jan breman- a dualistic labour system? part ii

8/18/2019 Jan Breman- A Dualistic Labour System? Part II

1/5

Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Economic and Political

Weekly.

http://www.jstor.org

A Dualistic Labour System? A Critique of the 'Informal Sector' Concept: II: A FragmentedLabour MarketAuthor(s): Jan BremanSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 49 (Dec. 4, 1976), pp. 1905-1908Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4365157Accessed: 09-02-2016 03:19 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of contentin a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

This content downloaded from 128.220.8.15 on Tue, 09 Feb 2016 03:19:55 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/publisher/epwhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4365157http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4365157http://www.jstor.org/publisher/epwhttp://www.jstor.org/


2/5

Dualistic

a b o u r System

A

Critique of the 'Informal Sector'

Concept

II:

A

Fragmented Labour

Market

Jan

Breman

This paper examines the utility of the concept of the 'informal

sector'.

The author argues, partly on

the

basis of research

into

labour relations in a small town

in western

India, that the concept of the informal sector is analytically inadequate. The informal

sector,

he

sug-

gests, cannot be demarcated as a separate economic

conzpartment

and or labour

situation.

In Part

I

of the article it is argued that any attempt to demarcate the informal sector will

give

rise to numerous inconsistencies and difficulties. Moreover, by interpreting the relationship of the

infor-

mal sector to the formal sector in a dualistic framework and by focussing on the mutually

exclusive

characteristics, we lose sight of the unity and totality of the productive

system.

In Part 11 of the article, the author suggests that

tather

than divide the urban system into two

segments, it is preferable to emphasise the fragmented nature of the entire labour market.

Finally, in Part

III,

the author considers the social classes which are usually associated

with

the

urban labour force.

[Part I of the article appeared last week and Part

III will be

published next week.]

STRUCTURE

F EMPLOYMENT

ATTEMPTS

to conceptualise

the

infor-

mal

sector encounter

problems,

arising

from

the impossibility

of demarcating

its activities

as

an isolated sector

of

the urban

economy.

The

economic

system

encompasses

various

modes

of

production

-

with labour

relations

which are

more or less attuned

to

the

particular

mode - without

these being

crystallised

into independent

segments.

The urban labour force inevitably has

some

dualistic tendencies.

In my fieldwork

in

a district

town

and its

rural

surroundings

in

South

Gujarat,

I initially

attempted to

divide

the local labour

market

into two

levels.

The

results

of this research show

that

it is fairly

easy to find

two extreme

categories

that oppose

each

other. On

the one

hand,

those who

have to

earn

their daily bread with

the

aid

of poorly-

paid,

unskilled, intermittent

work

which,

due

to the

considerable

physical

effort involved,

is

considered

of

low

standing;

on the

other

hand,

those

in

permanent

employment

for which

for-

mal education

or

trained

skills

are

re-

quired

-

a job

with

a fairly high

and

often

regular wage

which

ensures

se-

curity and

social respectability

to the

worker. However,

these

proffles

are

seen most

clearly

at the extremes

of

the two poles

of the labour

force. As

the distance

between

the extremes

lessens,

similarities in

recruitment,

working

conditions, and bargaining

procedures

gradually

outdo the

diffe-

rences

between

various

categories of

labour

in

this respect.34

In

other

words,

gradations,

rather

than

watertight

divisions.

To split

the

employment

system

into

two

sectors

is,

therefore,

to

adopt

an approach

which

is

over-

rigid

and

too

little

differentiated.

I have

already

drawn

attention

to

the

fact

that

various

authors

try

to

solve

this

problem

by dividing

the

labour

market

into

more

than two

levels.

But

this

concession

is not sufficient

if

it is only intended to indicate the

existence

of

a differentiated

horizontal

structure.

Each

sector

has

its

own

internal

variation,

and

vertical

barriers

between

the parts

of

one

sector

are

frequently

far

more

rigid

than

its

hori-

zontal

dividing

lines.

For

example,

outsiders

tyrpically

tend

to

consider

various

types

of

poorly-paid,

unorganised

and unskilled

labour

as

substitutable.

