january 2013 · 2018-08-03 · abstract against the background of the low-intensity conflict that...
TRANSCRIPT
South African Instit
ute of Inte
rnat
iona
l Affa
irs
African perspectives. Global insights.
South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme
O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 1 3 2
Wade’s Senegal and its Relations with Guinea-Bissau: Brother, Patron or Regional Hegemon?
J a n u a r y 2 0 1 3
V i n c e n t F o u c h e r
A b o u t S A I I A
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A b o u t t h e S o u t h A f r I c A n f o r e I g n p o l I c y A n d A f r I c A n d r I v e r S p r o g r A m m e
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development of Africa. To achieve its ‘African Agenda’ objectives, South Africa needs to
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and African Drivers (SAFPAD) Programme has a two-pronged focus. First, it unpacks South
Africa’s post-1994 Africa policy in two areas: South Africa as a norm setter in the region and
South Africa’s potential to foster regional co-operation with key African states and other
external partners, in support of the continent’s stabilisation and development. Second, it
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© SAIIA January 2013
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Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.
A b S t r A c t
Against the background of the low-intensity conflict that affects its Casamance region,
Senegal should pay particular attention to its relations with its southern neighbour, Guinea-
Bissau. Since 2000 Senegal has used its democratic legitimacy, diplomatic network and
scarce resources to pursue a policy of influence and patronage towards a neighbour
weakened by the war of 1998. In return, the Senegalese government has received special
support from the Guinea-Bissau armed forces in its fight against secessionist rebel forces
in Casamance. Far from being merely a representative of – or channel for – French or
Western interests, under the leadership of Abdoulaye Wade Senegal showed its capacity
for exercising a policy of influence in the West Africa sub-region and the African continent
as a whole, albeit as a consequence of some favourable conditions, and with only limited
financial resources.
A b o u t t h e A u t h o r
Vincent Foucher obtained his PhD in political studies from the School of Oriental and
African Studies, London. Between 2003 and 2011 he was a researcher with the French
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, based at the Centre d’Études d’Afrique Noire
(now Les Afriques dans le Monde), Bordeaux. From 2006 to 2008 he was also the editor in
chief of Politique Africaine, the leading French academic journal on contemporary African
affairs. He now works with the International Crisis Group as a senior analyst in its West
Africa Office, Dakar.
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A b b r e v I A t I o n S A n d A c r o n y m S
AFP AgenceFrance-Presse
APS AgencedePresseSénégalaise
CFA FinancialCommunityofAfricaorAfricanFinancialCommunity
(Communauté financière d’Afrique);
alsoknowasWestAfricanfranc(ISOcodeXOF)
CPLP CommunityofPortugueseLanguageCountries
(Comunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa)
ECOWAS EconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates
Fesman WorldFestivalofBlackArts (Festival Mondial des Arts Nègres)
FLING LiberationFrontfortheNationalIndependenceofGuinea
(Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional da Guiné)
ICG InternationalCrisisGroup
MFDC MovementofDemocraticForcesintheCasamance
(Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance)
PAIGC AfricanPartyfortheIndependenceofGuineaandCapeVerde
(Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde)
PANA Pan-AfricanNewsAgency
UNESCO UNEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganization
WAEMU WestAfricanEconomicandMonetaryUnion
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I n t r o d u c t I o n
Opération Gabou was unquestionably one of the most impressive foreign policy
initiativesundertakenbyanindependentSenegal.Amilitaryinterventionthatlasted
fromJune1998toMarch1999,itrequiredDakartodeploymorethan2000soldiers
to itssmall southernneighbour,Guinea-Bissau.The intentionwas tohelpPresident
JoãoBernardo(‘Nino’)Vieirastaveoffanattemptedcoupd’étatbymilitaryrebelsledby
Brigadier-GeneralAnsumaneMané,thatresultedintheso-called‘SeventhofJuneWar’.1
ThatSenegalwaspreparedtomakeconsiderablesacrificesinthatinstanceclearlyindicates
Guinea-Bissau’simportancetoDakar.ToSenegal,Bissaumattersprimarilybecauseof
thelowlevel,apparentlyinsoluble,conflictthatforthepast30yearshastroubledthe
CasamanceregioninthesouthofSenegal,whichbordersonbothGuinea-BissauandThe
Gambia.2
AlthoughSenegalesetroopswithdrewinMarch1999afteraceasefire,thewarproper
endedonlyinMay1999onadefeatforDakar:Manétookover,chasingVieira.Kumba
Yala,headofGuinea-Bissau’sSocialRenewalPartyandanotherofVieira’sopponents,won
thesubsequentpresidentialelectioninFebruary2000.Soonafterwardsamajorpolitical
upheaval took place in Senegal, with the March 2000 election of the long-standing
oppositionfigure,AbdoulayeWade,aspresident.Thiswasthefirstpoliticalturnover
inSenegal’spoliticaldirectionsince independence in1960.Afterassumingofficeon
1April2000WadequicklytookstepstoreinforceSenegal’srelationshipwithGuinea-
Bissau;thefirstdiplomatictripofhispresidentialtermwastoBissaulessthanamonth
later.UnderhispresidencySenegalsucceededinexercisingconsiderableinfluenceoverits
smallsouthernneighbourwithoutfurthermajorinterventionsonthelinesofOpération
Gabou;itwastheGuinea-Bissauarmy,not‘foreign’forces,thateventuallydislodgedthe
mostextremeelementsoftherebelMovementofDemocraticForcesintheCasamance
(MFDC)fromtheirbasesalongtheborderwithSenegal.
Howcanoneunderstandthere-establishmentofsuchstrongtiesbetweenDakarand
BissausosoonafterOpération Gabou,whichthepopulationofGuinea-Bissauhadmet
withmarkedhostility?Onemust firstestablishwhichdevelopmentswerestructural
andwhichcircumstantial;whichstrategicandwhichtactical;andinwhatwaysevents
wereinfluencedbythelong,tangledhistoriesofthetwocountries,especiallyagainst
thebackgroundofpost-conflictGuinea-Bissauontheonehandandontheother,the
fundamentalchangesinSenegalesepoliticsbroughtaboutbythe2000election.What
doesthisrelationshiptellusaboutthecapabilitiesandlimitationsofSenegalgiventhat
thecountry isoftendescribedeitherasadiplomaticpawnofFrance,orof theWest
ingeneral,oranultra-opportunisticplayerthatusesforeignpolicyasaninstrumentto
attractresourcesforinternaluse?3Finally,onemustalsoconsiderthewayinwhichthe
relationshipbetweenBissauandDakarfitsintothewiderWestAfrican,Africanandworld
context.ByexaminingSenegal’shandlingofsuchamajorstrategicquestionforitselfas
Guinea-Bissau,thispaperseekstoshedlightontheforeignpolicyoftheWaderegime
byanalysingitstools,‘style’,connectionsanddevelopmentsbetween2000andtheend
ofWade’spresidencyin2012.ItalsolooksatSenegal’srelativepowerandinfluenceinits
immediateregion,aswellasinitsbroadercontinentalenvironment.
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Somehistoricalbackgroundisnecessarybeforetracingthecomplexpathoftherelationship
betweenSenegalandGuinea-Bissauafter2000,anddrawingsomegeneralconclusions.
TheterritoriesthattodayconstituteSenegalandGuinea-Bissauhavealongcommon
history,basedonthedynamicsofcolonialismandlinkedtothecoastalpresenceofthe
Portuguesefromthe15thcentury,andconsequentinvolvementwiththeAtlantictrade.4
Evenafterthecolonialbordersweredrawn,tiesbetweenSenegalandthePortuguese
coloniesofCapeVerdeandGuinea–nowGuinea-Bissau–remainedstrong.Theywere
nourishedbySenegal’srelativelydynamiceconomy.ImmigrantsfromPortugueseGuinea
providedcheaplabourforFrenchSenegal,withsomemovingontometropolitanFrance.
MeanwhileFrenchcompaniesinSenegalwenttheotherway,extendingtheirtradinginto
PortugueseGuinea.
WhentheRepublicofSenegalbecameindependentin1960,variousemigrantgroups
fromtheGuineaandCapeVerdediasporabecameinvolvedinavarietyofindependence
movements;theyenjoyedthetacitsupportofSenegalesepresidentLéopoldSédarSenghor.
EventuallytheAfricanPartyfortheIndependenceofGuineaandCapeVerde(PAIGC),
establishedin1956byagronomistAmilcarCabral,cametothefore.Duringthe1960s
thePAIGCoptedforarmedstruggle,winningsupportfromtheSovietblocandfrom
formerFrenchGuinea(bythentheRepublicofGuinea),underPresidentSékouTouré,
aMarxistnationalisthostiletoSenghor’spro-Westernline.Inevitablytherelationship
betweenDakarand thePAIGCdeterioratedandSenegalopenlysupportedmoderate
nationalistshostiletothePAIGC,whichby1962hadgatheredtoformtheLiberation
FrontfortheNationalIndependenceofGuinea(FLING),tolittleavail.TheOrganisation
ofAfricanUnityacknowledgedPAIGCastheonlylegitimateindependencemovement
in1965,andtheSenegaleseauthoritieslatertoleratedthepresenceonSenegalesesoilof
numerousGuinea-Bissaurefugees,oftenlinkedtothePAIGC,andturnedablindeyeon
theiractivities.5
PAIGCprevailed,andPortugalrecognisedtheindependenceofGuinea-Bissau6 in
1974.SenegalandGuinea-Bissau,however,belongedtoopposingColdWarblocsand
formal contactbetween themwas limited;but from the1980s tiesbecame stronger
asBissauopenedupitseconomyandin1997joinedSenegalintheAfricanFinancial
Community,thusbecomingthefirstnon-FrancophonecountrytoadopttheWestAfrican
CFAfranc(XOF)asitscurrency.
