japanese airborne sigint capabilities / desmond ball and
TRANSCRIPT
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TRATEGIC & DEFENCE
STUDIES CENTRE
WORKING PAPER NO .353
JAPANESE AIRBORNE SIGINT
CAPABILITIES
Desmond Ball and Euan Graham
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WORKING PAPER NO .353
JAPANESE AIRBORNE SIGINT
CAPABILITIES
Desmond Ball and Euan Graham
Canberra
December 2000National Library of AustraliaCataloguing -in-Publication EntryBall , Desmond , 1947Japanese airborne SIGINT capabilities .
Bibliography.ISBN 0 7315 5402 7 ISSN 0158 -3751
1. Electronic intelligence . 2.Military intelligence - Japan .I. Graham , Euan Somerled , 1968- . II. Australian NationalUniversity. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre . II
I. Title .
(Series : Working paper (Australian National University .
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre ) ; no .353 ) .
355 .3432
© Desmond Ball and
Euan Graham , 2000
4 - 3 - 01
ABSTRACT
Unsettled by changes to its strategic environment since the Cold War ,
but reluctant to abandon its
constitutional constraints , Japan has moved in
recent years to improve and centralise its intelligence -gathering capabilities
across the board . The Defense Intelligence Headquarters established in
Tokyo , in early 1997 , is now complete and Japan plans to field its
own fleet
of
reconnaissance satellites by
2002 . Intelligence sharing with the UnitedStates was also reaffirmed a
sa key element of
the 1997 Guidelines for
Defense Cooperation . One of
the less conspicuous but most remarkablefeatures o
f
Japan ' s intelligence drive has been the steady development ofan
airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT ) capability thatnow ranks second only
to that of
the
United States in the
Asia -Pacific region .
The Japanese Air
Self -Defense Force (JASDF ) and Japanese MaritimeSelf -Defense Force (MSDF ) together maintain about 16 dedicated SIGINTcollection aircraft , as well as half - a -dozen electronic warfare (EW ) trainingaircraft with some electronic intelligence (ELINT ) capabilities . There areanother 1
3E - 2C Hawkeye and four E - 767 airborne early warning and control
(AEW & C ) aircraft with substantial secondary ELINT /electronic surveillancemeasure (ESM ) capabilities . And there are 1
7 RF -4EJ reconnaissanceaircraft which are equipped with a variety o
f
ELINT /ESM systems . ThisWorking Paper describes these aircraft and their capabilities , and discussestheir SIGINT operations .
Unless otherwise stated , publications of
the Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre are presented without endorsement as contributions to the
public record and debate . Authors are responsible for their own analysis andconclusions .
JAPANESE AIRBORNE SIGINT CAPABILITIES
Desmond Ball and Euan Graham *
Introduction
Unsettled by changes to its strategic environment since the Cold War ,
but reluctant to abandon its constitutional constraints , Japan has moved in
recent years to improve and centralise its intelligence -gathering capabilities
across the
board . The Defense Intelligence Headquarters established in
Tokyo , in early 1997 , is now complete and Japan plans to field its
own fleet
of
reconnaissance satellites by
2002 . Intelligence sharing with the UnitedStates was also reaffirmed a
s
a key element of
the 1997 Guidelines for
Defense Cooperation . One of the
less conspicuous but most remarkablefeatures o
f Japan ' s intelligence drive has been the steady development of
an
airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT ) capability that now ranks second only
to the United States in the Asia -Pacific region .
* * *
Japan has made an enormous investment , sustained over several
decades , in airborne SIGINT capabilities . It is one of about two dozen
countries which maintain dedicated airborne SIGINT -collection systems . It
was also one of
the first , following the United States , the United Kingdom ,
the Soviet Union , and a couple of
other European countries . By the late1950s , the Japanese Air Self -Defense Force (JASDF ) and then the JapaneseMaritime Self -Defense Force (JMSDF ) had initiated acquisition programmesfor airborne SIGINT capabilities . Japan now has the third -largest SIGINTaircraft fleet in the world , after the United States and Russia , but it is moreactive than the Russian fleet .
The JASDF and JMSDF together maintain about 16 dedicated
SIGINT -collection aircraft , as well as half a dozen electronic warfare (EW )
training aircraft with some ELINT capabilities . There are another 13
E - 2C
Hawkeye and four E -767 airborne early warning and control (AEW & C )
aircraft with substantial secondary ELINT /electronic surveillance measure
* Desmond Ball is a special professor and Euan Graham is a PhD candidate in the Strategic
and Defence Studies Centre , Australian National University .
This paper is a revised and expanded version of
Desmond Ball and Euan Graham ,
‘Japanese SIGINT Takes Off , Jane ' s Intelligence Review , December 2000 , pp . 26 - 31 .
2 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
(ESM ) capabilities . And there are 17 RF -4EJ reconnaissance aircraft whichare equipped with a variety of ELINT /ESM systems .
Airborne systems have greater operational flexibility than ground
based systems and are able to monitor very high frequency (VHF) andmicrowave transmissions which are beyond the line -of-sight of groundstations . They are very well suited to Japan 's geostrategic circumstances .They a
re able to monitor low -power high frequency (HF ) and VHF radiovoice communications , and especially the electronic order of battle (EOB ) of
neighbouring countries , which cannot be heard from the Japanese islands . In
wartime , they are less vulnerable than fixed facilities .
However ,airborne systems are very expensive to maintain and operate ,
especially if regular ( for example , daily ) flights are required . The acquisitioncosts a
re greater in the
case of
some aircraft than the
costs of ground stations .
The EP - 3s acquired by
the JMSDF in the early 1990s cost about
Y12 . 67 billion ( or US $ 95 . 5 million in 1992 dollars ) . ' The JMSDF ' S UP - 3D
EW training support aircraft cost Y13 . 61 billion (US $ 155million ) in 1995 .
The E -767 AEW & C aircraft cost even more , but they are equippedwith many expensive systems (such a
s the distinctive rotodomes and
associated radar systems ) not directly involved in SIGINT activities . The lastbatch o
f
five E -2Cs had a programme cost of Y9 . 23 billion each in 1990 ( or
US $ 62 . 4 million ) . The four E -767s cost Y55 billion each , or US $ 2 billion
for
the programme ( including parts , training and simulators ) . " The E -767purchase dominated the JASDF ' s budgets in the early 1990s . '
Airborne platforms are difficult to categorise functionally . They can
be
used to collect strategic and tactical SIGINT , both communicationsintelligence (COMINT ) and ELINT , and to contribute operationally in EW
environments .
JASDF Curtiss C -46D Commando SIGINT Aircraft
The JASDF began planning the
acquisition of
an airborne capability
for strategic and operational SIGINT soon after its establishment , and
decided in the late 1950s to acquire ‘ a number of
Curtiss C -46D Commandoaircraft ( including JASDF 9
1 -1140 ) modified for SIGINT /EW operations .
These were operated by
the JASDF Electronic Warfare Training Unit at
Iruma Air Base , northwest of Tokyo , in the 1960s and 1970s .
The
rapid build - up
of
the
Japanese Air Self -Defense Force after 1955
56 reflected American concerns about the threat of
air
attack from the Soviet
Union and China , and
the
need to protect US strategic bases in Japan . In its
Working Paper No. 353 3
formative years, the United States was heavily involved in equipping theJASDF , training it
s pilots and planning down to the tactical level . ”
The C - 46 Commando was a twin -engined tactical transport aircraftproduced in large numbers b
y
the Curtiss -Wright Corporation during theSecond World War , and provided to the JASDF in the 1950s . It could carry a
payload of9 ,287 kg , and had a range of some 4 ,000 km . The C - 46Ds
configured for the SIGINT role were fitted with nose and ventral antennafairings , as well a
s inboard SIGINT processing and analysis systems . TheJASDF also maintained two C -46As for calibration purposes ; these also hadlimited ELINT /EW capabilities . ”JMSDF E
P - 2J SIGINT Aircraft
The JMSDF ' s 81 Air Training Support Squadron (Kokutai ) of the 31stFlight Group , based at Iwakuni Air Base , near Hiroshima , operated two EP
2J
SIGINT aircraft from themid -1970s until the early 1990s , when they werereplaced b
y
the
much more capable EP - 3 aircraft . “
The EP -2Js were ELINT versions of the
Kawasaki P - 2J
twin -turbopropanti -submarine aircraft , which could carry more than ten tonnes o
f
electronic
equipment , had a cruising speed of about 200 knots (370 km / h ) at an altitude
of3 ,050 metres ( 10 , 000
feet ) , and a range of some 4 ,450 km ( 2 ,765 miles ) . "
The EP - 2Js were equipped with indigenously produced HLR - 105 and
HLR - 106
SIGINT equipment . " 2 These aircraft deployed to Hachinohe AirBase near Misawa , in Aomori Prefecture , for ELINT missions against Sovietfacilities on Sakhalin . 13
JMSDF EP - 3 SIGINT Aircraft
The 81st Kokutai at Iwakuni now has five EP - 3 aircraft , which have
much greater endurance and frequency coverage than the EP - 2Js . The first
EP - 3 (No . 9171 ) flew in October 1990 and was delivered to the JMSDF in
March 1991 ; the second was delivered a few months later ; the third aircraftwas flown in June 1995 ; the fourth was delivered in September 1996 ; and thefifth in September 1998 . " The EP - 3s ( as well as the UP - 3D EW training
aircraft ) have been spotted atGifu Air Base , northwest ofNagoya .
It was reported in 1987 , when procurement of
the first EP - 3 was
funded , that nine aircraft were planned . " More recent accounts state that a
fleet of8 - 10 is still intended .
