combatant commandwithin whose AOR the incident occurs.

For further CM guidance, refer to CJCSI3214.01, Military Support to ForeignConsequence Management Operations, JP3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

As the Gulf War’s fighting ended on 28 February 1991, a Kurdish rebellionerupted in northern Iraq. Iraqi forces attacked the Kurds. People fled fromcities and towns. Worldwide television showed cold, wet Kurds suffering fromhunger and disease and dying in the hills of northern Iraq and southern Turkey.

On 6 April 1991, Commander in Chief, US European Command (USCINCEUR)established Joint Task Force (JTF) Provide Comfort. Initial objectives were toprovide humanitarian relief by airdropping food and other necessities,establishing relief centers, supervising distribution of food and water, andimproving sanitation and medical care. JTF Provide Comfort included UnitedStates Air Force airlift, a special operations command, and an amphibiousready group (with an embarked Marine expeditionary unit). When it becameapparent that operations would significantly increase in complexity andduration, USCINCEUR expanded the organization of the JTF, changedcommanders to reflect the changed nature and increasing complexity of theoperation, and established the JTF headquarters at Incirlik, Turkey.

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The new JTF commander established two subordinate JTFs: JTF ALFA, aspecial operations task force, at Silopi, Turkey; and JTF BRAVO at Zakhu,Iraq. JTF BRAVO’s mission was to provide security in its operational areainside Iraq, build refugee camps, and move displaced persons into thesecamps. JTF BRAVO forces included the Marine expeditionary unit, a BritishCommando Brigade, a French Parachute Regiment, a Spanish ParachuteRegiment, and US Army airborne infantry and attack helicopter battalions aswell as psychological operations and civil affairs units. Ultimately, JTF BRAVOincluded combat and combat support units from US and coalition membernations, including an Italian Composite Special Forces Airborne Brigade, aDutch Marine Combat Battalion, and an Infantry Rifle Platoon from Luxembourg.

Air Force forces operated from Incirlik and established and maintained an airexclusion zone over the protected area and coordinated air delivery. Armyand non-US cargo helicopters were assigned operational control (OPCON) toCommander, Air Force Forces. Army forces (less those in JTF BRAVO) werealso based at Incirlik. Commander, Army Forces was also designatedcommander of a multinational support command, with OPCON of Army, AirForce, and Marine logistic units to support its multinational force.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was a coalition effort. The United Kingdom,Spain, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Luxembourg, Canada,Germany, and the United States contributed forces. The operation alsoencompassed United Nations relief assistance. The JTF became CombinedTask Force Provide Comfort.

Especially in its early weeks, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT demonstratedthe remarkable agility and flexibility of a team-oriented effort. The commander,joint task force and subordinate commanders used Service capabilities wherethey were needed. They assigned clear (although not easy) missions; gavedirect, simple guidance; and established command relationships that facilitatedmission accomplishment. It was an outstanding example of the complexity ofthe end state and posthostilities operations.

VARIOUS SOURCES

Procedures for Foreign HumanitarianAssistance, and JP 3-07.7, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for DomesticSupport Operations.

d. DOD Support to CounterdrugOperations. In counterdrug operations, theDepartment of Defense supports federal,state, and local law enforcement agenciesin their effort to disrupt the transfer ofillegal drugs into the United States. TheNational Defense Authorization Act of 1989assigned three major counterdrug

responsibilities to the Department ofDefense.

• Act as the single lead agency fordetecting and monitoring aerial andmaritime transit of illegal drugs into theUnited States. (The US Coast Guard hasthe lead for maritime interdiction of illegaldrugs.)

• Integrate the C3 and technicalintelligence assets of the United Statesthat are dedicated to interdicting the

V-9


movement of illegal drugs into the UnitedStates.

• Approve and fund State governors’ plansfor expanded use of the National Guardto support drug interdiction andenforcement operations of lawenforcement agencies.

For additional guidance on DODcounterdrug operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

e. Domestic Support Operations (DSO).DSO provide temporary support todomestic civil authorities when permittedby law, and normally are taken when anemergency overtaxes the capabilities of thecivil authorities. DSO can be as diverse astemporary augmentation of air trafficcontrollers and postal workers duringstrikes, restoration of law and order in theaftermath of a manmade or natural disaster,protection of life and federal property, orproviding relief in the aftermath of a naturaldisaster.

For additional guidance on DSO, refer to JP3-07.7, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Domestic Support Operations.

f. Enforcement of Sanctions and/orMaritime Intercept Operations. These areoperations that employ coercive measures tointerdict the movement of certain types ofdesignated items into or out of a nation orspecified area. These operations are militaryin nature and serve both political andmilitary purposes. The political objectiveis to compel a country or group to conform tothe objectives of the initiating body. Themilitary objective is to establish a barrier thatis selective, allowing only those goodsauthorized to enter or exit.

g. Enforcing Exclusion Zones. Theseoperations are conducted to persuade

nations or groups to modify their behavior tomeet the desires of the sanctioning body orelse face continued imposition of sanctionsor threat of force. The measures usually areimposed by the UN or other internationalbodies of which the United States is a member,but may be imposed unilaterally by the UnitedStates. Exclusion zones usually are imposeddue to breaches of international standards ofhuman rights or flagrant violations ofinternational law.

h. Ensuring Freedom of Navigation andOverflight. These operations are conductedto exercise and assert navigationalfreedoms and overflight rights recognizedby international law. Such operationsexercise freedoms of navigation and overflighton the high seas, the right of innocent passagethrough the territorial sea, the right of transitpassage through international straits, and theright of archipelagic sea lane passage througharchipelagic waters.

• International law accords the right of“innocent” passage to ships of othernations through a state’s territorialwaters.

• Aircraft threatened by nations or groupsthrough the extension of airspacecontrol zones outside the establishedinternational norms will result in legalmeasures to rectify the situation.

i. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.FHA operations are conducted to relieve orreduce the results of natural or manmadedisasters or other endemic conditions suchas human pain, disease, hunger, or privationin countries or regions outside the UnitedStates. FHA provided by US forces isgenerally limited in scope and duration; itis intended to supplement or complementefforts of HN civil authorities or agencieswith the primary responsibility for providingassistance.

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JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW

At 0500 on 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and causedextensive damage. The Governor of Florida requested Federal assistance.The Secretary of the Army, as the President’s executive agent, directed initiationof disaster relief operations in support of the Federal response plan. As partof those operations, the Commander in Chief, Forces Command, directed theSecond US Army to form Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew and begin humanitarianrelief operations. Eventually composed of elements of all Services and bothActive and Reserve forces, JTF Andrew began operations on 28 August 1992.

JTF Andrew’s mission was to provide humanitarian support by establishingfield feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transferoperations, local and line haul transfer operations, and other logistic supportto the populace in affected areas. Commander, JTF Andrew, defined successas getting life support systems in place and relieving immediate hardshipsuntil non-DOD Federal, state, and local agencies could reestablish normaloperations. Operations were conducted in three phases. Immediate reliefprovided life support systems — food, water, shelter, medical supplies andservices, information, sanitation, and transportation. A recovery phase ensuredsustainment of services provided in Phase I while assisting Federal, state,and local authorities to reestablish public services. Finally, a reconstitutionphase continued to reestablish services under Federal, state, and local control,while JTF forces redeployed.

During these operations, 1,014 sorties were flown, carrying over 19,000 tonsof mission support materials. Almost 900,000 meals were served. Over 80,000tons of humanitarian supplies were moved into the area by sea and over land.Almost 2,000 tons were moved by air. Over 67,000 patients received medicaltreatment, and over 1,000 tents were erected. A mobile radio station wasestablished to provide emergency information to the local population and toprovide route information to assist convoys as they arrived. Four life supportcenters were constructed, providing mass care for 2,400 people per day forapproximately 2 months. Over 6 million cubic yards of debris were removed,and 98 schools were repaired.

JTF Andrew coordinated with multiple Federal, state, and private agencies.These included the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Civil AirPatrol, the American Red Cross, the General Services Administration, the PublicHealth Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the BoyScouts of America, and numerous religious relief organizations.

This disaster relief effort demonstrated the versatility of the Armed Forces ofthe United States. The training for war that developed and promoted initiative,ingenuity, and flexibility in leadership and conduct of operations, served theNation well in a noncombat situation.

VARIOUS SOURCES

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j. Nation Assistance. Nation assistance iscivil or military assistance (other than FHA)rendered to a nation by US forces within thatnation’s territory during peacetime, crises oremergencies, or war, based on agreementsmutually concluded between the United Statesand that nation. Nation assistance operationssupport an HN by promoting sustainabledevelopment and growth of responsive

institutions. Nation assistance programs ofteninclude, but are not limited to, securityassistance, FID, and humanitarian and civicassistance.

For additional guidance on nation assistance,refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense(FID).

OPERATION EASTERN EXIT

On 1 January 1991, the United States Ambassador to Somalia requested militaryassistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign nationalshad sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day as the reign of Somalidictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused battle for control ofMogadishu.

The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated. Despite the priorities ofthe Gulf War, special operations forces helicopters were put on alert, Air ForceC-130 transport aircraft were deployed to Kenya, and two Navy amphibiousships with elements of a Marine expeditionary brigade embarked were sentsouth from the North Arabian Sea toward Somalia. Initial plans called forevacuation of the endangered Americans through Mogadishu’s internationalairport, utilizing Air Force aircraft staged in Kenya. The situation in Mogadishurapidly worsened and aircraft, even those of the United States Air Force, couldnot land safely at the airport. It seemed unlikely in any case that those shelteredat the Embassy could travel safely through the embattled city to the airport.

By 4 January, it had become apparent that the Embassy’s only hope lay withthe two ships still steaming south at flank speed. At 0247, two CH-53Ehelicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for the466-mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC-130 aircraft,the helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 armed Somalistood with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into the compound, theSomali scattered. Shortly after the helicopters touched down, a specialoperations AC-130 gunship arrived overhead to provide fire support, if needed.The CH-53Es unloaded the security force, embarked 61 evacuees, and took offfor the 350-mile return flight.

The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout theday. The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the shipshad arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the security forcewere extracted during the night.

Operation EASTERN EXIT, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people — from30 different countries — from a bloody civil war, was the result of the synergisticemployment of widely dispersed joint forces that rapidly planned andconducted a noncombatant evacuation operation in the midst of the Gulf War.

VARIOUS SOURCES

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k. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.These operations normally relocatethreatened noncombatants from a foreigncountry. Although principally conducted toevacuate US citizens, NEOs also may includecitizens from the HN as well as citizens fromother countries. The Department of State isresponsible for the protection and evacuationof American citizens abroad and for guardingtheir property. The US Ambassador or Chiefof the Diplomatic Mission is responsible forpreparation of Emergency Action Plans thataddress the military evacuation of US citizensand designated foreign nationals from aforeign country.

For additional guidance on NEOs, refer to JP3-07.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

l. Peace Operations. PO are militaryoperations to support diplomatic efforts toreach a long-term political settlement andare categorized as peacekeeping operations(PKO) and peace enforcement operations(PEO). PO are conducted in conjunction withthe various diplomatic activities necessary tosecure a negotiated truce and resolve the

conflict. Military PO are tailored to eachsituation and may be conducted in support ofdiplomatic activities before, during, or afterconflict.

• Peacekeeping Operations. PKO aremilitary operations undertaken with theconsent of all major parties to a dispute,designed to monitor and facilitateimplementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreements) andsupport diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. An exampleof PKO is the US commitment to theMultinational Force Observers in theSinai since 1982.

