IsPrivateInvestmentinAgriculturetheSolution?AnEvaluationoftheNewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritioninSenegal

MarieGagné

Forthe

FoodSecurityPolicyGroup(FSPG)

Finalversion,March2017

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IsPrivateInvestmentinAgriculturetheSolution?AnEvaluationoftheNewAllianceforFood

SecurityandNutritioninSenegal

ByMarieGagné

PublishedMarch2017,FoodSecurityPolicyGroup(FSPG),Canada

Abouttheauthor:MarieGagnéisaPhDCandidateattheUniversityofTorontoandaresearchaffiliatewithInitiativeProspectiveAgricoleetRurale(IPAR)inSenegal.Shehasconductedthis

studyinparalleltoherdoctoralstudies,asanindependentconsultanthiredbytheFSPG.Shecanbereachedatgagne.marie1@gmail.com

AbouttheFSPG:AcoalitionofCanada’sleadingdevelopmentandagriculturalorganizations

concernedwithglobalfoodsecurity,includingAgaKhanFoundationCanada,CanadianCatholicOrganizationforDevelopmentandPeace,CanadianCouncilforInternationalCo-operation,

CanadianFeedtheChildren,CanadianFoodgrainsBank,CanadianHungerFoundation,CanadianPhysiciansforAidandRelief,CanadianRedCross,CARECanada,ETCGroup,FarmRadio

International,HuairouCommission,InterPares,MennoniteCentralCommitteeCanada,NationalFarmersUnion,OxfamCanada,OxfamQuébec,PlanCanada,Results-ResultatsCanada,Savethe

ChildrenCanada,UnitedChurchofCanada,UPADéveloppementinternational,USCCanada,WorldAnimalProtection,andWorldVisionCanada.FormoreinformationontheFSPG:

http://www.ccic.ca/working_groups/food_e.php

Author’sacknowledgements:TheauthorbenefitedfromtheexpertiseofIPARonagriculturalissuesinSenegal,inparticularCheikhOumarBa(ExecutiveDirector),IbrahimaHathie(Directorof

Research),andAdamaFaye(SeniorResearcher).IPARalsosupportedtherecruitmentofparticipantstotheresearch.

SeydiAliouTallwasaknowledgeableandresourcefulresearchassistantinSenegaleseruralareas.

ModouMbayeprovidedvaluableassistancewiththetranscriptionofinterviews.

ThescientificcommitteeinCanadaofferedcogentcommentsonvariousdraftsofthisreport.TheauthorwouldliketothankJenniferClapp,SophiaMurphy,EricChaurette,PaulHagerman,Faris

AhmedandPierreKadetfortheirguidancethroughoutthewritingprocess.TaariniChoprahelpededitthereportinEnglish.

Thisresearchwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheparticipationofthe50intervieweesin

SenegalandCanada,includingCanadiangovernmentagents,whogenerouslydedicatedtheirtimetomeetwiththeauthor.

Anyerrorsoromissionsarethesoleresponsibilityoftheauthor.Thecontentofthisreportdoesnot

necessarilyreflecttheofficialpositionoftheFSPG.

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TableofContents

ListofAcronyms.......................................................................................................................................5

ExecutiveSummary..................................................................................................................................7

Introduction..............................................................................................................................................9

1.Rationale,Goals,andFunctioningoftheNAFSN..............................................................................101.1AMeanstoImplementtheComprehensiveAfricaAgricultureDevelopmentProgramme.....................111.2NAFSN’sInstitutionalMatrix:LeadershipCouncil,GrowAfrica,andEnablingActions...........................11

2.ReviewsoftheNAFSN:AMixedPicture............................................................................................122.1AgriculturalModernizationandGlobalExpansionofCapitalistFrontiers...............................................122.2InterferenceinDomesticPolicies................................................................................................................132.3ImpactsonFoodSecurity.............................................................................................................................162.4ImplicationsforWomen..............................................................................................................................162.5ImproperConsultationWithNon-GovernmentalStakeholders...............................................................17

3.TheRoleofCanadaintheNAFSN.......................................................................................................173.1FinancialSupport:RedirectingExistingFundsTowardstheNAFSN.........................................................183.2CanadianEncouragementforSenegaltoJointheNAFSN........................................................................18

4.ExpectationsandCommitmentsundertheNAFSNinSenegal.......................................................234.1HighExpectationsfortheNAFSN...............................................................................................................244.2StakeholderCommitmentsUndertheNAFSN..........................................................................................25

5.AssessmentofNAFSN’sObjectivesinSenegal.................................................................................285.1TheNAFSN’sInfluenceonDomesticPoliciesandPriorities.....................................................................285.2InclusivenessandSenseofOwnershipoftheNAFSN..............................................................................335.3Self-ReferentialEvaluationMethod...........................................................................................................35

6.EvaluationofNAFSN’sResultsinSenegal:ModestResults............................................................366.1ImplementationofFoodSecurityObjectives............................................................................................366.2PolicyChangestoIncreasePrivateInvestmentsinAgriculture..............................................................376.3ImpactsoftheNAFSNonPrivateInvestment...........................................................................................386.4ImpactsofNAFSNProjectsonLandandSeeds........................................................................................426.5LimitedSenseofStakeholderAccountability...........................................................................................426.6SenegalinPerspective:RegionalConsequencesoftheNAFSN..............................................................43

Conclusion...............................................................................................................................................45

Endnotes..................................................................................................................................................49

Bibliography............................................................................................................................................60

Appendix1:ListofInterviewedParticipants........................................................................................67

Appendix2.WorkshopsandMeetingsAttended................................................................................68

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Appendix3:NAFSN’sEnablingActions.................................................................................................69

Appendix4:Canada’sAgriculturalProgramsinSenegal....................................................................70

Appendix5:TheNewAllianceinSenegal:ATimeline..........................................................................71

Appendix6:MainOrganizationsandgovernmentsInvolvedintheNAFSNinSenegal...................72

Appendix7:NAFSN’sBusinessSectorsandPlannedInvestments.....................................................73

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LISTOFACRONYMS

ADUPES SustainableFisheriesManagementProjectAFE ActionforEnterpriseAFSI L’AquilaFoodSecurityInitiativeAGRA AllianceforaGreenRevolutioninAfricaANORF AfricanNetworkontheRighttoFoodAPIX NationalAgencyforthePromotionofInvestmentandInfrastructureWorksASPRODEB AssociationforthePromotionofGrassrootsDevelopmentASPSP SenegaleseAssociationofPeasantSeedsGrowersAUC AfricanUnionCommissionBACDI CanadianCooperationSupportOfficeBNDE NationalBankforEconomicDevelopmentCAADP ComprehensiveAfricaAgricultureDevelopmentProgrammeCASL CompagnieagricoledeSaint-LouisCGIAR ConsultativeGrouponInternationalAgriculturalResearchCEO ChiefexecutiveofficerCIDA CanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgencyCLM TaskForceagainstMalnutritionCNC CAADPNon-StateActorsCoalitionCNCAS NationalBankforAgriculturalCreditCNRF NationalLandReformCommissionCNCR NationalCouncilforRuralCooperationCNES NationalConfederationofEmployersofSenegalCNP NationalCouncilofEmployersCNT CoumbaNorThiamCSO CivilsocietyorganizationDAPSA DepartmentofAnalysis,ForwardPlanningandStatisticsDGPSN GeneralDelegationofSocialWelfareandNationalSolidarityDFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentEAFF EasternAfricaFarmersFederationECOWAS EconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStatesECOWAP ECOWASAgriculturalPolicyFAO FoodandAgriculturalOrganizationoftheUnitedNationsFARA ForumonAgriculturalResearchinAfricaFONGIP PriorityInvestmentGuaranteeFundFONSIS SovereignStrategicInvestmentFundGAC GlobalAffairsCanadaGAFSP GlobalAgricultureandFoodSecurityProgrammeGDP GrossdomesticproductGIE EconomicInterestGroupsGMO GeneticallymodifiedorganismGOANA GreatAgriculturalOffensiveforFoodandAbundanceGODAN GlobalOpenDataInitiativeforAgricultureandNutritionICAI IndependentCommissionforAidImpactICT InformationandcommunicationstechnologyIFAD InternationalFundforInternationalDevelopment

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IFPRI InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstituteIRPAD InstituteforResearchandthePromotionofAlternativesinDevelopmentISFSN IntegratedSupporttoFoodSecurityandNutritionISRA SenegaleseInstituteofAgriculturalResearchLOI LetterofintentMAER MinistryofAgriculturalandRuralEquipmentMCA MillenniumChallengeAccountMI MicronutrientInitiativeMNC MultinationalcorporationNAFSN NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritionNAIP NationalAgriculturalInvestmentProgramNEPAD NewEconomicPartnershipforAfricanDevelopmentODA OfficialDevelopmentAssistanceOECD OrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentPADEN ProgrammeforLandUseandEconomicDevelopmentoftheNiayesRegionPADEC EconomicDevelopmentofCasamanceProgramme PDIDAS SustainableandInclusiveAgribusinessProjectPINKK IntegratedNutritionProjectfortheKoldaandKedougouRegionsPOAS CommunalLandUsePlanPPP PublicprivatepartnershipPRACAS ProgramtoAcceleratethePaceofAgricultureinSenegalPREAC ProgramforReformsoftheBusinessEnvironmentandCompetitivenessPSE PlanforanEmergingSenegalROPPA WestAfricanNetworkofPeasantandAgriculturalProducers’OrganizationsSACAU SouthernAfricanConfederationofAgriculturalUnionsSAGCOT SouthernAgriculturalGrowthCorridorSAKKS StrategicAnalysisandKnowledgeSupportSystemSDC SwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperationSSTP ScalingSeedsandTechnologiesPartnershipSUN ScalingUpNutritionTFP TechnicalandfundingpartnerUSAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopmentVAT Value-addedtaxWAAPP WestAfricaAgriculturalProductivityProgramWAEMU WestAfricanEconomicandMonetaryUnionWEF WorldEconomicForumWHO WorldHealthOrganization

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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Launchedon18May2012,theNewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutrition(NAFSN)isaG8(nowG7) initiative spearheaded by former US President Barack Obama. The New Alliance aims toincreaseprivate investment inAfricanagricultureasameans to“achieve sustainedand inclusiveagriculturalgrowthandraise50millionpeopleoutofpovertyoverthenext10years.”Intotal,10African countries have signed on to the NAFSN. Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Ghana,Mozambique,andTanzaniaenrolledintheNewAlliancein2012,whileBenin,Malawi,Nigeria,andSenegaljoinedin2013.

AlmostfiveyearshaveelapsedsincethelaunchoftheNAFSN.Studiesonitsimpactshavebeguntoappear,andresearchersarestartingtoshedlightontheNewAlliance’strackrecord.However,verylittleofthisresearchhasbeenconductedfromaCanadianperspective,leadingtoalackofanalysisonCanada’sroleintheNAFSN.ThisstudyaddressesthisgapthroughanexaminationofCanada’sinvolvementintheNAFSNinSenegalandanassessmentoftheinitiative’sresults.

Thisreport istheproductofanindependentevaluationoftheNAFSNinSenegal.Specifically,theresearchseeksanswers to the followingquestions formulatedby theFoodSecurityPolicyGroup(FSPG):(1)WhatisCanada’sinvolvementintheNAFSN?(2)WhatinitiativeshavebeensupportedbyCanada through the NAFSN? (3) What are the underlying assumptions of the projects fundedthrough theNAFSN? (4)What is themotivation for the Senegalese government and the privatesector to engage in theNAFSN? (5)What is the perception of results achieved byGlobal AffairsCanada (GAC),bySenegal’sgovernmentandcivil society,bybeneficiarieson theground,andbycompanies involved? (6) How has the NAFSN in Senegal and other African member countriesinfluencedpolicies related to landandseed laws? (7)Are there lessons to learn fromtheNAFSNthat can inform policy on private sector and public partnerships using Official DevelopmentAssistance(ODA)?

The findingsof this study indicate thatCanada’s rolehasbeenpivotal in launching theNAFSN inSenegal. Under the New Alliance, Canada has mostly targeted its support to the Senegalesegovernment and has accompanied the latter in drafting documents and convening meetings.Canada does not seem to have directly influenced the specific orientation of theNAFSN in thatcountry. The Canadian team’s involvement in the initiative was significant at first, but it hasprogressivelydeclinedduetoexternalfactors.

Canada’s financial help under the NAFSN falls into three categories: agricultural programs;budgetary support; and logistical assistance. Canada renewed or approved most of its flagshipprogramsrelatedtoagriculturaldevelopmentandfoodsecurityinSenegalbetween2009and2012.Even if they were launched before 2013, these projects have been counted toward Canada’sfinancial pledges to the New Alliance. In addition, Canada has recently made the release of itsbudgetary support conditional on the Senegalese government fulfilling a number of objectivesdelineated in itsNAFSNCooperationFramework.Finally,CanadahasfinancedtheorganizationofvariousworkshopsandthehiringofexternalconsultantstohelptheSenegalesegovernmentmeetitsNAFSNcommitments.Despitethenewpriorities,CanadahasnotincreasedspendingforofficialdevelopmentassistanceinSenegalinresponsetotheNewAlliance.

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Companies thatparticipate in theNAFSNdonot receivedirect financial support fromCanada(orother donors for that matter). Canada did not take part in the process to select New Allianceprivatepartners;thistaskwasdevolvedtoMonitorDeloitte,aconsultingfirmpaidbyUSAID.Thereareseeminglynoclearguidelinesthatmotivatedthechoiceofdomesticand internationalprivatepartners participating in the New Alliance in Senegal. The goal was rather to recruit as manyenterprisesaspossible.