The EP - 3 aircraft , produced by
Kawasaki Heavy Industries , are
modified P - 3C Orion long -rangemaritime patrol (LRMP ) and anti -submarinewarfare (ASW ) aircraft .With four turboprop engines , and a patrol speed of
4 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
376 km /h ( 234 mph), the P -3Cs have a mission radius of 3,834 km (2 ,382miles ). "
The EP -3 SIGINT suite , produced locally by NEC and MitsubishiElectric Corporation (MELCO ), covers the frequency range from VHFthrough to the I/J bands with an ELINT capture range of 370 km (230miles)." According to the JMSDF, the ELINT capability of the EP - 3Cs ismore than five times that of the EP -2Js.18
In addition to the
SIGINT suite , the EP - 3s are
equipped with an
ESM /electronic countermeasure (ECM ) system for self -protection . The firstthree aircraft , produced before 1992 ,were given the Magnavox A
N /ALQ - 78
produced under licence by
Mitsubishi . Housed in a radome under the
port
wing root , the AN /ALQ - 78 system provides warning and bearing of
radar
threats in the
2 - 40 GHz band . " The later EP - 3s are equipped with theAN /ALR - 66 ( V ) 3 system produced b
yMELCO under licence to Litton in
California , and which has improved sensitivity and
direction - finding ( DF)
capabilities . The wing -spans of these aircraft were increased by0 . 82 metres
to accommodate the associated ESM antennas and receivers . ? ' A large ESMpod is hung from th
e
lower face of
the
fuselage . 22 These systems are expected
to be replaced by ‘ a new indigenous system ' ,designated HLR -109 . 23
JASDF EC - 1 SIGINT Aircraft
The
JASDF began developing a new airborne SIGINT capability in the
early 1980s , based on
the J /ALR - 1 SIGINT system produced by Toshiba . It
was originally planned to install this system aboard two C -130H transports ,
but this plan was cancelled for cost reasons . Studies showed that installation
of
the Toshiba system would have required a significant and costly redesign
of
theC -130 airframe . 24 Instead , the system was deployed aboard a Kawasaki
C - 1 transport ,which began operations in 1985 . 25
Under a contract signed in March 1983 , Kawasaki modified a C - 1
tactical transport aircraft (JASDF 78 -1021 ) for
use as“ an ECM training
aircraft ' . 26 The C - 1 is a medium -range (maximum about 3 ,000 km ) aircraft ,
with a high wing to maximise cabin volume , produced by
Kawasaki for
the
JASDF in 1973 - 81 . 27
The EC - 1 first flew on
3 December 1984 , and was delivered to the
JASDF ’ s Air Development and Test Wing at Sayama , in Saitama Prefecture ,
in late January 1985 for evaluation . Between April 1985 and March 1986 , theAir Development and Test Wing conducted about 100 test flights , and in
June 1986 it was transferred to the JASDF ' s Electronic Warfare TrainingUnit at Iruma Air Base . 28
Working Paper No .353 5
In addition to the J/ALR - 1 SIGINT system , the EC -1 aircraft isequipped with a Technical Research & Development Institute
(TRDI)/MELCO J/ALQ -5 ECM system . The aircraft has a large , flat,bulbousnose radome, tail radomes , a blister on each side of the forward fuselage a
ft
of
the flight deck side windows , others on
each side of
the rear fuselage , andtwo antennas beneath the fuselage . ? ' It currently serves with the Y
S - 11s at
Iruma Air Base .
JASDF YS -11E SIGINT Aircraft
The IISS reported in 1999 that the JASDF has 10 YS -11E SIGINT /EWaircraft , forming (together with the E
C - 1 ) two squadrons . 30 The YS - 11 is a
twin -turboprop short -range transport produced by
the Nippon Airplane
Manufacturing Company (NAMC ) in the 1960s , with a payload capacity of
5 . 7 tonnes and a range of about 2 ,320 km ( 1 ,440miles ) . "
Martin Streetly reported in 1983 that the first YS - 11 aircraft configured
for EW operations was delivered on
30 March 1965 , that there were three
such YS -11s operating with the Electronic Warfare Training Unit at Iruma in
1981 , including No . 12 -1163 , that these aircraft were “externally characterised
by
numerous avionics fairings ' , and that ' the JASDF has recently orderedadditional aircraft of this type ’ . se
A fourth YS - 11 ELINT aircraft entered service in April 1985 .
According to a contemporary press account , the role of the new aircraft was
to fly
over the northwest Pacific and the Sea of
Japan and intercept radio and
radar signals emitted from Soviet land bases , airfields , and operationalaircraft and warships in the Soviet Far East . It noted that the YS - 11s wereparticularly valuable in monitoring Soviet radars which cannot b
e effectively
monitored by
the
Chobetsu ' s ground stations . "
The JASDF decided in the late 1980s to upgrade three of
the YS - 11
ELINT /EW aircraft . The modifications featured new turboprop engines to
extend the range of
the aircraft ( to 2 ,670 km ) and to cope with the increasedweight and electrical power requirements o
f
the new electronic systems . The
J /ALR - 1 SIGINT system had by
then been superseded by
the much moreadvanced J /ALR - 2 , which was therefore installed o
n
these three aircraft . The
J /ALR - 2 system was produced by
MELCO , but evidently also involved USsub -contractors (such as Signal Technology Corporation ' s Arizona Operationand Space Center ) . The first YS -11E with the J / ALR - 2 SIGINT system ,
No . 12 -1163 , was rolled out on 12 September 1991 and delivered to the
JASDF on
20 December 1991 . The upgrading also included installation of
the
NEC J /ALQ - 7 ECM system . 34 According to the IISS , three more YS -11E
6 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
ELINT/EW aircraft were acquired in 1996 , and another three in 1998 ." Theaircraft also operate out of Chitose , in Hokkaido , when conductingmonitoring operations around the Russian Far East .
JMSDF EW Training Aircraft
The JMSDF has acquired eight aircraft for EW training support – threelong-range UP -3D Orions, a UP -3C Orion , and five Learjet U - 36A je
t
aircraft . These are equipped with a wide variety of ESM and ECM systems ,
and comprise a substantial reserve ELINT /EW capability .
The five Learjet U -36As were converted by
Shin Maywa Industries to
serve as fleet training support aircraft for
the JMSDF , beginning with U -36A9201 in November 1985 and U - 36A 9202 in late 1986 , and then 9204 -9206
in the early and mid -1990s . The U - 36As have an operating speed of 590 -770
km / h and a range of 1 ,960 - 4 , 165 km (depending on altitude ) . " Flown by
the
814 Squadron at Iwakuni , they are used for anti -ship missile simulation and
ECM missions . They are equipped with a long - range ocean surveillanceradar , a large underbelly radome housing a scanning antenna , an AN /ALQ - 6
jammer , and an AN /ALE - 43 chaff dispenser .
The three UP - 3D EW training support aircraft (Nos .9161 -9163 ) wereordered from Kawasaki in 1994 - 96 and delivered in 1997 - 99 . 37 The singleUP - 3C aircraft (No .9151 ) , delivered in February 1995 , was initially reported
to be a ' flying testbed ' for the JMSDF , but is also reportedly used as an EWtrainer and calibration aircraft . It has an elongated antenna pointing forwardfrom the nose . In addition to their primary mission systems , these aircraft arealso equipped with the AN /ALR - 66 ( V ) 3 ESM system installed o
n all recentJMSDF P - 3C Orions .
Rear Admiral Makoto Yamazaki , Director of
the Logistics Department
of
the JMSDF ' s Maritime Staff Office , noted in 1996 that the UP - 3D EWtraining support aircraft have sufficient capability and flexibility to support a
wide range of
post -Cold War 'duties ' :
The UP - 3D is an electronic warfare training support aircraft , of whichone was programmed fo
r
each year from fiscal years 1993 through
1995 . The training support aircraft presently possessed by
theMSDF is
the U - 36A , which is used actively in the
electronic warfare training of
the fleets . However , this aircraft is basically designed for jamming theradar o
fa single ship and is not capable of jamming radar nor the
communications ofan entire unit . The UP - 3D has been designed to
create a highly composite electronic warfare environment and to
support air
defense training of
surface ships more effectively .
Working Paper No.353 7
The above equipment was programmed in the transitory period
immediately after the end of the Cold War and was presupposed tofollow previously established duties without alteration . However , inthe future , it is necessary to consider equipment which can deal with awider variety of duties based on the new NDPO [National DefenseProgram Outline ) while using the existing technology of aboveequipment as a basis ."
JASDF E- 2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning Aircraft
The JASDF now has the
second -most -extensive AEW & C capability in
the world . The aircraft are used to greatly extend warning of intrusions into
Japanese airspace , and would serve asa powerful ‘ force multiplier ' for the
JASDF in air
defence contingencies . Although they are known more for theirradar /rotodome configurations , their SIGINT collection , analysis and
exploitation capabilities are substantial .The JASDF currently has 13 E - 2C Hawkeye E - 2C aircraft ,operated b
y
its
6015 AEW Squadron , whose home base is with the Northern Aircraft
Control and Warning Wing atMisawa on Honshu Island . This is the largest
E - 2C force outside the US Navy . The first eight were acquired between 1982and 1984 , and the other five in 1992 - 93 .
The E - 2C AEW aircraft have a length of
17 . 6 metres , a wing -span of
24 . 56 metres , a payload capacity of 6 ,000 kg , a cruising speed of 600 km / hr ,
anda maximum range of2 , 550
km or
an endurance of
more than six
hours .
They have a crew of
five , comprising the pilot and co -pilot on the flight deck ,
and three staff of
the Combat Information Center . 4° Operating from landbases (rather than aircraft carriers , for which they were designed for the USNavy ) , the airframes have a
n expected service life of
40 years . The
operational readiness of
the JASDF ' s Hawkeye fleet ,which completed morethan 6
0 ,000 flying hours (without an accident ) in October 1999 , is extremelyhigh . 41
The
air
defence of
Japan had been the
JASDF ' s highest priority since
its
foundation in the 1950s . By the mid -1970s , the JASDF had five squadrons
ofF -1043 Starfighters and two squadrons ofF -4EJ Phantoms , and was just
beginning to introduce itsF - 15 Eagles ,which would equip eight squadrons
by the late 1990s . It had built a network of28
fixed radar sites interlinked
through the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE ) air
defence
network across the country to provide constant surveillance in most of
theairspace ' , but these had limited range against aircraft intruding a
t
low
altitudes , and had 'insufficient electronic warfare capabilities ’ . The need for
8 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
an AEW capability for
long -range surveillance and early detection of
offensive air attacks was accepted by defence planners . There was also
considerable pressure from the United States for procurement of a substantial
AEW capability .The eventual decision to acquire a
n airborne early warning capability
was prompted by
the Belenko affair in September 1976 , when the defecting
Soviet fighter pilot flew his
MiG - 25 from Chuguyevka (about 120 milesnortheast o
f
Vladivostok ) across the Sea of Japan and landed at
HakodateAirport , some 9
0 miles southwest of
Chitose , in Hokkaido , without being
intercepted by
Japanese fighter aircraft . 43
The Grumman E - 2C was selected rather than the Boeing E - 3 becausethe Sentry was too expensive , exceeded required capabilities , and could b
e
used on only a limited number of
Japanese runways , whereas the E -2Cscoulduse almost any airfield . * *
The operational concept for
the E -2Cs was to provide ' threecontinuous surveillance points over Japan ' s air and sea lanes ' – the areaaround Hokkaido , the Sea o
f
Japan , and the East China Sea – as well as a
capability to be 'scrambled ' with JASDF fighters to investigate intrusions
into Japan ' s airspace . With only the eightHawkeyes acquired in 1982 - 84 , thiswas not possible . Only two 'points ' could b
e
covered : the northern part of theSea o
f Japan and the Sea of
Okhotsk west and north of
Hokkaido , and thecentral sector over the main breadth o
f
the Sea of Japan . Twelve aircraft were
necessary to cover the East China Sea aswell . 4s
Although based at Misawa , the E -2Cs also operate from Gifu , and
during special missions , and especially when more intensive electronicsurveillance o
f
orth Korea is required , they also deploy to Nyutabaru AirBase in Miyazaki Prefecture and Tsuiki Air Base in Fukuoka Prefecture ,
Kyushu . 46
The first eight Japanese E -2Cs were originally equipped with theAN /APS - 125 radar system , but the next five carried the AN / APS -145 radar .