• Peace Enforcement Operations. PEOare the application of military force, orthreat of its use, normally pursuant tointernational authorization, to compelcompliance with resolutions orsanctions designed to maintain orrestore peace and order. Examples ofPEO are Operation DENY FLIGHTconducted in Bosnia from 1992-1995 andthe secondary effort in Unified TaskForce Somalia, 1992-1993.

UN equipment is loaded on a C-5 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, bound for Kigali,Rwanda, during Operation SUPPORT HOPE peace operations.

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For additional guidance on PO, refer toJP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Peace Operations.

m. Protection of Shipping. Protection ofshipping operations involve the use ofproportionate force by US warships,military aircraft, and other forces, whennecessary for the protection of US flagvessels and aircraft, US citizens (whetherembarked in US or foreign vessels), andtheir property against unlawful violence.This protection may be extended to foreignflag vessels, aircraft, and persons consistentwith international law.

n. Recovery Operations. Recoveryoperations are conducted to search for, locate,identify, rescue, and return personnel orhuman remains, sensitive equipment, oritems critical to national security. Theseoperations are generally sophisticatedactivities requiring detailed planning in orderto execute them, especially when conductingthem in denied areas. They may beclandestine, covert, or overt.

o. Show of Force Operations. Show offorce operations are designed to demonstrateUS resolve and involve increased visibilityof US deployed forces in an attempt to defusea specific situation that, if allowed to continue,may be detrimental to US interests or nationalobjectives. Show of force operations aremilitary in nature but often serve both politicaland military purposes. These operations caninfluence other governments or politico-military organizations to respect US interestsas well as international law.

p. Strikes and Raids

• Strikes are offensive operationsconducted to inflict damage on, seize,or destroy an objective. Strikes may beused as a reprisal against offendingnations or groups or to prevent or endviolations of international law.

• Raids usually are small-scale operationsinvolving swift penetration of hostileterritory to secure information,confuse the adversary, or destroyinstallations. They end with plannedwithdrawals upon completion of theassigned missions.

q. Support to Counterinsurgency.Support to counterinsurgency includessupport provided to a government in themilitary, paramilitary, political, economic,psychological, and civic actions itundertakes to defeat insurgency. Supportto counterinsurgency operations often includesecurity assistance programs such as foreignmilitary sales, foreign military financingprogram, and international military educationand training program. Such support also mayinclude FID.

For further guidance on support tocounterinsurgency, refer to JP 3-07.1, JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forForeign Internal Defense (FID).

r. Support to Insurgency. Support toinsurgencies involves support to organizedmovements aimed at the overthrow ofconstituted governments through use ofsubversion and armed conflict. US forcesmay provide logistics and training support,but normally do not themselves conductcombat operations.

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OPERATIONS PROVIDE RELIEF AND RESTORE HOPE

Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE demonstrated thecomplexity of integrating peace operations with other types of operations andprovided a glimpse of a new style of post-Cold War military operations. By themiddle of 1992, after years of civil war, drought, and famine, the situation inthe southern half of Somalia had reached such a tragic state that humanitarianorganizations launched a worldwide appeal for help. In response to this outcry,the President of the United States directed, in mid-August 1992, an airlift offood and supplies for starving Somalis (Operation PROVIDE RELIEF).

US forces immediately initiated the airlift of relief supplies from Mombassa,Kenya, but continued instability in Somalia prevented safe passage of theflights. Relief workers in Somalia operated in this unsafe environment underconstant threat. Distribution of relief supplies was haphazard and subject tobanditry and obstruction by local warlords. The people of Somalia continuedto suffer.

Based on the continued suffering and the realization that the United Stateswas the only nation capable of decisive action, the President directedCommander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT) to plan a largerscale humanitarian relief operation. On 3 December the President directedUSCINCCENT to execute Operation RESTORE HOPE. In broad terms, it wasan effort to raise Somalia from the depths of famine, anarchy, and desperationin order to restore its national institutions and its hope for the future.Conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), Operation RESTOREHOPE was a multinational humanitarian assistance operation that ultimatelyinvolved more than 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations, with an additional9 nations providing funding, support, and facilities vital to the operation.

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia was formed with forces from France,Italy, Canada, Belgium, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, aswell as other nations. On 9 December 1992, under UN auspices, US specialoperations forces and amphibious forces assaulted and secured the airport atMogadishu and the seaport soon thereafter. Arriving supplies could now beoff-loaded safely.

The task force methodically expanded throughout the capital city of Mogadishuand into the countryside. As land forces were added to the task force, controlwas pushed inland. The airlift of supplies increased significantly as air baseswere secured. Over the next 3 months, the coalition expanded into the southernhalf of Somalia, establishing and securing relief centers and escorting supplyconvoys.

The operation was made more complex by continued uncertainty and instabilityin the Somali political situation. The task force, working closely with the USDepartment of State and eventually more than 50 humanitarian relieforganizations, assisted in establishing an environment in which reliefoperations could proceed. Because of the proliferation of weapons throughoutthe country during the many years of civil war, relief efforts included the

V-15


identification of individuals and groups that posed immediate threats and theremoval of visible weapons from circulation. A radio station and newspaperwere established to inform the public regarding the UN force objectives, aswell as public service information to enhance security.

As the situation was brought under control by military forces, priority shiftedto diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain a lasting truce betweencompeting factions. UNITAF Somalia was amended to include relief-in-placeby forces assigned to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM),now designated UNOSOM II. The distribution of relief supplies continued whilegreat care was taken to ensure a seamless transition between UNITAF andUNOSOM II forces.

VARIOUS SOURCES

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIMULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

VI-1

1. General

a. US military operations often areconducted with the armed forces of othernations in pursuit of common objectives.

b. Multinational operations, both thosethat include combat and those that do not, areconducted within the structure of analliance or coalition.

• An alliance is a result of formalagreements between two or morenations for broad, long-term objectives(e.g., the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization). These alliance operationsare combined operations, though incommon usage combined often is usedinappropriately as a synonym for allmultinational operations.

• A coalition is an ad hoc arrangementbetween two or more nations forcommon action; for instance, thecoalition that defeated Iraqi aggressionagainst Kuwait in the Gulf War,1990-1991.

c. Joint operations as part of an alliance orcoalition require close cooperation amongall forces and can serve to mass strengths,reduce vulnerabilities, and provide legitimacy.Effectively planned and executedmultinational operations should, in additionto achieving common objectives, facilitateunity of effort without diminishing freedomof action and preserve unit integrity anduninterrupted support.

“Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States ithas been as a member of — most often to lead — coalition operations.”

GEN Robert W. RisCassi, USA“Principles for Coalition Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly: Summer 1993

d. Each multinational operation isunique, and key considerations involved inplanning and conducting multinationaloperations vary with the internationalsituation and perspectives, motives, andvalues of the organization’s members.Whereas alliance members typically havecommon national political and economicsystems, coalitions often bring togethernations of diverse cultures for a limited periodof time. As long as the coalition membersperceive their membership and participationas advancing their individual nationalinterests, the coalition can remain intact. Atthe point that national objectives or prioritiesdiverge, the coalition strains to function orbreaks down.

e. The Armed Forces of the UnitedStates should be prepared to operate withinthe framework of an alliance or coalitionunder other-than-US leadership.Following, contributing, and supporting areimportant roles in multinational operations —often as important as leading. However, USforces often will be the predominant and mostcapable force within an alliance or coalitionand can be expected to play a centralleadership role, albeit one founded on mutualrespect. Stakes are high, requiring the militaryleaders of member nations to emphasizecommon objectives as well as mutual supportand respect.

For additional guidance on multinationaloperations, refer to the following paragraphsand JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for MultinationalOperations.

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2. Command and Control of USForces in MultinationalOperations

The President retains command authorityover US forces. This includes the authorityand responsibility for effectively usingavailable resources and for planningemployment, organizing, directing,coordinating, controlling, and protectingmilitary forces for the accomplishment ofassigned missions. It is sometimes prudentor advantageous (for reasons such asmaximizing military effectiveness andensuring unity of effort) to place appropriateUS forces under the control of a foreigncommander to achieve specified militaryobjectives. In making the determination toplace US forces under the control of non-UScommanders, the President carefully considerssuch factors as the mission, size of the

proposed US force, risks involved, anticipatedduration, and ROE.

3. Considerations forMultinational Operations

Considerations for multinational operationsare shown in Figure VI-1 and discussed below.

a. National Goals. No two nations shareexactly the same reasons for entering acoalition or alliance. To some degree,participation within an alliance or coalitionrequires the subordination of nationalautonomy by member nations. The glue thatbinds the multinational force is agreement,however tenuous, on common goals andobjectives. However, different national goals,often unstated, cause each nation to measureprogress in its own way. Each nation cantherefore produce differing perceptions of

Figure VI-1. Considerations for Multinational Operations

CONSIDERATIONS FORMULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

NATIONAL GOALS

UNITY OF EFFORT

DOCTRINE, TRAINING,AND EQUIPMENT

Reach agreement oncommon goals andobjectives to bindmultinational forces.

Multinational objectivesmust be supported by eachmember nation.

Improve other nationalforces through training,assistance, and sharing ofresources.

CULTURALDIFFERENCES

MANAGEMENT OFRESOURCES

NATIONALCOMMUNICATIONS

Employ linguistics and areaexperts to assist with culturaland language challenges.

Support forces of membernations with national assetsor through the coalition.

Have direct and immediatecommunications capability torespective leaderships.

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Multinational Operations

progress. JFCs should strive to understandeach nation’s goals and how those goals canaffect conflict termination and the desired endstate. Maintaining cohesion and unity of effortrequires understanding and adjusting to theperceptions and needs of member nations.

b. Unity of Effort

• Motivations of member nations maydiffer, but multinational objectivesshould be attainable, clearly definedby the commander or leadership structureof the multinational force, andsupported by each member nation.Commanders of multinational forcesshould carefully consider the types ofmissions assigned to member forces.Capabilities often will differ substantiallybetween national forces, but sensitivityto and consideration of national honor,pride, and prestige often will be asimportant to final success as thecontributions and capabilities of thenational forces themselves. Smalldecisions, such as which national forcesare involved in the main effort or perhapsplay the lead role at the start of anoffensive, can have major consequencesin multinational operations.

• Coordinated policy, particularly on suchmatters as alliance or coalitioncommanders’ authority over nationallogistics (including infrastructure) andtheater intelligence, is required.Coordinated planning for ROE, combatidentification, military deception, forceprotection, public information, EW,communications, special weapons,source and employment of reserves, andtiming of operations is essential for unityof effort. Actions to improveinteroperability and the ability to shareinformation need to be addressed early(as early as the development of militarysystems for formal alliances). Nationsshould exchange qualified liaison

officers at the earliest opportunity toensure mutual understanding and unityof effort.

• JFCs also may consider the use ofcoalition support activities. Coalitionsupport improves the interaction ofcoalition partners and US military forcesand includes training coalition partnerson tactics and techniques as well asassisting with communications interfaceto integrate them into the coalitioncommand and intelligence structure. USSOF teams assigned to coalition units canprovide the JFC with an accurateevaluation of capabilities, location, andactivities of coalition forces, therebyfacilitating joint force C2.