StakeholderswhoagreedtojointheNewAllianceinitiallyhadhighexpectationsfortheinitiative.Overall,theNewAllianceisinlinewiththeSenegalesegovernment’svisionofagriculture.Indeed,sincethe2000s,theleitmotifoftheSenegalesestatehasbeenthatagriculturaldevelopmentistobe achieved through increased private investment, although family farmsmust be preserved. Inaddition,SenegaldidnotwanttobeexcludedfromaG7initiativethatseemedmajoratthetime.Fortheirpart,privatepartnersinSenegalhopedthatinvolvementintheNewAlliancewouldhelpthem increase their political leveragewith the Senegalese government, improve their corporatevisibility,andestablishcommercialpartnerships.

ThemomentumthattheNewAlliancewasabletogatherattheoutsetgraduallywitheredaway.Most stakeholders andobservers,be theyopponentsorproponentsof theNAFSN, consider thetangibleresultsthathavebeenachievedinSenegaltobebelowexpectationsthusfar.Assessmentof theprogramrevealsasharedsenseofdisappointmentand lackofownership.TheSenegalesegovernmentisnowalsolesspronetohighlighttheNAFSNinitsactivities.CanadaisoneofthefewactorsthatspeakspositivelyabouttheNewAllianceinSenegal.Canadianofficialsholdthat,intheshortterm,theNAFSNhasallowedtheSenegalesegovernmenttoassemblepreviouslydispersedmeasuresandprogramsintoacoherentpolicyframework.Inthelongrun,theycontendthattheNewAlliancehassetintomotionaprocessofstructuralchangethatwillyieldresultsincrementally.

A number of researchers and NGOs argue that the New Alliance forces African countries toliberalizetheirseedandlandsectorstotheprofitofagribusiness.ThedeleteriousimpactsforwhichtheNAFSNhasbeencriticizedinothercountriesarenotseeninSenegal.Inthiscountry,theNAFSNfocusesontheproductionofseedscertifiedbyagovernmentalagencybutdoesnotprohibittheuseandexchangeofpeasantseeds.Also,beforetheNAFSNwasestablished,Senegalhadalreadyinitiateda landreformthat itwould likelyhaveundertakenregardlessoftheNewAlliance.WhiletheNewAllianceencouragestheimplicithomogenizationofagriculturalpoliciesacrossparticipantcountries, it is not a binding agreement. African countries display varying levels of interest andinvolvement in the NAFSN. In brief, the New Alliance represents an additional force promotingprivateinvestmentinagriculturebutisnotinitselfadeterminantinstrumentofchange.

In sum, the New Alliance has not so far delivered on its promises, be it significant reformsconductedbytheSenegalesegovernment,increasedprivateinvestmentinagriculture,orimprovedfoodsecurityandnutrition.Canadianstaffhasshownacommitmenttomakethe initiativework,but their dedication has not prevented a gradual loss of interest in the NAFSN by its primarystakeholders. Against this background, a fruitful avenue to consider for Canada is to enlarge itsexistingworkwithsmallholdersthroughagriculturalaidprogramsandtomaintaintheplatformofexchangescreatedforcivilsocietyorganizationsinthecontextoftheNewAlliance.

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INTRODUCTIONLaunchedinMay2012,theNewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutrition(NAFSN)isaG8(nowG7)1initiative spearheadedby formerUSPresidentBarackObama.TheNewAllianceaims to increaseprivateinvestmentinAfricanagricultureasameansto“achievesustainedandinclusiveagriculturalgrowthandraise50millionpeopleoutofpovertyoverthenext10years[…].”2Intotal,10AfricancountrieshavesignedontotheNAFSN.BurkinaFaso, IvoryCoast,Ethiopia,Ghana,Mozambique,andTanzaniaenrolledintheNewAlliancein2012,whileBenin,Malawi,Nigeria,andSenegaljoinedin2013.

AlmostfiveyearshaveelapsedsincethelaunchoftheNAFSN.Studiesonitsimpactshavebeguntoappear,andresearchersarebeginningtoshedlightontheinitiative’strackrecord.However,verylittleofthisresearchhasbeenconductedfromaCanadianperspective,leadingtoalackofanalysisonCanada’s role in theNAFSN,aswell ason theachievementof its statedgoals. This studywilladdressthisgapthroughanexaminationofCanada’sinvolvementintheNAFSNinSenegal.

This research focuses on Senegal given that Canada is Senegal’s NAFSN lead partner, and hascommitted significant support to Senegal under the NAFSN agreement. 3 Senegal publiclyannounceditscommitmenttoparticipateintheNAFSNonJune8,2013.Onthesameday,Canadaalsoindicatedinapressreleasethatitwouldtakea“leadershiprole”toassistSenegalinbecomingamemberoftheNewAlliance.4CanadapromisedfinancialsupporttotheNAFSNinSenegalintheamountof$80millionforthe2013-2017period.Despitethesenewpriorities,however,CanadahasnotincreasedspendinginSenegalinresponsetotheNAFSN.

This report, commissionedby theFoodSecurityPolicyGroup (FSPG),presents the findingsofanindependentevaluationoftheNAFSNinSenegal.Specifically,theresearchexploresthefollowingquestions,definedbytheFSPG:(1)WhatisCanada’sinvolvementintheNAFSN?(2)WhatinitiativeshavebeensupportedbyCanadathroughtheNAFSN?(3)WhatisthemotivationfortheSenegalesegovernment and the private sector to engage in the NAFSN? (4) What are the underlyingassumptions of the projects funded through the NAFSN? (5) What is the perception of resultsachievedbyGlobalAffairsCanada(GAC),bySenegal’sgovernmentandcivilsociety,bybeneficiarieson the ground, and by the companies involved? (6) How has the NAFSN in Senegal and otherAfricanmembercountriesinfluencedpoliciesrelatedtolandandseedlaws?(7)AretherelessonstolearnfromtheNAFSNthatcaninformpolicyonprivatesectorandpublicpartnershipsusingofficialdevelopmentassistance(ODA)?

TheconclusionsofthisstudyarebasedonoriginalqualitativefieldresearchconductedinSenegalandCanadaduringseveralmonthsoverthecourseof2015and2016.Threedifferentdata-gatheringmethods were employed. The report first draws on a thorough content analysis of academicpublications, NGO reports, press releases, policy documents, and legislative texts related to theNAFSN. Second, information was collected through qualitative interviews with Senegalese,Canadian, and American government officials, Senegalese and foreign private companies,representatives of domestic and international civil society organizations (CSOs), experts, anduniversityprofessors.Theevaluationalsoincludedanin-depthimpactstudyoftworicecompaniesparticipating in the NAFSN in Senegal, based on interviews with agricultural producers,

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decentralized authorities and local administrative agents. In total, 50 interviewswere conductedwith60keyinformants(seeAppendix1forthelistofparticipants).5Third,theauthorparticipatedin variousworkshops andmeetings related to food security, agroecology, land issues, rice valuechains, and regional agricultural policies. Her observations during these events informed theanalysis.(SeeAppendix2foracompletelistoftheeventsattended.)

This report beginswith an examination of the rationale and goals of the NAFSN. The followingsection provides an overviewof civil society and academic studies that assess theNewAlliance.Section3discusses the roleofCanada in theNAFSN,andsection4presents thecontoursof theNewAlliance inSenegal,witha focusonstakeholders’expectationsandcommitments.Section5exploresthecontentoftheCooperationFrameworkandassessestheNAFSN’sevaluationprocessinSenegal.ThereportconcludeswithanappraisaloftheresultsthattheNAFSNhasachievedsofarinSenegal andabrief comparisonwith the initiative’soutcomes inothermember countries as ameanstobetterunderstanditsregionalimpacts.

1.RATIONALE,GOALS,ANDFUNCTIONINGOFTHENAFSNThe global food crisis of 2007-2008 prompted the G7 to intensify its support to improve foodsecurity inAfrica.AttheJuly2009G7summit inItaly,membergovernmentssteppeduppreviouseffortsandlaunchedtheL’AquilaFoodSecurityInitiative(AFSI).Tothiseffect,theypledged$25.55billion6over threeyears tosupport“sustainableagriculturedevelopment,whilekeepingastrongcommitment to ensure adequate emergency food aid assistance” in 26 African countries.7However,only$6.97billionoutof the totalamountearmarked forAFSIactuallyconstitutednewfunds,and“thepledgesrepresentedone-timecommitments,notlong-termincreases.”8

Anothersurgeinfoodpricesin2010and2011,coupledwithadroughtintheHornofAfricain2011,prompted the creation of the NAFSN. The New Alliance was launched during the G7 summitorganized at Camp David in the United States on May 18, 2012, under the leadership of thenPresidentBarackObama.TheinitiativewasalsoaresponsetothefactthattheG7countriesfailedto fully respect L’Aquila’s engagements by cutting back on international aid budgets.9In thiscontext, the NAFSN turned to greater involvement of the private sector to supplement bothinternationalassistancefromdonorsandexpendituresbyAfricangovernments intheagriculturalsector.

Indeed,theNAFSNisbasedonthepremisethatpublicinvestmentaloneisinsufficienttodevelopagriculture, even though African governments have recently deployed considerable efforts. Therationale of the NAFSN thus consists of effecting structural changes in African countries’ policyenvironmenttoattractprivate investors. Inreturnforpolicysupport,companiesareexpectedtocontribute to the achievementof objectivesdelineated in national plans for thedevelopmentofagriculture on the basis of a “mutual alignment.”10Each African member country designs a“Cooperation Framework,” outlining the commitments of the host government, aid donors, andprivate partners, including passages from Letters of Intent (LOIs) crafted by companies.11TheseLOIsdonotrepresentbindingagreements,butpublicdeclarationsofobjectives.

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1.1AMeanstoImplementtheComprehensiveAfricaAgricultureDevelopmentProgrammeThe New Alliance seeks to expand on policy objectives elaborated in the Comprehensive AfricaAgricultureDevelopmentProgramme(CAADP),whichwaslaunchedatthe2003AfricanUnion(AU)Summit in Maputo, Mozambique. CAADP is part of the New Economic Partnership for AfricanDevelopment(NEPAD),andrepresents“apan-Africanframework–asetofprinciplesandbroadlydefined strategies tohelp countries critically review theirownsituationsand identify investmentopportunities”intheiragriculturalsectors.12CAADP’soverarchingobjectiveistoadvanceeconomicdevelopmentthroughagriculture.InJuly2003,membercountriespledgedtodedicate“atleast10percent of national budgetary resources to agriculture and rural development policyimplementation within five years”13as well as to reach a 6% increase in agricultural productivityannually. While the Maputo objective was only partially fulfilled, AU countries reiterated theircommitmenttoagriculturaldevelopmentatMalaboin2014.

To coordinate and execute CAADP in its member countries, the Economic Community of WestAfrican States (ECOWAS) developed its own regional policy, the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy(ECOWAP),spanningtheperiodfrom2006to2010.EachcountrywasresponsiblefordesigningaNational Agricultural Investment Program (NAIP) to implement ECOWAP at the national level.(Senegal adopted its NAIP in February 2010). In December 2016, ECOWAS countries gathered toapprovethesecondgenerationofECOWAP.TheStatutoryCouncilofMinistershasyettoendorsethedocument.14

WhilebuildingonCAADP,theNAFSNencouragesAfricangovernmentstoenactchanges insevenareasagainstwhichprogressismeasured:1)promotionofabusiness-enablingenvironmentintheformof“infrastructure, tax reforms,andaccess to finance”; 2) improvements in theproduction,distribution, and use of inputs; 3) clarification of land and resource rights; 4) implementation ofnutrition policies, “including biofortification, fortification, […] and malnutrition treatment”measures; 5) strengthening of governmental institutions; 6) adoption of resilience and riskmanagement policies; and 7) formulation of “policies that promote efficient and competitivedomestic marketing and trading systems.”15 However, the NAFSN holds that “Each AfricangovernmentdecideshowtooverseeandimplementNewAlliancecommitmentsinitscountry.”16

When theNewAlliancewas inaugurated, theG7 committed to aligning their assistance “behindcountry plans” in an effort to respect existing national priorities in Africa. The G7 additionallypromisedtobettercoordinatebilateralprogramstargetedtoNAFSNAfricanmembersinorder“toincreaseefficiencies,reducetransactionburdens,andeliminateredundanciesandgaps,”aswellastooffer“predictable”fundstorecipientcountries.17

1.2NAFSN’sInstitutionalMatrix:LeadershipCouncil,GrowAfrica,andEnablingActionsTheNAFSNisadministeredthroughan“informal”platformcalledtheLeadershipCouncil,createdin 2012. The Leadership Council offers “strategic direction and advice,” but “does not provideoperationalgovernance.”18ItgathersAfricanPresidents,headsofdonoragencies,chiefexecutiveofficers (CEOs)of large firms,and representativesofproducerorganizations. In2014, theUnitedStatesandtheWorldEconomicForum(WEF)weretheco-convenersofthis30-membercouncil.19In2015, the African Union Commission (AUC) became a permanent co-convener of the LeadershipCouncil.TheWEFremainedaco-convenerin2015and2016.

