jean monnet and the ‘democratic deficit’ in the european union

Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 32, No. 2 June 1994

Jean Monnet and the ‘Democratic Deficit’ in the European Union

KEVIN FEATHERSTONE* University of Bradford

1. Introduction

How is the European Union (EU) to respond to the challenge to its legitimacy posed by the difficulties in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty? Since the Danish referendum of June 1992 rejected the Treaty, the European Community (‘EC’ is preferred here) has been bedevilled by confusion and a loss of faith.l There has been a widespread backlash by political leaders and mass publics against how the EC is currently run and concern as to how it might develop in the future. A major focus of attention -in some instances, the primary focus -has been on the perceived ‘distance’ between ‘Brussels’ and the ordinary citizen. The EC Commission has been seen to be out of touch, meddling in matters beyond its legitimate concern, and wielding power over and above its assumed bureaucratic remit. The pre-Maastricht Treaty comment of Bogdanor and Woodcock still seems to hold true: ‘the shortcomings of the Community lie in the feelings of

*This is a revised version of a paper delivered to the Political Studies Association Conference, April 1992, at the University of Leicester. The author would like to express his gratitude to David Bell, Simon Bulmer, Kenneth Dyson, John Gaffney, John Pinder, Willie Paterson, and an anonymous reviewer of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors that remain are the responsibility of the author. I In June 1992.50.7 percent voted against ratification in Denmark. A few weeks later, the Irish referendum resulted in 69percent voting in favour ofratification. In September 5 I .05 percent in France voted in favour of ratification. In May 1993, a second Danish referendum voted 56.7 per cent in favour of ratification, following special arrangements agreed at the December 1992 Edinburgh European Council.

@Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994, 108CowleyRoad.OxfordOX4 IJF. UK and23XMain Srree1,Cambridge. MA02142. USA

150 KEVIN FEATHERSTONE

remoteness and lack of influence and involvement on the part of many of its citizens’ ( 199 I , p. 492).

Hitherto, most academic discussion on this matter has dwelt on the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ in the EC (and the wider EU), and has assumed that it can best be rectified by changing the balance of power between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament in favour of the latter (Williams, 1990h2 Yet, such attention neglects an important part of the current problem: the criticisms of the role of the EC Commission. The challenge to legitimacy concerns the relationship between all three institutions, as well as the balance between national and supranational responsibilities.

The criticisms of the Commission challenge fundamental aspects of the existing integration process. It requires a re-examination of the original conception of the role to be played by the Commission, and its rationale. The genesis of this role stems, in large part, from the early philosophy of Jean Monnet, and his pursuit of what has been dubbed the ‘Monnet method’ of integration, beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), first proposed in May 1950. In some important respects, the ‘High Authority’ established by the ECSC was the forerunner of today’s Commission, as Pinder has commented, ‘the institutions of the European Community have remained remarkably similar to those designed between May and July 1950’ (1985-86, p. 43).

Monnet is widely regarded as ‘the architect of the European Community’ (Ball, ‘Introduction’, in Monnet, 1978b). As a result, ‘a certain saintliness’ has been conferred upon him by advocates of European unity (Milward, 1984, p. 396). This probably inhibited later criticism of him. Yet, to traditional federal- ists, his contribution has been judged with more circumspection. For example, Altiero Spinelli commented that ‘Monnet has the great merit of having built Europe and the great responsibility to have built it badly’ (quoted in Burgess, 1989, pp. 55-6). Moreover, ‘we are still paying for his false departure’. Indeed, Monnet was motivated by a ‘vision of a Europe united by a bureaucracy’, a telling comment, given current problems (in Burgess, 1989, p. 59). In a neo- realist historical survey, Milward has gone so far as to dismiss Monnet as ‘a assiduous self-publicist and a remarkable collector of disciples’ (1984, p. 129). A re-evaluation of Monnet’s legacy would thus seem to be in order.

The argument of this article is that Monnet established the European integration process with a particular character - which was marked by technocracy and elitism -and that the legacy of this early strategy has been to afford the Commission a weak and fragile democratic legitimacy. In that sense, the

The democratic deficit in the EC can be defined as ‘the combination of two phenomena: (i) the transfer of powers from the Member States to the EC; (ii) the exercise of these powers at Community level by institutions other than the European Parliament, even though, before the transfer, the national parliaments held power to pass laws in the areas concerned’ (Toussaint Report, 1988 quoted in Bogdanor and Woodcock, 1991, p. 482).

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JEAN MONNET AND THE ‘DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT’ IN THE EU 151

backlash against the Maastricht Treaty is a direct consequence of Monnet’s original strategy. As Jacques Delors has commented:

Europe began as an elitist project [in which i t was believed] that all that was required was to convince the decision-makers. That phase of benign despot- ism is now over. (Independenr, 26 July 1993)

In order to overcome these problems of legitimacy, today’s EU needs to be endowed with a more transparent structure of political accountability, based on the classic executive-legislative model found in most European states.

The article examines the original conception that Monnet had of the ECSC’s High Authority, to clarify the role to be played by the technocratic executive. It seeks to explain how and why the notion of the High Authority was adopted. It is necessary to highlight the choices made by Monnet in establishing the European integration process, before considering how well they serve today’s needs. The article then considers the constraints faced by today’s Commission in exercising the political leadership required of it. It concludes that reform of the Commission’s position is crucial to sustain the European integration process.

Criticism of the Commission had been a central part of the attack on the Maastricht Treaty. It surfaced in the campaigns against the Treaty in Britain, Denmark and France. Whilst there have been important differences amongst the opponents of the Treaty, criticism of the Commission often finds a common echo.