The formationofa separatistmovement insouthernSenegalat theendof1982,
ledbytheMFDC,didnotbringaboutadeteriorationinrelationsbetweenDakarand
Bissau,despitenumerousSenegaleseobserversdismissingtheMFDCasaninstrument
ofmalevolentneighbours–Mauritania,TheGambia,orGuinea-Bissau–orevenofthe
contemporaryinternational ‘badguys’,Iraq,LibyaorLiberia.Skirmishesoverborder
delimitationbetweenSenegaleseandGuinea-Bissauforcesin1990fuelledsuchsuspicions
butalthoughtheMFDCenjoyedsomesympathyamongelementsoftheGuinea-Bissau
political elite, the Bissau government did not offer its support. Instead it took an
opportunisticapproachandinclinedtowardthemostpowerfulpartytothedispute,the
Senegalesestate,whileusingtheCasamancesituationasabargainingcounter.Guinea-
BissauandSenegaloftencollaborated in securitymattersandapparently therewere
‘extrajudicialarrests,betweenservices’;7anMFDCmemberreportedbeingarrestedwith
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anotheractivistin1986bytheBissauauthoritiesandexchangedforfourFLINGmilitants
basedinSenegal8,andinMarch1993thepoliticalheadoftheMFDC,FatherAugustin
DiamacouneSenghor,wasdeportedfromGuinea-BissautoDakar.BissauenjoyedSenegal’s
support,includingmaterialassistanceforitsarmy,diplomaticbackupforitsentryinto
thefranczone,andconcessionsovertheborderdisputeaftertheInternationalCourtof
JusticeatTheHaguein1989and1991camedownonthesideofSenegal.9Dakartrusted
BissauenoughtoacceptitsmediationinnegotiationswiththeMFDC,whichledtoa
short-livedceasefireagreementsignedintheGuineancityofCacheuinApril1992.
Itwasthatsameopportunismratherthananydeepcommitmenttotheseparatist
cause,thatpromptedGuineansatalllevelstosell(orlease)weaponstotheCasamance
separatists.ItwaspreciselythisarmstraffickingwithCasamanceseparatiststhatplunged
Guinea-Bissauintowarin1998.10UnderpressurefromSenegalandFrance,whichwere
unhappyattheincreasingstrengthoftheMFDC,PresidentVieiraplacedtheblamefor
thearmssuppliesonGeneralMané,thechiefofstaffofthearmedforces(althoughothers
closetothepresidencymayhavebeenalsoinvolved).Thisact,grantedthatitwasmade
indifficulteconomicandpoliticalcircumstances,hadseriousconsequences.InJune1998,
ManémountedanunsuccessfulassassinationattemptonVieira,afterwhichheheadeda
militaryrevolt,gatheringaroundhimadisparategroupthatincludedveteransofthewar
ofindependenceunhappywiththeirdeterioratingconditions,youthsinsearchofafuture,
andopponentsofVieirawithinthePAIGCandthelegalopposition.Paradoxicallyacall
forhelpfromVieiratoalliesinDakarandtheGuineancapital,Conakry,11strengthened
Mané, as experienced MFDC combatants as well as the Guinea-Bissau population
generallyralliedaroundhiminpatrioticenthusiasm,heightenedbyangeratthepillaging,
vandalism and racketeering of the foreign forces coming to Vieira’s aid.12 After the
centreofBissauwasoccupiedbyMané’sforcesinMay1999theSenegaleseembassywas
pillagedinaclearindicationoftheangerarousedbytheinvasion.Diplomaticoffices
ofSenegal’sstrategically,France,whichmaintained(and,toanextent,reinforced)its
militaryco-operationwithSenegalthroughouttheconflict,werealsoaffected.Bytheend
oftheSeventhofJuneWar,relationsbetweenSenegalandGuinea-Bissauseemedtohave
sufferedlong-termdamage.
f o r g I n g A n e W A l l I A n c e , 2 0 0 0 – 2 0 0 3
Fromlate2000–onlyafewmonthsaftertheendoftheSeventhofJuneWar–until
2006,theGuinea-BissauarmyoperateddirectlyagainstSalifSadio,aseniorfigureinthe
MFDCandaformerallyagainstVieira.Threemainattackstookplace,eachlastingseveral
weeksandcausingsignificantcasualties.Sadiowaseventuallyforcedtowithdrawtothe
Gambianborder.SuchextensiveinvolvementbytheGuineanarmyagainstanadversary
oftheSenegalesestateconstitutedstrikingevidenceofanewalliancebetweenDakar
andBissau.
Presidential alliance and military co-operation
When Wade made his presidential trip to Bissau in April 2000 the situation was
tense.Eversince theendof theSeventhof JuneWar therehadbeenahigh levelof
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insecurityontheborderbetweenthetwocountries;MFDCcombatantswereincreasing
theiroperationsandGuinea-Bissausoldierswereinvolvedinthetheftoflivestockin
Casamance.Severaltimesduring2000Casamancevillagersclosedtheborderinprotest;
such action threatened the Guinea-Bissau economy, dependent as it was on those
Senegalesepointsofpassage.Meetingsbetweenthetwocountrieswereincreasedand
co-ordinationmeasuresestablished,withtheSenegaleseprovidingthenecessaryradio
communicationsequipment. InAugust2000 thenewlyelectedpresidentofGuinea-
Bissau,Yala,visitedDakar,whereinagestureofgoodwill,Wadeimprovedtermsforthe
sharingofanyrevenuesthatmighteventuallyresultfrompetroleumexplorationinthe
commonmaritimezone.13
This good relationship might perhaps be explained by the somewhat similar
backgroundsofWadeandYala,bothofwhomwereoppositionfigureselectedafterlong
yearsofstruggle.Buttheirpersonalrelationshipwasunderpinnedbywell-understood
commoninterestsandasharedmistrustofManéandhisMFDCallies.Intruth,Mané
maintainedstrongtieswiththeCasamanceseparatistsandrumourscirculatedofajoint
offensivetocaptureZiguinchorbytheseparatistsandtheGuinea-Bissauarmy.
Mané had supported an opponent of Yala during the presidential elections and
althoughheagreedtorelinquishtheformalcommandofthearmedforcestoGeneral
VerissimoCorreiaSeabra,hecontinuedtowieldconsiderableinfluenceinBissau.Forhis
part,Yalawaskeentodevelophislinkswiththearmy,favouringrecruitmentofyoung
loyalistslargelyfromhisownethnicgroup,theBalantas,anditwaswhenhebeganto
insinuatehisfollowersintotheofficercorpsthathisrelationshipwithManécollapsed.
Thecontestbetweenthetwoendedon30November2000withthedeathofManéin
ashoot-outwiththearmy,andasubsequentpurgeofthoseclosetohim.Thisepisode
sealedwhatwasineffectatriplealliancebetweenDakar,Yalaandthemilitaryelite.
TheSenegaleseministerof the interior,GeneralMamadouNiang,whohadbeen
closelyinvolvedwiththeCasamancesituation,proceededtoincreasehiscontactswith
Bissau.DakardirectlysupportedGuinea-Bissau,whichatthetimewasembroiledina
seeminglynever-endingbudgetarycrisis,andSenegalwasoneoftheAfricancountries
fromwhich,inNovember2002,Yalawasabletocollectthemoneytopaygovernment
salaries.14DakaralsonurtureditstieswiththeGuinea-Bissaumilitarydirectly,forexample
byfinancingtherefurbishmentofmilitarybuildings,openingDakarmilitaryhospitalsto
Guinea-Bissauofficers,andprovidingmilitarysuppliesandmaterial–andalso,probably,
money.
TheCasamanceissuewasatthecoreofthisrelationship.Ironically,thetiesestablished
duringtheSeventhofJuneWarbetweentheGuinea-BissauarmyandtheMFDC,andthe
newrelationsbetweenDakarandBissau,allcombinedtodetermineamajorturninthe
historyoftheseparatistmovement:theemergenceofa‘moderate’MFDCguerrillagroup
ontheGuinea-Bissauborder.
Strange bedfellows on the Casamance front
Mané’sdeath,theeffectofwhichwasquicklyfeltintheborderareaswithSenegal,fed
earlierinternaltensionsintheMFDC‘southernfront’.Bissaubecamethefocalpointof
whatamountedtoatacitcoalitionbetweentheSenegaleseauthoritiesandanMFDC
factioninoppositiontoSalifSadio,thenheadofthesouthernfront.
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Sadio,whohadbeenclosetoMané,facedoppositionwithintheMFDC15andMané’s
deathofferedseparatistmilitantshostiletoSadiotheopportunitytotaketheinitiative.
They were supported by the new military chiefs in Bissau, who were close to Yala,
mistrustedSadioandwereundoubtedlysensitivetoSenegal’sbroaderconcerns.Inthe
militaryoffensives that followed,Guinea-Bissau troops co-operatedwith theMFDC
separatists,operatinginSenegaleseterritorywiththetacit(orperhapssecret)agreement
ofDakar.
InJanuary2001Sadio,inaletteraddressedtothechairmanoftheGuinea-Bissau
national assembly,denounced theassaultbyGuinea-Bissau troops.16Despiteofficial
denialsofmilitaryaction17controversyexploded inBissau.On17January2001 the
PAIGC–atthattimeinparliamentaryopposition–askedthegovernmenttokeepto
its roleofmediator in theCasamanceconflict. Inresponse toSenegaleseconcernsa
committeeofthenationalassemblyrequestedthearmynottointerfereinpoliticsandto
respectinstitutions,18tacitconfirmationthattheGuinea-Bissaumilitarywasactingina
quasi-independentmannerinthisaffair.Fightingcontinueduntilthesummerof2001,
withSadio’sMFDCopponentsconsolidatingtheirholdontheareaaroundacampsituated
nexttothevillageofKassolol.In2002,Guinea-BissauforcesputfurtherpressureonSadio
andhissupporters,arrestingthoseofthemlivinginBissauorexpellingthemtoSenegal,
andoccupyinganddestroyinganumberofrefugeevillages.
TheKassololfactionoftheMFDCwasambiguousfromthestart.Allitsmemberswere
hostiletoSadioandsomewouldhavelikedtocontinuethearmedstrugglewithouthim,
butothers,tiredofendlesswar,wantedanegotiatedsettlement.Overtime,someofits
leaderswentsofarastoestablishcontactwithDakarandreceivemoneyfromthatsource.
Inexchangefortheirsupport,theGuinea-BissauarmyobligedtheKassololfaction
toabstainfromattacksinCasamance.AsSadio’spositionwasprogressivelyweakening,
thesouthernfrontceasedtobeahotspotintheCasamanceconflict.19Thus,soonafter
itsdefeatintheSeventhofJuneWar,Senegalhadobtainedamajorstrategicsuccessin
Guinea-Bissauactingwithrelativerestraintandprudenceandatthelowestpossiblecost
byenteringintoanalliancewiththeGuinea-Bissaupresidencyandarmyandturningthem
againsttheSadiofaction.
A r e S I l I e n t A l l I A n c e : 2 0 0 3 – 2 0 0 9
ItwasindicativeofacontinuedunderstandingbetweenDakarandBissauthatthispeculiar
alliancebetweentheSenegalesegovernment,thefightersofKassololandtheGuinea-
Bissauauthoritiesheldtogetherreasonablywell.Itdidsointhefaceofseverepolitical
turbulencethataffectedGuinea-Bissaubetween2003and2009,spanningtheperiodfrom
thefallofYalatothedeathofVieira,whohadbythenreturnedtothepresidency.
