STATE OF MARYLAND

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'' CASE No. 115141033x CASE No. lt5l4l034* CASE No. 115141035* CASE No. t 15141036* CASE No. ll5l4l037

v.

CAESAR GOODSON,EDWARD NERO,GARRETT MILLER,BRIAN RICE,ALICIA WHITE, &WILLIAM PORTER

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STATE'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 4-263(m).MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF. AND REOUEST FOR EXPEDITED

IIEARING

Now comes the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's

Attorney for Baltimore City; Janice L. Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and

Matthew Pillion, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and pursuant to Rule a-263(m)

moves this Honorable Court to issue a protective order restricting the Parties' dissemination of

discovery materials to the public. This order is necessary because the Defendants' attomeys

have demonstrated a likelihood of publicizing discovery materials in a manner that may

jeopardize the ability to conduct a fair and impartial trial of these matters. The State requests this

Honorable Court to designate discovery materials supplied to the defense as confidential. The

scope of the requested restrictions is set forth in the attached proposed order. The State outlines

the basic factual grounds and the legal authority for this Motion and proposed order below and

requests that the Court hold an expedited hearing for the State to present partiolJarized facts in

support of the Motion.

Introduction

"Criminal justice must be carried out in the courtro om." Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.

Gansler,377 lldd. 656, 674 (2003). When publicity surrounds a criminal trial, the United States

Supreme Court has "always held that the atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial-

the most fundamental of all freedoms-must be maintained at all costs." Estes v. Texas,381

U.S. 532, 540 (1965). To that end, "the right to a fair trial . . . must take precedence over the

right to make comments about pending litigation by lawyers who are associated with that

litigation if such comments are apt to seriously threaten the integrity of the judicial process."

Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,522F.2d242 (7th Cir. 1975). "As officers of the court,

court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate to the

detriment of the accused or that will obstruct the fair administration of justice." Nebraska Press

Ass'n v. Stuart,427 U.5.539, 601 n.27 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). That duty obliges not

only the government but also the defendant to respect our judicial system, for "the concept of a

fair trial extends to both the prosecution and the defense." In re Kinlein, 15 Md. App. 625, 631

n. a Q972); accord Quinones v. Stqte,2l5 Md. App. l, 23 (2013)(As the Supreme Court has

noted, the State like the defense is entitled to a fair trial."). Indeed, the whole "theory of our

system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and

argument in open court . . . ." Patterson y. Colorado,205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). In this regard,

"when an attomey makes a publicized, out-of-court statement about fthe case] . . . , the public

may view [his or her] speech as authoritative and reliable . . . [because] [a]ttomeys involved in a

particular case have greater access to information through discovery . . . ." Gansler,377 Md. at

676. As such, while "litigants do not surrender their First Amendmenr rights at the courthouse

door," nor does "a litigant [have] an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been

obtained through pretrial discovery." Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,467 U.S. 20,31-32 (1984).

A fair trial must be guarded, and "premature disclosure and weighing of the evidence may

seriously jeopardize [the ability to find] an impartial jury." Sheppard v. Manuell, 384 U.S. 333,

361 n. 1s (1966).

Factual Basis for the State's Motion

With these precepts in the background, the State's request for a protective order

restricting the public dissemination of discovery comes amid a foreground of enormous publicity

surrounding the trial of the Defendants. Numerous television and newspaper reports have

described and debated the facts of this case. The Defendants' attorneys themselves have been

responsible for much of that publicity. They have repeatedly and publicly attacked the merits of

the case and the character and motivation of the prosecution. They have commented on the

evidence that will be introduced at trial. They have publicly released defense evidence, whether

or not such evidence is relevant or would ever be admissible at trial. In short, they have

attempted to drive the narrative in this case, and the Court can easily deduce that their unfettered

ability to release select discovery to the press without the State being ethically able to respond in

rebuttal will only further enable the manipulation of the public's perception of this case.

