Islamic democracyFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Islamic democracy refers to a political ideology that seeks to apply Islamic principles to public policy within a democratic framework. In practice, there are three kinds of political systems in the Muslim-majority countries today; the basis of the distinction between them has to do with how comprehensively Islam is incorporated into the affairs of the state:[1]

1. Secular democracies , in secular states such as Azerbaijan and Turkey, that do not recognize any religion as its state religion and, therefore, does not incorporate religious principles into its public policy and other state affairs.

2. Religious democracies ; that recognize Islam as its state religion and a source of legislation, such as Malaysia and Maldives. The application of religious principles into public policy varies from country to country, since Islam is not the only source of law, such as Pakistan.

3. Theocracies ; that endeavor to institute Sharia, in full force,[1] and offers more comprehensive inclusion of Islam into the affairs of the state. Presently, Iran is the only example of an Islamic state in the form of Islamic republics.

Not all of these states are recognized internationally as democratic under concepts of liberal democracy.

The concepts of liberalism and democratic participation were already present in the medieval Islamic world.The Rashidun Caliphate is perceived by its proponents as an early example of a democratic state and it is claimed that the development of democracy in the Islamic world eventually came to a halt following to the Sunni–Shia split.[5]

Sunni viewpointDeliberations of the Caliphates, most notably the Rashidun Caliphate were not democratic in the modern sense rather, decision-making power lay with a council of notable and trusted companions of Muhammad and representatives of different tribes (most of them selected or elected within their tribes).[6]

In the early Islamic Caliphate, the head of state, the Caliph, had a position based on the notion of a successor to Muhammad's political authority, who, according to Sunnis, were ideally elected by the people or their representatives,[7] as was the case for the election of Abu Bakr,Umar bin Alkhattab Uthman and Ali as Caliph. After the Rashidun Caliphs, later Caliphates during the Islamic Golden Age had a much lesser degree of democratic participation, but since "no one was superior to anyone else except on the basis of piety and virtue" in Islam, and following the example of Muhammad, later Islamic rulers often held public consultations with the people in their affairs.[8]

The legislative power of the Caliph (or later, the Sultan) was always restricted by the scholarly class, the ulama, a group regarded as the guardians of the law. Since the law came from the legal scholars, this prevented the Caliph from dictating legal results. Laws were decided based on the ijma (consensus) of the Ummah (community), which was most often represented by the legal scholars.[9]In order to qualify as a legal scholar, it was required that they obtain a doctorate known as the ijazat attadris wa 'l-ifttd  ("license to teach and issue legal opinions") from a madrasa.[10] In many ways, classical Islamic law functioned like a constitutional law.[9]

Democratic religious pluralism also existed in classical Islamic law, as the religious laws and courts of other religions, including Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism, were usually accommodated within the Islamic legal framework, as seen in the early Caliphate,Al-Andalus, Islamic India, and the Ottoman Millet system.[11][12]

Legal scholar L. Ali Khan argues that Islam is fully compatible with democracy. In his book, A Theory of Universal Democracy, Khan provides a critique of liberal democracy and secularism. He presents the concept of "fusion state" in which religion and state are fused. There are no contradictions in God's universe, says

Khan. Contradictions represent the limited knowledge that human beings have. According to the Quran and the Sunnah, Muslims are fully capable of preserving spirituality and self-rule.[13]

Furthermore, counter arguments to these points assert that this attitude presuppose democracy as a static system which only embraces a particular type of social and cultural system, namely that of the post-Christian West. See:constitutional theocracy .

Muslim democrats, including Ahmad Moussalli (professor of political science at the American University of Beirut), argue that concepts in the Quran point towards some form of democracy, or at least away from despotism. These concepts include shura (consultation), ijma (consensus), al-hurriyya (freedom), al-huqquq al-shar'iyya (legitimate rights). For example shura (Al Imran 3:159,[14] Ash-Shura 42:38[15]) may include electing leaders to represent and govern on the community’s behalf. Government by the people is not therefore necessarily incompatible with the rule of Islam, whilst it has also been argued that rule by a religious authority is not the same as rule by a representative of God. This viewpoint, however, is disputed by more traditional Muslims. Moussalli argues that despotic Islamic governments have abused the Quranic concepts for their own ends: "For instance, shura, a doctrine that demands the participation of society in running the affairs of its government, became in reality a doctrine that was manipulated by political and religious elites to secure their economic, social and political interests at the expense of other segments of society," (InProgressive Muslims 2003).

Much debate occurs on the subject of which Islamic traditions are fixed principles, and which are subject to democratic change, or other forms of modification in view of changing circumstances. Some Muslims allude to an "Islamic" style of democracy which would recognize such distinctions.[16] Another sensitive issue involves the status of monarchs and other leaders, the degree of loyalty which Muslims owe such people, and what to do in case of a conflicting loyalties (e.g., if a monarch disagrees with an imam).

Shia viewpoint[edit]

According to the Shia understanding, Muhammad named as his successor (as leader, with Muhammad being the final prophet), his son-in-law and cousin Ali. Therefore the first three of the four elected "Rightly Guided" Caliphs recognized by Sunnis ('Ali being the fourth), are considered usurpers, notwithstanding their having been "elected" through some sort of conciliar deliberation (which the Shia do not accept as a representative of the Muslim society of that time). The largest Shia grouping — the Twelvers branch — recognizes a series of Twelve Imams, the last of which (Muhammad al-Mahdi, the Hidden Imam) is still alive and the Shia are waiting for his reappearance.

Since the revolution in Iran, Twelver Shia political thought has been dominated by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini argued that in the absence of the Hidden Imam and other divinely-appointed figures (in whom ultimate political authority rests), Muslims have not only the right, but also the obligation, to establish an "Islamic state."[17] To that end they must turn to scholars of Islamic law (fiqh) who are qualified to interpret the Quran and the writings of the imams. Khomeini distinguishes between Conventional Fiqh and Dynamic Fiqh, which he believes to also be necessary.

Khomeini divides the Islamic commandments or Ahkam into three branches:

the primary commandments (Persian:  اوليه (حكم the secondary commandments (Persian:  ثانويه and (حكم the state commandments (Persian:  حكومتي .(حكم

This list includes all commandments which relate to public affairs, such as constitutions, social security, insurance, bank, labour law , taxation, elections, congress etc. Some of these codes may not strictly or implicitly pointed out in the Quran and generally in the Sunnah, but should not violate any of the two, unless there's a collision of rules in which the more important one is given preference (an apparent, but not inherent, violation of a rule). Therefore, Khomeini emphasized that the (elected) Islamic state has absolute right (Persian:  مطلقه to enact state commandments, even if it (appears as if it) violates the primary or (واليت

secondary commandments of Islam. This should happen when a more important primary or secondary commandment is in danger because of some limitations.