The attacks launched by Phillipe SCguin, of the Gaullists and co-leader of the ‘No’ campaign in France, for example, would strike a chord elsewhere. He argued that the ‘democratic deficit’ stems from ‘the nature and role of the Commission’ itself (LibCration, 3 1 August 1992). The Treaty confronted the European people with being ‘conquered by the arbitrary power of anonymous experts’. The electorate could not democratically sanction their leaders. Instead, ‘technocratic irresponsibility is ... the keystone of the European institutions’. Later SCguin urged France to make common cause with British criticisms of the EC, and shift it towards intergovernmentalism (Le Monde, 6 February 1993). One year after the French referendum, a poll in Le Figaro showed 54 per cent against the Maastricht Treaty, and a survey in Le Monde suggested 56 per cent would have voted against the Treaty (Guardian, 21 September 1993). The implications of such criticisms deserve careful attention.

2. Monnet and the Birth of the High Authority

At the heart of Monnet’s proposals on the ECSC was his idea of a ‘High Authority’ to be the driving force behind the new community. Although

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Monnet’s views on the particular form the High Authority should take were relatively late in developing, he clung to this idea tenaciously throughout the ECSC negotiations. Monnet saw it as an essential means to overcome the constraints of intergovernmentalism displayed by previous European organiza- tions.

The idea of establishing the High Authority was the result of Monnet’s commitment to the principle of supranationality, an attitude formed by his previous international activities. The active economic role he foresaw for the High Authority stemmed from his experience with French economic planning. In institutional planning, the idea of a High Authority came first; it developed from the discussions Monnet had with his advisers. The other institutions of the ECSC were adopted in stages: a court of justice; and then, at the start of the detailed negotiations, a parliamentary assembly (Diebold, 1959, p. 62). As the negotiations progressed, Monnet fought against the proposal to create a Council of Ministers, but he was forced to accept this as a means of maintaining some accountability to national governments. Monnet had feared that his cherished High Authority might be strangled at birth.

But, why was Monnet seduced by the notion of a high authority? Where did the idea come from? Certainly, Monnet’s previous career must have been formative. A number of writers have noted the significant influences of Monnet of his experience of the inter-allied executive committees in the First World War, and his activities in the Second World War, notably as president of the Committee of Co-operation of the Allied War Effort. These led to the recogni- tion of the advantages for international co-operation and for economic growth of nations pooling resources and accepting a system of shared management. He had also been made aware of the limitations of international institutions that lacked sufficient power at the centre, as a result of his service as the first deputy Secretary-General of the League of National (BBC interview, 1972). His international experience prior to 1945 was crucial to his belief in supranationality.

After liberation, Monnet was at the centre of French policy debates on reconstruction. This work had a dual impact on Monnet: it refined his ideas on economic modernization, whilst also affecting his understanding of the role to be played by national, and later European, authorities. The two elements were inextricably linked and formed the rationale for the ECSC proposals. It was thus inevitable that Monnet’s economic philosophy would be fundamentally shaped by distinctive French conditions and inherited traditions.

Monnet’s work in France absorbed him, and publicly he did not get involved in debates on European unity (Milward, 1992, p. 335). In March 1946, he became the first Commissaire gCnCral du Plan de Modernisation et d’Equipement, a post he was to hold until becoming the first President of the ECSC High



Authority. The 1946 Plan gave priority to the reconstruction of basic industries (steel, coal, electricity amongst others) ‘as the necessary basis for a lasting recovery’ (Ardagh, 1968, p. 14). The parallel with the sectoral coverage of the ECSC is clear. Milward has gone further, however, to argue that the ECSC was launched in order to ‘save’ the domestic French plan, which had begun to falter (Milward, 1984, p. 395). Indeed, the ECSC proposals stemmed from ‘the determination not to allow the recovery of West Germany under the Marshall Plan to prevent French resurgence’ (Milward, 1992, p. 336). Making this the primary explanation is a contentious interpretation; in any event, it stretches beyond the concerns of this article. The relevant point is how the 1946 French plan - dubbed the ‘Monnet Plan’ - might have affected Monnet’s ideas on the institutional form and economic role of the ECSC.

But, where did the principles of the Monnet Plan come from? According to Mioche, the Monnet Plan had ‘its roots in the planning experiments that France had attempted since the First World War’ (1984, p. 15). This is potentially misleading. Pre- 1940, the French state had engaged in substantial market intervention, but very little in co-ordinated economic planning.

Certainly, the principle of government intervention was already implanted into French economic thinking, as Hayward has noted:

Owing in part to the belated nature of her industrialization and exposure to international competition, official France ... had only occasionally, during the Second and Third Republics, even paid lip service to market values until the late 1960s. French governments had for centuries alternated between policies of passive protection and active promotion - state-sponsored capitalism and state capitalism - based upon close collusion between the private sector and its public senior partner. The legendary timidity of the mass of French family firms meant that it was public rather than private enterprise that innovated and took risks. (Hayward, 1983, p. 172)

Yet, whilst there had been considerable political debate on plunisme in the 1930s, there had been little government action during peacetime in this regard. The ConseilNutionul Economique was set up in 1925, with representatives from employers, unions and consumers, and it gave advice on economic policy, but its influence was minimal (Jackson, 1985, p. 21). Until LCon Blum established the Ministry of the National Economy in 1936, there had been no ministry responsible for overall co-ordination. These developments notwithstanding, the Ministry of Finance remained the most important body affecting economic policy (Jackson, 1985, p. 20). Successive governments failed to take up the idea of an economic plan. The idea was at the centre of political debate, especially in 193435, but, ‘the argument over planism was conducted exclusively on the left’ (Jackson, 1985, p. 222). Interestingly, given Monnet’s own attitude later, some planistes emphasized extra-parliamentary forms of representation and 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994


action, downgrading the role of parliament (Jackson, 1985, p. 147). Thus, the notion of economic planning had been raised, it was clearly associated with the left, and it had a strong technocratic character to it, as Jackson has noted (1985, p. 5). But planning had not been implemented: it took the dislocation of occupation and new economic thinking to make it a reality. Monnet was instrumental in establishing this new economic planning; the Monnet Plan was a radical departure (Gaffney, 1987).

