Item ID Number 01469

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DOSCriptOD NOtOS Includes "Agent Orange Controversy: Is Agent OrangeResponsible for Health problems Reported AmongVietnam Veterans?", OSTP Issue 1981-1988; Agendafor the Domestic policy Council Agent Orange WorkingGroup at DHHS; "Air Force Health Study: StudyOverview and Update," Air Force Systems Command;three articles, "Agent Orange: An American Tragedy",Joe Cole, The Stars and Stripes National Tribune,November 14,1988, "Legion Testimony Attacks CDCStudy of Agent Orange", The Missouri Veterans News,"The Declassified War", Anthony L. Kimery, Veteran,November/December, 1988; correspondence fromCongress to Donald M. Newman, Chairman, AgentOrange Working Group, November 22,1988;memorandum from National Vietnam VeteransCoalition, November 1988, No. 48, "Agent Orange:Pending New Legislation"

Tuesday, May 15, 2001 Page 1469 of 1514

OSTP ISSUE1981-1988

AGENT ORANGE CONTROVERSY

Is Agent Orange Responsible

For Health Problems Reported

Among Vietnam Veterans?

BACKGROUND

From 1965 to 1970, USAF Applied in

Tactical Operations in South Vietnam,&

42 Million Liters of Agent Orange.

2.5 Million Military Personnel From the

U.S., Australia, New Zealand and South

Korea Served One-Year Tours During the

Same Period.

BACKGROUND (Cont'd)

Beginning in 1978 Many Veterans Of

That Era Reported Medical Problems

That They Believed Stemmed From

Exposure To Agent Orange During Their*»

Military Assignment.

Complaints Have Ranged From Tingling

In the Extremities To Skin Disfigurement

And Rare Forms Of Cancer. Some

Veterans Have Fathered Children With

Birth Defects.

DPC AGENT ORANGE WORKING

GROUP (AOWG)

o 1981 President Reagan Established the

AOWG.<5>

- Chaired By Under Secretary Of HHS

- Serves As Overall Coordinator,

Clearinghouse, And Evaluator Of The

Federal Research Efforts

o Policy Group - HHS, DOD, VA, OMB, OPD

and OSTP

o Science Panel - CDC, NIOSH, NIEHS, NCI,

Air Force, OSHA, EPA, USDA, DOS, & OTA

STATUS OF AOWG ACTIVITIES

o • In The Past 7 Years, AOVVG Provided

Oversight To 10 Major Health Studies And 5

Major Health Surveillance Programs.• ' • • ' ' . • *

o Federal Agencies Have Expended $200 M

On Human, ToxicologicJAnd Environmental

Studies. i"

o CDC/Air Force Developed State-Of-The-Art

Methods For Detecting And Verifying• • . - . - • . : • • i

Exposure.

o Serum Dioxin Studies Completed On

Ground Troops.

Serum Dioxin Analyses Underway For

Cohorts In Air Force Health Study (The Men

Who Served in AF Defoliation Program In

SEA And Their Matched Controls).

FINDINGS

To Date, No Major Health Effects (Mortality,

Cancer Or Birth Defects In Children) Can Be»

Associated With Agent Orange Exposure in

Vietnam.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Retain DPC Agent Orange Working Group

Retain HHS As Chair

Within 18 Months, CDC Rare Cancer Study

And Air Force Health Study Will Be

Completed.

Publish Findings, Brief Congress

Close-Out AOWG

**»s<\*0

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES office of the Secretary

Washington, D.C. 20201

AGENDA FOR THE DOMESTIC POLICYCOUNCIL AGENT ORANGE WORKING GROUP

December 6, 1988 - 2:00-3:00 P.M.

Welcome and Introductions Chairman Don Newman

Report from DOD Admiral Edward Blasser ,DAS/Defense

A presentation by Major-General James Sanders, Air ForceDeputy Surgeon-General and the USAF Health Study (RanchHand) team.

Report from Chairman Science Panel Dr. Vernon Houk

Remarks from the Veterans Administration Don Ivers

Other business from Members Chairman Don Newman

Closing remarks Chairman Don Newman

DECEMBER 1988BRIEFER:COL WILLIAM H. WOLFE

EK-RT-i; -.1

SERUM DIOXIN STUDIES

ASSAY DEVELOPED AT CDC TO DETECT DIOXIN IN SERUMAT PARTS PER TRILLON LEVEL

JOINT USAF/CDC EFFORTS:HALF-LIFE STUDIES (7.1 YEARS)

ASSAY OF AFHS PARTICIPANTS

PRETEST OF 200 DEMONSTRATED ASSAY VALIDITY

RANCH HAND MEAN = 48.0 PPT

COMPARISON MEAN = 4.8 PPT

EXPANDED STUDY OF 2010 PARTICIPANTS

TO BE COMPLETED IN 1989

FUNDED BY HQ AFSC WITH REIMBURSEMENT FROM

EXCESS VA^ FUNDS (S.11) / j

DETAILS OF TRANSFER BEING ARRANGED

FUNDS TO COVER COST OF ASSAYS AND ANALYSIS

JEK-RT-12-11 881122

STATUS TO DATE

SERUM DIOXIN VALUES IN AFHS PERSONNEL

GROUP "NUMBER MEAN RANGE

RANCH HAND 283 35.0 1.6 - 313

COMPARISON 246 4.8 0 - 84

RANCH HAND

ENLISTED GROUND 184 46'3 1 '6 ~313

OTHER OCCUPATIONAL STRATA ARE TOO SPARSE

FOR ANALYSIS AT THIS TIME

JSAM/LS-10-11 881122

AIR FORCE HEALTH STUDY250 -r

200--

150- -

NUMBER OFPARTICIPANTS

100:,

50--

0-9

SERUM DIOXIN RESULTS

COMPARISONS

RANCH HANDS

•llllil

10-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200 or^ more

SERUM TCDD LEVEL (ppt)