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AllcountriesparticipatingintheNAFSNarealsomembersofGrowAfrica.GrowAfricawascreatedin 2011 by theWEF, the AUC, and NEPAD to accelerate “private sector investment in 12 CAADPPartnerCountries.”20TheplatformreceivesgrantsfromtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment (USAID), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and theDepartment for International Development (DFID) in theUnited Kingdom. GrowAfrica providedassistancewiththeelaborationofLOIsinseveralNAFSNcountries21(thoughnotinSenegal,whichformallyjoinedGrowAfricain2014).GrowAfricadoesnotofferfundstocompaniesoncetheyhavesigned their letters, but instead helps these companies to structure their messages and deliverthemtogovernments,inordertoresolveproblemsthat,intheirview,constrictinvestment.22GrowAfrica also supports the development of value chains, 23 and organizes annual internationalinvestmentforumsthatCEOsandgovernmentalofficialsattend.

TheNAFSNisalsoworkingtoadvanceahostof“globalenablingactions”thatarepursuedinmostAfrican member countries. Notably, the NAFSN supports the Scaling Seeds and TechnologiesPartnership(SSTP)managedbytheAllianceforaGreenRevolutioninAfrica(AGRA).TheSSTPaimsto “increase production of high-quality seeds by 45 percent in three years and ensure that 40percentmorefarmersgainaccesstoinnovativeagriculturaltechnologies”.24Tothisend,SSTPhassponsored a “trainingprogramof seed industry personnel fromSenegal,Mali, Burkina Faso andNiger[…]inordertobuildandstrengthenseedenterprises.”ThroughSSTP,AGRAhassteppedupits involvement inSenegalwith thecreationofapartnershipwithAction forEnterprise (AFE), tohelpprivateseedcompaniesexpandtheirdistributionnetworkinruralareas.25(SeeAppendix3foradescriptionofotherinitiatives).

2.REVIEWSOFTHENAFSN:AMIXEDPICTUREProponents of public-private partnerships (PPPs) portray the NAFSN as an innovative form of“enlightenedcapitalism” thathelps“catalyzemarkets to reach thepoor.”26Theyalso regard theCooperation Frameworks designed under the New Alliance as a successful example of “countryownership.”27However, the strengths of theNAFSN in the eyes of proponents are perceived aslimitationsbyitscritics.Accordingtosomeanalysts,theverypreceptsonwhichtheNewAllianceispredicatedofferareductionistviewofagriculturaldevelopment.28SeveralNGOspromotingsmall-scale agriculturebelieve that theNAFSN represents an instrument that theG7employs toboostagribusinessinterestsandopenupnewfrontiersforcapital.29TheyareconcernedthattheNAFSNwill not help solve food andmalnutrition problems, but instead prompt policy changes in seed,land, and fiscal laws that constrain African countries’ capacity to regulate their agricultureindependently.30NGOsandpolicyexpertsarealsoworriedthattheNAFSNmightdiscouragefamilyfarming,exacerbatepressureonland,andfurthermarginalizewomen.31

Thissectionprovidesareviewoftheanalysesthathaveemergedfromcivilsocietyorganizationsandacademicswith regard to theNewAlliance.Sections fiveandsixassess thevalidityof thesecritiquesinthecontextofCanada’sroleinSenegal.

2.1AgriculturalModernizationandGlobalExpansionofCapitalistFrontiersTheNAFSNisbasedupontheassumptionthat“AgriculturaltransformationisurgentlyrequiredforAfrica.”32According to its supporters, theNAFSN encourages companies to partake in efforts to

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developagriculture,unlockeconomicgrowth,andhencetackleglobalpoverty.WhitebelievestheNewAllianceoffersauniqueopportunitytohelpAfricancountriestapinto“privatesectorflows”and attract foreign direct investments that now outweigh international aid funds in terms ofmagnitude.33In his view, PPPs “seek to marry the comparative advantages of donors andcompanies in a synergistic way.”34Companies provide money, technology, and managementcapacity,whiledonorshelp firmsadapt tonew“developmentcontexts.”Assuch,PPPscanhelpAfricancountriesmodernizetheiragriculturalsectors.

Incontrast,theformerUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteurontherighttofood,OlivierDeSchutter,thinksthattheNewAllianceis infactbasedon“anoutdatedmodelofagriculturaldevelopment”that attributes food insecurity to low productivity levels “resulting from a lack of irrigation, ofmechanisation,andofinputs.”35McKeonsuggeststhattheNAFSNreinvigoratesoldconceptsthathave pervaded development policies for decades. Predicated upon a revamped modernizationdiscourse,theNewAlliance’snarrativeimpliesthat“‘traditional’societiesmustdeveloporprogressinto‘modern’ones,[…]withlittleornoroleforpeasantagricultureandlocalizedfoodsystems.”36According to opponents, the NAFSN views family agriculture37as an antiquated farming system,andassumes that thepassage from tradition tomodernity in theagricultural sectorought toberealized through the achievement of a second “Green Revolution,” which will result in theexpansionofproductiveyieldsandmarketintegrationintheformofeffectivevaluechains.

Similarly,BichardmaintainsthattheNAFSNappearstobeafaçadetopromoteprivateinvestmentin agriculture and render it socially acceptable, rather than a genuine means to improve foodsecurity and nutrition in Senegal.38 Such concerns are heightened by the fact that NAFSNCooperation Frameworks do not define the duties of private partners to respect human rights,“whileinvestorsarepromisedastableandhospitableinvestmentclimate.”39Manycommentatorsbelieve that the NAFSN is more likely to consolidate the power of multinational corporations(MNCs)thatarealreadydominantinglobalmarketsthantofosterfamilyfarmingandimprovefoodsecurity.Inthisvein,Patel,Kerr,Shumba,andDakishonicontendthattheNewAlliancediscursivelytransforms private investment in agriculture into a “twenty-first century political necessity.”40OthersbelievetheNewAlliancedenotesthe increasing influenceofMNCsontheG7.41Observingthat firms such as Monsanto, Unilever or Syngenta have signed LOIs, ActionAid InternationalconsidersthattheNAFSNrepresentsaninstrumentthatG7membersusetopromotetheinterestsof their agribusiness conglomerates and open up new capitalistic frontiers in Africa.42However,according to theNGOOne,African firms, including several small-to-mediumenterprises, are alsoresponsiblefor“sizeableinvestments”undertheNewAlliance.43

2.2InterferenceinDomesticPoliciesAccording to its advocates, the New Alliance conforms to the Paris Declaration on AidEffectiveness, which stresses the importance of “increasing alignment of aid with partnercountries’priorities.”44WhitemaintainsthatthisismanifestedinmeetingsorganizedtoelaborateCooperationFrameworksand“bringNewAlliancecommitmentsbydonorsandtheprivatesectorinto linewithcountryplans.”45Hearguesthatdialoguebetweenthegovernment,privatesector,civil society, and aid community builds trust between stakeholders,while also ensuring that theNAFSNisnothijackedbyMNCsanddoesnotfacilitatelandgrabs.

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However, a numberof skeptical analysts havedenouncedNAFSN’s efforts toworkwith existingcountryinitiativesasdisingenuous.Tobeginwith,McKeonquestionstherelevanceofCAADPitselfasanaptvehiclefordevelopingagriculture:“CAADP,establishedasanAfrica-ownedinstrumentfordefiningagriculturalprioritiesandprograms,inspiredgreatexpectationsattheoutset.However,ithasendedupbeingorientedtowardsexternalaidratherthanthemobilisationandeffectiveuseofdomestic resources”.46Pateletal. suggest that,bybuildinguponexistingnationalprograms, theG7 simplywanted toavoidbeingaccusedof imposing“thewillof favoredprivate-sectorentitiesontoAfricancountries,”withouthavingtheintentiontorespecttheirstatedpriorities.47

TheNewAlliancepostulatesthat, intheircurrentform,publicpoliciesonagriculture inAfricaareinadequateandneedmajortransformations.Whilethis isawidelysharedopinion,recommendedsolutionsandapproachesdiffer.Formany,therequirementsforgovernmentsto“refinepoliciesinordertoimproveinvestmentopportunities”imposeonAfricancountriesconditionsreminiscentofstructuraladjustmentprograms.48SomecriticsevenarguethattheNewAllianceconstitutesanewformofcolonialismthatexertsunduepressureonAfricancountries49andsubmitsgovernmentstothe influence of corporations. ForMcKeon, theNewAlliance “has given agribusiness companiesunprecedentedaccesstoAfricandecision-makersinastructuredplatforminwhichdonorshaveputtheir weight behind obtaining desired policy changes.” 50 In particular, several experts areconcernedabouttheways inwhichtheNewAlliancemaybringaboutreforms inseed, land,andfiscallawsthatstripawayAfricancountries’controlovertheiragriculture.51

ChangesinSeedLawsandMarketingofFertilizersAfter gaining independence, most African governments took control over the distribution ofagricultural inputs, includingseedsandfertilizers.Withthe introductionofneoliberalmeasures inthe1980sand1990s,however,statestructuresweregraduallydismantled,andprivateoperatorswere taskedwith thecommercializationof inputs.Someanalystsargue thatNAFSNprojectsandpolicy changes will further deepen the dependence of farmers on the purchase of seeds andfertilizersmanufacturedby largemultinationals.52Accordingtocertainestimates,seedsrepresentthe largest sector in terms of overall private investment committed under the New Alliance.53However, Hong remarks that most NAFSN projects intend to engage smallholder farmers assuppliersofagriculturalproductsratherthancustomersofinputs.54

Critics also observe that 36 NAFSN policy revisions contained in the national CooperationFrameworksencourageprivatecompaniestoplayagreaterroleinthecommercialproductionandsale of seeds, particularly hybrid seeds. These revisionsmay constrain the ability “of farmers tomultiply, use, exchange and sell their own seeds.”55NGOs also fear that theNAFSN, through itsSSTP,willpavethewayfor the introductionofgeneticallymodifiedorganisms(GMOs) inAfricancountrieswherethetechnologyiscurrentlybannedorrestricted.56Asmentioned,thisPartnershipisco-sponsoredbyAGRA,anorganizationthatisopentotheadoptionofGMOstoincreaseyields.

LandReformsandLandGrabsThe NAFSN posits that clear land rights are a prerequisite for private investment in agriculture.Baileyalsoconsidersthatsmallholderscanbenefitfromsecurelandtitles.57Apoliticalcommitmentto easing investors’ access to land was apparently made a sine qua non for membership in theNAFSN.58CooperationFrameworksinallcountriespromotetheenactmentoftitlingprogramsand

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land-mappingexercises.McKeonobserves,“Actionrangesfromdemarcatingandregisteringlandsto establishing or streamlining procedures for land leases to encourage long-term leases, tostrengthening land markets.”59For critics, these changes may facilitate transfers of land tocompaniesandthereforeunderminecustomarytenureandcommunityownershipofland.60AsDeSchutterobserves, “the commodificationofproperty rights” sometimes lead to involuntary landcessions which, in turn, “can be a source of exclusion, and increase insecurity of tenure” ofvulnerablepopulations.61

NGOs have also denounced the impact of the NAFSN on land ownership, suggesting that theprogram is responsible foractualor foreseeable landgrabs.On thebasisof 58publicly availableLOIs(representing20%ofallprojectsasofAugust2014),Jamart,Jorand,andPascalcalculatethattheNAFSN’sprojectscoveratleast1.4millionhectares.62AccordingtoCurtis,1.8millionhectaresofland inNigeria,Malawi, Tanzania and Senegal alone have been allotted to the realization of theNewAlliance’sinitiatives.63Inparticular,theauthorclaimsthat106,730hectaresoflandhavebeentargeted for large-scale land acquisitions in Senegal under theNAFSN.However, this estimate isexaggerated.64

Thecreationofvastagriculturalcorridorsequippedwithproductionandstorageinfrastructurethatservice geographically concentrated clusters of companies has also generated concern.65As of2014, the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor was under development inMozambique (however,other announced corridors under the Pro-Savana Programme are stalled).66In Tanzania, thecreation of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT) is currently underway. TheNigerian government is also discussing the establishment of “staple crop processing zones […]whereinvestorsare‘guaranteedlandacquisition’,benefitfrom‘lowaveragewages’andaregiventaxholidays.”67Accordingtocritics,theseNAFSN-sponsoredcorridorscouldengendertheevictionoflocalpopulationsfromtheirland.68

FiscalandAdministrativeChangesSeveral observers denounce fiscal policy changes announced under the NAFSN. At least 31modifications related to financial, administrative, and commercial laws are planned in countriesparticipating in the New Alliance in order to ease private companies’ tax burdens. For instance,Malawihascommittedtorevisingitstaxsystemtoincentivizeinvestmentintheexportsector.69Ofparticular concern are the special economic zones or agricultural corridors involving customexemptions,taxholidays,andotherarrangementstoattractprivatecompanies.70

Criticsconsider thatthesefiscalpolicies riskencumberinggovernmentalbudgetsand limitingthecapacityforpublicinvestmentinagricultureinAfrica.Jamartetal.arguethattheseprovisionsalsomostly favour large agribusinesses rather than smallholders who operate outside formaladministrative circuits in remote rural areas.71The World Bank report Enabling the Business ofAgriculture,which aims to “analyze legal barriers for the business of agriculture and to quantifytransaction costs of dealing with government regulations,”72may further encourage Africancountriesto implementmarket-friendlypoliciestodemarcatethemselves inaracetothebottomwithregardtofiscal,socialandenvironmentalnorms.73

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2.3ImpactsonFoodSecurityAnearlyassessmentoftheNewAlliancewarnsthatagribusinessfirmsprimarilycatertotheirowninterests,whichmayormaynotalignwithimprovedfoodsecurityforAfricancountries.AsMurphyandWiseobserve,“Corporationsareaccountabletotheirshareholders,obligedtomakeaprofit.They are not charities. They are bound by law, but not by the public interest.”74Other authorsquestion thevalidityof theNewAlliance’s conceptionof food security andnutrition,which theyconsiderrestrictedinscope.Ahostofcivilsocietyorganizationsreleasedajointstatementinwhichtheynote:

