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Home » Jerusalem Issue Briefs » Is the Palestinian Authority Stable Enough for

Peace Talks?by Dan Diker | Pinhas Inbari

Published June 2009

Vol. 9, No. 3 16 June 2009

Is the Palestinian Authority Stable Enough for Peace Talks?

Assessing the Resignation and Return of Prime Minister Salam

Fayyad

Dan Diker and Pinhas Inbari

Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's agreement toremain as PA prime minister defied the unprecedented oppositionto his new PA government by both Hamas and the Fatahmovement. While Fayyad's stellar reputation in the West as areformer-statesman continues to inspire confidence among U.S.security officials and Western donor nations, his position is far

more difficult in the fragile Palestinian political reality.

While the Fatah Central Committee tolerated the previous PAgovernment due to its offensive against Hamas subversion in theWest Bank, Fatah's overall opposition to the current cabinet reflectsfundamental divisions between its "young guard" and the older andmore powerful founding generation.

Fayyad has continued to pay monthly salaries to nearly 12,000Hamas Executive Force members, which had been agreed upon bythe short-lived Palestinian national unity government in 2007. Thesame PA-funded Hamas Executive Force fought IDF troops in therecent Gaza war.

Fayyad also avoided confrontation with Fatah's Iranian-backed AlAqsa Martyrs Brigades, even integrating its militia leaders as local

commanders in the PA's National Security Forces (the U.S.-backed"Dayton forces"). While PA forces dispersed Hamas demonstrationsin the West Bank during the Gaza war, they did not act against theprotests of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.

Fayyad's government reflects the intention of the U.S. to create anew security framework in which the Palestinians could move from

an era of gangsterism, armed resistance, and terror to an era ofnation-building and statehood. However, Fayyad does not have thepolitical base to succeed in the long term. Moreover, Washington'snotion that reformed political power can be purchased is naïve.

The PA prime minister's alliance with the "young guard" Fatahleadership has thus far proved to be insufficient and the deals he

has made with local warlords and militia groups in the West Bankhave severely compromised his state-building project.

Just days before Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas' first

official White House visit with U.S. President Barack Obama on May 28,2009, PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad reversed his resignation for thesecond time in three months. He had first offered to step down in January

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2009,1 under growing pressure from Fatah, but immediately acceded toAbbas' appeal to stay on as prime minister. Fayyad's latest return enabled

Abbas to cobble together a tenuous, last-minute, coalition in advance ofthe Washington summit.

The Abbas-Obama meeting only stimulated Hamas' determination totopple the PA government. Hamas officials immediately labeled Fayyad a

"traitor" and promised an "earthquake" of a response.2 Within a few days,the Fayyad-led PA security forces and Hamas were engaged in a deadly

firefight in the West Bank town of Kalkilya in which three PA securityforces and three Hamas operatives were killed including Hamas seniorcommander Mohammed Samman. The bloody showdown did not reflectthe PA's willingness to uproot terror groups. In fact, PA security forceslater admitted on Al Jazeera that they had not intended to open fire onHamas, but merely acted in self-defense as Hamas had opened fire on

them.3 One senior Fatah security official considered the fatal showdown

as a step toward civil war in the West Bank.4

Fayyad's last-minute agreement to remain as PA prime minister defiedthe unprecedented opposition to his new PA government by both Hamasand the Fatah movement. While Fayyad's stellar reputation in the West asa reformer-statesman continues to inspire confidence among U.S. securityofficials and Western donor nations, his on again, off again resignationsindicate far more difficult political fortunes in the fragile Palestinian political

reality. They also indicate severe internal security and political threats toPalestinian political stability that may be overlooked by Westernobservers.

