jisfa quarterly news letters/ jci… · planners’ preparedness survey, a survey of over one...
TRANSCRIPT
Inside this Issue
About JCISFA
Foreword
New Administration Demands Security Cooperation Accountability
Security Cooperation Planners’ Preparedness Survey (Summary of Observations)
JCISFA JTF Handbook Development
Senior Leader Advisor Study
Observations on SFA
JCISFA Online SFA Courses
Registering for an Account
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JCISFA Quarterly
CONTACTS:
Director: COL Lowe (913) 684-3622 [email protected] Lessons Learned and Knowledge Management Division Chief: LTC Jenkins (913) 684-3629 [email protected] Editor, LtCol Achico (913) 684-3648 [email protected] Editor, Ms. Jessica Meyring (913) 684-3642 [email protected]
Acknowledgements Cover Photo Credit: U.S. Army Lt. Col. Drew Meyerowich speaks to Sheik Ibrahim, the Muqtar of Mahuz, about ways to use government channels to solve infrastructure problems prior to the opening of the Sen Al Thebban water project March 20, 2007, in the Hawijah district of the Kirkuk province of Iraq. The project will support 10 villages north of Hawijah and is capable of providing clean drinking water for approximately 20,000 people. Meyerowich is the commander of 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Maria. J. Bare)
2 About JCISFA
Foreword
New Administration Demands Security Cooperation Accountability
Security Cooperation Planners’ Preparedness Survey
Joint Task Force for Security Force Assistance Handbook Development
Senior Advisor Training and Education Study
Observations on SFA
An Exercise in Mission Command: The Panther Brigade in Operation Inherent Resolve
How the Iraqi Army Operates (Edition 3)
Security Cooperation Planners’ Preparedness Survey Report
JCISFA Online SFA Courses
Registering for an Account
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In this Issue
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About JCISFA
JCISFA is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) controlled
activity (CCA) that reports to the Joint Staff J7, Joint Force
Development.
JCISFA supports the integration of Security Force Assistance (SFA)
capabilities into the current and future Joint Force in order to
advance joint warfighting capability, through our two Mission
Essential Tasks:
Develop and Integrate SFA Capabilities
Support SFA Strategy, Policy, Planning and Current Operations 425 McPherson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS
Phone: 913-684-3629
DSN: 552-3629
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Foreword
JAMES P. LOWE Colonel, US Army Director
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425 McPherson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS
Phone: 913-684-3629
DSN: 552-3629
The purpose of this newsletter is to
provide a quarterly publication to
inform the SFA community of interest
(COI) of JCISFA’s efforts, to serve as a
platform to highlight the greater COI
efforts, and to foster interoperability
within the COI. Sharing JCISFA’s
efforts will help inform the COI of the
myriad of ways JCISFA can be
leveraged .
In addition to the JCISFA website, this
newsletter serves as a forum for the
COI to submit Observations and
Recommendations or other articles of
interest regarding their respective SFA
efforts. As a service to the Joint
Force, this newsletter intends to
promote dialogue among the SFA COI
that finds itself dispersed across
various countries, and a myriad of
Interagency, Joint & Service
organizations.
The opinions, conclusions, and
recommendations expressed or
implied within are those of the
contributors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Department of
Defense or any other agency of the
Federal Government.
Change is coming to the Security Cooperation (SC) / Security Assistance (SA) enterprise.
This edition of our newsletter will examine how the security cooperation and security
assistance references in both President Trump’s inaugural address and the 2017
National Defense Authorization Act that will impact our community of interest. Looking
toward the future, there is opportunity for those of us who work in this enterprise to
shape how the U.S. is going to engage in SC/SFA going forward. Here at JCISFA, we
welcome that opportunity.
We continue to develop SFA awareness and capability in the Joint Force and our efforts
during 1st QTR, FY17 were a direct reflection of that mission. We completed our SC
Planners’ Preparedness Survey, a survey of over one thousand respondents that
demonstrated the need for continuation of SC training and education. Our SFA
Planner's Guide, that assists planners at all levels of security force assistance activities,
is now an online course posted at the Defense Technical Information Center. It
provides another potential training venue for SFA. We are on track to deliver a Joint
Task Force assistance handbook and a separate study reviewing the training and
education of senior level advisors by the end of this year. These efforts will offer some
recommended courses of action to train, educate, organize, plan, and execute SFA
activities by the Joint Force.