Empirical

research,

however,

demons-

trates

that

the labour

force

threatens

to

disintegrate

into

small

and fairly

independent units

-

creating a

situation

which,

also

for those

who operate

on

the

market,

is difficult

to

survey.

It

is not unusual

for

the

term

'labour

market'

to

be

reserved

for

the

structuring

of

employment

in

the

modem

sector

of the

economy

which

is

characterised

by free

and

mobile

labour.

Where

this

is

not

the

case

-

ie,

where

employ-

ment

conditions

are

not

standardised,

relationships

are

personal,

and

reaction

to

fluctuating

supply

and

demand

is

inflexible

-

it

is said

that

the

market

is

imperfect,

or

even

that

a

labour

market

simply

does

not

exist.

This

point

of

view,

advocated

by

Todaro

for

example,35

means

in effect

that

the

employment

norm

refers

to

conditions

that

apply

only

to a small

sector

of

the

total

labour

force,

as Weeks

has

rightly

remarked.36

In

my

own

terminology,

the

concept

'market'

should

be applied

to the

entire

labour

force.

The

structure

of

this

market

is

not

dualistic,

but

has

a

far

more

complex

ranking.

This

is

illus-

trated

by the

considerable

fragmentation

of the labour force, particularly in the

lower

regions

of

the

urban

economy

where

labour

relations

are

rarely

formal

in

the

sense

stated

above.

Does

this

mean

that

the

labour

market

is pluralist

rather

than

dualis-

tic?

Not

if

this

is

taken

to

imply

a

great

many

separate

and

identifiable

sub-markets.

If

there

is

a

tendency

to

partition

off

a

sector

by

excluding

'out-

siders',

this

in

no

way

testifies

to

the

presence

of

closed

circuits,

each

characterised

by

its

own

rationale

and

considerable homogeneity. To - take

such

a

rigid compartmentalisation

as

our

point

of departure

would

be

in-

corrct

for various

reasons.

In

the

first

place,

the

tendency

to

fence-off

a

particular

field

of

employ-

ment

has

to

be seen

as

an

attempt

to

monopolise

certain occupational

roles

or

activities

for

social

equals

in

a

situation

of

extreme.

scarcity.

Conversely,

at-

tempts

are

made

to

penetrate

another

sphere

of

work

-

by

establishing

a

bridgehead

and by

using

various

mechan-

isms

and

channels to facilitate access

from

another

environment.

However,

1905


http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/5

December

4,

1976

ECONOMIC AND

POLITICAL

WEEKLY

this particularist nature of the labour

system should not be equailsed with

the existence of

more

or less autono-

mous circuits.

Secondly,

it

should

be realised that

the poor try to increase their security

within the

urban

system by entering

into dependency relations with social

superiors; in doing

so

they accept

a

wide range

of contractual and semi-

contractual

commitments.

They

have

a

fundamental

claim to a minimal

livelihood,

to the

bare necessities which

would enable them to continue to

live

-

a claim which nowadays

is no

longer duly

and

completely

honoured

by the other, stronger, party.

Com-

plementary

to

this

expectation

of a

basic living allowance, posited

as a

moral imperative,

is

the

willingness

on

the part of the weaker party to acknow-

ledge

infinite

accommodation

and

grati-

tude, whether this has

to

be

given

material or immaterial expression. Work

forms part of

this

obligation and

has to

be supplied where, when,

and

to

the

degree required by the creditor,

even

if

other members of a household or

a

Wider

circle of equals have to be

mobilised. For this part of the urban

population, work is not the

basis

for

a more

or

less

independent

existence

but

the outcome

of

a

comprehensive

dependency relationship.

This inter-

pretation of

labour

performance as an

element of the social

distributive

system

indicates

that

employment

is

not

fully

crystallised

into a

separate framework

with its

own

institutional

arrangements

and consistency. In such circumstances,

labour

is

fluid

in

character, without

any question

of

differentiated and

mutually

exclusive

sub-markets.