While the State at the requested hearing will provide the Court with detailed evidence and

exhibits to support these claims, examples of the amount of publicity and defense counsel's

conduct abound. Following Mr. Gray's death, the mass protests, riots, and state of emergency in

Baltimore City prompted international press attention. The Baltimore Sun newspaper and CNN

both maintain an entire portion of their websites dedicated to coverage of this case. A Google

search for the name "Freddie Gray" yields 60,500,000 results as of this Motion's writing. When

the Defendants were charged in these cases, defense counsel immediately filed motions

attempting to undermine public faith in the prosecutor and the charges. In their "Joint Motion to

Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct," they wrote that the prosecution "shredded and

demolished the very core of the Constitutional right to due process for what can only be

described as self-aggrandizing motives." They characterized the prosecution in charging these

cases as having "preached like a prophet and reveled like a rock star." They commented that any

defendant statements that might exist as evidence "will necessarily be inadmissible at trial." In

their "Joint Motion for Recusal," they publicly decried that, "[a]t best, the charges levied against

these officers are extraordinary prosecutorial overreaching," while "[a]t worst, they are

something far more nefarious." The Motion continued that "the charges are baseless and that

there are material false statements and omissions in the Statement of Charges." The defense

attorneys even claimed that familial and political pressures made the prosecution "susceptible to

be influenced in choosing to file criminal charges against the defendants in this matter."

Continuing their media blitz, on May 13, 2015, Sgt. White's counsel spoke at a press

conference hosted by the Vanguard Society, extolling how Sgt. White "was destined by

Vanguard and other police officers to break the glass ceiling for females." Defendant White's

counsel attacked the prosecution and its case while praising the character of the Defendant:

"[a]ccuracy was sacrificed for speed . . . and politics . . . Ms. White was steamrolled into this,"

concluding, "[s]he's your sister, she's your cousin, she's your friend, she's your neighbor."

When on June 2,2015, the State filed a request to extend the time to respond to defense

motions and made reference to the intent to seek this protective order to restrict dissemination of

the autopsy in this case, the defense publicly mischaracteized the request. Defendant White's

counsel told the Sun, "there is something in that autopsy report that they are trying to hide" and

that "to ask for a protective order is beyond disingenuous." Defendant's counsel proves the

State's point. There is nothing in the autopsy report that the State seeks to hide. Indeed, if the

Defendants were to consent and the court would so order, the State would have no objection to

posting the entire autopsy report on the intemet, along with all of the discovery in the case.

Defendants, however, want to have it both ways. They want the freedom to publicize selected

aspects of the discovery, while requiring the State to follow the law that prevents comments in

order to ensure a fair trial for Defendants. The Defendants continue to generate publicity to

prejudice the jury pool and support their argument for removal, yet demand the State remain

silent.

Recently, on June 9,2015, the defense attorneys filed a Supplement to their Joint Motion

for Recusal in which they attach as an exhibit emails they obtained. The emails, dated between

March 17-20,2015, consisted of a correspondence between a prosecution employee and a police

major and a second exchange between that major and other police officers regarding crime-

prevention strategies in the area where Mr. Gray was arrested on April T2,2015. The defense

attorneys then wrote that this email exchange somehow meant that certain of the Defendants

were acting "at the direction of the State's Attorney'' the day they are alleged to have arrested

Mr. Gray. The press roared. The Baltimore Sun ran the story under the headline, "Baltimore

prosecutor asked police to target area where Freddie Gray was arrested." The public reacted

strongly also. Reader comments to the story on the Sun's website expressed, for example, "the

truth is slowly coming out" and "every day is just looking better for the Baltimore police and

their defense." On the other hand, one reader wrote, "the defense attorneys want to adversely

affect the public perception of Mosby's competence." The State agrees this is a more than fair

inference about the defense strategy in this case.

With the State's deadline to provide discovery to the Defendants fast approaching on

June 26, 2015, the degree of media attention has not abated. Considering the defense attomeys'

history of public statements and selective release of evidence, the circumstances compel the State

to seek a protective order to preserve the integrity of the adversarial trial system. The Court must

not allow the discovery in this case to further fuel a defense public-relations firestorm. The

evidence must be made public, but its release to the public must be made in a court of law, not in

defense efforts to court public favor.

