joachim - a study of ethics spinoza
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Joachim's famous research on Spinoza's EthicsTRANSCRIPT
THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES
A STUDY OF THE
ETHICS OF SPINOZA
HENRY FROWDE,
M.A.
PUBLISHER XO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
LONDON, EDINBURGH
NEW YORK
A STUDY OF THE
ETHICS OF SPINOZA(ETIIICA
ORDINE GEOMETRICO
DEMONSTRATA)BY
HAROLD
H.
JOACHIM
FELLOW AND TUTOR OF MKRTON COLLEGE, OXFORD
OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS1901
OXFORDPRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESSBY HORACE HART,M.A.
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
urn.
PREFACEis a work which presents many perto the interpreter. Barren abstractions, plexities tortured into the form of 'geometrical demonstra-
The
Ethics
tions
'
by a pedanticit:
logic,
larger portion of
appear to constitute the and the remainder has been
taken
for poetry pure and simple. It has seemed to annihilate the first with a few catchwords easy
of criticism, dismissing the second as the dreams of
a mystic.that the
In the following exposition I have tried to interpret the Ethics as a whole. I have assumed''
imagination which breathe through its pages are as in a great thinker they must be in the service of a mind, which is pe-
poetry
and
'
'
'
dantic' only in its endeavour to think clearly and The so-called mysticism must, reason logically. I am convinced, be read as part and parcel of''
Spinoza's metaphysical views the earlier parts of the Ethicsin the light of the
;
and the God of must be interpreted'
'
whole work.difficulties;
In the course of
my
exposition
themselves
many upon me
but I
and criticisms forced have endeavoured so to
arrange their discussion that it may interrupt the statement of Spinoza's views as little as possible.
*7
/?
A
'
vi
PREFACEWhereseemed important, I have traced the relation between the theories of Spinozait;
historical
and those of Descartesattempt to give
but I have
made no
philosophy. sketch to be of value, and for a complete exposition I
a general sketch of the latter's It would have to be more than a
have no space.
In the desire to avoid needless obscurity I have sometimes passed over the views of well-known
commentatorswill
in silence,
and
I
hope this omission
not be attributed either to ignorance or to
conceit.
WhereverIlist
it
was'
possible for
me
to trace
a creditor'
have acknowledgedof
my
debts,
and
in
the appendedtionsI
References and Abbrevia-
have mentioned those commentaries which
have helped me most. In common with all English students of Spinoza, I am greatly indebted to the works of Sir FrederickPollock, the late Principal Caird,
and the
late Dr.
Martineau
;
and
my
obligation does not
end whereBut, so far
myas I
interpretation differs from theirs.
aware, no English book appeals only to readers who wish to make a special study ofSpinoza's philosophy and I venture to publish this attempt at a critical exposition of the Ethics in the hope that, whatever its shortcomings, it may;
am
a gap. I owe the interpretation of two of Spinoza's geometrical illustrations (below, p. 32 note 2 andhelp tofill
p.
223 note 2) to the kind help of
my
colleague,
PREFACE
vii
Mr. A. L. Dixon, Fellow and Tutor of Merton and I am glad to have this opportunity College of thanking my friend, Dr. Robert Latta, Professor:
of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen, who read nearly the whole of this book before it
was and
printed,
and made many valuable suggestions
criticisms.
TABLE OF CONTENTSPAGES
INTRODUCTIONThe Tractatus deIntellectus
1-13Emendatione.
The Geo-
metrical Method.
BOOK
I.
THE GENEEAL NATURE OF REALITYCHAPTER1.
.
14-97
I
MEANING OF THE ANTITHESES(i)(ii)
:
Substance and ModeSubstance and Attribute
14-1717-27
2.
INFINITE
AND INDEFINITE
27-35
CHAPTERREALITY AS A WHOLE OR GOD1.
II
36-6436-38' '
SUBSTANCEIS'
IS'
GOD
2.
THE ENS PERFECTISSIMUM OR REALISGOD INCLUDES ALL AFFIRMATIVE BEING SIMUM::
SUBSISTS OF INFINITE ATTRIBUTES3.