Another Fragile "Interim" PA Government

Hamas' opposition to the new PA government is clear. The Hamasleadership and parliamentary majority elected in 2006 did not recognizethe previous Abbas-Fayyad government. Furthermore, the previous

Fayyad administration had entirely excluded Fatah figures from thecabinet, whereas the new government has given Fatah eight portfolios.However, this Fatah participation is misleading. It only includes a certain

sector of Fatah figures loyal to jailed Tanzim leader Marwan Bargouti andformer Gaza strongman Muhammad Dahlan. Moreover, the Fatah CentralCommittee did not approve the appointments, as part of its protest against

the new government. The Fatah Central Committee's rejection of the newPA government and the simultaneous participation in the cabinet by someFatah figures has further weakened Fatah's overall public support and has

strengthened Hamas across the West Bank.5

While the Fatah Central Committee tolerated the previous PA governmentdue to its offensive against Hamas subversion in the West Bank, itsoverall opposition to the current cabinet reflects fundamental divisionsinside Fatah between the "young guard" and the older and more powerful

founding generation. The Fatah majority opposition to Fayyad and Hamas'violent rejection of his second independent "interim" government has

already seeded the ground for future instability in the West Bank.

What's Behind Fayyad's Multiple Resignations?

On March 7, 2009, Fayyad submitted his resignation to Abbas, saying hewanted to remove himself as an obstacle to sensitive reconciliation talks

between Fatah and Hamas.6 His announcement came just weeks after aGaza international aid conference in Sharm a-Sheikh, Egypt, allocated $5billion to his government to rebuild Gaza. Despite his declaration, Fayyad

did not leave his post and instead acceded to Abbas' request to continueas prime minister until the possible formation of a Fatah-Hamas national

7





unity government. With the swearing in of a new interim government, theprospects of a Fatah-Hamas government now appear slim.

Many Israeli and Western observers have tended to interpret Fayyad'sresignations as tactical moves that would keep him firmly in the primeminister's office on the expectation that Hamas-Fatah reconciliation talks

would ultimately fail.8 However, his two resignations and subsequentreturn suggest far greater tensions and political dysfunction.

Understanding the Palestinian context of Fayyad's severe politicallimitations reveals a sizable gap between Western expectations that hecan deliver wide-ranging Palestinian reforms from the "top down" and the

starker realities of the Palestinian street. Both Fatah and Hamas seeFayyad as interfering with and even threatening their respective political

agendas, and steadfastly reject his U.S.-backed challenge to theirauthority.

Fayyad's government was initially established by special decree followingFatah's expulsion from Gaza by Hamas in June 2007, when in reactionAbbas disbanded the Hamas-Fatah national unity government. However,

neither Fayyad nor his government of independent figures were membersof the PLO's ruling Fatah faction. Rather, they were independenttechnocrats from the secular-civil NGO community in the West Bank.They represented the old Palestinian left and its human infrastructure fromthe First Intifada in the late 1980s.

From its inception in 2007, the Fayyad government's politically peripheralstatus set it on a collision course with both Fatah and Hamas: Fatah hasbeen determined to get rid of Fayyad because he sidelined them whenforming his independent government. Hamas has rejected Fayyad asprime minister because his Ramallah-based government was born outsideof the Hamas-controlled Palestinian Legislative Council. In fact, the very

existence of the Fayyad government was perceived as a challenge to the

legitimacy of Hamas' Gaza-based government headed by Ismail Haniye. 9

The Palestinian Forces of U.S. Gen. Dayton

Fayyad's Western-backed security and economic policies onlyexacerbated tensions with both Fatah and Hamas. Fayyad cooperated

with U.S. security reform plans in line with the Roadmap to establish anindependent force called the Palestinian National Security Forces - namedthe "Dayton forces" by Hamas. Its ranks were vetted and trained by U.S.security subcontractors in Jordan under the supervision of Gen. KeithDayton, U.S. Security Coordinator for the Palestinian Authority. UnderFayyad's supervision, the Palestinian National Security Forces have been

mobilized to establish law and order in West Bank cities including Jenin,Nablus, Bethlehem, and Hebron.