TheNewAlliance[…]isbasedonthesimplisticassumptionthatcorporateinvestmentinagriculturewillincreaseproductionand that thiswill automatically improve foodandnutrition security and reducepoverty. This logiccompletelyneglects that foodandnutrition securitymeansconsistentaccess toadiverseandnutritiousdiet,whichwillnotbeachievedsimplybyincreasingfoodproduction.75

DrawingontheworkofScrinis,Pateletal.arguethattheNAFSNinMalawiispredicatedupon“alogicof‘nutritionism’–understoodasasetofideasandpracticesthatseektoendhungernotbydirectlyaddressingpovertybutbyprioritizingthedeliveryof individualmolecularcomponentsoffood to those lacking them […].”76As such, some critics consider that the New Alliance errs infocusing primarily on nutritional outcomes rather than a more encompassing notion of foodsecurity that includes its economic causes and its cultural dimensions. National CooperationFrameworksoftenreducefoodsecurity–whentheymention itatall–totheminimalamountofnutrientsandcaloriesneededdaily.Forinstance,GhanaandEthiopiadonotevenrefertomeasuresaimedatimprovingnutritionaloutcomesintheirdocuments.AmongNAFSNmembers,onlyBeninadoptsnewmeasuresandoffersconcretestepstodiminishtheextentofchronicmalnutrition.77

2.4ImplicationsforWomenEven thoughwomen representa significant shareof small-scale farmers, theydisproportionatelysufferfrommalnutrition. Inaddition,womengenerallyexperiencegreaterdifficulties inaccessingland, credit, and agricultural training.78In this context, several analysts consider that theNAFSNdevotes insufficient attention to gender issues, with nomechanisms to measure its impacts onwomen. They argue that the New Alliance mainly focuses on export crops that are typicallycontrolledbymen,whilewomentendtoberesponsibleforthecultivationoffoodcrops.Forcritics,this emphasis is likely to reinforce men’s dominance in the agricultural sector.79According toseveral NGOs, land deals facilitated by the NAFSN also risk overwhelmingly penalizing women,whoselandrightsremainespeciallyinsecure.

The Cooperation Frameworks barely mention women’s particular predicaments and ways tomitigate them.80According to one study, Benin is the only NAFSN country that has elaboratedambitiousandmeasurablecommitmentstoempowerwomeninagriculture.Incontrast,Tanzania,Ethiopia, Ghana, and Mozambique do not touch on gender issues at all in their New Alliancedocuments.Fortheirpart,Senegal,IvoryCoast,Malawi,andBurkinaFasoalludetotheimportanceofsupportingwomeninagriculturebutdonotofferconcrete indicatorstomonitorprogress.81Inbrief, several NGOs and experts believe that the New Alliancemay potentially have detrimentaleffectsonwomenduetoinadequateconsiderationofgenderissues.

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2.5ImproperConsultationWithNon-GovernmentalStakeholdersNGOs believe that civil society organizations and peasant associations have not been properlyincluded in the design of the New Alliance’s general orientation and national CooperationFrameworks.82These documents have inmost cases beenwritten hastily (during the summer of2012,forapproval inSeptember2012).TheG7supposedly invokesthisshorttimeframetoexplainthelackofconsultationwithcivilsociety.83WhiletheNewAlliancehassubsequentlydemonstratedgreater efforts to involve NGOs and peasant associations in response to criticisms, observersmaintainthatcivilsocietyremainsunderrepresentedinNAFSN’snationalmeetings.84Perhapsmoreimportantly, theNewAlliance has not consultedwith the small-scale producerswho are directlyaffectedbyitsimplementation.85Assuch,criticsclaimthattheNAFSNignorestheknowledgeandexperience of farmers who have developed alternative agricultural models based on agro-ecologicalprinciples.86Individualswhosuffer fromfood insecurityandmalnutritionhavealsonotbeencalledupontoparticipateinthedefinitionofNewAlliancepriorities.

ThecompositionoftheLeadershipCouncilisalsocontested.OxfamAmericawasamemberofthecouncil from 2012 to 2014 but have left because of the body’s limited transparency andaccountability.87WhiletheCEOsof7agribusinesscompaniesrepresentedtheprivatesectorasofSeptember 2013, only twoproducer organizations, the EasternAfrica Farmers Federation (EAFF)and the Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU), had seats on theLeadership Council. The West African Network of Peasant and Agricultural Producers’Organizations (Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest –ROPPA),whichpromotesfamilyagriculture,wasnoticeablyabsentfromthelistofmembers,eventhough, asMcKeonobserves, “6 of the 10NewAlliance countries are located inWestAfrica.”88AccordingtoNAFSNofficialdocuments,ROPPAsubsequentlybecameamemberoftheLeadershipCouncil89,butthisinformationdoesnotappeartobeaccurate.90

The AUC and NEPAD Agency publicly acknowledged civil society’s concerns around the NewAlliance,suchas“allegationsof itsnegativeeffectsonthelivelihoodsofsmall-scalefarmers”andimproperconsiderationof“climatechange,gender inclusionandnutritionsecurity.” Inresponse,theAUCandtheCAADPNon-StateActorsCoalition(CNC)91organizeda“consultativemeeting”on14October2016,inEntebbe,Uganda.Theresultingdeclarationenunciatedanumberofobjectivesandcommitments,includingtheneedtoensurethattheprivatesector“isinclusiveoftheinterestsof smallholders along the value chain,” in a context where “the smallholders’ communityconstitutesthelarger[sic]blocofinvestorsinAfricanAgriculture.”Inparticular,“investmentsmustalsoprovideopportunitiesforwomen,youthandthemarginalpoor.”AccordingtotheDeclaration,monitoring should put less emphasis on quantitative data and instead track NAFSN’s“transformativeeffects.”Finally,theNewAlliance“shouldpromoteagro-ecologicalpracticesandinnovationsandintegratetheenvironmentaldimensioninitsapproach.”92

3.THEROLEOFCANADAINTHENAFSNCanadadevotessubstantialfundstofoodsecurityandagriculturethroughtheNAFSNinSenegal,Ghana,andEthiopia,althoughthissupportiscomprised,forthemostpart,ofalreadyprogrammedmoney. As the lead partner for Senegal, Canada has primarily worked with the Senegalese

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government to elaborate its Cooperation Framework and manage logistics. While it has beenpivotal in launching and coordinating the NAFSN in Senegal, Canada has subsequently played alesserroleinitsimplementationandfunctioning.Canada’sinvolvementinselectingandsupportingfirms participating in theNAFSN in Senegal has also remained peripheral. This section examinesCanada’sfinancialcontributionsandroleinspearheadingtheNewAllianceinSenegal.

3.1FinancialSupport:RedirectingExistingFundsTowardstheNAFSNInrecentyears,Canadahasdirectedconsiderablefundstowardagricultureandnutritionaspartofitsaidpackagetodevelopingcountries.In2009,Canadapromiseditwould“doubleitsinvestmentsinagriculture indevelopingcountriesand increaseresourcesforfoodassistanceandnutrition.”93Principles and objectives to this effect were articulated in a Food Security Strategy under theauspicesofthethenCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency(CIDA),whichisnowsubsumedinto Global Affairs Canada (GAC). The Strategy focuses on sustainable agricultural development,food assistance and nutrition, and research and development. Canada’s commitment to foodsecurity is reflected in its involvement with AFSI. According to Canada’s Office of the PrimeMinister,“Atthe[G7]SummitinL’Aquilain2009,Canadaannouncednewfundingof$600millionforsustainableagriculturaldevelopmentoverthreeyears,elevatingitstotalsupportto$1.18billion.InApril2011,Canadabecamethefirst[G7]countrytofullymeetitsL’Aquilacommitment.”94

At theNAFSN’s inception in 2012,Canadapledged todonate $219million. Specifically, from2012-2014, Canada planned to dedicate $169 million to finance “ongoing bilateral food securityprogramming in Ghana and Ethiopia,” to spend $25million on the creation of “a new Canadiannutrition initiative with multilateral partners to support innovative nutrition research andtechnologies,” and to allocate $25 million in new funding for the Global Agriculture and FoodSecurity Programme (GAFSP) Public Sector Window that aims to improve farmers’ access tomarkets.95Basedonthisinformation,Canadaonlyallotted$50millioninadditionalmoneyfortwomulti-country initiatives subsumed under the NAFSN.96(Funds for Senegal are discussed below.)CanadadoesnotoffersubsidiestoprivatecompaniesthatparticipateintheNewAlliance.

The global financial contribution of Canada under the New Alliance may appear modest whencomparedtowealthierdonorssuchastheUnitedStatesortheEuropeanUnion.Canadaisthe5thmost importantdonorunder theNAFSN in termsof contributionsmeasured inabsolute terms.97However,Canadarespected,andevenexceeded, itsoriginal funding intentionsplannedfor2014.WhenallNAFSN countries are considered, Canadahas the second-highest rateof disbursementsagainstintention(135%).98Asof2014,Canadahadcontributed$295.62milliontotheNewAllianceasawhole,whileexpectedfundingforthatyearamountedto$219.01million.

3.2CanadianEncouragementforSenegaltoJointheNAFSNAteachG7annualsummit,thehostcountrytraditionallyproposesaninitiativearoundwhichotherstates rally.99Canada’s participation in the New Alliance was thus expected. When the NAFSNconsideredSenegal apotentialmember in 2013,100Canada volunteered to act as its leadpartner,since most G7 countries were already designated to assist other African countries. A CanadianofficialexplainedthatCanadawasregardedasanaptchoiceforthisroleconsideringthattherearepractically noCanadian companies involved in agribusiness in Senegal.101In his view, Canadawasthusseenas“neutral”intheimplementationoftheNAFSN.

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Canadian staff in Dakar then suggested the idea of joining the New Alliance to the SenegalesePrimeMinister.(ForatimelineofNAFSNactivitiesinSenegal,consultAppendix5).TheypresentedtheNAFSNasameanstosecure,andeventually increase,the leveloffundingthatCanadaoffersSenegal.102Canada approached Senegal due to reasons partly related to the former’s domesticpolitical climate. Canadian public administrators seized the opportunity provided by the NewAlliance in hopes of maintaining and expanding their activities in Senegal in a context where achanginggovernmentalperspectiveondevelopmentpossiblycompromisedaidprograms.Indeed,approvalofprojectsandbudgetdisbursementshadbecomesubjecttostricterconditionsthan inthe past. TheNAFSN represented an occasion for aid staff to advocate for funding in a contextwhere the then Conservative Canadian government tended to believe that private enterprisesoutperformthepublicsectorandthatinternationalaidshouldpropupcommerceandinvestment.

The G7 contemplated Senegal’s membership in the NAFSN at a moment where Canada wasreworking its aid strategy in Senegal and considering collaborating directlywith the Senegalesegovernment.Traditionally,Canadahassupportedorganizationsofproducers in ruralareas,but itwanted to effect policy changes at a higher level in order to remedy perceived structuralimpediments to the conduct of its agricultural programs.103Several analysts believe that thestructureoftheSenegaleseMinistryofAgricultureneedstoberevampedtooptimizeefficiency.Inthe past, frequent rearrangements of theMinister of Agriculture have also hampered a smoothconductofaffairs.Inthatcontext,theNAFSNhelpedreassurepoliticalstaffinOttawathatSenegalwasdedicatedtomakingeffortstoimprovegovernancethroughstrategiccoordinationandpolicyadjustments.OfspecialimportanceforCanadianofficialswastheimplementationofalandreformauthorizingindividualtitlingandlandsales.Intheirview,thecurrentformalsystem,whichdoesnotconferpropertyrightsandlimitslandallocationstoresidentsofthecommune,actsasahindrancetothedevelopmentofmodernfarms.

Canada’sFinancialSupporttotheNAFSNinSenegalInparallel to itsoverallcommitmenttotheNewAlliance,theCanadiangovernmentalsopledgedmoney to Senegal, where it had already identified food security as a development assistancepriority.ItisalsothesecondlargestdonortotheNAFSN.Canadacommittedtodedicate$20millionannuallyforfouryearsspecificallyfortheNAFSNinSenegal,amountingto$80millionfrom1April2013 to 31March 2017, subject to funding availability for the last three years. Canada’s financialpledge to theNAFSN in all countries amounts to $299million.While appreciable, the funds thatCanadaprovidesundertheNAFSNrepresentaquarterofthemoneyitcommittedunderL’Aquila.104

Table1.Canada'sPledgesundertheNAFSN

Initiative Amount(million$)FoodsecurityprogramsinGhanaandEthiopia 169Canadiannutritioninitiative 25GAFSPPublicSectorWindow 25Agriculturalprograms,budgetarysupport,andlogisticalassistanceinSenegal 80Total 299

According to Canadian officials, Canada already allocated a comparable amount of money toagriculture and food security projects before the beginning of the New Alliance in Senegal.

