Prelude to war in Burma

Sino-Japanese War

In July 1937 open war broke out between Japan and China. Japan immediately be-gan to occupy China’s sea ports, cutting off vital supplies from the outside. In response China contracted 200,000 Chi-nese and Burmese labourers to build a 717 mile narrow, gravel road from Lashio in north-eastern Burma through the moun-tains to Kunming (Yunnan Province) in south west China. Called the Burma Road, it became notori-ous for its “cowboy drivers” who raced its treacherous length day and night. They were totally oblivious to the safety of pe-destrians, other drivers and animals. Fa-talities were common. Many a truck never reached his destination. Many an animal was squashed in an untimely death. Goods destined for China were shipped to the port in Rangoon and from there via rail

to a terminal in Lashio. A convoy of trucks then transported the goods along the wind-ing Burma Road to Kunming in south-west China. This allowed China to evade the Japanese blockade. In July 1940, the Japanese put pressure on the British to close the Burma Road for at least 3 months. Britain did not want an-other potential war front, as it was too pre- occupied with defending itself in the Battle of Britain. It gave in, shutting down the Burma Road and isolating China.

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Truck convoy on Burma Road enroute to Kunming

Japanese Invasion of Burma —

The Early Days By John Mealin and Gladys Hamilton (Maddox)

Britain reopened the Burma Road in Octo-ber 1940. It became the only supply line into China. By late 1941, the US was shipping lend-lease munitions and other goods into Ran-goon. By keeping China amply supplied, the US ensured that Japan was forced to maintain a considerable ground force in China, preventing them from being de-ployed elsewhere. Concerned about the Japanese war in China and its imperialistic expansion, in July 1941, the Americans, British and Dutch froze all Japanese assets and im-posed an embargo on oil exports to Japan. AVG and RAF activity Around the same time, an American Vol-unteer Group (AVG – Flying Tigers) con-sisting of US volunteer pilots began oper-ating from a British airfield in Toungoo, ap-proximately 136 miles north-east of Ran-goon. The AVG squadron’s mission was to protect the Burma Road. By November 1941, the AVG had grown to three opera-tional squadrons, two based in Kunming in China and the third at Mingaladon airfield outside Rangoon. The Royal Air Force (RAF) strength in

Burma in late 1941 was negligible. Daily operational strength of British 67 Fighter Squadron (based at Mingaladon) was 16 Brewster Buffalo aircraft. And that was when they were all mechanically sound and flyable. The four principal airfields at that time be-tween Mingaladon (Rangoon) and Singa-pore were Moulmein, Tavoy, Mergui and Victoria Point. These were strategically important refueling points for aircraft flying east to Malaya, Singapore and Dutch East Indies. Unfortunately, these airfields were susceptible to being occupied easily by the Japanese, as was proven later. Wireless communications between the air-fields was deplorable. Sadly, only one ra-dio-direction finder was available. A “lost pilot” seeking a “RDF steer” (navigational direction) to a destination could be placed in a life-threatening situation, if the RDF facility was unavailable. The Burma Observation Corps had no wireless. They had to resort to a tele-phone or telegraph system, assuming the lines were functional. This left the AVG and RAF susceptible to attack by the Japa-nese Air Force (JAF) without prior warning.

The weather in Burma could make flying

Shwedagon Pagoda, Rangoon

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extremely hazardous, especially during the Monsoons. Given Lord Mountbatten’s de-cree that “we will fly through the Monsoon” and the rudimentary navigational equip-ment on board the aircraft, it is unimagin-able the risks that AVG and RAF pilots took flying blind through the thick clouds, violent thunderstorms and turbulence. Sometimes pilots had no other choice but to resort to “dead reckoning”, using a map, watch and compass to navigate through the soup. The accuracy of some maps were questionable, especially when using a small scale (1:1,000,000). Meanwhile, in Japan the military strategists recognized their predicament. They con-cluded that Burma needed to be invaded. Strategically, it would allow Japan to cut the supply line and gain complete control of China. That would let some of the Japa-nese armed forces be released for deploy-ment to other areas. It would permit them to protect their flank against a retaliatory British attack from India. Also, they would have full access to the abundant natural resources in Burma, something Japan dearly needed.

All weather operations

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Early days of war A war in Burma! Nothing could be further from everyone’s mind. It was almost Christmas --- a time for last minute shop-ping, house decorations, merriment and meeting friends. War in Europe and other parts of South East Asia seemed a world away. Few could envision the grief, de-struction and horror soon to be unleashed. The British Civil Government in Burma would not accept the fact that war could come to its doorstep. They believed that Burma was secure and impregnable. They totally underestimated Japanese fa-naticism and its faith in seishin, the strength of will and spirit over the material superiority of its enemies. The western world could not comprehend such intangi-ble beliefs. Yet the Japanese soldiers’ faith in seishin led to many astounding feats on the battlefield. The British ridiculed the idea that Japan wielded a serious fighting force. However, those who had witnessed the Japanese forces in action knew that they were formi-dable. A Colonel Simpson of the Royal Scots,

who had been the military attaché in To-kyo, reported that the Japanese Army was “the toughest war machine in the world”. Naturally, Colonel Simpson was ridiculed and ignored. The British in Burma were totally unprepared for the rapid invasion and the violent storm about to be let loose on them. Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese soldiers were not trained for jungle war-fare. Japan had no place to conduct such training. They acquired their fighting skills in Manchuria and China. It gave them the experience to operate in varied terrain and climatic conditions. They also developed a natural ability to understand the conditions of operational areas and how to adapt swiftly. Their key tactical disciplines focused on attack, sur-prise, rapid movement and logistics.

