j. stuart mill - of names

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CHAPTER H

Of Names

§ 1. [Names are names of things, not of our ideas] A name, says

Hobbes,* is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark which may raise

in our mind a thought like to some thought we had be

f

ore, and which being

pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought the speaker

had_ before in his mind. This simple definition o

f

a name, as a word (or set

of words) serving the double purpose of a mark to recall to ourselves the

likeness of a former thought, and a sign to make it known to others, appears

unexceptionable. Names, indeed, do much more than this; but whatever else

they do, grows out of, and is the result of this: as will appear in its proper

place.

Are names more properly said to be the names of things, or of our ideas

o

f

things? The first is the expression in common use; the last is that of some

_metaphysicians =, who conceived that in adopting it they were introducing a

highly important distinction. The eminent thinker, just quoted, seems to

countenance the latter opinion. But seeing, he continues, names ordered

in speech (as is defined) are signs of our conceptions, it is mani

f

est they are

not signs of the things themselves; for that the sound of this word stone

should be the sign of a stone, cannot be understood in any sense but this, that

he that hears it collects that he that pronounces it thinks of a stone. t*]

If it be merely meant that the conception alone, and not the thing itsel

f

, is

recalled by the name, or imparted to the hearer, this of course cannot be

denied. Nevertheless, there seems good reason for adhering to the common

usage, and calling b(as indeed Hobbes himself does in other places) b the

word sun the name of the sun, and not the name of our idea of the sun. For

names are not intended only to make the hearer conceive what we conceive,

but also to inform him what we believe. Now, when I use a name for the

purpose of expressing a belief, it is a belief concerning the thing itself, not

* Computation or Logic, [in The English Works o/Thomas Hobbes, Vol. I.

Ed. William Molesworth. London: Bohn, 1839,] Chap. ii [p. 16].

f

in the original had, or had not. These last words, as involving a subtlety

foreign to our present purpose, I have forborne to quote.

[*Ibid., p. 17.]

a-a

MS,

4

3,

4

6

phi

los

op

h

er

s

_-b

+7

2



OFNAMES 25

concerning my idea of it. When I say, the sun is the cause of day, I do not

mean that my idea of the sun causes or excites in me the idea of day; cor in

o

th

er wo

r

ds,

th

at thin

k

in

g

of th

e

sun ma

k

es m

e

thin

k

o

f

da

y

. I mea

n

,

th

at a

certain physical fact, which is called

th

e sun's

pr

esence (and w

hi

ch, in

th

e

ultimate analysis, resolves itself into sensations, not ideas) causes another

physical fact, which is called dayc. It seems proper to consider a word as the

name of that which we intend to be understood by it when we use it; of that

which any fact that we assert of it is to be understood of; that, in short, con-

ce

r

nin

g

w

hi

ch, when we

e

m

p

loy the wo

r

d, we intend to

g

iv

e

info

r

ma

ti

on.

Names, th

e

r

e

for

e

, sh

al

l

al

ways be spo

k

en of in this wo

rk

as th

e

nam

es

of

thin

g

s

t

h

e

ms

e

lv

e

s, and not m

ere

ly of our ide

as

o

f

thin

gs

.

But the question now arises, of what things? and to answer this it is neces-

sary to take into consideration the different kinds of names.

§

2. [

Words which are not names

,

but parts of names

] It is usu

al

, b

e

fore

examinin

g th

e various classes into which

n

am

e

s are co

m

monly divid

e

d, to

begin by distinguishing from names of acvcrya description, those words which

are not names, but only parts of names. Among such are reckoned particles,

as of, to, truly, often; the inflected cases of nouns substantive, as me, him,

John s; b and even adjectives, as large, heavy. These words do not express

th

i

ngs

of which

an

ythin

g

can be af

fir

m

e

d o

r

denied. We cannot say

,

H

e

avy

fell, o

r

A heavy fell; T

r

uly, o

r

A t

r

uly, w

as

as

ser

t

e

d; Of, or An of, w

as

in

th

e

r

oo

m

. Unless, ind

ee

d, w

e

a

r

e

s

p

e

aki

ng

o

f th

e

m

e

r

e wo

r

ds th

e

mselv

es

, as

when we say, Truly is an English word, or, Heavy is an adjective. In that

case they are complete names, viz. names of those particular sounds, or of

those particular collections of written characters. This employment of a

word to denote the mere letters and syllables of which it is composed, was

te

rm

ed by the sch

oo

lme

n th

e

suppositio materialis

of th

e

wo

r

d. In any oth

e

r

s

e

nse w

e

c

an

not i

ntrod

uc

e

one of

th

ese wor

ds

into the s

u

bject o

f

a

pr

o

p

osi-

tion, unless in combination with other words; as, A heavy body fell, A truly

important fact was asserted, A member of parliament was in the room.

An adjective, however, is capable of standing by itself as the predicate of

a

pr

o

po

sition;

as

when we sa

y

, Sno

w

is white;

an

d occ

as

ionally

e

v

e

n

as

the

subject, for we may say, White is an agreeable colour. The adjective is often

said to be so used by a grammatical ellipsis: Snow is white, instead of Snow

°--cMS but that the physical object, the sun himself, is the cause from which the

outwardphenomenon, day, follows as an effect] 43, 46 as MS... the sun itself...

as

M

S

a'-aMS any

bMS,

43

,

46

,

5

1,

56

[

f

ootnote:] *It wo

u

ld, p

e

rhaps,b

e mo

r

e

corr

e

ct t

o

say that in-

fl

e

ct

e

dc

ase

s ar

e

names ands

ome

thing

m

or

e; an

d tha

t th

is

a

ddition

pre

v

e

nts th

e

mfrom

being used as the subiects of propositions. But the purposes of our inquiry do not

d

e

mandth

a

t w

e

should

e

nt

e

rwi

th

scrupul

o

usaccuracyint

o

si

mi

lar

m

inut

i

a

e

.



26 BOOKI, CHAPTERi, § 2

is a white obiect; White is an agreeable colour, instead of, A white colour, or,

The colour _ white, is agreeable. The Greeks and Romans were _allowed _,

by th

e

rul

e

s o

f the

ir l

an

guag

e

, to

e

m

p

loy this

e

llipsis univ

e

rsally in

the

sub

j

ect

as well as in the predicate of a proposition. In English this cannot, generally

speaking, be done. We may say, The earth is round; but we cannot say, Round

is

eas

ily moved; w

e

must sa

y

, A round ob

ie

ct, eI

_

is

_

distin

c

tion, how

eve

r, is

rather grammatical than logical. Since there is no difference of meaning

between round, and a round object, it is only custom which presc

ri

bes that

on any given occasion one

s

hall be

us

ed, and not the other. We shall, there-

fore, without scruple, speak of adjectives as names, whether in their own

ri

ght, or as representative of the more circuitous

f

orms o

f

expression above

exemplified. The other classes of subsidiary words have no title whatever to

be considered as names. An adverb, or an accusative case, cannot under any

circumstances (except when their mere letters and syllables are spoken of)

figure as one of the terms of a proposition.

Words which are not capable of being used as names, but only as parts of

names, were called by some of the schoolmen Syncategorematic terms:

f

rom

a_p, with, and Karn_/oo_00,to predicate, because it was only with some other

word that they could be predicated. A word which could be used either as

the s

u

b

j

ect or predicate of a proposition without being accompanied by any

other word, was termed by the same authorities a Categorematie term. A

combination of one or more Categorematic, and one or more Syncategore-

marie words, as A heavy body, or A court of iustiee, they sometimes called a

mixed term; but this seems a needless multiplication of technical expressions.

A mixed term is, in the only useful sense of the word, Categorematic. It

belongs to the class of what have been called many-worded names.

For, as one word is frequently not a name, but only part of a name, so a

number of words often compose one single name, and no more. tThese

words, The place which the wisdom or policy of antiquity had destined for

the residence of the Abyssinian princes, tt*l form in the estimation of the

logician only one name; one Categorematic Dtermg. A mode of determining

whether any set of words makes only one name, or more than o

n

e, is by

[*Samuel Johnson, The History o/ Rasselas. In Works. London: Buckland,

1787, Vol. XI, pp. 1-2.]

cMS,43, 46 of

a-nMS, 43, 46 permitted

e'-eMS The [?]

t-/MS, 43, 46 Thus, in the openingof the Paradise Lost [Bk. I, 11.1-5] these lines,

•.. the fruit

Of thatforbidden tree,whose mortaltaste

Broughtdeathinto the world, and all our woe,

Withloss ofEden, till one greaterMan

Restore us, and regain the blissful seat....