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Canada’s logic was that it would record all expenses incurred in the agricultural sector afterNovember 2013 as part of its contributions under the NAFSN.105In all likelihood, the NAFSN hasthereforenotledtoanincreaseinCanada’sbudgetforSenegal.106Thismakessense,asitsgoalistoencourage private sector investment, not public sector contributions. However, the NAFSN hashelped secure funding for ongoing agricultural projects that might have been otherwisejeopardized,insofarasallprogramsmustbeconfirmedannually.AstheG7leaderfortheNAFSNinSenegal,itwouldhavebeenhardlyconceivableforCanadatodisengagefromagriculture.107

MostprojectspertainingtoagriculturaldevelopmentandfoodsecuritysubsumedundertheNewAlliancewere launchedprior tothat initiative.For themostpart, theystartedbetween2009and2012,presumably inthewakeofAFSI. InSenegal,Canadacarriesout5mainprogramsthatcounttowarditsNAFSNfundingcommitments:ProgrammeforLandUseandEconomicDevelopmentoftheNiayesRegion(PADEN),EconomicDevelopmentofCasamanceProgramme(PADEC),SupporttoRiceProductionProjectforFoodSecurity inSenegal(BeyDunde), IntegratedSupporttoFoodSecurity and Nutrition (ISFSN), and Integrated Nutrition Project for the Kolda and KedougouRegions (PINKK). (For information on these programs’ goals, duration, sponsors, and funds, seeAppendix4).Combinedtogether,theseprogramshaveatotalbudgetof$89.8millionoverseveralyears.Canada’sbasicaidorientationsinSenegaldidnotchangesignificantlyaftertheNewAlliancewas initiated.Except for thePINKKprogram,an initiativepertaining tonutrition,CanadahasnotapprovedanymajornewagriculturalprojectssincetheadoptionoftheNewAlliance.It isunclearwhethertheNAFSNhasfacilitatedthebirthofPINKKinSenegal,giventhatCanadaalsofinancestheMicronutrient Initiative (MI), amulti-country project contributing to theMuskoka Initiative’s“commitmenttoMaternal,NewbornandChildHealth.”

After the NAFSN was launched, the Senegalese government adopted another master plan inFebruary2014,thePlanforanEmergingSenegal(PlanSénégalÉmergent–PSE),whichisnowthemain policy framework for eight sectors deemed fundamental for economic growth. Canada issupposed to donate $51.5 million for the realization of the PSE over 2016-2020.108Part of thesefundswillcounttowardthe$80millionpledgetotheNAFSN.ThedisbursementofCanadianaidisconditional on Senegal fulfilling a number of commitments delineated in the CooperationFramework.CanadahasusedtheNewAlliancetofocusthecontentofitsconditionsonagricultureandfoodsecurity(inadditiontothemanagementofpublic financesandextractiveresources).109Toobtainthefixedtrancheofthegeneralbudgetsupport,whichamountsto$5millioneachyear,Senegalmustcomplywith5requirements,includingtheconductofanAnnualJointReviewoftheAgriculturalSector.110IfSenegalfailstomeetalltherequirements,itriskslosingboththefixedandvariableportionofthebudgetsupportfromCanada.

In 2016, disbursementof variable tranches111dependedon the achievementof 11 conditions, 5 ofwhicharerelatedtoimprovementsinthebusinessenvironmentandfoodsecurity:draftofthelandreformbill;adoptionofaStrategyfortheReconstitutionofSeedStock(StratégiedeReconstitutionduCapitalSemencier);releaseofadecreefortheexonerationofagriculturalmaterial;elaborationandendorsementoftheNationalStrategyofFoodSecurityandResilience(Stratégienationaledesécurité alimentaire et de résilience – SNSAR);112and writing of the Sectorial Policy on Nutrition.Requirementsforvariabletranchesareadjustedannuallytoreflectprogress.Ofthe11conditions113posedbyCanadain2016,Senegalfailedtoachieveonlyone–submissionofthelandreformbillto

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the National Assembly. The NAFSN policy commitments that Canada used as conditions for theallocationofitssupportwillbediscussedingreaterdepthinSection5.

Inadditiontoagriculturalprogramsandbudgetsupport,CanadahasalsofinancedNAFSN-relatedevents. Canadaextended funds for theorganizationofworkshops to elaborate theCooperationFramework, the official NAFSN launching ceremony, discussion meetings for the First ProgressReport,andrevisionoftheCooperationFramework.Canadaalsohiredtwoconsultantstosurveyinternational aid donors and civil society organizations in order to support the Department ofAnalysis, ForwardPlanningandStatistics (Directionde l'Analyse,de laPrévisionetdesStatistiquesAgricoles – DAPSA) in writing the First Progress Report.114Finally, Canada paid a consultant toelaborateandmeasureCSOcommitmentsfortherevisedCooperationFrameworkandtheSecondProgressReport.

As of March 2014, the Canadian government had distributed $11.88 million to Senegal for theNAFSN.115BetweenApril1,2014,andMarch30,2015,Canadaexpended$22.62millionforitsprojectsundertheNewAllianceinSenegal.116Thecalculationmethodfordisbursementsin2016differsfrompastyears,renderingacomparisondifficult.117

LogisticalSupport:CanadaHelpstoAcceleratetheImplementationProcessinSenegalAccordingtoaCanadianofficial,CanadacollaboratedwiththeUnitedKingdom,whichwasthenco-convener of the Leadership Council, to bring changes to the New Alliance before itsimplementation in Senegal. On the basis of past experience, both countries agreed thatCooperation Frameworks needed to address women’s empowerment and nutrition issuesmorethoroughly.CanadaalsoinsistedonamoreeffectiveinclusionofNGOsintheNAFSN.

WhileCanadaencouragedSenegaltojointheNewAlliance,itisnotdirectlyinchargeofpilotingit.This responsibility falls on the NAIP Political and Technical Committees,118which are taskedwithcoordinating NAFSN-related activities. (Consult Appendix 6 for an organizational chart of theNAFSN in Senegal). As facilitators, Canadian Embassy staff have assisted the Senegalesegovernment in drafting the Cooperation Framework. Even though it has coached Senegal in theidentificationofpolicyobjectivespursuedunderthis initiativeandusedtheoccasiontoexchangeviewswiththeSenegalesegovernmenton issues itdeemednecessarytoaddress,CanadaarguesthatithasnotimposeditschoicesonSenegal.119AseniorSenegaleseofficialinvolvedindraftingtheCooperationFrameworkalsoconsidersthattheexercisewascarriedoutinacollaborativefashion.

The Senegalese Ministry of Agriculture also organized consultation sessions and validationmeetingswithtechnicalsupportfromtheCanadianEmbassy.MerelysixmonthselapsedbetweenSenegal’sdecisiontojoinNASFNandtheprogram’sofficialinauguration.120Inthisregard,Canadianstaffseemtohavecatalyzedstakeholderstogetthingsorganized.Byallaccounts,Canada’sstronginvolvementhasconsiderablyaccelerated the implementationprocess,anobservationconfirmedby a Senegalese government agent: “Canada had a very important, proactive role –muchmoreproactive than ours, because we have a thousand things to do. It’s true, BACDI [CanadianCooperationSupportOffice/Bureaud’appuiàlacoopérationcanadienne]reallyworkedhardontheNAFSN.Thefirststeps,it’sthem.”121

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Figure1.TimelineofNAFSNactivitiesinSenegal

WhileCanadahasprovidedassistancetotheSenegalesegovernment,itwasnotactivelyinvolvedintheselectionofcompaniesparticipatingintheNAFSN.USAIDinWashingtonmandatedandfundedMonitorDeloittetoidentifyprivateinvestorsforSenegalincollaborationwiththeNationalAgencyfor the Promotion of Investment and Infrastructure Works (Agence Nationale Chargée de laPromotiondel’InvestissementetdesGrandsTravaux–APIX),theSenegalesegovernmentalagencyin charge of helping companies to navigate administrative procedures. Monitor Deloitteapproached companies already collaborating with USAID or the US Embassy through theirprograms.122Initially,thefirmwassupposedtoconductthisworkinpreparationforthenPresidentObama’svisittoSenegalfromJune26-28,2013.TheNAFSNreportedlybuiltonthepoolofinvestorsselected to meet with the US President.123The consulting firm also contacted the economicdepartmentofvariousembassies,includingCanada.However,Canadadidnotprovidesuggestionson potential private partners.124Monitor Deloitte also solicited two employer organizations, theNationalCouncilofEmployers(ConseilNationalduPatronat–CNP)andtheNationalConfederationofEmployersofSenegal (ConfédérationNationaledesEmployeursduSénégal –CNES), inorder toidentifyeventualcollaboratorsundertheNewAlliance.Finally,APIXreferredsomecompanieswithwhichithadworkedpreviously.

The New Alliance recruited firms informally, as no public call for expression of interest wasorganized.ThereislittleevidencethattheNAFSNemployeddefinedguidelinestoselectorexcludefirms. The rationale was that the more private partners that join the New Alliance, the better.Companiesweresimplyrequestedtoprovidealetterofintentbasedonatemplate,inwhichthey

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confirmedthattheirbusinessplanalignedwithCAADP’sobjectivesinSenegal.Theywereinvitedtodescribethecontent,amount,durationandlocationoftheirinvestments,aswellasthenumberofsmallholders they hoped to reach. Companies were not requested to demonstrate how theiractivitieswereexpectedtoimprovenutritionandfoodsecurity–notallofthemevenspecifiedthenumberofsmallholdersconcerned.Assuch,abroadlyunderstoodintentiontoinvestprivatefundsinagricultureseemedtobethesolecriterionrequiredtoparticipateintheNewAlliance.125

AlthoughCanada is stillofficially theG7 leaderof theNewAlliance inSenegal, its responsibilitieshavebeengraduallycurtailed.EvenbeforethelaunchoftheNAFSN,inJune2013,FrancetookovertheG8partnershipfor landtransparencyandgovernance inSenegal.126In2015,theAfricanUniondesignatedFrancetosurveytheTFPs,GrowAfricatocanvassprivatecompanies,andtheStrategicAnalysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKKS) to evaluate the government. Africa LeadcompiledtheinformationandcoordinatedthewritingoftheSecondProgressReport.SenegaleseandCanadianstaffinchargeofmonitoringtheNewAllianceinSenegaldidnotentirelyunderstandthemotivation behind this decision,which in their view seemed imposed from above. Also, theOfficeofthePrimeMinisterandtheMinisterofAgricultureofSenegalarenowengagingdirectlywith the African Union on matters related to the NAFSN.127Canada is not included in theseexchanges. Itmaybeanencouraging sign that theAfricanUnion is taking the reinson theNewAlliance, but as a result, Canadian staffmembers feel less engaged and accountable. Finally, theelection of a Liberal government in Canada in November 2015 seems to signal a change in aiddevelopmentprioritiesawayfromtheNAFSN.128

4.EXPECTATIONSANDCOMMITMENTSUNDERTHENAFSNINSENEGALInSenegal,theNAFSNaims“toattractandmobilizenationalandinternationalprivateinvestmenttostimulateandsupport[the]sustainabledevelopmentoftheagriculturalsector.”129Accordingtothe Cooperation Framework, “Food security and nutrition means improving access to sufficientquality food everywhere and at all times, aswell as reducingpoverty and eradicating hunger bymeetingthecommitments regardinggenderequality, theenvironment,andaccess toproductiveresources for smallholders, particularly women.”130The NAFSN in Senegal aims to contribute togovernmentaleffortstodiminishthepovertyratefrom46.7%in2013to39.48%in2016.131

Prior to theNAFSN’s launch,MonitorDeloittewas asked to survey thebusiness community andsuggestmeasurestoimprovetheinstitutionalenvironmentinSenegal.Itsstudyconcludesthatfivemain factors constrain agricultural investment in that country: unclear administrativeproceduresand non-involvement of stakeholders in fiscal reforms; difficulties in obtaining funding andagricultural insurance; complexities in gaining access to land; high electricity costs as well asinadequate transportation and irrigation infrastructure; and poorly structured commercial valuechains, including limitedaccess to inputs.132MonitorDeloitte recommendedaseriesofmeasures,such as the creation of institutional channels to involve private partners in the conduct ofgovernmentalreforms;thedevelopmentofagriculturalinsuranceandlease-purchaseagreements;increased collaboration with banks; public-private partnerships to improve roads and irrigationinstallations;implementationofcontractstoeaseinvestors’accesstoland;andencouragementofcontract farming and technical training for smallholders. The two versions of the CooperationFrameworkhavetakensomeoftheserecommendationsintoconsideration.

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Many civil society representatives in Senegal recognize that contractual arrangements betweenproducersandindustriesmayconstituteaninterestingcompromise.Theysuggestdirectingprivateinvestmentinfoodprocessingactivitiesthatrequireahighlevelofcapitalandtechnicalcapacity.Adivision of labour between family farms in charge of production and companies responsible forfood processing could also help ease pressures on land.133However, many CSOs, including inSenegal, hold that theNAFSNpromotes a narrowdefinitionof private investment that primarilycenters on agribusiness. They argue that small-scale producers themselves remain the biggestinvestorsinagriculturewhenconsideredcollectively,andshouldbeenabledtoincreaseinvestmentin their farms.Yet this typeof investment remains largely invisible in theNewAlliancediscourse,whichprioritizesprivateindustryinthepoliciesitpromotes.AccordingtoSenegaleseCSOs,inorderto boost family agriculture, support is needed to provide professional training to smallholders,install agricultural infrastructure, andmanage climate risks.134Peasant organizations also requestfacilitatedaccesstocredit,agriculturalequipment,andinputs.

4.1HighExpectationsfortheNAFSNThe NAFSN has generated many expectations in Senegal. Several companies that decided toparticipate in the New Alliance regarded it as a platform to inform the government about theirgrievances,asoneprivatepartnerexplains:“WeconsidertheNAFSNasarallyingpointbetweenusand the state. One of the factors that prompted us to join is the possibility to share on thehandicapsweexperienceasacompany.”135ManyCEOsexpectedswiftpolicychangesinresponsetotheneedstheyexpressed.Othersthoughttheywouldreceiveadhocgovernmentalanswerstotheir operational difficulties. For instance, a few entrepreneurs believed that participating in theNAFSNwouldeasetheiraccesstoland.SomealsohopedtoobtaintechnicaltrainingorassistancetohelpachievecommitmentsindicatedintheirLOIs.