• Planning often is complicated byparticipation of all members. Multinationalforce commanders and staffs should seekto involve all member nations in thedecisionmaking process, consistentwith the terms established at the foundingof the alliance or coalition. Memberrecommendations should be soughtcontinuously by multinational forcecommanders, but especially duringdevelopment of COAs, ROE, and combatidentification measures; assignment ofmissions to national forces; andestablishment of priorities of effort.

• JFCs should establish a workingrapport with leaders of other nationalforces. A personal, direct relationshipoften can overcome many of thedifficulties associated with multinationaloperations. Respect, trust, and theability to compromise are essential tobuilding and maintaining a strong team.

c. Doctrine, Training, and Equipment

• Doctrines, operational competence asa result of training and experience, andtypes and quality of equipment can

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vary substantially among the militaryforces of member nations.

• When the situation permits, JFCs seekopportunities to improve thecontributions of other national forcesthrough training assistance and sharingof resources consistent with US law andalliance or coalition terms of reference,such as the loan of American equipment(for example, radios, NBC protectiveequipment, vehicles, or weapons).

• JFCs implement measures to assess thecapabilities, strengths, and weaknesses ofmember forces to facilitate matchingmissions with capabilities.

• Where member forces have unique orspecial capabilities, they should beappropriately exploited.

• Joint and multinational exercises arekey components of joint training anddoctrine refinement. Types of exercisesinclude command post exercises and fieldtraining exercises. Simulation cancomplement most exercises. Distributedsimulation is a means to enhance trainingbetween remotely separated forces.

d. Cultural Differences

• Each partner in multinationaloperations possesses a unique culturalidentity — the result of language, values,religious systems, and economic andsocial outlooks. Even seemingly minordifferences, such as dietary restrictions,can have great impact. Commandersshould strive to accommodate religiousholidays, prayer calls, and other uniquecultural traditions important to allies andcoalition members, consistent with thesituation.

• Language differences often presentthe most immediate challenge.Specifying an official coalition languagecan be a sensitive issue. US forces cannotassume that the predominant languagewil l automatical ly be Engl ish.Information lost during translation can behigh, and misunderstandings andmiscommunications can have disastrouseffects.

• To assist with cultural and languagechallenges, JFCs employ linguists andarea experts, often available within orthrough the Service components or from

A US aircrew member coordinates loading procedures with UN loading crewsthrough an Ethiopian translator during Operation SUPPORT HOPE.

VI-5


other US agencies. In some instances,members of Service forces may beespecially familiar with the operationalarea, its cultures, and languages as a resultof previous assignments or heritage.

e. Management of Resources

• Forces of member nations must besupported either by national assets orthrough the alliance and/or coalition.Resource contributions will varyamong members. Some may contributelogistically, while others contributemilitary forces. Some may be able to doboth. Commanders of multinationalforces should seek to ensure that memberforces are appropriately supplied and thatcontributions of member nations areconsistent with national capabilities andthe terms established at the formation ofthe alliance and/or coalition. Frequently,JFCs will rely on national politicalleadership and representatives from suchagencies as the Department of State toeffect such coordination with theleadership of member nations.

• The acquisition and cross-servicingagreement (ACSA) is a potentially keytool for mutual exchange of logisticsupport and services. ACSA is areimbursable, bilateral support programthat allows reimbursable logistics-exchanges between US and foreignmilitary forces. ACSA provide thenecessary legal authority to allow mutuallogistic support between the US andmultinational partners. This agreementincreases flexibility for operationalcommanders by allowing fast responsewhen logistic support or services arerequested.

f. National Communications

• JFCs should anticipate that some forcesfrom alliance or coalition member

nations will have direct and nearimmediate communications capabilityfrom the operational area to theirrespective national political leadership.This communications capability canfacilitate coordination of issues, but italso can be a source of frustration asleaders external to the operational areamay be issuing guidance directly to theirdeployed national forces.

• JFCs should have a responsive andreliable link to appropriate USagencies and political leadership.Where senior JFCs are in the chain ofcommand between the deployed JFC andthe NCA, provisions should be madefor bypassing intermediate points inthe chain of command for exceptionaland emergency situations. Theconditions and supporting communicationssystems for such bypassing should beestablished early by the appropriatemilitary and political leadership.

4. Considerations During thePlanning and Execution ofMultinational Operations

a. Rules of Engagement

• US forces under the control of amultinational force will follow theROE of the multinational force unlessotherwise directed by the NCA. USforces will be under the control of amultinational force only if the NCAdetermine that the ROE for thatmultinational force are consistent withthe policy guidance on unit self-defenseand with the rules for individual self-defense contained in CJCSI 3121.01A,Standing Rules of Engagement for USForces.

• When US forces operate in conjunctionwith a multinational force, reasonableefforts will be made to effect common

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ROE. If such ROE cannot be established,US forces will exercise the right andobligation of self-defense contained inCJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules ofEngagement for US Forces, whileseeking guidance from the appropriatecombatant command. To avoid mutualinterference, the multinational forces willbe informed prior to US participation inthe operation of the US forces’ intentionsto operate under these standing ROE andto exercise unit self-defense.

• Participation in multinational operationsmay be complicated by varying nationalobligations derived from internationalagreements (i.e., other members in acoalition may not be signatories totreaties that bind the United States, orthey may be bound by treaties to whichthe United States is not a party). USforces still remain bound by US treatyobligations, even if the other membersin a coalition are not signatories to atreaty and need not adhere to its terms.

b. The Media

• Though not directly related to the conductof operations, JFCs seek to facilitate theactivities of national and internationalpress organizations, consistent withrequirements for OPSEC.

• This task is complicated in amultinational situation where presscorps from each member nation mayhave their own standards andrequirements. JFCs cannot hope toimpose control over such efforts and,instead, should seek to work closely withleaders of member forces and theirnational press elements to develop anopen and cooperative environment.Simple ground rules should beestablished by the senior political andmilitary representatives of the allianceor coalition at the earliest possible

moment to avoid incidents that couldjeopardize the operation or detract fromcoalition cohesion.

For additional guidance on dealing withthe media, refer to JP 3-61, Doctrine forPublic Affairs in Joint Operations.

c. Information Operations. US forceswill conduct IO and related activitiesduring multinational operations. Thedifferent practices and cultures of thenations involved may affect theseoperations. JFCs should seek agreement onthe multinational forces’ IO objectives,themes, and methods so multinational effortsin the IO arena can be coordinated, integratedand synchronized, and deconflicted.

d. Local Law Enforcement. US forcesoften will not have the authority orcapability to enforce local laws in theoperational area. JFCs should seek clearguidance from the alliance or coalitionpolitical leadership during the planning phaseof multinational operations. Where local lawenforcement organizations are present andcapable, JFCs should establish systems andprocedures to optimize the contributions ofindigent law enforcement personnel infacilitating operations and protecting lives andproperty in the operational area. Where locallaw enforcement systems and organizationsare not available, JFCs should considerdeploying appropriate US forces early in thedeployment flow as well as exploiting the lawenforcement capabilities of other membernations.

e. Command and Control

• Successful multinational operations cancenter on achieving unity of effort fromthe outset. Participating nations needto provide the multinational forcecommander sufficient authority overtheir national forces to achieve thisunity. In turn, multinational force

VI-7


commanders and staffs exercise theirauthority to unify the efforts of themultinational force toward commonobjectives. Such authority, however, isseldom absolute. Consensus andcompromise are important aspects ofdecisionmaking in multinationalorganizations.

• Alliances typically have developed C2structures, systems, and procedures.Alliance forces typically mirror theiralliance composition, with thepredominant nation providing thealliance force commander. Staffs areintegrated, and subordinate commandsoften are led by senior representativesfrom member nations. Doctrine,standardization agreements, and a certain

political harmony characterize alliances.Figure VI-2 provides an example of acommand structure within an alliance.

• Coalitions typically are formed on shortnotice and can include forces notaccustomed to working together.Establishing command relationshipsand operating procedures within themultinational force often ischallenging. It involves complex issuesthat require a willingness to compromisein order to best achieve the commonobjectives. National pride and prestigecan limit options for organization of thecoalition command, as many nationsprefer to not subordinate their forces tothose of other nations. Though many C2structures can be employed, coalitions

Figure VI-2. Combined Structure with National Integrity

COMBINED STRUCTURE WITHNATIONAL INTEGRITY

USNCA

ALLIED NATIONCOMMAND

ALLIED NATIONCOMPONENTS

US UNIFIEDCOMMAND

US SERVICECOMPONENTS

SUBORDINATEJOINT FORCE

Coordination

This diagram shows a variation of the parallel combined command structure.A formal, longstanding alliance will normally form a combined commandheadquarters with a combined staff and a single combined commander.Subordinate national commands, however, maintain national integrity.

Strategic Direction

Strategic Direction

Strategic Direction

Strategic Direction

MULTINATIONALALLIANCE

AUTHORITY

Combined Command

National Combatant Command(Command Authority)

NCA= National CommandAuthorities

COMBINEDCOMMAND

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most often are characterized by one oftwo basic structures: parallelcommand or lead nation command.

•• Parallel command exists whennations retain control of their deployedforces. If a nation within the coalitionelects to exercise autonomous control ofits force, a parallel command structureexists. Such structures can be organizedwith: (1) Nations aligned in a commoneffort, each retaining national control and(2) Nations aligned in a common effort,some retaining national control, withothers permitting control of their forcesby a central authority or another memberforce. Parallel command is the simplestto establish and often is the organizationof choice. Coalition forces controloperations through existing nationalchains of command. Coalitiondecisions are made through a coordinatedeffort of the political and senior militaryleadership of member nations and forces.It is common for other commandstructures to emerge as coalitions mature,but the parallel model is often the startingpoint. Figure VI-3 depicts the commandrelationships developed and employed bycoalition forces for Operation DESERTSTORM. These relationships representeda parallel command structure, withcoordination facilitated by the coalitioncoordination, communications, andintegration center (C3IC). The C3IC wasestablished specifically to facilitateexchange of intelligence and operationalinformation, ensure coordination ofoperations among coalition forces, andprovide a forum where routine issuescould be resolved informally andcollegially among staff officers.

•• Lead Nation Command. In thisarrangement, the nation providing thepreponderance of forces and resourcestypically provides the commander ofthe coalition force. The lead nation can

retain its organic C2 structure, employingother national forces as subordinateformations. More commonly, the leadnation command is characterized bysome integration of staffs. Thecomposition of staffs is determined bythe coalition leadership.

•• Combination. Lead nation andparallel command structures can existsimultaneously within a coalition. Thiscombination occurs when two or morenations serve as controlling elements fora mix of international forces, such as thecommand arrangement employed by theGulf War coalition. Western nationalforces were aligned under US leadership,while Arabic national forces were alignedunder Saudi leadership.

• Coordination and Liaison

•• Regardless of the command structure,coalitions require significantcoordination and liaison. Differencesin language, equipment, capabilities,doctrine, and procedures are some of theinteroperability challenges that mandateclose cooperation. Coordination andliaison are important considerations inalliances as well.

•• Robust liaison is critical todeveloping and maintaining unity ofeffort in coalition operations. Liaisonexchange should occur between seniorand subordinate commands and betweenlateral or like forces, such as betweennational SOF units or naval forces.

•• Commanders and liaison teamsrequire reliable communications,appropriate to the operational area andthe coalition’s concept of operations.JFCs often deploy robust liaison teamswith sufficient communicationsequipment to permit instantaneouscommunication between national force

VI-9


commanders. This communication isespecially important during the earlystages of coalition formation andplanning. JFCs should appropriatelyprioritize their liaison requirementsduring deployment into the operationalarea to facilitate communications as soonas possible.