Thirdly,

the

criteria which are

used

to

distinguish various circuits do not

run parallel. It may be very useful

to know the differences between regular

wage labour, for instance, and self-

employment, but this distinction is not

necessarily parallel to that between

protected

and

unprotected labour,

formal versus informal activities, orga-

nised

or

unorganised employment,

guaranteed security against insecurity.

In

other

words, these criteria do not

cumulate in a clear and consistent

stratification.

Labour market fragmentation is the

most

appropriate term for the situation

which

I shall describe,3d and for this

exercise I shall also draw on the out-

come of

team

research

carried

out some

years ago in

South

Gujarat.38

PARTICULARISM AND

SCARCITY

Lack

of

work is

the

predominant

characteristic of

the local

economy in

Gujarat,

also in

the

urban sector.

This

naturally has its effects on the structure

of the

labour

market.

To start

with,

there

is no

question of

equal

chances

for

all in

the search

for

work, in

terms

of

acceptability for

employment.

Many

kinds

of work

have

only

minimal

requirements

are

regards

education

and

experience, but

not all

those who

meet

these

requirements

have equal

access.

The

extremely

skewed

distribution of

economic

opportunity

among

the

various

population

groups is

in no

way a

new

phenomenon.

In the

past,

an

important

dimension of the social system was the

linkage

of

labour

division

with

parti-

cular

social

categories.

The

fact that

membership of a

certain

caste,

region,

ethnic

group,

tribal

unit or

religious

community

is

still

an

-important

factor

in

the

search for

employment,

causes

many

people

to

conclude

that

the

traditional system

is

still in

force,

though

with

some

modifications.

I would

maintain,

however,

that the

persistence

of

primordial

sentiments is

principally

due to

the

situation

of

scarcity of work and not due to 'force

of

tradition',

constancy,

and

margins

for

accommodation

of

a

social

sys-

tem

that' is

involved in

a

process

of

modemisation.

The

durability of

tested

loyalties

is

linked

to

the

advant-

ages

offered

by

such

ties

under

highly

unfavourable

economic

conditions. If

employment

opportunities

are

slow

to

expand

and

population

growth

is

rapid,

the

sources of

existence

will be under

pressure,

and

people

are

likely

to fall

back

on

familiar social

mechanisms

and

make use of

them

to

exert

influence

and

to promote

their

own

interests.

In

view

of

the

situation

of extreme

scarcity,

however,

it

would

be

a

fallacy

to

think

that

competition

for

work

on

the

labour

market

is

absolute.

Some

economic

functions

are

linked so

much

to

particular

groups

that

penetration

by

outsiders

is

almost

inconceivable.

This

closed-shop

character

of some activities

is naturally

connected

to

income,

level

of

education,

etc,

but

it

also makes

itself

felt

in

other

respects.

It

is

too

simple

to

seek

the

reason for

evident

cases of

self-restraint

in cultural

inhibi-

tion.

Apart

from

the

unfamiliarity

with

the

type

of

work

and

insufficient

knowledge

of

opportunities,

lack

of

access

is

one

of

the

most

important

structurally-determined

mpediments.

The

linkage

between

supply

and

demand

originates

in

a

particularistic

fashion,

and is part of the reason why the

number

of

applicants

for

some

activities

is

found

to

be

insufficient

even

though

labour

is

available

in

abundance.39

But

it

would

be

rash

to

conclude

that

labour

market

behaviour

becomes

irrational

or

imperfect

once

universalistic

norms

no

longer

form

the

guiding

rule.

The

particularistic

orientation

of

the

labour

market

does

not

automatically

mean

that

the

higher

social

classes

succeed

in

monopolising

the

most

attractive

jobs.

It

is

true

that

their

members have the advantage following

from

their

education

and

contacts,

but

as

other

social

categories

gain

access

to

formal

education

they

are

gradually

able

to

penetrate

to

those

jobs

that

are

allocated

on

the

basis

of

primordial

group

cohesion.

In

many

countries,

some

shift

in

the

social

distribution

is

definitely

perceptible,

although

this

tendency

is

hardly

likely

to

be

very

pronounced

in

a

tight

labour

market.

Nevertheless,

it

may

happen

nowadays

that

younger

members

of

the

lower

middle classes are educationally equip-

ped

for

relatively

well-paid

and

highly-

qualified

jobs.