Afewcompanies,aswellascertainSenegaleseofficials,understoodthattheNAFSNwouldofferfinancialsupporttotheprivatesector.Otherswerehopingtoaccessinsideinformationonpossiblepartnerships with the Senegalese government, aid donors or foreign companies – this wassuggested in the LOI template itself. Others regarded the New Alliance as an opportunity toshowcase their activities, increase their visibility and participate in public events. In sum, thecontent of their expectations and level of understanding of the objectives of the New Alliancevariesconsiderablybetweentheprivatepartnersthatwereinterviewed.However,allwerehopefulthattheNAFSNcouldplayapositiveroleinimprovingthebusinessenvironment.

The Senegalese government was already contemplating various means to increase privateinvestment in agriculture before the New Alliance. The prime minister at the time was AbdoulMbaye, a former banker with strong inclinations toward supporting the private sector.136WhileSenegaldidnotinitiatetheprocesstojointheNAFSN,thePrimeMinisterandhisstaffregardeditas a timely opportunity to rearrange the fiscal architecture in a more favourable manner foragribusiness companies, both national and international. In the opinion of Senegalese senioradvisors, theNewAllianceofferedthem institutionalsupport indrawingfromtheexperiencesofothercountriestoreformthebusinessenvironmentinSenegalandassemblethesemeasuresintoaCooperationFramework.Theyalsowelcomedtheopportunitytoengagewiththeprivatesectorin

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thecontextofNAFSNmeetings.Insum,theydidnotviewtheNewAllianceasbeingexogenouslyimposedonthem.

OneSenegalesegovernmentofficialcomparedtheNewAlliancetoa“banquet”allowingSenegaltonetworkwithactorsbelongingtoaglobalcoalitionofsuperpowers.Inhisopinion,SenegalcouldnotmissthisopportunitygiventhatseveralotherAfricancountrieshadalreadyjoined.HavingaG7leader partnering in the process with them conferred credibility to Senegal, and represented aguaranteeforprivateinvestors.TheSenegalesegovernmentdidnotseemtoexpectnewfundingforitsownagriculturalprograms,however.Also,APIXviewedtheNAFSNasameanstoencouragecompanies that underestimated their potential to increase their investment levels, but notnecessarilyasaninstrumenttoattractnewinvestors.

4.2StakeholderCommitmentsUndertheNAFSNTheSenegalesegovernment,privatecompanies,and internationalaiddonorseachmadeasetofcommitmentsundertheNAFSN. Inaddition, thesepartiesagreedonsomesharedcommitments.CivilsocietyorganizationsdonotfigureinthefirstCooperationFramework,butwereaddedinthesecondversionofthedocument.Stakeholdersareexpectedtoreportontheirprogressannually,butallcommitmentsarevoluntary,includingtheLOIssignedbyprivatecompanies.

CommitmentsbytheGovernmentofSenegalTheGovernmentofSenegalinitiallyidentifiedthreegeneralobjectivestofulfillNAFSNambitions:1)“Create an incentive-based business environment in order to increase private investment in theagriculturalsector(agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry)and innutrition”;2)“Improvesupplychainproductivityandcompetitivenesstoensurefoodsecurity”;and3)“Reducetheprevalenceofstuntingandwastinginchildrenundertheageof5.”137

Tothiseffect,theSenegalesegovernmentpledgedtoimplementatotalof17policymeasures.Toachieve the first objective mentioned above, the government promised to diminish subsidiesallocatedtoagricultural inputsfrom0.5%to0.3%ofthegrossdomesticproduct(GDP)overthreeyears and to better target recipients; to increase the volume of “financial loans” devoted toagriculturefrom3%to8%by2015;to“defineandimplementlandreformmeasuresforresponsibleagriculture”; and to apply tax exemptions for the purchase of agricultural equipment. Thegovernmentfurther identifiedeightpolicyactionstostructureagriculturalvaluechains, includingfor instance thedevelopmentof infrastructure to improvemarketaccessand storagecapacities;thereconstitutionofseedstockwiththeinvolvementoftheprivatesector;implementationoftheNational Livestock Development Plan; application of the Sectorial Policy Brief on Fisheries andAquaculture; and pursuit of the Program to Combat Deforestation and Soil Degradation. Todiminish the prevalence of stunting and emaciation of children under the age of five, theSenegalesestatecommittedtoupdateand/orimplementitsnutritionpolicy,itspolicyoninfantandyoung child feeding, the Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes, 138 and the CodexAlimentarius.139

TheSenegalesegovernmenthasalsoelaboratedgoalsthatarenotlistedinthe17policymeasuresbut appear in the first Cooperation Framework.Notably, it intends to encourage contract-basedproduction in agriculture, facilitate lease-purchase agreements of agricultural equipment, and

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promoteagricultural insurance.Additionally,thegovernmentaimstofosterprivate investment inthe agricultural sector by “focusing on participation by all stakeholders in the development ofpolicies.”Finally,thestatehasreiterateditsdesiretoexpandwomen’seconomicopportunitiesinthe agricultural sector, notably through better access and control over factors of production,services,andmarkets,aswellastheprovisionoftechnicalandmanagerialtraining.140

With theadoptionof thesecondCooperationFramework in2014, theSenegalesestate specifiedand broke down the content of the 17 initial commitments into 50 measurable components. Amajority–25–ofthesenewpolicyobjectivesconcernthebusinessenvironment,whileonly8arerelatedtonutrition.Inthesecondprogressreport,thegovernmentdelineated5majormonitoringrubrics: improvementofthebusinessenvironment, landandnaturalresourcespoliciesandrights,nutrition,politicalinstitutions,andinputpolicies.141

CommitmentsbyPrivateCompaniesBusinesses that have submitted letters of intent pledged to put in place “internal consultationframeworks” in order to adopt and pursue NAFSN’s objectives, “especially linking producers’groups, improving food and nutrition security, promoting responsible investment andmobilizingfunds.”142Another commitment was subsequently added in the first progress report released in2014,accordingtowhichtheprivatesectorpledged“tocooperateeffectivelywiththegovernmentto establish and strengthen businesses and initiatives thatwill have amajor impact on reducingpovertyacrossthecountryandboostingeconomicgrowth.”143TherevisedCooperationFrameworkalso includes new objectives for companies and lays out the private sector’s commitment tocreatingworkinggroupstostructuredifferentagriculturalvaluechains,similartotheexistinginter-professional frameworks for rice and tomatoes. Private partners also pledge to take intoconsiderationwomen’sstrategicinterestsandpracticalneedsintheirinvestments.Futurelettersofintentwillhavetospecifyconcretemeanstoencouragewomen’sempowerment.

Beyond these common commitments, private partners have enumerated their own targets inindividual lettersof intent.Companies involved intheNewAlliancediffersignificantly intermsofobjectives and planned investments (See Appendix 7 for a list of business sectors and financialcommitments).Asindicatedabove,theNAFSNacceptedallcompaniesthatshowedaninterestinjoining the program, withoutmuch oversight. As a result, it comprises a heterogeneousmix ofcompanies,rangingfromSenegalesecompanieswithasocialmandate,toprivatizedstateagenciesplaguedbyfinancialdifficulties,andmultinationalsorientedtowardexportmarkets.144

NAFSNcompaniesareactiveinavarietyofareas:inputs,production,transformation,andtechnicaland financial services. Several companies are involved in food processing activities.145Insofar astheseenterprisesrelyonsmall-scalefarmerstosourcerawmaterials,theydonotnecessarilyenterintocompetitionwith them,although theycansometimesoffer lowpurchaseprices.At least sixenterprises involved infisheriesaswellas fruitandvegetablefarmingexportsomeoralloftheirproduction.However,agriculturalproductsthatdonotsatisfyexportstandardsareusuallysoldonlocalmarkets.Otheractivities indicated in theCooperationFramework include technical training,organizationalsupport,andinsuranceproductsforfarmers.Inaddition,sixprivatepartnersaimtocreate jobs for women, source agricultural products from them, increase their revenues, orcollaboratewithgroupsofwomen.Themonetaryvalueofthesecommitmentsisnotquantified.

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Ifall theLOIsmadetodateundertheNAFSNareconsidered(includingcompaniesthathave leftthe initiative), private partners have pledged $770.65 million in Senegal. Based on availableinformation,foodprocessingisthemostimportantsphereofactivitiesundertheNAFSNintermsoffinancialcommitments(approximately$245.65million),followedbyproduction(atleast$139.25million), inputs (around $112.6 million), and training and services (about $12.65 million). All thecompaniesinvolvedintheNewAlliancewereoperatinginSenegalbeforeitwasinstigatedand,forthemostpart,hadalreadyprogrammedtheir investmentprojects. Itseems,however, thatsomecompanies have diversified their portfolios to alignwith food security imperatives. For instance,one firmthatalreadyexported fruitsandvegetablesconsideredproducing traditionalcereals forthelocalmarket.SomeotherprivatepartnershaveperhapsinflatedtheambitoftheirprojectsinhopesofreceivingfundingfromtheNAFSNortheSenegalesegovernment.

CommitmentsbyTechnicalandFinancialPartnersUndertheNAFSN,technicalandfinancialpartners(TFPs)reiteratedtheirpriorengagement“(i)toalignassistancetotheagriculturalsectorwiththeprogramsandprioritiesidentifiedbySenegalinthe NAIP, and to increase their contributions toward financing the programs identified; (ii) toindicate futureassistance to theagricultural sectoronamulti-yearbasis inorder toallowbetterpredictability, planning, budgeting and implementation.”146The revised Cooperation Frameworkincludes a third commitment to help Senegal in its efforts to promote women’s economicautonomyandgenderequalityintheexecutionoftheNAIPandNewAlliance.147

FundsthatotherdonorshavepromisedfortheNAFSNinSenegalseemtohavebeenprogrammedbeforetheprojectwaslaunched.148TheUnitedStatesdidnotreservespecificmoniesfortheNewAlliance either; the funds outlined in the Cooperation Framework are linked to two existinginitiatives:FeedtheFutureandtheMillenniumChallengeCorporationCompact.Eachcountrysetsitsownobjectivesandrunsitsagriculturalprogramsindependently,althoughTFPshaveprincipallyagreed to match their interventions with the priorities identified in the NAIP.149In total, G7countries and development partners have promised $1.05 billion to finance activities comprisedundertheNewAllianceinSenegal.ThismakesSenegalthesecondlargestrecipientoffundsundertheNAFSNafterEthiopia,whichhasbeenpromised$1.31billion.

CommitmentsbyCivilSocietyOrganisationsCommitments by civil society organizations are a new addition to the second CooperationFramework,andonethatseemsuniquetoSenegal.150ThedocumentexplicitlyrecognizesthatCSOsarestakeholdersintheNewAlliance.Inthatcapacity,theyagreetoplayamonitoringandwarningroletoensurethatNAFSNcommitmentsarerespected, inparticularthoserelatedto land issues,accesstofinancialresources,professionaltraining,theemergenceofthecooperativemovement,women’s empowerment,management of seed production, and the Voluntary Guidelines on theResponsibleGovernanceofTenureofLand,FisheriesandForests intheContextofNationalFoodSecurity.151Tothiseffect,CSOscommittoattendingNAFSNmeetings,disseminateinformationontheinitiative,andcontributeactivelytosolvingthelandquestion.

SharedCommitmentsShared commitments by the Senegalese government, private investors, and TFPs include thepreservation of “the natural foundations of agricultural, forestry, livestock, and fishery

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production”, as well as the consideration of the Voluntary Guidelines on the ResponsibleGovernanceof Tenureof Land, Fisheries andForests in theContextofNational FoodSecurity.152NAFSN’sstakeholdershavealsovowedtoachieveobjectivesrelatedtothe InternationalCodeofMarketingofBreast-MilkSubstitutes,theWorldHealthAssembly’sresolutionsonInfantandYoungChildNutrition,andtheRegionalNutritionalStrategydevelopedbytheAfricanUnion.

5.ASSESSMENTOFNAFSN’SOBJECTIVESINSENEGALProponentsoftheNewAlliancearguethattheinitiativeinvitesAfricancountriestotakeownershipofthedomesticimplementationoftheplan,whilecriticsmaintainthat,onthecontrary,itimposesunwarrantedpolicy revisions. InSenegal,however, theNAFSNhasnotbroughtaboutmajornewchanges insofar as the Cooperation Framework essentially compiles pre-existing goals andprograms.

This section discusses the New Alliance’s principles and objectives on paper in relation to thecritiquesithasreceived,andillustratesthewaysinwhichtheNAFSNinSenegalisbuiltonanumberofrelativelyweakassumptionsandproblematicevaluationmethods.Despitetheseshortcomings,the Cooperation Framework contains some governmentalmeasures thatmay foster agriculturaldevelopment.

5.1TheNAFSN’sInfluenceonDomesticPoliciesandPrioritiesOverall,theNewAllianceiscongruentwithSenegal’sprioritiesandorientationsintheagriculturalsector,whichhavesoughtthegreaterparticipationofprivatepartnerssincethearrivalofformerPresidentAbdoulayeWade in2000.153Senegalesepolitical authoritiesalso think that thegoalsoftheNAFSNmeshwiththecurrentgovernmentalapproachtowardagriculturaldevelopment.