The first eight were re -fitted with the AN /APS -145 later in the 1990s . Withthe aircraft flying a
t9 ,150 metres ( 30 , 000 feet ) , the AN /APS -145 is able to
detect targets as
small as
cruise missiles at ranges over 185 km , fighter
aircraft at ranges up to 370 km , and larger aircraft up
to 465 km away . The E
2Cs are also equipped with some 30 other electronic devices ,which combine
to give a picture of
targets , tracks and trajectories , and signal emissions , all
duly processed . " The passive ELINT /ESM systems are located on the nose
and tail , and on the tips of
the tailplane for lateral coverage . The principal
Working Paper No.353 9
ELINT/ESM system on the E -2Cs is the AN /ALR -73 Passive DetectionSystem (PDS ), which can detect the presence of electronic emitters at rangesup to twice that of the radar system - typically in excess of 600 km .“8 As aGrumman official has described :
If the radar represents the eyes of the Hawkeye then the PassiveDetection System is it
s
ears . With a monitoring envelope greater thanthe radar , the completely passive system provides the operators with a
bearing to the emitter , its type , and the classification of
the platform .
The range to the emitter can be determined with triangulation . “ 9
In May 1997 , the JASDF contracted with Grumman for modificationand enhancement o
f
its
13E -2Cs with the Update II Mission Suite , at a cost
of
US $400 million , in order to maintain both the operational readiness of thefleet and it
s interoperability with US and NATO E -2Cs . " When the decisionwas made to acquire the four E -767 AEW & C aircraft in the early 1990s , theJASDF also considered the future roles o
f
the Hawkeyes . In April 1993 ,
General Isao Ishizuki , the Chief of
Staff of
the
JASDF , argued that together
the E -2Cs and E -767s would provide a flexible threat -warning capability . Hesaid that :
The E - 2C will be used for
low
altitude early warning of threats . [ They
will ] not necessarily have a maritime role only , but will be operateddependent o
n the threat . . . A solely maritime role will be
inappropriate . "
In June 1999 , E -2Cs from Misawa accompanied F - 15 fighters fromHyakuri Air Base to Guam to participate in Exercise Cope North Guam ' 99
with the US Air
Force . This was the
first occasion in which the JASDF haddeployed fighter aircraft outside Japan . The exercise involved training in a
ircombat tactics ,airborne ai
r
control , and 'electronic combat ’ . S ? According to a
Japanese press account , the deployment to Guam permitted more realistic EW
training , 'using strong radio waves that cannot be allowed in Japan ' . " A
second joint exercise involving JASDF F -15Js and E - 2Cs , Exercise Cope
North Guam ' 00 , took place in Guam on
30 May - 3 June 2000 . 54
In December 1998 , the Board of Audit reported that the United Stateshad failed to deliver important 'communication components 'which the JapanDefense Agency (IDA ) had ordered for the JASDF ' s Hawkeyes in 1996 . "
The JASDF announced in August 1999 that because of shortage of spare
parts , it plans to maintain only eight E -2Cs , gradually withdrawing the otherfive aircraft from active service . "
10 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
JASDF /Boeing E- 767 Airborne Warning and Control AircraftBy th
e
time the government agreed to the procurement of
the
second
batch ofE - 2Cs in the late 1980s , it was already clear that a much better
airborne early warning and control capability was required than the
currentgeneration o
f Hawkeyes could provide . By
the late 1980s , Japan ' s air defencesituation had deteriorated considerably . The deployment to the Soviet FarEast o
f
Tu -22M Backfires equipped with AS - 4 Kitchen air - to - surface missiles
(with both nuclear and conventional warheads , and ranges of
300 -460 km
depending on
the altitude at launch ) meant that missile attacks could be
launched against Japan from bombers beyond the detection range of
the E
2Cs . Moreover , the
E -2Cs lacked the ability to operate as
airborne control
centres . 57
There was also a lot ofUS pressure on Tokyo to purchase a substantial
AEW & C capability . The US government was concerned about burdensharing issues and the 1 ,000 mile SLOC defence agreement ' , but the strategicrequirements were ‘entangled with US -Japan trade issues ' , as any AWACSpurchase would involve expensive off - the -shelf purchases from the UnitedStates . " Members o
f
Congress were insisting that Japan acquire a minimum
of
12
to 14 AWACS aircraft , hopefully the Boeing E - 3 Sentry AWACS
(which would also involve tanker requirements ) . 59
However , some Japanese officials remained unpersuaded about thenecessity fo
r
such a large capability . In May 1991 , as Tokyo vacillated ,
Boeing closed the production line for its
707 aircraft , which provided the E - 3
airframe , but proposed to Tokyo a 767 AWACS design . Although the
767
aircraft is more expensive than the 707 , it has a longer range , the
wide -bodyconfiguration provides much more floorspace , and it can use most Japanese
airfields . º - Japan has no air- to - air
refuelling capability .
The government decided to procure an initial two E -767s in December
1992 , and placed the order in November 1993 . A second pair was ordered in
1994 . The first two deployed to Hamamatsu Air Base , in ShizuokaPrefecture , in March 1998 , and the other two in January 1999 . After a year o
f
‘operational testing ' , they entered service with the
JASDF in May 2000 . 03
By
the time they were ordered , the AWACS aircraft were reckoned by
JASDF officers to be among the highest hardware priorities . In particular ,
there was an expressed requirement for 'AWACS that has a range that can fly
to the Spratlys ' . 0 *
The E - 767 AWACS combines the 767 -200ER airframe with the APY
2 radar and a suite of
modern electronic systems . The 767 aircraft are
48 . 5
Working Paper No . 353 11
metres long , have a maximum take - off
weight of
175 ,000 kg , a maximumcruising speed o
f
more than 800 km / h , a service ceiling of12 ,000 metres , a
range of8 ,300 to 9 ,200 km unrefuelled , and an endurance of8 - 12 hours
depending on
the distance to the area of
operations . With refuelling , theendurance is extended to 22 hours . They carry a crew o
f two pilots and 18
mission specialists . "The A
N /APY - 2 radar , which is mounted in a 9 . 1 metre diametercircular radome above the aircraft fuselage , was developed for the E - 3
AWACS . It provides 360° coverage , operates at about 10 GHz in the E / F
bands , and at operating altitudes can detect targets more than 320 km (200
miles ) away . When functioning in a passive mode , it is used to detect and
track in -band ( E / F band ) jammers , and to process ECM data for electronic
counter -countermeasures (ECCM ) purposes . "
The E -767s are also equipped with the AN /AYR - 1 advanced ESM
system , produced by
Boeing in the
mid -1990s for
upgraded E - 3 AWACSaircraft , which intercepts , analyses and identifies both radar and radio signals .
Antenna elements ,which are housed in two large blisters on
either side of
the
aircraft , just aft of
the cockpit , as well as nose and tail -mounted arrays ,
provide 360° coverage . It is able to intercept radar emissions at ranges in
excess of
800 km .
In peacetime , the
E - 767s are used for ' information gathering ' (ELINT
collection ) as well as training activities . In crisis and conflict situations , theoperational concept fo
r
the E -767s is to deploy the four aircraft to the
closest
airfield and use them to maintain a continuous airborne early warning ,
surveillance and control capability in any area of
operations out to 1 ,000 nm .
The JASDF ' s E -767s are designed to cooperate closely with United
States Air Force (USAF ) AWACS , and to provide intelligence to US forcesoperating near Japan , as outlined in th
e
updated guidelines for
bilateralcooperation . It has been suggested that the USAF and the JASDF might sharecertain airborne warning and surveillance tasks , such a
s , in the case of
the
Korean peninsula , the USAF ' s E - 3 aircraft based at Kadena in Okinawa
would cover the western side while the JASDF ' s E -767s would patrol theeastern side . The primary mission equipment aboard the E -767s wasdeveloped for the JASDF b
y
the USAF ' s Electronic Systems Center at
Hanscom Air Force Base in Massachusetts , and was tested before delivery by
a detachment of
the USAF ' s 66th Test Squadron . The Joint TacticalInformation Distribution System (JTIDS ) allows the JASDF ' s E -767s to
exchange data with US and NATO E - 3 AWACS aircraft . A USAF E -767
12 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
AWACS team is based at Yokota Air Base to support the JASDF E -767programme .
JASDF RF-4EJ Reconnaissance Aircraft
For tactical ELINT operations , the
JASDF has equipped 17 RF-4EJ
Kai reconnaissance aircraft with ELINT pods produced by
MELCO andbased o
n
the Analyseur Superheterodyne Tactique (ASTAC ) systemproduced b
y
Thomson -CSF in France . The pods are capable of detecting ,
analysing and locating modern threat radars in a dense electromagnetic
environment . ' The great advantage of the pods is that they provide a
substantial ELINT capability with minimal modification required of
the
aircraft , thus allowing retention of
the RF -4EJ ' s multi -role fightercapabilities . They are operated by the 5014 Air Reconnaissance Squadron a
t
Hyakuri Air Base , northeast of Tokyo , which also maintains an ELINT
ground processing station .
A decision to order 14 RF - 4E Phantoms from McDonnell Douglas wasapproved b
y
the Japanese Cabinet in October 1972 , as a replacement for the501 " Squadron ' s RF -86F Sabres . " These were delivered to the JASDFbetween November 1974 and June 1975 . They were unarmed , and were fittedfor photographic reconnaissance rather than ELINT collection . The 1
3
surviving aircraft were upgraded in the early 1990s , with a new radar
(AN /APG -172 ) , digital avionics , an infra -red surveillance system , and a new
J /APR - 6 radar warning system . Twin aft -facing radomes for this system weremounted o
n the fin tip
and forward -facing antennas on the wingtips . They
were also fitted for carrying the Westinghouse AN /ALQ - 161 advanced multimode ECM pod , which has a wide range o
f
modules and re -programmable
software ,making it capable of
quickly countering new threats .
However , the JDA had realised by 1989 that 'the inventory ofRF - 4E is
inadequate in number ' , and the JASDF decided to convert 17F -4EJ fighters
into reconnaissance aircraft and to equip them with the ASTAC ELINT /ESMsystem . In addition to Hyakuri Air Base , the RF -4EJs also operate out of
Chitose .