The fall of Yala: renewed alliance
Yala’spoormanagement,particularlyasitaffectedgovernmentsalaries,washisdownfall
andarmed forceschiefof staff,Seabra,assumedpower inabloodlesscoupd’état in
September2003.TheSenegalesepressreportedthiseventwithadegreeofconcern:the
dailynewspaperWal Fadjriaffirmedthat‘thenewmastersofBissau[favour]theMFDC’.20
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Yala’sfallfrompowerdidnot,however,createtensionbetweenGuinea-BissauandSenegal;
onthecontrary,itsawastrengtheningoftheirties.Thecoupistswantedtoavoidanother
SenegalesearmedinterventionandonthedayofthecouptheycalledWadetoassure
himthattheiractionwasnotcountertotheinterestsofSenegal.21Wade,whoatfirstwas
notconvinced,promptlysetoffforBissautogetherwithPresidentOlusegunObasanjoof
NigeriaandGhanaianPresidentJohnKufuor(thelatteralsochairmanoftheEconomic
CommunityofWestAfricanStates [ECOWAS]) tomeetwith thenew ruling junta.
Obasanjo’sfirmstand,reinforcedbyathreatofinterventionfromECOWAS,helpedWade
obtaintheguaranteeshesought.ThereaftertheemissariesshuttledbetweenBissauand
Dakar,whichthenkeptabenevolenteyeonthe‘transition’andindeedpubliclydefended
theputschistsontheregionalandinternationalscenes.
TheeffectsofthisrenewedalliancewerefeltontheCasamancefront.InFebruary2004
SeabralaunchedanewoffensiveagainstSadio’sseparatists,thistimefurthertotheeast
oftheborderzoneofFouladou,whereSadiohadretreated.Officially,theoperationwas
aimedatprotectingGuineancitizensfromthedepredationsoftheseparatists,butSadio
denounceditasajointassaultbytheGuinea-BissauarmyandtheKassololfaction.22
On19February,Seabraannouncedtheendoftheoperationandthedismantlingofthe
separatists’bases.Heacknowledgedthat fourGuinea-Bissausoldiershadbeenkilled
and14injured.23By25February,however,amilitarysourcenotedthat fightinghad
recommencedandannouncedthecaptureofanotherbase,thedeathsoffiveseparatists
andthecaptureofseveralprisoners.24
ThevictoryofthePAIGCledbyCarlosGomesJúniorinanelectioninMarch2004
andJúnior’ssubsequentappointmentasprimeminister,markedabreakinGuinea-Bissau’s
driveagainstSadio.ForthemostpartthePAIGChadsupportedthejuntaandtheMFDC
againstSenegalduringtheSeventhofJuneWar,andhadtakentheirsideagainstYala’s
supportfortheKassololfaction.ThedeathofSeabraatthehandsofmutinoussoldiers
on6October2004,however,workedtoSenegal’sadvantage.Hisreplacementaschief
ofstaff,GeneralBatistaTagmeNaWai,wasnotunknowntoDakar:hehadheadedthe
2001offensiveagainstSadioandenjoyedagoodrelationshipwithSenegal.Indeedcertain
elementsinthemilitaryfeltthatitwashispopularitywithinthearmy,dueinpartto
Senegal’sassistance,thatledtohisappointment.25Dakarkeptacloseeyeonthesituation
andon8October2004Senegaleseministerofstate,LandingSavané,(whohailedfrom
Bignona inCasamance)accompanied theexecutive secretaryofECOWASonavisit
toBissau.26ByFebruary2005NaWaiwasinDakarforthe‘strengtheningofmilitary
co-operationbetweenSenegalandGuinea-Bissau’andwasreceivedbyWadeinperson.27
Amonthlater,SenegaldispatchedvehiclesandmilitaryequipmenttotheGuinea-Bissau
army.Onthatoccasion,NaWaistressedthathewould‘doeverythingtorestoreorderand
tranquillityattheborderbetween[our]twocountries’.28
The clean-up revived
Afterthecoupsof2003and2004civilauthoritywasrestoredtoBissau.Adegreeof
internationalconsensuswasreachedtonormalisethesituation,whichinturnenabled
thetwoformerpresidents,YalaandVieira,toreturntothepoliticalarenaintherun-upto
anewpresidentialelection.VieirareliedforsupportonGuinea-Conakry,inparticularon
itspresident,LansanaConté,whowasapersonalfriend.ln2005Contéwelcomedsenior
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Guinea-BissaumilitaryfigurestoConakry,tomeetVieiraandhisadvisers.Bytheendof
thediscussionsanagreementhadbeenreached,albeitsomewhatopaque;29theGuinea-
BissaumilitaryguaranteedVieira’ssafety,anditwasundertheirprotectionandoverthe
protestsofciviltransitionalauthoritiesthatamilitaryhelicopterfromGuinea-Conakry
tookhimtoBissauinApril2005.
Dakarseemedtoremainalooffromthismanoeuvring,butunderstooditsportent:
althoughtheSenegaleseauthoritiescontinuedtosupportYalaintheelection(including
financially)theyrealisedthattheycouldhaveonlylimitedsuccess,bearinginmindYala’s
lossoflegitimacyintheeyesofthearmy,aiddonorsandindeedmostoftheGuineans.30
Vieirabecameapossiblealternativeprotégéwhileathirdplausiblecandidate,MalamBacai
Sanhá,whowassupportedbythePAIGC,stillboreastigmaintheeyesofDakarduetohis
pastalliancewithMané.TieswereestablishedbetweenWadeandVieira,withCasamance
entrepreneurPierreAtépaGoudiabyplayingacentralroleinforgingthisnewalliance.
AnimportantpersonalityintheinformaldiplomaticgameinWestAfrica,Goudiabywas
anadvisertoWadeandinvolvedinthemanagementoftheCasamancesituation.Hewas
alsoacloserelativeofVieira.AlltheevidenceindicatesthatVieira’scampaignbenefited
frommaterialsupportfromSenegal,andalsothatWadeandGoudiabyhelpedhimobtain
assistancefromotherAfricanheadsofstate.31
LinkedtobothYalaandVieiraashewas,Wadeplayedadecisiveroleinthe2005
presidentialelections.WhenYalarefusedtoacceptthirdplaceinthefirstroundofthe
electionWadesenthisplanetocollecthimandpersuadedhimtoaccepttheresultsand
supportVieira,thuscontributingtothelatter’svictory.32SoonaftertheelectionVieira
pushed his advantage and asked Dakar to keep Yala away from Bissau. Wade then
organisedYala’sexiletoMorocco,acountryveryfriendlytoSenegal.Onhispart,Vieira
saidthathewasreadytodoeverythinginhispowertosettletheCasamanceconflict,and
theSenegalesepresshailedhimas‘anassetforpeaceinCasamance’.33Therelationship
betweenWadeandVieiraremainedcloseuntilWade’sdeath,andVieirawasoneofeight
headsofstatewhoattendedtheceremonyfortheUNESCO’sFélixHouphouët-Boigny
PeacePrizeawardedtotheSenegalesepresidentinMay2006.34
Itfollowedthatafterthe2005electionsSenegalhadtwopointsofleverageinBissau:
thechiefofstaffandthepresident.UnderVieira,SenegalcontinuedtosupporttheGuinea-
Bissausecurityforcesbywayofshipmentsofrice,militaryequipmentandvehicles.Hence
astheSenegalesepresidentialelectionsof2007drewnear,Dakarwasinapositionto
requestarenewedeffortfromtheGuinea-Bissauarmy.InJanuary2006Guinea-Bissau
establishedacommitteetoexamineandanalysetheCasamancecrisis.HeadedbyNaWai,
itcomprisedabout10officers,aswellastheministerofInternalAdministration,Ernesto
Carvalho(whowasclosetoYala)andMinisterofDefenceHelderProença.Thiscommittee
washeldresponsiblefor‘aprogrammeofmediationbetweentheSenegalesegovernment
andtheMFDC’.35Inreality,itwasamilitaryoffensivethatwasintheworks,anditbegan
on14March2006.Lieutenant-ColonelAntónioInjai,NaWai’snephew,tookthereinsof
theso-called‘OperationClean-up’,stillinpartnershipwithKassololagainstSadio.Just
asinpreviousoffensives,Casamancerefugees–someofthemwithtiestotheseparatist
fighters–whohadsetupcampclosetoSadio’sbaseswerechasedbacktoSenegaland
theirhousesburned.By23Marchmorethan2 000refugeeshadfledGuinea-Bissau.36
Mineslaidbytheseparatiststooktheirtoll;militarysourcesadmittedtothedeathof60
Guinea-Bissausoldiers.37
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Thisnewoffensivewascriticisedamongcivilsocietyaswellasbytheparliamentary
oppositioninBissau.NaWaiaccusedsomedeputiesoftieswiththeMFDC;theministry
ofInternalAdministrationrequestedliftingtheimmunityofonedeputy;andaformer
ministerwasdetainedforaweek.38WithinthiscontextVieiracontinuedtourgeonthe
army;39itbarelyneededencouragement,buthissupportclearlyrevealedVieira’ssympathy
fortheSenegalesecauseandhispowerlessnesswhenfacedwithanarmythathadadirect
relationshipwithSenegalandoverwhich,inreality,hecouldexerciselittleifanyauthority.
On13April2006,theGuinea-BissauchiefofstaffannouncedthefallofSadio’slast
remainingcampatBarracaMandioca,althoughSadiohimselfescapedcapture,crossing
Casamance tosetupcampnext to theGambianborder.Confiscatedequipmentand
documentsweresenttotheSenegaleseauthorities.ColonelLassanaMassaly,thedeputy
commanderofoperations,showedhiszealbyclaiming‘therighttopursueSalifSadiointo
Senegaleseterritory…totheborderwithTheGambia’.40
Between2000and2006,therefore,despitepoliticalupheavalsandcriticismsfrom
civilsocietyandthepoliticalclassesinBissau,theGuinea-Bissauarmywasinvolved
inseveralattacksagainstSadio,incurringsignificantlosses.Italsoforcedtheremnants
oftheKassololseparatistsintoaninformalceasefirewiththeSenegalesearmy.Bissau
supportedmeetingsbetweenKassololandmediatorscarefullyselectedbySenegal(such
astheso-called‘WiseMenofCasamance’arbitrationgroup).41BissauhadrenderedDakar
considerableservices.Guinea-Bissau’spoliticalstrugglesin2009,however,dealtanew
handandDakarhadonlylimitedsuccessintryingtore-establishitslinkswithBissau.
t h e A f t e r m A t h o f m A r c h 2 0 0 9 : A b r o K e n r e l A t I o n S h I p
TheviolentdeathsinMarch2009ofDakar’stwoalliesinBissau,PresidentVieiraand
chiefofstaffNaWai,transformedtherelationshipbetweenthetwocountries.Suddenly
deprivedofitsconnections,Senegalbecameworriedaboutthegrowingpowerofmen
withwhomithadhardlyanyties.Itwasnotbychancethatthisphasecoincidedwitha
progressiverenewaloftensionontheCasamancefront.