As with the ECSC proposals afterwards, the institutional provisions of the Monnet Plan were not specified until a relatively late stage (Mioche, 1984, p. 6). A Planning Council was established, chaired by the Prime Minister, with 12 ministers and 12 public figures chosen for their expertise. The Council was to decide which industries were to be the subject of modernization studies. For each, ‘a Modernisation [Commission] will be set up, comprising representatives of the civil servants, experts, employers, trade unionists, and white-collar workers concerned’ (Monnet, 1978a, p. 239). At the head of the Planning Commission was the Planning Commissioner: Monnet himself, attached to the Prime Minister’s office, on the basis of which Monnet had extensive powers to direct and intervene in the planning process.

The legacy of the Monnet Plan for the ECSC was two-fold. Firstly, it established the notion of a technocratic approach: government action following the advice of experts. This philosophy subsequently had a strong hold over French public policy. As John Ardagh commented in the late 1960s,

The concept of technocracy, always stronger in France than in Britain, implies the control of policy by a disinterested elite of experts, with technical knowledge or at least technical outlook, differing both from the traditional businessman and from the party politician or bureaucrat. Their strength in France derives not only from the large role of the State in industry, but also from the high reputation of their main breeding-ground, the great engineering colleges known as the Grundes Ecofes. (Ardagh, 1968, pp. 18-19)

The Monnet Plan helped to give the technocrat a special position in France (Ardagh, 1968, p. 17).

From the start, Monnet’s proposals on the ECSC were widely seen as a consequence of his belief in an active role for the state, the philosophy of the Monnet Plan transferred to the European level. His conception of the role to be played by the High Authority in the coal and steel markets was clearly affected by the experience of the Monnet Plan. The economic advice he followed was strongly interventionist, for both growth and welfare objectives (Milward, 1992, p. 336). Subsequently, however, the negotiations on the ECSC tempered the dirigiste principles of the final treaty. Moreover, the other members of the High Authority, as well as Monnet’s successor as president, RenC Mayer, were not identified as being so strongly dirigiste (Hass, 1958, p. 457). 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994


The second legacy of the Monnet Plan was the mode of operation by the planning authority: a corporatist style, a process marked by engrenage, involving networks of outside producer and interest groups, Specifically. it was the practice of consulting representatives of industry to work out the details of policy. Indeed, this was probably a more accurate reflection of his economic philosophy. The nature of Monnet’s commitment to dirigisme is open to question. He certainly believed in active leadership, though he preferred to operate by means of consensus amongst technocratic and corporate partners rather than by crude direction. In any event, Monnet was a forceful advocate of the representation of organized labour (Milward, 1992, p. 336). The ‘Modern- ization Commissions’ were an important innovation and the practice of involving employer and union representatives, amongst others, was one which Monnet took up in the ECSC at the High Authority. The ECSC involved the creation of a ‘Consultative Committee’, bringing together some 5 1 representatives of producers, workers and consumers (Mazey, 1992, p. 44). Such consultation helped to create new networks at the European level, affecting the policy process and the distinctive nature of EC integration (Hass, 1958, 1968).

Indeed, the new mode of operation helped to set in motion a process of integration based on ‘a combination of benevolent technocrats and interest- propelled economic groups to build transnational coalitions in support of European policies’ (H. Wallace, 1993, p. 300). The method was neo-function- alism, a process built on technocracy and elitism. Subsequent progress in European integration would be seen to depend crucially on a process of elite capture: the ability of the EC Commission to engage key economic elites and to help them recognize their self-interest in supporting greater unity. This was the core of the ‘Monnet method’ (Paterson, 1993, p. 17). Both the High Authority and the EC Commission developed extensive links of this kind, also involving national government officials: a process marked by the so-called ‘comitology’ (Cassese and della Cananea, 1992).

The experience of the Monnet Plan also affected the administrative style and structure of the new High Authority. Both internally and externally, ‘Monnet modelled the High Authority on the French Administrations de mission’, such as the 1946 Planning Commission, with a relatively small bureaucracy (Cassese and della Cananea, 1992, p. 77). As Morgan has commented, ‘it only rarely happened that proposals submitted by Monnet in respect to the organization of the administrative services were rejected or substantially altered by his colleagues’ (1992, p. 1). Moreover other, wider national traits were imported from French administration: the divisional organization, the system of cabinets, the habilitarions (internal delegation of tasks), the statut du personnel, and the role of the General Secretariat (Cassese and della Cananea, 1992, p. 84). The creation of the new institution brought together personnel with different



national experiences. As a result, as Jean Rey recalled, ‘often, we, the commissioners, would suggest some administrative methods that we knew well in our own country -and which we regarded consequently as natural and normal -but which astonished our colleagues or made them laugh, and they would say that they had never heard anyone talk of such original ideas’ (cited in Cassese and della Cananea, 1992, p. 84). But in this clash of different cultures, it is clear that Monnet and the French tradition predominated. Initially, Monnet had an aversion to hierarchical bureaucratic structures - and this made co-ordination difficult at times - but, ‘within a period of four years the administrative services of the High Authority were ... transformed from an informal grouping of sympathetic individuals into a professional bureaucracy which, in terms of its structure and “technocratic” character, resembled the French administration’ (Mazey, 1992, p. 43). Indeed, the High Authority was affected by increasing bureaucratization and institutionalization (Ritchie, 1992, pp. 105-6). Many of these features were carried over, albeit in modified form, to the EC Commission (Morgan, 1992, p. 9).

