john smith 0 time times chronos kairos

Hegeler Institute

TIME, TIMES, AND THE 'RIGHT TIME'; "CHRONOS" AND "KAIROS"Author(s): John E. SmithSource: The Monist, Vol. 53, No. 1, Philosophy of History (January, 1969), pp. 1-13Published by: Hegeler InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902109 .

Accessed: 24/08/2013 23:57

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Hegeler Institute is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Monist.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sat, 24 Aug 2013 23:57:12 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=hegeler

http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902109?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


TIME, TIMES, AND THE 'RIGHT TIME';

CHRONOS AND KAIROS

Despite the frivolous note implied in the popular expression, 'The Greeks had a word for it', the literal truth is that they did!

Time and again we find reflected in the terminology developed by these ancient seekers after wisdom, an attention to important dis tinctions and a faithfulness to the details of actual experience which are truly remarkable. The Greek thinkers had, as every classical scholar and student of Greek philosophy knows, a finely developed philosophical language, one sensitive no less to the unusual, preg nant experience than to the familiar details of ordinary life.

A striking example of the sensitivity in question is furnished by the fact that the classical literature reveals two Greek words for *timef-chronos and Kairos. These words embrace the uniform time

of the cosmic system, the time which, according to Newton, aequabi liter fluit, and the time of opportunity or 'occasion* come and gone

which marks the significant moments of historical action. One term

-chronos-expresses the fundamental conception of time as mea

sure, the quantity of duration, the length of periodicity, the age of an object or artifact, and the rate of acceleration as applied to the

movements of identifiable bodies, whether on the surface of the

earth or in the firmament beyond. The questions relevant to this

conception of time are: 'How fast?', 'How frequent?', 'How old?'

and the answers to these questions can be given, in principle at

least, in cardinal numbers or in terms of limits that approach these

numbers. The other term-Kairos-points to a qualitative character

of time, to the special position an event or action occupies in a

series, to a season when something appropriately happens that can

not happen at 'any* time, but only at 'that time', to a time that

marks an opportunity which may not recur. The question especially relevant to Kairos time is 'when?', 'At what time?'. Kairos, or the

'right time9, as the term is often translated, involves ordinality or

the conception of a special temporal position, such that what hap



2 THE MONIST

pens or can happen at 'that time' and its significance are wholly dependent on an ordinal place in the sequences and intersections of events. Kairos is, therefore, peculiarly relevant to historical action and to historical enquiry because it points to the significance and

purpose of events and to the idea of constellations of events yielding results which would not have been possible at other times and under other circumstances.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the features of time, tempo ral development, and history denoted by the two terms in question, and to attempt to determine the role of each in expressing the historical dimension of reality. In addition, we must relate the two

features of time to each other, for it has often been assumed that

they are utterly distinct, time as measure being confined wholly to the subject matters of the physical sciences, while qualitative time alone is appropriate for historical events and their interpretation. I shall suggest, instead, that Kairos presupposes chronos and is there fore a necessary condition for history and historical loiowledge, but that by itself chronos does not suffice for the sort of historical

interpretation in which we commonly engage. Moreover, we shall see that there are processes of nature which, though determined in accordance with chronos, cannot be exhaustively understood from the standpoint of chronos time. For in these processes, chronos attains to "critical points" and thus begins to take on qualitative character.1

Aristotle gave classic expression to the concept of time as measure. In Physics, 219b (IV. xi) he defined time (chronos) as the "number of motion with respect to the before and after."

This characterization combines the three essential features of chro nos. There is, first, the element of change, of motion, of process which lasts through or requires a length of time; for Aristotle, time

is not identical with movement, but it nevertheless cannot be

thought apart from movement. Secondly, there is the fact that, an

i It is important to notice that, on the basis of the dictionary, chronos almost

always indicates a quantity or measure of time, and kairos always points to quality. But usage is not absolutely invariant; there are cases where chronos is used in the

sense of a particular time which is the date of an occurrence-"the time (chronos) when the comet appeared." It is, however, the importance of the event and its

content in this case which make the time of singular importance and not vice

versa.