SCHEDULE OF REPORTS

REPORT

1989 MORTALITY UPDATECOMPARISON COHORT EXPANDED

(N=19, 101)

BIRTH DEFECT REANALYSISBASED ON FULLY VERIFIED DATA

THIRD MORBIDITY REPORT

PUBLICATION DATE

WINTER 1988/1989

SUMMER/FALL 1989

FALL/WINTER 1989

SAM/LS-10-4 881122

FUTURE PLANS

1989 COMPLETE SERUM DIOXIN ASSAYS

1990 ANALYZE SERUM DIOXIN DATA AND PUBLISH REPORT

1991 PREPARE FOR AWARD OF CONTRACT FOR THIRDFOLLOWUP EXAMINATIONS

1992 CONDUCT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS

1993 ANALYZE DATA

1994 PUBLISH REPORT

SAM/LS-10-13 881122

AFHS ADVISORY COMMITTEEISSUES

SCIENCE PANEL OF THE AOWG STRONGLY SUPPORTS KEEPINGTHE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT WITHIN DHHS

USAF PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS STRONGLY FAVOR CURRENT STRUCTUREANY ACTION BY USAF OR DOD TO MANAGE THE COMMITTE ORSELECT ITS MEMBERS WILL GENERATE CHARGES OF INTERFERENCE ORCONFLICT OF INTEREST

INTENSE CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST EMPHASIZES NEED TOMAINTAIN SCIENTIFIC INDEPENDENCE

SAM/LS-10-10 881122

AFHS ADVISORY COMMITTEERECOMMENDATIONS

RENEW CHARTER OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COMMITTEE WITHIN DHHS

SELECT MEMBERS AFTER REQUESTING NOMINEES FROMVETERANS GROUPS

SELECT CHAIRMAN FROM CIVILIANS CURRENTLY SERVING

DR LEONARD KURLAND

DR RICHARD MONSON

SAM/LS-10-14 881122

ADIPOSE TISSUE TCDD LEVELSIN EXPOSED PERSONS

MISSOURI 1986

HORSE ARENA

RESIDENTIAL

WASTE HAULING

TCP PRODUCTION

50 150 250 350 450 550 650 750

PARTS PER TRILLION (PPT)

0 - 100 PPTEXPANDED

20 60 100

SENT BY.'Xerox Telecopier 7020 ;12- 5-58 ; 8-52AM 4044884531^ 2024723519I« 3

VIETNAM VETERANS(646 MEN)

1 MAN

fc•4. < •*. <

*

NON-VIETNAM VETERANS(97 MEN)

too•0•070BO•040•0BO100

RANCH HANDGROUND CREW

(147 MEN)

A. • 1 MAN

COMPARISONGROUND CREW

(49 MEN)

TCDD (PARTS PER TRILLION)

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BACKGROUNDREFERENCE

RANGE (< 20 PPT)

27821

27032

NO NO ND NO(.13) (.16) (.17) (.59)

137

PERSONS FROMUNEXPOSED AREA

(ZONE S)

PERSONS FROMEXPOSED AREA(ZONE A) WITH

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PERSONS FROMEXPOSED AREA(ZONE A) WITH

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"To C*r» For Him Who Stull*n 6an>« Th» Sctti* And

. Fo> Ht* Wtahm And Ml. Orphtn-AbrthMn Lincoln

14 NOVEMBER 1988 THE STARS AND STRIPES-THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE .7

Agent Orange: An American TragedyIn May 1983 officials of the Center for

Disease Control (CDC) recommendevacuation of the Quail Run MobileHome Park near Times Beach, Missouri,after EPA. officials find dioxin contami-nation in excess of four times that of thetown of Times Beach (1,100 ppb.). Morethan 90 percent of the town of TimesBeach, located approximately 25 milessouthwest of SL Louis, Mo., was found tobe contaminated with more than 100 ppb.of dioxin, according to a January 1983report CDC officials warned the morethan 3,000 residents to stay away becauseof health hazards.

Police were stopping the residents fromremoving personal belongings out of fearof spreading the contaminants to otherareas. Flooding of the Meramec Rivermay have further contaminated vast areasof southern Missouri, -

Russell Bliss, owner of Russell Bliss

By Joe Cole

Drain Oil Service, has been identified asthe source of much of the contaminatedwaste oils which were sprayed on over100 sites in southern Missouri, includingTimes Beach. The town of Times Beachpaid Bliss $4,800 for two applications ofthe contaminated waste oils in 1971 and1972. The federal government has sincepaid a reported 34.5 million dollars for thepurchase of Times Beach, as pan of theEPA Super-fund hazardous waste siteclean-up program.

Last April 1988, Mr. Brian Manza, adisabled Vietnam veteran, visited theTimes Beach site, only to be turned awayby EPA officials, wearing "moon suits" asBrian described them. Theentireareawasfenced and posted as an extremely hazard-ous waste site. Brian's concerns areobvious to Vietnam veterans who wereexposed to toxic chemicals in Vietnam.

Millions of gallons of Agent Orange,contaminated with dioxin were sprayedover vast areas of Vietnam. If two spraymissions using less than 5,000 gallons ofcontaminated oil could do this to a town inMissouri, what could millions of gallonsof oil-based herbicides contaminatedwith dioxin at thousands of times the levelfound in Times Beach do to a countrycalled Vietnam?