The Legal Framework of a Protective Order

It is imperative to be mindful that "[t]he purpose of [Rule 4-263) is to assist the defendant

in preparing his defense, and to protect him from surprise." Hutchins v. State,339 Md. 466, 473

(1995) (quoting Mayson v. State,238 Md. 283,287 (1965)(discussing Md. Rule 728, a precursor

to Md. Rule 4-263))(internal quotations omitted). Rule 4-263 governs the criminal discovery and

inspection process in circuit court and sets out the parameters within which the State and the

defense must provide each other with information about the case. "Discovery may be

accomplished in any manner mutually agreeable to the parties," but "discovery materials shall

not be filed with the court." Rule 4-263(k). Nothing in the rule expressly prohibits a party from

disseminating discovery materials to the public by means other than filing them with the court,

but the Rule does provide a mechanism for placing restrictions on such dissemination upon

request. Rule 4-263(m), entitled "protective orders," provides that "[o]n motion of a party . . .

the court, for good cause shown, may order that specified disclosures be denied or restricted in

any manner that justice requires."

Marvland's Limited Appellate Law Concerning Discoverv Protective Orders

Maryland's appellate courts have explored this provision for a protective order in the

context of witness protection and the flow of information between the parties and attomeys. In

Coleman v. State,82 Md. App. 247 (1990), the Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial judge's

issuance of a protective order that permitted the State to withhold from the defense the names of

two civilian witnesses until two weeks before trial and that prohibited defense counsel from

revealing those names to the defendants prior to trial. The Court noted that there exists "no

constitutional right to discovery of the names of prosecuting witnesses," stating rather that the

"source of any right to discovery of such information is found in Rule 4-263," which "permits

the court in its discretion to order that any of the discovery . . . be restricted." Id. at 251. The

appellants in Coleman had each been charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

One of the witnesses whose information the State sought to protect had overheard an

incriminating conversation between the appellants, and the other witness had actually seen the

murder. Id. at 249-250. The State based its request for a protective order with detailed

testimony from a detective that the appellants were members of a drug organization with a

history of violence and that the witnesses were justifiably "in extreme fear" for their safety. Id.

The Court found that the detective's testimony "was sufficient to establish the existence of a

substantial risk of harm to the two witnesses in question" and that the trial "court struck a fair

balance between the State's concern for the safety of its witnesses and the rights of appellants to

prepare their defenses . . . ." Id. at 252. The Court also relied on the provision in what is now

Rule 4-263(9), which "permits the court to withhold discovery of information which 'would

entail a substantial risk of harm to any person outweighing the interest in disclosure."' Id. at25l

(quoting what was then Rule 4-263(i)). The Court did not comment on other situations that

might justify a protective order, and when the appellants asked for further review of this

decision, the Court of Appeals merely affirmed the use of the protective order on the same

grounds as the intermediate court, doing so, again, without discussion of other uses of a

protective order. Colemanv. State,321 Md. 586 (1991).

Similarly, in Lancaster v. State,410 Md. 352 (2009), the Court of Appeals reviewed a

circuit court's witness-safety protective order that restricted the State's disclosure of witness

information to defense counsel and, in turn, counsel's dissemination of that information to the

defendant. Unlike in Coleman, the Court determined that the trial court erred because the State

failed to make an adequate record to justifu the restrictions, presenting no "evidence of specific

threats" against the witnesses, no showing of the defendant's reputation for violence, no

indication who would carry out any such violence since defendants were incarcerated, and no

showing of the materiality of the witnesses' testimony. Id. at379-80. Again, the Court did not

discuss other justifications for a protective order and considered only the restricted dissemination

of information between the parties and their lawyers.

Other Jurisdictions' Uses of a Protective Order to Restrict Discoverv Dissemination

The State's review of reported Maryland opinions has found no cases that squarely

address the use of a protective order to restrict a party's public release of discovery materials to

avoid unfair pretrial publicity. Other jurisdictions, however, have established well-litigated

standards on the issue based on their criminal and civil corollaries to Rule a-263(m). These

standards largely flow from the Supreme Court's decision it Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,467

u.s. 20 (re84).