The "Dayton forces" are considered by the U.S. to be the major successof Fayyad's government. U.S. enthusiasm over its early successes hasresulted in the doubling of the force to nearly 3,500 troops and a near 70

percent increase in its 2009 budget to $130 million.10

The IDF General Staff has also noted the positive contribution of the"Dayton forces" in preventing violence in the West Bank during Israel's

war against Hamas in Gaza in the beginning of 2009.11 However, Brig.-Gen. Michael Herzog, chief of staff to Israeli Defense Minister EhudBarak, said that while the PA security forces have improved significantlyover the last year, they were still far from ready to assume full security

responsibility in the West Bank.12

Despite noticeable improvements in public security in some of the major

Palestinian West Bank cities, Fayyad's control of these forces has upsetmany in Fatah. Some senior Fatah members have heavily criticized

Fayyad's lack of a security background,13 while others have simply been





indignant that the unaffiliated Fayyad has replaced Fatah in the PA's keysecurity role. The Fatah Central Committee even voted in November 2008to compel PA Chairman Abbas to replace Fayyad as head of the security

forces with an approved Fatah member.14

Hamas has viewed Fayyad as far more problematic, with Hamas websitescomparing Fayyad to Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai and AhmadChalabi in Iraq who, they said, were installed by the United States in

order to uproot the Islamic resistance (muquawama ).15 Both Hamas and

Fatah's Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades even threatened Fayyad's life.

Power Struggles in the West Bank

Fayyad's reform-oriented economic policies were greeted with similar

opposition. The prime minister had encouraged local, private-sector,business initiatives such as the "economic group" led by Nablus tycoonMunib al-Masri. Fayyad also initiated high-profile economic conferences inNablus and Bethlehem to encourage international investment. At the sametime, Fayyad called on Israel to remove security checkpoints and facilitatethe movement of economic goods and services as a prerequisite for

economic growth.

Fayyad's Western-style economic reforms and initiatives enhanced his"most favored Palestinian statesman" status in Washington, but also

disturbed Fatah and Hamas. His reforms threatened Hamas' "state withina state" infrastructure in the West Bank, similar to the infrastructure inGaza that brought it to power there. Hamas had governed theseinfrastructures largely unchallenged until Fayyad's appointment in June2007. Furthermore, Hamas and some Fatah groups opposed what theyunderstood as PA attempts to anesthetize the Palestinian armed

resistance through Western-backed economic projects.16 Hamas attackson the Erez and Karni industrial zones in Gaza are good illustrations ofthis attitude.

Fayyad attempted to justify his policy reform moves to Fatah and Hamascolleagues as fulfilling the Palestinians' Stage One obligations according

to the Quartet's diplomatic Roadmap.17 Fayyad insisted that Palestinian

fulfillment of Roadmap obligations would force Israel to remove West Banksettlement outposts and accept a PA presence in eastern Jerusalem.18

However, Fatah and Hamas remained unconvinced, suspecting that fast-track economic progress would douse the flames of the "liberationstruggle" and possibly replace it. Specifically, Fatah saw its pivotal role

threatened in both the military and economic spheres by Fayyad'sempowerment of the private sector and the establishment of theindependent "Dayton forces" that were replacing the PA-sanctioned Fatahmilitias.

Fayyad was also seen as a threat to Hamas military control. His

government was established following the Hamas takeover in Gaza, andits prime task was to contain Hamas in the West Bank and avoid a similarbloody putsch there. Fayyad's motivations were driven by political self-

preservation as opposed to preventing attacks against Israel. Nonetheless,Fayyad's National Security Forces arrested Hamas activists, censoredHamas incitement in Friday mosque sermons, appointed new loyal

mosque preachers, and revised and supervised the funding of religious

affairs.19

In sharp contrast to Fayyad's moves against Hamas, Fatah had refused totake similar actions when it was in full control of the PA between 1993and 2006, in contravention to the security requirements agreed to at Osloand in line with the Quartet's 2002 Roadmap. However, Fatah appreciatedFayyad's tough anti-Hamas measures taken after Fatah was expelled

from Gaza.