We are also participating in a collection effort in March with the 2nd Brigade of the
101st Airborne Division that recently returned from service as the Security Force Advise
and Assist Brigade in Iraq. We will provide an some observations and lessons learned
from this collection during the next edition of the newsletter.
In closing, a recent issue of Infantry Magazine identified JCISFA’s handbook, How the
Iraqi Army Operates, as “a valuable publication” and “the most important reference we
had.” It is very encouraging that our products enabled Army paratroopers as they
conducted operations in Iraq and will inform future publications.
As always, this newsletter intends to promote dialogue among the SFA COI and is part
of an ongoing effort to more effectively “Communicate, Cooperate, and Coordinate”
across the Joint Force with all the SFA stakeholders. Please let us know if there are any
topics of interest you would like to see in the future.
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In his inaugural speech, Friday, 20 January 2017, President Trump outlined a number of U.S. concerns regarding foreign relations. Specifically, he focused on certain foreign assistance efforts that seemed to suggest that future security cooperation activities were in danger.
[We’ve] subsidized the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military;
We've defended other nations' borders while refusing to defend our own;
And spent trillions and trillions of dollars overseas while America's infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay.
We've made other countries rich while the wealth, strength, and confidence of our country has dissipated over the horizon.
At first glance, such comments strongly suggest a U.S. nationalist or protectionist attitude that would result in U.S. withdrawal of support from our international allies and partners, thereby abdicating our place as a world superpower. To the American people, the comments ring true in the sense that the U.S. is planning to spend almost $50 billion in foreign aid. While the American people recognize foreign assistance is necessary to maintain a degree of political status quo in the world, the people are not confident on how much is too much and how little is not enough. The President believes that our National Security depends on world order, but must be managed as responsible stewards of the country’s treasured resources. His later words illustrate simple concepts: are the American people getting what they paid for, is it a fair deal, and if the answer is no, then shouldn’t we allocate funds and effort elsewhere?
Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs, will be made to benefit American workers and American families.
We will seek friendship and goodwill with the nations of the world - but we do so with the understanding that it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first.
We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example - we will shine - for everyone to follow.
We will reinforce old alliances and form new ones - and unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the Earth.
As the inaugural speech seemed to place the crosshairs squarely upon future security cooperation efforts, Congress also signaled the same problems in the National Defense Authorization Act the previous month. NDAA FY17 memorializes Congressional support to U.S. Security Cooperation / Security Force Assistance activities for the foreseeable future, but seems to signal their intent to tighten the Security Cooperation “purse strings” if the Department of Defense does not take a disciplined approach. Looking at NDAA FY17, it is clear that Congress is increasing Congressional oversight on the future of security cooperation programs and activities by directing the Department of Defense to create an effective Strategic Framework for security cooperation, an effective Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation program for security cooperation, and an effective program to develop the Security Cooperation workforce to ensure accountability in Department of Defense Security Cooperation programs and activities.
I n c r e a se d C o n g r e s s i o n a l
Oversight
Independent Evaluation of Strategic Framework for DoD Security Cooperation1
In the NDAA, Congress directs a Security Cooperation report to inform the Senate and House Committees on Foreign Relations. In NDAA FY16, Congress directed the implementation of a Strategic Framework for Department of Defense security cooperation. The framework required elements that included: 1) a discussion of the strategic goals of Department of Defense security cooperation programs, overall and by combatant command; 2) identification of the primary objectives, priorities, and desired end-states of Department of Defense security cooperation programs; 3) identification of challenges to achieving the primary objectives, priorities, and desired
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New Administration Demands Security
Cooperation Accountability
end-states; and 4) a methodology for assessing the effectiveness of Department of Defense security cooperation programs in making progress toward achieving the primary objectives, priorities, and desired end-states, to include an identification of key benchmarks for such progress.
A year later Congress now directs the Secretary of Defense to enter into an agreement with a federally funded research and development center with expertise in Security Cooperation to conduct an evaluation of the department’s implementation of that framework.