.
.
.
38-4 1
SOME
OF GOD'S ONE, UNIQUE, WHOLE, SIMPLE, INDETERMINATE, ANDIS
PROPERTIES.
GOD
CONCRETE
41-45
CONTENTSPAGES4.
NATURE, VALIDITY, AND VALUE OF SPINOZA'S ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT GOD EXISTS OF NECESSITY
45-5858-64
5.
THE CAUSALITY OF GOD
CHAPTER
III
GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES (NATURA NATURANS)1.
65-72
THE ATTRIBUTES AS LINES OF FORCE,' OR FORMS IN WHICH GOD'S OMNIPOTENCE MANIFESTS ITS FREE CAUSALITY TO AN INTELLIGENCE'
.
.
65-67
2.
THE ATTRIBUTE OF EXTENSION.DESCARTES
SPINOZA AND67-69
3.
THE INFINITY OF ATTRIBUTES. THE ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT. GOD IS SELF-CONSCIOUS..
69-72
CHAPTER
IV..
GOD AND HIS MODES (NATURA NATURATA)1.
73-97
DEGREES OF PERFECTION OR REALITY
.
.
73~74
2.
FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE ORDER OF THE MODAL SEQUENCE(i)
74~82
Immediate and Mediate infinite and eternal modesParticular things
(ii)
3.
MODAL SYSTEM OF THE ATTRIBUTE OF EXTENSION. WHOLE AND PARTS
....I
82-93 93~97
4.
MODAL SYSTEM OF THE ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT
APPENDIX TO BOOKDIFFICULTIES AND CRITICISMS
98-II9'
NOTE ON NATURA NATURATA PRESENTATION'
AND THE WORLD OFII9~I22
CONTENTS
xi
BOOKTHE HUMAN MIND
IIPAGES 123-219
CHAPTERSOUL AND BODY1.
I
123-145I23-I25.
INTRODUCTION
2.3.
4.
THE HUMAN MIND AS THE IDEA OF THE BODY CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SOME DIFFICULTIES.
125-I32
.
I32-I34I34-I45
CHAPTER THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE1.
II
146-185
'idea' and 'ideatum'
146-152
2.
the three stages of human progress as a development of knowledgeImaginatio (ii) Ratio(i)
....
152-185
152-170 170-180180-185
(iii)
Scientia Intuitiva
CHAPTER
III
THE EMOTIONAL NATURE OF MAN'
....
186-219
PREFATORY NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION OF THE TERM AFFECTUS l86 1. METHOD OF TREATMENT I87-I90 2. THE 'CONATUS' I9I-I93 3. WILL AND DESIRE I93~I99'
4.5.
ACTION AND PASSION'AFFECTUS' AND 'IDEA.' PASSIVE EMOTIONS
I99~2CO
THE THREE PRIMARY201-208.
6.7.
DERIVATIVE AND COMPLEX PASSIVE EMOTIONSACTIVE EMOTIONS
2o8-2l8 2l8-2I9
APPENDIX TO BOOKESSENCE AND EXISTENCE'
II
FREEDOMIDEAS
THE CONATUS 'CUPIDITAS' TELEOLOGY EMOTIONAL AND COGNITIVE22O-237
'
xii
CONTENTS
THE IDEAL LIFE
BOOK III FOR MAN
..... .
PAGES 238-309
CHAPTER I MEANING OF A STANDARD OF MORAL VALUECHAPTER':
238-254
II
MAN AS A MEMBER OF THE 'COMMUNIS ORDO THE BONDAGE OF MAN NATURAE. . .
255-263
1.
THE STRENGTH OF THE PASSIVE EMOTIONS, AND THE RELATIVE POWERLESSNESS OF THE ACTIVEEMOTIONS255-261
2.
THE LIFE OF MAN AS INTELLECTUALLY AND MORALLY IN BONDAGE
261-263
CHAPTER III THE MORAL LIFE AS THE LIFE OF REASON1.
.'
.
264-291264-268
INDIVIDUALITY IN THE GRADE OF
'
RATIO'
.