However, Fayyad's attempts to curry favor with Fatah met with only limitedsuccess. Aqsa Martyrs Brigades members accused Fayyad of being an

American agent and published threats against him,30 as rivals in Fatah's"old guard" leadership mobilized to pass resolutions in official Fatah

meetings calling for Fayyad's ouster.31

Fayyad's siding with the "young guard" also fanned economic rivalries.Fayyad's shared economic interests with Munib al-Masri's economic groupclashed with the economic interests of the "old guard" in several cases

that have likely negatively affected his relations with PA Chairman

Abbas.32

Economic and political tensions between the two leaders havereached new heights. Abbas even surprised President Obama during theirrecent meeting in Washington when he suggested nominating another

prime minister instead of Fayyad due to "Fatah opposition."33 However, amore compelling reason was Fayyad's winning of a hotly contested, multi-million dollar cell phone contract that apparently caused Abbas a majorloss of prestige and exposed the PA treasury to a major financial

setback.34

Hamas writer Ibrahim al-Madhun noted on the Hamas website al-Bayan :"What the Arab public does not know is that Salam Fayyad is notwelcomed by Fatah even in the West Bank. He is not pleased with theFatah movement and perceives it as an anarchic organization that needsto be destroyed from the foundations and rebuilt in a way that

corresponds to the Israeli occupation. The Fayyad danger to Fatah is

greater than to Hamas."35

The Sharm a-Sheikh Aid Conference

The Sharm a-Sheikh Palestinian aid conference, hosted by Egypt in

January 2009, placed Fayyad in an untenable situation. The international

community pledged more than $5 billion for Gaza reconstruction.36

However, the international community conditioned the aid with a demandto bypass Hamas completely. Egypt insisted on the precondition of asuccessful outcome of reconciliation talks with Hamas in Cairo. The Gulfemirates and Saudi Arabia conditioned their donations on channeling

funds directly to construction projects on the ground in Gaza, therebybypassing both Fatah and Hamas. For its part, Hamas established a

special bank in Gaza to receive Qatari aid and that of other friendlyparties to bypass the PA.

Despite mutual enmity, Fatah and Hamas have been motivated tocooperate in undermining Fayyad as the point man for international aid. Intheir view, if he were to receive even part of the pledged $5 billion, he

and his government would be strengthened. Hamas regarded itself as thelegitimate recipient of the money, resenting Fayyad's role as financial

gate-keeper and accusing him of being an agent of the United States. 37

At the same time, Fayyad also faced an acute financial crisis when he

was unable to pay salaries to PA officials on multiple occasions.38

Thiswas largely due to the fact that much of the $7 billion in internationalpledges from the 2007 Paris donors conference had still not been

delivered.39

The pressures on Fayyad resulting from the discontent of the Palestinianstreet forced him to make sharply anti-Israel declarations to survivepolitically. He warned that he would compel Israel to yield to internationalresolutions and demanded that Israel remove all roadblocks, implementthe Gaza-West Bank "safe passage," cease all settlement construction,

and end military operations in the West Bank.40







Implications for Fatah-Hamas Relations

Fayyad's resignation and return to office may have far-reaching

repercussions for the future stability of the PA, since Hamas and Fatahmade it clear that, from their respective perspectives, Fayyad's resignation

was final.41 Azzam al-Ahmad, head of the Fatah bloc in the PalestinianLegislative Council, demanded the appointment of a Fatah prime

minister.42 Some Fatah groups also threatened violence to change the

political reality in the PA.43

Fatah-Hamas "anti-Fayyad" coordination may play out in several ways.First, there may be upgraded opposition to Fayyad's "Dayton forces,"

which were seen to be operating in collaboration with Israel by Fatah,Hamas, and other Palestinian factions. Second, both Fatah militias andHamas share the need for an external enemy like Israel, which hadtraditionally served as an effective, if temporary, unifying factor that

masked internal Palestinian rivalries during the Arafat era.44

This is significant in view of the mutual suspicion and enmity between

Fatah and Hamas and the likely collapse of their national unity talks inEgypt, which could easily devolve into a new round of violence against