For example an (elected) Islamic state can ratify (according to some constitutions) mandatory insurance of employees to all employers being Muslim or not even if it violates mutual consent between them. This shows the compatibility of Islam with modern forms of social codes for present and future life,[18] as various countries and nations may have different kinds of constitutions now and may have new ones in future.[19]

Philosophical viewpoint[edit]

The early Islamic philosopher, Al-Farabi (c. 872-950), in one of his most notable works Al-Madina al-Fadila, theorized an ideal Islamic state which he compared toPlato's The Republic.[20] Al-Farabi departed from the Platonic view in that he regarded the ideal state to be ruled by the prophet, instead of the philosopher king Envisaged by Plato. Al-Farabi argued that the ideal state was the city-state of Medina when it was governed by Muhammad, as its head of state, as he was in direct communion with God whose law was revealed to him. In the absence of the prophet, Al-Farabi considered democracy as the closest to the ideal state, regarding the republican order of the Rashidun Caliphate as an example within early Muslim history. However, he also maintained that it was from democracy that imperfect states emerged, noting how the republican order of the early Islamic Caliphate of the Rashidun caliphs was later replaced by a form of government resembling a monarchy under the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties.[21]

A thousand years later, the modern Islamic philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, also viewed the early Islamic Caliphate as being compatible with democracy. He "welcomed the formation of popularly elected legislative assemblies" in the Muslim world as a "return to the original purity of Islam." He argued that Islam had the "gems of an economic and democratic organization of society", but that this growth was stunted by the monarchist rule of Umayyad Caliphate, which established the Caliphate as a great Islamic empire but led to political Islamic ideals being "repaganized" and the early Muslims losing sight of the "most important potentialities of their faith."[22]

Another internationally acclaimed Muslim scholar and thinker Muhammad Asad viewed Democracy as perfectly compatible with Islam. In his book The Principles of State and Government in Islam, he notes: "Viewed from this historical perspective, 'democracy' as conceived in the modern West is infinitely nearer to the Islamicthan to the ancient Greek concept of liberty; for Islam maintains that all human beings are socially equal and must, therefore, be given the same opportunities for development and self-expression. On the other hand, Islam makes it incumbent upon Muslims to subordinate their decisions to the guidance of the Divine Law revealed in the Qur'ãn and exemplified by the Prophet: an obligation which imposes definite limits on the community's right to legislate and denies to the 'will of the people' that attribute of sovereignty which forms so integral a part of the Western concept of democracy."[23]

Islamic democracy in practice[edit]

Obstacles[edit]See also: Democracy in the Middle East

Waltz writes that transformations to democracy seemed on the whole to pass by the Islamic Middle East at a time when such transformations were a central theme in other parts of the world, although she does note that, of late, the increasing number of elections being held in the region indicates some form of adoption of democratic traditions.[24] There are several ideas on the relationship between Islam in the Middle East and democracy. Writing on The Guardian website,[25] Brian Whitaker, the paper's Middle East editor, argued that there were four major obstacles to democracy in the region: the imperial legacy, oil wealth, the Arab–Israeli conflict and militant or "backward-looking" Islam.

The imperial legacy includes the borders of the modern states themselves and the existence of significant minorities within the states. Acknowledgment of these differences is frequently suppressed usually in the cause of "national unity" and sometimes to obscure the fact that minority elite is controlling the country. Brian

Whitaker argues that this leads to the formation of political parties on ethnic, religious or regional divisions, rather than over policy differences. Voting therefore becomes an assertion of one's identity rather than a real choice.

The problem with oil and the wealth it generates is that the states' rulers have the wealth to remain in power, as they can pay off or repress most potential opponents. Brian Whitaker argues that as there is no need for taxation there is less pressure for representation. Furthermore, Western governments require a stable source of oil and are therefore more prone to maintain the status quo, rather than push for reforms which may lead to periods of instability. This can be linked intopolitical economy explanations for the occurrence of authoritarian regimes and lack of democracy in the Middle East, particularly the prevalence of rentier states in the Middle East.[26] A consequence of the lack of taxation that Whitaker talks of in such rentier economies is an inactive civil society. As civil society is seen to be an integral part of democracy it raises doubts over the feasibility of democracy developing in the Middle East in such situations.[27]

Whitaker's third point is that the Arab–Israeli conflict serves as a unifying factor for the countries of the Arab League, and also serves as an excuse for repression by Middle Eastern governments. For example, in March 2004 Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, Lebanon's leading Shia cleric, is reported as saying "We have emergency laws, we have control by the security agencies, we have stagnation of opposition parties, we have the appropriation of political rights - all this in the name of the Arab-Israeli conflict". The West, especially the USA, is also seen as a supporter of Israel, and so it and its institutions, including democracy, are seen by many Muslims as suspect. Khaled Abou El Fadl , a lecturer in Islamic law at the University of California comments "modernity, despite its much scientific advancement, reached Muslims packaged in the ugliness of disempowerment and alienation."

This repression by secularist Arab rulers has led to the growth of radical Islamic movements, as they believe that the institution of an Islamic theocracy will lead to a more just society. However, these groups tend to be very intolerant of alternative views, including the ideas of democracy. Many Muslims who argue that Islam and democracy are compatible live in the West, and are therefore seen as "contaminated" by non-Islamic ideas.[25]

Orientalist scholars offer another viewpoint on the relationship between Islam and democratisation in the Middle East. They argue that the compatibility is simply not there between secular democracy and Arab-Islamic culture in the Middle East which has a strong history of undemocratic beliefs and authoritarian power structures.[27] Kedourie, a well known Orientalist scholar, said for example: "to hold simultaneously ideas which are not easily reconcilable argues, then, a deep confusion in the Arab public mind, at least about the meaning of democracy. The confusion is, however, understandable since the idea of democracy is quite alien to the mind-set of Islam."[28] A view similar to this that understands Islam and democracy to be incompatible because of seemingly irreconcilable differences between Sharia and democratic ideals is also held by some Islamists. However, within Islam there are ideas held by some that believe Islam and democracy in some form are indeed compatible due to the existence of the concept of shura (meaning consultation) in the Quran. Views such as this have been expressed by various thinkers and political activists in the Middle East.[29] They continue to be the subject of controversy, e.g. at the second Dubai Debates, which debated the question "Can Arab and Islamic values be reconciled with democracy?"[30]