2.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LIFE OF 'VIRTUE,' OR 'FREEDOM'
REASON,*268-273..
3.
APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES
273-280280-29I
4.
THE POWER OF REASON
CHAPTER IV THE IDEAL LIFE AS CONSCIOUS UNION WITH GOD1.
292-309
INTRODUCTION
292-294'
2.3.
THE CONCEPTION OF ETERNITY THE ETERNITY OF THE HUMAN MIND
'
,
.
.
294-298298-306
.
.
.
4.
REVIEW
306-309
REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS1.
DESCARTES.
Desc. Medit.
= Renati=
Des Cartes Meditationes de Prima PhiloDes Cartes Principia Philosophiae.
sophia. Renati Desc. Princ.
is given, the reference is to the Latin edition of Descartes' works, published at Frankfort in
Where
the page
1692. Desc. Epp. Renati
=
Des Cartes Epistulae.2.
SPINOZA.of Spinoza.
WlL=VanTr. P.
Vloten and Land's edition
Two
volumes.
The Hague,Politicus.
1882.
Tdle = Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione.
= Tractatus
Tr.
Th.= Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus.
Ph. D. = Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae (Spinoza's version). The section-numbers referred C. M. =Cogitata Metaphysica.
Epp. = Epistulae.
to are those of Bruder's edition of Spinoza.
E.=Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. K. V. = Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch, enWelstand.
deszelfs
K. V.
S.
= Sigwart's3.
German
translation
of
the
Korte Ver-
handeling.
COMMENTATORS ON SPINOZA.TJeber die beidcn ersten
Avenarius= Richard Avenarius,
PhasenParis,
des Spinozischen Pantheismus, &c.
Leipzig, 1868.
Brunschvi eg = Professor Leon Brunschvicg, Spinoza.1894.
xiv
REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS
Busolt=Dr. GeorgBusolt, Die Grundziige der Erkenntnisstheorie und Metaphysik Spinoza's. Berlin, 1875. Caird = Principal John Caird, LL.D., Spinoza. Edinburgh,1888.
Camerer=Theodor Camerer, Die Lehre1877. Elbogen Dr.
Spinoza's.
Stuttgart,
=
Ismar Elbogen, Der Tractatus de
intellectus enien-
datione, &c.
Erdmann,%
Breslau, 1898. ii=Dr. J. E. Erdmann, Grundriss der Geschichte dervol.
Philosophic
Erdmann, V. A.
=
ii. Berlin, 1878. Dr. J. E. Erdmann, Vermischte Aufsatzc.
Leipzig, 1846.
Grzymisch = Dr. Siegfried Grzymisch, Spinoza's Lehren von der Breslau, 1898. Ewigkeit und Unsterblichlceit. Joel = Dr. M. Joel, Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinoza's. Breslau,1871.
Loewe = Dr. Johann Heinrich Loewe, Die&c. (with
Philosophie Fichte's,
an appendix on Spinoza's conception of God).
Stuttgart, 1862.
Martineau = Dr. James Martineau,edition.
A
Study of Spinoza.
Third
London, 1895.Second edition.
Pollock = Sir Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: his Life and Philosophy. Sigwart, Tr.
= Dr.
London, 1899.
Christoph Sigwart, Spinoza's neuentdeckterGotha, 1866.C.
Tractat von Gott, &c.
Sigwart, Sp.
=Dr. H.
W.
Sigwart, Der Spinozismus,als
&c.
Tubingen, 1839. Thomas = Dr. Karl Thomas,Konigsberg, 1840.
Spinoza
Metaphysiker,
&c.
Zulawski=Dr. Jerzy Zulawski, Das Problem der KausalitatSpinoza.
hex
Bern, 1899.
INTRODUCTIONJ
The
early
and unfinishedis
Tractatus de
Intellectus The
Trac-
Emendatione
invaluable to students of the Ethics. inte uectus As a fragment of a treatise on Method, it supplements EmendaBut it has greater Spinoza's theory of knowledge.
claims on our attention than
this.
on Method
is set
in a framework,
For the treatise which exhibits the
central ideas of Spinoza's philosophy with remarkable The writer of the Ethics comes before the clearness.
world with a finished system
:
but the writer of the
Tractatus allows us to see this system in the making, and shows us the motives which inspired it.