Israel.45 Fayyad can neither temper nor join his Fatah and Hamas rivals.His version of non-violent political activity against Israel, such asdemonstrations against the West Bank security barrier in which he had

participated on several occasions, have not been widely popular.46 Fatah

and Hamas have both rejected his non-violent approach.47

Conclusions

The government of Salam Fayyad reflects the intention of the UnitedStates to generate a reform process in the PA that would create a newframework through which the Palestinians could move from an era ofgangsterism, armed resistance, and terror to an era of nation-building and

statehood. Fayyad has led a commendable effort to advance this newagenda. However, the PA's embattled prime minister does not have thepolitical infrastructure to carry the weight of this burden. He lacks a

political base and has threatened existing Palestinian political frameworks.Moreover, Washington's notion that reformed political power can be

purchased is naïve. In fact, Fayyad's unprecedented control of Westerndonations makes him a ripe target for both Fatah and Hamas.

His alliance with the "young guard" Fatah leadership has thus far provedto be insufficient and the deals he has made with local warlords andmilitia groups in the West Bank have severely compromised his state-

building project. Fayyad is now encircled. Hamas and Fatah are unitedagainst him, the donor community has not fulfilled its commitments, andthe collapse of the Wataniyya cellular phone company venture risks futureinvestments and destabilizes the already vulnerable PA treasury, whileFayyad's anti-Israel posture will likely backfire with the Netanyahugovernment in Israel.

This raises new questions as to the future of the "Dayton forces" thathave been so highly touted in Washington circles as representing astable, effective, centralized military force. The recent bloodyconfrontations between Fayyad's "Dayton forces" and Hamas may point tofurther armed confrontation both within the Palestinian ranks and against

Israel.

* * *

Notes

1. Dan Diker and Khaled Abu Toameh, "Can the Palestinian Authority's





Fatah Forces Retake Gaza?" Jerusalem Viewpoints, no. 569, JerusalemCenter for Public Affairs, Jan.-Feb. 2009.

2. http://www.paltimes.net/arabic/news.php?news_id=92308.

3. According to Adnan Dmeri, Spokesman for PA National Security

Forces, Al Jazeera, May 31, 2009.

4. Interview with a senior Fatah security official in Ramallah, May 27,2009.

5. For example, the new government includes "young guard" figures such

as Hatem Abd al-Qader, Marwan Bargouti's deputy in the Tanzimsupreme committee. Other "young guard" figures such as Hussein a-Sheikh are known to be close to Muhammad Dahlan. The generalimpression in Palestinian circles is that Dahlan is playing an increasinglypowerful role in the composition of the new government.

6. The text of Fayyad's resignation can be found athttp://www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=510228&issueno=11059.

7. Fayyad interview with Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, April 2, 2009,http://www.palpress.ps/arabic/index.php?maa=ReadStory&ChannelID=52494.

8. Assessment by Yuval Diskin, Head of the Israeli Security Agency, tothe Netanyahu Cabinet, March 29, 2009, as reported on Israel Radio.

9. Al-Bayan, a Hamas website (in Arabic), said Fayyad's resignation

would not be rescinded and compared Fayyad to Afghanistan PresidentHamid Karzai, whom Washington had installed in Muslim territory in orderto uproot the muqawama - the "Islamic resistance."http://www.albian.ps/ar/portal/7f1a6b0a-acee -402c-a75c-bb732c3d9033.aspx. "The end of the Salam Fayyad phenomenon in thePalestinian arena....The first Fayyad mission was to participate in

eliminating Yasser Arafat and demolishing his financial influence, but hisbasic mission was eliminating the Palestinian resistance and creating anew Palestinian regime that will follow the Zionist entity." Also, a Hamasleaflet in the West Bank, reacting to the resignation, said: "There will beno government that follows the USA shape." http://www.omamah.org/?

x=3&z=81&y=21. Leading Hamas figure Mahmud Zahar went as far asstating, "even if they give us the sun in our hands, we shall not acceptthat Fayyad will head the government."http://www.palpress.ps/arabic/index.php?maa=ReadStory&ChannelID=51646.