•• Liaison officers between multinationalforces should be operationally proficient,innovative, and tenacious, but at the sametime diplomatic and sensitive to the

multinational forces with whom they aredetailed. They should have the authorityto speak for their JFCs or national forcecommanders.

• Plans and Procedures

•• Plans in multinational operationsshould be kept simple and focused onclearly defined objectives. The morecomplex the operation or the moreplayers involved, the more time and effortit takes to plan and coordinate the

Figure VI-3. Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM

NATIONAL COMMANDAUTHORITIES OFUNITED STATES

NATIONAL LEADERSOF FRANCE

NATIONAL LEADERSOF ARAB/ISLAMIC

NATIONS

BRITISHFORCE COMMANDER

UNITED STATESFORCE COMMANDER

(USCINCCENT)FRENCH FORCE

COMMANDER

JOINT FORCE/THEATEROF OPERATIONS

COMMANDER (SAUDI)

GROUNDCOMMANDER

GROUNDCOMMANDER

AIRCOMMANDER

AIRCOMMANDER

ARMYCOMMANDER

(ARCENT)

AIR FORCECOMMANDER

(CENTAF)

NAVYCOMMANDER

(NAVCENT)

JOINT FORCEGROUND

COMMANDER(SAUDI)

JOINT FORCEAIR

COMMANDER(SAUDI)

SPECIAL OPERATIONFORCES COMMANDER

(SOCCENT)

NATIONAL OPERATIONALCOMMAND

TACTICAL CONTROL

COORDINATION

MARINECOMMANDER(MARCENT)

COALITION COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOROPERATION DESERT STORM

The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf conflict provides an example of a parallelcommand structure within which coalition capabilities were unifiedtoward a common goal. Coalition leaders demonstrated flexibility andinnovation in devising and working within this ad hoc structure.

NATIONAL LEADERSOF UNITED KINGDOM

Coalition Coordination,Communications, and

Integration Center

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operation. Plans should be issued farenough in advance to allow sufficient timefor member forces to conduct their ownplanning and rehearsals. Some allianceor coalition member forces may not havethe planning and execution dexterity andflexibility characteristic of US forces.Accordingly, JFCs should ensure that thetempo of planning and execution doesnot exceed the capabilities of othermember forces. Effective liaison andreliable communications can facilitatesubordinate planning and execution.

•• To the extent possible, proceduresshould be standardized within themultinational force, especially ifmistakes can result in failed missions orfratricide. Procedures such as control ofattacking aircraft, maneuver control andfire support coordinating measures, andrequests for supporting fires should bestandardized. Where this is not possible,liaison teams should be tasked to facilitatecoordination and deconflict operations.JFCs should fully exploit all capabilitiesavailable to them to coordinate operationsand facilitate combat identification,

including Air Force tactical air controlparties.

•• Commanders may elect to organizethe operational area that supports thecommand’s organization. For example,when a parallel command structure isemployed, there are advantages toassigning AOs to national forces. Thisassignment permits relative autonomy ofoperations and can significantlydeconflict operations. This techniquewas successfully employed by JTFBravo during Operation PROVIDECOMFORT, where American, British,French, and Spanish forces operated inan area approximately 170 by 70kilometers in size.

f. Intelligence

• The collection, production, anddissemination of intelligence can be amajor challenge. Alliance or coalitionmembers normally operate separateintelligence systems in support of theirown policy and military forces. Thesenational systems may vary widely in

Operation SUPPORT HOPE JTF officers explain airlift control element operationsat Entebbe Airport to the President of Uganda. A JTF, assembled in Entebbe,coordinated Ugandan support to the United Nations humanitarian relief effort toRwanda.

VI-11


sophistication and focus. Members maynot have capabilities similar to the UnitedStates to collect and process intelligence.Nonetheless, each nation’s contributionsand capabilities should be appropriatelyincorporated and exploited. JFCs shouldrapidly establish a system that optimizeseach nation’s contributions and providesmember forces a common intelligencepicture, tailored to their requirements andconsistent with disclosure policies ofmember nations.

• JFCs, in accordance with nationaldirectives, need to determine whatintelligence may be shared with theforces of other nations early in theplanning process. The limits ofintelligence sharing and the proceduresfor doing so should be included inagreements with multinational partnersthat are concluded after obtaining propernegotiating authority. Any suchagreements should incorporatelimitations imposed by US law and/or theUS national disclosure policy.

• The National Disclosure Policyprovides initial guidance. Itpromulgates national policy andprocedures in the form of specificdisclosure criteria and limitations,definitions of terms, releasearrangements, and other guidance. Italso establishes interagency mechanismsand procedures for the effectiveimplementation of the policy. In theabsence of sufficient guidance, JFCsshould share only that information thatis mission essential, affects lower-leveloperations, facilitates combatidentification, and is perishable.

g. Logistics

• Multinational logistics is a majorchallenge. Potential problem areas, as

shown in Figure VI-4, include differencesin logistic doctrine; stockage levels;logistic mobility; interoperability;infrastructure; competition betweenServices and alliance and/or coalitionmembers for common support; andna t iona l resource l imi ta t ions .Nonetheless, JFCs need to coordinatethe use of facilities such as highways,rail lines, ports, and airfields in a mannerthat supports mission accomplishment.The notion that logistics is primarily anational responsibility cannot supplantdetailed logistic planning in theoperational area. JFCs typically formmultinational logistic staff sections

Figure VI-4. Considerations inMultinational Logistics

CONSIDERATIONS INMULTINATIONAL

LOGISTICS

Difference in LogisticDoctrine

Stockage Levels

Logistic Mobility

Interoperability

Infrastructure

Competition betweenService, Alliances,and/or CoalitionMembers for CommonSupport

National ResourceLimitations

Potential Problem AreasInclude...Potential Problem AreasInclude...

Difference in LogisticDoctrine

Stockage Levels

Logistic Mobility

Interoperability

Infrastructure

Competition betweenService, Alliances,and/or CoalitionMembers for CommonSupport

National ResourceLimitations

VI-12

Chapter VI

JP 3-0

early to facilitate logistic coordinationand support multinational operations.

• Standardization of logistic systems andprocedures can ease the logisticchallenges. Interoperability ofequipment, especially in adjacent orsubordinate multinational units, isdesirable and is considered by operationalplanners during concept development.Significant logistic operations includeacquisition and distribution of food andwater, fuels, ammunition, and spare parts;transportation; field services; and healthservice support.

• Contracting. Contracting for varioustypes of support, especially labor,facilities, common supplies, andtransportation, is a significant aspect ofmany military operations. Procurementof materiel and services in the jointforce’s operational area is done eitherthrough contracting on the open marketor when the HN offers support throughspecific government agencies. The HNmay restrict the joint force’s contractingability as it manages essential servicesfor the host population. Requirementsfor materiel and services should beconsolidated and validated asoperationally required by the JFC’s staff.A determination of appropriate source formeeting the requirements should then beconducted (for example, supply system,HNS, or contracting). If contracting isdeemed appropriate, JFCs should ensurethat sufficient, qualified contractingofficers are available from the outset toleverage the capabilities available withinthe operational area. A centralcontracting effort is necessary to ensurethat scarce resources do not competeagainst escalating demands and that themain effort receives priority of support.When required, contracting officersshould be paired with linguists andshould be prepared to operate in

currencies or commodities other than USdollars.

• Host-Nation Support. Nations hostingUS joint forces may offer logistic supportor limit the ability of the joint force tocontract support only through host-government agencies. JFCs can considercentralizing HNS functions so thatrequirements are both identified andsupported, consistent with missionaccomplishment. Nations might agreeto have certain common supplies andsupport provided by member nations toother alliance or coalition forces. Nationsalso might agree on whether amultinational commander will have theauthority to conclude HNS arrangementson behalf of participating nations.

• Integration of Multinational Units. Ifsome level of force integration isnecessary to conduct operations,planners should determine where theintegration of units and headquartersneeds to occur. Such decisions affectthe deployment priorities and schedulesfor personnel and equipment. Ifintegration is to occur at an intermediatestaging base or port of debarkation, itsimpact on those bases or ports can besignificant and needs to be addressed andaccounted for by base and/or portcommanders and staffs.

For further guidance on multinationallogistics, refer to JP 4-08, Joint Doctrinefor Logistic Support of MultinationalOperations.

h. Protection

• Protection measures that apply to jointoperations are appropriate also formultinational situations. JFCs consider,for example, theater air and missiledefense , reconnaissance andsurveillance, and security measures for

VI-13


the multinational force. Theseconsiderations extend to NBC warning,protection, and decontamination.

• Combat identification, especiallybetween member forces, is importantbecause of its potential negative impacton alliance or coalition unity and trust

between member forces. JFCs shouldassess carefully the risks of fratricidebetween member forces involved inCOAs being considered and actively seekto minimize the fratricide potentialthrough a combination of operational andtechnological solutions and expedients.

VI-14

Chapter VI

JP 3-0

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX APRINCIPLES OF WAR

A-1

The principles of war guide warfighting atthe strategic, operational, and tactical levels.They are the enduring bedrock of US militarydoctrine.

1. Objective

a. The purpose of the objective is to directevery military operation toward a clearlydefined, decisive, and attainable objective.

b. The objective of military operations isto achieve the military objectives that supportaccomplishment of the overall political goalsof the conflict. This frequently involves thedestruction of the enemy armed forces’capabilities and their will to fight. Theobjective of a MOOTW might be moredifficult to define; nonetheless, it too must beclear from the beginning. Objectives mustdirectly, quickly, and economically contributeto the purpose of the operation. Eachoperation must contribute to strategicobjectives. JFCs should avoid actions thatdo not contribute directly to achieving theobjective(s).

2. Offensive

a. The purpose of an offensive action is toseize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

b. Offensive action is the most effective anddecisive way to attain a clearly definedobjective. Offensive operations are the meansby which a military force seizes and holds theinitiative while maintaining freedom of actionand achieving decisive results. Theimportance of offensive action isfundamentally true across all levels of war.

c. Commanders adopt the defensive onlyas a temporary expedient and must seek everyopportunity to seize or reseize the initiative.

An offensive spirit must be inherent in theconduct of all defensive operations.

3. Mass

a. The purpose of mass is to concentratethe effects of combat power at the mostadvantageous place and time to achievedecisive results.

b. To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilitieswhere they will have a decisive effect in ashort period of time. Mass often must besustained to have the desired effect. Massingeffects, rather than concentrating forces, canenable even numerically inferior forces toachieve decisive results and minimize humanlosses and waste of resources.

4. Economy of Force

a. The purpose of the economy of force isto allocate minimum essential combat powerto secondary efforts.

b. Economy of force is the judiciousemployment and distribution of forces. It isthe measured allocation of available combatpower to such tasks as limited attacks, defense,delays, deception, or even retrogradeoperations to achieve mass elsewhere at thedecisive point and time.

5. Maneuver

a. The purpose of maneuver is to place theenemy in a position of disadvantage throughthe flexible application of combat power.

b. Maneuver is the movement of forces inrelation to the enemy to secure or retainpositional advantage, usually in order todeliver — or threaten delivery of — the direct

A-2

Appendix A

JP 3-0

and indirect fires of the maneuvering force.Effective maneuver keeps the enemy offbalance and thus also protects the friendlyforce. It contributes materially in exploitingsuccesses, preserving freedom of action, andreducing vulnerability by continually posingnew problems for the enemy.