Sense of Congress – Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Framework for Security Cooperation2,3,4
Congress recognizes the Secretary of Defense is in the best position to conduct security cooperation efforts, but seems to doubt there is a cohesive plan for security cooperation supported by an interagency effort. In an expression of Congressional opinion (not binding law), Congress recommends the Secretary of Defense develop a framework that looks beyond supervision of various security cooperation “programs & activities,” but on a program that informs the security cooperation effort as a whole. Sec 1205 states the Secretary of Defense should develop and maintain an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation framework for security cooperation to ensure accountability and foster implementation of best practices. This contemplated framework is focused on ensuring security cooperation “efforts” are 1) consistent with interagency approaches and existing best practices, 2) sufficiently resourced and appropriately placed within the Department of Defense to enable rigorous examination and measurement of security cooperation efforts towards meeting stated objectives and outcomes, and 3) inform security cooperation planning, policies, and resources and ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of security cooperation efforts.
Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AME) of Programs and Activities5,6
While the above “Sense of Congress” regarding an AME Framework is non-binding, the new 16 USC §383 provision on AME directs accountability efforts for security cooperation programs and activities. This difference suggests that while Congress acknowledges they do not have the capability and capacity to administer the security cooperation “effort,” they will require the Secretary of Defense to account for security cooperation expenditures. This AME program will provide for: 1) initial assessments of partner capability requirements, programmatic risks,
and indicators of efficacy, or the ability to produce a desired or intended result; 2) monitoring of the implementation of such “programs and activities,” specific progress or desired outcome and achievement; 3) evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of such “programs and activities” in achieving desired outcomes; and 4) identification of lessons learned in carrying out such “programs and activities” and development of recommendations for improvement.
Subsequently, DoD provided AM&E policy in DoDI 5132.14, directing security cooperation programs to foster accurate and transparent reporting to key stakeholders on the outcomes and sustainability of security cooperation and its investments. It also directed programs to identify and disseminate best practices and lessons learned for security cooperation implementation to inform policy, plans, programs, program management, resources, and the security cooperation workforce.
Consolidated Annual Budget for SC Programs and Activities of the DoD7
In section 1249 (new 16 §USC 381), Congress is attempting to get a full accounting/justification of security cooperating funding. Congress will require the President to include in each Fiscal Year Budget, as a separate item, the amounts requested for the Department of Defense for all security cooperation “programs and activities” of the DoD, to include the military departments, to be conducted in that fiscal year, to include the specific country or region and the applicable authority.
DoD Security Cooperation Workforce Development8
In Section 1250 (new 16 USC §384), Congress is ensuring personnel conducting security cooperation activities are properly trained and know what they are doing. It directs the Secretary of Defense to carry out the “Department of Defense Security Cooperation Workforce Development Program” to oversee the development and management of a professional workforce supporting cooperation “programs and activities” of the Department of Defense and execution of security assistance programs delegated to the Department of Defense. More specifically the program is to ensure the workforce has the capacity, in both personnel and skills, needed to properly perform its mission and is assigned in a manner that ensures personnel with the appropriate level of expertise and experience are assigned in sufficient numbers to fulfill requirements for security cooperation “programs and activities” of the Department of Defense, and the execution of security assistance “programs and activities” delegated to it.
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The Way Ahead
Using the message articulate in the “Sense of Congress” regarding AME, the security cooperation workforce must ensure we look further than the planning and supervision of various security cooperation “programs and activities,” but focus also on the desired outcome of the security cooperation effort.
In the handful of NDAA provisions noted above, while Congress will generally monitor the DoD’s security cooperation effort, they will specifically scrutinize the success and failure for those “programs and activities” to achieve desired outcomes. If not monitored, well-intentioned programs and activities can become random acts of goodness that do not support an interagency unified (and internationally coordinated) effort or campaign plan. Our focus should ensure we are building a cohesive plan that has an achievable outcome or end state.
According to Joint Publication 5-0, a campaign plan is a joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. Planners should ensure “security program and activities” are not ends to themselves, but part of grand plan or strategy to achieve the security cooperation end or goal. The question Congress seems to ask, “what is the endstate or
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goal we are paying for?” As we look at DoDD 5132.03 on Security Cooperation policy for guidance, it echoes the interagency goals of PPD-23 and restates the three ends of security cooperation (build relationships, develop capabilities, ensure access), but what do those ends look like and how much is too much or too little? Conjoining various programs and activities as seen in the NDAA does not equate to a national strategy. Programs and authorities do not inform the mission and purpose, the mission and purpose informs the programs and authorities. Without a finite desired outcome or purpose, random acts of goodness will almost always support a security cooperation end, but will leave us vulnerable to unwelcomed open-wallet requests to Congress.