The events of March and June 2009
On1March2009,NaWaiwaskilledinabombattackandonthesamedayVieirawas
assassinatedbythemilitary,apparentlybecausehewassuspectedofinvolvementinNa
Wai’sdeath.Thetwomurdersarestillthesubjectofspeculation.42Thesituationtook
anotherturninJunewhentwopeopleclosetoVieira–theformerMinisterofDefence
ProençaandBaciroDabo,MinisterofInternalAdministrationandacandidateinthe
presidentialelections–werekilledbymeninuniform,andseveralotherswhohadbeen
closetoVieirawerearrested.ThearmedforcesandthegovernmentofGomesJúnior
accusedDaboandProençaofpreparingforacoupd’état in leaguewithotherVieira
partisans.TheyhintedattheinvolvementofSenegaleseauthorities,notingthatsome
VieiraassociateshadmetinDakarshortlybeforetheevents.Thatepisode,too,remains
shroudedinmysteryalthoughmanyinGuinea-Bissau’soppositionhaveopenlydenounced
amanipulationbyGomesJúnior.
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WhatiscertainisthattheseepisodesshooktherelationshipbetweenDakarandBissau.
ThedeathsofNaWai,VieiraandProença(whohadplayedacentralroleinforgingthe
relationshipbetweenDakarandtheGuinea-Bissauarmy),togetherwiththepoliticalrise
ofGomesJúnior,representedasevereblowtoSenegaleseinfluence.Significantly,Wade
decidednottoattendVieira’sfuneral,citingsecurityreasons.43TheSenegaleseleadership,
afterhavingreapedsomebenefitsfromit,despairedoftheautonomyexercisedbythe
Guinea-Bissauarmy,goingsofarastocallforthedeploymentofanECOWAS‘supervisory
force’,asuggestionturneddownbyGomesJúniorandthearmy.44
Gomes Júnior and Zamora Induta: suspicion and separatist renewal
ThedeathofVieiraledtothepoliticalriseofGomesJúnior,aprosperousbusinessman
withclosetiestotheformercolonialpowerPortugal.ZamoraInduta,theinterimchief
of staffbeforebeingconfirmed inOctober2009,wasacloseassociateandayoung,
intellectualofficerwhoalsoenjoyedverycloselinkswithPortugal.Hehadattracted
Dakar’sattentionasspokesmanfortheManéjunta.
Withconcern,SenegalnotedthatthedeathsofNaWaiandVieiracoincidedwitha
reactivationofthesouthernfrontoftheMFDC.WhileDakarkeptrefusingtonegotiate
substantiallywiththemilitaryfactionsoftheMFDCandstucktoastrategyofattrition,
somemoderateseparatistsagaintriedtheirluckonmilitaryterrain,thistimewithoutNa
Waitostopthem.Accordingtoonesource,someoftheGuinea-Bissaumilitaryresumed
salesofweaponrytotheseparatists.45SomeKassololfightersbroketheceasefireand
launchedanunsuccessfulattacktowardsZiguinchorinthesummerof2009.46InJanuary
andFebruary2010again,separatistsoperatedontheoutskirtsofZiguinchor.ByJune
ofthatyearthesplitwithinKassololseemedfinal:undertheleadershipofOusmane
NiantangDiatta anewbasewas established in theborder zone to the south-eastof
Ziguinchor,andwentontheoffensive.MeanwhileCésarBadiate,theKassololfaction
leader,whocontrolledtheborderstriptothesouthandsouth-westofZiguinchor,stuck
totheceasefire.
WhilethepowerbrokersinBissauinsistedthattheywerenotsupportingtheMFDC
butputtinganendtooffensives thathadprovedcostly inhumanlives,Senegalsaw
theneutralityobservedbytheGuinea-Bissauarmy,nowheadedbyInduta, inapoor
light,becauseDakarwassuddenlydeprivedofacentraltoolinitsmanagementofthe
Casamanceconflict.
Itssuspicionswerereciprocated,becausetheGuinea-Bissauauthoritiesseemedto
believethatDakarmayhavefavouredtheallegedattemptedcoupd’étatofJune2009.
TherelationshipbetweenDakarandBissaubecameincreasinglycomplex.InMarch2009,
IndutahadmetwithGambianpresidentYahyaJammeh–whosedifficultrelationshipwith
DakarandtieswithSadiowerewellknown–tosignamilitaryco-operationagreement.47
Followingaborderdisagreement in theVarelazone inOctober2009,Guinea-Bissau
authoritiesreactedbydeployingtroops,48andanillegalincursionofSenegalesefishermen
intoGuinea-BissauwatersresultedinswiftreactionbyBissau.Theseincidentsrevealed
atouchierandmoreindependentGuinea-Bissauthanbefore.Facedwiththissituation,
DakarsoughtnewavenuestoBissauthroughMalamBacaiSanhá.
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Sanhá: a new charter
AttheoutsetSanhá–aninfluentialfigurewithinthePAIGCandasupporterofGeneral
ManéagainstVieiraduringtheSeventhofJuneWar,andMané’scandidateduringthe
2000election–seemedlikeanunlikelyallyforDakar.Indeeditwasagainsthimthat
WadehadencouragedthealliancebetweenYalaandVieiraduringthe2005elections.
Learningfromhisdefeatsin2000and2005,however,Sanháhadtriedtodrawcloser
toSenegal.InDecember2005,duringoneoftheimpasseslinkedtoVieira’smanoeuvres,
hewenttoDakartorequesttheinvolvementofWade,whohehadthenreferredtoas
his‘bigbrother’.Onthatoccasion,heaskedtheMFDCtolaydowntheirarms.49With
VieiradeadSenegalsawSanháasafreshprotégé,undoubtedlyencouragedinitsthinking
byProença,BotchéCandéandRobertoCacheu,Vieira’sallieswithinthePAIGCwho,
deprivedoftheirleader,hadbecomeclosetoSanhá.
ThecloserelationshipbetweenWadeandSanhábecamewellknown;somuchsothat
arumourspreadthatSanhá,althoughhewasnotknownforhisfaith,begantoadopt
Wade’sownMuslimSufiaffiliation.Asthepresidentialelectionsof2009drewnearSanhá
paidavisittoSenegal,duringwhichhedeclaredtotheSenegalesemediathatWadewas
his‘father’and‘oneofthemostimportantfiguresinthecontemporaryhistoryofAfrica’.
Hethenexplained:‘ThisiswhyIcameinpersontoinformhimofmycandidacy…Iam
relyingonhissupport.AndiftomorrowIamelectedpresidentoftheRepublic,wewill
worktogether.’50
SenegaleseadvisersweredispatchedtoassistSanháanditseemsthatSenegalhelped
financepartofhispowerfulelectoralcampaign.51Hisvictoryinthesecondroundof
theelectionsof26July2009waswellreceivedinDakar.WadetravelledtoBissaufor
theswearing-inofhisnewallyon8September2009,ataceremonyorganisedbya
Senegalese communications agency.52 The Senegalese Press Agency also showed its
supportbypraising thenewpresident.53ByAugust2009, Senegalhaddonated100
tonnesofsugar,twocarsandtwobusestotheGuinea-Bissaupresidency.Iran,which
atthetimewasapreferreddiplomaticpartnerofSenegalandwhichWadehadputin
contactwithSanhá,donated20carsthatthepresidencygaveto‘formerfightersinthe
struggleforindependence’.54UntilhisdeathinJanuary2012Sanhá,whosufferedfrom
chronicdiabetes,washospitalisedregularlyinDakar,sometimesattheexpenseofthe
Senegalesestate.55LikeVieira,Sanháwasgraciousinmeetinghisobligationsasanallyof
theSenegalesepresident;forexampletravellingtodiplomaticeventshostedbyWade.56
Towards a new balance?
After his election Sanhá contributed to an improved relationship between Dakar
and Bissau. After negotiations following border tensions in October 2009, Guinea-
Bissautroopswithdrew.SanháfearedexcessivedependenceonSenegal,however,and
maintainedhisdistance.57Mostimportantlythepresidencyplayedafairlylimitedrolein
Guinea-BissauandasprimeministerGomesJúnior,whowaswellregardedbydonorsand
whocontrolledthePAIGCandtheassembly,hadgreaterinfluencethanSanhá.Hencethe
revisionoftheco-operationagreementof1975betweenthetwocountries,proposedin
February2010bySenegal,didnotcomeabout.58Diatta’sseparatistfighterscontinuedtheir
activitiesandSenegalcouldnolongerdependontheGuinea-Bissauarmytoexertpressure.
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Thesituationevolvedsomewhatwithapoliticalshake-upinBissauinApril2010
thatbroughtaboutthefallofInduta.GeneralAntónioInjai,whohadcommandedthe
lastassaultagainstSadio,wasappointedchiefofstaff,buthedidnothelpDakarmuch.
WeakenedbythefallofInduta,GomesJúniortookupthecudgelsagainandestablished
acloserelationshipwithInjai.59Thisnewphasewasinitiallymarkedbyserioustension
between the Sanhá and Gomes Júnior camps with charges and strenuous counter-
accusations,buteventuallyledtoamodusvivendibetweenthetwopartiesunderstrong
pressurefromaiddonors.Senegalseemedtohaveresigneditselftoalossofinfluenceand
triedtogetclosertoGomesJúniorbyofferingdiplomaticsupport.InFebruary2011,in
adiplomaticcampaigntoremobilisedonors,GomesJúniormadehisfirstofficialtripto
Dakar,meetingWadeandobtaininghissupport.60
DakaralsotriedtoreconnectwiththeGuinea-Bissauarmy.AttheendofJune2011
thechiefsofstaffofthetwocountriessignedanagreementinBissau,followingwhich
Guinea-Bissaupledgedto‘arrestalltherebelswhohadtakenrefugeonitsterritory’.61
Inturn,theSenegalesearmyundertooktotrainGuinea-Bissausoldiersandtocontribute
totheupgradingofthenavalbarracksinBissau.InJuly2011Senegaleseprimeminister
SouleymaneNdénéNdiayevisitedBissau. InSeptemberof that yearSenegalese and
Guinea-BissaucommandersoftheborderzonemetinthecityofKolda,intheeastof
Casamance.Themeetingincludedaconcertandafootballmatchbetweenthemilitary
corpsof the twocountries to ‘strengthen thebrotherlyandcordial relationship that
unitestheSenegaleseandGuinea-Bissauarmies’andendedwithanannouncementof
theestablishmentofjointpatrols,whichuntilthenhadbeenadeadissue.62Although
suchjointoperationswerefarfrommarkingaGuinea-Bissauoffensiveagainstcontinued
operationsbytheDiattafighters,inthisnewphaseDakarcouldatleastcountonacertain
levelofco-operation,althoughnothingmorecouldbeachievedintermsofestablishing
Guinea-BissauasanallyandusingitsarmytoassistinthecampaignagainsttheMFDC.