6. Unity of Command

a. The purpose of unity of command is toensure unity of effort under one responsiblecommander for every objective.

b. Unity of command means that all forcesoperate under a single commander with therequisite authority to direct all forcesemployed in pursuit of a common purpose.Unity of effort, however, requirescoordination and cooperation among all forcestoward a commonly recognized objective,although they are not necessarily part of thesame command structure. In multinationaland interagency operations, unity of commandmay not be possible, but the requirement forunity of effort becomes paramount. Unity ofeffort — coordination through cooperationand common interests — is an essentialcomplement to unity of command.

7. Security

a. The purpose of security is to neverpermit the enemy to acquire unexpectedadvantage.

b. Security enhances freedom of action byreducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts,influence, or surprise. Security results fromthe measures taken by commanders to protecttheir forces. Staff planning and anunderstanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and

doctrine will enhance security. Risk isinherent in military operations. Applicationof this principle includes prudent riskmanagement, not undue caution. Protectingthe force increases friendly combat power andpreserves freedom of action.

8. Surprise

a. The purpose of surprise is to strike at atime or place or in a manner for which theenemy is unprepared.

b. Surprise can help the commander shiftthe balance of combat power and thus achievesuccess well out of proportion to the effortexpended. Factors contributing to surpriseinclude speed in decisionmaking, informationsharing, and force movement; effectiveintelligence; deception; application ofunexpected combat power; OPSEC; andvariations in tactics and methods of operation.

9. Simplicity

a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepareclear, uncomplicated plans and concise ordersto ensure thorough understanding.

b. Simplicity contributes to successfuloperations. Simple plans and clear, conciseorders minimize misunderstanding andconfusion. When other factors are equal, thesimplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plansallows better understanding and executionplanning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarityof expression greatly facilitate missionexecution in the stress, fatigue, and othercomplexities of modern combat and areespecially critical to success in multinationaloperations.

APPENDIX BTHE ESTIMATE PROCESS

B-1

1. General

The estimate process is central toformulating and updating military action tomeet the requirements of any situation. Theestimate process should be used bycommanders and staffs at all levels. Thoughits central framework for organizing inquiryand decision is essentially the same for anylevel of command, specific detailed questionswithin each part of this framework will varydepending on the level and type of operation.This framework is presented below. Specificmaterial appropriate to joint force operations,especially for theaters of war and theaters ofoperations, has been added to providesubstance to the basic framework for readersof this publication.

2. Mission

a. Mission Analysis

• Determine the higher command’spurpose. Analyze national security andnational military strategic direction aswell as appropriate guidance in allianceand coalition directions, including long-and short-term objectives for conflicttermination. Conflict terminationobjectives should include the militaryobjectives that will provide the basis forrealizing the political aim regardless ofwhether an imposed or negotiatedtermination is sought.

• Determine specified and implied tasks.If multiple, determine priorities.

b. Mission Statement

• Express in terms of who, what, when,where (task parameters), and why(purpose).

• Frame as a clear, concise statement of theessential tasks to be accomplished andthe purpose to be achieved.

3. Situation and Courses ofAction

a. Situation Analysis

• Geostrategic Context

•• Domestic and international context:political and/or diplomatic long- andshort-term causes of conflict; domesticinfluences, including public will,competing demands for resources, andpolitical, economic, legal, and moralconstraints; and international interests(reinforcing or conflicting with USinterests, including positions of partiesneutral to the conflict), international law,positions of international organizations,and other competing or distractinginternational situations.

•• Characteristics of the operational area,including: military geography(topography, hydrography, climate,and weather); transportation;telecommunications; economics(organization, industrial base, andmobilization capacity); social conditions;and science and technology factorsaffecting the operational area.

• Analysis of the Adversary. Scrutiny ofthe opponent situation, includingcapabilities and vulnerabilities (at thetheater level, commanders will normallyhave available a formal intelligenceestimate) should include the following.

•• Broad military COAs being taken andavailable in the future.

B-2

Appendix B

JP 3-0

•• Political and military intentions andobjectives (to extent known).

•• Military strategic and operationaladvantages and limitations.

•• Possible external military support.

•• COGs (strategic and operational).

•• Specific operational characteristics,including strength, composition,location, and disposition; reinforcements;logistics; time, and space factors(including basing utilized and available);and combat efficiency (includingproficiency in joint operations).

• Friendly Situation. Should follow thesame pattern used for the analysis of theadversary. At the theater level,commanders normally will haveavailable specific supporting estimates,including personnel, logistics, and C4estimates; multinational operationsrequire specific analysis of alliance orcoalition partner objectives, capabilities,and vulnerabilities.

• Restrictions. Those limitations to theuse or threat of use of force that areimposed or necessary to support otherworldwide strategic requirements andassociated diplomatic, economic, andinformational efforts.

• Assumptions. Assumptions areintrinsically important factors uponwhich the conduct of the operation isbased and must be noted as such.

• Deductions. Deductions from the aboveanalysis should yield estimates of relativecombat power, including enemycapabilities that can affect missionaccomplishment.

b. Courses of Action Analysis. COAsdevelopment are based on the above analysisand a creative determination of how themission will be accomplished. Each COAmust be adequate, feasible, and acceptable.State all practical COAs open to thecommander that, if successful, willaccomplish the mission. Generally, at thetheater level, each COA will constitute atheater strategic or operational concept andshould outline the following.

• Major strategic and operational tasks tobe accomplished in the order in whichthey are to be accomplished.

• Forces required.

• C4 concept.

• Logistic concept.

• Deployment concept.

• Estimate of time required to reachtermination objectives.

• Concept for maintaining a theater reserve.

4. Analysis of AdversaryCapabilities

a. Determine the probable effect of possibleadversary capabilities on the success of eachfriendly COA.

b. Conduct this analysis in an orderlymanner by time phasing, geographic location,and functional event. Consider the potentialactions of subordinates two echelons down.

c. Consider conflict termination issues;think through own action, opponent reaction,and counterreaction.

B-3

The Estimate Process

d. Conclude with revalidation of suitability,adequacy, and feasibility; determine additionalrequirements, if any; make requiredmodifications; and list advantages anddisadvantages of each adversary capability.

5. Comparison of Own Coursesof Action

a. Evaluate the advantages anddisadvantages of each COA.

b. Compare with respect to governingfactors.

• Fixed values for joint operations (theprinciples of war, the fundamentals ofjoint warfare, and the elements ofoperational art).

• Other critical factors (for example,political constraints).

• Mission accomplishment.

c. If appropriate, merge elements ofdifferent COAs into one.

6. Decision

Translate the selected COA into a concisestatement of what the force, as a whole, is todo and explain, as may be appropriate, thefollowing elements: when, where, how, andwhy.

B-4

Appendix B

JP 3-0

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX CJOINT PUBLICATION 3-0 SERIES HIERARCHY

C-1

Joint ForceCapabilities

3-33

MultinationalOperations

3-16

InteragencyCoordination

3-08

Military OpsOther Than War

3-07

Aerospace Defof N. America

3-01.1

Joint SpecialOperations

3-05

Lndng ForceOps

3-02.1

SpaceOperations

3-14

Public Affairs3-61

Targeting3-60

Meteorological &Oceanographic

3-59

MilitaryDeception

3-58

Amphib Ops3-02

C2W3-13.1

Civil-MilitaryOperations

3-57

InformationOperations

3-13

C2 for JointAir Ops3-56.1

Theater MissileDefense3-01.5

UAV3-55.1

J-SEAD3-01.4

Jnt Spec OpsTask Frc Ops

3-05.1

RSTA3-55

Countering Air& Missile

Threats 3-01

DomesticSupport Ops

3-07.7

Joint TheaterNuclear Ops

3-12.1

NBC Defense3-11

Base Defense3-10.1

Rear Area3-10

Close AirSupport3-09.3

LaserDesig Ops

3-09.1

Fire Support3-09

Nuc Wpn Emp(Notional)

3-12.3

Nuc Wpn Emp3-12.2

Nuclear Ops3-12

JointOperations

3-0

Special OpsTarget’g & Msn

Plng 3-05.5

Special OpsProcedures

3-05.3

HumanitarianAssistance

3-07.6

CounterdrugOps

3-07.4

PeaceOperations

3-07.3

Antiterrorism3-07.2

JTTP for NEO3-07.5

UrbanOperations

3-06

SO Targeting &Msn Planning

3-05.2

Civil Affairs3-57.1

Barriers &Mines3-15

EngineerDoctrine

3-34

Deploymnt &Redeploymnt

3-35

ForcibleEntry Ops

3-18

C2 JointAir Ops

3-30

Airlift Ops3-17

JFLCC3-31

StrategicAttack3-70

ForeignInternal Def

3-07.1

Interdiction3-03

AmphibiousEmbarkation

3-02.2

ShipboardHelo Ops

3-04.1

OffensiveCounterair

3-01.2

DefensiveCounterair

3-01.3

Civil SAR3-49

OPSEC3-54

E & R3-50.3

CSAR JTTP3-50.21

CSAR3-50.2

PSYOP3-53

AirspaceControl

3-52

EW3-51

SpaceControl3-14.1

Counter-proliferation

3-40

C-2

Appendix C

JP 3-0

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX DREFERENCES

D-1

The development of JP 3-0 is based upon the following primary references.

1. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (10 USC 161et. seq. PL 99-433).

2. DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.

3. CJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.

4. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.

5. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

6. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

7. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

D-2

Appendix D

JP 3-0

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX EADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

E-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100,116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director forOperations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-0, 1 February 1995, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and JointForce Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

E-2

Appendix E

JP 3-0

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the jointpublication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outsidethe combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified jointpublication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through thelocal embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL,Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

CommanderUSJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, InformationSecurity Program.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

ACSA acquisition and cross-servicing agreementADCON administrative controlAO area of operationsAOI area of interestAOR area of responsibility

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and controlC3 command, control, and communicationsC3IC coalition coordination, communications, and integration

centerC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCA civil affairsCCIR commander’s critical information requirementsCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff InstructionCM consequence managementCMO civil-military operationsCNA computer network attackCND computer network defenseCOA course of actionCOCOM combatant command (command authority)COG center of gravityCOMMZ communications zoneCONUS continental United StatesCOP common operational picture

DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorizedDOD Department of DefenseDSO domestic support operations

EW electronic warfare

FHA foreign humanitarian assistanceFID foreign internal defenseFSCL fire support coordination line

HN host nationHNS host-nation supportHRP high-risk personnel

GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-0

IO information operationsIPE individual protective equipmentISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staffJ-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staffJFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJFLCC joint force land component commanderJFSOCC joint force special operations component commanderJIPB joint intelligence preparation of the battlespaceJOA joint operations areaJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJP joint publicationJRA joint rear areaJSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities PlanJSOA joint special operations areaJTCB joint targeting coordination boardJTF joint task forceJUO joint urban operations

LOAC law of armed conflictLOC line of communications

MOOTW military operations other than war

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCA National Command AuthoritiesNEO noncombatant evacuation operationNGO nongovernmental organizationNMS national military strategyNORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster AssistanceOPCON operational controlOPLAN operation planOPSEC operations security

PA public affairsPEO peace enforcement operationsPKO peacekeeping operationsPO peace operationsPSYOP psychological operations