TIME, TIMES, AND THE 'RIGHT TIME' 3

appropriate measuring unit being given, the quantity of the move ment and the elapsed time can be numbered. Thirdly, there is the feature of serial order or direction expressed in the terms 'before' and 'after'.

Time so conceived is both a frame or container in and through which events take place in an actual order of happening; chronos time is a grid upon which events can be plotted for the purpose of historical writing and interpretation. From the standpoint of chro

nos, no features of events other than the three indicated are to be taken into account. Time, in the chronos sense, permits, as the term

implies, a chronology to be constructed, and therefore a chronicle of events which forms the initial material for the writing of history. But considering no more than the facts of process, of measuring time elapsed and the 'before' and 'after' of events, leaves us with out the purpose, the significance and the evaluating interest which are the necessary ingredients both of historical action and of histori cal interpretation. The historical consciousness presupposes a

framework of chronos time as a necessary condition, but by itself it is insufficient because the relations it involves are too abstract to

express the significance of events.

The three features of chronos are essential for the compiling of those chronicles of events which form the indispensible, though never adequate, storehouse of material to be used by the historian. A chronicle rests on a basic chronology allowing for the dating of events and a temporal framework within which persons, govern ments, wars, religious movements, migrations, and all the stuff of

history can be identified. Historical persons live and die, wars begin and end, governments rise and fall, religious movements wax and wane. In each case temporal boundaries must be determined which mark off the life or 'career* of the identifiable men and movements, actions and beliefs. We may wonder, for example, how accurate it is to say that the medieval world came to an end abruptly and was

thus discontinuous with the modern world that succeeded it. Was the historical development simply a matter of moving from the non

scientific, dogmatic, world of authority to the age of science and the

mathematico-physical explanations of the cosmic system? Of course, such questions cannot be answered on the basis of chronos alone, but it is necessary to have a commonly accepted chronology in

accordance with which the relevant historical constituents-think



4 THE MONIST

ers, manuscripts, ecclesiastical pronouncements, scientific inquiries -can be dated and their temporal limits determined. For example, the recent discovery of the scientific work, especially in the medical faculties of Padua, that was being done before the 'end* of the

Middle Age has done much to force a change in our interpretation of the transition. New lines of continuity appear and, in some

respects at least, the conception of a sharp break in history has to be modified. Without precise dating of events and the determination of their temporal boundaries, such reinterpretation could not take

place.

The date and duration of the persons, events and movements in

history together with their precise 'before* and 'after* underlie all historical interpretation. Since the proper sequence of events is bound up with the problem of historical decision and causation, it is essential to be able to determine what events were contemporane ous with each other, what events partially overlapped in a specious present and what events were separated by an identifiable lapse of time. It is essential for understanding what 'really* happened to be able to determine whether, for example, an alleged assassin was or

was not informed before the convention (or could have been so

informed) where the intended victim would be seated on the plat form. The 'before* and 'after* of chronos is therefore essential for

history even if it is not sufficient.

If we penetrate deeper into the nature of chronos we shall discover that there is one sort of natural process which, when

considered from the standpoint of chronos, approaches the qualita tive character of kairos. If we consider, for example, the manner in

which the length of time2 required for a process to take place enters

essentially into the nature of the resulting product, we can see how

the qualitative feature of time begins to emerge. The aging of wine

furnishes an excellent example of an organic process in which time

takes on a qualitative character. The chemistry of wine making tells

us that whereas virtually any wine, once it has been initially consti

tuted as such, can be consumed while it is 'young*, there is, for

great wines at any rate, a time of 'maturity* when the development reaches a peak. It is at this time that the wine will be at its best.

2 Here only the duration or elapsed time is considered. A similar analysis could

be given with respect to the rate at which a process takes place.