Practice[edit]See also: List of Islamic democratic political parties

Following the Arab Spring, professor Olivier Roy of the European University Institute in an article in Foreign Policy has described political Islam as "increasingly interdependent" with democracy, such that "neither can now survive without the other".[31]

The Green Algeria Alliance is an Islamist coalition of political parties, created for the legislative election, 2012 in Algeria. It consists of the Movement of Society for Peace (Hamas), Islamic Renaissance Movement (Ennahda) and the Movement for National Reform (Islah).[32] The alliance is led by Bouguerra Soltani of the Hamas.[33] However, the incumbent coalition, consisting of the FLN of President Abdelaziz

Bouteflika and the RND of Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, held on to power after winning a majority of seats and the Islamist parties of the Green Algeria Alliance lost seats in legislative election of 2012.[34][35]

Shia Islamist Al Wefaq, Salafi Islamist Al Asalah and Sunni Islamist Al-Menbar Islamic Society are dominant democratic forces in Bahrain.[36]

During the Bangladesh Liberation War, the Jamaat -e-Islami  of Pakistan opposed the independence of Bangladesh, but established itself there as an independent political party, the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami after 1975.[37][38] The Bangladesh Nationalist Party is the second largest party in the Parliament of Bangladeshand the main opposition party. The BNP promotes a center-right policy combining elements of conservatism, Islamism, nationalism and anti-communism. The party believes that Islam is an integral part of the socio-cultural life of Bangladesh, and favors Islamic principles and cultural views. Since 2000, it has been allied with the Islamic parties Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh and Islami Oikya Jote .[39]

The Party of Democratic Action is the largest political party in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Party of Democratic Action was founded in May 1990 by reformist Islamist Alija Izetbegović ,[40] representing the conservative Bosniaks and other Slavic Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia.[41]

In the Egyptian parliamentary election, 2011–2012, the political parties identified as "Islamist" and "democratic" (the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, Salafist Al-Nour Party and liberal Islamist Al-Wasat Party) won 75% of the total seats.[42] Mohamed Morsi, an Islamist democrat of the Muslim Brotherhood was the first democratically elected president of Egypt.[citation needed]

Nahdlatul Ulama  and Muhammadiyah are two very influential Islamist social movement in Indonesia. National Awakening Party, United Development Party andProsperous Justice Party are major Indonesian Islamist parties, active in country's democratic process.[43][44][45]

The Islamic Action Front is Jordan's Islamist political party and largest democratic political force in country. The IAF's survival in Jordan is primarily due to its flexibility and less radical approach to politics.[46]

The Islamic Group is a Sunni Islamist and Hezbollah is a Shia Islamist political party in Lebanon.[47]

The Justice and Construction Party is the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm in Libya and the second largest political force in the country.[48][49][50] National Forces Alliance, largest political group in country, doesn't believe the country should be run entirely by Sharia law or secular law, but does hold that Sharia should be "the main inspiration for legislation." Party leader Jibril has said the NFA is a moderate Islamic movement that recognises the importance of Islam in political life and favours Sharia as the basis of the law.[51]

The United Malays National Organisation is the dominant party of Malaysia since that county's independence in 1957. UMNO sees and defines itself as a moderate Islamist, Islamic democratic and social conservative party of Muslim Malays.[52] The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party is a major opposition party and is relatively more conservative and traditionalist than the UMNO.[53][third-party source

needed]

The Moroccan Justice and Development Party has been the ruling party in Morocco since 29 November 2011. The Justice and Development Party advocates Islamism and Islamic democracy.[54][55]

Hamas  is the Sunni Islamist organization of Palestine that governs the Gaza Strip with Sharia law.[56] Hamas also has a military resistance wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades .[57]

The Muslim Brotherhood of Syria is a Sunni Islamist force in Syria and very loosely affiliated to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It has also been called the "dominant group" or "dominant force" in the Arab Spring uprising in Syria.[58] The group's stated political positions are moderate and in its most recent April 2012 manifesto it "pledges to respect individual rights", to promote pluralism and democracy.[59]

The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan is Tajikistan's Islamist party and main opposition and democratic force in that country.[60]

The Ennahda Movement , also known as Renaissance Party or simply Ennahda, is a moderate Islamist political party in Tunisia.[61][62][63][64] On 1 March 2011, after the government of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali collapsed in the wake of the 2011 Tunisian revolution, Tunisia's interim government granted the group permission to form a political party. Since then it has become the biggest and most well-organized party in Tunisia, so far outdistancing its more secular competitors. In theTunisian Constituent Assembly election, 2011, the first honest election in the country's history with a turn out of 51.1% of all eligible voters, the party won 37.04% of the popular vote and 89 (41%) of the 217 assembly seats, far more than any other party.[9][65][66][67][68]

Pakistan[edit]Early in the history of the state of Pakistan (12 March 1949), a parliamentary resolution (the Objectives Resolution) was adopted in accordance with the vision of the founding fathers of the Pakistan Movement (Muhammad Iqbal, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan ).[69] proclaiming:

Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone but He has delegated it to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust.

The State shall exercise its powers and authority through the elected representatives of the people. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by

Islam, shall be fully observed. Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in

accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in the Quran and Sunnah. Provision shall be made for the religious minorities to freely profess and practice their religions

and develop their cultures.

This resolution later became key source of inspiration for the writers of the Constitution of Pakistan and is included in it as preamble. However, Pakistan is practically an semi-secular state and Islamists and Islamic democratic parties in Pakistan are relatively less influential then democratic Islamists of other Muslim democracies.

Iran[edit]Theory[edit]The idea and concept of Islamic democracy has been accepted by many Iranian clerics, scholars and intellectuals.[70][71][72][73][74] The most notable of those who have accepted the theory of Islamic democracy is probably Iran's Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who mentions Islamic democracy as "Mardomsalarie Dini" in his speeches.

There are also other Iranian scholars who oppose or at least criticise the concept of Islamic democracy. Among the most popular of them are Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi [75]  who have written: "If not referring to the people votes would result in accusations of tyranny then it is allowed to accept people vote as a secondary commandment."[76] Also Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi has more or less the same viewpoint.

On the other hand, clergy like Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari  believe that: "The obligatory religious commandments in public domain not necessarily imply recognition of religious state. These obligations can be interpreted as the power of Muslims' religious conscience and applying that through civil society".[77] These clergies strictly reject the concept of Islamic state regardless of being democratic or not. They also believe no relationship

between Islam and democracy at all, opposing the interpretation of clergy like Ayatollah Makarim al-Shirazi from Islamic state. But they do not mention how legal laws as an example can not be implemented using civil societies and how to administer a country relying on conscience only.