RC Reserve ComponentROE rules of engagement

GL-3

Glossary

SO special operationsSOF special operations forces

TACON tactical controlTEP theater engagement planTST time-sensitive target

UCP Unified Command PlanUN United NationsUSC United States CodeUSG United States GovernmentUSJFCOM United States Joint Forces CommandUSSOCOM United States Special Operations CommandUSSPACECOM United States Space CommandUSSTRATCOM United States Strategic CommandUSTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

administrative control. Direction or exerciseof authority over subordinate or otherorganizations in respect to administrationand support, including organization ofService forces, control of resources andequipment, personnel management, unitlogistics, individual and unit training,readiness, mobilization, demobilization,discipline, and other matters not includedin the operational missions of thesubordinate or other organizations. Alsocalled ADCON. (JP 1-02)

air interdiction. Air operations conductedto destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’smilitary potential before it can be broughtto bear effectively against friendly forcesat such distance from friendly forces thatdetailed integration of each air mission withthe fire and movement of friendly forces isnot required. (JP 1-02)

airspace control authority. The commanderdesignated to assume overall responsibilityfor the operation of the airspace controlsystem in the airspace control area. Alsocalled ACA. (JP 1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formalagreements (i.e., treaties) between two ormore nations for broad, long-termobjectives which further the commoninterests of the members. (JP 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense,distribution for planning of limitedresources among competing requirements.Specific apportionments (e.g., air sortiesand forces for planning) are described asapportionment of air sorties and forces forplanning, etc. (JP 1-02)

apportionment (air). The determination andassignment of the total expected effort bypercentage and/or by priority that shouldbe devoted to the various air operations for

a given period of time. Also called airapportionment. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

area air defense commander. Within aunified command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or joint task force, thecommander will assign overallresponsibility for air defense to a singlecommander. Normally, this will be thecomponent commander with thepreponderance of air defense capability andthe command, control, and communicationscapability to plan and execute integrated airdefense operations. Representation fromthe other components involved will beprovided, as appropriate, to the area airdefense commander’s headquarters. Alsocalled AADC. (JP 1-02)

area of interest. That area of concern to thecommander, including the area of influence,areas adjacent thereto, and extending intoenemy territory to the objectives of currentor planned operations. This area alsoincludes areas occupied by enemy forceswho could jeopardize the accomplishmentof the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational areadefined by the joint force commander forland and naval forces. Areas of operationdo not typically encompass the entireoperational area of the joint forcecommander, but should be large enough forcomponent commanders to accomplishtheir missions and protect their forces. Alsocalled AO. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. The geographical areaassociated with a combatant commandwithin which a combatant commander hasauthority to plan and conduct operations.Also called AOR. (This term and its

GL-4 JP 3-0

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

definition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

battle damage assessment. The timely andaccurate estimate of damage resulting fromthe application of military force, eitherlethal or non-lethal, against a predeterminedobjective. Battle damage assessment canbe applied to the employment of all typesof weapon systems (air, ground, naval, andspecial forces weapon systems) throughoutthe range of military operations. Battledamage assessment is primarily anintelligence responsibility with requiredinputs and coordination from the operators.Battle damage assessment is composed ofphysical damage assessment, functionaldamage assessment, and target systemassessment. Also called BDA. See alsocombat assessment. (JP 1-02)

battlespace. The environment, factors, andconditions which must be understood tosuccessfully apply combat power, protectthe force, or complete the mission. Thisincludes the air, land, sea, space and theincluded enemy and friendly forces,facilities, weather, terrain, theelectromagnetic spectrum, and informationenvironment within the operational areasand areas of interest. (JP 1-02)

boundary. A line which delineates surfaceareas for the purpose of facilitatingcoordination and deconfliction ofoperations between adjacent units,formations, or areas. (JP 1-02)

branch. 1. A subdivision of any organization.2. A geographically separate unit of anactivity which performs all or part of theprimary functions of the parent activity ona smaller scale. Unlike an annex, a branchis not merely an overflow addition. 3. Anarm or service of the Army. 4. Thecontingency options built into the basicplan. A branch is used for changing the

mission, orientation, or direction ofmovement of a force to aid success of theoperation based on anticipated events,opportunities, or disruptions caused byenemy actions and reactions. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

campaign. A series of related militaryoperations aimed at accomplishing astrategic or operational objective within agiven time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of relatedmilitary operations aimed at accomplishinga strategic or operational objective withina given time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign planning. The process wherebycombatant commanders and subordinatejoint force commanders translate nationalor theater strategy into operational conceptsthrough the development of campaignplans. Campaign planning may beginduring deliberate planning when the actualthreat, national guidance, and availableresources become evident, but is normallynot completed until after the NationalCommand Authorities select the course ofaction during crisis action planning.Campaign planning is conducted whencontemplated military operations exceedthe scope of a single major joint operation.(JP 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics,capabilities, or sources of power fromwhich a military force derives its freedomof action, physical strength, or will to fight.Also called COGs. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil-military operations. The activities of acommander that establish, maintain,influence, or exploit relations between

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military forces, governmental andnongovernmental civilian organizations andauthorities, and the civilian populace in afriendly, neutral, or hostile operational areato facilitate military operations, toconsolidate and achieve operational USobjectives. Civil-military operations mayinclude performance by military forces ofactivities and functions normally theresponsibility of the local, regional, ornational government. These activities mayoccur prior to, during, or subsequent to othermilitary actions. They may also occur, ifdirected, in the absence of other militaryoperations. Civil-military operations maybe performed by designated civil affairs, byother military forces, or by a combinationof civil affairs and other forces. Also calledCMO. (JP 1-02)

close air support. Air action by fixed- androtary-wing aircraft against hostile targetswhich are in close proximity to friendlyforces and which require detailedintegration of each air mission with the fireand movement of those forces. Also calledCAS. (JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement betweentwo or more nations for common action.(JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specifiedcommand with a broad continuing missionunder a single commander established andso designated by the President, through theSecretary of Defense and with the adviceand assistance of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. Combatant commandstypically have geographic or functionalresponsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (commandauthority). Nontransferable commandauthority established by title 10 (“ArmedForces”), United States Code, section 164,exercised only by commanders of unifiedor specified combatant commands unless

otherwise directed by the President or theSecretary of Defense. Combatantcommand (command authority) cannot bedelegated and is the authority of acombatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assigned forcesinvolving organizing and employingcommands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction over all aspects ofmilitary operations, joint training, andlogistics necessary to accomplish themissions assigned to the command.Combatant command (command authority)should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Combatant command(command authority) provides fullauthority to organize and employcommands and forces as the combatantcommander considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Also calledCOCOM. (JP 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination ofthe overall effectiveness of forceemployment during military operations.Combat assessment is composed of threemajor components, (a) battle damageassessment, (b) munitions effectsassessment, and (c) reattackrecommendations. The objective of combatassessment is to identify recommendationsfor the course of military operations. TheJ-3 is normally the single point of contactfor combat assessment at the joint forcelevel, assisted by the joint force J-2. Alsocalled CA. (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise ofauthority and direction by a properlydesignated commander over assigned andattached forces in the accomplishment of

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Glossary

the mission. Command and controlfunctions are performed through anarrangement of personnel, equipment,communications, facilities, and proceduresemployed by a commander in planning,directing, coordinating, and controllingforces and operations in theaccomplishment of the mission. Also calledC2. (JP 1-02)

commander’s critical informationrequirements. A comprehensive list ofinformation requirements identified by thecommander as being critical in facilitatingtimely information management and thedecision making process that affectsuccessful mission accomplishment. Thetwo key subcomponents are critical friendlyforce information and priority intelligencerequirements. Also called CCIR. (JP 1-02)

commander’s estimate of the situation. Alogical process of reasoning by which acommander considers all the circumstancesaffecting the military situation and arrivesat a decision as to a course of action to betaken to accomplish the mission. Acommander’s estimate, which considers amilitary situation so far in the future as torequire major assumptions, is called acommander’s long-range estimate of thesituation. (JP 1-02)

command relationships. The interrelatedresponsibilities between commanders, aswell as the operational authority exercisedby commanders in the chain of command;defined further as combatant command(command authority), operational control,tactical control, or support. (JP 1-02)

common operational picture. A singleidentical display of relevant informationshared by more than one command. Acommon operational picture facilitatescollaborative planning and assists allechelons to achieve situational awareness.Also called COP. (This term and its

definition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

communications zone. Rear part of theaterof war or theater of operations (behind butcontiguous to the combat zone) whichcontains the lines of communications,establishments for supply and evacuation,and other agencies required for theimmediate support and maintenance of thefield forces. (JP 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphicstatement, in broad outline, of acommander’s assumptions or intent inregard to an operation or series ofoperations. The concept of operationsfrequently is embodied in campaign plansand operation plans; in the latter case,particularly when the plans cover a seriesof connected operations to be carried outsimultaneously or in succession. Theconcept is designed to give an overallpicture of the operation. It is includedprimarily for additional clarity of purpose.Also called commander’s concept orCONOPS. (JP 1-02)

conflict. An armed struggle or clash betweenorganized groups within a nation orbetween nations in order to achieve limitedpolitical or military objectives. Althoughregular forces are often involved, irregularforces frequently predominate. Conflictoften is protracted, confined to a restrictedgeographic area, and constrained inweaponry and level of violence. Within thisstate, military power in response to threatsmay be exercised in an indirect mannerwhile supportive of other instruments ofnational power. Limited objectives may beachieved by the short, focused, and directapplication of force. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

consequence management. Those measurestaken to protect public health and safety,

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restore essential government services, andprovide emergency relief to governments,businesses, and individuals affected by theconsequences of a chemical, biological,nuclear, and/or high-yield explosivesituation. For domestic consequencemanagement, the primary authority restswith the States to respond and the FederalGovernment to provide assistance asrequired. Also called CM. (This term andits definition are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

coordinating authority. A commander orindividual assigned responsibility forcoordinating specific functions or activitiesinvolving forces of two or more MilitaryDepartments, two or more joint forcecomponents, or two or more forces of thesame Service. The commander or individualhas the authority to require consultationbetween the agencies involved, but doesnot have the authority to compel agreement.In the event that essential agreement cannotbe obtained, the matter shall be referred tothe appointing authority. Coordinatingauthority is a consultation relationship, notan authority through which command maybe exercised. Coordinating authority is moreapplicable to planning and similar activitiesthan to operations. (JP 1-02)

coup de main. An offensive operation thatcapitalizes on surprise and simultaneousexecution of supporting operations to achievesuccess in one swift stroke. (JP 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving athreat to the United States, its territories,citizens, military forces, possessions, orvital interests that develops rapidly andcreates a condition of such diplomatic,economic, political, or military importancethat commitment of US military forces andresources is contemplated to achievenational objectives. (JP 1-02)

culminating point. The point at which a forceno longer has the capability to continue itsform of operations, offense or defense. a.In the offense, the point at which continuingthe attack is no longer possible and the forcemust consider reverting to a defensiveposture or attempting an operational pause.b. In the defense, the point at whichcounteroffensive action is no longerpossible. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

decisive point. A geographic place, specifickey event, critical system, or function thatallows commanders to gain a markedadvantage over an enemy and greatlyinfluence the outcome of an attack. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

electronic warfare. Any military actioninvolving the use of electromagnetic anddirected energy to control theelectromagnetic spectrum or to attack theenemy. Also called EW. The three majorsubdivisions within electronic warfare are:electronic attack, electronic protection, andelectronic warfare support. a. electronicattack. That division of electronic warfareinvolving the use of electromagnetic energy,directed energy, or antiradiation weaponsto attack personnel, facilities, or equipmentwith the intent of degrading, neutralizing,or destroying enemy combat capability andis considered a form of fires. Also calledEA. EA includes: 1) actions taken toprevent or reduce an enemy’s effective useof the electromagnetic spectrum, such asjamming and electromagnetic deception,and 2) employment of weapons that useeither electromagnetic or directed energyas their primary destructive mechanism(lasers, radio frequency weapons, particlebeams). b. electronic protection. Thatdivision of electronic warfare involving