A S p e c t S o f t h e A l l I A n c e A n d I t S d e t e r I o r A t I o n
Thedeeptiesbetweenthetwocountries,inparticulartheireconomiclinkages,acted
asaconstraintonBissau’spoliticaloptions.Takingstockofthecriticalthoughdiscreet
roleSenegalhasplayedinGuinea-Bissau’spoliticallifesince2000andidentifyingits
structuraldimensionsdoesnotmeanthatDakardecidesinBissau.Theinternaldynamics
ofGuinea-Bissauheldtotheirownlogicandfrom2009werefedbysubstantialchanges
inGuinea-Bissau’sinternationalaffairs.ThegrowinginfluenceofAngolahasbeenamajor
factor.Attheendofthe2000stheWaderegimewashavingtroublefindingalliesofweight
inBissauwhileLuandaestablishedacloserelationshipwithGomesJúnior,weakeningthe
tiesthatDakarhadforgedwiththeGuinea-Bissaustateapparatusanditsarmy.
Senegal as an economic pole
SomecommentatorshaddepictedtheSeventhofJuneWarasanactionagainstthejoint
forcesofneo-liberalglobalisationandla francophonie,drivenbySenegalandtheWest
AfricanEconomicandMonetaryUnion(WAEMU).63Certainly, theviolenteventsof
1998–1999thatfollowedGuinea-Bissau’spainfuleconomicliberalisationinthe1980s
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mightbesubjecttosuchaninterpretation:thepopulationwelcomedMané’sseizureof
powernotleastbecausethoseyearshadbeensodifficult.Farfromreversingthegrowing
inscriptionofGuinea-BissauinWestAfrica’sregionaleconomy,thedecadefollowing2000
confirmedthattrend.ThedynamiceconomyofSenegalhasbeenamajorfactorinthis
process.
Guinea-Bissau’sattractiontoitsFrancophoneneighbourswasnotnew:eversince
thecolonialeratheSenegaleseeconomyhasbeenadriverofcommercialandhuman
circulations in the region.AlthoughPortugal continued tobean importantpartner,
Guinea-Bissau’s linkswithWestAfricagrewincreasinglystrong.Portugalusedtobe
Guinea-Bissau’smainsupplier,providing56.6%ofthecountry’s importsin1990and
40.5% in1994.By2005,however, itwasonly the third-largest supplier, accounting
for 12.7% of imports, far behind Senegal (34.6%) and Italy (20.4%).64 Senegalese
businessmen,aswellascommercialinterestsfromotherbusinesscommunitiesconnected
withSenegal–Mauritania,LebanonorGuinea-Conakry–havebeensettlinginBissau.
Thecountry’sentryintoWAEMUsimilarlycontributedtothereworkingofitsbanking
profile:aftertheSeventhofJuneWartherewasnoPortuguesebankinBissauandby2009
threeofitsfourcommercialbanks(Ecobank,BanqueRégionaledeSolidaritéandBanco
daUnião)wereWestAfrican.65
Dakar’sseaportandinternationalairport,itsrelativelylargebusinessenterprisesand
markets,aswellasitsuniversitiesandtrainingcentres,haveallgonetomakeSenegal
accessible,influentialandattractive.SomebusinessesinGuinea-Bissauarebranchesof
companiesbasedinDakar,themostimportantbeingtelephoneoperatorOrange,abranch
oftheSenegal-basedSonatel.DakarprovidesmanyofthetechniciansworkinginBissau
intelecommunications,informationtechnologyandthemanagementofpetroleumor
portfacilities.66StudentsfromGuinea-BissaugotoDakar(evenCasamance,wheretwo
universitieswereestablishedinthesecondhalfofthepastdecade).67
Thistrendwasallthestrongerduringthesecondhalfofthe1990sandmostofthe
2000s,whenSenegalexperiencedaperiodofexceptionalgrowthwhileGuinea-Bissau
movedfromcrisistocrisis.68From1995to2008Guinea-Bissau’sgrossdomesticproduct
wasalmoststagnant,withanaverageannualgrowthof0.03%,whereastheSenegalese
economygrewby4.9%onayearlyaverage.ThedevastationoftheSeventhofJuneWar
andthepillagingofBissauexacerbatedthesituationinGuinea-Bissau,asBissau’sbusiness
elites lostmuchcapital,whichbenefitedbusinessmen fromneighbouringcountries,
beginningwithSenegal.ThedegradationofBissau’sportanditschannelreinforcedthe
roleoftheportsofDakarandZiguinchorinhandlingBissau’sexternaltrade,andtraffic
wasfurtherfacilitatedwhentheJoãoLandimbridgeprojectontheroadfromZiguinchor
toBissauwascompletedin2004.Tellingly,theGuineanbordertownofSãoDomingos
wasnotableforitsremarkablegrowthinthe2000s.69Furthermore,fortheyoungcitizens
ofGuinea-Bissau,criticaloftheirownnationalheritage,70Senegalwasinmanywaysa
modelcountry.Thephrase‘Dakar,littleParis!’wasoftenheardinBissauandSenegalese
immigrantsbecamerolemodelsformanyyoungstersinGuinea-Bissauhopingtoemigrate.
All this translates into languagechoices.Non-governmentalorganisations,banks
andbusinessesbasedinBissauhaveincreasinglydemandedthattheiremployeesmaster
French.ThroughoutGuinea-BissausocietytheattractionofFrenchhasgainedstrength:
theAllianceFrançaiseofZiguinchorisfullofGuineanslearningFrenchandmanyof
thehigh-levelmilitaryandcivilianofficialswhodidnotalreadyspeakFrench,hasten
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toobtainthebasicssothattheycanparticipateinWestAfricandiplomaticlife.71Wolof,
theSenegaleselinguafranca,hasalsoacquiredapresenceinBissau–todayitispossible
tofindyouthswhohavelearntthelanguagewithouthavinglefttheircountry,through
contactswithSenegalesebusinessmen,shopowners,carriersortradersinBissau.Ithas
beentheattractionofSenegalandWestAfrica,morethanofFrance,thathasledtothe
riseoftheFrenchlanguageinGuinea-Bissau.
This long-term trendhas certainly annoyedLisbon.The continuationofFrench
militarysupporttotheSenegalesearmyduringtheSeventhofJuneWar,wasoftenseen
byPortugueseobserversasevidenceofadesirebyFrancetoextenditszoneofinfluence
usingSenegalasalink,althoughFrenchdiplomatshavemaintainedthatFrancedidnot
wishtobecomeatoddswithanimportantEuropeanpartnersuchasPortugaljustto
protectthefewinterestsithadinGuinea-Bissau.72Indeed,althoughrecognisingthat
FranceremainedclosetoSenegal,Portuguesediplomatsnowseemtothinkthatithas
beenDakarratherthanParisthathashadambitionsinGuinea-Bissau.Senegal’spolicy
agendahasnotbeenembodiedinthesamefiguresasthatofPortugal,whichhasindicated
sympathyforGomesJúnior,amanconnectedtoPortuguesebusinessinterestsandone
who,fromthePortuguesestandpoint,broughthopeofstabilityanddevelopment.
The early 2000s: favourable years for the Senegalese state
AlthoughSenegalhasbecomeaneconomicandculturalcentreofincreasingimportance
toGuinea-Bissau,itsspecificinfluenceintheearlypartofthepastdecadeowedmuch
tothepoliticsofpersonalpatronageandprotectionthattheWaderegimeexercisedover
criticalelementsoftheGuineanstate.Theeffectivenessofthesepolicieswasreinforced
bythenewprosperityoftheSenegalesestate,whichgrewinstrengthintheearly2000s.
Withinternationalsupport(promptedbythetransitiontodemocracyin2000)alliedto
economicgrowth,greaterfiscalcloutandreformscarriedoutbyhispredecessor,Wade
enjoyedsignificantandgrowingstateresources.73 In2005theGuinea-Bissaubudget
amountedtoXOF48.3billion,ofwhich20.3billioncamefromforeignaid,whereasthe
SenegalesebudgetwasXOF955.8billion,only 75.6billionofitinexternaldonations.74
WhileGuinea-Bissauwasmiredininstabilityandbadgovernancethatdiscouraged
externalsupport,Senegalpossessedsufficientresourcestoexerciseconsiderablepolitical
influence.Testimonytothiswasitspolicyofmilitaryco-operationforthebenefitofthe
Guinea-Bissauarmy,whichatthetimewasindisarray.Dakar’sleverageinBissauincreased
furtherwiththedifficultrelationshipbetweenGuinea-Bissauauthoritiesandaiddonors
duringYala’sincumbencyaswellasinthesecondVieirapresidency,whichwasmarkedby
severegovernmentalinstability.Senegalwasabletoassumethepositionof‘bigbrother’to
Guinea-Bissau,defendingitintheinternationalarenaandpleadingwithdonorstosupport
thecountry.Moreprosaically,Wadeseveraltimesmadeavailablehispersonalaircraftto
enablepresidentsYalaandVieiratoattendinternationalmeetings.
End of the 2000s: the turn to Angola
AlthoughSenegalbenefited fromleverage inBissau in the2000s, itwasparticularly
successful because Guinea-Bissau was diplomatically isolated and the Senegalese
government’sresourceswerestrongenoughforittoexercisesuchinfluence.Thesituation
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changedprogressivelyduringthesecondhalfofthe2000s:Guinea-Bissau,whichhadbeen
marginalisedforsometime,appearedontheinternationalsceneattheendofaseriesof
crisesandaparadigmshift.AtthesametimeSenegalwasfacingnewdifficulties.Dakar’s
influenceinBissauwasreduced.AfteranewpoliticalandmilitaryupheavalinBissauin
April2010,Angola,whichinvolveditselfinGuinea-Bissaufrom2007,tookoverasthe
country’smaindiplomaticpartner.
Guinea-Bissauhadbeenaninternational issue inthe late1990sbut itwas inthe
secondhalfofthe2000s,afteradegreeofstabilityhadreturnedtocrisis-riddenLiberia,
Côted’IvoireandSierraLeone,thatitbecameacauseforconcern.
TheslowemergenceamongWestAfricanpoliticalelitesofagrowingsensethatregional
politicalinstabilityshouldbecontaineddidmuchtobringGuinea-Bissautotheforefront.