In 1986, the Centers for Disease Controlconducted blood serum studies of Viet-nam veterans, as a possible method ofidentifying those veterans who may havebeen exposed to toxic chemicals whileserving in the Vietnam War. Their find-ings indicated that Vietnam veterans'levels of dioxin in blood were similar tothose samples of persons who had notserved in Vietnam. Since the non-ex-

posed comparison group was selectedfrom the Times Beach and SouthernMissouri area, one can only speculate as tothe meaning of the studies results. South-ern Missouri is no better nor worse thanVietnam.

Last 7 July 1988, the Department ofDefense declassified documents whichrevealed that the Defense Department-hadpurchased a chemical plant at NVeldonSprings, Missouri, which was to produce8 million gallons of Agent Orange peryear by late 1969, over and above theentire domestically produced product,which was currently being used for defo-liation in Vietnam.

Declassified USMACV reports indi-cate herbicide use in Vietnam during 1967through 1969 was 11.9 million gallons peryear. V/eldon Springs, Missouri is locatedapproximately 25 miles west of SLLouis.*

PAGES THE MISSOURI VETERANS NEWS

Legion Testimony AttacksCDC Study of Agent Orange

WASHINGTON (ALNS)— The government has"fallen short of its responsi-bility" to compensate vic-tims of Agent Orange expo-sure, an American Legionspokesman has told a Housesubcommittee.

The statement submittedby John Sommer, director ofthe Legion's Veterans Af-

. fairs and Rehabilitation Di-1 vision, expressed serious

concern for the govern-ment's lack of responsibilityin recognizing any problemsassociated with dioxin expo-sure. Sommer criticized theCenters for Disease Controlfor its mishandling of re-search data, and for itsinterpretation of the data theCpC researchers did gather.

Sommer pointed out thatthe CDC study of AgentOrange exposure was solimited by the restrictionsupon just what veteranswould be included that anaccurate picture of theseveterans was not developed.Veterans eliminated fromthe group which the agency .looked at were those whoserved more than one tour in .Vietnam, those who servedIn a particular unit for fewerthan 180 days, those whowere above the rank of E-S,those who transferred fromone unit to another duringtheir tour, and any veteranwho served any number ofdays before or after the pro-posed study window (Janu-ary, 1967-December, 1968).

The U. S. sprayed more

ffAgefir'Orange'16nvafci;area ^

• smaller than the size of NewJersey during the war. "It isabsurd that the CDC saysthat it cannot find enoughpeople to study," Sommersaid. He told the membersthat the CDC developed astudy that was "destined tofail."

Basic research flaws werecommitted by the CDC,Sommer said. Among the er-rors made were what hecalled "cardinal sins ofepidemiology." First, theCDC research diluted the ef-fects of Agent Orange expo-sure by including in thestudy group every person inVietnam. For example,about Lin every 5 men whoserved in Vietnam actuallyserved in combat. The CDC"generalized" exposure toAgent Orange across the en-tire service population inVietnam, so that the 20 percent likely to be exposedwas diluted by the other 80per cent of the non-exposedmen.

To further weaken theCDC's study, the veteranswho were not included in thestudy took away the "statis-tical power" of the potentialdioxin victims. "A know-ledgeable epidemiologistwould try to optimize thechance of observing aneffect by including, ratherthan excluding, the veteranswho are most likely to havesuffered from exposures inquestion," Sommer said. '

Sommer also alleged thatthe CDC would minimize any ..flndlng^wWcnf^niuld^tte^Vietnam service to health

problems. Levels of combatwere not analyzed, nor wereother studies which showedthat levels of combat had agreat deal to do with healthproblems of Vietnam veter-ans looked at. "It seems thatevery time the CDC came upwith a positive finding, itwas interpreted to be eithernegative or wrong," Som-mer told the committee.

The CDC also failed toavail itself of the compre;hensive computer analysis

.of Vietnam service and•where troops were duringdifferent periods. He saidthat the data, developed bythe U.S. Army and Joint Ser-vices Environmental Sup-port Group, is one of themost carefully developedand extensive records of anyenvironmental exposure tobe found anywhere. Hechastised the CDC for optingfor a simplistic approach,rather than using this vitaland readily available tool

Despite Congressionalmandates calling on the Vet-erans Administration to paya certain amount for certaindiseases, not one AgentOrange claim has yet to bepaid. The VA also denied apresumption for certainproblems to be related todioxin exposure, denyingeven more veterans the rightto collect disability compen-sation.

Sommer's testimony alsoendorsed a legislative initia-tive which would excludepayments made to veteransand their survivors underthe Agent Orange liabilitysettlement In 1984 frombeing counted as incomewhen determining eligibilityfor or entitlement to a veter-an's or survivor's pension ora veteran's medical careunder means test provisions.He also called for the bill tobe extended beyond VA pro-grams, to include any.based government asstance program. •

•" ' ' ' ' ' '

DeclassifiedWarDocuments Disclose A/O UseCounterproductive And Ineffective

By Anthony L. Kimery

Ihas been nearly 20 yean since the last orange-tripcd, 55-gallon drum of Agent Orange wasprayed on the green canopy of Southeast Asia.

Since that time, the debate about its use and lethal sideeffects has appeared steadily throughout what are nowyellowing pages of newsprint, scientific journals, con-gressional hearings, and scholarly attempts to relate

' 'the history of its use. abuse, and deadly, devastatingconsequences. Yet, after all that, there is still anotherstory to be told. It is the story about the internal poli-cies, politics, and decision-making regarding the useof chemical defoliants in Southeast Asia. The story isbased on reams of newly declassified militaryrecords that -were recently released by the Army for

' storage at'the National Records and Archives Centernear Washington. DC.

This reporter spent weeks examining these records,most of which were declassified for the first time sincebeing turned over to the National Archives. The docu-ments show that America's use of defoliants in SouthVietnam—a program that would be expanded to in-clude Laos and Cambodia in direct violation of MACVdirectives governing the use of herbicides—was a hol-ly debated and often strongly contested concept amongmilitary and political planners, strategists, and an-alysts.