Philosophy is for Spinoza certain, demonstrable, and demonstrated knowledge. It is a system of necessary truth, whose consummation is the complete understanding of ourselves, and our place in the universe the most that we are or can be. In other words,philosophy is for him the complete knowledge of ethics scientifically demonhuman nature and life But it is also a great deal more. It is the strated.''
ideal
humanis
life
:
for,
which
This conception of philoknowledge, which is perfect life sophy is developed in the opening pages of the Tractatus as the outcome of Spinoza's personal experience \ Experience he tells us has taught him that nonesatisfactionas thefull1
philosophy, of our nature.
we enjoy
in the complete understanding the only permanent
of the
VV1L. i. pp. 3-5. The tone Tdle is that of a manpassed
stress of the
struggle,Cf.
and
at-
tainedp. 46.
peace.
Avenarius,
who hasSPINOZA
through
the
B
2
THE ETHICS OF SPINOZA
of the objects which men usually set before themselves can yield complete satisfaction of desire. Pleasure, power, wealth all fail to serve as a source of permanent, unbroken enjoyment. And they fail because of their nature. It is their nature to be perishable and finite but permanent happiness can flow only from what is;
To set one's heart permanent and unchangeable. on something eternal and infinite this feeds the mind an object of this kind can never with unmixed joy be the source of sorrow and disappointment V So long as our mind is set on the pursuit of finiteitself' :
impossible to fix our thoughts seriously Yet, so far as they go, these objects indeed the only goods satisfy desire and are goodobjects, itis
on anything
else.
'
'
'
'
which experience affirms
to us.
Are we then
to sacrifice
a certain for a chimerical good ? But further reflection shows that this is not the alternative that confronts us.
Wesole
are in search of something completely good, as the 2 remedy for the fatal disease of unsatisfied desirethis
:
and
the good
'
'
itself
is
certain
andit is
real,
and in no
waybut
chimerical.this
Our attainment of
'uncertain'
uncertainty diminishes with increased reflection. The end, then, is not chimerical, nor does its attainment necessarily involve the sacrifice of goods
we
pleasure of the supreme
power, riches, incompatible with the pursuit it becomes incompatible and good a hindrance only if we make these objects 'ends' But to surrender these desirable for their own sake.alreadyis
possess.
The pursuit
of
not in
itself:
as the ultimate ends of life is to surrender certain evils,
and not
to sacrifice goods. For pursue any of these objects as your ultimate end, and you will inevitably be led to despair and destruction. But it is not necessary1'
Sed amor erga rem aetemamtristitiae
est
expers.'S. 2. 7,
W1L.3.
i.
p.
5i.
;
cf.
et
infinitam sola laetitia pascit
K. V.2
animum, ipsaque omnis
Cf. the simile,
VV1L.
p. 4.
INTRODUCTION(nor indeed feasible) to mortify all desires of the in order to strive after complete happiness.'
3flesh,'
then, is in outline the nature of this supreme of desire, attainment of which must afford perfect object
What,
and permanent satisfaction?perfect knowledge, or in reality, there or 'bad,' no 'perfection' or 'imperfection.'is
To
is
good Everything'
no
'
'
a necessary consequence of the of the universe or the laws of nature.' Butit is as'
what
order
'
human
knowledge knows only in part, sees things only from certain points of view and not in their unbroken andnecessary coherence.
And
for that knowledge,
'
'
good
and
'bad,' 'perfect' and 'imperfect,' express adaptation or non-adaptation to purpose. Since the purpose is not in the things, but in our view of them and since our;
views are only partial and therefore many, good bad,' perfect imperfect,' are relative terms and relative to such an extent that the same thing may rightly be' ' '
'
'
'
:
called both 'good'fect'
and 'bad,' both 'perfect' and 'imperin accordance with our varying points of view *. Now, in searching for the 'supreme good,' we are''
Good considering things as objects of human desire. is that which satisfies the desires of human nature' ;
;
absolutely good ('the supreme good'), that which comrelatively good (a true pletely satisfies those desires good ') that which leads to this satisfaction.