Senegalplayeditspartinthisprocess,involvingitselfintheGuinea-Bissauissuewithinthe
ECOWASdiplomaticsphere.Dakarderivedsomesupplementaryleveragebecauseitcould
speakwiththesupportofECOWASandinparticularofNigerianPresidentObasanjo,with
whomWadehadbuiltagoodrelationship.Nigerianoilincomethusregularlycontributed
to supportingECOWASactions inGuinea-Bissau,which strongly reflectedSenegal’s
concerns.ButthearrivalonthestageofnewplayersdidsomethingtodiminishDakar’s
influence.
Thisnewinterest inBissauacceleratedduringthesecondhalfofthedecade.The
explosionofclandestineseabornemigrationfromWestAfricancoastsarousedtheinterest
oftheEUandinparticularofSpain,anewplayerinBissau.Duringthesameperiodthe
traffickingofcocaineandofGuinea-Bissauchildrenraisedequallystronginternational
attention.Al-Qaedaalsomadeanappearance:itwasinBissauthatMauritanianjihadists
werearrestedinJanuary2008afterhavingassassinatedFrenchtouristsinMauritania.All
thesedevelopmentswereinterpretedbyinternationalinstitutionsanddevelopedcountries
assymptomaticofafailedstate:Guinea-Bissauwasseenasbecomingasourceofmajor
risks(throughdrugtrafficking,clandestineimmigrationandinternationalterrorism)for
thewholeworld.AccordinglyinDecember2007itwasregisteredintheprogrammeof
theUNPeacebuildingCommission,andtheUNreinforceditspresence.In2009itturned
theUNPeacebuildingSupportOfficeinGuinea-Bissau,establishedin1999,intoafully
representativeoffice.InFebruary2008theEUalsobecameinvolvedthroughasupport
programmeforreformofGuinea-Bissau’ssecuritysector.
Thedevelopmentofaninternationalparadigmofstrengtheningratherthanmerely
‘adjusting’Africanstateshasbeenreinforcedbyageneralstrategicreclassificationof
Africaintheeconomicanddiplomaticarena.Guinea-Bissau’srelativelyunder-exploited
natural resources (bauxite, phosphates, petroleum, fisheries and forestry) aroused
increasinginterest.AselsewhereinAfrica,ChinaaddedtoitspresenceinGuinea-Bissau;
similarlyinvolved,withvaryingagendas,wereSouthAfrica,BrazilandVenezuela.Plans
forestablishingorreopeningembassiesinBissauwerefurtherevidenceoftheongoing
strategicreclassification.
Certainly,Guinea-Bissau isnotamajorconcern for the internationalcommunity,
butbytheendofthe2000sithadhadattractedsufficientinterestfortheauthorities
todiversifytheirdiplomaticportfolioandalsostrengthenthestate, inthesensethat
salariescouldbepaid,internaldebtreimbursed,externaldebtrenegotiatedandthelike.
BissauthereforedependedlessonDakarthanbefore.Guinea-Bissau’sbudgetincreased
significantlyoververyfewyears,fromXOF48billionin2005tomorethanXOF120
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billion in2009.75Certainly, international involvement inBissaudid takeSenegalese
concernsoverCasamanceinconsideration,andtheproliferationoftrafficinweapons
destinedfortheMFDCwasseenbytheinternationalcommunityasasymptomofthe
weaknessoftheGuinea-Bissaustate–aweaknessthatitbecameinvolvedincorrecting.
Senegal’squasi-monopolyoverBissauhad,however,beenbrokenpreciselyatthetime
thatSenegalwasexperiencingarelativeweakening.Wade’sdiplomacywasbecomingever
moreconfusedandhiscontroversialcandidacyforathirdpresidentialtermweakened
Senegal’sinternationalstanding,whilebudgetgrowthwasdropping.Almostinevitablythe
balanceofpowerwaslessfavourabletoSenegalin2012thanithadbeen10yearsearlier.
ItwastheinvolvementofAngola,however,thatwasthemostsignificantfactor.Calling
onoldideologicalcamaraderieaswellasdiplomaticambitionsandeconomicandfinancial
plans,76Angolahadbytheendofthe2000squicklybecomeamajorplayerontheGuinea-
Bissauscene.Beyondtakingamedium-termviewoftheminingsector,Luandaprovided
Guinea-Bissauwithsignificantbudgetaryaid,aswellascreditlinesfortheprivatesector.
Luandaalsoproposed theconstructionof adeepwaterport,whichwouldcall into
questiontheroleofDakarandZiguinchoraspointsoftransitforcommerceinGuinea-
BissauandpossiblyinthewiderWestAfricanregion;AngolaalsobackedBissauinthe
internationalarena,forexamplebypleadingitscausebeforetheEUandtheUN.
Finally,althoughECOWASandtheCommunityofPortugueseLanguageCountries
(CPLP),towhichAngolabelongs,collaboratedaftertheeventsofApril2010totryto
stabiliseGuinea-Bissau(togetherpreparingaroadmapforthereformofthesecurity
sector),therelationshipbetweenthetwoblocsquicklysoured.InSeptember2010Luanda
andBissausignedabilateralagreementfortheprovisionofAngolanmilitaryandpolice
assistance.Inthesamemonth,atanextraordinaryECOWASsummit,Wadeinsistedthat
theenvisagedstabilisationforcecomposedexclusivelyofsoldiersfromECOWASmember
countries,totrytocounteraneventualAngolandeployment.77SanháandWadehad
pleadedinvainsincemid-2010foranECOWASinterventionforce,aproposalforcefully
rejectedbytheGuinea-Bissauarmy,butAngolawasabletodispatchasmallmilitary
contingenttoBissauinMarch2011.Officially,theAngolansoldiersprovidedmilitary
co-operationforthebenefitoftheGuinea-Bissauarmy,buttheywerealsoguarantorsof
thecivilpower:duringanattemptedcoupd’étatinDecember2011,GomesJúniortook
refugeintheAngolanembassy.
Angola,asprotectorandpartnerofPrimeministerGomesJúnior,seemednowto
haveassumedthemainleverageinBissau.‘Eh,Angolaissobig,’sangPresidentSanhá
duringtheceremonyforaccreditationoftheAngolanmilitarymission,takingupafamous
Angolansong.78DakartriedtouseitsinfluenceinECOWAStoaddsomeweight,for
examplebyusingasleveragethepromiseofanECOWAScontributiontopensionfunds
fortheGuineanmilitary.Senegalappearedresignedtoitsdiminishinginfluence,however:
inthepresidentialelectionofMarch2012inthewakeofSanhá’sdeathinJanuary,Dakar
seemedtohaveacceptedthelikelihoodofavictoryofGomesJúnioranddidnotfollow
uponrequestsforassistancefromopponentsseekingSenegalesesupport.79
UsingacombinationoftoolssimilartothatofDakarbutwithheavierresourcesto
backit–diplomaticsupport,materialaidandpersonaltiesandpatronage–Luandaalso
establishedarelationshipwithGomesJúniorbutalsowithInjal,thearmedforceschief
ofstaff.CouldnewpoliticaltroublesinGuinea-BissauenableDakartore-establishits
influence?IfAngolaninvolvementweretolast,couldtheattractionofGuinea-Bissau
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totheFrancophoneandSenegalesearenasbetempered,orindeedreversedthroughthe
magnetismoftheAngolanpole?AlreadyGuinea-Bissauimmigrants,legalandillegal,have
begunmovingtowardsLuanda.
c o n c l u S I o n
ArealisticanalysisofthediplomaticgameduringWade’stwopresidentialtermsfrom
2000to2012showsthatDakardeployedafirmandcoherentpolicywithaveryrealist
inspirationtoinfluencepoliticsinBissau.Thankstothisapproach,Wadewasableto
secure,throughchangesofleadershipinBissau,Bissau’sinvolvementinthemanagement
oftheCasamancecrisis,whichfordecadeshadbeenoneofSenegal’scoreissues.Farfrom
beingapawnofFrance(orservantoflaFrancophonie),Senegalplayedanindependent
gameusingFranceforlinkageandsupport.
The politics of Senegal in Bissau, supported by strong economic and cultural
influences,hasbeensimilarinsomeaspectstotherelationshipsFrancemaintainedover
theyearswithitsAfricanpartners:militaryco-operation,accesstohealthcare,diplomatic
brokerage,andfinancingselectedcandidatesduringelections–akindofpatronagewith
aquasi-‘familial’dimension80withhandpickedGuinea-Bissaustakeholders.Senegalese
foreignpolicyismarkedbyatraittypicalindiplomaticrelationshipswithinFrancophone
Africa:moneycirculatesinformallybetweenpowerbrokersfromonecountrytoanother
(sometimes to thebenefitof thepoliticalopposition)andserves to financeelection
campaignsorregulatecrises(egfailuretopaygovernmentsalaries,giftingofmilitary
malcontents,andbuildingconsensusbetweenpoliticalfigures).81
Thispolicyfunctionsthrough‘back-channel’pathssuchasthebusinessmanPierre
Goudiaby,andthroughanextremelystableandexpertdiplomaticcorps,freefromthe
administrativeprincipleofperiodicrenewal.82Finally,althoughithaslimitedresources,
Senegalrunsavastinternationalnetworkandismakingitselfavailableasadiplomatic
link with other potential partners (France, the EU and ECOWAS, but also Nigeria,
EquatorialGuinea,LibyaandIran),enablingittodeploysomeweightinBissau.This
influencereacheditspeakin2006withthevictoriousoffensiveoftheGuinea-Bissauarmy
againstCasamance’schiefrebel,Sadio.
Although Senegal played its diplomatic cards well enough, this policy worked
onlyforawhile.Afteraprosperousfirstterm(2000–2007),inwhichSenegalenjoyed
diplomaticinfluenceandsawitspowergrow,Wade’ssecondtermwasmarkedbyrelative
deterioration.ThedeathinMarch2009ofitstwokeyGuineanallies,VieiraandNaWai,
weakenedSenegal’sinfluence.Finally,DakarowedsomethingofitsinfluenceinBissauto
Guinea-Bissau’sisolationattheendoftheSeventhofJuneWar.Ultimately,Wadeknew
howtouseGuinea-Bissau’smarginalisationat thebeginningof the2000s toacquire
influence.Hedeployedthesameapproachtothemilitaryregimesthatsubsequentlycame
topowerinMauritaniaandGuinea-Conakry:poorlyregarded,marginalisedandinsearch
ofrecognition,theywerereasonabletargetsforSenegalanditslimitedresourcesunder
Wade,whocouldcommitfortheirbenefithisinfluenceandprestigetoplaytheroleof
friendandmediatorwiththeinternationalcommunity.