Footnotes
1. Section 1204, NDAA FY17 2. Section 1205, NDAA FY17 3. DoDD 5132.03, 29 Dec 2016, DoD Policy And
Responsibilities Relating To Security Cooperation 4. DoDI 5132.14, 13 Jan 2017, Assessment, Monitoring,
And Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise
5. Section 1241, NDAA FY17 (new 16 USC §383) 6. DoDI 5132.14, 13 Jan 2017, Assessment, Monitoring,
And Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise
7. Section 1249, NDAA FY17 (new 16 §USC 381) 8. Section 1250, NDAA FY17 (new 16 USC §384)
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Purpose
JCISFA conducted a survey to determine if the planners of SC received mission specific training, if they were satisfied with the training they had received, and if these planners were aware of lessons learned and best practices gleaned from recent and ongoing operations. JCISFA was alerted to the Army’s plan to discontinue its SC planner’s course and specifically wanted to determine the impact of this decision. Before the survey was issued however, the Army decided to reestablish this course. Even with the operation of all the current SC Planner courses, including the one run by the Army, the survey showed that some SC planners were not provided an opportunity for SC training.
Methodology
All current SC courses conduct end of course surveys and generally receive positive comments and reviews. This SC survey specifically targeted SC practitioners at all levels after they had been in their positions to provide a different perspective from that shown by an end of course survey. JCISFA specifically wanted the field’s perspective about how they were organized and staffed, and how well policy and doctrine was supporting the SC planner at all the key points during SC planning. The survey also collected demographics and gauged current SC planning knowledge. There were over 1,000 survey respondents.
The findings can inform modification of the frequency, availability, and content of future SC/SFA courses in order to more effectively meet the needs of the Joint Force.
Security Cooperation Planners’ Preparedness Survey (Summary of Observations)
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Observations
1) Personnel with formal SC training were more confident in their abilities to plan SC than personnel who had not received formal training.
2) The Management Approach to SC planner training should be reviewed.
3) SC organizations are designed to conduct planning, but require additional resources to conduct assessments and carry out operations.
4) SC organizations do not routinely use Joint Manning Documents (JMD)s to ensure they are receiving the best fit in personnel to the available positions.
5) Joint and Service Planning Doctrine does not address executive, generating, and operating (EGO) functions, JTF organizational structures, or employment concepts relevant to different operating environments.
6) SC practitioners identified planning, authorities, assessments, Joint/Inter-organizational operations and Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) as most important to performing SC.
Click here to view the full report.
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Purpose
JCISFA is developing handbook outlining organizational structure and planning considerations for future Joint Task Force (JTF) Commanders preparing to conduct Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities.
Background
Historically, the JTF’s responsibility for SFA related tasks was primarily focused on the generation and tactical development of Foreign Security Forces (FSF). While the US military and our Coalition partners proved to be extremely capable at generating and training tactical forces, there was little development in supporting institutional and governmental processes required to maintain and support these tactical capabilities. Lessons from the contemporary operating environment (OE) suggests that the joint force requires a common understanding of the processes and requirements to plan and execute SFA across the entire institutional structure of a FSF. Current JTF manning and capabilities do not provide the subject matter expertise to effectively operate in a SFA environment. As a result, the responsibility for SFA historically falls to a specially created element within the staff. This “outsourced” SFA organizational structure restricts the employment of the full depth and experience of the entire JTF staff. To meet this operational need, JCISFA’s handbook development seeks to provide JFCs, and their supporting Staff Directorates, with practical SFA planning considerations, tools, and methodologies. In concept, the handbook emphasizes the role and responsibilities of individual staff directorates as it relates to assessing, planning, and executing SFA. Likewise, the handbook seeks to provide useful measures that a JFC can take within one or more domains of joint doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) that will strengthen the abilities of units, teams, and individuals assigned to the JTF that are tasked to carry out SFA as a primary or secondary mission.
Joint Task Force for Security Force Assistance Handbook
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Linkages to the National
Military Strategy
Our National Military Strategy (NMS) emphasizes working with allies to gain access and build relationships. As a result, the U.S. military seeks to develop the capability and capacity of FSF utilizing SFA activities. The JTF Handbook will assist JTFs and staff directorates in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing SFA missions, which strengthens the ability of the joint force to satisfy key aspects contained within the NMS.
Assumptions
Development of the handbook includes the following assumptions:
1) The Joint Task Force Commanders (JTFs) will continue to be tasked to conduct SFA as a primary or secondary mission.