In Seattle Times, the Court considered "whether parties to a civil litigation have a First

Amendmenr right to disseminate, in advance of trial, information gained through the pretrial

discovery process." Id. at 22. The case stemmed from a Washington state civil suit in which

Rhinehart, the leader of the Aquarian Foundation religious group, sued the Seattle Times and a

local newspaper after they published a series of allegedly defamatory and invasive articles about

the group. During the discovery process, the trial court ordered Rhinehart to disclose the

identities of the group's donors and members, which the newspapers stated they intended to use

for future articles about the group. On Rhinehart's motion, the court granted Rhinehart a

protective order that prevented the papers from disseminating the information disclosed. The

order was authorized by a Washington rule that permitted "for good cause shown . . . any order

which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, ernbarrassment, oppression,

or undue burden or expense . . . ." Id. at26.

Reviewing the newspapers' appeal from this order, the Court began its analysis by

recognizing that "information obtained through civil discovery authoized by modern rules of

civil procedure would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected speech identified by

the decisions of this Court," noting that there may be a "public interest in knowing" the

information learned from discovery. Id. at 31. While the Court acknowledged that restrictions

on litigant dissemination of discovery impaired the litigant's First Amendment nght of free

expression, the question turned on whether the "good cause" protective rule "furthers an

important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression and

whether the limitation of First Amendment freedoms is no greater than necessary or essential to

the protection of the govemmental interest involved." Id. at32 (internal quotations and citations

removed). Answering this question, the Court noted that discovery processes "are a matter of

legislative grace" such that "continued court control over the discovered information does not

raise the same specter of govemment censorship that such control might suggest in other

situations." 1d. Moreover, "[m]uch of the information that surfaces during pretrial discovery

may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action," and

"discovered, but not yet admitted, information" is not "a traditionally public source of

information." Id. at 33. Additionally, "[l]iberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of

assisting in the preparation and trial" of the case and carries "significant potential for abuse,"

including "obtain[ing]-incidentally or purposefully-information that not only is irrelevant but

if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy." Id. at35.

The Court determined that the "good cause" protective rule "furthers a substantial

govefirmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" since "the government clearly

has a substantial interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes." The Court explained,

furthermore, "whether or not the Rule itself authorizes a particular protective order, we have no

question as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent equitable powers of courts of

law over their own process to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices." Id. (intemal citations

and brackets removed). The Court also found that Washington's protective order provision and

"good cause" standard "requires, in itself, no heightened First Amendmenl scrutiny" given the

'hnique character of the discovery process [which] requires that the trial court have substantial

latitude to fashion protective orders." Id. at 36. Ultimately, the Court held that where "a

protective order is entered on a showing of good cause . . . , is limited to the context of pretrial

civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other

sources, it does not offend the First Amendment." Id. at37.

In the years since this decision, "courts have extended [the Seattle Times) reasoning to

pretrial criminal discovery," holding that "'[d]iscovery, whether civil or criminal, is essentially a

private process because the litigants and the courts assume that the sole purpose of discovery is

to assist trial preparation."' U.S. v. Carriles,654 F. Supp. 2d 557,573 (W.D. Tex. 2009)

10

(quoting U.S. v. Anderson, 7gg F.zd 1438, l44l 11 lth Cir. 1996) (applying Seattle Times in a

high-profile racketeering case)); accord e.g., State v. Cobbins,2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 78

(Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 4,2015) (applyng Seattle Times in a murder trial to an intervenor's

request to view discovery materials in the court file that were never formally admitted as

evidence). The federal courts have also considered "good cause" protective orders in the specific

context of preventing excessive pretrial publicity. ln Anderson v. Cryovac, lnc.,805 F.2d I (1't

Cir. 1986), the case involving the famous toxic tort suit that served as the basis for the 1996 book

and 1998 frlm A Civil Action, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered

the Boston Globe Newspaper Company's intervenor challenge to the trial court's protective

orders issued under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The orders prohibited

the parties from disseminating information obtained through discovery to the press.