TIME, TIMES, AND THE 'RIGHT TIME* 5

The evidence for determining when the crucial time occurs is, of course, partly qualitative in character, being dependent on the

talent, experience and sensitivity of the taster. On the other hand, it is the objective quality of the wine itself that is involved and this

quality is a function of the particular length of time required for

bringing the wine to maturity. There is a 'criticar or 'right time' for the wine; before this critical point, the wine has not yet ma

tured, and after this time, the wine begins to decline and is said to be "past" its peak. The product, though contemporaneous with the

consumer, is thoroughly dependent for its quality on the critical

length of time taken up by the process. The quality which the wine has at its peak is a function of chronos time and the task of the vintner (here is where 'art* enters) is to determine as exactly as

possible what the critical length of time is. In the phenomenon of the specific length of time approaching a

critical point in some natural process at which a special result is

reached, chronos approaches a qualitative character. In Hegelian terms, it is a case of the "transition from quantity to quality." Chronos approaches the feature which defines kairos, namely that some time is the right time for something to happen or take place and this right time is sharply distinguished from 'any* time. De

spite the phenomenon of transition, however, chronos in its main character as a measure, is too abstract, too completely universal and uniform in structure and too homogeneous in its units, to make

possible the historical order in the dual sense of the occurrence of events and of our cognitive grasp of their significance. For history, as Randall has incisively expressed the point, "does not designate . . . the mere occurrence of events" but concerns their significance.3

He writes:

Our name for the record of such occurrences is a "chronicle." If

the New York Times had been published from the first day of creation, we should have a most valuable "chronicle" of human his

tory. But without further appraisal of what had been significant, we should have still no "history."

Chronos allows for temporal location and the relations between the

distinguishable items of experience insofar as these relations are

3 J. H. Randall, Jr., Nature and Historical Experience (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1958), p. 31n.



6 THE MONIST

expressable in terms of the number of motion or duration with

respect to before and after. But, as can readily be seen, the temporal determination as such does not take us beyond the level of occur rence. In Randall's analysis, the familiar habit of identifying his

tory with the 'past* is fallacious. The philosophers' paradigm illus tration of a 'proposition about the past* (ipso facto an 'historical'

proposition), 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon', is not an historical

proposition because it does no more than state an occurrence which took place presumably at a determinate past time and is now no

longer occurring. The proposition is, to be sure, 'about the past', but insofar as it expresses no more than a past occurrence and does not in any way indicate the significance of that occurrence, it is not

yet an historical proposition. To know that an event occurred in the

past is the sort of knowledge that is, or may be, ingredient in

history, but the chronos determination of the event does not of itself

place the event in the historical context. For that we must advance to qualitative time or kairos.

Three distinct, but related, concepts are involved in the notion of kairos. It means, first, the 'right time' for something to happen in contrast with 'any' time; this sense of kairos is captured by the

English word, 'timing', as when we say, "The general's timing was

poor; he attacked too soon and lost his advantage." Second, kairos means a time of tension or conflict, a time of 'crisis' implying that the course of events poses a problem which calls for a decision at that time. Third, kairos means a time when an opportunity for ac

complishing some purpose has opened up as a result of the problem that led to the crisis. Thus kairos means the time when something should happen or be done, the 'right' or 'best' time; it means the time when a constellation of events presents a crisis to which a re

sponse must be made; it means the time when an opportunity is

given for creative action or for achieving some special result that is

possible only at 'this' time. Implicit in all three senses of kairos is

the concept of an individual time having a critical, ordinal position. Such a time is one marked off from its predecessors and successors by the fact that it is a critical or 'turning' point in an historical pro cess. Before this critical time is 'too soon' for the event, and after

this critical time is 'too late'. If, as was pointed out earlier, chronos

time is expressed through cardinal numbers, the contrast with




kairos time is best seen in the fact that the latter is wholly dependent on ordinality. A kairos is always some special temporal position.

Let us consider some examples of kairos time. Plato furnishes two illustrations that emphasize the second and third senses of the term and we shall find all three senses expressed in the sacred

writings of the Judeo-Christian tradition, the tradition from which the historical consciousness of the western world ultimately derives.

In the Seventh Letter (324b) we find Plato replying to a request from the associates of Dion for his support. These associates claim a

loyalty to Dion's principles and they argue that, because of this

loyalty, Plato should lend his support to their policies. He replies that he will give his support if they do in fact hold the views which

they claim to hold. In order to help determine the question, Plato

proposes to tell, not from conjecture, but from certain knowledge, what Dion's policy was and indeed how that policy originated. He

regards his telling of the narrative at "the present moment" as a

seizing of a time which is "opportune."4 That is to say, the telling of the narrative at that time has special significance or purpose. The narrative might indeed be told at "any" time, since there is nothing in the telling itself which necessitates when the tale should be told.