Practice[edit]Some Iranians, including Mohammad Khatami, categorize the Islamic republic of Iran as a kind of religious democracy.[78] They maintain that Ayatollah Khomeini held the same view as well and that's why he strongly chose "Jomhoorie Eslami" (Islamic Republic) over "Hokoomate Eslami" (Islamic State).

Others maintain that not only is the Islamic Republic of Iran undemocratic (see Politics of Iran) but that Khomeini himself opposed the principle of democracy in his book Hokumat -e Islami: Wilayat al-Faqih , where he denied the need for any legislative body saying, "no one has the right to legislate ... except ... the Divine Legislator", and during the Islamic Revolution, when he told Iranians, "Do not use this term, 'democratic.' That is the Western style."[79] Although it is in contrast with his commandment to Mehdi Bazargan . It is a subject of lively debate among pro-Islamic Iranian intelligentsia. Also they maintain that Iran's sharia courts, the Islamic Revolutionary Court, blasphemy laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Mutaween (religious police) violate the principles of democratic governance.[80]However, it should be understood that when a democracy is accepted to be Islamic by people, the law of Islam becomes the democratically ratified law of that country. Iranians have ratified the constitution in which the principle rules are explicitly mentioned as the rules of Islam to which other rules should conform.Ayatollah khomeini fervently believed that principles of democracy can't provide the targeted justice of Islam in the Sharia and Islamic thoughts.(Mohaghegh.Behnam 2014) This contrast of view between the two Iranian head leaders of this Islamic country,as above mentioned about Khatami's and Khomeini's views have provisionally been being a case of disaffiliation of nearly half a country in most probable political coincidence,so the people cognizant of this heterogeneous political belief shall not be affiliated by newly formed views of democratic principles.(Mohaghegh,Behnam 2014)

Indices of democracy in Muslim countries[edit]

There are several non-governmental organizations that publish and maintain indices of freedom in the world, according to their own various definitions of the term, and rank countries as being free, partly free, or unfree using various measures of freedom, including political rights, economic rights, freedom of the press and civil liberties.

The following lists Muslim-majority countries and shows the scores given by two frequently used indices: Freedom in the World (2013) by the US-based Freedom House and the 2012 Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit. These indices are frequently used in Western media, but have attracted some criticism and may not reflect recent changes.

As of 2012, Indonesia is the only Muslim-majority nation acknowledged as democratic by both Freedom

House and Economist democracy indexes.

Tariq RamadanFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Tariq Ramadan

Born August 26, 1962 (age 52)

Geneva, Switzerland

Nationality Switzerland

Alma mater University of Geneva (Ph.D.)

Religion Islam

Era 21st-century philosophy

Institutions University of Fribourg (1996–2003); Oxford

University (2005–present)

Main interests Islamic studies

Theology

Philosophy

Politics

Interfaith dialogue

Literature

Influences[show]

Website

www.tariqramadan.com

Tariq Ramadan (Arabic:  رمضان born 26 August 1962) is a Swiss academic and writer ;طارقof Egyptian origin. He is also a Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies in the Faculty of Oriental Studies at Oxford University (Oriental Institute, St Antony's College). He also teaches at the Oxford Faculty of Theology. He is Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies (Qatar), and Director of the Research Centre of Islamic Legislation and Ethics (Qatar).[3] He is a member of the UK Foreign Office Advisory Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief.[4] He advocates the study and re-interpretation of Islamic texts, and emphasizes the heterogeneous nature of Western Muslims.[5]

Contents  [hide] 

1 Biography 2 Oxford University Professorship 3 U.S. visa revocation and subsequent lifting 4 Views

o 4.1 Debate 5 Critical reception

o 5.1 Praiseo 5.2 Criticism

5.2.1 Response to some of the criticism 5.2.2 Public reception

6 Selected works 7 References 8 External links

Biography[edit]

Tariq Ramadan (at table, right) speaking in Oxford.

Tariq Ramadan was born in Geneva, Switzerland on 26 August 1962. He is the son of Said Ramadan and Wafa Al-Bana, who was the eldest daughter of Hassan al Banna, who in 1928 founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Gamal al-Banna , the liberal Muslim reformer is his great-uncle. His father was a prominent figure in the Muslim Brotherhoodand was exiled by Gamal Abdul Nasser [6]  from Egypt to Switzerland, where Tariq was born.

Tariq Ramadan studied Philosophy and French literature at the Masters level and holds a PhD in Arabic and Islamic studiesfrom the University of Geneva. He also wrote a PhD dissertation on Friedrich Nietzsche, titled Nietzsche as a Historian of Philosophy.[7]

He taught at the Collège de Saussure , a high school in Geneva, Switzerland, and held a lectureship in Religion and Philosophy at the University of Fribourg from 1996 to 2003. In October 2005 he began teaching at St Antony's College at theUniversity of Oxford on a Visiting Fellowship. In 2005 he was a senior research fellow at the Lokahi Foundation.[8][9] In 2007 he successfully applied for the professorship in Islamic studies at the University of Leiden, but then declined to take up the position, citing professional reasons.[10][11] He was also a guest professor of Identity and Citizenship at Erasmus UniversityRotterdam,[12][13][14] till August 2009 when the City of Rotterdam and Erasmus University dismissed him from his positions as "integration adviser" and professor, stating that the program he chairs on Iran's Press TV, Islam & Life, was "irreconcilable" with his duties in Rotterdam.[15][16] Ramadan described this move as Islamophobic and politically charged.[17] Beginning September 2009, Ramadan was appointed to the Chair in Contemporary Islamic Studies at Oxford University.[18]

Ramadan established the Mouvement des Musulmans Suisses (Movement of Swiss Muslims), which engages in various interfaith seminars. He is an advisor to theEU on religious issues and was sought for advice by the EU on a commission on "Islam and Secularism".In September 2005 he was invited to join a task force by the government of the United Kingdom.[6] He is also the founder and President of the European Muslim Network,[19] a Brussels-based think-tank that develops and implements political strategies for promoting an Islamist agenda in Europe. [citation needed]

Oxford University Professorship[edit]