10. Speech by Lt.-Gen. Keith Dayton, U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel

and the Palestinian National Authority, Washington Institute for Near EastPolicy, May 7, 2009,http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/DaytonKeynote.pdf. See also,"U.S. Plans to Expand Program for Abbas' Forces," Reuters, April 27,2009.

11. Dayton Speech, May 7, 2009. Dayton noted: "The results are beyondour most optimistic expectations and they relate directly to the title of thistalk, ‘Peace through Security.' The facts on the ground have changed,and will continue to change. The situation may be fragile; there are manychallenges ahead. But this is real progress in changing facts on the

ground." A senior IDF source told the authors in a meeting in Jerusalemon May 24, 2009, that the IDF General Staff has been impressed with theDayton forces' abilities to enforce public order in Palestinian-controlledareas of the West Bank.

12. Speech by Brig.-Gen. Michael Herzog, "The Middle East Security

Agenda, an Israeli Assessment," Washington Institute for Near EastPolicy, May 7, 2009,http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/HerzogKeynote.pdf.

http://www.albian.ps/ar/portal/7f1a6b0a-acee

http://www.albian.ps/ar/portal/7f1a6b0a-acee





13. Senior Fatah personnel blamed Fayyad for administering the securityorgans as an "accountant" and not as a military professional. Meeting inRamallah with a senior Fatah official, January 12, 2009.

14. Diker and Abu Toameh.

15. http://www.albian.ps/ar/portal/7f1a6b0a-acee-402c-a75c-bb732c3d9033.aspx (Arabic).

16. Dan Diker, "Peace Parks and Pipe Dreams," Jerusalem Post,November 26, 2007.

17. Al-Quds al-Arabi, April 23, 2009.

18. See also Fayyad interview with the Medialine News Agency websitein which he warned that he would compel Israel to yield to internationalresolutions like the Roadmap.http://www.themedialine.org/news/news_detail.asp?NewsID=24349. He

noted: "The Roadmap is an international document. Actually it hasbecome itself a matter of international law because there is UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1515 that actually deals with that. I think the issueshould be, ‘Isn't it time already for there to be insistence on applyinginternational law as it is and stop what has become a common practice ofnegotiating it?' A commitment is a commitment and obligations are

obligations." On the occasion of Land Day events in the Bethlehem areahe went further, declaring that, "Israel must take immediate steps with no

negotiations of compliance to the Roadmap, removing the siege, activatingthe safe passage, stopping settlement activity and assailing the PAauthorities." Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , March 26, 2009. The Palestinian

ambassador in Stockholm, Dr. Haidar Abd a-Shafi, admitted that the EUdecision to link the upgrade of its relations with Israel with its obligationsto the two-state solution was a result of Abbas' and Fayyad's diplomacy inEurope. Al-Quds, March 2, 2009. At a gathering for Gaza that took placein Ramallah on March 11, 2009, Fayyad boasted that he succeeded inpressuring Israel through the international community and isolated the

"Hebrew" (he does not recognize the Jewish state) state for inflictingmassive damage on Gaza. He demanded that Israel unconditionally yieldto international demands and open all roadblocks and the Gaza-WestBank safe passage, and cease all settlement construction as well as

military incursions in the West Bank. Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, March 12,2009.

19. Ibrahim al-Madhun noted on the al-Bayan website: "The strategicmistake that Salam Fayyad committed lately was his animosity to theHamas movement in the West Bank and the operations of the securityorgans of killing, kidnapping (arresting) and torturing of hundreds of

Hamas fighters...and closing down charity institutions as well aseducational and health care that belong or are close to Hamas, and theambitious Fayyad did not understand that the Hamas movement is the‘main gate' to Palestinian legal and national policy and that every attemptto bypass it is doomed to failure."


21. The al-Ahed website (in Arabic) reported on April 8, 2009, that afterIsrael permitted the transfer of money to Gaza, the (Fayyad) governmentsent salaries to Gaza banks for the benefit of PA government employees"and military personnel" which included thousands of Hamas operatives.

http://www.alaahd.com/arabic/?action=detail&id=8378.