Bissaushookoffsomeof itsdiplomatic isolationinthesecondhalfof the2000s.
Seizingtheopportunityleftopenbythemilitaryshake-upofApril2010,Angolahas
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establisheditselfasthenewfriendofGuinea-Bissau,formingarelationshipasprimary
patron,withCarlosGomesJúnior,favouredasthedefaultoptionbytheinternational
community,butalsowithAntónioInjai.Senegalcontinuedtoworkitsconnectionsand
alliancesinBissau,butitisnotsurethatitwilleverregainthekindofinfluenceexercised
intheearlyyearsofWade’smandate.
p o S t S c r I p t
ThistextwasfinalisedatthebeginningofMarch2012,whenSenegalandGuinea-Bissau
wereeachorganisingpresidentialelections.On25March2012Wadewasdefeatedinthe
secondroundofSenegaleseelectionsbyMackySall,oneofhisformerprimeministers.A
weekearlier,on18March,GomesJúnior,Guinea-Bissau’soutgoingprimeminister,won
49%ofvotesinthefirstroundofthatcountry’spresidentialelections.InBissau,numerous
militarymenandpoliticiansfearedthatGomesJúnior’slikelyvictoryinthesecondround
wouldallowhimtoassumehispersonalhegemony,all inthenameof thenecessary
reformsandwiththesupportoftheinternationalcommunity–inparticularPortugal
andAngola.On12April2012,encouragedbytheblockingoftheelectionbyopponents
whorefusedtovalidatetheresultsofthefirstround,themilitarysuspendedtheelectoral
processandarrestedGomesJúnior,whomtheyaccusedofhavingbeeninvolvedwith
Angolainaplotagainstthenationalarmy.Withthesupportofthemainoppositionparties
andopponentsofGomesJúniorwithinthePAIGC,themilitaryestablishedtransitional
authoritiesthatGomesJúniorandtheparliamentarymajorityPAIGCrefusedtorecognise.
ForSenegal,whichseemedtohaveaccepteditsdiminishedinfluence,GomesJúnior’s
likelyvictoryandhisfavouredrelationshipwithAngola,thisnewshake-upprovidedthe
opportunitytoplayaroleoncemore.AlongwithNigeria,BurkinaFasoandCôted’Ivoire
–otherECOWAScountriesunhappywithAngola’sinvolvementinWestAfrica–Senegal
supported the transitionopenedby themilitary’s actionwhereAngolaandPortugal
rejecteditandadvocatedtheimmediaterestorationofGomesJúnior’sauthorityandthe
continuationoftheelectoralprocess.ECOWASstressedtheneedtotakeintoaccountthe
de factopowerofthevictoriouscoupists,butitiscleartoobserversthatseveralinfluential
WestAfricanstates,includingSenegal,arehappytoseeAngolaanditsallyGomesJúnior
introuble.TheGomesJúniorcampunhesitatinglyaccusedECOWAS(orsomeof its
members),andevenFrance,ofhavingorganisedthecoupd’état.
UnderpressurefromtheGuineanmilitary,AngolantroopswithdrewfromBissauand
ECOWASdeployeda600-strongforcewhichincludedasmallSenegalesecontingent.83
Thus,alittlemorethan10yearsafterOpération Gabou,Senegalesesoldiersweresetting
foot inBissauonceagain, this timetobewell receivedby theGuineanarmy. In the
internationalarena,alliedwithsomekeypartnersinECOWAS,Senegalwasinvolvedin
defendingtheGuinea-Bissautransitionalauthorities.ItwastoDakarthatthetransitional
president,ManuelSerifoNhamadjo,madehisfirstdiplomaticexcursionon14June2012.
Theoutcomeofthetransitionisstilluncertain.ThePAIGCeventuallysignedthe
transitionpacton16January2013,butitisnotsureyethowthiswilltranslateinterms
ofpowerdistribution,notwhennewelectionswillbeheld.GomesJúniorisstillinexile
inPortugalandCPLPcountriesmaintaintheircriticismofECOWASandthetransition
authorities.AlthoughtheauthoritiesandtheGuinea-Bissauarmyhavethecountryunder
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propercontrol,theyarediplomaticallyisolatedandrequireresourcesthatECOWASand
WAEMUcannotprovideallbythemselves.Theevents,however,confirmthestrategic
importanceofBissauforSenegal,andthecapacityofthissmallcountryfordiplomatic
action–whichitisabletosupportwithitslimitedmilitaryresources,84usingECOWAS
asitschannel.
e n d n o t e S
1 Thematerialinthispaperresultsfromresearchconductedbytheauthoronbehalfofand
withsupportfromtheCentreNationaldelaRechercheScientifique,andtheCentred’Etudes
d’AfriqueNoireofInstitutd’ÉtudesPolitiquesdeBordeaux,beforehejoinedtheInternational
CrisisGroup.ThispaperdoesnotrepresentinanywaytheviewsoftheInternationalCrisis
Group.TheauthorthanksCamilleBauer,MarinaTemudo,Momar-CoumbaDiop,DanielBach,
Jean-ClaudeMarut,RichardMoncrieff,AristidesGomesandVictorPereirafortheirvaluable
comments.
2 FortheCasamanceconflict,seeMarutJ-C,Le conflit de Casamance. Ce que disent les armes.
Paris:Karthala,2010;aswellasFoucherV,‘Onthematter(andmateriality)ofthenation:
interpretingCasamance’sunresolvedseparatiststruggle’,Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism,
11,1,2011;andFoucherV,‘Senegal:theresilientweaknessofCasamanceseparatists’,inBoas
M&KCDunn(eds),African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine.Boulder:LynneRienner,
2007.
3 BayartJ-F,‘Africaintheworld:ahistoryofextraversion’,African Affairs,99,2000,pp.217–267.
4 BarryB,La Sénégambie du XVe au XIXe siècle. Traite négrière, islam et conquête coloniale.Paris:
L’Harmattan,1988.
5 ThisincludedthemovementsofheavyartillerypiecesonSenegaleseground.Interview,former
memberofthearmybranchofthePAIGC,Bissau,June2010.
6 InaccordancewithPAIGCpolicy,Guinea-BissauandCapeVerdehad formedaunionat
independence,whichwasdissolvedin1980.
7 Interview,officialoftheGuineanministryoftheinterior,Bissau,October2009.
8 Interview,officialoftheMFDC,Mandinari(Gambia),March2000.
9 On14October1993,thetwocountriessignedanagreementforthejointmanagementofthe
disputedzone.TheagreementresultedintheestablishmentoftheAgencyforManagement
andCooperation(Agence de Gestion et de Coopération)betweenSenegalandGuinea-Bissau
(http://www.agc.sn).
10 OntheSeventhofJuneWar,seeMartinsM, ‘Le conflit en Guinée Bissau: chronologie d’une
catastrophe’,L’Afrique politique,1999,pp.213–218,aswellasthespecialeditionofSoronda:
Revista de Estudos Guineenses, December2000.
11 DakarsupporteditsputativeallyagainsttheMFDCandapparentlyconsideredattackingthe
MFDCfrombehind,whereasGuinea-Conakry’sassistancewasmorepersonal:PresidentConté,
hadbeenafriendofNinoVieirasincethedaysofthe‘liberationstruggle’.
12 DjaloT,‘Lições e legitimidade dos conflitos politicos na Guiné-Bissau’,Soronda: Revista de Estudos
Guineenses,December2000,pp.29–32.Ablackmarketwasestablishedduringthewar,as
soldierssentconsumergoodspillagedinBissautoDakarandConakry.Interview,former
receiver,Bissau,October2009.
13 WadebroughtGuinea-Bissau’sshareofthepotentialincomefrom15%to20%.
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14 Lusa, ‘Guiné-Bissau – Kumba Ialá distribui um milhão de euros a Governo, FA’s e MAI’,
29November2002.
15 Someseparatistsattackedhimforhisauthoritarianism,brutality,lackofconsiderationfor
civiliansandhisdisregardforthemovement’spoliticalwing.Inaddition,likemanyMFDC
militants,SadiowasaMuslimfromBuluf,northoftheCasamanceRiver,andwasaccused
of favouringhisownpeople.FromSeptember2000therewasfactionalviolencebetween
militantsoftheMFDCinGuinea-Bissau;ManéwasinvolvedinthereleaseofSadiofollowers
arrestedbytheGuinea-Bissauauthorities.AFP(AgenceFrance-Presse),‘RebelsinCasamance
postponemeetingfollowinginternalstrife’,2January2001.
16 BBC Monitoring Service,‘CasamancefactionleaderaccusesGuinea-Bissaugovernmentof“open
war”’,18January2001.
17 AFP,‘Vingt-quatremaquisardscasamançaistuésdanslenorddelaGuinée-Bissau’,8January
2001.
18 PANA(Pan-AfricanNewsAgency),‘Legouvernementn’interviendrapasdanslesproblèmes
sénégalais’,21January2001.
19 TheKassololgroupthereafterlimiteditsuseofforcetoactingagainstinterferencefromthe
SenegalesearmyandCasamanceciviliansinitszoneofcontrol.
20 ‘InquiétudespourlaCasamance’,Wal Fadjri(Dakar),15September2003.
21 Interview,memberofNationalTransitionalCouncil,Bissau,May2008;andinterview,African
diplomat,Bissau,October2009.
22 Author’sachives.
23 IRIN(IntegratedRegional InformationNetworks), ‘Guinea-Bissau:Armyadmitssoldiers’
death’,Wal Fadjri,14–20February2004.
24 ‘Guinée Bissau: Cinq morts chez les rebelles’,26February2004.
25 Interviews,Guinea-Bissaumilitary,Bissau,October2009.
26 AFP,‘Guinée-Bissau:L’ONUpaierabientôtlesarriérésdeprimesdesmutins’,16October2004.
27 ‘GénéralTagméNaWayàDakar:pourunesurveillancecorrectedelafrontièresénégalo-bissau-
guinéenne’,Wal Fadjri,15February2005.
28 PANA,‘Dond’équipementsduSénégalàl’arméebissau-guinéenne’,1March2005.
29 ThereisatleastoneknowninstanceofConakry’ssupportfortheGuinea-Bissauarmy:anavy
vesselfromConakrysunkwhiledockingintheportofBissautooffload40tonnesofrice,a
fueltankeranduniforms.SeePANA,‘UnnaviredelaGuinéeConakrycouleauportdeBissau’,
4October2005.SomesourcesclaimthatseniormilitaryfiguresinBissauweregivenmoney
andwereofferedtoparticipateintransportingcocainefromLatinAmericatoWestAfrica,a
businessinwhichContéassociates,includingason,wereinvolved.Interviews,personsclose
toVieira,Dakar,May2011;andinterviews,Europeandrugsexperts,Conakry,April2011and
Dakar,January2012.