Japanese commanders operated well for-ward with relatively simple plans. The Japanese soldier was capable and unwav-ering, unafraid of death. British opinion of the JAF followed a similar tone. They thought it inconceivable that the JAF could match the RAF capability in Burma. This misguided perception was a flaw of dismal British intelligence. When Japan went to war with China in 1937, Brit-ish intelligence failed to grasp what was clearly evident --- the JAF air combat and bombing run capabilities were formidable. A classic example of this serious oversight was demonstrated in the aerial dogfights, when the British Brewster Buffalo (US manufactured) came up against the Japa-nese Mitsubishi Zero. The Buffalo was outclassed in every aspect by the Zero. It suffered severe losses in air combat against the JAF in South East Asia. How could the British “top brass” have un-derrated Japan’s ability so badly? A prob-able answer is that they were blinded by their own arrogance. They had no inkling what they were up against. Attack from the sky In preparation for the invasion of Burma, the JAF first bombed Rangoon on the morning of 23 December 1941. It was part

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Bombed Rangoon Docks

Rangoon after bombing by JAF

of its “softening up” process. Easily visible from 40 miles or more away, the 325 foot high, shimmering, golden Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon was the ideal navigational beacon to home in on. 80 twin engine bombers and 30 single en-gine fighter bombers, taking off from air-fields in Thailand and Indochina, sped like arrows to their selected targets --- Mingala-don airfield (where AVG and RAF fighter squadrons were based), the downtown dis-tricts and Rangoon’s river port on the Ir-rawaddy. Around 10 a.m. that morning, the AVG and RAF were scrambled, taking to the air to engage the Japanese aircraft. Despite their heroic efforts, they were severely out-numbered and powerless to prevent the

JAF from bombing and strafing their se-lected targets. When the air raid sirens went off, instead of running for cover, many of the civilians rushed out to the streets to watch the fas-cinating aerial circus. The silver flashes in the sky mesmerized them. The dogfights were spectacular, especially when the

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JAF sketch of Mingaladon airfield in 1941

Land invasion

Capture of Rangoon in March 1942

AVG and RAF squadrons shot down the Japanese bombers and fighters. The civilians did not comprehend their im-minent danger, until the horror of the ex-ploding Japanese bombs brought terror, injury and death to them. The damage to Rangoon was significant. No protective trenches had been dug. Ground shelters were inadequate. Casual-ties were high, the buildings on fire and the docks paralyzed. The civil defense, res-cue and medical services fell apart as most of the staff fled the city. Rangoon was at a standstill and the public shocked into panic. The raid triggered off a mass exodus of refugees into the jungles and to the north. Unfortunately, the civilian flight included the Indian dock labourers. Now no one was available to unload the stores, vehi-cles and equipment. (Some 15,000 of the Indian labourers were later persuaded to return to Rangoon to help out.) Know thy enemy The Japanese raid was successful, almost surgical. They hit their targets. That pre-cise targeting information could only have come from Japanese spies and Burmese fifth columnists. They had amassed intelli-gence about land and sea objectives, troop strengths and dispositions and the layout of ports and airfields. This was the work of the Japanese

“tokumu kikan” (Special Service Organiza-tions). Apparently, two weeks before the war began in the Far East, the Japanese community including doctors, dentists and photographers disappeared from Ran-goon. By then the maps of the jungles, trails and footpaths had been handed to the Japa-nese army. It allowed them to advance with bewildering speed. Much of this intel-ligence came from the Burmese who were obsessed with the belief that the Japanese would liberate colonial Burma from the British. They were influenced by the un-rest in India, where the dissidents were fanatic about “self-government”. Move swiftly where not expected The British Army in Burma believed that the Japanese invasion would likely origi-nate from the north east (via Kengtung in the Shan States). Consequently, it based the bulk of its defending forces there. It was the wrong call. The invaders attacked from the south-east.