_

-

0

MS word



oF NA_ES 27

predicatingsomething of it, and observing whether, by this predication, we

m

ak

e

only on

e

ass

erti

o

n

or s

e

v

e

ral. Thus, wh

e

n w

e

say, John Nok

e

s, who

was the mayorof the town, died yesterday--by this predication we make but

one assertion; whence it appears that John Nokes, who was the mayor of

the

t

o

wn,

is n

o

m

ore than o

n

e

nam

e

. I

t

i

s

t

rue th

a

t

in

th

i

s p

ro

po

si

tio

n,

besides the assertion that John Nokes died yesterday, there is included an-

other assertion, namely, that John Nokes was _ mayor of the town. But this

last assertion was already made: we did not make it by adding the predicate,

died yesterday. Suppose, however, that the words had been, John Nokes

and the mayor of the town, they would have formed two names instead of

one. For when we say, John Nokes and the mayor of the town died yesterday,

we make two assertions: one, that John Nokes died yesterday; the other, that

the m

a

yor of the town died yesterday.

It being needless to illustrate at any greater length the

s

ub

j

ect of many

-

worded names, we proceed to the distinctions which have been established

among names, not

acc

ording to the words they are

c

omposed

o

f, but

a

c

c

ord-

ing to their signification.

§ 3. [General and Singular names] All names are names of something,

real or imaginary; but all things have not names appropriated to them in-

dividually. For some individual objects we require, and consequently have,

sep

a

rate dis

ti

nguishing names; there is a name for every person, and for every

remarkable place. Other objects, of which we have not occasion to speak so

frequently, we do not designate by a name of their own; but when the neces-

sity

a

ri

s

es

f

or naming them, we do so by putt

i

ng together several words, ea

c

h

of which, by itself, might be and is used for an indefinite number of other

objects; as when I say, this stone: this and stone being, each of them,

names that may be used of many other objects besides the particular one

meant, though the only object of which they can both be used at the given

moment, consistently with their signification, may be the one of which I

wish to speak

.

Were this the sole purpose for which names, that are common to more

thing

s

than one, co

u

ld be employed; i

f

they only served, by mutually limiting

each other, to afford a designation for such individual objects as have no

names of their own: they could only be ranked among contrivances for

economizing the use of language. But it is evident that this is not their sole

fun

cti

on. I

t

i

s

by their means that we are enabled to assert general propos

i

-

tions; to aiFmn or deny any predicate of an indefinite number of things at

once. The distinction, therefore, between general names, and individual or

singular names, is fundamental; and may be considered as the first grand

division of name

s

.

h

MS th

e



28 BOOK, CHAPTERi, § 3

A

genera

l

nam

e

is fa

m

i

l

iarly define

d,

a n

ame w

hich

i

s capabl

e

of b

e

in

g

trul

y a

f

fi

rmed

,

in the

s

ame

s

ense

, of

ea

ch of

a

n ind

efinite

nu

mber

of

thi

n

gs.

An individual or singular name is a name which is only capable of being

truly a

ff

irmed, in the same sen

s

e, o

f

one thing.

Thus, man is capable of being truly allirmed of John, *George,Mary_, and

other persons witho

u

t assignable blimitb;and it i

s

a

ff

irmed o

f

all o

f

them in

the same sense; for the word man expresses certain qualities, and when we

predicate it o

f

those persons, we assert that they all pos

s

e

s

s tho

s

e q

u

alities.

But lohn is only capable of being truly affarmedof one single person, at least

in the same sense. For, though there are many persons who bear that name,

it is not conferred upon them to indicate any qualities, or anything which

belongs to them in common; and cannot be said to be affirmed of them in

any sense at all, consequently not in the same sense, o The king who sue-

eeeded William the Conq

u

eror, is also an individual

n

ame. For, that there

dcannot be more than one person dofwhom it can be truly affirmed, is implied

in the meaning of the words. 'Even the king, when the occasion or the

context defines the individual o

f

whom it is to be

u

nderstood, may

jus

tly be

regarded as an individual name?

It is not unusual, by way o

f

explaining what is meant by a general name,

to say that it is the name of a class. But this, though a convenient mode of

expression

f

or some p

u

rposes, is objectionable as a definition, since it ex-

plains the dearer of two things by the more obscure. It would be more logical

to reverse the proposi

ti

on, and turn it into a defini

ti

on o

f

the word class:

A

class is the indefinite multitude of individuals denoted by a general name.

It is necessary to distinguish general from collective names. A general

name is one which can be predicated of each individual of a multitude; a

collective name cannot be predicated of each separately, but only of all taken

together. The 76th regiment of foot tin the British armyf, which is a col-

lective name, is not a general but an individual name; for though it can be

predicated of a multitude of individual soldiers taken jointly, it cannot be

predicated of them severally. We may say, Jones is a soldier, and Thompson

is a soldier, and Smith is a soldier, but we cannot say, Jones is the 76th

regiment, and Thompson is the 76th regiment, and Smith is the 76th regi-

ment. We can only say, Jo

n

es, and Thompson, and Smith, and Brown, and

so forth (enumerating all the soldiers), are the 76th regiment.

The 76th regiment is a collective name, but not a general one: a

e'-aMS

,

4

3, 4

6

P

ete

r

, Georg

e] 5

1 Peter

,

G

e

org

e

, Mary

b-bMS, 43, 46 limits

e_

MS,

43, 46, 56

Th

e

pr

e

s

e

nt king of England ]

5

1

Th

e p

r

e

s

e

nt qu

ee

n of

England

a,

-

n

MS, 43, 46, 51, 56 never can be more than one person at a time

e-

e

+

6

2, 6

5,

68, 72

f

-

f

+62, 65, 68, 72



O

FNAMES 29

regiment sbothacollectivendageneralame.Generalithrespectoall

individualegimentsfeachofwhichseparatelytcanbeaffirmed:ollec-

tivewithrespectotheindividualoldiersfwhom anyregimentscom

posed.

§ 4. [Concrete and Abstract names] The second general division of

names is into concrete and abstract. A concrete name is a name which stands

for a thing; an abstract name is a name which stands for an attribute of a

thing. Thus Yohn, the sea, this table, are names of things. White, also, is a

name of a thing, or rather of things. Whiteness, again, is the name of a quality

or attribute of those things. Man is a name of many things; humanity is a

name of an attribute of those things. Old is a name of things; old age is a

name of one of their attributes.

I have used the words

c

on

c

rete and abstract in the sense ann

e

xed to them

by the schoolmen, who, notwithstanding the imperfections of their philo-

sophy, were unrivalled in the construction of technical language, and whose

definitions, in logi

c a

t le

a

st, though they never went more than a littl

e

way

into the subject, have seldom, I think, been altered but to be spoiled. A

practice, however, has grown up in more modern times, which, if not intro-

duced by Locke, has gained currency chiefly from his example, of applying

the expression

a

bstra

c

t name to all names whi

c

h are the result of abstrac-

tion or gener

a

liz

a

tion, and

c

onsequently to all general names, instead of

c

onfining it to the names o

f

attributes. The met

a

physi

c

ians of th

e

Condilla

c

s

c

hool,--whose

a

dmiration of Lo

c

ke, passing over the profoundest spe

c

ul

a

-

tio

n

s o

f

th

a

t trul

y

origi

n

al genius, us

u

ally

f

aste

n

s with pe

c

uliar e

a

ger

n

ess

u

pon his weakest points,

--

have gone on imitating hi

m

i

n this

abuse o

f

language, until there is now some difficulty in restoring the

w

ord to its

original signification. A more wanton alteration in the meaning of a word is

rarely to be met with; for the expression general name, the exact equivalent

of which exists in all languages I am acquainted with, was already available

for the purpose to which abstract has been misappropriated, while the mis-

appropriation leaves that important class of words, the names of attributes,

without any

c

ompa

c

t distinctive appellation. The old acceptatio

n

, however,

has not gone so completely out of use, as to deprive those who still adhere to

it of all chance of being understood. By abstract, then, I shall °always, in

Logic proper, mean* the opposite of concrete; by an abstract name, the name

of an attribute; by a concrete name, the name of an object.