A lack of institutional continuity is nonetheless observable. While the Senegalese governmentconsiders that it has aligned the objectives of theNewAlliancewith its NAIP, severalmeasurescontained in the NAFSN Cooperation Framework do not figure in the NAIP as such, given theexplicitfocusoftheNewAllianceontheprivatesectorandthecreationofotherinitiativeswiththesuccessionofWadetocurrentPresidentMackySall.154InFebruary2014,thestatealsolaunchedanew program that specifically guides its intervention in the agricultural sector: the Program toAcceleratethePaceofAgricultureinSenegal(ProgrammedeRelanceetd’AccélérationdelaCadencede l’Agriculture Sénégalaise – PRACAS). Thereafter, the Senegalese government shifted its focusfromtheNAIPtoPRACAS,whichitnowpromotesasitschiefagriculturalprogram.

TheinclusionintheCooperationFrameworkofobjectivesnotlinkedtotheNAIPisnotnecessarilyaproductofSenegal’senrolment intheNAFSN.SeveralmeasuresencouragedbytheNewAlliancewerealready intheSenegalesegovernment’spipeline,an indicationthat itwasabletodesign itsCooperation Framework in line with existing priorities. For instance, before the NAFSN wasimplemented, thegovernmenthadannouncedthat itwouldexemptagriculturalequipmentfromthe value-added tax (VAT) as part of its new Fiscal Code, adopted on December 31, 2012. Thismeasurewas included in thenPresidentAbdoulayeWade’sGreatAgriculturalOffensive forFoodandAbundance(GrandeOffensiveAgricolepourlaNourritureetl’Abondance–GOANA),launchedin2008. 155 Similarly, the idea of creating a governmental fund to finance small and medium

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enterprisesfirstappearedin2010.156Inhiselectoralplatform,PresidentMackySallalsopromisedtoestablish a sovereign strategic fund in order to improve access to agricultural insurance andmodernize infrastructure.157Projects for the creation of the Priority Investment Guarantee Fund(Fonds de Garantie pour les Investissements Prioritaires – FONGIP), the Sovereign StrategicInvestmentFund(FondsSouveraind'InvestissementsStratégiques–FONSIS)andtheNationalBankfor Economic Development (Banque Nationale de Développement Économique – BNDE)were notmentioned in the NAIP, but nonetheless preceded the New Alliance. In addition, theimplementation of Credit Reference Bureaus emanates from a West African Economic andMonetary Union (WAEMU) initiative unrelated to the New Alliance. Finally, the Program forReforms of the Business Environment and Competitiveness (Programme de Réformes del'EnvironnementdesAffaires etde la Compétitivité –PREAC), adopted inDecember2012, includesseveralmeasuresthatappearintheNAFSNCooperationFramework.158

Canada does not seem to have directly influenced the specific content of Senegal’s NAFSNCooperation Framework, although it has recently drawn up conditions to encourage theSenegalesegovernmenttorespectitscommitments.Assuch,Canadausespre-existingSenegaleseprioritiestoimposeitsownrequirementsforthedisbursementofitsfinancialsupport.Indoingso,Canada put emphasis on policy changes it considers the most imperative, which might notnecessarilycorrespondtothoseoftheSenegalesegovernment.EvenifseniorSenegaleseofficialsdo not feel that these conditions represent an undue burden, it is nonetheless Canada thatapproachedSenegalto jointheNAFSNtobeginwith,conferringasomehowcircularcharactertotheenforcementoftheserequirements.Indeed,itwouldarguablyhavebeendelicateforSenegalto refuse to join a G7-sponsored initiative in the first place, as the country’s dependence on aidmakesitdifficultforthegovernmenttodeclineparticipationindonorprojects.

Insum,theSenegalesestatedoesnotappeartohaveadoptednewpolicygoalsasaresultof itsinvolvement intheNAFSN,asconfirmedbyhigh-rankingofficials.However,thesepublicservantsestimate that, at the time of its inception, the New Alliance has legitimized the government’sapproachtoagriculturaldevelopment.Inaddition,discussionstodeterminepolicyobjectivesseemtohavecenteredontheneedsof theSenegaleseprivatesector (andnotnecessarilyonthoseofpowerful MNCs). NAFSN’s efforts to work with existing African initiatives in a more consistentfashion are laudable. Yet these priorities were not developed in a vacuum; they originate in anormative framework that prevails in the global realm. In Africa, conceptions that circulate ininternationalcirclesinfluencepoliticalelites’viewsonagriculturaldevelopment.Forinstance,mostAfrican countries have elaborated “emergence plans.” The concept of emergence does notfundamentallydepartfromneoliberaltenets;itisratheranewdevelopment“avatar”producedbyprivateconsultingfirmsoperatinginaglobaleconomicenvironment.159

FoodSecurityObjectivesAchieving foodsecurity160isacomplex issue towhich theNewAlliancehasperhapsnotdevotedenoughconsideration.Overall,theCooperationFrameworkhasnotidentifiedthestructuralcausesof food insecurity and malnutrition in Senegal. This oversight makes it difficult to deviseappropriatemeasuresthatcouldredressdeficiencies.TheCooperationFrameworkdoesnotspelloutthewaysinwhichprivatefundingofagriculturewilltranslateintoincreasedfoodsecurityand

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reduced malnutrition for vulnerable populations. 161 The NAFSN has seemingly not helpedparticipatingcompaniestoreflectonadequatestrategiestosupportsmallholderseither.

TheassumptionbehindtheNAFSNisthat integratingsmallholders intovaluechains isanobviouspathtoincreasingrevenuesandproductivity,andasaresult,foodsecurity.Aconsiderablebodyofresearch shows indeed that inclusive value chains may create employment and raise farmers’incomes,162whichinturnenhancestheirabilitytocommandfoodinmarkets.163Higherpurchasingpowercanleadtonutritionalimprovementsifpeopleusethisextraincometoeatmorehealthily.Sofarmersdonotnecessarilyneedtoincreasetheirownagriculturalproductiontoimprovefoodsecurityandnutrition.

However,theNewAlliancedoesnotseemtogivefullconsiderationtotheothersideofthestory.The limitations of global value chains must be addressed lest they create new problems.Smallholders who integrate formal value chains can lose autonomy in productive activities,especially,asLee,Gereffi,andBeauvaisobserve,in“bilateraloligopolies[…]characterizedbythepresence of concentrated producers and retailers with tight chain coordination.”164If they areproducingforexport,smallholdersmayfacevolatileworldmarketsandbecomemorevulnerabletobroadereconomicconditionsthantheyotherwisewouldhavebeeniftheywereproducingforlocalmarkets.Vorleyalsonotesthatlocalmarketscanprovidemoreflexiblesolutionsto“cashstrappedfarmers”thanintegrationinvaluechainsinvolving“contracts,membershipofaproducergroups,delayedpaymentsandstrictcompliancewithstandardsforquality.”Dynamicinformalmarketscanalsoofferhigherpricesthanpredeterminedproductioncontracts.165

As Seville, Buxton, andVorley remark, “a producer’s assets are a critical factor in their ability toparticipate inandbenefit fromformalmarkets.” In thecourseofagriculturalmodernization, lessproductive farmerswill likely be left out from value chainswith no governmental safety nets oralternative employment options. As such, the development of inclusive value chains “requireslearning how to reach the less organized farmers and investingwith farmers so that thosewithfewerassetsalsobenefit.”166ForVermeulenandCotula,theinclusivenessofvaluechainsdependsultimatelyonthebalanceofownershipbetweensmallholdersandagribusinessinvestors,onlocalactors’ “ability to influencekeybusinessdecisions,”on thedistributionof riskbetweenbusinesspartners,andon“thesharingofeconomiccostsandbenefits.”167

Finally, theNAFSNdoesnotappeartoconsidertheadverseeffectsthatglobaleconomicpoliciescan have on domestic private investment. For instance, Economic Partnership Agreementsbetween Europe and Africa to liberalize trade include the elimination of customs duties onEuropeanproduce.While the EuropeanUnion contends that it does not subsidize the export ofagricultural commodities, Berthelot has contested this claim using econometricmodels.168TheseagreementsarelikelytorenderAfricanagriculturalproductslesscompetitive.

ChangesinSeedLawsTheNAFSNinSenegalhasnotresultedintheadoptionofnewseedlaws.However,arevisedpolicydocument, theStrategy for theReconstitutionofSeedStock,169was issued in2016.TheStrategywasdevelopedtorespondtothefactthatcurrentseedsuppliesareinsufficienttomeetdemand,despitemorethantenyearsofgovernmentaleffortstoreplenishseedreserves.170Itproposesto

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setupanefficientseedsystemthat isadaptedtotheneedsofsmallholdersby2020.Specifically,the Strategy aims to increase the quantities of seeds certified by an Official Service of Control,improve the quality control process, enlarge seed storage capacity, and eliminate commercialmalpractices.TheStrategyalsoplanstocapitalizeonthepresenceofAfricaRiceinSenegal,whichprovides New Rice for Africa (Nerica) seeds, a cultivar that crosses African and Asian varietiesthroughplantbreeding.171

According to the Senegalese Institute of Agricultural Research (Institut Sénégalais de RechercheAgricole– ISRA),peasantseedsareunderperformingby30% incomparisontocertifiedseeds,butthis assertion is disputed.172Nonetheless, the Strategy does not exclude small-scale farmersaltogether. For instance, cooperatives of the Association for the Promotion of GrassrootsDevelopment (Association pour la Promotion du Développement à la Base – ASPRODEB) areimportantactorsinthemultiplicationofpre-basicseedsproducedbyISRA.173However,tocountera lackofresources,theSenegalesegovernmenthasrecentlyallowedafewprivatecompaniestoproduce pre-basic seeds, an activity that previously reserved for state agencies.174The Strategydoesnotincludemeasurestopromotepeasantseeds,althoughitdoesnotimposerestrictionsonthemeither.

In 2010, Senegal started the application process to become a member of the Organisation forEconomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) seed certification scheme.175Reference to theschemedisappearedinthesecondProgressReport.However,SenegalwasacceptedasamemberonMay21,2015.176Asaresult,Senegal’sseedcontrolandcertificationsystemisnowinternationallyrecognized. Senegal will be able to export maize, rice, and sorghum seeds to other membercountries. Proponents of the OECD scheme say that it will help Senegal produce higher qualityseeds.177The relevance of this policy remains unclear, as Senegal experiences difficulties inprovidingenoughseedsforitsdomesticmarket.

CriticshavealsoarguedthattheNAFSNaimstofacilitatetheintroductionofGMOstoAfrica.TherehaveallegedlybeendiscussionsaboutthepromotionofGMOsinthecontextoftheNewAllianceinSenegal, but the idea was not pushed at higher decision-making levels.178Senegalese officialsconsideredtheissuetoopoliticaltoincludeitintheCooperationFramework.179Also,theStrategyfor the Reconstitution of the Seed Stock does not amend the existing Law n° 2009-27 onbiosecurity,whichrestrictstheuseandtradeofGMOsinSenegal.180

LandReformIn2012,Senegalinitiatedaprocesstorevisethe1964NationalDomainLaw,whichconferstoruralcouncils the authority to allocate land. The content of this policy change was inspired by theSustainable and Inclusive Agribusiness Development Project (Projet de Développement Inclusif etDurable de l’Agrobusiness au Sénégal – PDIDAS), financed by the World Bank. Despitecomprehensive consultations with numerous stakeholders, the President of the National LandReformCommission(CommissionNationaledeRéformeFoncière–CNRF)seemedtoalreadyhaveapreference: matriculation of all lands in the name of the state→ emphyteutic181lease from thestatetomunicipalcouncils→creationofsubleasesforindividualusers,bothlocalsandforeigners.Inapublicspeech,PresidentMackySallalsoexcludedthepossibilityofregisteringlandinthenameofmunicipalities.182TheCNRFsharedadraftofthepolicydocumentwithgovernmentagencies,the

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private sector and civil society in August 2016.183Concerned that the proposed leases mightcompromise customary land rights instead of protect them, civil society organizations issued astatementdeploringtheemphasisontherecognitionof“indefeasiblerightstotheexclusionofallothersystemsoflandsecurement.”184

It seems that these complaints were partially heard. While affirming the need to allow privateinvestorstoaccess land,thefinal landpolicydocument185issued inOctober2016statesthat“thefundamentalorientationofthelawonthenationaldomain infavorof local landadministration ismaintained.”Thetextalsocallsforthecreationof“agraduationoflandrightswhichmaybeofadifferentlegalnature”(administrativecertificate,certificateofpossession,leaseorsublease,landtitle,etc.),“withgatewaystomovefromonetypeoftitletoanother.”186

OneoftheobjectiveslistedintheCooperationFrameworkconcernsthefinalizationofthecurrent“landreforminaparticipatorymannertoenabletheissuanceoftitles”toenterprises.187However,Senegal’s proposed reform predates its accession to the NAFSN and likely would have beenundertakenregardlessofwhetherornotSenegaljoinedtheNewAlliance.Inthelast20years,thegovernment started a land reform review process on three occasions but interrupted it eachtime.188Despite pressure from international bodies and domestic farmer organizations, it hasconsistently postponed implementing each land reform due to fears that such changes woulddestabilizetheruralworld. Inthiscontext,theNewAlliancerepresentsanadditional incentivetocompletethetransformationofthelandtenuresystembutwasnotthemainimpetus.