22. The Palestinian representative in Lebanon, Fatah senior official AbbasZaki, in an interview on PA TV, shed light on the nature of Hamas'

subversive activity in the West Bank. He had tried to intervene with Abbasand Fayyad in favor of some of Hamas' detainees in order to releasethem. He said, "I received detailed information on plans to commitassassinations of responsible personnel and formal commanders inaddition to being involved in smuggling and storing huge quantities of







weapons and smuggling of illegal funds. The problem was that theweapons that they stored were not (slated to be) used against Israel butwere prepared for different targets." Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , January 31,2009.

23. http://fpnp.name/arabic/?action=detail&id=25820.


25. Even Islamic Jihad terrorists found shelter from Israeli pursuit inFayyad installations in Jenin. Seehttp://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=139862 (Arabic). On

the shelter of the Aqsa Martyrs in Bethlehem, seehttp://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=152487.

26. Yanna Pevzner, "Beyond the Bullet," Yediot Ahronot , June 12, 2009.

27. http://www.factjo.com/fullNews.aspx?id=7931.

28. Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , April 18, 2009.

29. It is not surprising therefore that Dahlan's website Pal Press endorsedFayyad's return as head of a Palestinian unity government.http://www.palpress.ps/arabic/index.php?

maa=ReadStory&ChannelID=51618.


31. Ibid.

32. An open dispute broke out between Fayyad and Abbas overadvancing the interests of competing cellular phone companies Jawwaland Wataniyya. While Fayyad supported Jawwal's partnership with aleading Kuwaiti company, Zain, Abbas supported Kuwaiti competitorWataniyya. http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=153298.

Abbas' communications advisor, Dr. Sabri Saidam, insisted that before thePA approved the agreement, Jawwal must disconnect from Munib's Paltelconcern. Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , April 5, 2009. See alsohttp://www.palpress.ps/arabic/index.php?maa=ReadStory&ChannelID=52795.

33. Authors' meeting with senior Fatah sources, Ramallah, June 10,2009.

34. Al-Jazeera, June 6, 2009. For more on the Wataniyya-Zain cell phonecontract crisis, see

http://fpnp.name/arabic/?action=detail&id=25820; http://fpnp.name/arabic/?action=detail&id=25820;

http://www.palpress.ps/arabic/index.php?maa=ReadStory&ChannelID=53901;

http://www.alaswaq.net/articles/2008/02/25/14188.html.

35. During the Cairo reconciliation meetings, Hamas and Fatah

exchanged views on a variety of topics including their shared interest inremoving Fayyad, http://www.albian.ps/ar/portal/7f1a6b0a-acee-402c-a75c-bb732c3d9033.aspx.

36. Amira Hass, "International Donors Pledge $5.2 Billion for GazaReconstruction," Ha'aretz, March 2, 2009.

37. Hamas threatened Fayyad not to channel the Gaza money to

Ramallah. Hamas, on its main Palestinian Information Center website,accused the Sharm e-Sheikh conference of bolstering Abbas' authority inthe West Bank at the expense of the victims of Israel's Gaza operation aswell as the owners of the demolished houses inGaza.http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7yhk% 2fk6eoiWKtOx7kFjU4Hg


http://www.palpress.ps/arabic/index.php

http://www.palpress.ps/arabic/index.php






KKloR0J2BFD3yjrqUQcd6Ktz8cPuyVl4YfyEFMjG2rGZFxBl098dvZ9vIOAwAyZMbwoOuCjJZYI%2biCs8okgPE%3d. Also, during the Gazawar Hamas published reports about alleged security cooperation betweenthe IDF and the "Dayton forces." For example, see the Hamas website

Palestine Today for March 19, 2009: "Abbas' Organs in Hebron DeliveredThree Hamas Supporters to the Occupation." See also

http://www.paltimes.net/arabic/news.php?news_id=87068.