Monnet’s attitude towards the form of the ECSC High Authority also seems to have been affected by the organization of the International Authority of the Ruhr, established in 1949 (Gerbet, 1986, p. 220). The Authority had a similar sectoral remit - concerned with coal, coke and steel - and, like its successor the ECSC, was set up to deal with the German problem. The Authority’s organiza- tional structure was based on a ‘Council-Commission’ type of relationship. The London conference which established the terms of the Ruhr Authority agreed that it should ‘consist of a Council composed of representatives of the [six] member-governments and [that it] will have a permanent secretariat, with an executive secretary’ appointed by the Council (CommuniquC on International Authority of the Ruhr, 28 December 1948). The Council was to operate on the basis of qualified majority voting. Moreover, it was agreed that for the personnel of the secretariat, ‘in the discharge of their duties, they shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or Authority’ (Art. 10c of Statute). Given Monnet’s later resistance to the notion of a Council of Ministers for the ECSC, he cannot have been attracted by the role of the Ruhr Council. Yet, the concept of a permanent international secretariat of experts working for the common good, rather than sectional or national interests, was a clear parallel with Monnet’s subsequent ECSC proposals.3 The Ruhr Authority probably served as both a model and a rationale for the ECSC. Moreover, once the ECSC was established, the responsibilities of the Ruhr Authority passed briefly to the High Authority, and then to West Germany in 1954.

As Monnet was to write to E. Plowden, Chief Planning Officer at the U K Treasury at the time: ‘The independence of the Authority vis-d-vis Governments and the sectional interests concerned are the precondition for the emergence of a common point of view which could be taken neither by Governments nor by private interests’ (letter of 25 May 1950; quoted in Weigall and Stirk, 1992, p. 59). 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994


A vital source of influence on Monnet is more difficult to interpret. It is widely acknowledged that Monnet had excellent, high-level relations in the US Administration throughout this period, and that Monnet was, in general, influenced by US thinking. Milward goes further and suggests that Monnet was a ‘privileged interlocutor’ between the US and France, in particular: indeed, that Monnet’s own influence in Western Europe was dependent on Washington’s leverage on their allies (1992, p. 334). Again, this seems an exaggerated claim; it neglects Monnet’s own later role in persuading reluctant Europeans, for example in Germany. In any event, it is difficult to assess US influence on the specific form of the ECSC institutions. Gerbet suggests that Monnet’s key adviser, Paul Reuter, was affected by his own experience in the US (1986, p. 220). Moreover, Wall notes that George Ball ‘proposed a framework [to Monnet] modelled on American regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission’ (Wall, 1991, p, 105). There is no further acknowledgement, however, that Monnet directly drew upon US models for the High Authority.

Monnet developed his plan for a Franco-German market in coal and steel with obvious enthusiasm, but he felt he needed wider advice on the institution(s) to govern it (Monnet, cited in Gerbet, 1986, p. 120). He consulted Reuter, a professor of law, in particular (Lynch, 1988, p. 120). Subsequently, Monnet ‘was strongly attracted [s.iduir] by the formula of a High Authority formed not by representatives of states, but by independent personalities, chosen for their competence, and not in receipt of instructions from governments’ (Gerbet, 1986, p. 221). Monnet (and Gerbet) saw the High Authority as the key to everything else: ‘Monnet had produced a project that was both precise for the situation of coal and steel at the time, and potentially rich in future developments for Europe, he had made it efficient due to a supranational High Authority, in short, by making this the key idea’ (Gerbet, 1956, p. 552).

Certainly, Monnet was insistent on the principle of the High Authority. Before the ECSC negotiations began, Monnet was adamant to the British government that ‘all parties to the talks must accept beforehand the principle of the existence of a High Authority whose decisions would be binding’ (Milward, 1984, p. 401). Such a notion was, apparently, sacr~sanct .~ As Diebold has commented, ‘it was truly to be an imperium in imperio, wielding powers previously held by national governments and having some functions not previously exercised by governments’ (Diebold, 1959, p. 78).

The scheme advocated by Monnet, on behalf of the French government, was that the institutional structure of the ECSC should essentially be composed of a High Authority, with a court ofjustice and a parliamentary assembly alongside

However, in private a more flexible understanding seems to have been reached with the Dutch government, which was amongst those which later insisted on substantial controls over the exercise of the Authority’s powers. 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994


it.5 ‘Protection against the High Authority’s abuse of power lay primarily in the right of appeal to the supranational court’ (Diebold, 1959, p. 63). Indeed, governments would also be able to challenge the Authority through the court. The simplicity of this structure served to emphasize the strong executive role to be played by the High Authority.

In the detailed negotiations to draw up the ECSC Treaty, Monnet had to make strenuous efforts to defend his conception of the High Authority. To some, his manner of ‘bulldozing ahead’ was infuriating (Lynch, 1988, p. 123); moreover, he appears to have operated ‘almost independently’, failing to consult the French government for prolonged periods during the negotiations (Griffiths, 1988, p. 39). Monnet sought to reassure critics of the High Authority by emphasizing its ‘limited and specific powers’, arguing that some of its powers would be ‘precautionary’ in nature (Diebold, 1959, p. 65). His opponents interpreted matters differently. Notably, the Belgian and Dutch governments objected to ‘the great and undefined powers’ envisaged for the authority (Milward, 1984, p. 409).

The Benelux delegations insisted from the outset that the final treaty should lay down detailed and absolute provisions for the powers of the High Authority, and they were determined that there should be some governmental supervision over its decisions. Both Dutch and Belgian delegations wanted a Council of Ministers to be able to issue directions to the High Authority. (Milward, 1984, p. 409)

Monnet noted in his memoirs that the negotiations proceeded to insert ‘a thousand technical precautions’ into the ECSC edifice (Monnet, 1976, p. 468; 1978, p. 324). Monnet had not envisaged a Council of Ministers at all.