Reviewing these orders, the Court applied the Seattle Times analysis to Rule 26(c), which

permits a court to enter a protective order "for good cause shown." Cryovac,805 F.2d at 5. The

Court first explained that "[a] finding of good cause must be based on a particular factual

demonstration of potential harm, not on conclusory statements." Id. at 7. Examining the record,

"[t]he district court was concerned that the extensive publicity generated.by the allegations made

against the defendants, particularly the accounts appearing in the daily newspapers, would inhibit

and perhaps prevent the selection of an impartial jury." Id. at 8. The Court also noted that

"[s]pecific instances of such publicity were discussed in the hearings on the motion, and the

court took judicial notice of 'quite heavy stufP appearing in the newspapers." Id. The Court

found on this record that "there was good cause for the district court to issue the protective

order." Id- The district court's actions, the Court continued, "were fully consistent" with the

reasoning of In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108 (1't Cir. 1981), in which the Court upheld a

t1.

protective order "prohibiting disclosure of deposition contents to the press or public, finding that

'the massive amount of publicity' and 'the emotionally-charged nature of the trial' were

reasonably likely to cause 'material harm to the defendants' right to a fair trial." Cryovac,805

F.2d at 8. While the Court ultimately found that the district court's order erred by later

permitting selective dissemination to some media outlets but not to others, id. at9, the Court's

holding demonstrates that the risk of prejudicial pretrial publicity can constitute good cause for

restricting parties' right to disseminate discovery materials to the public. These federal cases,

moreover, can guide the use of Maryland's protective order provisions as the State here requests.

Our sister States have likewise recognizedthat there is no right -- constitutional, common

law, or First Amendment based -- to public access of criminal discovery materials. See Tacoma

News, Inc. v. Cayce,256 P.3d 1179, ll91 (Wa. 20ll) (holding no First Amendmenl right of

access to a pretrial deposition of a witness in a criminal case); Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v.

Burk, 504 So. 2d 378, 383 (Fla. 1987) cert. denied 484 U.S. 954 (1987) (holding no First

Amendment ngtfi of access to criminal deposition proceedings or to unfiled depositions in

criminal prosecutions); In re Worrell Enterprises, Inc.4l9 S.E.2d 271 (Ya. App. 1992) (holding

there is no constitutional right of access to the discovery documents such as defendant's medical,

psychological and psychiatric documents subpoenaed by the Commonwealth); Rosado v.

Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.,292 Cowr.l, 36 (Conn. 2009) cert. denied 558 U.S.

991 (2009) (observing that discovery proceedings never were open to the public at common law,

citing Seattle Times; and fuither that the principles supporting liberal discovery are distinct from

those supporting public access to court documents, citing Cryovac).

L2

Conclusion

Maryland's appellate courts have yet to issue a reported opinion about a protective order

issued under Rule 4-263(m) that restricts the parties' right to disseminate discovery materials to

the public. The State's request, however, fully comports with Coleman and Lancaster in that the

State does not ask for any restrictions on the information that will be disclosed to defense

counsel, nor does the State seek any restrictions on defense counsel's right to review the

discovery material with the Defendants. The restrictions the State seeks neither impair the

Defendants' ability to prepare their defense nor expose them to surprise. The State seeks only to

preserve the integrity of the trial of these matters. Excessive pretrial publicity risks interfering

with the fairness of the potential jury pool and, thereby, the trial itself to the same degree as the

risk that witness intimidation presented in Coleman to the parties' ability to present their case to

the jury at all. Truth must not succumb to prejudgment or fear.

Moreover, the State's request is consistent with Seattle Times and the decisions applying

its holding in the face of pretrial publicity. The State does not seek a restriction on dissemination

of discovery material any longer than necessary to achieve a final judicial result in these cases.

The State also does not seek to limit in any way the press's right to attend the trial or any pretrial

hearings of these matters. The State seeks only to have justice carried out in the courtroom, not

the newsroom. Given certain Defendants' attomeys' actions to date and the intense press interest

in these cases, the State believes that good cause amply exists to justify the Court's granting the

reasonable restrictions herein requested that will prevent discovery materials from being

published and debated publicly for the months leading up to jury selection and trial in these

matters. Rather than present evidence by way of written exhibits attached to this Motion, the

13

State requests to present particulaized facts in support of this Motion

Honorable Court.