The ASTAC ELINT /ESM system is made up of
microscan receiversfor high - resolution measurement o
f signal parameters and interferometers for
providing DF with accuracy better than 1° , across the frequency band from
0 . 5 to 40 GHz . The design enables incorporation of enhanced processing
capabilities and extension of
the frequency coverage . 74 From an altitude of
40 ,000 feet , it provides instantaneous coverage of
an area of
164 ,000 square
Working Paper No. 353 13
nauticalmiles on the ground , and is able to intercept airborne radar emissionsout to a distance o
f
some 520 nauticalmiles . 75
The pods also contain a UHF data - link for
air - to - ground transmissionof
the intercepted ELINT data to the ground processing station , which
'enables a very rapid build - up of the electronic order of battle of
the observed
area ' . Data are also stored in a recording system in the pod for 'post - flight
analysis ' . ? ?
JGSDF LR - 1 Liaison and Reconnaissance Aircraft
The Japanese Ground Self -Defense Force (JGSDF ) currently operates
ten
LR - 1 liaison and reconnaissance aircraft . " These are modified MU - 2M
twin -turboprop short -take -off -and -landing (STOL ) utility transport aircraft ,
produced by
Mitsubishi in the 1970s and 1980s . These aircraft have a cabinlength o
f
about 3 . 2 metres , a cruising speed of
about 500 km / h , and a
maximum range of2 ,700 km . " They are based at Camp Utsunomiya , Tochigi
Prefecture .
Airborne SIGINT Operations
A fleet of
several dozen SIGINT aircraft , comprising more than half a
dozen quite different types of
aircraft and associated SIGINT systems ,
together with the inherent operational flexibility of
aircraft and a body of
highly trained operators , provides Japan with capabilities for
undertaking a
wide variety of
SIGINT operations , both on
a regularly scheduled basis and
expeditiously as close monitoring of particular events is required . The range
and payload capacities of
the EP - 3 and E -767 aircraft permit missions to be
undertaken at
substantial distances from Japanese territory . Both the JASDFand the JMSDF are now able to undertake radio reconnaissance patrols , and
to engage in electronic warfare , in a broad area from the Bering Sea and theAleutian Islands in the north to th
e
Spratly Islands and the South China Sea ,
and from the Sino /Russian littoral to the mid -Pacific Ocean . Airborneactivities are regularly undertaken to intercept signals emanating from
Russia , North Korea and China , as well as from aircraft intruding intoJapanese airspace and from ships in surrounding waters .
( i ) Collection of
Electronic Order of Battle (EOB )
The most routine activity ofthe
Japanese airborne SIGINT aircraft ,
conducted almost continuously , is the collection of
data about electronic
emitters in adjacent countries , and its compilation into an electronic order of
battle (EOB ) for
Japan ' s region of primary strategic interest . The EOBconsists of
the location of
each detected signal emitter and the parameters of
the signals , such as
the frequency (wavelength ) , strength , pulse rate , pulse
14 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
repetition frequency (PRF ), scan rate , antenna pattern (beam width ), antennagain , antenna polarisation , pulse width and pulse shape , and the transmissionschedules , and catalogued for expeditious identification of subsequentlyintercepted signals .80
In peacetime and crisis situations , monitoring of the EOB is animportant 'warning indicator '. Changes in important elements of the EOB ,especially the communications and other electronic emissions integral to orclosely associated with command and control centres , military bases ,
airfields, and naval ports , reveal much about deployments , movements , andalert levels , and hence about likely actions. In conflict situations , the quality
of the EOB is amajor ingredient in the success of EW operations .
Electronic reconnaissance for production and monitoring of EOB data
is the principal task of some of the YS -11E , the EP- 3 and the RF -4EJ aircraft,and is a common task of the E -2C and E -767 early warning and controlaircraft . Both the JASDF and JMSDF must have compiled EOB about theRussian Far East and North Korea of extraordinary precision , detail, andthoroughness .
( ii) Ocean Surveillance
Japanese defence planners have emphasised that Japan is an island
nation dependent on imports of food , energy and raw materials for
its
survival . An active maritime surveillance posture provides forewarning of
threats against Japanese territory and merchant shipping . The JDA hasdeclared that ‘inasmuch a
s Japan takes an exclusively defense oriented
policy , it is highly important to conduct at all
times warning and surveillanceactivities in territorial waters and adjacent sea areas , and the airspaceabove ' . 81
SIGINT activities remain the
principal component of
ocean
surveillance . The main straits controlling access to and from the Sea of
Japan
(Tsushima , Tsugaru and Soya ) are monitored continuously by
both ships and
land -based coastal surveillance units . The 1977 defence White Paper outlined
an operational requirement for
the
MSDF ' s fixed -wing anti -submarineaircraft ‘ o
f patrolling the seas around Japan ona daily basis - when the
necessity arises - at ranges of
about 300 nautical miles from the Pacific coast
and 100 -200 nauticalmiles from the Sea of Japan coast ; and of deploying one
squadron to each of
the ocean and coastal sea lanes when the necessity for
ship protection arises ' . 82 In May 1981 , prime minister Zenko Suzuki gave a
further commitment to ' strengthen our defense capability in order to defend
Working Paper No.353 15
several hundred miles of surrounding waters and the sea -lanes to a distanceof 1,000 miles '.Long -range patrol and surveillance is chiefly the responsibility of the
JMSDF 's substantial fleet of P -3C Orions.8%Daily surveillance flights arecurrently conducted over the waters around Hokkaido , the Sea of Japan andEast China Sea .84
The P -3C's ESM systems (the AN /ALQ - 78 in earlier aircraft and theAN /ALR -66 (V ) 3 in later ones ) are at least as important as their active radar(the AN /APS -115 ) in detecting and identifying vessels. The EP-3s perform a
more specialised function , depending entirely on their passive COMINT andELINT systems fo
r
identification of
emitting platforms .
The EP - 3s
conduct regular electronic reconnaissance flights over the
main maritime approaches to Japan . For example , one is responsible for thesouthern part o
f
the Sea of
Japan , opposite North Korea , and along thewestern coastline o
f
Honshu from Akita to Shimane prefectures . According
to Admiral Satoshi Takemura , commander of
the JMSDF base atMaizuru ,
Kyoto Prefecture , 'general surveillance is handled by
an EP - 3 patrol plane ,
which monitors the region ' . 8
( iii ) Sovereignty Intrusions
The airspace surrounding Japan is monitored around -the - clock by
ground -based radar stations , while the critical approaches are patrolled daily
by
E - 2C Hawkeyes , and the E -767s are now available for AEW & C
operations further afield . The ESM systems aboard the E -2Cs and the E -767sare the first to detect approaching aircraft , and provide identification .
During the Cold War , the JASDF was concerned principally withintrusions into Japan ' s air defence identification zone (ADIZ ) b
y
Soviet
aircraft . JASDF interceptors were frequently scrambled in response to flightsby both Soviet combat aircraft ( fighters and bombers ) and reconnaissanceaircraft . In the 1980s , as shown in Table 9 . 2 , the Soviets conducted more than300 surveillance flights around Japanese airspace a year . These activitiesbegan to decrease in 1988 , although the JDA reported a
n increase in Russianflights close to Japanese airspace during 1998 - 99 . 80 Since the end of the ColdWar , the JASDF has also scrambled to intercept Chinese and North Koreanjet aircraft . The first occasion involving Chinese jets occurred o
n
24 August
1995 , when JASDF fighters scrambled as
the Chinese aircraft nearedJapanese airspace close to th
e
disputed Senkaku Islands . * 7 And in the case of
North Korea , the JASDF ' s E - 2C Hawkeyes patrolling over the Sea of Japan
on
24 March 1999 , when 'suspicious ' North Korean boats were found inside
16 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
the Japanese ADIZ , detected four North Korean jets (probably MiG -21s ) andvectored two F - 15J fighters tomeet them .88
( iv ) Telemetry Collection
The north Pacific is the
most active area in the world in terms of
missile test launches and telemetry interception operations .During the ColdWar , the Soviet Union regularly launched dozens of inter -continental ballisticmissiles (ICBMs ) per year in development and operational tests into splash
down areas around the Kamchatka peninsula . The United States developed an
amazing array of
ground -based , satellite -borne , ship -borne and airbornesystems for interception o
fthe telemetry transmitted from themissiles back to
the Sovietmissile development facilities . The most expensive andmost secretprogramme involved the Rhyolite geostationary SIGINT satellites . The mostsophisticated US airborne system is code -named Cobra Ball , and involvesRC -135 aircraft equipped with a
n Advanced Telemetry System , which aresometimes stationed a
t Kadena , Okinawa . ” Although designed for
interception of Soviet ballistic missile telemetry , the Cobra Ball aircraft also
monitored Chinese missile launches and , more recently , North Koreanlaunches . In March 1996 , for example , a Cobra Ball aircraft monitoredChinese missiles fired into Taiwan ' s shipping lanes , and soon after monitoredNorth Korean tests . In May 1997 , a Cobra Ball aircraft monitored the NorthKorean test o
fan anti -ship cruise missile . 92 In June 2000 , ITAR -TASS
reported that an RC -135 was deployed to Kadena in anticipation ofa second
test of
China ' s Dong Feng - 31 ICBM . ”
Japan began its own airborne operations to monitor regional ballistic
missile development programmes in the early 1990s , initially using EP - 2JSIGINT aircraft and then the EP - 3s . Since the late 1980s , the JDA had beenincreasingly concerned about North Korea ' s ballistic missile programme ,
based on Scud - B and Scud - C technology . On 29 May 1993 , the North
Koreans conducted the first test launch of
the Nodong - 1 medium -range
ballistic missile (MRBM ) , which splashed into the Sea of Japan west of theNoto peninsula , on the mid -west of Honshu . An EP - 2J SIGINT aircraftintercepted the telemetry signals transmitted from the missiles back to
technicians in North Korea . "
On 31 August 1998 , when North Korea test -fired its
new Taepodong - 1
intermediate -range ballistic missile (IRBM ) in a trajectory which passed overJapan and into the north Pacific Ocean , the telemetry was intercepted b
yan
EP - 3 SIGINT collector . ” The recordings of
this telemetry were taken first to
the Electronic Data Analysis Department at Iwakuni , and then transmitted to
the Electronic Information Support Unit assigned to the
JMSDF Fleet
Working Paper No . 353 17
Command at Yokosuka , Kanagawa Prefecture , and then to various JDAsections .
(v ) Electronic Warfare Training
Both the JASDF and JMSDF have extraordinary capabilities forproviding training in ELINT collection and EW operations . Their exercisesand simulations are as realistic as possible , using ELINT collection flights toupgrade EOB tables and inform EW training .