The High Authority survived, but in altered form and in conjunction with other institutions (Griffiths, 1988, p. 35). The Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice and the Assembly were established as institutional checks, and the powers of the Authority were defined much more precisely. The negotiations had not developed, in this regard, as Monnet had intended (Gillingham, 199 1 a, p. 130). The extent to which the final ECSC treaty diverged from Monnet’s original thoughts is a matter of continuing historical dispute (cf. Diebold, 1988; Griffiths, 1988). The High Authority was, however, a notable innovation, with a formidable role to play.

Under the Treaty of Paris, the High Authority had a different set of executive powers than was to be given to the Commission under the Treaty of Rome (EEC and Euratom) later. The High Authority was ‘the driving force’ behind the ECSC, whereas the Treaty of Rome provides for the Commission and Council to operate in ‘tandem’ (Noel, 1988, p. 7). Even the change of title - ‘Commis-

The French had also raised, at one stage in the ECSC negotiations, the idea of ‘regional association of producers’, but this proposal was quickly dropped (Diebold, 1959, p. 64). 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994


sion’ rather than ‘High Authority’ - is indicative of a role being scaled down, as one of the early key figures has noted (Robert Marjolin in Brinkley and Hackett, 1991). Still today, the Council acts in ECSC affairs mainly at the request of the Commission, which can take decisions and make recommenda- tions (both of which are binding on Member States, to varying extents) on its own account (Noel, 1988, p. 7). The powers of the High Authority and the Commission therefore differed, but much of the philosophy underpinning the role of today’s Commission stems directly from Monnet’s conception of the High Authority. The role of the High Authority was crucially to affect the nature of the integration process set in motion. This is despite the fact that by the time he stepped down as President of the High Authority in 1955, the ECSC and its executive arm were developing in different directions than that favoured by Monnet himself. Indeed, his approach was being more strongly challenged: ‘he could only have been disappointed at the turn of events’ in the ECSC (Gilling- ham, 1991a, p. 156).

Monnet regarded agreement on the High Authority as crucial to the launch of the ECSC:

like Adenauer and Schuman, 1 thought that the accord of the High Authority must be conducted very quickly. Once the institution is in place and the breakthrough consolidated, the moment of the technicians amves, and their difficulties, I do not doubt that - but the political step will have been taken. (Monnet, 1976, p. 463; see also 1978a, p. 321)

The High Authority was to be the key political breakthrough. Moreover, Monnet believed in the power and utility of institutions to settle international problems. Institutions, ‘accumulate collective experience; and owing to this experience and wisdom, men subject to the same rules will not see their own nature change but their behaviour gradually transformed’ (quoted in Fontaine, 1988, p. 31). It was assumed that those involved in the High Authority would share a similar experience.

Monnet’s ECSC strategy was to proceed in a piecemeal fashion, thereby not taking too many political risks by inflaming those jealously guarding national sovereignty. As he subsequently explained,

We believed in starting with limited achievements, establishing de fact0 solidarity, from which a federation would gradually emerge. I have never believed that one fine day Europe would be created by some great political mutation, and 1 thought it wrong to consult the peoples of Europe about the structure of a Community of which they had no practical experience. It was another matter, however, to ensure that in their limited field the new institutions were thoroughly democratic; and in this direction there was still progress to be made ... the pragmatic method we had adopted would ... lead to a federation validated by the people’s vote; but that federation would be the


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culmination of an existing economic and political reality, already put to the test. (Monnet, 1978a, pp. 93,286,295,392-3,383,387 cited in Burgess, 1989, P. 54)

On the second day of the ECSC negotiations Monnet submitted further details of his ideas concerning the new institutions. Monnet was very much taking the lead; no other delegation ‘produced constitutional drafts of their own for the new community’ (Gillingham, 1991b, p. 239). Monnet proposed the creation of a parliamentary assembly, to insert some democratic accountability into the new Community. According to some historians this was a response to early sensitiv- ities.

Diebold interpreted it as a ‘French response to the criticism that they were proposing a supranational board above and beyond democratic control’ (Die- bold, 1959, p. 62). Milward sees it as being designed to ‘blunt the technocratic edge of the Authority’ (Milward, 1984, p. 409). Monnet had not foreseen the need for such an assembly in his original plan; he had not seen ‘the need for democratic assemblies’ in the new European venture ‘ as a representation of the west’s spiritual superiority’ (Milward, 1992, p. 336). A key participant in the negotiations, Etienne Hirsch, takes amore sympathetic view, however, suggesting that Monnet saw the point of the assembly very soon after it was put to him, which was before the detailed negotiations in Luxembourg began (Hirsch, 1987, p. 107).

In any event, the assembly Monnet finally proposed was a very weak one. This was probably inevitable, given the fact that the new Community would be concerned only with coal and steel. The assembly was to meet annually, the time for a European assembly to take centre stage being long in the future. The ECSC Common Assembly alone would not have been much impediment to the innovators of the High Authority. Monnet had tried to block the establishment of a Council of Ministers, as an assembly and a council could have been a more powerful combination. Instead, it seemed technocrats had to build Europe first, before the politicians and the people could get their hands on it.6

Monnet, a man who had built up his influence by operating within the corridors of government administrations and beyond, by instinct focused on elites. Though not a ‘technocrat’ as such himself, he was the entrepreneur and planner wanting to move governments (Ardagh, 1968, p. 21). As he later explained when enthused by a new scheme, ‘I go to see the man in authority’, and make him see that circumstances demand a particular action (BBC interview). Edward Heath also noted that, ‘Monnet operated on the basis of governments giving a remit to experts and for them to get on with it’ (BBC

According to Haas (1968. p. 455), even after the ECSC was up and running Monnet continued to show disdain for the role of the Council of Ministers. As first President of the High Authority, he ‘barely acknowledged the existence of the Council of Ministers’. preferring to develop the potential of the Authority to the full. 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994


interview). Monnet displayed a strong ‘attachment to functional administrative machinery, and above all to a small and powerful committee able to make far- reaching decisions’ (Milward, 1992, p. 336). Monnet’s ideas on the ECSC were symptomatic of the new age of post-war technocracy in France and beyond. Monnet never sought a career as an elected politician, as he believed himself to be unsuited to it, though Milward is more tendentious in suggesting that Monnet believed this to be ‘a calling ... leading to powerlessness’ (Milward, 1992, p. 333).