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Glossary

passive and active means taken to protectpersonnel, facilities, and equipment fromany effects of friendly or enemyemployment of electronic warfare thatdegrade, neutralize, or destroy friendlycombat capability. Also called EP. c.electronic warfare support. That divisionof electronic warfare involving actionstasked by, or under direct control of, anoperational commander to search for,intercept, identify, and locate or localizesources of intentional and unintentionalradiated electromagnetic energy for thepurpose of immediate threat recognition,targeting, planning and conduct of futureoperations. Thus, electronic warfaresupport provides information required fordecisions involving electronic warfareoperations and other tactical actions suchas threat avoidance, targeting, and homing.Also called ES. Electronic warfare supportdata can be used to produce signalsintelligence, provide targeting for electronicor destructive attack, and producemeasurement and signature intelligence.(JP 1-02)

enemy capabilities. Those courses of actionof which the enemy is physically capable,and that, if adopted, will affectaccomplishment of our mission. The term“capabilities” includes not only the generalcourses of action open to the enemy, suchas attack, defense, or withdrawal, but alsoall the particular courses of action possibleunder each general course of action.“Enemy capabilities” are considered in thelight of all known factors affecting militaryoperations, including time, space, weather,terrain, and the strength and disposition ofenemy forces. In strategic thinking, thecapabilities of a nation represent the coursesof action within the power of the nation foraccomplishing its national objectivesthroughout the range of military operations.(JP 1-02)

environmental considerations. The spectrumof environmental media, resources, orprograms that may impact on, or are affectedby, the planning and execution of militaryoperations. Factors may include, but arenot limited to, environmental compliance,pollution prevention, conservation,protection of historical and cultural sites,and protection of flora and fauna. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

expeditionary force. An armed forceorganized to accomplish a specific objectivein a foreign country. (JP 1-02)

fires. The effects of lethal or nonlethalweapons. (JP 1-02)

fire support coordinating measure. Ameasure employed by land or amphibiouscommanders to facilitate the rapidengagement of targets and simultaneouslyprovide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP1-02)

fire support coordination line. A fire supportcoordinating measure that is establishedand adjusted by appropriate land oramphibious force commanders within theirboundaries in consultation with superior,subordinate, supporting, and affectedcommanders. Fire support coordinationlines (FSCLs) facilitate the expeditious attackof surface targets of opportunity beyondthe coordinating measure. An FSCL doesnot divide an area of operations by defininga boundary between close and deepoperations or a zone for close air support.The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land,and sea-based weapons systems using anytype of ammunition. Forces attacking targetsbeyond an FSCL must inform all affectedcommanders in sufficient time to allownecessary reaction to avoid fratricide.Supporting elements attacking targets

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beyond the FSCL must ensure that theattack will not produce adverse effects on,or to the rear of, the line. Short of an FSCL,all air-to-ground and surface-to-surfaceattack operations are controlled by theappropriate land or amphibious forcecommander. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features. Coordination ofattacks beyond the FSCL is especiallycritical to commanders of air, land, andspecial operations forces. In exceptionalcircumstances, the inability to conduct thiscoordination will not preclude the attack oftargets beyond the FSCL. However, failureto do so may increase the risk of fratricideand could waste limited resources. Alsocalled FSCL. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

force projection. The ability to project themilitary element of national power from thecontinental United States (CONUS) oranother theater, in response to requirementsfor military operations. Force projectionoperations extend from mobilization anddeployment of forces to redeployment toCONUS or home theater. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Actions taken to preventor mitigate hostile actions againstDepartment of Defense personnel (toinclude family members), resources,facilities, and critical information. Theseactions conserve the force’s fightingpotential so it can be applied at the decisivetime and place and incorporates thecoordinated and synchronized offensive anddefensive measures to enable the effectiveemployment of the joint force whiledegrading opportunities for the enemy.Force protection does not include actionsto defeat the enemy or protect againstaccidents, weather, or disease. (Uponapproval of this revision, this term anddefinition will modify the existing term anddefinition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

functional component command. A commandnormally, but not necessarily, composed offorces of two or more Military Departmentswhich may be established across the rangeof military operations to perform particularoperational missions that may be of shortduration or may extend over a period oftime. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken toaffect adversary information andinformation systems while defending one’sown information and information systems.Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

information superiority. The capability tocollect, process, and disseminate anuninterrupted flow of information whileexploiting or denying an adversary’s abilityto do the same. (JP 1-02)

integration. 1. In force projection, thesynchronized transfer of units into anoperational commander’s force prior tomission execution. 2. The arrangement ofmilitary forces and their actions to create aforce that operates by engaging as a whole.3. In photography, a process by which theaverage radar picture seen on several scansof the time base may be obtained on a print,or the process by which severalphotographic images are combined into asingle image. (JP 1-02)

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt,delay, or destroy the enemy’s surfacemilitary potential before it can be usedeffectively against friendly forces. (JP 1-02)

joint fires. Fires produced during theemployment of forces from two or morecomponents in coordinated action towarda common objective. (JP 1-02)

joint fire support. Joint fires that assist air,land, maritime, amphibious, and specialoperations forces to move, maneuver, andcontrol territory, populations, airspace, and

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key waters. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

joint force. A general term applied to a forcecomposed of significant elements, assignedor attached, of two or more MilitaryDepartments, operating under a single jointforce commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. Thecommander within a unified command,subordinate unified command, or joint taskforce responsible to the establishingcommander for making recommendationson the proper employment of assigned,attached, and/or made available for taskingair forces; planning and coordinating airoperations; or accomplishing suchoperational missions as may be assigned.The joint force air component commanderis given the authority necessary toaccomplish missions and tasks assigned bythe establishing commander. Also calledJFACC. (This term and its definition modifythe existing term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint force land component commander. Thecommander within a unified command,subordinate unified command, or joint taskforce responsible to the establishingcommander for making recommendationson the proper employment of assigned,attached, and/or made available for taskingland forces; planning and coordinating landoperations; or accomplishing suchoperational missions as may be assigned.

The joint force land component commanderis given the authority necessary toaccomplish missions and tasks assignedby the establishing commander. Also calledJFLCC. (This term and its definition modifythe existing term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

joint force maritime component commander.The commander within a unified command,subordinate unified command, or joint taskforce responsible to the establishingcommander for making recommendationson the proper employment of assigned,attached, and/or made available for taskingmaritime forces and assets; planning andcoordinating maritime operations; oraccomplishing such operational missionsas may be assigned. The joint force maritimecomponent commander is given theauthority necessary to accomplish missionsand tasks assigned by the establishingcommander. Also called JFMCC. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint force special operations componentcommander. The commander within aunified command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or joint task force responsibleto the establishing commander for makingrecommendations on the properemployment of assigned, attached, and/ormade available for tasking specialoperations forces and assets; planning andcoordinating special operations; oraccomplishing such operational missions asmay be assigned. The joint force specialoperations component commander is giventhe authority necessary to accomplishmissions and tasks assigned by theestablishing commander. Also calledJFSOCC. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

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joint intelligence preparation of thebattlespace. The analytical process usedby joint intelligence organizations toproduce intelligence assessments,estimates, and other intelligence productsin support of the joint force commander’sdecision making process. It is a continuousprocess that includes defining the totalbattlespace environment; describing thebattlespace; evaluating the adversary; anddetermining and describing adversarypotential courses of action. The process isused to analyze the air, land, sea, space,electromagnetic, cyberspace, and humandimensions of the environment and todetermine an opponent’s capabilities tooperate in each. Joint intelligencepreparation of the battlespace products areused by the joint force and componentcommand staffs in preparing their estimatesand are also applied during the analysis andselection of friendly courses of action. Alsocalled JIPB. (JP 1-02)

joint operations. A general term to describemilitary actions conducted by joint forces, orby Service forces in relationships (e.g., support,coordinating authority), which, of themselves,do not create joint forces. (JP 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea,and airspace, defined by a geographiccombatant commander or subordinateunified commander, in which a joint forcecommander (normally a joint task forcecommander) conducts military operationsto accomplish a specific mission. Jointoperations areas are particularly usefulwhen operations are limited in scope andgeographic area or when operations are tobe conducted on the boundaries betweentheaters. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations area. A restrictedarea of land, sea, and airspace assigned bya joint force commander to the commanderof a joint special operations force to conductspecial operations activities. The

commander of joint special operationsforces may further assign a specific area orsector within the joint special operationsarea to a subordinate commander formission execution. The scope and durationof the special operations forces’ mission,friendly and hostile situation, andpolitico-military considerations allinfluence the number, composition, andsequencing of special operations forcesdeployed into a joint special operations area.It may be limited in size to accommodate adiscrete direct action mission or may beextensive enough to allow a continuingbroad range of unconventional warfareoperations. Also called JSOA. (JP 1-02)

joint strategic attack. A joint strategic attackis a combatant commander directedoffensive action against a vital target(s),whether military, political, economic, orother, that is specifically selected in orderto achieve National Command Authoritiesor combatant commander’s strategicobjectives. (This term and its definition areprovided for information and are proposedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02by JP 3-70.)

joint urban operations. All joint operationsplanned and conducted across the range ofmilitary operations on or against objectiveson a topographical complex and its adjacentnatural terrain where manmade constructionor the density of noncombatants are thedominant features. Also called JUO. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

lines of operations. Lines which define thedirectional orientation of the force in timeand space in relation to the enemy. Theyconnect the force with its base of operationsand its objectives. (JP 1-02)

major operation. A series of tactical actions(battles, engagements, strikes) conductedby various combat forces of a single or

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Glossary

several Services, coordinated in time andplace, to accomplish operational and,sometimes, strategic objectives in anoperational area. These actions areconducted simultaneously or sequentiallyin accordance with a common plan and arecontrolled by a single commander. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships,aircraft, or land forces in a position ofadvantage over the enemy. 2. A tacticalexercise carried out at sea, in the air, on theground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3.The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle,to cause it to perform desired movements.4. Employment of forces in the battlespacethrough movement in combination withfires to achieve a position of advantage inrespect to the enemy in order to accomplishthe mission. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

military deception. Actions executed todeliberately mislead adversary militarydecisionmakers as to friendly militarycapabilities, intentions, and operations,thereby causing the adversary to takespecific actions (or inactions) that willcontribute to the accomplishment of thefriendly mission. The five categories ofmilitary deception are: a. strategic militarydeception—Military deception planned andexecuted by and in support of seniormilitary commanders to result in adversarymilitary policies and actions that supportthe originator’s strategic military objectives,policies, and operations. b. operationalmilitary deception—Military deceptionplanned and executed by and in support ofoperational-level commanders to result inadversary actions that are favorable to theoriginator’s objectives and operations.Operational military deception is plannedand conducted in a theater of war to

support campaigns and major operations.c. tactical military deception—Militarydeception planned and executed by and insupport of tactical commanders to result inadversary actions that are favorable to theoriginator’s objectives and operations.Tactical military deception is planned andconducted to support battles andengagements. d. Service militarydeception—Military deception plannedand executed by the Services that pertainto Service support to joint operations.Service military deception is designed toprotect and enhance the combat capabilitiesof Service forces and systems. e. militarydeception in support of operations security(OPSEC)—Military deception planned andexecuted by and in support of all levels ofcommand to support the prevention of theinadvertent compromise of sensitive orclassified activities, capabilities, orintentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures aredesigned to distract foreign intelligenceaway from, or provide cover for, militaryoperations and activities. (JP 1-02)

military operations other than war.Operations that encompass the use ofmilitary capabilities across the range ofmilitary operations short of war. Thesemilitary actions can be applied tocomplement any combination of the otherinstruments of national power and occurbefore, during, and after war. Also calledMOOTW. (JP 1-02)

mission type order. 1. Order issued to alower unit that includes the accomplishmentof the total mission assigned to the higherheadquarters. 2. Order to a unit to performa mission without specifying how it is tobe accomplished. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective termto describe military actions conducted byforces of two or more nations, usuallyundertaken within the structure of a coalitionor alliance. (JP 1-02)