The moment he seizes on is, in his view, the "right" or appropriate time because it serves a special purpose, namely, of laying down a

criterion, at the specific time of their request for his support, by means of which he will determine his own response and also provide Dion's successors whith a touchstone for appraising their own views.

The moment, or kairos, of Plato's response has the special char acter of being fitted for a purpose. Of all the occasions on which the

narrative might be told, this time is singled out as "opportune" or

as the "right time" to tell it. The situation or constellation of events

helps to determine Plato's response; the occasion had to be provided in the form of the historical complex and the intersection of events

coming at that time. But it is Plato's perception of, and seizing

upon, the particular time, the kairos, as the right time in which

something of importance can happen, that constitutes the basis of

historical decision and action. As an opportunity, the occasion is a

challenge that calls for a response, but it is a response that is not

appropriate at 'any* time you please but only at 'that* time.

4 The crucial expression is Katpov ra vvv



8 THE MONIST

In the fourth book of the Laws* Plato declares, "Chance (tyche) and occasion (kairos) cooperate with God in the control of all human affairs." This pronouncement is made in connection with his discussion of the different factors that govern human life. Previ

ously, he had raised the question whether laws are explicitly and

designedly made by man, or whether external factors alone deter mine what shall happen. The answer is given in dialectical terms; chance and occasion are the two mundane factors which condition human action and Plato's belief is that the two stand in some sort of

harmony governed ultimately by what is understood to be "God," either fate (fio pa) or the Idea of the Good. Whatever may be the truth about the total harmony in Plato's view, it is instructive to note that he contrasts the time expressed in the term kairos with the notion of chance. What happens by 'chance' happens in a way that is opaque to human understanding; 'chance* is a coming together of events that, for all we can understand or determine, could have

happened at 'any* time in contrast with what could happen at some

particular time. By contrast, 'occasion* points to a right, proper or

favorable time which makes possible what, under different circum

stances, could not come to pass. 'Occasions*, or opportunities are times which must be apprehended as such through historical insight and understanding; moreover, they are times for historical decision and action. By contrast, what comes to be by 'chance* takes place without our having any sense that the events 'conspired* to bring about the result. We often express our failure to grasp a pattern in the chance happening by saying that the event "just happened to take place that way" and we view it merely as occurring without further significance.

Further aspects of kairos time are brought to light in some

biblical writings, a fact which is perfectly intelligible since the Hebraic tradition had from the outset a vivid sense of the historical

order and of the course of history as a medium of divine disclosure.

In the third chapter of the book of Ecclesiastes there occurs a series

of contrasts involving seasons, events, human attitudes, activities

and other happenings in human life. The basic idea expressed is

5 The passage quoted in the text comes at 709b and it is quoted from the

translation of the Loeb edition. "Occasion" is meant to be the equivalent of the

Latin " opportunitas."




that there are appropriate times (Kairoi) when something should

happen and these times preclude the possibility that they can hap pen at 'any' time. "For every thing there is a season, and a time for

every purpose under heaven," says the writer, and he goes on to illustrate his point. There is a time to be born and a time to die; there is a time to plant and a time to reap; there is a time to weep and a time to laugh; there is a time to mourn and a time to dance; there is a time to keep silence and a time to speak. It is interesting to note that the Greek translators of the Old Testament in what we know as the Septuagint, chose Kairos and not chronos for translating all these occurrences of 'there is a time to*, implying their grasp of the qualitative character of the times involved. In some cases, the

right or appropriate time is set by the structure of a natural, organic process as in the time for sowing and the time for reaping; in other cases, the appropriate time is more totally dependent on freedom and our grasp of the nature of the occasion and its possibilities. Thus to know when is the right time for silence and when is the time to speak, or to know when to mourn and when to dance, call for historical understanding of the import of human events.