Do abstract names belong to the class of general, or to that of singular

names? Some of them are certainly general. I mean those which are names

not of one single and definite attribute, but of a class of attributes. Such is

the word colour, which is a name common to whiteness, redness, &e. Such is

a aM

S,

43

, 4

6

,

5

1,

56

,

6

2

, 65

a

l

waysm

e

an] 68 a

l

ways,in Logic

,

m

e

an



30 BOOKI CHAPTERii 5

eve

n

the word whit

e

ness, in r

e

s

pec

t of

the

diff

e

rent

s

hades of w

hi

te

n

ess to

which it is appliedin common; the wordmagnitude, in respectof the various

degrees of magnitudeand the various dimensions of space; the word weight,

in

re

spect of

the

various d

e

gr

ee

s of w

e

ight. Such also is

the

word

att

r

ibute

itself, the common name of all particular attributes. But when only one

attribute, neither variable in degree nor in kind, is designated by the name;

as visibl

e

n

e

ss; t

an

gibl

e

n

e

ss;

e

quality; squar

e

n

e

ss;

m

ilkwhit

e

n

e

ss

; the

n

the

n

ame

c

an

h

ar

dly be consid

e

r

e

d gen

e

r

al

;for

th

ough it d

e

notes

an

attribut

e

of

many different objects, the attribute itself is always conceived as one, not

many.* bToavoid needless logomachies, the best course would probablybbe

to consider these names as neither general nor individual, cand_to place them

in a class apa

r

t.

It may be objected to our definition of an abstract name, that not only the

names which w

e

ha

ve

ca

lle

d a

b

st

r

act,

b

u

t

a

dj

ec

tiv

es, which w

e

ha

v

e place

d

in the concrete class, are names of attributes; that white, for example, is as

much the name of the colour as whiteness is. But (as before remarked) a

word ought to be considered as the name of that which we intend to be

understood by it when we put it to its principal use, that is, when we employ

i

t

i

n p

re

dicati

o

n.

W

hen w

e

say sn

o

w

i

s whit

e

, mi

l

k

i

s wh

i

te,

l

inen

i

s

w

h

i

t

e

,

we do not mean it to be understood that snow, or linen, or milk, is a colour.

We mean that they are things having the colour. The reverse is the case with

the word whiteness; what we affirm to be whiteness is not snow, but the

col

o

ur

of

sn

o

w.

W

hit

e

ness, the

r

e

for

e,

i

s th

e

na

m

e

of

the c

olo

u

r e

xc

l

us

ive

ly:

white is a name of all things whatever having the colour; a name, not of the

quality whiteness, but of every white object. It is true, this name was given

t

o

all th

o

se

v

ari

o

us

obj

ects

o

n acc

o

un

t of

the qual

i

ty; an

d

w

e m

ay the

r

e

for

e

say, with

o

ut

im

p

ro

pri

e

ty, that th

e

quality

fo

rms pa

r

t

of

its sign

ifi

cati

o

n;

b

ut

a name can only be said to stand for, or to be a name of, the things of which

it can be predicated. We shall presently see that all names which can be said

to have any signification, _all namesa by applying which to an individual we

give any information respecting that individual, may be said to imply an

attribute of some sort; but they are not names of the attribute; it has its own

p

ro

pe

r

abs

tr

act nam

e

.

§ 5. [Connotative and Non-connotative names] This leads _to the con-

sideration of as third great division of names, into connotative and non-

*[62]Vide infra,noteat the end of §3,Bk.II, Chap. ii. [p. 178n.]

b-bMS,43, 46, 51,56 The questionis, however,of no moment,and perhapsthe

bestwayof decidingitwould

C-cMS,3,46,51,56,62, 65 but

--

_

M

S

or

a

'

-aMS,

43,

46 us

to

the c

o

ns

i

de

r

a

tio

no

f t

he



O

F NAME

S 31

connotative, the latter sometimes, but improperly, called absolute. This is

o

ne

of

the

mos

t

important distin

c

t

i

onsw

h

ich w

e

sh

al

l hav

e

oc

ca

sion to

po

int

ou

t

, and on

e

of

th

os

e

w

hic

h go d

eepe

st

in

to

the

na

t

ur

e

of l

an

guag

e

.

A no

n

-

c

onnotat

ive

t

e

rm is on

e

w

hic

h signifi

es

a subj

e

ct o

n

ly, or an attri

-

bute only. A connotative term is one which denotes a subject, and implies an

attribute. By a subject is here meant anything which possesses attributes.

Thus John, or London, or England, are names which signify a subject only.

Whit

e

n

e

ss, l

e

n

g

th, virtu

e

, signif

y an

at

t

ribut

e

only. Non

e

of

the

s

e

nam

e

s,

therefore, are connotative. But white, long, virtuous, are connotative. The

word white, denotes all white things, as snow, paper, the foam of the sea, &c.,

and implies, or bin the language oP the schoolmen, connotes,* the attribute

whiteness. The word white is not predicated of the attribute, but of the sub-

iects, snow, &c.; but when we predicate it of them, we Cconveythe meaning_

that the attrib

u

te whiteness belongs to them. The same may be said o

f

the

other words above cited. Virtuous,

f

or example, is the name o

f

a class, which

includes Socrates, Howard, the Man of Ross, and an aundefinable_ number

of other individuals, past, present, and to come. q'hese e individuals, collec-

tively and severally, can alone be said with propriety to be denoted by the

word: of them alone can it properly be said to be a name. But it is a name

applied to tall of them in consequence of an attribute which they uare sup-

posed too possess in common, the attribute which hhas received the name oP

virtue, It is applied to all beings that are considered to possess this attribute;

and to none which are not so considered.

All concrete general names are connotative. The word man, for example,

denotes Peter, _Jane_,John, and an indefinite number of other individuals, of

whom, taken as a class, it is the name. But it is applied to them, because they

possess, and to sigpJfy that they possess, certain attributes. These seem to be,

c

orporeity, ani

mal li

fe, rationali

t

y,

an

d a ce

rtai

n extern

a

l form, w

hi

ch for

distinctionwe call the human. Every existing thing, which possessed all these

attributes, would be called a man; and anything which possessed none of

them, or only one, or two, or even three of them without the fourth, would

not be so called. For example, if in the interior of Africa there were to be

discovereda rac

e

of

an

i

m

als po

s

sessing

r

eason equal to

th

at of hum

an b

eing

s

,

*Notare, to mark; connotare, to mark along with; to mark one thing with or

inaddition to

anoth

e

r.

_bMS, 43, 46, 51, 56, 62, 65, 68 as it was termed by

°

°

M

S

,

4

3,

4

6,

5

1,

5

6, 6

2

, 6

5

, 68 imply

,

or connot

e

,

a-aMS, 43, 46, 51, 56, 62 undefined

°

_

MS Those [

printer s e

r

ro

r

?]

/-tMS

t

h

em

a

ll

a ¢

+

51, 56,

6

2,

6

5, 6

8

, 7

2

_hMS, 43, 46 men have agreed to call

t

'_M

S

, 43, 46

Pau

l



32 SOOKI, CHAPTERi, § 5

bu

t w

i

t

h the f

o

rm

o

f

a

n

e

l

e

phan

t,

th

ey wo

ul

d

n

ot

b

e

c

a

ll

ed

men.

S

wif

t's

Houyhnhnmst*l _would not beJ so called. Or if such newly-discovered beings

p

o

s

s

e

ssed

th

e

f

orm o

f

m

an with

out

a

ny

vestige

of reason, it i

s p

robab

l

e that

some o

th

er name

than

that o

f man

wo

ul

d

be

found

f

or

th

em. How it ha

p

p

e

n

s

that there can be any doubt about the matter, will appear hereafter. The word

man, therefore, signifies all these attributes, and all subjects which possess

these attn'butes. But it can be predicated only of the subjects. What we call

men, are the subjects, the individual Stiles and Nokes; not the qualities by

which their humanity is constituted. The name, therefore, is said to signify

the subjects directly, the attributes indirectly; it denotes the subjects, and

implies, or involves, or indicates, or as we shall say henceforth connotes, the

at

tr

ibute

s

. It i

s

a connotative n

am

e.

Connotative names have hence been also called denominative, because

the subject which they denote is denominated by, or receives a name from

the attribute which they connote. Snow, and other obiects, receive the name

white, because they possess the attribute which is called whiteness; _Peter,

lames, and others _ receive the name man because they possess the attributes

which are considered to constitute humanity. The attribute, or attributes,

may therefore be said to denominate those objects, or to give them a common

name

.*

It has been seen that all concrete general names are connotative. Even

abstract names, though the names only of attributes, may in some instances

be

ju

s

t

ly considered as connotative;

f

or attributes themselves may have

attributes ascribed to them; and a word which denotes

a

ttr

ibut

e

s

may con-

note an attribute o

f

those attributes. _)f this description,

f

or example, is _

such a word as fault; equivalent to bad or hurtful quality. This word is a

name common to many attrib

u

tes, and connotes hurtfulness, an attribute of

those various attributes. When, for example, we say that slowness, in a horse,

is a fault, we do not mean that the slow movement, the actual change of

place of the slow horse, is a bad thing , but that the property or peculiarity

of the horse, from which it derives that name, the quality of being a slow

mover, is an undesirable Peculiarity.