They

literally

try

to

buy

their

way

in

to

the

modem

sector

in

an

attempt

to

compensate

their

lack

of

influence

and

protection.

In

this

way,

they

obtain

access

to

greatly

coveted

jobs

in

formal

organisations

with

the

prospect

of

greater

security

and

higher

social

prestige.

These

intruders

create

an

outpost

through

which

they

try

to

bring in

relatives

and

otber

social

equals.

Particularistic loyalties are not only

found

within

the

same

social class.

Job

allocation

is

also

coloured

by

patronage

relationships,

particularly

those

jobs

over

which

people

of

high-rank have

some

say.

These

peple

then

use

their

rank

to

benefit

clients in

the

lower

rankings

of the

social

hierarchy.

Control.

over

a

iiunuber

of

jobs

or

over

licences

which

ar

required

for

certain

ecgnomic

acti

vities

can

be

used

to

political

advant-

age,

economic

profit

and

social

prestige.

Personal

intervention,

through

the

use

of

protection,

occurs both

horizontally

and

vertically

on

eveiyr

level

of

employ-

1906




4/5

ment

and is

not

tied

to

favouritism

by

social

elites

alone.

The

ILO

report

on

the

employment

situation

in Kenya

de-

votes

a separate

section

to the

pheno-

menon

of labour

brokerage,40

involving

the

figure

of the

jobber

who

is

parti-

cularly

concerned

with

unskilled,

un-

ogranised,

and

poorly-paid

employment,

usually

in

the

form

of gang

labour.

MOBILrTY

Scarcity

not

only

has

its

repercussions

on

the

question

of

who

should

be

considered

for

which

type

of

work

and

in

what

way;

it

also

has

its effect

on

labour

mobility.

Todaro,

in

a

model

that

is

as

simple

as it

is naive,

assumes

that

the

unskilled

workers

who

migrate

to

the towns

first

drift

into

what

he

calls

the

urban

traditional

sector,

and

subsequently

move

on

to

jobs

in

the

modem sector. This

model

is

a

striking

example

of the

assumption

that

small-

scale,

labour-intensive

activities

act as

a

buffer

,zone

and

are

carried

out

by

a

floating

labour

force.

This

way

of

thinking

has various

shortcomings.

In

the first

place

the

rural

migrant

is

elevated

to a

uniform

type,

whose

mobility

is

laid

down

in

a

completely

mechanistip

pattern.

In practice,

how-

ever,

access

to

employment

occurs

at

different

levels,

dependent

on

the

socio-economic

background,

education,

availability

or lack

of

protection,

etc.

Under

otherwise

equal

conditions,

de-

terminants

of a high

ranking

in

the

rural

system

are

converted

into

advant-

ages

over

other categories

of

migrants

who,

conversely,

see

their

former

backward

position

within

the

village

continued

in

the urban

environment.

In

the

second place,

the

idea

that

in

the

town

it

is

possible

to

progress

to

better-paid

and

more highly

qualified

work

is

largely

fictional.

Those

who

join

the

lower

ranks

of the

urban

labour

system

usually

remain

there,41

and

even

horizontal

mobility

is limited. Shortage

of

work

and limited

chances

to

accu-

mulate

any

capital

or

to invest

in

any

formal

education,

can lead

to

a position

of

defensiveness

in

which

one's

ac-

customed

sphere

of activity

is protected

as

much

as

possible

and

entrance

to

it

is

restricted

to those

who

can

appeal

to particularistic

loyalties

-

although

the

success

in

doing

so may

vary.

The

frequently

heard

view,

that

small-scale

and

non-institutionalised

activities

are

capable

of almost

unlimit-

ed expansion and that newcomers can

set themselves

up

as self-emeployed

with

almost

no

money

or

without

too

much

trouble

and

with

few

tools,

because

those already

present

obligingly make

room

for them,

is

a dangerous

and

mis-

placed romanticisation

of

the

hard

fight

for

existence at the

bottom of

the urban

economy.