30 YalamadehisrelationshipwithSenegalacampaignissue,forexamplestatingthatifhewere
elected,Wadewouldprovide$10milliontotheGuinea-Bissauarmy.Lusa, ‘Guiné-Bissau:
Kumba Ialá reassume-se como candidato às presidenciais’,26May2005.
31 Jeune Afrique,‘Ninolecaméléon’,1August2005.Interview,formerGuineanminister,Paris,
December2011.
32 BBC Monitoring Africa,‘OustedGuinea-BissaupresidentflowntoSenegalfortalksaheadof
crucialpoll’,23May2005.
33 BBC Monitoring Africa,‘FrenchradiointerviewsGuinea-BissauPresident-electJoaoVieira’,
24
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22September2005;‘NinoVieiraprésident,unatoutpourlapaixenCasamance’,Wal Fadjri,
25July2005.
34 Supportersincludedseveraloldallies(egChirac,Obasanjo,ObiangNguemafromEquatorial
Guinea) and other clients (Mamadou Tandja from Niger and Marc Ravalomanana from
Madagascar).APS (AgencedepresseSénégalaise),‘8 Chefsd’Etatserontprésentsàlacérémonie
deremiseduPrixHouphouëtBoigny’,12May2006.
35 AFP,‘TagméNaWaiinvestichefd’Etat-majordesarmées’,6January2006.
36 PANA,‘2.178réfugiésbissau-guinéenssontarrivésàZiguinchor’,23March2006.
37 PANA,‘Prèsde60soldatsbissau-guinéenstuésparleMFDC’,1April2006.
38 PANA,‘L’ancienministredel’IntérieurdelaGuinée-Bissauarrêté’,3April2006.
39 PANA,‘LeprésidentVieirademandelapoursuitedescombatscontreleMFDC’,3April2006.
40 PANA,‘BissauréclameledroitdepoursuivreSalifSadio’,24April2006.
41 ‘Casamance–Bissaudonneuncoupdepouceauprocessusdepaix’,Wal Fadjri,17August
2007.
42 SeeICG(InternationalCrisisGroup), ‘Guinea-Bissau:beyondtheruleofthegun’,Africa
Briefing,61,25June2009.
43 ‘Peursurlesobsèquesde“Nino”VieiraàBissau:Wadereculefaceaudanger’,Le Quotidien,
11March2009.
44 Interview,Africandiplomat,Bissau,October2009.
45 Interview,Bissau,October2009.
46 Interview,‘radical’memberoftheSouthernFrontoftheMFDC,Bissau,September2009.
47 ‘GAF,Guinea-BissauarmedforcessignMoU’,The Daily Observer,30March2009.
48 AFP, ‘L’arméedeGuinée-BissauenalerteprèsduSénégal(sourcemilitaire)’, 14October2009.
49 Le Soleil, ‘SituationpolitiqueenGuinée-Bissau:MalamBacaiSanhademandeauprésidentWade
des’impliquerdavantage’,5December2005;‘MalamBacaiSanhá:“Larébelliondoitdéposerles
armesenCasamance”’,Wal Fadjri, 5December2005.
50 Malan Bécaye Sagna, candidate to the Guinea-Bissau presidency: ‘L’indépendance de la
Casamance est une utopie’,15May2009.
51 SanhátookspecialcareofhiscommunicationswiththeFrancophoneworld:aPRfirminParis
publishedaLettre de la Lusophonie inwhichSanháwasinvariablypresentedinafavourable
light.
52 APS,‘MalamBacaiSanha“trèssatisfait”dutravaildeSénégalBâches’,7 September2009.
53 APS, ‘Malam Bacaï Sanha, l’espoir d’un retour à un Etat moderne’, 4 September 2009;
‘InvestituredeMalamBacaïSanha:uncachetpopulaireannonciateurderuptures’,4September
2009.
54 Africa 21 Digital,‘PresidentedoSenegaloferecequatroviaturasaoseuhomólogoguineense’,
24August2010.
55 Les Afriques,‘C’estl’Etatsénégalaisquiaprisenchargelesfraisd’hospitalisationduprésident
deGuinéeBissau’,27October2010.
56 ForexampletheFestival mondial des Arts nègresorwelcomingHaitianstudentstoSenegalafter
theearthquakeinHaiti.Le Soleil,‘MeAbdoulayeWadeauxétudiantshaïtiens–“Vousêteschez
vousenterreafricaineduSénégal”’,14October2010;‘Ouverture3èmeFESMAN:simplement
grandiose!’,Le Point du Jour (Dakar),11December2010.
57 Interview,formeradvisertoPresidentSanhá,Bissau,24May2012.
58 APS,‘Sénégal:AbdoulayeBaldépourletraitementde“questionsplusimportantes”quecelle
delafrontière’,12February2010.
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59 OnGuinea-BissausinceApril2010,seeICG,‘Au-delà des compromis: les perspectives de réforme
en Guinée-Bissau’,Rapport Afrique,183,23January2012.
60 APS,‘CarlosGomesJúniorattenduàDakar,lundi’,13February2011.
61 SudOnLine,‘Casamance:LeCEMGAlegénéralAbdoulayeFallàBissau’,25June2011;Lusa,
‘Rebeldes são problema do Senegal, mas não vamos permitir perturbações à paz – CEMGFA
guineenses’,23June2011.
62 ‘Sénégal: Banditisme transfrontalier –Le Sénégal et laGuinée-Bissau vont organiserdes
patrouillescommunes’,Le Soleil (Dakar),19September2011.
63 See,forexample,VanderDriftR,‘Democracy:legitimatewarfareinGuinea-Bissau’,Soronda:
Revista de Estudos Guineense,December2000,pp.37–65.
64 DatafromIMFTradeStatisticsDepartment,citedinTheEconomistIntelligenceUnit,‘Country
profile.SãoToméandPríncipe,Guinea-Bissau,CapeVerde1996–97’,p.63;and‘Country
profile2007.Guinea-Bissau’,p.30.
65 APortuguesebankthatretained15%ofthecapitalofBissau’sfourthbank,BancodaÁfrica
Ocidental,wassoldin2007toChinesebusinessmanStanleyHo,whooperatesfromtheformer
PortuguesecolonyofMacau.SeeAngop(AngolaPress),‘Guiné-Bissau:Actividadereduzidae
integraçãonaUEMOAdeixapaísforadarededosbancosportugueses’,6November2009.
66 Interviews,Bissau,October2009.
67 See,forexample,‘UniversitéCheikhAntaDiopdeDakar:Lanouvelledestinationdesétudiants
delaGuinée-Bissau’,Le Soleil, 8April2008.
68 OndevelopmentsinSenegalinthe2000sseeDahouT&VFoucher,‘Senegalsince2000:
rebuildingstatehegemonyinaglobalage’,inMustafaR&LWhitfield(eds),Turning Points In
African Democracy.Oxford:JamesCurrey,2009,pp.13–30.
69 ‘São Domingos corre a ritmo galopante’,http://www.jornalnopintcha.com(undated).
70 SeeBordonaroL,‘LivingattheMargins.YouthandModernityintheBijagóIslands(Guinea-
Bissau)’,PhDdissertation.Lisbon:ISCTE,2007;andVighH,Navigating Terrains of War. Youth
and Soldiering In Guinea-Bissau.NewYork:BerghahnBooks,2006.
71 Theauthorhadaninterviewwithanimportantmemberofthenationalassemblycutshort
becausethelatterhadtoattendhisFrenchlesson.
72 Interviews,Frenchdiplomats,Paris,June2011.CitedbyWikileaks,anAmericandiplomat
pointed out in 2005 that while Senegal was satisfied with its relationship with Yala
Francewouldrather followthePortuguese lineontheGuineancase.USEmbassyParis,
‘MFA official discusses CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea’, 25 April 2005, http://wikileaks.org/
cable/2005/04/05PARIS2789.html.
73 DahouT&VFoucher,op. cit.,p.19.
74 The data used is from Banque de France, http://www.banque-france.fr/fr/eurosys/zonefr/
page2_2008.htm.Forcomparisonpurposes,Guinea-Bissauhad1.5millioninhabitantsand
Senegalalmost10timesmore(13million).
75 APA(Agence depresseafricaine),‘Economie:Lesdéputésapprouventlebudgetdel’Etatqui
s´élèveàprèsde120milliardsdeF.CFA’,10December2009.
76 OntheriseofAngolainGuinea-Bissau,seeICG,2012,op. cit.,pp.5–8.
77 ‘Conseildesministres:Lechefdel’Etatmaintientleprixdel’huileàsonniveauactuel’,Le Soleil,
1October2010,http://www.lesoleil.sn.
78 ‘MISSANGinstaladaemBissau’,O País(Luanda),29March2011.
79 Two of Gomes Júnior’s opponents, Serifo Nhamadjo and Afonso Té, the political heirs
respectively of Malam Bacai Sanhá and Nino Vieira, went to Dakar during the electoral
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S O U T H A F R I C A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y & A F R I C A N D R I V E R S P R O G R A M M E
campaign,butwereapparentlynotwellreceived.Interview,high-levelSenegaleseofficial,
Dakar,April2012.
80 NotethatMalamBacaiSanhácalledhimselfthebrother,thentheson,ofAbdoulayeWade.
81 PresidentWadehimselfmentionedthatduringhistimeinoppositionhehadreceivedmoney
fromPresidentOmarBongoofGabon.WadeA,Une vie pour l’Afrique. Entretiens avec Jean-Marc
Kalflèche et Gilles Delafon.Paris:MichelLafon,2006,p.202.InOctober2009theoutgoing
representativeoftheIMFinSenegal,AlexSegura,reportedtotheIMFthathehadbeenoffered
asuitcasewithEUR100000and$50 000asapartinggift–theresultofamistake,saidthe
presidency.Themoneywasreturned.Inautumn2011FrenchlawyerRobertBourgiaskedfor
asubstantialcontributionfromtheSenegalesepresidencytoJacquesChirac’s2002French
presidentialcampaign.
82 AbdoulayeDieng,SenegaleseambassadorinBissau,reservegeneraloftheSenegalesearmy,has
heldofficesince2002.Itisdifficultnottocomparethissituationtothelongtenureofsome
FrenchambassadorsinparticularlystrategicAfricancountries:MichelDupuchinAbidjan
1979–1993,orMauriceDelauneyinLibreville1967–1972and1975–1979.
83 ProbablytoavoidrevivingmemoriesoftheSeventhofJuneWar,Senegaldeployedonlynon-
combatanttroops:anengineeringunitandamedicalunit.
84 SenegalaskedFrancetoprovidetransportforitsmentoBissau.
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