[*See Gulliver s Travels, Bk. IV.]

*[51] Archbishop Whately, who, in the qater editions of his Elements of Logic

aided in reviving the important distinction treated of in the text, proposes the

term Attributive as a substitute for Connotative (p. 122, 9th ed.). The ex-

pression is,

in

itself, appropriate; but as it h

as

not the advantage of being con-

nected with any verb, of so markedly distinctive a character as to connote, it

is

no

t

, I t

h

in

k,

fitt

ed

t

o s

u

p

pl

y

the place

o

f

t

he word Connotati

v

e in scientific

u

se

.

f-JMS,43, 46, 51, 56, 62, 65 werenot

t-'_MS,43, 46 James andRobert] 51, 56 James, Mary and others

_-_51,56, 62 morerecent editionsof hisElements of Logic, has

_4n

MS,

43

,

46

,

51

It is

th

us

,

for

e

xampl

e

,with

- MS, 43, 46 has any mischievouseffects] 51, 56 is a thing to be avoided



OF NAMES 33

In regard to those concrete names which are not general but individual, a

distinction mustbemade.

Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are

called by

t

hem; b

ut th

ey do no

t in

dica

t

e or imply any a

tt

ribu

t

es as

be

longing

to those individuals. When we name a child by the name °Paul°,or a dog by

the name C_esar, these names are simply marks used to enable those indivi-

duals to be made subjects of discourse. It may be said, indeed, that we must

have had some reason for giving them those names rather than any others;

and this is true; but the name, once given, PisPindependent of the reason. A

man may have been named John, because that was the name of his father; a

town may have been named Dartmouth, because it is situated at the mouth

of the Dart. But it is no part of the signification of the word John, that the

father of the person so called bore the same name; nor even of the word

Dartmouth, to be situated at the mouth of the Dart. If sand should choke up

th

e

mo

u

th

o

f th

e

ri

ver, or an ear

t

hqua

k

ech

an

ge i

t

s co

u

rse,

an

d remove i

t t

o

a dis

tan

ce from

th

e t

own

,

qth

e name

o

f

th

e to

wn would

n

o

t

n

ecessarilya

be

ch

an

g

ed

. That fact,

th

erefore, c

an

form no par

t

of

th

e sig

n

ification of

th

e

word; for otherwise, when the fact confessedly ceased to be true, no one

wou

l

d

an

y longer think o

f

applying

th

e n

am

e

. Pro

p

er n

am

es are a

t

tach

ed

to

the o

bj

e

c

t

s

the

ms

e

lves

, and

ar

e

n

ot d

epe

ndent o

n

the

con

t

inuance

of

any

a

t

tr

i

bu

te

of

th

e objec

t

.

But there is another kind of names, which, although they are individual

n

am

es,

th

at i

s

, pre

di

cable only of one o

bj

ec

t

,

ar

e really connotative. For,

th

ou

gh

we may

gi

ve t

o an indivi

dual a n

am

e

utt

erly unmeaning,

whi

ch

w

e

call a proper name,--a word w

hi

ch answers

th

e purpose of showing w

h

a

t

thing it is we are talking about, but not of telling anything about it; yet a

name peculiar to an individual is not necessarily of this description. It may

be significant of some attribute, or some union of attributes, which, being

possessed by no object but one, determines the name exclusively to that

individual. The sun is a name of this description; God, when used by a

'monotheist , is another. These, however, are scarcely examples of what we

are now a

tte

mp

t

ing

t

o illus

t

ra

t

e,

bein

g,

in

s

tr

ic

t

ness of l

an

guage, gener

al

,

t

not individual names: for, however they may be in fact predicable only of

one object, there is nothing in the meaning of the words themselves which

implies this: and, accordingly,whenwe are imagining and not affirming, we

may speak of many suns; and the majority of mankind have believed, and

still believe, that there are many gods. But it is easy to produce words which

°-_MS, 43, 46 Mary

S_°MS, 43, 46, 51, 56 becomes

q-qMS, 43, 46 there is no reason to think that the name of the town would

r

-

MS,

43, 46

c

e

as

e

d to b

e

tru

e

, th

e

n

ame

would

ce

as

e

to

be

appli

e

d

*'-*MS,43, 46 Christian

tMS, 43, 46, 51, 56 and



34

B

O

O

KI

,

CHAPTERi

, § 5

are real instances of connotative individual names. It may be part of the

meaning of the connotative name itself, that there can exist but one indivi-

dual possessing the attribute which it connotes: as, for instance, the only

son of

J

o

h

n Stiles

; ....

t

he first

e

mp

eror of Rome

.

Or

the

attri

b

ut

e

connoted

m

ay be a co

nn

exion

w

it

h

som

e

d

e

terminat

e

ev

e

nt,

an

d

the

conn

e

xion may b

e

of such a kind as only one individual could have; or may at least be such as

only one individual actually had; and this may be implied in the form of the

expression. The father of Socrates is an example of the one kind (since

Socrates could not have had two fathers); the author of the Iliad, the

murderer of Henri Quatre, of the second. For, though it is conceivable that

more persons than one might have participated in the authorship of the Iliad,

or in the murder of Henri Ouatre, the employment of the article the implies

that, in fact, this was not the case. What is here done by the word the, is done

in other cases by the context: thus, Caesar's army is an individual name, if

it appears from the context that the army meant is that which Czesar com-

manded in a particular battle. The still more general expressions, the Ro-

man army, or the Christian army, may be individualized in a similar

manner. Another case of frequent occurrence has already been noticed; it is

the following. The name, being a many-worded one, may consist, in the first

place, of a general name, capable therefore in itself of being affarmed of more

things than one, but which is, in the second place, so limited by other words

joined with it, that the entire expression can only be predicated of one object,

consistently with the meaning o

f

the general term. This is exemplified in such

an instance as the

f

ollowing: the present prime min

i

ster of E

n

glan

d

. Prime

Minister of England is a general name; the attributes which it connotes may

be possessed by an indefinite number of persons: in succession however, not

simultaneously; since the meaning of the _name _ itself imports (among other

things) that there can be only one such person at a time. This being the case,

and the application of the name being afterwards limited by '_the article and '_

the word present, to such individuals as possess the attributes at one in-

divisible point of time, it becomes applicable only to one individual. And as

this appears

f

rom the meaning of the name, without any extrinsic proo

f

, it is

strictly an individual name.

From the preceding observations it will easily be collected, that whenever

the names given to objects convey any information, that is, whenever they

have properly any meaning, the meaning resides not in what they

denote

,

but in what they connote. The only names of objects which connote nothing

are proper names; and these have, strictly speaking, no signification.*

*[

6

2] A writer who entitles hi

s

book

Philosophy; or

,

the Science o

f

Truth

,

-_ MS,43, 46, 51, 56 exists

r- MS, 43, 46, 51, 56, 62, 65 word

_r

-

*_q-6

2,

65

,

6

8

,

72



OF NAMES 35

If, like the robber in the Arabian Nights, t*J we make a mark with chalk

on a house to enable us to know it again, the mark has a purpose, but it has

not properly any meaning. The chalk does not declare anything about the

h

o

us

e; it does not mean, This is suc

h

a

p

erson's

h

ous

e,

or T

h

is is a hous

e

which contains booty. The object of making the mark is merely distinction.

I say to myself, All these houses are so nearly alike that if I lose sight of them

I shall not again be able to distinguish that which I am now looking at, from

any of the others; I must therefore contrive to make the appearance of this

one house unlike that of the others, that I may hereafter know when I see the

mark_not indeed any attribute of the house--but simply that it is the same

house which I am now looking at. Morgiana chalked all the other houses in a

similar ma

n

ner, and defeated the scheme: how? simply by obliterating the

difference of appearance between that house and the others. The chalk was

s

till there, but it no longer served the purpose of a distinctive mark.

When we impose a proper name, we perform an operation in some degree

analogous to what the robber intended in chalking the house. We put a mark,

not indeed upon the object itself, but, _so to ° speak, upon the idea o

f

the

object. A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our

minds with the idea of the object, in order that whenever the mark meets our

eyes or occurs to our thoughts, we may think of that individual ob

j

ect. Not

being attached to the thing itself, it does not u, like the chalk, enable usU to

distinguish the ob

j

ect when we see it; but it enables us to distinguish it when

it is spoken of, either in the records o

f

our own experience, or in the discourse

o

f

others; to know that what we find asserted in any proposition of which it

is the subject, is asserted o

f

the individual thing with which we were pre-

viously acquainted.