38. Fayyad's intended delay in paying salaries to security organs thatwere recruited before the formation of the "Dayton forces" created aserious showdown between all Fatah military personnel and the new

conscripts. http://www.alaahd.com/arabic/?action=detail&id=7579. Fayyadgovernment secretary Dr. Sa'di al-Krunz admitted to al-Ahd , one ofFatah's websites, that no money entered the PA from the Sharm e-Sheikh summit "despite the organs set up for them and the Paris donors'summit." http://www.alaahd.com/arabic/?action=detail&id=7367.

39. On June 16, 2009, the PA's Ramallah-based information minister,

Riyadh al-Malki, admitted that only $760 million arrived at the PA treasuryfrom the January 2008 Paris donor conference at which $7 billion hadbeen committed to the PA. Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , June 17, 2009.

40. See note 18.

41. Hamas leader Ibrahim al-Madhun said: "It is the Hamas movement'sduty while preparing for the national dialogue to remove Fayyad from anyfuture government whatsoever and help the Fatah movement to put anend to the U.S.'s project in the West Bank."http://www.albian.ps/ar/portal/7f1a6b0a-acee-402c-a75c-

bb732c3d9033.aspx.

42. http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=162835.

43. Al-Quds al-Arabi, May 20, 2009. Fatah sources also noted that Fatahgroups planned to organize major disturbances in Ramallah and the West

Bank and that major trade unions will refuse to cooperate with the Abbas-Fayyad government.

44. David Makovsky, Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East PeaceProcess project at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,

expressed concern over the future of the "Dayton forces" in the eventHamas and Fatah agree on a unity government.http://www.washingtoninstitute.org:80/templateC05.php?CID=3028.

The Islamic Jihad website, "Palestine Today," revealed from Hamassources the points of agreement and disagreement over security

cooperation. They only mentioned the "old" security organs and explicitlyavoided any mention of the "Dayton forces."http://www.paltoday.com/arabic/News-41294.html. Also, according to theFatah website Al-Ahed , Hamas accepted Abu Ala's suggestion followingthe return of Fayyad to office that Fatah and Hamas amahestablish a jointsecurity committee, which can only be understood in the context of a joint

rejection of Fayyad's "Dayton forces."

45. Hamas has announced that it is ready for a new military Intifada inthe West Bank, http://www.omamah.org/?x=3&z=212&y=7.

46. On March 22, 2009, Fayyad convened in his bureau the committees

of the "popular intifada" as opposed to the military one. These committeeswere charged with organizing the popular activities against the securitybarrier and the settlements. Fayyad told them: "This example ofresistance received respect, appreciation and support worldwide." See Al-

Hayat al-Jadeeda , March 22 2009.

47. Hamas' rejection of Fayyad's "non-violent" Intifada is obvious. As forFatah, al-Quds daily published a report on March 8, 2009, about ameeting at Al-Quds University with the participation of Fatah cadres inpreparation for the 6th General Congress and in their concluding




statement they said: "To stick to the resistance strategy...(alongside) thepolitical alternatives...[is] not being limited to one alternative." "Resistance"here means terror. A senior Fatah official from Bethlehem, Nafez Rifai,said that the "anti-wall" activities such as in Ni'lin and Bil'in can be appliedas a "successful modus operandi" after the South African example. Thatis to say, Fatah adheres to the old military struggle principle but is ready

to adopt other useful methods in addition to the "armed struggle."However, he indirectly attacked Fayyad from another angle, saying: "TheFatah leadership will end up penniless as a result of non-patriotic agendastrying to undermine the movement financially."

* * *

Dan Diker is Director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at theJerusalem Center for Public Affairs, where he is also a senior foreignpolicy analyst. He is also an Adjunct Fellow of the Hudson Institute inWashington.

Pinhas Inbari is a senior policy analyst at the Jerusalem Center for PublicAffairs. He is also a veteran Palestinian affairs correspondent whoformerly reported for Israel Radio and Al Hamishmar newspaper, andcurrently reports for several foreign media outlets. He is the author of anumber of books on the Palestinians including The Palestinians: Between

Terrorism and Statehood.

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