Even the

shoeshine-boy,

the

com-

mon

example of

work

which, although

it might not provide an opulent

standard

of living

would at

least

appear to be

within

reach of

any

resourceful

youngster is

in

fact

not an

open

trade at all and

working condi-

tions are

also more

constricted

than-

might be

assumed.

In an interesting

description of

this type of

streetwork

in

the Indian

town of

Patna, Bhatta-

charya

distinguishes

between

two

categories

of

shoeshiners.42

Members

of the

first group have a

fixed place

of

work for

which they

sometimes

have

to pay

rent to an

intermediary

who has

leased

the

right to do so

from the

municipal

authorities.

These

people

form a more

or less

cohesive

group, are equipped with proper tools

(box

with

accessoies), and

demand

a

fixed sum for

their work.

The

'non-standardised'

itinerant

shoe-

shiners, on the

other

hand, are not

organised in a

group,

have few or

only

very

poor tools, and do

not

have

standard prices.

Almost

all of

them

are of

the

same social

class, a

low-ranking

Moslem

community. To

gain

access, a

candidate needs

to

have

connections

with a

working

shoeshiner and

sometimes to have

been

apprenticed to him

without

payment

for

a

certain

period.

Only

then

is

the

newcomer given

the

opportunity to rent a

shoeshine

box,

for which he then has to pay the

owner

a sum

equal to half

his daily

takings. Bonds

of this sort

often

continue

almost

indefinitely

because

many

younger

shoeshiners cannot

afford

to

buy

their own

material and

are,

therefore, compelled

to rent

their

boxes

from

older

colleagues or

from

outsiders.

Examination

of the

social

context of

the

informal

sector

shows

clearlv

that

access

to

it is not

so

easy

as

is usually

assumed.43 In other

respects, too,

activities in

the

sector

are closed

in

character

and

are

typified

by

depen-

dency relationships which give the

concept

of

'self-employed'

a

rather

dubious

meaning.

The

difficulty

in

capturing

a

place

on

the

labour

market

and the

necessity

of

doing

it

within

the

restricted

socio-

economic

network of which one

forms

part,

does

not

mean that

there

is

no

vertical mobility.

Although

the

road

upwards

is often

blocked,

the

road

downwards

is

all

too

easy

to

traverse.

As the

inflow to the

labour

market

continues,

pressure

on the sources

of

livelihood increases, thus accentuating

the competition

for work. From

one

generation

to the

next, more and

more

families

have to

face

the

problem

of

consolidating

their position

in society.

Inequality

then seems to increase

rather

than

decrease. For example,

a parti-

cular job nowadays requires

a

higher

level of

education than was

formerly

the

case, the access

threshold

to all

levels of employment

having been raised

during

the last few

years. This has a

socially depressive

effect.

It is discourging

to have to accept

employment

of

a

lower

level

than

one's educational

attainments.

The

consequences

for

the

lower working

classes are

even more

serious. Jobs, which

formerly

required

little

if

any

formal education,

now only

go

to those who

have

a school-leaving

certificate,44

but

many

households lack

the material

resources

which would

enable them

to make

such a lengthy

and ultimately

hazardous investment.

It is reasonable to assume, therefore,

that although more people

participate

in

the education

process,

their actual

performance

cannot keep

up with the

higher

demands which

are set as

a result

of the

surplus on the

labour market.

This

process

of

marginalisation

denies

the younger generation

access

to jobs

which

are

still filled by

older, less-

educated

members of the

same family.

In

these circumstances,

we

can only

conclude

that the lower

socio-economic

groups

are mobilised in

the urban

economy under increasing tensions and

under

conditions

which clearly

illus-

trate the worsening

of their

overall

social

and economic position.

LAsouR RESERVE AND POLARISATION

Do these impoverished

masses

repre-

sent

a potential threat

to those

members

of

the

working

population

who are

employed

on a regular

and contractual

basis,

thus

enjoying fairly

considerable

protection

and security? Authors who

consider that the small self-employed

and the unorganised workers represent

an

industrial

reserve army are inclined

to

give an affirmative

answer to this

question.