The idea of Kairos as indicating a special time at which some

thing of peculiar significance occurs played a vital role throughout the biblical writings. It is found in the historical consciousness of the

prophetic movement of the Old Testament where historical devel

opment is seen in terms of periods of crisis or judgment. The destruction of the temple at Jerusalem and the consequent captivity in Babylon are events seen by the prophets as judgments wrought in

history by the God of the Covenant. Or again, in the interpretation of Jesus at the hands of the Christian writers, his appearance in

history was seen as coming at the 'fullness of time* implying a

period of preparation which culminated in the coming into the historical order of the being who is to manifest the divine meaning of the entire historical process. History, like the course of nature, has its seasons and just as there is a time of the locust, there is also a time of the Messiah. And insofar as we are justified in speaking about Jesus* intention or self-consciousness, there is evidence that he

thought in these same terms when he spoke of his own historical

destiny in the expression, 'My time has corne'. He sees, that is to

say, a divine pattern in the course of events and that pattern is a

special succession of special times.



10 THE MONIST

In order to grasp the full significance of Kairos time for history it is necessary to focus attention on history as an order of actual

happening and not only an order of interpretation. One of the

shortcomings of much recent philosophical thinking and writing about history has been the tendency to emphasize but one side of historical reality, namely, historical knowledge and history as a rec ord. History as a dynamic continuum of events, as a sequence of ac tual occasions which call for decision and action on the part of individuals and groups, has often been forced into the background.

History as record is, of course, essential; human memory and self

interpretation, the main ingredients of historical writing, can have their being only in signs or the marks left in every present by means of which we are able to determine and to interpret what happened. But it is necessary to keep steadily in view the abstract character of all historical knowledge; events take place "in" history or in the

spatio-temporal setting of all actions and interactions, challenges and responses. Events do not take place 'in* historical knowledge; they find there a position in a relational framework of facts and

significances, but while the writing of history is something that

happens, the events receiving interpretation and explanation do not happen in the writing. No matter how far we push the idealistic thesis in analyzing the nature of historical knowledge-and it is clear that the 'reconstructive' nature of such knowledge lends itself

extremely well to idealist treatment-the central truth of the realis tic pproach cannot be ignored. History as record must stand under the constraint of history as happening, and indeed it is impossible to write critical history that allows for significant argument and alteration of views among historians on the basis of evidence unless this assumption is made. For if historian A offers an account a of an

event or complex of events E, and historian B proposes an alterna tive account fe of E which purports to modify, contradict, improve, falsify etc. a, it is clear that B does not propose merely to substitute b for a and thus replace one record with another. B claims much

more; he claims that fe is a correct, true, more adequate, better

founded account of E than a is. In short, B as critical historian, is

claiming that he, B, has advanced an account which is true of the same E about which the account advanced by A is false. The

reference to objective happening standing over against both histori ans is intended, indeed must be intended, by every critical historian.



TIME, TIMES, AND THE 'RIGHT TIME* ll

Unless this reference is involved, there is no critical historical

knowledge; the most that any historian could do would be to offer another account but he could make no claims for it vis- -vis the other accounts, except to say that his differs from them.. Even then, however, the difference would be of no interest without the presup position that the various accounts are of the same E.

The reason for calling attention to the realistic reference at this

juncture is to redress an imbalance and force a return to history as

happening. For the occurrence of Kairos times is essentially related to historical decision and action, to history 'in the making', even if it is also necessary for historical understanding after the event. Let us now turn to some illustrations of the role of Kairos as marking off both a 'crisis' and an 'opportunity' in the actual historical contin uum.

Insofar as historical action has an intentional side to it, that is, insofar as individuals and groups determine to any degree what

actually happens through their decisions and actions, the historical

present will always be a situation of interaction, of a challenge

presented and a response demanded. As has been repeatedly empha sized both by historians and philosophers, one of the significant keys to the understanding of historical men and movements is the loca tion of the problem or challenge posed by change. Change means a

tension between old, institutionalized ways of thinking and behav

ing, and novel ideas, inventions and new ways of doing things. For men to act at a given historical juncture it is essential that they seek to grasp the dominant problem or problems-the 'crisis'-they confront and the possibilities for response inherent in their situa

tion. Thus confronted, they must envisage the 'opportunities' of

that time, what 'must' be done and what 'can' be done. The churchmen and theologians of the 16th century, for example, the

architects of the Counter-Reformation, confronting the theological,

religious, social and political challenge of Reformed Christianity, had to assess their opportunity in order to prepare their response.