In October of 2008, Oxford University accepted a benefaction of 2.3 million pounds from Qatar to establish and maintain a new and permanent Professorship in Contemporary Islamic Studies titled "His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani Professorship in Contemporary Islamic Sciences." Tariq Ramadan had begun lecturing at Oxford in 2005 (after being barred by the U.S. State Department from accepting a professorship in the USA. [20]) and was a member of the committee that negotiated the benefaction. Less than one year later, Ramadan's appointment to the endowed chair was announced.[21] The terms of Ramadan's contract with Oxford stipulate that for a period of ten years, he shall devote himself to the establishment of a research center in Qatar. In January 2012, with famed Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Qatar's Queen Sheikha Mozah at his side, Ramadan presided over an elaborate opening ceremony for Doha's new Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics. [22] With the financial support and aura of respectability conferred by an endowed Oxford chair, Ramadan is now free to pursue his life dream of being "an activist professor." [23] Thus he trots the globe delivering mostly non-academic speeches to mostly Muslim audiences in support of his political and religious views.[citation needed]

He is widely interviewed and has produced about 100 tapes which sell tens of thousands of copies each year.[24]

As of 2009, Tariq Ramadan was persona non grata in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,[25] Libya and Syria because of his "criticism of these undemocratic regimes that deny the most basic human rights".[26]

U.S. visa revocation and subsequent lifting[edit]

In February 2004, Tariq Ramadan accepted the tenured position of Henry R. Luce Professor of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, at the University of Notre Dame in South Bend, Indiana, United States. He was granted a nonimmigrant visa on May 5; however, on July 28, his H-1B visa was revoked by the State Department.[27] In August 2004, spokesman for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement cited the "ideological exclusion provision" of the USA PATRIOT Act as the grounds for Ramadan's visa revocation.[28] In

October, the University of Notre Dame filed a H-1B petition on Ramadan's behalf. After hearing no response from the government by December, Ramadan resigned his position from the university.

In September 2005, Ramadan filed an application for a B Visa to allow him to participate at speaking arrangements with various organizations and universities. The government did not issue a decision on Ramadan's visa application, so the American Civil Liberties Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit on January 25, 2006 against the United States government on behalf of the American Academy of Religion, the American Association of University Professors and thePEN American Center – three groups who had planned on meeting with Ramadan in the US – for revoking Ramadan's visa under the "ideological exclusion provision". The ACLU and NYCLU argued that the ideological exclusion provision was in violation of the First Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights of those three groups and that the government's actions violated the Administrative Procedures Act.[29] After two months had passed without a decision being made, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Pursuant to the injunction, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered the government on June 23, 2006 to issue its decision on Ramadan's pending B Visa application within 90 days. [30]

On September 19, 2006, the government formally denied Ramadan's visa application. A State Department statement said: "A U.S. consular officer has denied Dr. Tariq Ramadan's visa application. The consular officer concluded that Dr. Ramadan was inadmissible based solely on his actions, which constituted providing material support to a terrorist organization."[31][32] Between December 1998 and July 2002, Ramadan had given donations totalling $940 to two charity organizations, the Committee for Charity and Support for the Palestinians (CBSP) or Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens and the Association de Secours Palestinien.[33] The United States Treasury designated both the CBSP and ASP terrorist fundraising organizations for their alleged links to Hamas on August 22, 2003.[34] The U.S. Embassy told Ramadan that he "reasonably should have known" that the charities provided money to Hamas. In an article in The Washington Post, Ramadan asked: "How should I reasonably have known of their activities before the U.S. government itself knew?"[33][35][36][37]

On February 2, 2007, the ACLU and NYCLU amended their complaint, arguing that the government's explanation for denying Ramadan's visa application was not "facially legitimate and bona fide" and that the ideological exclusion provision of the PATRIOT Act was in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments. They also argued that Ramadan's denial violated the First Amendment rights of those who wanted to hear him speak. In his decision on December 20, 2007, District Judge Paul A. Crotty ruled that the government's justification for denying Ramadan's visa was "facially legitimate and bona fide" and noted that the Court "has no authority to override the Government's consular decision".[38]

In January 2008, the ACLU appealed Crotty's ruling. Jameel Jaffer , Director of the ACLU National Security Project and lead attorney in the case, stated:

"The government's shifting positions only underscore why meaningful judicial review – the kind of oversight that the district court failed to provide – is so important. In Professor Ramadan's case and many others, the government is using immigration laws to stigmatize and exclude its critics and to censor and control the ideas that Americans can hear. Censorship of this kind is completely inconsistent with the most basic principles of an open society."

Ramadan himself remarked:

"The U.S. government's actions in my case seem, at least to me, to have been arbitrary and myopic. But I am encouraged by the unwavering support I have received from ordinary Americans, civic groups and particularly from scholars, academic organizations, and the ACLU. I am heartened by the emerging debate in the U.S. about what has been happening to our countries and ideals in the past six years. And I am hopeful that eventually I will be allowed to enter the country so that I may contribute to the debate and be enriched by dialogue."[39]

On July 17, 2009, the US federal appeals court reversed the ruling of the lower district court. The three-judge panel on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit – composed of Judges Jon O. Newman, Wilfred Feinberg and Reena Raggi  – ruled that the Court had "jurisdiction to consider the claim, despite the doctrine of consular nonreviewability". They stated that government was required by law to "confront Ramadan with the allegation against him and afford him the subsequent opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and reasonably should not have known, that the recipient of his contributions was a terrorist organization." Under the limited review permitted by the 1972 Supreme Court ruling in Kleindienst v. Mandel, the panel concluded that the "record does not establish that the consular officer who denied the visa confronted Ramadan with the allegation that he had knowingly rendered material support to a terrorist organization, thereby precluding an adequate opportunity for Ramadan to attempt to satisfy the provision that exempts a visa applicant from exclusion under the 'material support' subsection if he 'can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [he] did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization.'" Additionally, the panel agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that their First Amendment rights had been violated. The panel remanded the case to a lower court to determine if the consular officer had confronted Ramadan with the "allegation that he knew that ASP provided funds to Hamas and then providing him with a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that he did not know, and should not have reasonably known, of that fact."[40]

Following the ruling, Ramadan stated, "I am very gratified with the court's decision. I am eager to engage once again with Americans in the kinds of face-to-face discussions that are central to academic exchange and crucial to bridging cultural divides." Melissa Goodman, staff attorney with the ACLU National Security Project, issued a statement saying, "Given today's decision, we hope that the Obama administration will immediately end Professor Ramadan's exclusion. We also encourage the new administration to reconsider the exclusion of other foreign scholars, writers and artists who were barred from the country by the Bush administration on ideological grounds." [41]

On January 20, 2010, after more than five years of waiting, the American State Department has decided, in a document signed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to lift the ban that prohibited Ramadan (as well as Professor Adam Habib from South Africa) from entering the United States. On the lifting of this ban, Ramadan has stated:

Coming after nearly six years of inquiry and investigation, Secretary Clinton's order confirms what I have affirmed and reaffirmed from day one: the first accusations of terrorist connections (subsequently dropped), then donations to Palestinian solidarity groups, were nothing more than a pretense to prohibit me from speaking critically about American government policy on American soil. The decision brings to an end a dark period in American politics that saw security considerations invoked to block critical debate through a policy of exclusion and baseless allegation.