The High Authority was to be the champion of the European cause and the beholder of the true European interest. Monnet was thus the first to assume that Brussels knows best and should be allowed to get on with it. As Haas commented:

In a sense, Monnet considered the High Authority as the repository of the European General Will, with the evil governments merely the spokesmen for the selfish political wills. The Treaty, as administered by the High Authority, is the basic European consensus for progress, peace and federation (Haas, 1968, p. 456; emphasis in original)

In sum, fundamental to Monnet’s beliefs was the need to tie governments to the European objectives, but to have them entrust much of the task for their attainment to the technocratic High Authority, a body which he thought should be barely accountable to them. The High Authority should work for a federated Europe, but federalism would be built gradually and a European Parliament was an idea for tomorrow. In this sense, as Burgess has remarked, Monnet was ‘an advocate of federalism without ever having been a federalist’ (Burgess, 1989, p. 51). Monnet believed that his gradualist strategy would have an inherent dynamic, strong and sustainable, which would lead to a union among peoples (Burgess, 1989, p. 59). As he wrote for Schuman, ‘Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single general plan. ... It will be built through concrete achievements ...’ (Speech by Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950).

The notion of a ‘democratic deficit’ existing in today’s European Commu- nity properly stems, then, in part, from the manner in which Monnet conceived the ECSC. Monnet built a European edifice with a weak representative assembly. Moreover, his strategy for the ECSC clearly involved setting his attention firmly on persuading elites, rather than the mass publics, to the European cause. (Later, given the political difficulties surrounding the ratification of the Euro- pean Defence Community proposal, he adopted a somewhat different strategy, seeking to gain the support of a wider section of the public. Nevertheless, he had previously helped to establish an ‘elitist’ conception of European unity, which was to have long-term consequences.) Similarly, criticisms of today’s EC Commission ‘meddling’ in matters beyond its legitimate concern, and of it



being a largely unaccountable and distant bureaucracy also originate with Monnet’s original conception of its ECSC predecessor. The problems of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93 must be ascribed, in part, to Monnet.

Monnet’s actions might be defended by arguing that there was no viable, alternative institutional model available to him in this early period. Democratic accountability via a federal structure might not have been acceptable, and the alternative of national governments being in the driving-seat would have led to little progress in the quest for European unity. Such arguments might defend Monnet from being a ‘sinner’, rather than a ‘saint’, in his European career. There are two separate issues here, nevertheless: the wisdom of Monnet’s original strategy and ideas, and the utility of following essentially the same path today. The evaluation of Monnet’s contribution may differ between the two issues. The argument here is that Monnet set European integration on a particular course, having crucially shaped its character, and the long-term effect was to make its central institution - the Commission - weak and vulnerable in the face of democratic challenge. It is important to identify the consequences of yester- day’s choices, particularly in the context of the criticism that has arisen in the Maastricht Treaty debates.

3. The Commission and Democratic Legitimacy

By almost any measure, the Commission fails the test of democratic legitimacy. Whilst it has a high profile, public opinion often seems not to understand its role nor to accept a primary leadership role for it. Admittedly, public attitudes are difficult to gauge on the matter: they appear to vary significantly between Member States, and no doubt over time also. The Commission’s own survey found, in December 199 1 at the height of public interest in the Maastricht Treaty proposals, substantial minorities holding ‘generally unfavourable’ views of the Commission (Eurobarometer, December 199 1). Such dissatisfaction amounted to 43 per cent of respondents in the UK; 36 per cent in the Netherlands; 34 per cent in Denmark; and 27 percent in France. Such dissatisfaction appears distinct from public apathy to national governments during periods of party unpopular- ity: in the latter case, the criticism is of recognized individual political leaders, rather than the institutions of government per se; for the Commission, it is that significant portions of public opinion object to its very nature (and, moreover, cannot identify its leading personnel).

In the general debate on maintaining democratic accountability over the exercise of power, national governments assume an advantage in contrasting their dependency on their own domestic electorates with the position of the unelected, and seemingly unaccountable, Commission. Public opinion seems much less agitated about the balance of power between the Council of Ministers



and the European Parliament, than it does by the differentiation between national capitals and ‘Brussels’. When the choice is put in these stark terms, the position of the Commission is too often undermined. Public support for the Commission seems dependent on the acceptability of the policies with which it is identified: the Commission as an institution is not attractive and enjoys a fragile legitimacy.

According to its original conception, the Commission was not supposed to enjoy democratic legitimacy: this was not seen as essential to the task in hand. However, with the progress of integration, it is increasingly apparent that the Commission’s role is undermined by this lack of public legitimacy. This affects its ability to exercise leadership on behalf of European unity. It is well worth recalling the analysis made of the Commission’s role in 1970 by Coombes - still one of the best studies of its subject - to clarify the leadership problem:

There must be aconstant strain within the Commission between its Normative and Initiative functions,on the one hand, and its Mediative and Administrative ones, on the other. The dichotomy between the two different sets of functions could be described roughly as that between a political or promotive role and a bureaucratic or implementative one. The promotive role exercised by the Commission ... is usually identified within the nation state of Western experience with the political leadership, say, a cabinet of ministers which is popularly elected, or which is responsible to a representative assembly. This is the way the promotive institution acquires legitimacy and wields the necessary power for its task. The Administrative and Mediative functions, on the other hand, are in theory performed in the national context by regulatory agencies, government departments, advisory committees, or other sections of the bureaucracy, whose power is essentially based on delegated authority. Parallel to this difference in the amount of power exercised in performing different functions is a difference in type of organization. (Coombes, 1970)

Denied the kind of parliamentary legitimacy normally possessed by national cabinets, the Commission has struggled to fulfil its leadership role. It is a sui generis organization, established without any direct, public means of legitima- tion. Unlike national cabinets, its composition is not determined by the outcome of parliamentary elections (European or national). The tenure of the Commis- sion as a whole is subject to the approval of the European Parliament, and the Maastricht Treaty envisages the approval of its President by the Parliament. Yet these are still modest means of obtaining legitimacy, much less clear than in conventional cabinet-parliamentary systems.