The JMSDF 's EW training capability , with the five Learjet UA - 36As,the UP-3C and the three UP - 3D aircraft , is especially strong . In particular , theability of the UP -3Ds ' to create a highly composite electronic warfareenvironment ', as Rear Admiral Makoto Yamazaki noted in 1996 , is extremelyimportant in exercising the a
ir
defence of
JMSDF battle groups . ”
( vi ) Monitoring Special Events
Airborne systems have the flexibility and responsiveness to deploy
rapidly , and at
short notice , and can be fitted with the most appropriateequipment fo
r
the occasion , for monitoring crises or other special events .
This is especially the case with the EP - 3s , which have the range to undertake
collection operations with substantial times - on - station at
distances beyond
those reachable by
other platforms .
Until the beginning of
the 1990s , the crises which warranted theimmediate deployment o
f
airborne SIGINT assets generally involved theSoviet Union . The JASDF ' s YS -11Es were procured primarily fo
roperations
against Soviet radio and radar sources . The E - 2C service began withcoverage o
f
the northern part of
the Sea of
Japan and around Hokkaido ,
monitoring Soviet electronic activity from Vladivostok north through
Sakhalin and east through the Kuril Islands . The JMSDF ' s EP -2Js were alsoused mainly to monitor the electronic emissions from Soviet activities . Sincethen , however , Japan ' s listening aircraft have been flown to monitor activitiesinvolving China and North Korea much more frequently . During the Chinesemissile firings into Taiwanese sealanes in March 1996 , for example , JMSDF
EP - 3s and JASDF E - 2Cs maintained virtually continuous stations over the
southern part of
the East China Sea , from where they could interceptelectronic signals emanating from a large area in China , extending beyondZhejiang and Fujian provinces , as well as from Taiwanese naval and a
ir
defences . Six
months later , in October , up to six E -2Cs were deployed on
Okinawa to monitor a joint Hong Kong -Taiwanese flotilla of
civilianprotesters sailing in the vicinity o
f
the Senkaku Islands disputed among
Japan , China and Taiwan . ”
18 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Since 1993, when suspicions arose about North Korea's nuclearweapons development which provoked a major international crisis , Japan 'sintelligence -collection aircraft have responded to numerous unusual, aberrantor potentially dangerous North Korean actions . During the 1993 crisis , theJMSDF and JASDF mounted wide-ranging electronic reconnaissance flights ,involving EP -3, RF -4E , YS -11E and E-2C aircraft .99On 9 July 1994 , whenPyongyang announced the death of President Kim Il-sung, E -2C , EP- 3 andYS-11E aircraft were dispatched for flights along the North Korean peninsulato monitor North Korean a
ir activity in order to discern any unsettling
behaviour . 100
When North Korea launched its Taepodong - 1 IRBM on 31
August 1998 , not only was an EP - 3 used to intercept the missile telemetry ,
but from around 15 August ELINT collection systems were also deployed to
the Sea of Japan ( including the
Aegis -equipped Myoko DDG destroyer ) .
The frequency ofE - 2C patrols over the
southwestern sector of
the Sea of
Japan was also increased , thus enhancing both radar and ELINT coverage . 102
An EP - 3 SIGINT aircraft , together with a P - 3C LRMP aircraft , flew to
the area west of
Tsushima Island in December 1998 to monitor a small - scalenaval firefight in which South Korean patrol boats , supported b
y
fighter
aircraft , sank a North Korean submersible vessel which the South Koreanshad found attempting to land espionage agents near the southern port city o
f
Yosu . ' ' s In April 1999 , when the 'suspicious 'North Korean boats were found
in the ADIZ , the E -2Cs again used both radar and ELINT systems to locatethe boats aswell as guard against North Korean fighter intervention . "
( vii) Warfighting
The JSDF can reasonably expect to be well served by
its
airborne
SIGINT systems in the event ofits
involvement in conventional hostilities inthe northwest Pacific o
r
the East Asian littoral . They should be able to
establish and maintain control of
the electromagnetic spectrum , providingtimely intelligence for strategic and operational planning , as well a
s
electronic intelligence to support EW operations , including ECM for
both
offensive purposes and protection of
JSDF forces .
The JSDF would enter any
such hostilities with the
mostcomprehensive and detailed EOB data . It would almost certainly have thelargest airborne SIGINT fleet , including some of the most advanced types
(such as
the
EP - 3s and E - 767s ) , equipped with the best SIGINT and EW
systems , and operated by very well -trained SIGINT /EW personnel .
Working Paper No.353 19
Table 1:Airborne SIGINT Systems
Aircraft No Base Range (km ) Comments
YS - 11E | 10 2,320- 2,670Iruma AirBase
2 E-P3 5 Iwakuni 7, 760
Operated by
JASDF Air
| Electronic Research Unit .
Equipped with J /ALR - 2 SIGINTsystem .
Includes serial numbers 12 -1162 ,
12 -1163 , 02 -1159 , 92 - 1157 , 12
1161 , 82 -1155 .
Operated by
No . 81 Air SupportSquadron , JMSDF .
Serial numbers 9171 -9175 .
First delivery March 1991 .
Replaced two P - 2J SIGINT
aircraft .
8 - 10 aircraft planned .
Operated by
JASDF 501 " AirReconnaissance Squadron .
Operated by
JASDF 6015 AirWarning Squadron .
3 | RF-4EJ | 17 1 ,700Hyakuri Air
Base
Misawa AirBase
13
2 ,550E - 2C
Hawkeye
5 8 ,300 - 9 ,200E - 767 | 4
AWACSHamamatsu
Air Base
EC - 1 3 ,000Iruma Air
Base
7 UP - 3D 3 Iwakuni 7 ,670
18 | UP -3C1 Iwakuni 7 ,670
First two delivered in March 1998
(Nos . 64 -3501 and 64 -3502 ) ;
second pair in early 1999 .
Equipped with J /ALR - 1 SIGINTsystem .
First test flight in 1985 .
JMSDF EW training aircraft .
Serial numbers 9161 -9163 .
Delivered 1998 - 99 .
JMSDF EW training aircraft .
Serial number 9151 .
Delivered in February 1995 .
JMSDF ECM training support
aircraft .
Operated by 81 Air Support
Squadron .
Serial numbers 9201 , 9202 , 9204 ,
9205 , 9206 .
JGSDF liaison and reconnaissanceaircraft .
Delivered in the 1970s and 1980s .
5 Iwakuni 1 ,960 - 4 , 165UA - 36ALearjets
10
LR - 1 10
2 ,700Camp
Utsunomiya
20 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Table 2: Soviet/Russian Military Aircraft Activities around Japan ,
1983 - 93
Year No . of flights
315
345
354
347
320
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
295
260
240
210
176
149
Source : Japan Defense Agency,Defense of Japan (Japan Defense Agengy,Tokyo , various issues).
Working Paper No.353 21
Figure 1: Japanese SIGINT Aircraft Bases
Sea ofOkhotsk
RUSSIA
CHINA
Rama
reMisawa( E - 20 )NORTH
KOREA Sea of
Japan
SOUTH
KOREA
Iruma
MEC - 1 , YS - 11E) .
TOKYOHyakuri
( RF - 4EJ)
Iwakuni
( EP- 3 ) Hamamatsu
( E - 767 )
PACIFIC OCEAN
500
i bilometers soo
kilometres
22 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Figure 2 : Curtiss C -46D (91-1140 ) Commando SIGINT Aircraft
0011-
16
Source : Streetly ,World Electronic Warfare Aircraft , p . 43 .
Working Paper No.353 23
Figure 3: Kawasaki/ JMSDF EP - 3 SIGINT Aircraft (No. 9171)
Source : Japan Defense Agency : <http://www . jda. go. jp /JMSDF /data /equip /gallery / img /link /ep
301 _ m .jpg > .
24 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Figure 4 : Kawasaki/JASDF EC - 1 (78 -1021) SIGINT Aircraft ,Gifu AirBase, 7 September 1988
Source :Norio Aoki: <http://www .usiwakamaru .or. jp/~strgzr/aircraft /index _ e. htm> .
Working Paper No . 353 25
Figure 5:NAMC /JASDF YS - 11EA (12 -1163 ) SIGINT Aircraft
Source : Lambert (ed.), Jane 's All
the Worlds Aircraft , 1994 - 95 , p .237 .
26 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Figure 6 :NAMCIJASDF YS - 11EB (92 -1157) SIGINT Aircraft ,
Chitose Air Base
LS11
-26
Source : Hidehiro Takahashi : < http : / /www .geocities . co . jp /SweetHome /2998 / 92 -1157 .jpg > .
Working Paper No. 353 27
Figure 7: NAMCIJASDF YS -11E (12 -1162) SIGINT Aircraft,
Chitose Air Base
:
Source : Hidehiro Takahashi: <http://www .geocities .co. jp/SweetHome /2998/12-1162.jpg>.
28 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Figure 8:NAMCIJASDF YS11E (82 -1155) SIGINT Aircraft ,
Chitose Air Base
9911
-CB
"
S91
Source : Hidehiro Takahashi : < http : / /www .geocities . co . jp /SweetHome /2998 / 82 -1155 .jpg > .
Working Paper No.353 29
Figure 9: NAMC/JASDF YS -11E (02 -1159) SIGINT Aircraft
YS- 11EB1
59
Source : Akira Sahara : < http : / /www .linkclub . or . jp / ~ strange /jsdf /jmsdf /JMSDF05 .htm > .
30 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Figure 10 : Kawasaki/JMSDF UP -3D (No.9161 )
Source : Japan Defense Agency :< h
ttp: / /www . jda. go . jp / JMSDF / data/equip /gallery / img/ link/ up -3d01 _ m . jpg> .
Working Paper No.353 31
Figure 11 : Shin Maywa / JMSDF Learjet U -36A ECM Training Aircraft(No. 9202 )
Source : Japan Defense Agency:<http://www . jd
a. go. jp / JMSDF /data /equip /gallery / img / link / u - 36a01 _ m . jpg > .
32 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Figure 12:Grumman/JASDF E -2C Early -Warning Aircraft(No . 34 -3460),Misawa Air Base
Source : Atsushi Tsubota: <http://www .people.or.jp/~Atsubo /DATA1/E2.htm>.
Working Paper No.353 33
Figure 13: JASDF E -767 Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft(No. 64 -3502 ), Hamamatsu Air Base
WWW
COOK
Source : Atsushi Tsubota : < http : / /www .people . or . jp / -Atsubo /DATA1 /E767 .htm > .