In

their

opinion,

the

presence

of

what

is

actually

a

labour surplus

acts

as a mechanism

which

exercises

pressure

on

the

wage

levels

of

the

regular

labour forcre,

hampers

their

collective

action,

and

generally

detracts

from

the

stability

of

their existence.

It

is true

that many

activities of

an

in-

formal nature

seem to

be redundant

or

at least would be done

away with

im-

mediately if employment opportunities

in the formal

sector were to

be im-

1907




5/5

proved.45 But this does not imply that

marginal categories in the production

process actually represent

an

industriai

reserve army.

Such a

hypothesis

can

be rejected without

further ado

if

the

distinction

between formal

and

infor-

mal sector is accepted as valid, in

which

the

non-competitive

character

of the

two

circuits

of

the economy

is

taken

for

granted. According

to this

view, the more

educated and

specialis-

ed

workers

in the

formal sector who

are

recruited on

the

basis

of

standard

and

impersonal procedures, represent

an

elite,

with whose

interests

the trade

unions

are

exclusively

concerned.

It

is

maintained

that

casual and

mostly

unorganised workers

in

the

informal

sec-

tor are

quite unable

to

compete

with

such

an elite,

and

emphasis

is

some-

times

placed

on

the

lack of

affinity

and

substitutability by reference

to

the

un-

employable poor, i e, an approxima-

tion

to

the

conception

of

the

lumpen

proletariat.

If, contrary to this view, the funda-

mental

unity of

the entire

production

system

is

emphasised under rejection

of

the idea of urban

dualism, it

can-

not

be

automatically hypothesised

that

the

unskilled

and

uneducated

do

form

an industrial

reserve

army.

I

have

already posited

that

the employment

system

is

organised on

a

particularistic

basis.

The

attempt

to fence-off

parti-

cular fields of work is intended to ham-

per external access, but

it also

prevents

people taking steps in the opposite di-

rection. This contradicts Meillassoux's

assumption

of

an

almost inexhaustible

reservoir of free and mobile workers.46

Mioreover, employers and brokers are

able

to

control

labour

through depen-

dency relationships

-

wage advances,

debts, housing,

and

other forms of

'favouritism'.

True, the linkage be-

tween

supply

and

demand on the

la-

bour

market

is

regulated within a

single institutional framework, but the

channels involved are many and aie

very

often

only indirectly related to

each

other.

On

the other hand, the fragmenta-

tion

of the labour market should not

be

unnecessarily exaggerated. My own

research has shown that a surplus of

casual labour, which is also characte-

rised by fairly high mobility, exercises

a

negative influence on conditions in

large enterprises,

and

can increase the

tendency to 'informalise' labour

rela-

tions; particularly at the lower eche-

lons.47

However, I agree with Obre-

gon

that,

in

Latin

America,

as

in

other

conutries

of

the

Third

World,

the

expansion

of

non-agricultural

pro-

duction

is

no

longer

dependent-on

the

quantity of

available

manpower

but

rather

on

the

quality

of

the

technolo-

gical

improvements

which

are

intro-

duced.

From

this

point of view, the man-

power

available

in

the

market

no

longer

constitutes

a

'reserve'

for

those

hegemonic

levels

of

industrial

production,

but

an

excluded

labour

force,

which

as

changes

in

the

tech-

nical

composition

of

capital

pro-

gress,

loses in

a

permanent

and

not

a

transitory

way,

the

possibility

ofi

being

absorbed,

into

those

hegemo-

nic

levels

of

production,

and

espe-

cially,

in

urban-industrial

production

which

has

hegemony

within

the

overall

economy.48

In

view

of

the

shortage

of

highly-

qualified

manpower

and

the

need

for

stable

and

continuous

relations

in

lar-

ge-scale

enterprises,

there

is

little

chance

of

an

industrial

reserve

being

formed

for

this

sector of

the

economy.

On

the

other

hand,

in

small-scale

workshops,

artisan

establishments,

re-

tail

shops, and

similar

types

of

activi-

ties,

people

have to

work

under

con-

ditions

which

are

in

complete

agree-

ment

with

the

classical

concept

of

'exploitation',

a

situation

aggravated

by

the

fact

that

workers

are

subject to

arbitrary

and

immediate

dismissal.