When we predicate of anything its proper name; when we say, pointing to

a man, this is Brown or Smith, or pointing to a city, that it is York, we do

not, merely by so doing, convey to the hearer any information about them,

charges me in his very first page (referring at the foot of it to this passage) with

ass

e

rting that general nam

e

s have properly no signification. And he repeats this

statem

e

nt many tim

e

s in th

e

course of his volume, with comments, not at all

flattering, thereon. It is well to be now and then reminded to how great a length

p

e

rv

e

rse mi

s

qu

o

tation (for, strange as it appears, I do not believe that the writer

is dishonest) can sometimes go. It is a warning to readers when they see an author

accus

e

d, with volum

e

and page referr

e

d to, and th

e

apparent guarantee of in-

verted commas, of maintaining something more than commonly absurd, not to

gi

ve

impl

icit cre

d

e

n

ce to

th

e

ass

e

rt

ion

wi

thou

t

verif

ying th

e re

f

e

re

nce

.

[

S

ee

J

a

mes

Haig, Philosophy; or, The Science o/Truth. London: Saunders, Otley, 1861.]

[*'_rhe

H

ist

o

ry

of A

li Baba, and o

f

the Forty Robbers,

K

illed by One Slave,

The Arabian Nights. Tr. Edward Forster. 5 vols. London: Miller, 1802, Vol. V,

pp. 168-70.]

_-¢MS,43, 46 ff I may so

_

MS

, 43

,

46 e

nabl

e

us, as th

e c

halk did,



36

S

OO

KI

,

CHAPTERi,

§ 5

except that those are theirnames. By enablinghim to identify the individuals,

we may connect

them

wi

th

information p

re

viously possessed by him; by

saying, This is York, we may tell him that it contains the Minster. But this

is in virtue o

f

whathe has pre

vi

o

us

ly h

e

ardconcernin

g

Yo

r

k; not by anythin

g

impli

e

d

in t

h

e

n

ame

. I

t

is

othe

rwis

e

wh

e

n

o

bj

e

cts ar

e

spo

ke

n of by conno

tati

v

e

names. When we say, The town is built of marble, we give the hearer what

may be entirely new

in

fo

r

mation,

an

d this merely

b

y

th

e signification of

th

e

many-worded connotative name, built of marble. Such names arenot signs

of the mere objects, invented became we have occasion to think and speak

of those objects individually; but signs which accompany an attribute: a kind

of livery in which the attribute clothes all objects which are recognised as

possessing it. They are not mere marks, but more, that is to say, significant

marks; and the connotation is what constitutes their significance.

As a proper name is said to be the name of the one individual which it is

predicated of, so (as well from the importance of adhering to analogy, as

f

or

th

e o

th

e

r

re

as

ons

f

o

rm

erly assi

gn

ed) a co

nn

otative n

am

e ought to be

co

nsidered a name of all

th

e various individuals which i

t

is predicable of, or

in other words denotes, and not of what it connotes. But by learning what

thing

s

it i

s

a n

am

e o

f

, we do not learn

th

e

m

eaning o

f th

e name: for to

th

e

same thingwe may, with equal propriety, applymany names, not equivalent

inmeaning. Thus, I call a certain man by the name Sophroniscus: I call him

by another name, The father of Socrates. Both these are names of the same

individual, bu

t th

eir meaning is altogether di

ff

erent

; th

ey are app

li

ed to that

in

di

vidu

al f

or two

diff

erent purposes:

th

e one, merely to

di

s

ti

nguish hi

m

from other persons who are spoken of; the other to indicate a fact relating

to hi

m

,

th

e fac

t th

at Soc

r

ates w

as

his son. I further apply to hi

m th

ese o

th

er

expressions: aman, a Greek, an Athenian, a sculptor, an old man, an honest

man, a brave man. All these are , or may be/names of Sophroniscus, not

indeed of him alone, but of him and each of an indefinite number of other

human beings. Each of these names is appliedto Sophroniscus for a different

reason, and by each whoeverunderstands itsmeaning is apprisedof a distinct

fac

t or n

umbe

r of facts con

ce

rninghim

;

but those who knew nothing about

the names except that they were applicable to Sophroniscus, would be alto-

gether ignorant of theirmeaning. It is even*possible_that I mightknow every

singlendividualfwhom a givenname couldbe withtruthaffirmed nd

yetcouldnotbesaidtoknow themeaningofthename.A childnowswho

areitsbrothersndsistersongbeforethasanydefiniteonceptionfthe

nat

ure

o

f

th

e facts which

ar

e

in

vo

l

v

ed

in

th

e

si

gni

fi

ca

t

i

o

n

o

f th

os

e w

o

rd

s

.

In some ca

s

es i

t

is no

t

e

as

y

t

o d

ec

ide precisely how m

u

ch a

p

art

i

c

ul

ar

word does or does not connote; that is, we do not exactly know (the case not

_ ¢+62,65,68,72

_

'

aM

S

,

43

,

46,51 concei

v

a

b

le



OF NAMES 37

having arisen) what degree of difference in the object would occasion a

differe

n

ce

in th

e

n

ame

.

Thu

s

,

it

is clear

t

ha

t th

e

wo

rd man, besides animal

life an

d

ra

ti

onali

t

y, conno

t

es a

l

so a cer

t

ai

n

ex

te

rnal form

;

bu

t

i

t

would be

impossible

t

o say precisely wha

t

fo

rm; th

a

t

is,

t

o decide how

gr

ea

t

a deviation

from the form ordinarily found in the beings whom we are accustomed to

call men, would suffice in a newly-discovered race to make us refuse them

the name of man. Rationality, also, being a quality which admits of degrees,

it has never been settled what is the lowest degree of that quality which

would entitle any creature to be considered a human being. In all such cases,

the meaningof the generalname is so farunsettled and vague;mankind have

not come to any positive agreement about the matter. When we come to

t

rea

t

of Classi

fi

ca

t

ion, we shall have occ

as

ion

t

o show under wha

t

con

di

tions

this vagueness may exist without practical inconvenience; and cases will

appear in whic

h

the ends of language are better promoted by it than by

complete precision; in order that, in natural history for instance, individuals

or species of no very marked character may be ranged with those more

strongly characterized individuals or species to which, in all theirproperties

taken together, they bear the nearest resemblance.

But this partial uncertainty in the connotation of names can only be free

from mischief when guarded by strict precautions. One of the chief sources,

indeed, of lax habits of thought, is the custom of using connotative terms

without a distinctly ascertained connotation, and _dth nob more precise

notion o

f

t

h

eir meani

n

g than can be loosely collected

f

rom observing what

objects they are used to cdenote_.It is in this manner that we all acquire, and

inevitably so, our first knowledge of our vernacular language. A child learns

the meaning of the words man, or white, by hearing them applied to a variety

of individual objects, and finding out, by a process of generalization and

analysis _ whiehhe could not himself describe_, what those different objects

have in common. In t

h

e

ca

se of these two words the pro

c

ess is

s

o easy a

s

to

r

e

q

ui

re

no assistan

c

e fr

om c

ulture

;

t

h

e

o

bje

c

ts

c

alled human beings

,

an

d

the

ob

j

ects called white, diffe

ri

ng

f

rom all others by qualities o

f

a peculiarly

definite and obvious character. But in many other eases, objects bear a

gener

a

l resemblance to one another, whic

h

_leads to their being

fa

miliarly

cl

a

s

s

ed together under a common name, while, without more analytic habits

than the generality of mankind possess, it is not immediately apparent what

are the particular attributes, upon the possession of which in common by

them all, their general resemblance depends. When this is the case,/peoplet

use the name without any recognised connotation, that is, without any precise

b

-

't'