But a
'
'
good
of this kind
is
a state or condition ofstate' is
human
nature
itself.
A
'good,
one which
we
conceive to be far stronger 2 and more stable than our for all we know to the contrary own, and which
within our powers of attainment. A 'good,' in fact, a better state of ourselves. The supreme good for a man is to attain to such a development that he if possible in common with his fellows may enjoyis
is
'
'
1
cf.
E.
See below, Bk. III. ch. iv. praef., K. V. S. 1.6,
1
;
and7-9.
2
Multo firmiorem
more
self-
sufficient or self-dependent.
b a
4
THE ETHICS OF SPINOZA
a permanent realization (in his own person and in theirs) of ideal human nature, i. e. of that state which he conceives as the best human state. And to anticipate 1
we cannaturestand
say in general terms that this ideal state of human is 'that in which we know the union of man's
of nature.' To know and underwould be to understand (and therefore to love) this, the eternal and necessary order of things. And full consciousness of this (and of our place in that order) would be perfect and permanent satisfaction of our desire 2 This being the ultimate aim of all our efforts, we have next to consider the means. Of these the first and most
mind with the whole
.
important
is
to clear our intellect from error.
Passing by,
for the present, all other needs, we must turn our attention to the discovery of a method for removing the pre-
liminary obstacles to the attainment of truth a method to remedy the defects of our intellect, or to render it fit so to understand things that we may attain our supreme good.:
'
'
1
W1L.loco,
i.
p. 6.
'
Quaenamesse
au-
tern ilia sit
natura
ostendemuscogni-
compulsion of unreasonable passion as 'mentis libertas seubeatitudo.'If Spinoza's design had been completed, we should have in the Tdle the Logica to purge the mind
suo
nimirum
tionem unionis, quani mens cum tota Natura habet.' Footnote of Spinoza's 'Haec fusius suo locoexplicantur.'
This conception of the supreme good for man is the same as that elaborated in the Ethics(cf. E. v. praef., and Descartes, introductory letter to the PrinBoth in the Ethics and cipia|.
2
that
of erroneous ways of thinking, it may be fitted to attain;
the perfect state and we should have in other treatises the Medicina for the body, the Theory of Mechanics for increasing the conveniences oflife,
the TJieories of
the Tdle, the supreme good for man is the attainment (by oneself and others) of such dein
Moral Philosophy and of the Education of the Young for the formation of a suitable political society, and the Theory of Physics for
velopment of ourthereforeto
human
nature
as will enable us to 'know,''love,'
andi.e.
God,
an adequate knowledge of our corporeal selves and materialthings.(Cf.I.e.,
Nature. In both works this knowledge is conceived as freeing the
V V1L.andE.
i.
p.
6.
Descartes7 S.)
ii.
Lemma
mind from the external
or alien
INTRODUCTIONAt
5
this point l the treatise on Method proper begins. Its details belong to Spinoza's theory of knowledge; and we need not treat of them here. But his conception
of the general nature of the
method
is
all-important
for the understanding of the Ethics. The aim of the method is to fit the intellect for the
attainment of the best knowledge of things. What then is the best knowledge in what form of apprehension do we most fully understand? If the object to be known is self-dependent (and in that sense causa sui 2 ), we must, in order to understand if the essential nature it, grasp it solely by its own'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
:
object
ofis
its
dependent, 'proximate' cause.
is
we mustFor
grasp by knowledge to understand a thing
it
toits
know whybeing.
of
what it is to see the necessity The method therefore must prepare theit is
intellect for
knowing under
this
form of apprehension'
the form whereby we understand things per solam suam essentiam vel per cognitionem suae proximae causae.'
And our task in this treatise is to lay down the method or way of thinking under this form of apprehension 3.
For let us be quite method of knowledge'
clearis
what a method'
is.