They had to determine what was necessary-what the situation

'called for'-and to adjust that to their grasp of what was actually

possible-what the situation 'allowed'. Earlier, Luther had seen the

Kairos of his time and had seized the opportunity to make his

protest against the Roman Catholic Church in the name of Pauline

Christianity and the biblical witness. A new Kairos was brought



12 THE MONIST

about in time by the various movements of reform and revolution which challenged the Catholic Church to respond. It is interesting to note that by contrast with the contemporary self-critical response being made by the Catholic Church in the new Kairos brought about by secularization and the problems of the nuclear age, the

response of the 16th century churchmen to their crisis and opportu nity was largely noncritical and consisted almost entirely of a reiteration of the traditional faith in essentially dogmatic terms.

We can detect in the contemporary political and religious situa tion in the Western countries a new Kairos time. The liberal democ racies find themselves confronted by the revolutionary challenge of

Marxism in its many forms. It is a time of crisis or judgment as well as of opportunity in the social, political and religious situations

especially. The crisis seems clear enough; the opportunity less so. A

seizing of the Kairos in a courageous way as an opportunity would mean an attempt on the part of the democratic systems to find resources for self-criticism by recognizing the extent to which Marx ism was spawned by their own failures. The opportunity is that of

seeking to incorporate what is valid in the new criticism while at the same time preserving the truth inherent in the basic principle of

representative government, and the institutions of a free society. The grasp of the Kairos as both judgment and opportunity is a

function of historical understanding within the context of historical action itself. As such, Kairos belongs to history as happening and not only to the domain of historical interpretation. Moreover, Kairos points to the need on the part of the agents of history for an historical type of understanding in assessing the situation in which

they must act. The contemporary confrontation, especially in Amer

ica, between traditional Christianity and the drive towards seculari

zation, illustrates the point very well indeed. The churches clearly are faced with a crisis; they are confronted with vigorous criticism directed against religious beliefs and practices in the name of indi vidual freedom, new moralities, man's belief in his ability to control his own destiny, and a growing sense of the irrelevance of much traditional theology in a technological age. For the churches the

challenge of new beliefs constitutes the crisis. What is the correct

response? What opportunity is hidden in the time of crisis? These are the central questions to be answered for those who would seize the Kairos. A major possibility for response under these circum




stances is one of candid self-criticism and an attempt to determine the extent to which the charges of modern secularism are a justifi able reaction to failure on the part of the religious institutions to

reinterpret religious ideas in terms that are intelligible in the

contemporary world. Whatever the actual response may turn out to

be, it must be made with the sense that the critical character of the time demands a response 'now* and with an understanding of the

opportunity that goes with this necessity. A response, properly pre

pared, can be a creative move especially if it is based on a realistic and informed appraisal of the problematic character of the situa tion out of which the crisis has arisen.

The idea of Kairos time functions not only in historical decision and action, but it also furnishes a valuable guide to the historian

attempting to determine and explain what happened. A powerful key to historical understanding is given in the historian's sensitivity to the quality of time and to the 'timing* exhibited by those who

made decisions in the period under study. If he correctly locates the

crisis faced by the age or the institution under consideration, he will be able to understand and evaluate the response which was

made. Moreover, if he is able to envisage, from after the fact, of

course, the several possibilities or 'opportunities* inherent in the

situation, he will be in a position to make comparative judgments between the possibilities that were actually envisaged by the agents themselves and what he takes to be real possibilities which the

situation allowed.

JOHN E. SMITH

YALE UNIVERSITY



john smith 0 time times chronos kairos

Documents

kairos time

time of opportunity

uniform time

right time chronos

fundamental conception

qualitative character

jstor terms

jstor archive