Agent Orange and its chemical cousin. AgentWhite, were first introduced to South Vietnam in 1962,albeit in limited quantities. According to the docu-ments turned over by the Army to the National Ar-chives, the defoliants were earmarked for three broadpurposes. First, they offered a means to destroy cropsand therefore deny foodstuffs to the burgeoning Viet-cong movement in the coumryside';"second, theyoffered a means to dampen infiltration by providingobservation corridors to South Vietmunete aerial spot-ters; and third, they offered support for alliedoperations—by clearing out landing zones and fire-bases. Between its introduction in 1962 and the end ofthe program in the early I970's, the U.S. governmentdumped 20 to 40 million gallons of the chemical onSoutheast Asia, according to the documents. Exactfigures are hard to come by, in apparent reflection ofthe willy-nilly planning of the U.S. program.

While actual day-to-day chemical operations wereunder the titular control of the South Vietnamese gov-ernment, it's clear the U.S. initialed and monitored theprogram's effectiveness.

Contrary to popular belief, the most healed debatesabout the use of defoliants were not over the dangersthey posed to human health, but over whether theprincipal reasons for their being used were justified.The Archives' records indicate that the military has longbeen aware that the saturation of South Vietnam widi

herbicides was actually causing more problems than itwas solving.

The declassified records show that the horrific after-math of Ranch Hand should have been avoided on thegrounds that the program was counterproductive withrespect to the objectives it hoped to achieve. Yet it wasallowed to continue. The documents also indicate thatwithin just a few years of their introduction to Viet-nam, and continuing through the early I970's, therewas overwhelming evidence that the use of defoliantswas not hindering the VC by depriving them of food-stuffs.

A study conducted on the use of herbicides between1%) and June 1967, for instance, found that there hadbeen nd effects of any significance from the use of theherbicides. The study concluded that their use wasinstead causing damage with respect to winning thehearts and minds of the Vietnamese.

This report, and many others, clearly pointed to thenegligible benefits of the further use of defoliants. Amajor policy review was convened in 1968 which,while conceding that the risks of using the defoliantsdid not outweigh the benefits, concluded that defolia-tion efforts should be intensified. As a result of thisstudy, a clause was built into subsequent directives forusing herbicides to permit their use in heavily pop-ulated areas, "in those cases of extreme militarynecessity." More important stilt, the military docu-ments show that economic considerations broughtabout by the government's murd-million-dollar commit-ment to bringing on-line a government-run AgentOrange production plant was an important factor inescalating defoliation efforts.

In late 1967, prior to the broad-based policy reviewon the use of defoliants in South Vietnam, theAmerican military command in South Vietnam

prepared a memorandum containing harsh languageabout the "disadvantages" of using herbicides. "Theherbicide program carries with it the potential for caus-ing serious adverse impacts on the economic, social,and psychological .fields." the report concluded.Nevertheless, the proponents of Agent Orange withinMACV continued to push for expanded use of AgentOrange and other herbicides. Consequently, the debateabout their use continued to be rigorously fought inSaigon, despite doubts about the herbicides' actualeffectiveness.

Probably no better illustration of the conflict withinthe military over the use of herbicides is a July 1967MACV memorandum setting forth new criteria fordefoliant use. "Crop destruction should continue to bethe highest priority for the use of herbicides." (he

memorandum states. It adds, "there has never been aquestion as to the effectiveness of crop destruction."This conclusion, however, is in glaring contrast towhat militarily contracted studies and intelligence re-ports were showing. A RAND Corporation report con-cluded in October 1967 that the VC required only threepercent of the total food consumed in the country, thatthe crop-destruction operations were not in any majorsense denying food to the VC, and that Vietnamesepeasants, the target of long-range pacification objec-tives, bore (he brunt of the crop-destruction efforts,and they held the U.S. and the Government ofSourh Vietnam (GVN) responsible.

As of July 31, 1968. the VCand North VietnameseArmy (NVA) had a daily food requirement of about215 short ions, according to the documents. About 58percent, or 124 short tons, could be internally procuredin South Vietnam. Of that, "only a small portion isproduced by the enemy in areas subject to herbicideoperations," a MACV report concluded. This reportadded that "food shortages are reported in captureddocuments, but they are temporary in nature and areoften the result of distribution problems. The enemyusually meets the minimum food requirements of hismilitary forces."

Numerous internal MACV reports, memorandums,and intelligence briefs support these conclusions. A1968 MACV report on the RAND and other studiesstates, "reported food shortages have been the result ofAllied sweep operations, not of herbicide operations.''

This had already been spelled out earlier, in a Decem-ber 1967 field report to MACV, which states, "thisheadquarters does not have empirical data on theeffects of herbicide operations on VC/NVA foodstocks, nor is there evidence that enemy combat op-erations have been cancelled because of food shortagesresulting from crop destruction. Such food shortages as

Continued on next page

Above: Three Air Force C-I.Ws spray Orange inthe A Shau. Right: A USAF airman operates sprayequipment during defoliation mission

NOVEMBnR/OECF.MRF.R |0«»

are known (o exist among the VC arc the results of amany-faceted program to deny resources to theenemy." The report went on to stale that "the effortand cost of employing crop destruction is insignificantin comparison to (he troop effort required to controland secure an equivalent area of rice."

(n a 1968 MACV evaluation of crop-destructionprograms which followed the final 1%8 herbicide poli-cy review, Col. John Moran, chief of the ChemicalOperations Division, slated (hat "herbicide crop de-struction is only one aspect of a comprehensive food-denial program." Moran went on to stale that depriva-tion of food is due more to "Allied sweep operations"and only "occasionally to herbicide operations."