The'
that knowledge reflected on itself the thinking of our thinking, cognitio reflexiva or idea ideae.' If this were not so, we should neverattain to
any knowledge
at all
;
to the infinite process before
we should be committed we could begin to know.
first,
"We should require a new method to test the truth of the and again a third to test the second, and so on. The case may be roughly illustrated from man's productiveactivities.
a
To beat iron we require a hammer to make hammer we need another hammer and so on (it might And yet men, by the use of be thought) ad infinitum.;
the simple tools with which nature provided1
them
(e. g.1.
VV1L.
2i.
p. 7.
VV1L.3
i.
p.
30
;
see below, p. 53, note
lb. pp. 10-16.
6
THE ETHICS OF SPINOZAmaterial),
hands and raw
have advanced step by
step,
through the perfecting of more complicated tools, to the most elaborate artistic products. So, the mind by thecareful
employing of
its tools
(the true thoughts
which
its
inherited power has enabled it to fashion *) can advance step by step to a more perfect understanding.
We1
how:
ideas arise in our
are not here concerned with the question as to mind at all.' It is enough for us
at present that the mind has ideas, some of true i. e. it thinks and can think truly. Thetreatise
on Method
is
which are aim of the to trace reflectively the way in which:
we apprehend
in true thinking for the clear consciousness of the course of our thinking when we apprehend things
through their essential nature or through their proximatecausethis itself is theshall
method we'
are seeking.
understand this more clearly, if we consider for a moment the nature of an idea/ An idea is an act Now an to have an idea of thought is to think. The idea must be distinguished from its ideatum.' true idea of Peter, e.g., is not Peter himself: it is the''
We
:
'
'
'
'
And
objective essence' of Peter, i. e. Peter as he is for thought. the idea of Peter, qud an act of thought, has a dis-
tinctive being of its
own which can''
in turn be the object
of another thought the ideatum of another idea which presents the first idea objectively,' or is its essentia obiec'
Every idea thus exhibits a double character. As presentative of an original, it is the objective essence of its ideatum and, as an act of thought, it possessestiva.'' '
'
;
1
'
So the intellect by
its
inborn
vestigations yet further;it
and thus
power (by which I mean that which is not the effect in us ofexternal causes) fashions for itself instruments of understanding:these give it strength for further works of understanding; from thelatterit
advances step by step until it reaches the pinnacle of wisdom.'i.
VV1L.tur.'
p.
n.':
In the footnote read 'non causu-
gains other instrumentsits
but it is VV1L. omit 'non a necessary emendation of Paulus, adopted by Saisset and Bruder;
or the
power of pushing
in-
cf.
Elbogen, p.
13,
note
3.
INTRODUCTION' '
7
a peculiar nature of its own (a 'real,' or formal essence), which may in turn become the 'ideatum' of another idea 1 This latter process may be repeated indefinitely, as is matter of common experience. Thus we all recognize.
know,' and so on ad infinitum. But we and this is the important point that also recognize has no need to wait for the completion of knowledge
we know know that wethat'
that
we
know,' and again
'
know
that
we
On the contrary this indefinite process. reflection itself postulates as its starting-point regressive and condition the first idea or act of thought. In otherthisinfinite:
words applying this to our present purpose all methods postulate the knowledge of which they are the methods all reflection on the truth of an idea postulates the first;
idea or act of thinking. cannot advance a step in unless we can start with an idea which is knowledge,itself true
We
and the guarantee of its own truth. The test of truth must be given in the act of thinking it cannot be applied externally by a separate act of thought. Our:
knowledge or certainty of truth is our knowing truly. Jf I think truly, I shall eo ipso be conscious that my thought is true for to think truly is to have in idea the real nature of the object of thought to have obiective the essentia formalis of that which we are thinking. If I have a true idea, or think truly, I am, in the very act of thinking, convinced of the truth of my thought and this conviction is but my way of feeling (being conscious of) the essentia formalis of the object of my thought 2' ' ::
.
A
method, then, postulates as
its
starting-point true
knowledge or a true thought of some kind. And the bost method will be that which reflects upon the truest1 On this subject, and on an ambiguity in the expression esse'
nihil sit praeter ipsam essentiam obiectivam ; id est, modus, quo
obiectivum ideae,' see below, pp. 70 ff.2