The constraint on the Commission exercising political leadership is part of the much larger question of determining the conditions essential for the successful expansion of integrative tasks. Neo-functionalist analysis, following the Monnet method, held that a prerequisite to ‘effective problem-solving’ was



a ‘supranational agency’ which ‘slowly extends its authority so as to progres- sively undermine the independence of the nation-states’ (Lindberg and Schein- gold, 1970, p. 6). The supranational authority would promote the ‘spill-over’ process. In the event, spill-over has been far from automatic or inevitable. Instead, key developments in European integration since the 1960s have, according to a number of writers, crucially depended upon ‘intergovernmental bargains’: the launch of the European Monetary System (Ludlow, 1982), and of the Single European Market (Moravcsik, 1991 ; Keohane and Hoffman, 199 1, for a more qualified view), for example.

The Commission’s ability to exercise political leadership has probably been much less than that envisaged by Monnet, and has seemingly depended on a complex set of variable conditions. In the 1980s, the Commission played a key role in the progress of the Single Market and Single Act proposals, the intergovernmentalist interpretation of Moravcsik ( 199 1) notwithstanding. Rather more prominently, Jacques Delors was able to play a key role in the launch of the proposals for Economic and Monetary Union. He helped to set the agenda, was able to chair the committee empowered to draw up detailed proposals (which subsequently took his name), and was instrumental in setting the pace of the decision-making process on the matter. In short, Delors was at the centre of theEMU launch. However, Delors, to some extent, created the influential role for himself; the Commission per se was much less involved in the EMU project. His role was probably more significant than that of Roy Jenkins over the EMS initiative almost a decade earlier (Ludlow, 1982). Delors pursued a shrewd strategy and was a deft mediator. Afterwards, his high profile in the EMU launch was to provoke some negative reaction in the debates over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, Delors’ personal success contrasts with the much longer period of lesser influence experienced by the Commission as an institution since the days of Walter Hallstein (1958-66). Indeed,

Both Walter Hallstein and Jacques Delors conceived the Commission’s role in heroic terms. Other Presidents have been more impressed with the constraints. (Paterson and Millar, 199 1)

The reality is that the Commission has faced severe difficulties in exercising political leadership. The Maastricht Treaty incorporated different ‘pillars’ for integration, explicitly limiting the Commission’s role in key areas. The opposition to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and the outcome of the Danish referendum, suggest that the Intergovernmental Conference due to be held in 1996 (to review developments) will find it more difficult to merge the three pillars into one, or to achieve the full absorption of the Western European Union (Corbett, 1993, p. 36). Moreover, the backlash against the Maastricht Treaty also suggests that the leadership role of the Commission is undermined by the



very nature of the institution itself. Indeed, its institutional form has not kept pace with the ‘deepening’ of the EC: what might have been acceptable for the early stages of integration no longer seems appropriate in the 1990s. Neo- functionalists were not ‘much concerned about the form of democratic control’ exercised in the integration process (Pinder, 1985-86, p. 51). They assumed a depoliticized process. In the event, this was a major miscalculation, as shown by the attacks of de Gaulle in the 1960s, Thatcher in the 1980s. and the opposition to the Maastricht Treaty. With a deepening of economic integration, the inherent and necessary political form of the Commission as an institution is more exposed. The nature of the Commission - in particular its lack of accountability - is at variance with the prevailing cultural values of the 1990s, and the democratic ethos. In part due to the impact of economic recession, there is a widespread problem of governance in the industrialized world, associated with public disenchantment. The problem for the Commission is that it is amore exposed institution than most.

4. Conclusions

Monnet’s original conception of an elitist, technocratic High Authority to lead the integration process has been found wanting. The very form of today’s EC Commission weakens its capacity to exert political leadership. It is too vulnerable to attack, as a result of its lack of accountability and democratic legitimacy. Monnet’s establishment of the High Authority made the ‘first steps easier to obtain, but he made the later steps muchmore difficult to achieve’ (Spinelli cited by Burgess, 1989, p. 60). This is probably the case, at least, with respect to the limited powers and role originally assigned to the ECSC assembly and, later, the European Parliament. In different senses, the Commission has been overtaken by the progress of integration: more intensified forms of integration highlight the Commission’s lack of democratic legitimacy; all too often it is not longer up to the job of exerting political leadership.

To sustain further integration, today’s EU needs a stronger political executive. ‘There must be separate provision for a legitimate, autonomous political authority at a federal level before integration can be regarded as worthwhile. This authority will be ineffective it if is bureaucratically organized like the present Commission’ (Coombes, 1970, pp. 322-3). The response of EC leaders to the reaction against the Maastricht Treaty has, so far, been to build on the notion of ‘subsidiarity’, bringing responsibility down to the lowest level, as far as possible. Yet, ‘subsidiarity’ challenges the original rationale for EC integration. An ill-defined concept, it weakens the leadership needed for integration to proceed; if followed, it would veer the EU towards more intergovernmentalism. The alternative is to re-examine the position of the Commission.