The 196)1 MACV evaluation also emphasizes, as didthe contracted private studies, (hat "very few POWswho have infiltrated ever mention the efforts of U.S.herbicide operations. Some stale (hat they have seenareas where vegetation has been killed but do notmention any infiltration problems caused by (he de-foliation. There are indications that U.S. herbicideoperations have had a negligible effect on NVA in-filtration and combat operations."

Yet, while this report says, "herbicide operations. . . appear to cause temporary food shortages in thearea defoliated, but have little lasting effect onthe VONVA food supply." it nevertheless states, "theCINCPAC Scientific Advisory Group concludes,without qualification, (hat the crop-destruction pro-gram is an essential and effective part of the total effortin South Vietnam."

If there was ever any doubt about the ineffectivenessof U.S. defoliation operations, however, they were putfirmly to rest in a MACV briefing paper dated Decem-ber 1967. "Within the context of what has been stud-ied, it would appear the crop-destruction effort maywell be counterproductive. The VC continue to feedthemselves, while the peasant bears the brunt_of the

deprivation and doesn't like it." In other words, theU.S. policy of spraying Agent Orange over wide areasof South Vietnam in order to deny the VC and NVA theuse of cover and food resources was not only notworking and unnecessary, it was actually harming theAmerican war effort.

ile it was agreed by military planners inSaigon that the use of herbicides was suc-

T T cessful in denying the enemy cover, there isabundant evidence that defoliants did not significantlydeprive the Vietcong access to food stores. One of themost damning condemnations of the use of herbicidesfound in the National Archives came in a November20. 1968. letter from Robert II. Marian, USAID assis-tant director for economic planning and policy andembassy counselor for economic affaire to U.S. ambas-sador Ellsworth Bunker.

Marian protested the expanding use of defoliants inQuang Due and Phu Bon Provinces. "I feel compelledto nonconcur in both proposals," Harlan wrote."Although crop destruction operations may have hadsome successes, we suspect their effectiveness in ham-pering enemy military operations may have been ex-aggerated. The Report of the Herbicide Policy ReviewCommittee, itself, on Page 17 pointed out, 'herbicidecrop destruction is only one aspect of the efforts todeny foodstuffs to the VONVA. The enemy relies oncommercial purchases, imports, taxation, requisition,and confiscation for some 90 percent of his foodrequirement.' "

The negligible contribution!! of herbicide operationswere equally evident with respect to the effect thatherbicide operations were having on the Vietnamesepopulation. In the early !960's. a herbicide evaluationreport noted, "the chief sufferer from crop-destructionoperations is the local worker." Such findings con-

At right: USAF sprayers in stables in South Vietnam; theycalled for thousands of gallons. Below: Loading White onan Irotjuois prior to defoliation mission. U.S. dispatchedspecial chemical teams

tinued (o mount through the balance of the 1960's andup until (he 1968 policy review.

The same inconsistencies found in the debate aboutthe effectiveness of denying food to the VONVA werejust as replete in the debate over the psychologicaleffects (he defoliants were supposed to bring. OneMACV report. Advantages and Disadvantages of theUse of Herhicides in Vietnam, states, "the herbicideprogram dues not loom large as a public-opinion issueat the present lime." At the same lime, a MAC-CORDS evaluation report was staling that "the herbi-cide program is one of the most widely known pro-grams" among the population, and it "is a naturaltopic of interest with people whose livelihood is in theland."

"The principal effect on pacification is the animos-ity the peasant feels initially towards the U.S. for beingresponsible for the damage," the MAC-CORDS eval-uation says, "and then toward the GVN for its failureto rectify the situation. There is nothing that can bedone beforehand lo head off the alienation the peasantdevelops when his crops are destroyed." The MAC-CORDS report then summarizes the inadequacy ofSouth Vietnam government efforts to compensate anti-VC peasants for the inadvertent loss of their crops.

"The present system is completely unsatisfactoryfrom the point of view of rectifying the economicdamage and its psychological impact by demonstratinglo the peasant the concern of the government for hiswelfare," (he report states.

"The slowness and unfairness of this system usuallyresult in further alienation of the peasant. He is left tohis own devices to find the means with which to replanthis crop, if there is enough time left in the growingseason, or lo find some other means of supporting hisfamily. Even if his claim were approved, the time lapsebetween submission and payment and the fact that itrepresents only a fraction of the actual damage, havethe result of leaving the peasant in the hole and bearingthe responsibility for an act he was helpless to prevent.As long as the present system remains, the pacificationprogram is going lo suffer unpredictable .setbackswhich h is at present unable to alleviate wnh-^ny—'effectiveness . . . The net effect is to alienate himfurther from his government.

The report's conclusion seems to indicate that thespraying of Agent Orange was having more than just aslight impact on VC and NVA resources—it wasactually turning pro-government peasants into anti-government guerrillas.

Col. Moran's report corroborates the MAC-CORDSevaluation. "The vast majority of (he enemy's dailyfood requirement is procured through taxation of thepeople and purchases from the local markets," Moranwrote. "While the enemy's production capability hasbeen reduced, his procurement efforts have enabledhim to sustain his forces. The taxes levied on thepeople arc in the form of food, money, and services.Through these measure!!, the enemy has been able (o.procure enough food from outside his areas to nearlyoffset his production losses.

"The obvious reaction of the peasant whose laborshave been destroyed is one of bitterness and haired. Hewill frequently direct this hatred toward the U.SXJVNfor accomplishing the destruction. If he has previouslyleaned toward the VC, he is likely to side with themcompletely after the crop destruction.