34 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Figure 14 : Comparative E - 2C and E -767 Operational Areas
Shadedareasrepresentlow-altitudecoverageby 28radarsitesthroughoutJapan
Operational range
of E -2Cs(example of operations
by three E-2Cs )
Examplesarebasedon theassumptionthatE-2Cswillbeoperatedona fixedbasis,whileE-767swillbeoperatedonamobilebasisdependingon thesituation
CHINA RUSSIA
NORTHKOREA
SOUTHKOREA
Operational
range of
E-7678
PACIFIC OCEAN500
kilometres
Source : Japan Defense Agency ( JDA ), Defenseof Japan 1993, p.112.
Working Paper No . 353 35
Figure 15 : JASDF RF -4EJ Reconnaissance Aircraft
RF-EJ
Source : Akira Sahara: <http://www . linkclub .or. jp/~strange/jsdf/ jasdf/rf4ej .JPG >.
36 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Figure 16 : JGSDF LR -1 Liaison and Reconnaissance Aircraft
1.
9107A
91022
SU
Source : Norio Aoki : < http : / /www .usiwakamaru . or . jp / - strgzr /aircraft / index _ e . htm> .
Working Paper No.353 37
Figure 17 : E - 2C ELINT Coverage , East China Sea Deployment
117 125E
31°N
Hangzhoun
PACIFIC
OCEAN
600kmCHINA
27°N
Fuzhou
Quanzhou
Zhangzhou
Taiwan Strait
Taipei
Xiamen
TAIWAN
Shantou
100 200 300 km
38 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Notes
1 Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Defense of Japan 1992 (Japan DefenseAgency , Tokyo, 1992 ), p .259 .
2 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ), Defense of Japan 1995 (Japan DefenseAgency , Tokyo , 1995 ) , p .285. See also Eiichiro Sekigawa and MichaelMecham , 'Japan Eyes New Programs, But Pays fo
r
AWACS Now ' ,
Aviation Week & Space Technology , 21March 1994 , pp. 62 - 3 .
3 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) , Defense of Japan 1989 (Japan Defense
Agency , Tokyo , 1989 ) , p .316 ; and Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) ,Defense
of
Japan 1990 (Japan Defense Agency , Tokyo 1990 ) , p .289 .
4 Tetsushi Kajimoto , ‘ASDF Takes Delivery of AWACS Planes ' , Japan
Times , 26 March 1998 , pp. 1 , 3 ; and 'First Two 767 AWACS Delivered to
Japan ' , Defense News , 30 March - 8 April 1998 , p . 33 .
5 Eiichiro Sekigawa and Michael Mecham , 'Japan Eyes New Programs ,
But Pays For AWACS Now ' , Aviation Week & Space Technology , 21
March 1994 , pp. 62 - 3 .
6 Martin Streetly ,World Electronic Warfare Aircraft (Jane ' s PublishingCompany Limited , London , 1983 ) , p
p. 42 - 3 .
7 John Welfield , An Empire in Eclipse : Japan in the Postwar American
Alliance System ( The Athlone Press , London , 1988 ) , pp . 110- 11 ,354 ; and
Joseph P . Keddell , The Politics of Defense in Japan :Managing Internal andExternal Pressures ( M . E . Sharpe , ArmonkNY , 1993 ) , pp . 41 - 2 ,172 .
8 Leonard Bridgman ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1941
(Sampson , Low , Marston & Company , London , 31st edition , June1942 ) , pp . 158 - 60 ; and Derek Wood , Jane ' s World Aircraft RecognitionHandbook (Jane ' s Information Group , Coulsdon , Surrey , 4th edition ,
1989 ) , p .257 .
9 ibid .
10 'Japan ' s Navy Weighs E - 3 , Additional E -2Cs for AEW Mission ' ,
Aviation Week & Space Technology , 11 May 1987 , p . 59 ; and MartinStreetly , 'Japan ' s SIGINT Islands ’ , Jane ' s Defence Weekly , 20 August1991 , p .236 .
11 John W . R . Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1978 - 79
(Macdonald and Jane ' s ,London , 1978 ) , pp .119 - 20 .
Working Paper No.353 39
12Martin Streetly , “Japan ' s SIGINT Islands ', Jane's Defence Weekly , 20August 1991, p. 23
6; and Martin Streetly , State of Japan ' s EW ' , Jane ' s
Defence Weekly , 27 July 1991 , p . 144 .
13 Jeffrey T . Richelson , Foreign Intelligence Organizations (Ballinger ,
Cambridge MA , 1988 ) , p .257 .
14 Paul Jackson ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the
World ' s Aircraft , 1998 - 99 (Jane ' s
Information Group , Coulsdon , Surrey , 89th edition , 1998 ) , p .282 .
15 ‘Japan Navy Weighs E - 3 , Additional E -2Cs for AEW Mission ' ,
Aviation Week & Space Technology , 11May 1987 , p . 59 .
16 Paul Jackson ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the
World ' s Aircraft , 1997 - 98 (Jane ' s
Information Group ,Coulsdon , Surrey , 1997 ) , pp. 289 - 90 .
17 Martin Streetly , “Japan ' s SIGINT Islands ' , Jane ' s Defence Weekly , 10
August 1991 , p .236 ; Martin Streetly , 'State of Japan ' s EW ' , Jane ' s
Defence Weekly , 27 July 1991 , p .144 ; and Air Force Magazine , October1997 , p . 66 .
18 'Japan ' s Navy Weighs E - 3 , Additional E -2Cs for
AEW Mission ' ,
Aviation Week & Space Technology , 11May 1987 , p . 59 .
19 Norman Friedman , The Naval Institute Guide toWorld NavalWeapons
Systems , 1997 -1998 (Naval Institute Press , Annapolis MD , 1997 ) , p .538 ;
and Bernard Blake ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems ,
1995 - 96 (Jane ' s Information Group , Coulsdon , Surrey , 7th edition ,
1995 ) , p .584 .
20 Friedman , The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons , 1997
1998 , pp.541 - 3 ; and Blake ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Radar and Electronic Warfare
Systems , 1995 - 96 , p .567 .
21 John W . R . Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1998 - 99 (Jane ' s
Information Group , Coulsdon ,Surrey ,89th edition , 1998 ) , p .283 .
22 Kenichi Watanabe , 'Japan : MSDF Improves P - 3C Navigation
Precision ' , Wing , 11 March 1998 , p . 7 , in FBIS -EAS - 98 -103 , FBISTranslated Text ,Daily Report , 13 April 1998 .
23 Friedman , The
Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Systems , 19971998 , p .543 .
24 ‘Industry Observer ' , Aviation Week & Space Technology , 2 July 1984 ,
p . 13 .
40 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
25Martin Streetly , 'State of Japan 's EW ', Jane's Defence Weekly , 27 July1991 , p .144;Martin Streetly, “Japan 's SIGINT Islands ', Jane 's DefenceWeekly , 24 August 1991, p .236 ; and Streetly , World Electronic WarfareAircraft , p .74 .
26 John W .R. Taylor (ed .), Jane 's All theWorld ' s Aircraft , 1987 - 88 (Jane ' s
Publishing Company , London , 1987 ) , p .178 .
27 John W . R . Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1981 - 82 (Jane ' s
Publishing Company , London ,72nd edition , 1981 ) , pp. 143 - 4 .
28 Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All theWorld ' s Aircraft , 1987 - 88 , p . 178 .
29 ibid . , pp. 178 - 9 .
30 The International Institute for Strategic Studies ( IISS ) , The Military
Balance 1999 -2000 (Oxford University Press ,Oxford , 1999 ) , p . 193.
31 John W . R . Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1965 - 66
(Sampson Low ,Marston & Company , London , 1965 ) , pp . 105- 6 .
32Streetly ,World Electronic Warfare Aircraft , p . 95 .
33 ‘ ASDF Plane to Gather Data on Soviets : Sources ' , Japan Times , 26
April 1985 , p . 3 .
34“Japanese Continue to Upgrade Airborne EW Capability ' , Journal of
Electronic Defense , Vol . 14 , No . 12 , December 1991 , p . 19 ; and MarkLambert ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1994 - 95 (Jane ' s
Information Group , Coulsdon ,Surrey , 1994 ) , p .237 .
35 The International Institute for
Strategic Studies ( IISS ) , The MilitaryBalance , 1996 - 97 (Oxford University Press , Oxford , October 1996 ) ,
p . 186 ; and The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS ) , TheMilitary Balance , 1998 - 99 (Oxford University Press , Oxford , October1998 ) , p .185 .
36 John W . R . Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1987 - 88 (Jane ' s
Publishing Company , London , 1987 ) , pp .418 - 19 ; and Mark Lambert
( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1994 - 95 ( Jane ' s Information Group ,
Coulsdon , Surrey , 1994 ) , p .548 .
37 Jackson ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1998 - 99 , pp .282 - 3 .
38 ibid . , p .282 .
Working Paper No. 353 41
39 Rear Admiral Makoto Yamazaki , “Rear Admiral on Future MSDFTechnology ',Gekkan Jadi,November 1996 , pp 7- 17, in FBIS -JST-97 -001 ,FBIS Translated Text, 1November 1996 .
40 Jackson (ed .), Jane's All the World 's Aircraft , 1997 -98, pp.708 - 9.41 “Japan Air Self -Defense Force Completes Key E -2C Milestone',Aerotech News and Review : Journal of Aerospace and Defense IndustryNews, 12 October 1999 , at <http ://www .aerotechnews .com /starc/1999/101299 /Japan _ E2C .html> (November 2000 ).
42 Defense of Japan (JDA), Defense of Japan 1984 (The Japan Times,Tokyo , 1984 ), p.99 .
43 Tokyo Shimbun , 17 August 1999 , in Daily Summary of Japanese Press ,American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office of TranslationServices , 18 August 1999. See also John Barron , MiG Pilot : The FinalEscape of Lieutenant Belenko (Reader ' s Digest Press, New York , 1980 ).44 Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Defense of Japan 1993 (Japan DefenseAgency , Tokyo , 1993 ), pp.110 -13; and Tokyo Shimbun , 17 August 1999 ,in Daily Summary of Japanese Press , American Embassy , Tokyo , PoliticalSection ,Office of Translation Services , 18 August 1999 .
45 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ), Defense of Japan 1986 (The JapanTimes , Tokyo , 1986 ), p . 14
8 ; and 'Japan Weighs E - 3 Additional E -2Csfor AEW Mission ' , Aviation Week & Space Technology , 11 May 1987 ,
p . 59 .46 'Documents Reveal SDF ' s Intelligence Collection Activities ' , Tokyo
Shimbun , 13 August 1998 , p . 1 , in FBIS -EAS - 98 - 30 , FBIS TranslatedText ,Daily Report , 28 October 1998 .
47 BillGunston , An Illustrated Guide to Spy Planes and Electronic Warfare
Aircraft (Arco Publishing ,New York , 1983 ) , pp. 122 - 3 .