With EMU and enlargement on the agenda in the 1990s. the political base of the Commission needs to be strengthened if these objectives are to be more readily achieved. (The desirability of such further integration is a question beyond the scope of this article, here the concern is to emphasize that political reform is a pre-condition of further integration, given the backlash against the Maastricht Treaty and the problem of legitimacy.) To strengthen the Commis- sion, attention needs to be redirected to the values of the classic legislative-executive model found in most European states: a model eschewed by the early integration process. Democratic legitimacy must logically involve either a greater role for the European Parliament (EP) in determining its composition, or a system of direct election to the Commission from the mass electorate. Bogdanor and Woodcock have advocated the latter, although this seems unrealistic given current political conditions of government and public scepticism ( 199 1 , p. 483). The former strategy seems more feasible, and would enhance the parliamentary base of the EC.

Some limited, incremental reforms have already been initiated. The 1983 Stuttgart Declaration led to the Parliament’s Enlarged Bureau being consulted on the choice of President of the Commission, prior to the European Council making its decision. The Maastricht Treaty envisages a vote in a plenary session of Parliament on the nominee. This procedure was followed in the re-election of Jacques Delors for a new term from January 1993 onwards (Corbett, 1993, p. 43).7 It is also established that each new Commission ‘must present itself and its programme to the European Parliament to obtain a vote of confidence before going to the Court of Justice for the oath-taking ceremony, a procedure that will be formalized by the Maastricht Treaty’ (Corbett, 1993, p. 45). The Parliament has, of course, the power of censure over the Commission as a whole. Yet, its formal powers over the Commission remain inadequate: by themselves, they are insufficient to secure the Commission’s legitimacy.

Giving the EP more powers in this regard might involve one or more of a set of changes: the EP electing the Commission (a more direct procedure than that which exists at present); the EP electing the Commission from its own personnel; the EP able to dismiss individual Commissioners. To be most effective, all three reforms would be necessary. Such changes would, of course, also strengthen the EP, giving increased importance to its own direct elections. ‘Politicizing’ the Commission and the EP in this manner would help to clarify policy choices and enable European campaigns to set alternatives. At times, both institutions are criticized for their ‘suffocating consensus’ of views, contrasting with national experience.8 ’Under the Maastricht Treaty procedures, ‘the rest of the Commission should ... have been agreed by the national governments in consultation with the [Commission] President-designate’, but this was not followed for 1993 (Corbett, 1993, p. 43).


Comment made by Tom Megahy, MEP, University of Bradford lecture, 15 January 1993.


An additional reform that has often been suggested is to create a second chamber or assembly of national parliamentarians (see, for example, Herman and Lodge, 1978; Heseltine, 1989). Declarations attached to the Maastricht Treaty envisage such a conference, or ‘assizes’. The European Constitutional Group have recently advocated the establishment of a formal chamber along these lines (European Constitutional Group, 1993). But, by itself, this is not a remedy to the problem of the Commission’s lack of democratic legitimacy: it does not address the accountability and electoral base of the Commission. Moreover, the self-avowed confederal nature of this proposal weakens the core principle that Monnet was right to hold so firmly: supranationality.

The reform of EU institutions is almost certain to remain on the agenda in the 1990s. Enlargement of the EU, to include EFTA nations and eastern European states, could double the size of the Union by the end of the decade, or soon afterwards. Such expansion has particular implications for the role and nature of the Council and the Commission. Both institutions could be unwieldy if their size was to increase proportionately to accommodate the new Member States. Monnet’s original High Authority had nine members, the Commission in 1993 has 17 members: with enlargement the number could be too large for effective decision-making. There are two alternatives: to end the double representation of the current five larger Member States (of the possible new entrants Poland, at least, could claim to be one of the larger states); or, to abandon the principle of each nation having a Commissioner. In the 1991 IGC on Political Union, it was provisionally agreed ‘to reduce the number of Commissioners to one per Member State with the creation of five “junior Commissioners”’ (Corbett, 1993, p. 38). This was deleted from the final Maastricht Treaty package, but it was agreed to return to this issue later, probably in 1994. Reducing the number of Commissioners to one per Member State does not require a treaty change (Corbett, 1993, p. 38). In the context where reform seems almost inevitable, strengthening the accountability of the Commission to the EP might be seen as an attractive means of keeping the bureaucracy under control. As for the Council, an increase in its size could lead either to more ‘deadlock’ in its meetings, or to increased use of majority voting, with voting ‘weights’ being suitably adjusted to maintain the preferential position of the larger Member States (Brams and Affuso, 1985).

With little institutional change, the European Constitutional Group have argued that enlargement might leave the Commission in an all too powerful position: the only body able to overcome gridlock in the Council (1993). Yet a more assertive, powerful Commission would only expose its undemocratic nature further.

The resolution of these institutional problems will serve to clarify further what type of system the Union is to be. Even with the Maastricht Treaty the EU



is set to maintain, of course, both ‘federal’ and ‘intergovernmental’ elements in its structure. Indeed, in important respects the Maastricht Treaty is more intergovernmentalist than the Single European Act (H. Wallace, 1993, p. 295). Moreover,

The language of the 1991 IGC was of political union, but without systematic discussion of the EC ‘polity’. The term ‘political’ was hijacked by the debate on foreign and security policy as the essence of the political, a curious distortion of language long embodied in EC vocabulary. (H. Wallace, 1993, p. 296)

The EU ‘polity’ has avoided making the choice between intergovernmental and federal paths; indeed, it has often eschewed consideration of the coherence of its political system. This is a unique and difficult combination born out of Monnet’s launch of the ECSC over 40 years ago. This combination served earlier purposes, but its continuation in the 1990s threatens instability and an increasing lack of legitimacy in the system. Monnet’s early virtues may begin to increasingly look like sins before the decade is out.

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jean monnet and the ‘democratic deficit’ in the european union

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