"Captured documents and interrogation reportsindicate that the detrimental effects of herbicide op-erations far outweigh the beneficial effects." Moranconcludes. "Civilians living in VONVA-conlrolledareas, whose crops are destroyed by herbicide op-erations, have no recourse but lo face famine andpossible starvation as a result of Allied destruction oftheir crops."

The declassified documents clearly present a picturewhich shows that the U.S.'s defoliation program nulli-fied pacification efforts by alienating the Vietnamesefrom not only the U.S.. but from their own governmentas well. By the time the defoliation operations werestopped, the damage was irreparable. The documentsalso show that in other areas, the U.S. defoliationcampaign was counterproductive to the U.S. wareffort. The records show, for instance, that the destruc-tion of valuable resources, such as harvestable limberand rubber trees, was far greater than was reported oradmitted by the U.S. during (he war.

VETERAN

L

s public concerns over the use of herbicidesintensified, the need for a policy was quicklyrecognized and embarked upon by (he U.S. It

is clear from (he minutes of those meetings (hat theintent was to allay fears by not only continuing defolia-tion efforts, hut by expanding them.

The first meeting on this subject took place on Jan-uary 17, 1968. under (he chairmanship of DavidCarpenter, political officer at the U.S. embassy. In amemorandum for the record distributed (he followingday by Col. Morin. he stresses thai Carpenter"emphasized that if (here should be a leak of thisinformation to the press, (he embassy would receivemany inquiries which would be d i f f i c u l t torespond to."

Not only was the embassy keeping the true intentand purpose of the policy review from the press, it wasalso keeping it secret from the GVN. "Mr. Carpentercautioned the members of the committee that thereshould he no release of the purpose and actions of thecommittee (o the Republic of Vietnam," Moran wrote.' 'There may be a need to call on officials of the Repub-lic of Vietnam for certain data; however, such contactsshould be limited to (he specific subject area involvedwithout divulging any information of the policy re-view. He further requested that contacts with the Viet-namese government concerning these matters be con-ducted with his office."

Such secrecy contrasted with the U.S.'s repeatedassertion (hat herbicide operations were strictly underthe control of (he GVN. with (he U.S. providing onlysupport and logistic roles. This was again reiterated at aSeptember 20.l%8. background briefing for the pressin Saigon following the policy review.

The answers provided to questions raised by thepress during the briefing glaringly contradict informa-tion about the negligible effects of the defoliation pro-grams. A memorandum to the secretary of stale fromAmbassador Bunker, drafted the week before the pressbriefing, establishes that the press, public, and even

the GVN. were being deliberately deceived about theconsequences of herbicide operations.

"We would prefer not to draw attention, even byimplication, to the serious shortcomings (he |policy|review revealed in (he aspects of (he |hertncide| pro-grams." Bunker said.

Among the shortcomings (hat were being concealedwas the growing concern over the economics of toomuch Agent Orange having been procured. By (histime, "the entire commercial production of Orange(had been | diverted from domestic use to military re-

.quirements in Southeast Asia."Throughout the late I960'], beginning in 1967.

military records declassified for the Veteran began toreflect that (here were pressing economic reasonsfavoring (he apparent unjustified reason (o increase theuse of defoliants, especially Agent Orange, which hadwrongly been ordered in vast quantities because of adomestic shortage.

In secret briefing papers prepared during late 1967,at a time when the Department of Defense was purlinginto motion an Agent Orange expansion program, it isevident that orders for Agent Orange had consistentlyfar exceeded both the ability and capability for usingthis herbicide, which had caused an enormoussurplus—a surplus that was only going to get worsewith a new multi-million dollar, government-runAgent Orange production plant soon to come on-line asa result of the expansion program.

One of the conclusions of these briefing papers,which helped to prepare the way for the pending policyreview, was that "MACV could be embarrassed if[the) plant expansion is carried out, and the pro-grammed herbicide cannot be used."

A report prepared by USAF Col. H.F. Greenhow,Material Division, put the economic reasons for un-precedented increase in the use of Agent Orange vivid-ly in focus: "In view of the large inventory on hand,(he huge investment in production capability, and thefuture low cost of Orange, it is imperative from aneconomic point of view (hat Orange be used to themaximum extent possible and that White be used onlywhen there is a compelling operational requirement."Greenhow stressed that "the MACV staff computingrequirements need to be more accurate in (heir com-putations and project their requirements into the futureand realize die dollar impact caused by changes inrequirements."

By the time Greenhow prepared his report, howev-er, MACVs "overstatement of requirements" hadcaused "excess quantities (of Agent Orange) havingbeen purchased." resulting in an 18-month supply onhand in (he system, with an additional eight milliongallons per year to begin being produced in December1969 by the government's facility.

The pressure was on. Twenty-eight million gallonshad been committed for the completion of this plant,located at Weklon Springs. Missouri, as a result of the .deputy secretary of defense having, on erroneous in-formation, ordered an Agent Orange expansion pro-gram on July 31, 1967, an order that came at a timewhen MACV was well aware that the use of AgentOrange was far less than it was forecasting, or had thecapability to use. It was also at a time when the MACVsecret briefing papers were pointing out that"MACV could be embarrassed if plant expansion is carriedout. and the programmed herbicide cannot be teed."

By early 1969. the problem with the surplus ofAgent Orange was embarrassingly out of hand. Com-munications traffic during this time period was freneticwith requests and discussions about reducing the sur-plus of Agent Orange. Asa result. Agent Orange beganto be used for every defoliation purpose. The use of allother herbicides was brought to an abrupt halt, while anumber of policies governing the use of defoliantswere relaxed in order to deplete (he Agent Orangesurplus.