On April 8, 2010, Ramadan spoke as part of a panel discussion at the Great Hall of Cooper Union in New York City, his first public appearance since the State Department lifted the ban.[42] The group debated the lengths to which Western nations should go to accommodate their Muslim populations.

Views[edit]

Ramadan works primarily on Islamic theology and the position of Muslims in the West and within Muslim majority countries. Generally speaking, he prioritizes Qur'anicinterpretation over simply reading the text, in order to understand its meaning and to practice the tenets of Islamic philosophy.[43]

He rejects a binary division of the world into dar al-Islam  (the abode of Islam) and dar al-harb  (the abode of war), on the grounds that such a division is not mentioned in the Qur'an. He has been also known to cite favourably the Dar al-Da'wa (Abode of Information Dissemination).[44]

For him the "Islamic message" to which Muslims are expected to bear witness is not primarily the particularist, socially conservative code of traditionalist jurists, but a commitment to universalism and the welfare of non-Muslims; it is also an injunction not merely to make demands on un-Islamic societies but to express solidarity with them.[45][46]

Ramadan has voiced his opposition to all forms of capital punishment but believes the Muslim world should remove such laws from within, without any Western pressure, as such would only further alienate Muslims, and instead bolster the position of those who support hudud punishments: "Muslim populations are convincing themselves of the Islamic character of these practices through a rejection of the west, on the basis of a simplistic reasoning that stipulates that 'the less western, the more Islamic'".[47]

He has condemned suicide bombing and violence as a tactic.[48] Additionally, he contends that terrorism is never justifiable, even though it is sometimes understandable. [49]

in France, Ramadan maintains star status[citation needed] at the center of the niqab/hijab conflict, arguing famously that “Compelling a woman to wear a headscarf is against Islam, and compelling her to remove it is against human rights.”[citation needed] But in April of 2014, at a mosque in San Jose, California, Ramadan proclaimed to a wholly Muslim audience: "We will not give up on the head scarf."[citation needed]

Ramadan wrote that the Muslim response to Pope Benedict XVI's speech on Islam was disproportionate, and was encouraged by reactionary Islamic regimes in order to distract their populations, and that it did not improve the position of Islam in the world. [50]

Ramadan wrote an article, "Les (nouveaux) intellectuels communautaires", which French newspapers Le Monde and Le Figaro refused to publish. Oumma.com did eventually publish it. In the article he criticizes a number of French intellectuals and figures such as Alexandre Adler , Alain Finkielkraut, Bernard-Henri Lévy, André Glucksmann and Bernard Kouchner, for allegedly abandoning universal human rights, and giving special status to the defence of Israel. Ramadan was accused, in return, of having used inflammatory language.[51][52] The underlying content of the essay was sharply criticized as well.[53] Although Ramadan had explicitly directed his attacks against "French Jewish intellectuals", the first of those intellectuals singled out by him – Pierre-André Taguieff – is in fact not a Jew at all, but has merely a Jewish-sounding name. [54]

Debate[edit]In a French television debate in 2003 with Nicolas Sarkozy, Sarkozy accused Ramadan of defending the stoning of adulterers, a punishment supposedly warranted by a section of the Islamic penal code known as hudud. Ramadan replied that Sarkozy was wrong. He said that he opposed stoning and that he favored "amoratorium" on such practices to have time to discuss the law outright. Many people, including Sarkozy, were outraged. Ramadan later defended his position arguing that, because it involved religious texts, the law would have to be properly understood and contextualised. Ramadan argued that in Muslim countries, the simple act to "condemn" won't change anything, but with a "moratorium", it could open the way for further debate. He thinks that such a debate can only lead to an abolition of these rules.[55] He further engaged in similar debates on the issue, notably at the Cambridge Union with Sir Bernard Crick, among others, in 2008.[citation needed]

Critical reception[edit]

Some academics have greeted his works with enthusiasm, detecting liberalising and rationalising tendencies.[56]

Praise[edit]Paul Donnelly at the liberal [57]  online magazine Salon.com asked rhetorically: "Tariq Ramadan: The Muslim Martin Luther?".[58] Similarly, an article at the self-described liberal [59]  The American

Prospect praised Ramadan and his work in particular as an "entire corpus consists of a steady and unyielding assault on Muslim insularity, self-righteousness, and self-pity."[60]

Criticism[edit]In a book published by Encounter Books, Caroline Fourest analysed Tariq Ramadan's 15 books, 1,500 pages of interviews, and approximately 100 recordings,[61][62]and concludes "Ramadan is a war leader" and the "political heir of his grandfather", Hassan al-Banna, stating that his discourse is "often just a repetition of the discourse that Banna had at the beginning of the 20th century in Egypt", and that he "presents [al-Banna] as a model to be followed."[24][63] She argues that "Tariq Ramadan is slippery. He says one thing to his faithful Muslim followers and something else entirely to his Western audience. His choice of words, the formulations he uses – even his tone of voice – vary, chameleon-like, according to his audience."[61] Tariq Ramadan responded that Caroline Fourest's book was filled with inaccuracies and untruths, a few of which she has acknowledged on her blog. [64]

The former head of the French antiracism organization SOS Racisme, Malek Boutih , has been quoted as saying to Ramadan, after talking with him at length: "Mr. Ramadan, you are a fascist". [65] In an interview with Europe 1, Malek Boutih also likened Ramadan to "a small Le Pen";[66][67] in another interview he accused him of having crossed the line of racism and anti-Semitism, thus not genuinely belonging to the alter-globalization movement. Bertrand Delanoë, mayor of Paris, declared Ramadan unfit to participate at the European Social Forum, as not even "a slight suspicion of anti-Semitism" would be tolerable.[68] Talking to the Paris weeklyMarianne, Fadela Amara , president of Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Submissive, a French feminist movement), Aurélie Filippetti, municipal counsellor for The Greens in Paris, Patrick Klugman, leading member of the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions juives de France , and Dominique Sopo, head of SOS-Racisme, accuse Ramadan of having misused the alter-globalization movement's ingenuousness to advance his "radicalism and anti-Semitism."[68] Egyptian intellectual Tarek Heggy  has also charged Ramadan with saying different things to different audiences.[69] Other criticisms have included claims that that an essay attacking French intellectuals was anti-semitic[70] and that Ramadan has shown excessive generosity in his rationalization of the motives behind acts of terrorism, such as in the case of Mohammed Merah.[71]