MS with

o

u

t

any

e

'e

MS

den

ot

z

g-_MS, 43, 46, 51, 56, 62 of which he is but imperfectly conscious

MS resemblance

J'-/

MS

, 43, 4

6 m

en



38

B

OOK, CHAPTERi,

§

5

m

e

a

ning; they t

a

lk, and cons

eq

uently think, vaguely,

an

d re

m

ain cont

e

nted

to attach only the same degree of significance to their own words, which a

child g three years old attaches to the words brother and sister. The child at

least is seldo

m

pu

zz

led by

th

e st

a

r

t

ing u

p

of new individu

al

s

,

on whom he is

ignorant whether or not to confer the title; because there is usually an

au

th

o

ri

ty clos

e

at h

an

d co

mp

etent to solve

al

l doubts. But

a

si

m

il

ar

resource

does not exist in the generality of cases; and new objects are continually

presenting themselves to men, women, and children, which they are called

upon to class proprio motu. They, accordingly, do this on no other principle

than that of superficial similarity, giving to each new object the name of that

familiar object, the idea of which it most readily recalls, or which, on a

cursory inspection, it seems to them most to resemble: as an unknown sub-

stance found in the ground will be called, according to its texture, earth,

sand, or a stone. In this manner, names creep on from subject to subject,

until all traces of a common meaning sometimes disappear, and the word

comes to denote a number of things not only independently of any common

attribute, but which have actually no attribute in common; or none but what

is shared by other things to which the name is capriciously refused.* Even

_scientific writers _have aided in this perversion of general language from its

n*[72] Take the familiar term Stone. It is applied to mineral and rocky ma-

te

ri

als, to the kernel

s

of fruit, to the accumulations in the gall-bladder and in the

kidney; while it is refused to polished minerals (called gems), to rocks that have

the cleavage suited for roofing (slates), and to baked clay (b

ri

ck

s

). It occurs in

the designation of the magnetic oxide of ir

o

n (loadstone) and

n

ot in speaking of

other metallic ores. Such a term is wholly unfit for accurate reasoning, unless

hedged round on every occasion by other phrases; as building stone, precious

stone, gall stone,

&

c. More

o

ver, the methods o

f

de

fi

nition are baf

fl

ed

f

or want of

sufficient community to ground upon. There is no quality uniformly present in

the cases where it is applied, and uniformly absent where it is not applied; hence

the definer w

o

uld have to employ largely the lice

n

ce of striking off existing appli-

cations, and t

a

king in new one

s

. Bain,

Log/c

, Vol. II, p. 1

7

2. n

PM

S of

_-_MS,43, 46 *It would be well if this naturaldegeneracyof language took place

only in th

e

h

a

nds of th

e

ignorantvulgar;butsom

e

of th

e

most r

e

markab

le

instanc

e

sar

e

to b

e

fo

u

nd in t

e

rms of art

, a

n

d

among t

e

chnically

e

duca

te

d

pe

rsons, such as English

lawyers. Felony, for example, is a law term, with the sound of which all ears are

familiar

;

but th

ere

is no la

wye

r who would und

e

rtak

e

to t

e

ll what a f

el

ony is, oth

e

r-

wise than by enumeratingthe variouskinds of offences which are so called. Originally

th

e

wordf

el

ony had a m

e

aning;it d

e

no

te

d all off

e

n

ce

s,

the

penalty of which includ

e

d

forfeiture of goods; but subsequentacts of parliament have declared various offences

to be felonie_withoutenjoining that penalty, andhave taken away the penalty from

others which continue nevertheless to be called felonies, insomuch that the acts so

called have now no property whatever in common, save that of beinl_unlawful and

punishabl

e

.]

5

1

, 56, 6

2 *Itwould

be

w

e

ll if this d

e

g

e

n

e

racy..,

as

MS... th

e

un-

taughtvulgar..,

as

MS... sound of which all ar

e

..,

as

MS... various off

e

nc

e

s...

as MS... forfeitureof lands or goods.., as MS] 65, 68 [no footnote]

t-

_

MS,

43

,

46

philosoph

ers



OF NAMES 39

purpose; sometimes because, like the vulgar, they knew no better; and some-

times in deference to that aversion to admit new words, which induces man-

kind, on all subjects not considered technical, to attempt to make the original

J stock o

f

n

a

mes serve with but little augmentation to express a constantly

i

n

creasing number o

f

objects and distinctions, and, consequently, to express

them in a manner progressively more and more imperfect.

To what ta _ degree this loose mode o

f

classing and denominating ob

j

ects

has rendered the vocabulary of mental and moral philosophy unfit for the

purposes of accurate thinking, is best known to whoever has most _editated z

on the present condition o

f

those branches o

f

knowledge.

S

ince, however, the

introduction of a new technical language as the vehicle of speculations on

subjects belonging to the domain o

f

daily discussion, is extremely di

ff

icult

to effect, and would not be free from inconvenience even if effected,_' the

problem

f

or the philosopher, and one o

f

the most difficult which he has to

resolve, is, in retaining the existing phraseology, how best to alleviate its

imperfections. This can only be accomplished by giving to every general

concrete name which _there is_ frequent occasion to predicate, a definite and

fixed connotation; in order that it may be known what attributes, when we

call an object by that name, we really mean to predicate of the object. And

the question o

f

most nicety is, how to give this fixed connotation to a name,

with the least possible change in the objects which the name is habitually

employed to °denote°; with the least possible disarrangement, either by add-

ing or subtraction, o

f

the group o

f

ob

j

ec

t

s which _, in however imperfect a

manner, it serves_ to circumscribe and hold together; and with the least

vitiation o

f

the truth o

f

any propositions which are commonly received as

tr

u

e

.

This desirable purpose, of giving a fixed connotation where it is wanting,

is the end aimed at whenever any one attempts to give a definition of a

general name already in use; every definition of a connotative name being an

attempt either merely to declare, or to declare and analyse, the connotation

of the name. And the fact, that no questions which have arisen in the moral

sciences have been subjects of keener controversy than the definitions of

almost all the leading expressions, is a proof how great an extent the evil to

which wehave

a

dverted has attained.

JMS, 43, 46, 51 small

_-t+62, 65, 68, 72

_

-

z

MS

,4

3,

46

,

5

1

re

fl

ec

t

ed

m-'nMS, 43, 46 moral subjects would not, in this country at least, be tolerated, and

if tol

e

rated

,

wou

l

d d

e

priv

e

thos

e

subjects of

th

e

be

n

e

fit of

th

e habitual f

ee

lings, wh

i

ch

have grown round the established phrases and the recognised groups, and which would

not for a long time take an equally strong hold of new ones;

'_-nMS,43, 46 he has

°-°MS denote

P

-

_

MS

, 43

,

46

it

se

rv

e

s

,

in h

o

w

e

v

e

r imp

e

rf

e

ct a mann

e

r,



40 _OOKI, CHAPTEXi, § 5

Names with indeterminate connotation are not to be confounded wi

th

n

am

es which have more

th

an one connotation, that is to say, ¢ ambiguous

words. A word may have several meanings, but all of them fixed and recog-

nised ones; as the word post, for example, _or the word box, _ the various

senses of which it would be endless to enumerate. And the paucity of existing

n

am

es, in compari

s

on wi

th th

e de

man

d for

th

e

m

,

m

ay often render it ad-

visable

an

d even necessary to retain a n

am

e in this

m

u

lti

plicity of accepta-

tions, distinguishing these so clearly as to prevent their being confounded

with

one

an

o

th

er. Such a word

m

ay be considered as two or more n

am

es,

accidentally written

an

d spoken alike.*

*Before quitting the subject of connotative names, it is proper to observe, that

the 'first writer who, in our t times8, has adopted from the schoolmen the word

to connote, aMr. vJamesv Mill, in his Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human

Mind

,

_

[2 vols. London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1829, Vol. II, p. 67,] employs it

in a

s

ignification different from that in which it is here used.

_o

He uses the word

in a sen

se

coextensive with its etymology, apply

in

g it to every

ca

se in which a

name, while pointing directly to one th

in

g, (which is consequently termed i

ts

signification,) includes also a tacit reference to some other thing. In the case •

considered in the text, that of concrete general names, vhis language and mine

are the converse of one another,. Considering (very justly) the signification of

the name to lie in the attribute

,

he speaks of the word

as noting

the attribute, and

_connoting _

the things possessing the a

tt

ribu

te

. And he d

es

c

ri

bes abstract n

am

es

as be

ing properly concrete nam

es wi

th their connotation dropped: whereas, in

my view, it is the denotation which would be said to be dropped, what was pre-

viously connoted becoming the whole signification.

In adopting a phraseology atvariance with that which so high an authority, and

one which

_

Ia

m

less likely than

_ an

y other person to unde

rv

alue, has deliberately

sanctioned, I have been influenced by

th

e urgent necessi

ty

for a te

rm

exclusively

approp

ri

at

ed

to express the

m

anner in which a concrete general name

se

rves to

mark

th

e attributes which are involved in i

ts

si

gn

ification. This ne

cess

i

ty

c

an

scarcely be felt in its full force by any one who has not found by experience how

vain is the attempt to communicate clear ideas on the philosophy of language with-

out such a word. It is hardly an exaggeration to say, that some of the most preva-

lent o

f

the errors withwhich logic has been infected,

an

d a large part of the cloudi-

ness and confusion of ideas which have envelo

pe

d it, would, in all probabili

ty

, have

be

en avoided, if a te

rm

had been

in

common u

se

to express exactly what I have

q

MS,

4

3

,

46 with

r-

r

+43

, 4

6

,

51, 56

,

62, 65

,

68, 72

S

-

_

MS,

4

3,

4

6 only recentwriterwho, to

m

y knowledge

t

S1 own

_4 +43, 46, 51, 56, 62, 65, 68, 72

_ _

+68, 72

'

r

MS The

wr

iter to whom I allude is th

e

la

te

Mr.J

am

es Mill, in his

Analysis o] the

Phenomena of the Human Mind

.