Wherefore, the State moves this Honorable Court to schedule

consider evidence in support of this Motion and, following that hearing,

issue the attached proposed order.

at a hearing before this

an expedited hearing to

to grant this Motion and

Respectfully submitted,

Marilyn J. Mosby

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o"p{/ffi" tttorneyI ?*1. ast Baltimore S treet

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The SunTrust Bank BuildingBaltimore, Maryland 21202(443) 984-60 I 2 (telephone)(443) 984-6256 (facsimile)i bleds oe@ stattornelt. org

Matthew Pillion (#653 49 l)Assistant State's Attorney120 East Baltimore StreetThe SunTrust Bank BuildingBaltimore, Maryland 21202(443) 984-6045 (telephone)(443) 984 -6252 (facsimile)mpi I li on@ s tat tornev. org

74

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this _ day of June,2015, a copy of the State's Motion forProtective Order Pursuant to Rule 4-263(m), Memorandum in Support Thereof, and Request forExpedited Hearing was mailed and e-mailed to:

Matthew Fraling, III, Esq.Counsel for Caesar Goodson

Joseph Murtha, Esq.

Counsel for William Porter

Catherine Flynn, Esq. MarcZayon, Esq.Counsel for Garrett Miller Counsel for Edward Nero

Michael Belsky, Esq.Counsel for Brian Rice

Ivan Bates, Esq.Counsel for Alicia White

Respectfully submitted,

Marilyn J. Mosby

State's Attorney120 East Baltimore StreetThe SunTrust Bank BuildingBaltimore, Maryland 21202(443) 984-60 1 2 (telephone)(443) 98 4 - 625 6 (facsimile)i b leds oe@ s tatt ornqt. org

15

STATE OF MARYLAND

v.

CAESAR GOODSON,EDWARD NERO,GARRETT MILLER,BRIAN RICE,ALICIA WHITE, &WILLIAM PORTER

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ORDER

Having considered the State's Motion for

cause, it is by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City this

TN THECIRCUIT COURT FORBALTIMORE CITY

CASE No. 115141032CASE No. 115141033CASE No. 115141034CASE No. 115141035CASE No. 115141036CASE No. 115141031

Protective Order and having found good

day of 20t5,

ORDERED, that the State's Motion for Protective Order is hereby GRANTED in its

entirety; and it is fuither

ORDERED, that all materials disclosed in the above-captioned cases as discovery

pursuant to Rule 4-263 shall be subject to this Order concerning confidential information, as set

forth below:

(a) All materials disclosed in the above-captioned cases as discovery pursuant to Rule 4-

263 will be treated as confidential whether or not the material is labeled

..CONFIDENTIAL.''

(b) Information or documents designated as confidential under this Order shall not be

used or disclosed by the parties, counsel for the parties, or any persons identified in

subparagraph (c) below for any purposes whatsoever other than in accordance with this

Order and for the purpose of preparing for and conducting the litigation in which the

information or documents were disclosed (including appeals).

(c) The parties and counsel for the parties shall not disclose or permit the disclosure of

any documents or information, designated as confidential under this Order to any other

person or entity not authorized by the Court, except that disclosures may be made in the

following circumstances :

(i) Disclosure may be made to the parties, counsel for the parties, and employees

of counsel for the parties who have direct functional responsibility for the

preparation and trial of the above-captioned matters. Any such employee to whom

counsel for the parties makes a disclosure shall be provided with a copy of, and

become subject to, the provisions of this Order requiring that the documents and

information be held in confidence.

(ii) Disclosure may be made only to employees of counsel required in good faith

to provide assistance in the preparation and trial of the litigation in which the

information was disclosed.

(iii) Disclosure may be made to those persons, if any, specifically engaged for the

limited purpose of making photocopies of documents. Prior to disclosure to any

such person engaged in making photocopies of documents, such person must be

informed of and agree in writing to be subject to the provisions of this Order

requiring that the documents and information be held in confidence

(iv) Disclosure may be made to consultants, investigators, or experts employed by

counsel for the parties to assist in the preparation and trial of the above-captioned

matters. Prior to disclosure to any consultants, investigators, or experts, such

persons must be informed of and agree in writing to be subject to the provisions

of this Order requiring that the documents and information be held in confidence.

.!a'

(v) Any person or entity to whom or to which disclosure is made pursuant to this

Order shall keep all documents designated as confidential which are received

under this Order secure within their exclusive possession and shall take

reasonable efforts to place such documents in a secure area.

(d) Unless subsequently otherwise ordered, this Order shall remain in effect until the

termination of all proceedings of the above-captioned matters in the circuit court.

(e) The Court may exercise its discretion to punish violators of this Court's Order for

contempt of court.

JudgeCircuit Court for Baltimore City