Olivier Guitta, writing in The Weekly Standard, welcomed the U.S. decision to refuse Ramadan a visa, based on Ramadan's supposed links to terrorist organizations, and claiming that his father was the likely author of "'The Project'… a roadmap for installing Islamic regimes in the West by propaganda, preaching, and if necessary war." Guitta also criticized Ramadan for his campaign against the performance of Voltaire's play Mahomet in Geneva.[24] Similarly, self-described conservative [72] Daniel Pipes  concurred with the revocation of Ramadan's visa on grounds of Ramadan's alleged ties with Islamic extremism.[73] After the lifting of the visa revocation, an article in the National Review criticized the double standard of lifting the visa restriction on Ramadan, but not for Issam Abu Issa who was banned by the Bush Administration for being a whistleblower against the Palestinian Authority's corruption.[74]

Response to some of the criticism[edit]Ramadan vehemently denies contacts with terrorists or other Islamic fundamentalists and the charges of anti-Semitism and double talk, attributing the charges to misinterpretation and an unfamiliarity with his writings.[75] He stated: "I have often been accused of this 'double discourse', and to those who say it, I say – bring the evidence. I am quite clear in what I say. The problem is that many people don't want to hear it, particularly in the media. Most of the stories about me are completely untrue: journalists simply repeat black propaganda from the internet without any corroboration, and it just confirms what they want to believe. Words are used out of context. There is double-talk, yes, but there is also double-hearing. That is what I want to challenge."[48] In answer to criticism of his response to September 11th, Ramadan replied that two days after the attacks he had published an open letter, exhorting Muslims to condemn the attacks and the attackers, and not to "hide behind conspiracy theories."[76] and that less than two weeks after the attacks he had stated

that "The probability [of bin Laden's guilt] is large, but some questions remain unanswered. … But whoever they are, Bin Laden or others, it is necessary to find them and that they be judged", and that the interview had been conducted before any evidence was publicly available. [77]

Public reception[edit]Time magazine has twice recognized Ramadan: first in 2000, naming him one of the world's top 100 innovators of the 21st Century (one of the world's top 7 religious leaders),[citation needed] and again, in 2004, as one of the world's 100 most influential people.

In a free internet poll by Foreign Policy magazine, Ramadan was listed as one of the 100 top global thinkers in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2012.

Hassan al-BannaFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Hasan al-Bannaالبنا حسن

Founder and 1st General Guide of the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood

In office

1928–1949

Succeeded by Hassan al-Hudaybi & Said Ramadan

Personal details

Born October 14, 1906

Mahmoudiyah, Beheira, Egypt

Died February 12, 1949 (aged 42)

Cairo, Egypt

Alma mater Dar al-Ulum

Religion Sunni Muslim

Sheikh Hassan Ahmed Abdel Rahman Muhammed al-Banna (Arabic:  الرحمن عبد أحمد حسنالبنا IPA: [ˈħæsæn ˈæħmæd ʕæbdeɾɾˤɑħˈmɑːn mæˈħæmmæd elˈbænnæ]) known as Hassan ,محمد

al-Banna (14 October 1906 – 12 February 1949) was a school teacher and imam, best known for founding the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the largest and most influential 20th century Muslim revivalist organizations.

Contents  [hide] 

1 Biographyo 1.1 Early lifeo 1.2 Educationo 1.3 Ismailia establishment of the Muslim Brotherso 1.4 Political activity

2 Muslim Brothers and the 1936 Palestinian Revolto 2.1 Last days and assassination

3 Legacy 4 See also 5 Notes 6 References 7 External links

Biography[edit]

Early life[edit]Hassan al-Banna was born on the 14th of October of 1906 in Egypt in Mahmudiyya, a rural town located northwest of Cairo in Beheira Governorate  in the Nile delta.

His father, Shaykh Ahmad Abd al-Rahman al-Banna al-Sa'ati, was a Hanbali imam,[1] muezzin, and mosque teacher. Shaykh Ahmad was an important spiritual influence during al-Banna's early life, ensuring that Hassan and his brother Gamal had a pious upbringing that emphasized strong Islamic values. Shaykh Ahmad was also known for his extensive work as a Hanbali scholar, particularly his classifications of the traditions of imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal al-Shaybani. These classifications became known as musnad al-fath al-rabbani. Through this work, Shaykh Ahmad forged valuable

connections with Islamic scholars, which later proved useful when Hassan al-Banna moved to Cairo in 1932.

Many attribute Shaykh Ahmad's affiliation with the Hanbali school as Hassan al-Banna's primary religious influence. However, despite his early exposure to Hanbali Puritanism, al-Banna was also inspired by Rashid Rida's book al-Manar. Furthermore, al-Banna was heavily influenced by Sufism as a youth in Mahmudiyya. He attended weekly Hadra and was a member of the al-Hassafiyya Sufi order.[2]

Although Hassan al-Banna was only thirteen years old during the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, it was an important event that first exposed al-Banna to Egyptian nationalist politics. In his personal accounts, al-Banna proudly connects himself with the widespread activist efforts of the time. In spite of his young age, al-Banna participated in demonstrations in Damanhur, self-published political pamphlets, and founded youth reform societies. During this time, al-Banna experienced a political awakening that would later inform his already established religious fervor.

Although al-Banna's family were by no means members of the Egyptian elite, they were relatively well-respected in Mahmudiyya, as evidenced by Shaykh Ahmad's distinction as both an imam and ma'dhun, and by the fact that the family owned property. However, with the 1920s economic crisis, the family had trouble sustaining the upkeep of their property and moved to Cairo in 1924. Despite their financial troubles, al-Banna's parents placed a large value on providing educational opportunities for their sons.