=MS w

h

ich we have

v'-_MS Mr.Mill's languageis the directconverseof mine

z_

MS

con

noting

a -aMS itwould be moreunpardonableinme than in



OF NAMES 41

§ . [Positivend Negativenames] The fourthprincipalivisionof

nam

es

, i

s i

n

t

o positive a

nd

negative.

P

o

s

iti

ve,

as man

,

atree a

,

good;

n

e

g

ativ

e,

a

s

not

-

man, bnot

-

treeb, not

-

good. To ev

e

ry

p

ositiv

e c

o

nc

r

e

t

e n

am

e

, a

c

or

-

responding negative one might be framed. After giving a name to any one

thing, or to any

p

lurality o

f

things, we might

c

r

e

at

e

a s

ec

o

n

d

n

ame which

should be a name of all things whatever, except that particular thing or

things. Th

e

s

e ne

gative name

s

ar

e e

m

p

loy

e

d wh

e

n

e

v

e

r w

e

hav

e

o

cc

asio

n

to

speak collectively of all things other than some thing or class of things. When

th

e

positiv

e

name i

s

connotative, th

e c

or

r

espondi

n

g n

e

gativ

e

nam

e

is

c

o

n-

notativ

e

lik

e

wis

e

; but in a peculiar way, connoting not the

pre

s

en

c

e

but th

e

abs

en

ce o

f

an attribut

e

. Thus, not

-

white denotes a

l

l thi

n

gs

w

hat

e

ver

ex

ce

p

t

white things; and

c

onnot

es

th

e

attribute o

f

not pos

se

ssing white

n

ess. For th

e

non-possession of any given attribute is also an attribute, and may receive a

nam

e

as s

uc

h; and thus n

e

gative concr

e

t

e

names may obtai

n n

egativ

e

abstra

c

t

names to correspond to them.*

N

am

e

s whi

c

h ar

e

positive in

f

o

r

m ar

e

o

f

te

n n

egative in r

e

a

l

ity, and others

signified by th

e

t

e

rm to connote. And th

e

schoolm

e

n, to whom w

e

a

re

i

n

debt

ed

for the gr

e

at

e

r

pa

rt of our logical lang

u

ag

e

, gav

e

u

s

this also, and in thi

s

v

e

r

y

s

e

n

se

. For thou

g

h som

e

of th

e

ir g

e

neral

e

xpr

ess

ions

c

ount

e

nan

c

e th

e

u

s

e

o

f th

e

word in

t

he mor

e e

xt

e

n

s

iv

e

and bvagn

e

b acc

e

ptation in which it is take

n

by Mr.

Mil

l

, y

e

t wh

e

n they had to d

e

fine it s

p

ecifically a

s

a t

ec

hni

c

al term, and to fix i

ts

m

e

a

n

ing as

suc

h, with that admirabl

e p

r

e

ci

s

ion which alwa

y

s _

c

hara

ct

edz

es

c th

e

ir

definitions, they clearly explained that nothing was said to be connoted except

forms, whi

c

h word may ge

n

erally, in th

e

ir writing

s

, be u

n

d

e

rstoo

d

as synonymou

s

with attributes.

Now, if the word to connote,

s

o well

s

uit

e

d to th

e

purpo

se

to whi

c

h th

e

y a

ppl

i

ed

it, b

e d

ivert

e

d from that

p

urpo

se

b

y

being tak

e

n t

o

fulfil anoth

e

r, for which it

do

es

not

s

eem to m

e

to he at all required; I am unab

l

e to fi

n

d a

n

y

e

x

p

r

ess

io

n

to

re

p

lace it, but d

s

u

c

h ass are

c

ommo

n

ly em

p

loye

d

in a

s

e

nse

so mu

c

h more ge

n-

e

ral, that it would b

e

u

se

less att

e

m

pt

ing to as

s

o

c

iate th

e

m

pec

uliarly with thi

s

preci

se

id

e

a.

S

uch ar

e

th

e

wor

ds

, t

o

involve, to im

p

ly, &c.

B

y em

p

lo

y

i

n

g th

ese,

I

s

hould

f

ail o

f

attaining th

e

ob

jec

t for whi

c

h alon

e

th

e

name i

s n

eed

e

d,

n

amely, to

distingui

s

h thi

s p

arti

c

ular kind o

f

involving and im

p

lyi

n

g

f

r

o

m all

o

th

e

r ki

nds

,

a

n

d to as

s

u

re

to it th

e

d

e

gr

ee

of habitual att

e

ntio

n

whi

c

h it

s

im

po

rtan

c

e demand

s

.

*

[

72

]

Prof

esso

r

B

ain (Logic, Vol. I,

p

. 56) thinks that negativ

e

nam

es

are

no

t

n

am

es

o

f

all things what

e

v

e

r

e

x

cep

t tho

s

e d

e

noted by th

e c

or

re

lativ

e p

o

s

itive

name

,

but only for all things of some particular class:

not

-

white

, for instance, he

deem

s

not to b

e

a

n

am

e

for

e

ver

y

thing in na

t

ure

e

x

cept w

hite thing

s

, but onl

y

f

o

r

eve

ry

coloured

thi

ng

ot

her

t

h

a

n wh

it

e

.

I

n

th

is ca

se

,

ho

w

e

v

e

r,

as i

n all

o

the

rs

, th

e

t

e

st

o

f what a nam

e

d

e

not

e

s is what it

ca

n b

e p

r

e

dicat

e

d of

:

and w

e

can

ce

rtainly

p

r

e

di

ca

t

e

of a

s

ound

,

or a sm

e

ll

,

that it is not whi

te

.

T

h

e

affi

rm

ation and th

e

n

e

ga-

ti

on of

the

s

a

m

e

attribut

e can

n

o

t but divid

e

th

e

whol

e

fi

e

ld of pr

e

di

ca

tion b

e

tw

ee

n

them.

b-b

MS vagu

e

r

_

-

c

MS

,43

,

46 cha

r

a

c

terize

d

g-

_

MS what

a-aMS stone _bMS not-stone



42 BOOK I, CHAPTERi, § 7

are really positive though their form is negative. The word inconvenient, for

example, does not express the mere absence of convenience; it expresses a

positive attrib

u

te, that o

f

being the cause o

f

discom

f

ort or annoyance. So the

word unpleasant, notwithstanding its negative

f

orm, does not connote the

mere absence of pleasantness, but a less degree of what is signified by the

word painJul, which, it is hardly necessary to say, is positive. Idle, on the

other hand, is a word which, though positive in form, expresses nothing but

what would be signified either by the phrase not working, or by the phrase

not disposed to work; and sober, either by not drunk or by not drunken.

There is a class of names called privative. A privative name is equivalent

in its signification to a positive and a negative name taken together; being

the name of something which has once had a particular attribute, or for some

other reason might have been expected to have it, but which has it not. Such

is the word blind, which is not equivalent to not seeing, or to not capable of

seeing, for it would not, except by a poetical or rhetorical figure, be applied

to stocks and stones. A thing is not usually said to be blind, unless the class

to which it is most familiarly referred, or to which it is referred on the

particular occasion, be chiefly composed of things which can see, as in the

case of a blind man, or a blind horse; or unless it is supposed for any reason

that it ought to see; as in saying of a man, that he rushed blindly into an

abyss, or of philosophers or the clergy that the greater part of them are blind

guides. The names called privative, therefore, connote two things; the ab-

sence of certain attributes, and the presence o

f

others,

f

rom which the

presence also of the former might naturally have been expected.

§ 7. [Relative and Absolute names] The fifth leading division of names

is into relative and absolute, or let us rather say, relative and non-relative;

f

or the word absolute is put upon m

u

ch too hard duty in metaphysics, not to

be willingly spared when its services can be dispensed with. It resembles the

word civil in the language of jurisprudence, which stands for the opposite of

criminal, the opposite of ecclesiastical, the opposite of military, the opposite

of political--in short, the opposite o

f

any positive word which wants a

negative.