Since "Agent Orange stocks were in long supply,and costly contract terminations were involved," onememorandum states in communications used in thedecision to halt the use of other defoliants, the termina-tion of the use of other herbicides "should result inconsiderable dollar savings from acceptance and max-

l*eft: Dr. James flrwninspects results tifdefoliant sprayin/t.Below: Ranch handsinspert chemicalMurage tank onboardU.S. aircraft

imum use of Orange."Another memorandum emphasizes the nerd to use

' 'Orange in lieu of White (o avoid further procurementof White.'' Contracts for Agent Orange were having (obe "terminated at msts in excess of 1.5 million dol-lars." with "ultimate" contract terminations costingihe government $19.1 million—a reflection of the USgovernment's inability lo draw-down the AgentOrange surplus.

' 'Considerable dollar savings may he expected fromacceptable and maximum use of Orange." anothermemorandum stales. "Forestalling potential futurecriticism of herbicide procurements should result ifOrange can be employed to a greater extent*... re-quest review of requirements for both Orange andWhite herbicides and recommendations concerningpossible means to increase substitution of Orange forWhile."

Memorandum after memorandum reiterates Ihe sur-plus problem. "White is being consumed at higherthan forecast rates and is in short supply, while Orangeis heavily overstocked." one report notes. "Everyeffort must be made lo schedule herbicide operations insuch a manner that White will not be used in lieu ofOrange." another report says.

"Considerations argue strongly for use of Orange,which is overstocked." wrote Army deputy assistantchief of staff. MACV. Brigadier General John G.Wheelock. 111.

Finally, on April 14. 1969, the U.S. embassy sus-pended its policy requiring the use of Agent Orange oncertain restricted defoliation targets, such as rubberplantations and other valuable natural resources, andallowed the "use of Orange herbicide on all defoliationtargets." adding, "for economic reasons, the use ofOrange is preferred."

When concerns about the dangers dioxinposed to human health began to explodeseven months later, in late 1969. there was

still little attention paid to Ihe ramifications of the all-out effort to deplete Agent Orange stockpiles. A mem-orandum from the deputy secretary of defense to thechairman of (he Joint Chiefs of Staff sent lo CINCPACconcludes that "large-scale substitution for Orangewill not be permitted."

Despite (he fact that the memorandum points out(even at this early lime) that the National Institutes ofHealth had presented evidence that 2.4.5-T "can causemalformation of offsprings and stillbirths in mice,when given in relatively high doses." and that "thismaterial is present in defoliant Orange." Ihe large-scale, and apparently counterproductive, spraying ofthe chemical went forward.

Within a few years, though, (he outrage over usingchemical defoliants had grown so intense, both backhome and in (he world community, that Ihe U.S. wasforced lo cancel its defoliation operations. But. by thattime, following a decade of having negligently sat-urated Southeast Asia with the chemical, the damagehad already been done by a program, Ihe objectives ofwhich all along were not being achieved."

NOVF.MBF.R/DF.CEMBKR I 17

Congreste of tfje ®mtebJB.C. 20510

November 22, 1988

Honorable Donald M. NewmanChairmanAgent Orange Working Group200 Independence Avenue, S.W.Washington, D.C. 20201

Dear Don,

As Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House and SenateVeterans' Affairs Committees, we are writing to request that theAgent Orange Working Group review and provide comments on fivestudies recently published in "Environmental Research." (A copy ofthe journal is enclosed.) The studies examine the health effects ofherbicide exposure and service in Vietnam based on questionnairescompleted by American Legion members. We would appreciate yourcomments with respect to the scientific methods used, the validityof the statistical analyses, and the strength of the studies'findings.

As always, we appreciate your continuing cooperation and support.We look forward to your response.

With warm regards,

Cordially,

ans't'onChairman

Frank H. MurkowskiRanking Minority Member

Senate Committee onVeterans' Affairs

-»-A ruc<iG.V. (Sonny) MontgomeryChairman ' <j y i f 1

BZ AOW e<?,„/,„/„ Q3A

Solomonnority Member

House/Committee onVete/ans1 Affairs

J. IVmu* Hnrrh. Jr.

NATIONAL VIETNAM VETERANS COALITION1000 Thomas Jefferson St.. Sixlh Floor

Washington. D.C. 20007(202) 338 NVVC

November 1988 . No. 48

AGENT ORANGEPending New Legislation

The omnibus veterans benefits legislation contains thefollowing new provisions on Agent Orange:

(T)his agreement (i.e. the bill) would extend, fromSeptember 30, 1989 to December 31, 1990, the authority to providebasic VA health-care services for veterans' disabilities if it isfound that the veteran, during active duty, may have been exposedin Vietnam to any toxic substance in a herbicide ordefoliant. . . .

(T)he agreement also includes a provision that states thatamounts received as part of the settlement of the agent orangeproduct liability litigation will not be considered as income forpurposes of any of the needs-based programs administer by the VA,including nonservice-connected VA pension.

(T)he proposed amendments would require the VA to conduct anoutreach program to Vietnam veterans oriented to notifying themof health risks, if any, resulting from exposure to herbicides in

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Vietnam, as information on such health risks becomes known. Inorder to facilitate such an outreach effort, the bill wouldrequire the VA to take reasonable actions to organize and updatethe information contained in the VA's agent orange registry,particularly the addresses of veterans listed in the registry.(Remarks by Rep. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Congressional Record,Oct. 19, 1988, H10353.)

The committee report accompanying the legislation includesthe following comments:

Section 1203 of the bill treats Agent Orange payments "asreimbursement for prior unreimbursed medical expenses."(Id., H10338, 10555) (Ed. Note: The bill, however, does not makea similar exception for Social Security disability pensions orfood stamp eligibility.) ....