2) A JTF will have the responsibility to conduct SFA within the governance and executive, generating, and operating (EGO) functions of a partner nation (PN) security force in non-permissive operating environments or when shortages of other resources requires execution at the JTF level.
3) The PN government will be a willing and active participant in the development of the capability and capacity of their security forces.
4) The JTF will see SFA as a “whole of JTF” effort and that staff directorates are willing and able to contribute to the execution of the SFA mission.
5) That a JTF will have the appropriate authorities, clearances, and access to the PN, the security forces, and any U.S. military or diplomatic personnel operating in the country.
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Purpose
JCISFA is conducting a study to determine capability gaps in current training and education for senior level advisors. Results (forthcoming) will be published in a FY17 4th quarter Information Paper.
Background
Military personnel directed to perform senior leader advising are too often selected utilizing the “next man up” method. Historically, these personnel do not receive either redeployment advisor specific training or exposure to advising activities during their professional military education. Redeploying advisors have expressed concern over the lack of training and education when preparing to conduct these activities. This capability gap results in an impediment to the advising mission enterprise. JCISFA initiated a yearlong study to analyze this gap.
A three person team is currently in the collection phase of this study. The scope of the study is E-6/O-6 and above as well as civilian MoD/MoI advisors. The study is broken into components including a review of current requirements, validation, notification, onboarding, and
Senior Advisor Training and Education Study
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pre/post deployment. To date, JCISFA has conducted multiple interviews with key leaders as part of the collection phase for this effort, to include the Chief of the Resolute Support Mission SFA Center, selected personnel from the 101st AA DIV, civilian counterparts of the Defense Governance and Management Team (DGMT), and redeploying personnel who were senior leader advisors.
Way Ahead
The timeline is below. The effort moves beyond the collection phase in March 2017. The team is hosting a working group to discuss the study in the upcoming Peace and Stability Operation Training and Education Workshop (PSOTEW). The workshop is scheduled for 05-07 April 2017 at the Johns Hopkins Campus in Rockville, Maryland.
The study team will complete its analysis and prepare a study draft in March 2017 with a goal of delivering a final product in May.
In a recent issue of Infantry Magazine, JCISFA’s handbook, “How the Iraqi Army Operates” is lauded by the authors as “a valuable publication” and “the most important reference we had.” They went on to say, “Throughout the deployment, we found that it was still largely applicable and served as a touchstone for us.”
The article discusses the following key topics:
Complexity of the Operating Environment
Preparing and Organizing for the Mission: Transforming from the GRF to Advisors in 45 Days
Adaptability
Interoperability
Talent Management
Building Partner Capacity – How to Train, How to Fight through Equipment Challenges, and the Enduring Importance of Leadership
Advising and Assisting – Listening, Training Commanders and Staffs, and Helping Them “See Themselves”
Mission Focused – Challenge of Expectation Management
Over the nine-month deployment, both the paratroopers deployed and those who remained at Fort Bragg learned many valuable lessons. The leaders and paratroopers embraced a complex, evolving mission and contributed substantially to progress in what will undoubtedly be a long and enduring campaign. Collectively, they gained insights on an exceedingly complex, culturally sensitive operating environment that epitomizes those we can expect to operate in the future; demonstrated tremendous adaptability, initiative, and innovation throughout an ever-changing mission; validated the importance of our own high level of training and readiness and our ability to transfer those skills to Iraqis; and learned valuable lessons in interoperability and the importance of a coalition. As one looks at predictions of the future operating
An Exercise in Mission
Command: The Panther Brigade
in Operation Inherent ResolveClick here to read the entire O&R
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environment, one cannot help but see similar requirements and missions on the horizon. Through a mission-command approach, proper leadership, adaptability, and creative thinking, success is achievable.
How the Iraqi Army Operates
(Edition 3) Click here to read the entire O&R
This smart book provides transition teams and organizations
partnered with Iraqi forces with a baseline reference on
processes and procedures integral to the Iraqi Army. It
attempts to connect “theory” to “practice” by providing a
means by which transition teams and partner units can
differentiate between how things are supposed to be done
and how they are being done. This smart book does not
address procedures internal to the transition teams, partner
units, and their chains of command.