In

many

cases,

relations

between

em-

ployers

and

workers

in

these

small

workshops

and

enterpn'ses

in

the

dis-

tributive

sector

are

standardised,

to

a

certain

extent

regulated

by

legal

sta-

tutes.

However,

under

conditions

of

a

surplus

labour

market, the

unskilled

nature

of

most

of

the

work,

the

unor-

ganised

nature

of the

work

force,

and

the

non-implementation

of

protective

measures,

labour

relations

have

gra-

dually

become

informalised.

And

the

hypothesis

that

an

industrial

reserve

exists

at

this

level

thus

becomes

more

acceptable.

I

have

earlier

tried to

explain that

there

is

good reason

for

misgivings

on

the

undiminishing

absorptive

capacity

which

is

supposed to

characterise

the

lower

regions of

the

urban

economy.

Adherents

of

this

view

consider

that

mechanisms

of

shared

poverty will

make

it

possible in

some

malleable

fashion

to

provide

a

living

-

however

marginal and

insecure -

for

growing

numbers

of

small

self-employed

and

casual

labourers.

If

this

assumption

has ever had any validity, this is cer-

tainly-no

longer

the

case.49

Growing

numbers

of

the

urban

poor

are

caught

up

in

a

competitive

struggle

for

their

mere

existence.

The

tensions

to

which

this

gives

rise

often

follow

particu-

laristic

lines.

These

are

then

high-

lighted

as

isolated

and

self-sustaining

social

and

political

phenomena

with-

out

any

proper

identification

of

the

economic

background and its dynamics.

During

the

last

few

years,

conflicts

of

this

nature

have

become

more

severe

and

more

numerous

in

many

cities

of

the

Third

World,

and

there

is

every

reason

to

assume

that

these

contracts

will

continue

to

intensify in

the

future.

(To

be

continued)

Notes

34

For

a

detailed

report,

see

Bre-

man

(1975).

35

Todaro

(1969),

139,

note

3,

and

(1973), 50.

36

Weeks

(1973),

62.

37

Mliller

(1971)

uses

the

term

'balkanisation'

to

describe

this

si-

tuation.

38

"Modernisation

and

Social

Change

in

South

Gujarat"

is

the

working

title

of

a

forthcoming volume

edit-

ed

by

Baks,

Hommes

and

Pillai.

39

Standing

(p

2)

"...

it

is

intri-

guing

that

in

Kingston

where

open

employment

is

over

20

per

cent

of

the

active

labour

force,

even

core or

primary

employers

complain

of

shortage

of

suitable

workers

in

all

grades,

not

just

highly

skill-

ed

workers.

This

is

even moreevident in the

peripheral

formal

sector."

See

also

Breman

(1975),

Chapter

II.

.

40

"Employment,

Incomes

and

Equali-

ty",

Technical

Paper

No

23,

509-

510.

41

Cf

Papanek,

15.

42

Bhattacharya

(1969),

167-174.

43

This

hypothesis

is

rebutted

by

Bienefeld

(1974),

21,

44

and

69;

by

McGee,

34-35,

and

also

by

Temple,

79.

44

Cf

Breman

(1975),

Chapter

II,

Bienefeld

(1974),

15.

45

Dasgupta

(1973),

72.

Gerry

(p

42)

comments

that

a

proportion

of

the small self-employed in Dakar

have

formerly

been

in

wage

em-

ployment

but

that

they

lost

their

jobs

as

a

result

of

economic

re-

cession.

46

Meillassoux's

interpretation-

(1974)

is

regarded

as

outdated

by

other

Marxist

authors

due

to

the

de-

velopment

of

a

new

international

division

of

labour.

See

Frobel,

Heinrichs

and

Kreye

(1976).

47

Breman

(1975),

Chapter

III;

Gerry,

Chapter

VIII.

48

Obregon

(1974),

418.

49

Friedmann

and

Sullivan,

400-

401;

Papanek,

14.

[References will appear at the .ed of

the

concluding

part

of

the

article

next

week.]

1908


jan breman- a dualistic labour system? part ii

Documents