48 Jackson ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All theWorld ' s Aircraft , 1997 - 98 , pp .708 - 9 .
49 Kenneth Koehler , 'The Grumman E - 2C Hawkeye Airborne Warning
and Control System ' in Desmond Ball ( ed . ) , Air Power : GlobalDevelopments and Australian Perspectives (Pergamon -Brassey ' s DefencePublishers , Sydney , 1988 ) , p .385 .
42 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
50 U .S. Department of Defense Memorandum for
Correspondents ,
No .079 - M , 19 May 1997 at
< http : / /www .defenselink .mil : 80 /news /
May1997 /m051997 _m079 - 97 .html > (November 2000 .
51General Isao Ishizuka , cited in Paul Beaver , ‘Japan ' s Balancing Act ,
Jane ' s Defence Weekly , 24 April 1993 , pp . 24 - 5 .
52 ‘ U . S . Trains With Japan in Exercise Cope North Guam ' 99 ' ,PACAF
News , 21 June 1999 , at < http : / /www2 .hickam . af .mil /news /newsarchive /
1999 /99108 . htm> (November 2000 ) .
53 Yomiuri Shimbun , 3 November 1998 , p . 3 , in Daily Summary of Japanese
Press , American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office of
Translation Services , 9November 1998 .
54 'Exercise Cope North Guam ' 00 Begins May 30 ' , PACAF News , 23
May 2000 , at <http : / /www2 .hickam . af .mil /news /2000 /2000079 . htm >
(November 2000 ) .
55 ' US Lagging on Defense Deliveries : Audit Board ' , Japan Times , 11
December 1998
56 Tokyo Shimbun , 17 August 1999 , in Daily Summary of Japanese Press ,
American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office of
Translation
Services , 18 August 1999 .
57 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) , Defense of Japan 1993 , pp . 110- 13 ; and
Tokyo Shimbun , 26 March 1998 , pp . 6 - 7 , in Daily Summary of JapanesePress , American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office o
fTranslation Services , 30March 1998 .
58 Norman D . Levin ,Mark Lorell and Arthur Alexander , The Wary
Warriors : Future Directions in Japanese Security Policies (RAND , SantaMonica CA , 1993 ) , p
p. 62 - 3 .
59 ibid . ; and Naoaki Usui , 'AWACS May Get New Plane : Boeing
Considers Retrofitting 767 Airframe For Japan Buy ' , Defense News , 21
December 1991 , p . 4 .
60David E .Sanger , “Japan May Delay Buying US Military Planes ' ,New
York Times , 5 August 1991 , p . D8 .
61 Naoaki Usui , 'AWACS May get
New Plane : Boeing ConsidersRetrofitting 767 Airframe For Japan Buy ' , Defense News , 21 December1991 , p . 4 .
Working Paper No.353 43
62 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ), Defense of Japan 1993,pp.110 -13 .63 'In Brief: AWACS Enter JASDF Service', Jane's Defence Weekly , 24May 2000 , p. 14; and Japan :AWACS Enter Service ', Asian DefenceJournal , June 2000, p.54 .
64 Asahi Shimbun , 2 December 1995 ; and Lam Peng Er, 'Japan and theSpratlys Dispute : Aspirations and Limitations ', Asian Survey , Vol.36 ,No. 10, October 1996 , p.1009.65 Jackson (ed .), Jane's All th
e
World ' s Aircraft , 1997 - 98 , pp .582 - 3 ; andTetsushi Kajimoto , ‘ASDF Takes Delivery of AWACS Planes ' , JapanTimes , 26 March 1998 , p . 3 .
66
D . Clifford Bell , 'The Boeing E - 3 Airborne Warning and ControlSystem ' in Ball ( ed . ) , Airpower : Global Developments and AustralianPerspectives , p .327 ; Lambert ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Al
l
the
World ' s Aircraft , 1991 - 92 ,
p .365 ; and Blake ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems , 1995
96 , p .292 .
67 Blake ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems , 1995 - 96 ,
pp. 588- 9 .
68 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) ,Defense ofJapan 1993 , pp . 110- 12 .
69 Tokyo Shimbun , 26 March 1998 , pp. 6 - 7 , in Daily Summary of Japanese
Press , American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office of
Translation Services , 30 March 1998 .
70 ‘Electronic Systems Center ' , at < http : / /www .afmc .wpafb . af .mil /HQ
AFMC / PA /leading _ edge /may98 /esc . htm> (November 2000 ) .
71 Japan Adopts Thomson -CSF ' s ASTAC EW Pod ' , Defense and
Armament International , February 1990 , p . 12 .
72 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) , Defense of Japan 1976 (Japan Defense
Agency , Tokyo , 1976 ) , Appendix 6 , p . 147 .
73 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) , Defense of Japan 1989 (Japan Defense
Agency , Tokyo , 1989 ) , p .114 .
74
F . P . Dube ( ed . ) , International Electronic Countermeasures Handbook
(Horizon House ,Norwood MA , 1999 ) , p . 14 .
44 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
75 Pierre Alain Antoine , “Tactical ESM and ELINT', paper prepared for
a conference on Electronic Warfare Asia ' 97 , Kuala Lumpur , 5 - 6
November 1997 .
76 Martin Streetly ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems ,
1998 - 99 (Jane ' s Information Group , Coulsdon , Surrey , 10th edition ,
1998 ) , p .436 .
77 ibid .
78 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS ) , The Military
Balance , 1999 -2000 , p .192 .
79 Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Allthe
World ' s Aircraft , 1978 - 79 , pp .123 - 5 .
80 J . A . Boyd , D . B . Harris , D . D . King and H . W . Welch (eds ) , Electronic
Countermeasures (Peninsula Publishing , Los Altos CA , 1978 ) , chapter
11 ; and Lt . Col . Richard E . Fitts ( ed . ) , The Strategy of Electromagnetic
Conflict (Peninsula Publishing , Los Altos CA , 1980 ) , chapter 4 .
81 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) , Defense of Japan 1998 (Japan Defense
Agency , Tokyo , 1998 ) , p .115 .
82 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) , Defense of Japan 1977 (Japan Defense
Agency , Tokyo , 1977 ) , p . 66 .
83 Rear Admiral Yasuo Ito , ‘Surveillance Tasks ' , Journal of the Australian
Naval Institute ,November 1989 , p 37 .
84 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) , Defense of Japan 1998 (Japan Defense
Agency , Tokyo , 1998 ) , p . 115.
85 Eric Johnston , 'Maizuru in Pyongyang ' s Sights ? ' , Japan Times , 2
September 1999 , p . 3 .
86 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) , Defense of Japan 1999 (Japan Defense
Agency , Tokyo , 1999 ) , p . 34 .
87 The International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS ) , StrategicSurvey 1995 -1996 (Oxford University Press , Oxford , April 1996 ) , p .253 ;
and Michael J . Green and Benjamin L . Self , 'Japan ' s Changing ChinaPolicy : From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism ' , Survival ,
Vol . 38 ,No . 2 , Summer 1996 , p . 37 .
Working Paper No. 353 45
88 Asahi Shimbun , 7 April 1999 , pp.2-3, in Daily Summary of JapanesePress , American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office ofTranslation Services , 12 April 1999 .89 See Desmond Ball, Pine Gap : Australia and th
e
US Geostationary SignalIntelligence Satellite Program (Allen & Unwin , Sydney , 1988 ) , especially
pp. 34 - 41 .
90William E .Burrows ,Deep Black : Space Espionage and National Security
(Random House , New York , 1986 ) , pp.171 - 3 ; Tom Bernard and T .
Edward Eskelson , ' U . S . Spy Plane Capable of Interceding in Attack on
Korean Jet ' , Denver Post , 13 September 1983 , p . 38 ; and 'Recon WingFamed for Skill , Endurance ' , Aviation Week & Space Technology , 4
August 1997 , p . 53 .
91 Jeffrey T . Richelson , The
U . S . Intelligence Community (Westview
Press , Boulder CO , 4th edition , 1999 ) , p . 193 ; and 'Recon Wing Famed
for Skill , Endurance ' , Aviation Week & Space Technology , 4 August 1997 ,
p . 53 .
92 Richelson , The U . S . Intelligence Community , p .193 ; and Bill Gertz , ' N .
Korea Fires New Cruise Missile ' , Washington Times , 30 June 1997 ,
pp.A1 , A8 .
93“ ' Informed Sources ” Tell TASS US Alerted to Imminent Chinese
ICBM Tesť , ITAR - TASS 1151 GMT 6 June 2000 , in FBIS TranscribedText ,Daily Report , FBIS -SOV -2000 -0606 , 6 June 2000 .
94 Bungei Shunju ,November 1998 , pp.150 - 7 , in FBIS -EAS - 98 -299 , FBIS
Translated Text ,Daily Report , 26 October 1998 .
95 ibid .
96 ibid .
97 Rear Admiral Makoto Yamazaki , “Rear Admiral on Future MSDF
Technology ' ,Gekkan Jadi ,November 1996 , pp . 7 - 17 , in FBIS - JST - 97 -001 ,
FBIS Translated Text , 1November 1996 .
98 ‘ Tokyo Leaders Fear SmallMistake Could Turn Confrontation into a
Military Conflict , South ChinaMorning Post , 7 October 1996 .
99 'Documents Reveal SDF ' s Intelligence Collection Activities ' , Tokyo
Shimbun , 13 August 1998 , p . 1 , in FBIS -EAS - 98 - 30 , FBIS TranslatedText , Daily Report , 28 October 1998 .
46 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
100'Rabbits ' Ears and Doves ' Dreams : Information on North Korea ' s
Missile Test -Firing Kept Secret ' , Mainichi Shimbun , 14 August 1994 ,
Morning Edition , p . 1 , FBIS Translated Text , at < http : / /www .fas .org /
news / japan /eas9x192 . htm > (November 2000 ) .
101
Bungei Shunju , November 1998 , pp. 150 - 7 , in FBIS -EAS - 98 -299 , FBIS
Translated Text , Daily Report , 26 October 1998 .
102
Mainichi Shimbun , 7 September 1998 , p . 3 , in Daily Summary of
Japanese Press , American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office of
Translation Services , 10 September 1998 .
103'Agency Alarmed by
Sinking of
Sub ' , Daily Yomiuri , 19 December1998 , p . 2 .
104
Asahi Shimbun , pp. 2 - 3 , 7 April 1999 , in Daily Summary of Japanese
Press , American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office of
Translation Services , 12 April 1999 .