Observations on SFA Page 10
Security Cooperation Planners’
Preparedness Survey Report Click here to read the entire O&R
The DoD observed that merely applying resources over time
seldom results in viable foreign security forces (FSF). In order
to create and sustain a unity of effort across the DoD
enterprise, and to prevent a series of random acts of
development with our foreign counterparts, the DoD is
depending on the knowledge, skills, and abilities of its SC
planners throughout the globe. Subsequently, it is placing
greater importance on understanding what SC planners need
to know and ensuring they are properly prepared. JCISFA
conducted a survey to determine if the planners of Security
Cooperation (SC) received mission specific training, if they
were satisfied with the training they had received, and if these
planners were aware of lessons learned and best practices
gleaned from recent and ongoing operations. The final report
is attached.
JCISFA specifically wanted the field’s perspective about how
they were organized and staffed, and how well policy and
doctrine was supporting the SC planner at all the key points
during SC planning. The survey also collected demographics
and gauged current SC planning knowledge. There were a total
of over 1,000 survey respondents.
JCISFA has two SFA courses available online though JKO. Click on the course titles below to launch.
JCISFA Online Courses
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Security Force Assistance 101 (1 hr) J3O P-US1336
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This course introduces the learner to Security Force Assistance (SFA). Topics covered include SFA goals, SFA imperatives, and the role, traits, and skills of the Security Force Assistance Advisor.
SFA 201 Building Partner Security Capacity (1 hr) J3O P-US1335
This course discusses the elements of building and maintaining partner security capacity. Executive, Generating, and Operating functions basics are covered, as well as Ends, Ways, and Means.
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JCISFA Online Courses
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Security Force Assistance Planner’s Guide (1.5 hrs)
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The Security Force Assistance Planner's Course introduces you to information from the Security Force Assistance Planner's Guide. The guide was designed to assist planners at all levels who plan security force assistance activities. However, this information may also prove to be useful for plans regarding security cooperation.
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Registering for an Account
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Did you know that any government employee can
register for an account on the JCISFA portal? While we
are primarily a military organization, we do have
members who are from the State Department, the
Department of Justice, the Coast Guard, Homeland
Security and many more. Non-government employees
with a government sponsor may also be granted access.
To register for an account please follow the following
directions:
1. Click here to register on NIPR. To register on SIPR, go
to https://jcisfa.js.smil.mil.
2. Please choose your authentication type. (You may
choose either a government issued smart card or a
username/password.*)
3. Please fill out the required contact information for
your profile. This information allows us to properly
categorize you in the system. (The system will
recommend items based on your categorization and
preferences.)
4. Click continue/save (one click). At this point the site will
create an account for you.
5. Once you click save, you will be granted the opportunity
to create a username/password or register your CAC.
After you have registered, JCISFA staff will review and
approve your account. Please note that we have different
rules for Contractors, foreign nationals and for non-
government entities. Please refer to our FAQ’s section on
our site for more information.
* The use of a username/password will prevent you from
accessing For Official Use Only (FOUO) items on our site.
JCISFA Weekly Notification
JCISFA publishes a weekly notification on NIPR, designed
as a means to alert our subscribers to new Observations
& Recommendations (O&Rs) posted to the JCISFA
Website.
These O&Rs cover a variety of topics related to Security
Force Assistance. The system can automatically mail
these to you each week.
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To subscribe to this notification, please do the following:
1. Login to the JCISFA site
2. Go to the ‘My Profile’ tab
3. Select the ‘My Subscriptions’ tab
4. Click ‘General Site Notifications’ and ‘Notify Me When
Content is Published’
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425 McPherson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS
Phone: 913-684-3629
DSN: 552-3629
NIPR site — https://jcisfa.jcs.mil
SIPR site — https://jcisfa.js.smil.mil
JCISFA’s website provides a knowledge repository for SFA related Observations &
Recommendations. Some of the key features of our site are its search and posting
capabilities.
Members can search and find Published and Archived Observations &
Recommendations (O&Rs). Releasability on O&R attachments varies, so please
check prior to distributing.
Additionally, members can submit O&Rs based on their experiences in SFA.
Submitted O&Rs are verified and published by JCISFA Staff.
To submit a Request for Information, please use the RFI button on our website or
click here. JCISFA will then contact you as soon as possible.
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Knowledge Sharing
The JCISFA website pulls and
publishes Observations and
Recommendations (O&Rs) from
PKSOI/SOLLIMS daily.
Additionally, O&R’s from JCISFA
are imported / exported to the
Joint Lessons Learned Information
System (JLLIS) daily.
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The JCISFA Website is our external presence online. We maintain both a
NIPRnet (Unclassified/FOUO) site and a SIPRnet site.
JCISFA Website
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