>After February 28, 1989, not less than one-third of the

total number of members of the Ranch Hand Advisory Committeeshall be individuals selected by the Secretary of Health andHuman Services from among scientists who are recommended byveterans' organizations . . . . (Id., H10334, H10339)

The House . . . rejected a Senate bill that, for the firsttime, would award disability benefits to veterans exposed toAgenent Orange during the Vietnam War [i.e., for soft tissuesarcoma, no-Hodgkins lymphoma] (Rep. Sonny) Montgomery saidfurther studies were needed to prove a connection between variousdiseases and Agent Organge. (Philadelphia Inquierer, Oct. 20,1988)

"Sprayed and Betrayed" - Round II

More newly declassified documents emerge from the NationalArchives:

The State Department was involved in policy-making respraying operations. "On 14 April 1969, the U.S. Embassysuspended its policy requiring the use of WHITE herbicide oncertain restricted defoliation targets and will now allow use ofORANGE herbicide in all defoliation targets. For economicreasons, tfie use of ORANGE is preferred . . . . We respectfullyrequest that you assure WHITE stocks are kept available for useshould the policy be deinstituted." (Memorandum for Col. TranDinh Tho from Col. Harold C. Kerne (?) , Jr., "Use of DefoliantsORANGE and WHITE (V), 17 April 1969). LTC John A. Sullivan,CONVSNACV notes in a memo to CINCPAC "Ambassador Sullivan'sapproval has been requested for the use of CS in those areas ofLaos approved for spray operations. ("Use of Riot Control AgentCS," undated)

MIAs. During the week ending 4 Feb. 67, the followingdefoliation missions were flown in Laos with C-123 aircraft:

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31 Jan 3 sorties . . . Acft 611 lost to ground fire. 5 KIA(Ed. Note: the five men are now on the MIA list) (Memorandumfrom Maj. Philip L. Boster, COMUSMACV to NMCC, "Herbicide Report(V)," undated. Access Number (?) 0380818)

The Empty Drums. The New Jersey Agent Orange Commissioninterprets other reports: •

"It seems that as far as the US Government was concerned,"empty" Agent Orange drums were the property of the,, ARVN, andthey could dispose of then anyway they chose. The problem wasthe drums weren't really empty, and each contained about 2.2gallons of Agent Orange that was not pumped o,ut. The ARVN, intheir constant quest to turn an extra buck, sold the drums toanyone who wanted them, generally civilians for about $2 each.The creative Vietnamese civilians used them for all sorts ofthings, spilling the residual Agent Orange all over the place andseriously damaging plants and shade trees throughout the city ofDanang. The defoliant was even killing the civilians' vegetablegardens. Since we were using about 1000 gallns per day ofherbicide out of Danang at the time, about 20 "empty" drums ofAgent Orange were hitting the streets of Danang every day!! tocompound this lunacy even more, it seems that the Vietnamese Navycompound purchased some of the drums to store gasoline for theirgenerators. The result is that they ended up fogging theirentire compound through the generator exhaust with Agent Orange,effectively killing all vegetation in sight!!

"The report recommended that the practice of allowing theARVN to sell the drums be discontinued, but we're not sure thatever happened. It also should be mentioned that Agent Orange wasalso stored at Bien Hoa, Phu Cat, Nha Trang, and in Saigon andwas presumably disposed in the same manner." (NJAOC, AgentOrange Update, Oct. 1988)

Miscellaneous

1. From studying the injuries among the tens of thousandsof Kurdish refugees, the doctors believe the Iraquis are using amixture of herbicide and a form of tear gas known as CS to drivethe Kurds from their mountain villages. (Edmonton Journal, (?)Sept. 21, 1988)

2. (Vietnam veteran Ron Heiman) was 38 years old when hedied in January of this year .... The doctor put as the causeof death, on his death certificate, the type of cancer thatkilled him, and added that it was a direct result of Agent Orangepoisoning. This is the first time such a statement appeared inan official record.

Well, the Death Certificate on file at the County Medicalexaminer's office has been changed! Any reference to Agent

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Orange has been removed from the official files! (Attachment toletter from George L. Claxton, Oct. 19, 1988)

3. Was the morbidity of women Vietnam-era veteransaffected by assignment in Vietnam? . . . (N)o remarkabledifferences (between a control group of 720 U.S.-basedVietnam-era veterans and a study group of 28 Vietnam veterans)are seen in the percentage of those who had an acute illness, GYNcondition or miscarriage.

However, three interesting differences are observed. First,a higher percentage of those who were assigned in Vietnam havechronic conditions and disabilities, and they have more of them.Second, a higher percentage have been told they have cancer.Third, although a smaller percentage of Vietnam-assigned womenever had a baby, a higher percentage of those who did havechildren born with defects and/or die before their firstbirthday. (Le Donne, Trends in Morbidity and Use of HealthServices by Women Veterans of Vietnam, Navy Medicine. May-June1988, p. 24)

4. What's Evidence?, by Joe Cole (Mahess Productions, Inc.states: "blows the lid off") Send $15.00 to Joe Cole, 6806 36thAve., S.E., Olympia, Washington 98503

5. As part of a budget austerity program in Massachusetts,the state's funding of its prestigious Agent Orange Commissionhas been reportedly "substantially reduced."

6. The Washington (Me) Sunrise Memorial; Made of twolarge, rugged stones, standing like the tattered pages of an openboo, the memorial carries three messages: one for those who arestill missing in action or prisoners of war; one for all the menand women who served in Southeast Asia; and one for the veteranswho have died, and the veterans and their families who continueto suffer, from medical and psychological problems associatedwith exposure to the chemical defoliants, such as Agent Orange,used in the war. (Bangor Daily News, Oct. 24, 1988)(Ed.Note:This is claimed to be the first memorial in the country to honorAgent Orange victims .J

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