Education[edit]In Mahmudiyya, al-Banna studied in the village mosque with Shaykh Zahran. The two would develop a close relationship, adding to al-Banna's early intellectual and religious development. In addition to the mosque school, al-Banna received private instruction from his father, Shaykh Ahmad. In 1923, Hassan al-Banna moved to Cairo and attended Dar al-‘Ulum, an Egyptian institution designed to educate prospective teachers in modern subjects. As it was a less traditional school, al-Banna enrolled against his father's wishes, marking a notable break from typical Islamic conservatism. He studied in Cairo for four years, and during this period, al-Banna established valuable relationships with various Islamic circles. Building upon his father's scholarly connections, al-Banna became associated with the Islamic Society for Nobility of Islamic Morals and the Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA). Through his involvement with the YMMA, al-Banna published over fifteen articles through Majallat al-Fath, an influential Islamic journal associated with the organization.

Ismailia establishment of the Muslim Brothers[edit]After completing his studies at Dar al-‘Ulum in 1927, al-Banna became a primary school teacher in Ismailia, which was the location of the Egyptian headquarters of the Suez Canal. At this time, Ismailia was the Egyptian town that had the highest foreign influence. While living there, al-Banna grew increasingly disillusioned with the British cultural colonization he witnessed. He was especially concerned that hasty attempts to modernize Egypt often resulted in the negative effect of sacrificing or forgetting Islamic principles. Al-Banna was also among many Egyptian nationalists who were dissatisfied with Wafd leadership, namely because of its moderate stances and its insistence on secularism. According to al-Banna's accounts, the Muslim Brothers organization was established in March 1928 when six unnamed workers affiliated with various Suez Canal companies approached al-Banna, complaining about the injustices suffered by Arabs and Muslims at the hand of foreign control. Feeling that their complaints resonated with his own concerns, al-Banna became their leader and the Muslim Brothers was created.

At first, the society was only one of the numerous small Islamic associations that existed at the time. Similar to those that Al-Banna himself had joined since he was 12, these associations aimed to promote personal piety and engaged in charitable activities. By the late 1930s, it had established branches in every Egyptian province.

A decade later, it had 500,000 active members and as many sympathizers in Egypt alone, while its appeal was now felt in several other countries as well. The society's growth was particularly pronounced after Al-Banna relocated its headquarters to Cairo in 1932. The single most important factor that made this dramatic expansion possible was the organizational and ideological leadership provided by Al-Banna.

In Ismaïlia, he preached in the mosque, and even in coffee houses, which were then a novelty and were generally viewed as morally suspect. At first, some of his views on relatively minor points of Islamic practice led to strong disagreements with the local religious élite, and he adopted the policy of avoiding religious controversies.[3][4]

He was appalled by the many conspicuous signs of foreign military and economic domination in Isma'iliyya: the British military camps, the public utilities owned by foreign interests, and the luxurious residences of the foreign employees of the Suez Canal Company, next to the squalid dwellings of the Egyptian workers.[3]

Political activity[edit]He endeavoured to bring about the changes he hoped for through institution-building, relentless activism at the grassroots level, and a reliance on mass communication. He proceeded to build a complex mass movement that featured sophisticated governance structures; sections in charge of furthering the society's values among peasants, workers, and professionals; units entrusted with key functions, including propagation of the message, liaison with the Islamic world, and press and translation; and specialized committees for finances and legal affairs.

In anchoring this organization into Egyptian society, Al-Banna relied on pre-existing social networks, in particular those built around mosques, Islamic welfare associations, and neighborhood groups. This weaving of traditional ties into a distinctively modern structure was at the root of his success. Directly attached to the brotherhood, and feeding its expansion, were numerous businesses, clinics, and schools. In addition, members were affiliated to the movement through a series of cells, revealingly called usar ("families" – singular: usrah).

The material, social and psychological support thus provided were instrumental to the movement's ability to generate enormous loyalty among its members and to attract new recruits. The services and organizational structure around which the society was built were intended to enable individuals to reintegrate into a distinctly Islamic setting, shaped by the society's own principles.

Rooted in Islam, Al-Banna's message tackled issues including colonialism, public health, educational policy, natural resources management, social inequalities, pan-Islamism, nationalism, Arab nationalism, the weakness of the Islamic world on the international scene, and the growing conflict in Palestine.[5] By emphasizing concerns that appealed to a variety of constituencies, Al-Banna was able to recruit from among a cross-section of Egyptian society—though modern-educated civil servants, office employees, and professionals remained dominant among the organization's activists and decisionmakers. Al-Banna was also active in resisting British rule in Egypt. Hassan Al-Banna wished to produce a national identity for their followers.

Muslim Brothers and the 1936 Palestinian Revolt[edit]

Al-Banna (third from left) with Aziz Ali al-Misri (fourth from right) and Egyptian, Palestinian and Algerian political and

religious figures at a reception in Cairo, 1947

Among the Muslim Brothers' most notable accomplishments during these early years was its involvement in the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine. The Muslim Brothers launched a pro-Palestine campaign that was largely responsible for making the Palestine issue a widespread Muslim concern. The Muslim Brothers carried out a fundraising campaign that was impressive because it relied upon donations from rural and urban working classes rather than wealthy Egyptians. In addition to fundraising efforts, the Muslim Brothers also organized special prayers for Palestinian nationalists, held political rallies, and distributed propaganda. Although the Palestinian Revolt was ultimately suppressed through tough military action, the Muslim Brothers' impressive mobilization efforts helped make the Palestinian question a pan-Arab concern in the Middle East.

Last days and assassination[edit]Between 1948 and 1949, shortly after the society sent volunteers to fight against Israel in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, the conflict between the monarchy and the society reached its climax. Concerned with the increasing assertiveness and popularity of the brotherhood, as well as with rumours that it was plotting a coup, Prime Minister Mahmoud an-Nukrashi Pasha disbanded it in December 1948. The organization's assets were impounded and scores of its members sent to jail. Following Pasha's assassination by a student member of the Muslim Brotherhood,[6] Al-Banna promptly released a statement condemning the assassination, stating that terror is not an acceptable way in Islam. [7][8][9]

On February 12, 1949 in Cairo, Al-Banna was at the Jamiyyah al-Shubban al-Muslimeen headquarters with his brother in-law Abdul Karim Mansur to negotiate with Minister Zaki Ali Basha who represented the government side. Minister Zaki Ali Basha never arrived. By 5 p.m., Al-Banna and his brother-in-law decided to leave. As they stood waiting for a taxi, they were shot by two men. He eventually died from his wounds.

Following his death in 1949, he has often been referred to as Al-Shaheed Imam Hassan Al-Banna ("the Martyr Imam Hassan al-Banna").

Legacy[edit]

Al-Banna has had a huge influence on Islamic thought.[10]

He is the grandfather of Tariq Ramadan and older brother of Gamal Al-Banna .