Relative names are such as

f

ather, son; ruler, sub

j

ect; like; equal; unlike;

unequal; longer, shorter; cause, e

ff

ect. Their characteristic property is, that

they are always given in pairs. Every relative name which is predicated of an

object, supposes another object (or objects), of which we may predicate

either that same name or another relative name which is said to be the

correlative of the

f

ormer. Thus, when we call any per

s

on a son, we s

u

ppose

other persons who must be called parents. When we call any event a cause,

we suppose another event which is an effect. When we say of any distance

that it i

s

longer, we suppose another di

s

tance which is shorter. When we

s

ay



OF NAMES 43

of an

y

object tha

t it is

like, we

m

ean th

at it is

like

s

o

m

e other

o

bjec

t

, which

is

also said to be like the first. In this last a case both objects receive the same

name; the relative term is its own correlative.

It is evident that these words, when concrete, are, like other concrete

general names, connotative; they denote a subject, and connote an attribute;

and each of them has or might have a corresponding abstract name, to denote

the attribute connoted by the concrete. Thus the concrete like ha

s

its abstract

likeness; the concretes,

f

ather and son, have b, or might have, b the abstracts,

paternity, and cfiliety, or sonship '. The concrete name connotes an attribute,

and the abstract name which answers to it denotes that attribute. But of what

nature is the attribute? Wherein consists the peculiarity in the connotation of

a relative name?

The attribute signified by a relative name, say some, is a relation; and this

they give, if not as a sufficient explanation, at least as the only one attainable.

If they are asked, What then is a relation? they do not profess to be able to

tell. It is generally regarded as something peculiarly recondite and mysterious.

I cannot, however, perceive in what respect it is more so than any other

attribute; indeed, it appears to me to be so in a somewhat less degree. I

conceive rather, that it is by examining into the signification o

f

relative

names, or, in other words, into the nature of the attribute which they con-

note, that a clear insight may best be obtained into the nature of all attributes:

of all that is meant by an attribute.

It is obvious, in fact, that if we take any two correlative names, father and

son

f

or instance, though the objects denoted by the names are di

ff

erent, they

both, in a certain sense, connote the same thing. They cannot, indeed, be

said to connote the same attribute: to be a father, is not the same thing as to be

a son. But when we call one man a father, another aaa son, what we mean to

affirm is a set of facts, which are exactly the same in both cases. To predicate

of A that he is the father of B, and of B that he is the son of A, is to assert

one and the same fact in different words. The two propositions are exactly

equivalent: neither of them asserts more or asserts less than the other. The

paternity of A and the efiliety_ of B are not two facts, but two modes of ex-

pressing the same

f

act. That fact, when analysed, consists of a series of

physical events or phenomena, in which both A and B are parties concerned,

and

f

rom which they both derive names. What those names really connote,

is )'this series of events: that is the meaning, and the whole meaning, which

either of them is intended to convey. The series of events may be said to

_-a+51, 56, 62, 65, 6

8

, 72

_b-b5l, 56, 62, 65, 68, 72

c_MS, 43, 46 filiation] 51, 56 filiety,or filiation

_--_MS,43, 46, 51, 56, 62 his

e-eM

S

,

43

,

4

6

filia

t

ion

) -/MS the



44

BOOKI, CHAPTERi,

§

8

constitute

the rela

ti

on;

th

e schoolmen called it

th

e

f

ounda

ti

on o

f th

e rela

ti

on,

fundamentum relationis

.

In this man

n

er any

f

act, or

s

erie

s

o

f f

acts, in whi

c

h two different obie

c

ts

are imp

lic

ated, and which is there

f

ore predicable o

f

both o

f

them, may be

either

c

on

s

idered as constit

u

ting an attribute o

f

the one, or an attribute o

f

the other. Ac

c

ordi

n

g as we

c

onsider it in the

f

ormer, or in the latter as

p

e

c

t,

it is connoted by the one or the other of the two correlative names. Father

c

onnotes the

f

act, regarded as constituting an attribute o

f

A; son connotes

the same fact, as constituting an attribute of B. It may evidently be regarded

with equal propriety in either light. And all that appears necessary to account

for the existence of relative names, is, that whenever there is a fact in which

two individuals are o concerned, an attribute grounded on that fact may be

ascribed to either of these individuals.

A name, therefore, is said to be relative, when, over and above the object

which it denotes, it implies i

n

its

s

ignification the existence o

f

another ob

j

e

c

t,

a

lso derivi

n

g a denomination

f

rom the same

f

act

w

hi

c

h is the grou

n

d o

f

the

first name. Or (to express the same meaning in other words) a name is rela-

tive, whe

n

, bei

n

g the name o

f

o

n

e

t

hing, its signification ca

n

not be e

x

plained

but by mentioning another. Or we may state it thus--when the name cannot

be employed i

n

dis

c

ourse so as to have a meaning, unles

s

the

n

ame o

f

some

other thing than what it is itself the name of, be either e

x

pressed or under

-

stood, hThese definitions _ are all, at bottom, equivalent, being modes of

vari

o

us

l

y ex

pr

es

s

ing th

is o

ne disti

n

ctive eir

c

umstance--th

a

t every

o

the

r

attri-

bute of an object might, without any contradiction, be conceived still to exist

if *no object be

s

ides that one had ever existed_; * but those of its attrib

u

tes

which are expre

s

sed by relative names, would on that s

u

pposition be swept

a

wa

y.

§ 8. [Univocal and iEquivocal names] Names have been further distin-

gnished into univocal and _equivocah these, however, are not two kinds o

f

names, but two different modes of employing names. A name is univoeal, or

•Or rather, all objects except itself and the percipient mind; for, as we shall

see hereafter, to ascribe any attribute to an object, necessarily implies a mind to

pe

rceive it.

rr

he sim

p

le

an

d

c

lear ex

p

l

a

nation given in the te

x

t, of relation and

r

ela

ti

ve

names, a subject so long the opprobrium of metaphysics, was given (as far as I

know) for the first time, by Mr. James Mill, in his Analysis of the Phenomena

of the Human Mind

[Vol. II, pp. 6ff.].J

o

MS,

43,

4

6

alike

n-hMS,43, 46 Wemay takeour choice among these definitions.They

_'-_MS3, 46, 51, 56 all objects besidesthatonewere annihilated

_-Jq-68,72



OFN

AM

ES 45

applied univoca

U

y

,

with respec

t

to all t

hin

gs of which i

t

can be predic

ated in

the same sense

;

_

it is

_.q

ui

v

o

cal

, or a

pp

li

ed e

e

q

ui

vocal

ly, as res

pe

cts

th

ose

things of which it is predicated in different senses. It is scarcely necessary to

give instances of a fact so familiar as the double meaning of a word. In

reality

, as

h

as

been already o

b

served,

an

a

_

quivocal or ambiguous

w

ord is

not

o

ne n

am

e, but two n

am

es, accidentally coinciding in sound

. File b

mean-

ing a steep instrument, and

file _m

eaning

_

a

li

ne of soldiers, have no more

title to

be

considered one

w

ord, beca

us

e written alike,

than grease

and

Greece

have, beca

us

e

they ar

e prono

un

ced al

i

ke

.

They

ar

e one

so

und, appropriated

to form two different words.

An

in

terme

di

ate

c

as

e

is

th

at of a n

am

e used

analogically

or

m

eta

p

horically;

that is, a name which is predicated of two things, not univocally, or exactly

in

th

e s

am

e signification, but in significations so

m

e

wh

at simila

r

,

an

d

whi

ch

being derived one from the other, one of them may be considered the

primary, and the other a secondary signification. As when we speak of a

brill

ian

t

li

ght

an

d a brilli

an

t ac

hi

eve

m

ent

.

The

w

ord is not applied in

th

e

same sense to the light and to the achievement; but having been applied to

the ligh

t

in

i

t

s o

riginal sense

,

th

at of bri

ghtne

ss

t

o

the e

y

e

, it is

tran

sf

erred

to

the achievement in a derivative signification, supposed to be somewhat like

the primi

ti

ve one. The word,

h

owever, is

j

ust as properly two names instead

o

f

one, in this ease, as in that o

f

the most perfect ambiguity. And one of the

commonest

f

orms o

f

fallacious reasoning arising

f

rom ambiguity, is that o

f

arguing from a metaphorical expression as if it were literal; that is, as if a

word, when applied metaphorically, were the same name as when taken in its

original sense

: w

hic

h

will be

s

een

mor

e particularly in

i

ts place

.

aMS, 43, 46, 51, 56 but

_-bMS, 43, 46, 51 standing for an iron

°

-¢MS,43,

46

, 51 sta

n

di

n

g

fo

r

j. stuart mill - of names

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