On 20 January 1942, the 33rd and 55th divi-sions of the Japanese Fifteenth Army, fresh from their victories in China, Malaya and Singapore swept into Burma, the 55th Division driving across the Thai / Burmese border at the 5500 foot high Kawkareik Pass. Tavoy airport had already been bombed and strafed by Japanese fighter bombers on 11 December. Japanese forces had

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Japanese flag from WW2 in Burma

invaded Victoria Point (the southern most point in Burma) on 13 December. The initial Japanese target was Moulmein, at the mouth of the Salween River. It fell on 31 January, despite a valiant effort by the British forces to fend off the invaders. An incident occurred at the Sittang Bridge which caused significant controversy. Concerned about a possible Japanese parachute drop and attack from behind, the bridge was blown, stranding the main Gurkha force on the wrong (east) side of the river. The fit survivors, under enemy fire, made their way to safety across the river by swimming or on improvised rafts; however, the wounded were left behind to the mercy of the enemy. The British also abandoned much of their arms and supplies on the east bank. Deception and surprise Besides being a superior force, the Japa-nese developed a tactic that frequently surprised their opponents during battle. They would advance along the village and forest paths usually at night and block the roads behind the British positions. The British forces would be thrown into confu-sion when they found their enemy also to their rear, impeding any possible pullback. By 7 March, the British evacuated Ran-goon. The last of the ships had left for Calcutta. The last Burma Railway train

had headed north. A scorched earth policy was implemented to avoid leaving anything of strategic value to the invaders. Rangoon was left burning. The docks, workshops and factories were destroyed. Oil pumps, pumping stations and storage tanks in the refinery across the river in Syriam were set on fire. Oil rigs were cut up to prevent further use. During the British Army retreat to India, they set on fire or destroyed oil fields and facilities at Yenangyaung and Chauk. Mines were blown, some unsuccessfully. On 8 March, the Japanese occupied Ran-goon. Two additional divisions, the 18th and the 56th landed, reinforcing the 33rd and 55th divisions in their onward drive into central and northern Burma. Chiang Kai-Shek, then President of China, agreed to provide Chinese forces under the command of US General Stillwell to defend Burma and the Burma Road. But this gesture was hopeless.

The Chinese forces were inadequately trained, poorly armed and out-matched. The seasoned Japanese soldiers swiftly overwhelmed them and forced the Chinese to retreat to China. Although several other attempts were made to drive back the invaders, the Brit-ish forces in Burma were not prepared for jungle warfare, under-equipped and achieved limited success.

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Stamps issued by Japanese during occupation of Burma

Preoccupied with the European war thea-tre, neither the British nor the US were ready to commit forces necessary to save Burma. It was not a priority. Conse-quently, the British forces (comprised of British, Burmese and Indians) quickly fell into disarray and began a retreat towards the Indian border in March 1942. On 12 May, the monsoon broke in Burma, impeding the Allied retreat. Life for the refugees trekking out to India became even more miserable. By 20 May, the Japanese had completed their conquest of Burma. Japanese liberation of colonial Burma a fantasy When the Japanese invaded South East Asia, many of the natives considered the Japanese as liberators. This was particu-larly true in Burma. The Burmese were lulled into a false sense of assurance that the Japanese were there to “liberate” them from the British and give them self-determination and independence. Living under an oppressive Japanese oc-cupation soon changed this perception, although some ethnic groups continued to support them.

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Strategic value of Burma to Japanese The Japanese had several good reasons to occupy Burma, including the following. The supply line from Burma to China would be cut off: The US was helping keep China supplied dur-ing the long Sino-Japanese war. Lend-Lease supplies, including goods, trucks and muni-tions, were being landed in Rangoon and moved by rail to Lashio. From there the sup-plies were driven via the Burma Road over the Chinese border to Kunming.

Burma would be used as a buffer zone shielding Japanese conquests in SE Asia: Japan wanted to protect the countries to the east of Burma that it had invaded and held. These included Thailand, Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore, some of them abundant in natural resources.

Burma was abundant in natural resources that Japan wanted: Burma was the most prolific rice producer in the Far East. It was abundant in natural re-sources including oil, rubber, tungsten, wolf-ram, tin, lead, silver, teak and precious gems. Japan had few natural resources. It needed access to the natural resources available from the countries it invaded and now held.

A gallant defense

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Burma was an ideal springboard to over-run India: The occupation of Burma would provide a stag-ing area for the planned Japanese invasion of India. The Japanese intended to coordinate their invasion with the revolutionary Indian in-dependence movement (“Quit India” launched by Congress Party). An Indian National Army (INA) was formed of Indian soldiers previously in the British Army and now Japanese prisoners-of-war in several SE Asian countries. It subsequently drew other volunteers. Subhas Chandra Bose (previously member of the Indian Congress Party) fled In-dia to pursue a relationship with Germany and Japan. The Japanese appointed him leader of the INA that fought along side the Japanese troops throughout the war. However, with the decline of Japanese power in SE Asia, many of the INA soldiers were captured and repatriated to India. After WW2 ended, it was noted that the INA did have an impact on British policy in India and helped influence the end of the “British Raj”.

Planning for the return Following his trek out of Burma into India in 1942, US General Joseph Stilwell re-marked: “I claim we got a hell of a beating.

We got run out of Burma, and it is hu-miliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it.”

Japanese soldiers enter Tavoy

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AVG pilots scrambled during an enemy air raid