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national military strategy. The art and scienceof distributing and applying military powerto attain national objectives in peace andwar. (JP 1-02)

national security strategy. The art andscience of developing, applying, andcoordinating the instruments of nationalpower (diplomatic, economic, military, andinformational) to achieve objectives thatcontribute to national security. Also callednational strategy or grand strategy. (JP1-02)

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive,and attainable goals towards which everymilitary operation should be directed. 2.The specific target of the action taken (forexample, a definite terrain feature, theseizure or holding of which is essential tothe commander’s plan, or, an enemy forceor capability without regard to terrainfeatures). (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

operational area. An overarching termencompassing more descriptive terms forgeographic areas in which militaryoperations are conducted. Operationalareas include, but are not limited to, suchdescriptors as area of responsibility, theaterof war, theater of operations, jointoperations area, amphibious objective area,joint special operations area, and area ofoperations. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

operational art. The employment of militaryforces to attain strategic and/or operationalobjectives through the design, organization,integration, and conduct of strategies,campaigns, major operations, and battles.Operational art translates the joint forcecommander’s strategy into operational

design, and, ultimately, tactical action, byintegrating the key activities of all levels ofwar. (JP 1-02)

operational authority. That authorityexercised by a commander in the chain ofcommand, defined further as combatantcommand (command authority),operational control, tactical control, or asupport relationship. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority thatmay be exercised by commanders at anyechelon at or below the level of combatantcommand. Operational control is inherentin combatant command (commandauthority) and may be delegated within thecommand. When forces are transferredbetween combatant commands, thecommand relationship the gainingcommander will exercise (and the losingcommander will relinquish) over theseforces must be specified by the Secretaryof Defense. Operational control is theauthority to perform those functions ofcommand over subordinate forces involvingorganizing and employing commands andforces, assigning tasks, designatingobjectives, and giving authoritativedirection necessary to accomplish themission. Operational control includesauthoritative direction over all aspects ofmilitary operations and joint trainingnecessary to accomplish missions assignedto the command. Operational control shouldbe exercised through the commanders ofsubordinate organizations. Normally thisauthority is exercised through subordinatejoint force commanders and Service and/orfunctional component commanders.Operational control normally provides fullauthority to organize commands and forcesand to employ those forces as thecommander in operational control considersnecessary to accomplish assignedmissions; it does not, in and of itself, includeauthoritative direction for logistics or

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Glossary

matters of administration, discipline, internalorganization, or unit training. Also calledOPCON. (JP 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of war atwhich campaigns and major operations areplanned, conducted, and sustained toaccomplish strategic objectives withintheaters or other operational areas.Activities at this level link tactics andstrategy by establishing operationalobjectives needed to accomplish thestrategic objectives, sequencing events toachieve the operational objectives, initiatingactions, and applying resources to bringabout and sustain these events. Theseactivities imply a broader dimension of timeor space than do tactics; they ensure thelogistic and administrative support oftactical forces, and provide the means bywhich tactical successes are exploited toachieve strategic objectives. (This term andits definition modify the existing term andits definition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

operational reach. The distance and durationacross which a unit can successfully employmilitary capabilities. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

operations security. A process of identifyingcritical information and subsequentlyanalyzing friendly actions attendant tomilitary operations and other activities to:a. Identify those actions that can beobserved by adversary intelligence systems.b. Determine indicators hostile intelligencesystems might obtain that could beinterpreted or pieced together to derivecritical information in time to be useful toadversaries. c. Select and execute measuresthat eliminate or reduce to an acceptablelevel the vulnerabilities of friendly actionsto adversary exploitation. Also calledOPSEC. (JP 1-02)

peace operations. A broad term thatencompasses peacekeeping operations andpeace enforcement operations conducted insupport of diplomatic efforts to establishand maintain peace. Also called PO. (JP1-02)

physical security. That part of securityconcerned with physical measures designedto safeguard personnel; to preventunauthorized access to equipment,installations, material, and documents; andto safeguard them against espionage,sabotage, damage, and theft. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior offoreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behaviorfavorable to the originator’s objectives.Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information,command information, and communityrelations activities directed toward both theexternal and internal publics with interestin the Department of Defense. Also calledPA. (JP 1-02)

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken toobtain, by visual observation or otherdetection methods, information about theactivities and resources of an enemy orpotential enemy; or to secure dataconcerning the meteorological,hydrographic, or geographic characteristicsof a particular area. (JP 1-02)

risk management. The process ofidentifying, assessing, and controlling risksarising from operational factors and makingdecisions that balance risk cost with mission

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benefits. Also called RM. (This term andits definition modify the existing term andits definition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

sequel. A major operation that follows thecurrent major operation. Plans for a sequelare based on the possible outcomes(success, stalemate, or defeat) associatedwith the current operation. (This term andits definition are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

Service component command. A commandconsisting of the Service componentcommander and all those Service forces,such as individuals, units, detachments,organizations and installations under thecommand including the support forces, thathave been assigned to a combatantcommand, or further assigned to asubordinate unified command or joint taskforce. (JP 1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted byspecially organized, trained, and equippedmilitary and paramilitary forces to achievemilitary, political, economic, orinformational objectives by unconventionalmilitary means in hostile, denied, orpolitically sensitive areas. These operationsare conducted across the full range ofmilitary operations, independently or incoordination with operations ofconventional, non-special operationsforces. Political-military considerationsfrequently shape special operations,requiring clandestine, covert, or lowvisibility techniques and oversight at thenational level. Special operations differfrom conventional operations in degree ofphysical and political risk, operationaltechniques, mode of employment,independence from friendly support, anddependence on detailed operationalintelligence and indigenous assets. Alsocalled SO. (JP 1-02)

specified command. A command that has abroad, continuing mission, normallyfunctional, and is established and sodesignated by the President through theSecretary of Defense with the advice andassistance of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It normally is composed offorces from a single Military Department.Also called specified combatant command.(JP 1-02)

strategic estimate. The estimate of the broadstrategic factors that influence thedetermination of missions, objectives, andcourses of action. The estimate iscontinuous and includes the strategicdirection received from the NationalCommand Authorities or the authoritativebody of an alliance or coalition. (JP 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war atwhich a nation, often as a member of a groupof nations, determines national ormultinational (alliance or coalition) strategicsecurity objectives and guidance, anddevelops and uses national resources toaccomplish these objectives. Activities atthis level establish national andmultinational military objectives; sequenceinitiatives; define limits and assess risks forthe use of military and other instruments ofnational power; develop global plans ortheater war plans to achieve thoseobjectives; and provide military forces andother capabilities in accordance withstrategic plans. (JP 1-02)

strategy. The art and science of developingand employing instruments of nationalpower in a synchronized and integratedfashion to achieve theater, national, and/ormultinational objectives. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

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Glossary

support. 1. The action of a force that aids,protects, complements, or sustains anotherforce in accordance with a directiverequiring such action. 2. A unit that helpsanother unit in battle. 3. An element of acommand that assists, protects, or suppliesother forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commanderhaving primary responsibility for all aspectsof a task assigned by the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan or other joint operationplanning authority. In the context of jointoperation planning, this term refers to thecommander who prepares operation plansor operation orders in response torequirements of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of asupport command relationship, thecommander who receives assistance fromanother commander’s force or capabilities,and who is responsible for ensuring that thesupporting commander understands theassistance required. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

supporting commander. 1. A commander whoprovides augmentation forces or othersupport to a supported commander or whodevelops a supporting plan. Includes thedesignated combatant commands andDefense agencies as appropriate. 2. In thecontext of a support command relationship,the commander who aids, protects,complements, or sustains anothercommander’s force, and who is responsiblefor providing the assistance required by thesupported commander. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

surveillance. The systematic observation ofaerospace, surface or subsurface areas,places, persons, or things, by visual, aural,

electronic, photographic, or other means.(JP 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel,logistics, and other support required tomaintain and prolong operations or combatuntil successful accomplishment or revisionof the mission or of the national objective.(JP 1-02)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement ofmilitary actions in time, space, and purposeto produce maximum relative combatpower at a decisive place and time. 2. Inthe intelligence context, application ofintelligence sources and methods in concertwith the operational plan. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority overassigned or attached forces or commands,or military capability or forces made availablefor tasking, that is limited to the detaileddirection and control of movements ormaneuvers within the operational areanecessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. Tactical control is inherent inoperational control. Tactical control may bedelegated to, and exercised at any level ator below the level of combatant command.When forces are transferred betweencombatant commands, the commandrelationship the gaining commander willexercise (and the losing commander willrelinquish) over these forces must bespecified by the Secretary of Defense.Tactical control provides sufficientauthority for controlling and directing theapplication of force or tactical use of combatsupport assets within the assigned missionor task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at whichbattles and engagements are planned andexecuted to accomplish military objectivesassigned to tactical units or task forces.Activities at this level focus on the orderedarrangement and maneuver of combat

GL-18

Glossary

JP 3-0

elements in relation to each other and to theenemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP1-02)

terms of reference. Terms of reference alludeto a mutual agreement under which acommand, element, or unit exercisesauthority or undertake specific missions ortasks relative to another command, element,or unit. Also called TORs. (This term andits definition are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

theater of operations. A subarea within atheater of war defined by the geographiccombatant commander required to conductor support specific combat operations.Different theaters of operations within thesame theater of war will normally begeographically separate and focused ondifferent enemy forces. Theaters ofoperations are usually of significant size,allowing for operations over extendedperiods of time. (JP 1-02)

theater of war. Defined by the NationalCommand Authorities or the geographiccombatant commander, the area of air, land,and water that is, or may become, directlyinvolved in the conduct of the war. Atheater of war does not normally encompassthe geographic combatant commander’sentire area of responsibility and may contain

more than one theater of operations. (JP1-02)

theater strategy. The art and science ofdeveloping integrated strategic conceptsand courses of action directed towardsecuring the objectives of national andalliance or coalition security policy andstrategy by the use of force, threatened useof force, or operations not involving the useof force within a theater. (JP 1-02)

unified action. A broad generic term thatdescribes the wide scope of actions(including the synchronization of activitieswith governmental and nongovernmentalagencies) taking place within unifiedcommands, subordinate unified commands,or joint task forces under the overalldirection of the commanders of thosecommands. (JP 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broadcontinuing mission under a singlecommander and composed of significantassigned components of two or moreMilitary Departments, and which isestablished and so designated by thePresident, through the Secretary of Defensewith the advice and assistance of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Alsocalled unified combatant command. (JP1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director, J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is the keystone joint operations publication. Thediagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

� Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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