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Bruce Vaughn
WP260 A Question of
Priorities : Australian and New Zealand Security Planning in the 1990sby StewartWoodman
WP261 Papua New Guinea -Australia Defence and Security Relations by
Peter I . PeipulWP262 The Regional Security Outlook : A
n
Australian Viewpoint by
Paul DibbWP263 Pakistan ' s Security Concerns : A Chinese Perspective b
yLiu Jinkun
WP264 TheMilitary Build - upin the Asia -Pacific Region : Scope , Causes and Implications
for Security by
Andrew Mack and Desmond BallWP265 Principles o
f
Australian Maritime Operations byW . S . G . Bateman and R . J .
SherwoodWP266 Sino -Russian Detente and theRegional Implications b
y
Gary KlintworthWP267 Australia and Asia -Pacific Regional Security b
y
Peter Jennings
WP268 Cambodia ' s Past , Present and Future by
Gary KlintworthWP269 Australia ' s Aerial Surveillance Programme in the South Pacific : Review and New
Options by
Wing Commander R . W .GreyWP270 Strategic Culture in th
e
Asia -Pacific Region (With Some Implications for
Regional
Security Cooperation ) by
Desmond BallWP271 Australian Security Planning a
t
theCrossroads : The Challenge of theNineties by
StewartWoodmanWP272 Index to Parliamentary Questions o
n
Defence , 1992 by
Gary BrownWP273 Trends in Military Acquisitions in the Asia /Pacific Region : Implications for Security
and Prospects for Constraints and Controls by
Desmond BallWP274 A Proposal for Cooperation in Maritime Security in Southeast Asia b
y
Wing
Commander R . W .GreyWP275 The Preparation andManagement o
f
Australian Contingents in UN
PeacekeepingOperations b
y
Captain Russ Swinnerton RANWP276 The Future o
f
Australia ' s Defence Relationship with the United States by
Paul DibbWP277 Russia ' s Military and theNorthern Territories Issue b
y
Geoffrey JukesWP278 A Regional Regime fo
r
MaritimeSurveillance , Safetyand Information Exchanges by
Captain Russ Swinnerton RAN andDesmond Ball
WP279 ThePoliticalRole of the Singapore Armed Forces 'Officer Corps : Towards a
Military - Administrative State ? by
Tim Huxley
WP280 The East Coast Armaments Complex (ECAC ) Location Project : Strategic andDefence Aspects b
y
Desmond BallWP281 Rules of Engagement in Maritime Operations by
Captain Russ Swinnerton RAN
1993
1994
1995
1996
WP282 The Political and Strategic Outlook, 1994-2003: Global,Regional and AustralianPerspectives by Paul Dibb
WP283 Index to Parliamentary Questions on Defence, 1993by Gary BrownWP284 New Dimensions to the Japan -Australia Relationship : From Economic Preference to
Political Cooperation by Nobuyuki TakakiWP285 Winners and Losers: South Asia After th
e
Cold War by
Sandy GordonWP286 Australia and New Zealand : Towards a More Effective Defence Relationship b
y
Jim
RolfeWP287 China ' s Policy Towards the Spratly Islands in the 1990s b
y
Sheng Lijun
WP288 How to Begin Implementing Specific Trust - Building Measures in the Asia -PacificRegion b
y
Paul Dibb
WP289 Burma ' s Arms Procurement Programme by
Andrew SelthWP290 Developments in Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare in Southeast Asia b
y
Desmond BallWP291 India ' s Naval Strategyand th
e
Role ofthe
Andaman and Nicobar Islands byD . N .
Christie
WP292 Japan and Australia : A New Security Partnership ? by
Naoko Sajima
WP293 Chinese Strategy and the
Spratly Islands Dispute by
Brigadier Chris RobertsWP294 Transnational Crime : TheNew Security Paradigm b
y
John McFarlane and Karen
McLennanWP295 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT ) in North Korea b
y
Desmond BallWP296 The Emerging Geopolitics o
f
the Asia -Pacific Region by
Paul DibbWP297 Maritime Strategy into the Twenty -First Century : Issues fo
r
Regional Navies by
JackMcCaffrie
WP298 The Cold War in Retrospect : Diplomacy , Strategy and Regional Impact by
Coral BellWP299 Australia -Indonesia Security Cooperation : For Better o
r
Worse ? by
Bob Lowry
WP300 Reflections on
American Foreign Policy Strategy by
John Chipman
WP301 New Requirements for Multilateral Conflict Management by
UN and Other Forces :
Nordic Responses by
Jaana Karhilo
WP302 Developing Army Doctrine in the Post -Cold War Era by
Bill HoustonWP303 The Joint Patrol Vessel ( JPV ) : A Regional Concept for Regional Cooperation b
y
Desmond Ball
WP304 Australian - American Relations after the
Collapse of
Communism by
Harry G . GelberWP305 Policy Coordination for Asia - Pacific Security and Stability by Yukio SatohWP306 Force Modernisation in Asia : Towards 2000 and Beyond b
y
Paul DibbWP307 PMC , ARF and CSCAP : Foundations for a Security Architecture in the Asia -Pacific ?
by
Jörn Dosch
WP308 Burma ' s Intelligence Apparatus by
Andrew SelthWP309 Burma ' s Defence Expenditure and Arms Industries by Andrew SelthWP310 Australia ' s Vulnerability to Information Attack : Towards a National Information
Policy by
Adam Cobb
WP311 Australia , the US Alliance and Multilateralism in Southeast Asia by
Desmond BallWP312 From Distant Countries to Partners : the Japan -Australia Relationship b
y
YukioSatoh
WP313 The Burma Navy by
Andrew SelthWP314 Problems and Issues in Malaysia - Singapore Relations b
y
Andrew Tan
WP315 The Burma Air Force by
Andrew SelthWP316 Australia ' s National Security into the Twenty -First Century b
y
Brigadier Mike SmithWP317 Alliances , Alignments and theGlobal Order : The Outlook for the Asia -Pacific
Region in theNext Quarter -Century by Paul DibbWP318 The South African National DefenceForce : Between Downsizing and New
Capabilities ? by
Greg MillsWP319 The Evolution o
f
China ' s Perception of Taiwan by
Sheng Lijun
WP320 UN Peacekeeping , UNIFIL and the Fijian Experience by
Jim Sanday
WP321 The Future of
the ASEAN Regional Forum : An
Australian View by
Alan Dupont
WP322 Singapore ' s Defence Policy in theNew Millennium by
Andrew TanWP323 Responses to NATO ' s Eastward Expansion by the
Russian Federation by
AlexeiMouraviev
1997
1998
1999
WP324 TheRemaking of Asia 'sGeoppolitics by Paul DibbWP325 The Nuclear Crisis in Asia : The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programmes by
Desmond Ball and Mohan Malik
WP326 Researching Security in East Asia : From "Strategic Culture ' to 'Security Culture 'byPauline Kerr
WP327 Building the Tatmadaw : TheOrganisational Development of the Armed Forces inMyanmar , 1948-98by Maung Aung Myoe
WP238 Drugs , Transnational Crime and Security in East Asia by Alan DupontWP329 The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge by Paul DibbWP330 TheUS -Australian Alliance : History and Prospects by Desmond BallWP331 Implications of the East Asian Economic Recession fo
r
Regional SecurityCooperation b
y
Desmond BallWP332 Strategic Information Warfare : A Concept b
y
Daniel T . KuehlWP333 Security Developments and Prospects for Cooperation in the Asia -Pacific Region ,
with Particular Reference to the Mekong River Basin by
Desmond BallWP334 Burma and Weapons o
f
Mass Destruction by
Andrew SelthWP335 Transnational Crime and Illegal Immigration in the Asia -Pacific Region :
Background , Prospects and Countermeasures by
JohnMcFarlaneWP336 Burma and Drugs : TheRegime ' s Complicity in theGlobal Drug Trade b
y
DesmondBall
WP337 Defence Strategy in the Contemporary Era by
Paul DibbWP338 TheBurmese Armed Forces Next Century : Continuity o
rChange ? by
Andrew SelthWP339 Military Doctrine and Strategy in Myanmar : A Historical Perspective b
yMaungAung Myoe
WP340 TheEvolving Security Architecture in the Asia -Pacific Region by
Desmond BallWP341 The Asian Financial Crisis : Corruption , Cronyism and Organised Crime b
y
JohnMcFarlane
WP342 The Tatmadaw in Myanmar since 1988 : An
Interim Assessment by
Maung Aung
MyoeWP343 Cambodia and Southeast Asia by Tony KevinWP344 ThePrinciple o
f
Non -Intervention and ASEAN : Evolution and Emerging Challenges
by
Herman KraftWP345 Will America ' s Alliances in the Asia -Pacific Region Endure ? b
yPaul Dibb
WP346 Officer Education and Leadership Training in the Tatmadaw : A Survey by
Maung
Aung Myoe
WP347 The Prospects for
Southeast Asia ' s Security by PaulDibbWP348 The Army ' s Capacity to Defend Australia Offshore : TheNeed for a Joint Approach
by
John Caligari
WP349 Interpreting China -Indonesia Relations : 'Good -Neighbourliness ' , 'Mutual Trust '
and 'All - round Cooperation ' by
He KaiWP350 Strategic Trends in the Asia -Pacific Region b
y
Paul Dibb
WP351 Burma ' s Order of Battle : An Interim Assessment by
Andrew SelthWP352 Landmines in Burma : TheMilitary Dimension b
y
Andrew Selth
WP353 Japanese Airborne SIGINT Capabilities by
Desmond Ball and Euan Graham
2000
MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS SA
(including cost of packaging & postage )
Australian Paper on
Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Regionby Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb ( 24 + iv p
p) 1994 11 . 50
Armies and Nation -Building : Past Experience - Future Prospects by
David Horner ( ed . )
(240 + xvi pp) 1995 28. 00
Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat : A Model for Middle Powers by
Paul Dibb
( 27+ iv pp) 1996 12. 50
Restructuring the Papua New Guinea Defence Force : Strategic Analysis and Force StructurePrinciples for a Small State by
Paul Dibb and Rhondda Nicholas (162 + xii pp ) 1996 34 . 50
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Strategic and Defence Studies CentreAustralian National University
MISSION STATEMENT
Strategic studies is the primary analytical discipline
for examining the defence policies of, and securityrelationships between , states. It embraces not onlythe control and application ofmilitary force , but thefull range of factors determining the security ofstates. Strategic studies is interdisciplinary , and
includes military , political , economic , environmental, scientific and technological aspects .
The mission of the Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre (SDSC ) is:• to be the leading Australian research centre on
strategic and defence studies ;
to develop postgraduate research and teaching
on Asia -Pacific strategic affairs , which willsupport the priorities of the Research School ofPacific and Asian studies ;
to achieve quality in its scholarly publication
programme , which will enhance the Centre ' s
international reputation ;
to provide advice to Government , the
Parliamentand th
e
private sector that will contribute to the
University ' s national function ;
to promote awareness of , and informed public
debate on , strategic and defence issues .
JUICS ,