Initially,Canadamadetheadoptionofalandreformpolicyaconditionfordisbursingitsbudgetarysupport toSenegal.Afterdiscussionwith theSenegalesegovernment,Canadianofficials realizedthat the National Assembly could actually reject the proposed reform. Instead, Canada is nowaskingtheSenegalesestatetosubmitthedraftbilltotheNationalAssemblyasaconditionforthereleaseoffunds.CanadianagentsclaimthattheyhavenotinvitedmembersoftheCommissiontofavouroneparticularoptionortheotherinthedraftbill,althoughCanadaundeniablyregardslandtitlingasahighpriorityforstimulatingprivateinvestmentsinagriculture.

OtherCommitmentsintheCooperationFrameworkAt leastonpaper, theNAFSNCooperationFramework containsanumberofgoodmeasuresputforthbytheSenegalesegovernment(thoughwithsomecaveats).Forinstance,onesub-objectiveaimstodevelopaprofessionaltrainingprogramfortheagriculturalsector.Thisisalaudablegoal,although funds were not yet available when the review was conducted for the 2015 progressreport.189Oneindicatoralsomentionsthereceiptof106storagewarehouses.Thisprojectisnotagovernmentalcommitmentperse,asithasbeenfinancedbyWAEMU,butnonethelessrepresentsa relevant initiative in a context where post-harvest losses amount to 30-40% of agriculturalproductioninSenegal.

Senegal is also the only country among the ten African members of the NAFSN that refers toenvironmentalconsiderationsinitsCooperationFramework.190Onepolicycommitmentreadsthatthe government must “Continue to implement the program to combat deforestation and soildegradation through sustainable and integratedmanagement of forest stands and soil.” In thisregard, the National Strategic Investment Framework for Sustainable LandManagement (Cadre

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nationald’investissementstratégiqueengestiondurabledesterres)aimstocombatsoilsalinization.AnotherindicatorreferstothedisseminationofimprovedtechnologiesbyISRA,tohelpsmall-scaleproducers copewith climate change – although it also seems to correspond to theWest AfricaAgricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP) financed by the World Bank. 191 However, theCooperationFrameworkdoesnotaddress the linksbetweenclimatechange, rainfalldeficits,andfood shortages in a thorough manner. Also, the document does not contain any measures tosupportorganicagricultureoragro-ecologicalpractices.

One good proposal involves the adoption of a new Pastoral Code by the National Assembly.Elaborationofthepastoralcodestartedin2013withtheparticipationofdedicatedexperts.Itaimsto protect access to grazing areas; regulate seasonal cattlemigration and straying; anddiminishconflicts between pastoralists and agricultural producers. The construction of four centers forcollecting milk is another commendable initiative. 192 The implementation of the SustainableFisheriesManagementProject(Projetd'aménagementdurabledespêcheriesduSénégal–ADUPES),whichbeganin2014,mayhelplimitoverfishing.TheEuropeanUnionfinancesthisprogram.

MostSenegaleseexpertsandNGOrepresentativesagreewiththeCooperationFramework’sgoalof reducing agricultural subsidies, because they are often capturedby political elites or religiousleadersandseldomreachsmallproducers.193Also,subsidizedinputsaretypicallydeliveredafterthecultivation season has started, disrupting the cropping calendar. According to many, the mostimpoverished farmers still need subsidized seeds and fertilizers, but the majority of producerswouldbenefitmorefrombetteraccesstocredit.

5.2InclusivenessandSenseofOwnershipoftheNAFSNSenegal’saccessiontotheNewAlliancestemsfromadecisionmadeatthehighestpoliticallevels.Therewerenopublic consultations to assess the relevanceof joining this initiative for Senegal’sdevelopment.However,afterPresidentMackySallconfirmedSenegal’smembershipintheNAFSN,several discussion sessions were organized to elaborate the Cooperation Framework and tomonitorprogress.Opinionsontheinclusivenessofthemeetingsvary.

SenegalandCanadadepict the implementationprocessasbeingparticipatoryandtransparent,aviewsharedbysomestakeholders,notablysomeSenegaleseagencies.Forinstance,theTaskForceagainstMalnutrition(CelluledeLuttecontrelaMalnutrition–CLM)considersthattheNAFSNtookitspointofviewseriouslyandthattheworkshopsrepresentedauniqueoccasiontodialoguewithotherinstitutionalpartnersandprivatefirms.194BasedoninformationavailableinProgressReports,Senegalese agencies in charge of nutrition issues do not, however, seem to have taken part insubsequent consultationworkshops.Now that it is functional again, theExecutiveSecretariatoftheNationalFoodSecurityCouncil(SecrétariatexécutifduConseilnationaldelasécuritéalimentaire– SE-CNSA) regrets that it is notmore involved in overseeing the activities of theNewAlliance,givenitsfocusonfoodsecurity.195

Severalprofessionalagriculturalorganizationsandcivilsocietygroupsfeelthattheirparticipationintheearlyconsultationprocessprimarilyservedcosmeticpurposes.Forinstance,theywouldhavelikedtobeincludedintheselectionofcompaniestakingpartintheNewAlliance.196However,CSOsweresurveyedduringthetworeviewprocesses.TheNAFSNreportedthepointofviewofdifferent

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stakeholders in its institutional documents in a relatively transparent manner. For instance,concernsthatNGOshaveexpressedseemtohavebeendulyrecordedinthefirstdocumentsoftheNAFSN(althoughcertaingroupsconsiderthattheircritiqueshavebeendilutedormisrepresented).

Despitethesediscussions,NGOprioritiesnotalreadyincludedintheCooperationFrameworkwerenot translated intonewpolicyobjectives. Peasantorganizationshave consistently advocated forthe promotion of family agriculture, and several consider that agribusiness companies competeunfairlywithsmallholders.Theseconcernshavenotbeeneffectivelyintegratedintothefunctioningof the New Alliance. However, CSOs have requested and obtained from the New Alliance theinformalrecognitionthatfamilyproducersalsorepresentvaluableprivateinvestorsinagriculture.Indeed, after having criticized theNAFSN,ASPRODEB joined the initiative as a privatepartner, asignificantachievementthat illustratestherelativeopennessofSenegalandCanada,butalsothestrengthofSenegalese civil society (even thoughASPRODEBhasnot subsequentlypublicized itsdecisiontoparticipateintheNAFSN).197

Manyofthecivilsocietyrepresentativesinterviewedinthisresearchwerenotveryfamiliarwiththespecific content of the Cooperation Framework in Senegal. This reveals both a lack of publiceducationeffortsonthepartoftheNewAlliance,aswellasNGOs’limitedinterestinthisinitiativein a context where other matters, notably the land reform, were deemed more urgent. Incomparison with other issues, some NGOs have admittedly not been as well organized andmobilized on the NAFSN. Other CSOs have been more proactive. While recognizing that thefounding principles of the New Alliance remain problematic, they have enunciated counterargumentsandattemptedtomodifythecontentandobjectivesoftheNAFSNfromwithin.

According to the Canadian team, the Senegalese government has occasionally convened theprivate sector tomeetings and workshops in past years but has not necessarily consulted withthemsystematically.OneoftheobjectivesoftheNewAllianceistofacilitatedialoguebetweenthegovernment and the business community for a better consideration of the latter’s concerns.Canada and Senegal’s officials estimate that this goal has been attained. However, the currentSenegalese PrimeMinister seems less prone to advance theNAFSN agenda. As a result, severalfirms taking part in the New Alliance maintain their own independent lobbying channels toinfluencethegovernmentonissuesthatdirectlyaffectthem.

Many company representatives involved in the NAFSN in Senegal oscillate betweenincomprehensionanddisappointment,asituationthatechoes thatofBurkinaFasoandGhana.198Several private partners do not fully understand the basic principles of the New Alliance. SomecompaniesfeelthatthenumberofdirectmeetingstheyhavehadwiththeSenegalesegovernmentis insufficient and would like more interaction. In contrast, others are experiencing “meetingfatigue.”ACEOsharedhisdiscontent:“IamalittledisappointedwiththeNAFSNbecausetherearealotofdiscourses,alotofdeclarations.Buteconomicoperatorsonthegroundarestillwaitingforresults.”199Theycomplain that theyhavenot seenconcreteoutcomesandappropriate follow-upactionsafterthecompletionofquestionnairesandtheorganizationofthesesessions.Companiesalso feel that the language of the NAFSN is rather abstract and does not allow them to clearlyunderstandthepolicyreformsthatarebeingundertaken.

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Finally, direct consultationswith thosewho are affected (both positively and negatively) by theNAFSN in rural and urban areas are remarkably absent from the New Alliance elaboration andimplementation process, a pattern observed in other member countries as well. None of theagriculturalproducersinterviewedforthisstudyhadeverheardoftheNAFSN.

In brief, the NAFSN in Senegal has, so far, been characterized by an overall lack of coherence,ownership,andcommunication.Severalindividualsfromthegovernment,civilsociety,andprivatesectorwishtheywerebetterinformedabouttheNewAllianceandcouldparticipatemoreactivelyinmonitoring and implementation activities.When these problems andmisunderstandingswerebroughtupwithCanadianofficials inDakar, their importancewasdownplayed. In theopinionofthe Canadian staff, their role is to communicate information, but they are not responsible formaking sure that stakeholders grasp the principles and goals of theNAFSN. However, Canadianagents do recognize that civil society organizations must be able to influence the content ofgovernmentalobjectivesincludedintheNewAlliance.

5.3Self-ReferentialEvaluationMethodOne of the major difficulties in assessing the results of the New Alliance relates to its internalevaluationmethod.TherearenomechanismstodeterminehowtheNAFSNeffectivelycontributestoreducingpovertyorimprovingfoodsecurityandnutrition(theprogressreportsdonotmeasuretheseindicators).200AccordingtoCanadianofficials,theobjectiveoflifting50millionpeopleoutofpovertywasasimplifiedmessageusedasa“marketingstrategy”tolegitimizetheNewAlliance.Assuch,itremains“anaspirationalgoal”,notan“attributional”one.201Thisstatementlendscredenceto critics of theNAFSNwhowonderwhether the initiative can succeed in reducing poverty andfood insecurity.Althoughtheremaybesignificantprogressonthesetwoobjectivesbefore2022,thereisnowaytodirectlycorrelateittotheNAFSN.

Achievementsareprincipallymeasuredagainstcommitmentsthateachsetofstakeholdersmadeinthe Cooperation Framework, rendering the assessment exercise rather self-referential. Forinstance,resultsobtainedbytheTFPsinvolvedintheNewAllianceareevaluatedsolelyonthebasisofplannedlevelsofaid.Thereisnosubstantiveassessmentoftheimpactoftheirprogramsonthedevelopment of agriculture and improvement of nutrition within the ambit of the NAFSN.202Asseveral donor programs began before the NAFSN, it is also unclear as to whether they respectSenegal’sagriculturalpriorities.Similarly,SenegalesegovernmentalagenciesprovidetotheDAPSAanappraisalofprogressonpolicyindicatorsforwhichtheyareresponsible.NotonlyisSenegaltheNAFSNcountrywiththehighestnumberofgovernmentalcommitments,italsohasthehighestrateof completion for 2014 (54%). 203 However, when one looks closely at the results, severalachievementsseemonlyvaguelyrelatedtotheinitialcommitments.

Themainindicatorsusedtomonitortheprivatesectoraretheglobalvalueofrealizedinvestments,thenumberofjobscreated,thenumberofsmallholdersreached,204andtheimplementationstatusofLOIs.205Eachcompany isresponsibleforevaluatingandreportingon itsownprogress;there isno independent auditing to verify information. As such, possible negative impacts of corporateactivities related to theNAFSNarenotaccounted for. Someprivateenterprisesbelieve that thisratingsystemisinadequateandwouldliketheNAFSNtocarryon-the-groundvisitstoseparatethegrain from the chaff. Also, because not all private partners have provided their annual progress

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reports,thereisnoreliablebaselinetointerprettheaggregatedatameaningfullyfromyeartoyearandcompareindicatorsbeforeandaftertheNewAlliance.

Lastly, theNewAlliancehas impacts inSenegal throughanumberof“globalenablingactions” itendorses. According to NAFSN reports, the SSTP, the New Alliance Information andCommunicationsTechnology(ICT)ExtensionChallengeFund,andthePlatformforAgriculturalRiskManagement have been conducting activities in Senegal.206 The Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN)initiativeisalsopresent.However,itisimpossibletoevaluatetheconsequencesoftheseprograms,astheyarenotreviewedinSenegal’sprogressreportsforunknownreasons.207Moststakeholders,includingCanadianofficials,wereunawareoftheexistenceoftheseenablingactions.

6.EVALUATIONOFNAFSN’SRESULTSINSENEGAL:MODESTRESULTSCanadiangovernmentagentshaveagenerallypositiveviewoftheresultsobtainedundertheNewAlliance. This stance contrasts with that of several, if not most, private partners, NGOs, andinternationalorSenegalesegovernmentofficialswhobelieve that theNAFSN’saccomplishmentssofarremainnegligiblerelativetoinitialexpectations.Indeed,eventhoughCanadaclaimsthattheNew Alliance has accelerated the implementation of programs and enactment of new laws,availableevidencesuggeststhat,asyet,ithasnotbeennotaprimarydriverofchangeinSenegal,be it reforms conducted by the Senegalese government, increased private investment inagriculture, or improved food security andnutrition.Overall, it is alsodifficult tomeasurewhichaccomplishments are actually attributable to the New Alliance, as most actors had alreadyprogrammed their activities before it was launched. This section analyzes the modest resultsachievedbystakeholdersonthegroundinlightofstatedgoals.

6.1ImplementationofFoodSecurityObjectivesSo far, the influence of the New Alliance on food security seems limited to reviews of existingpolicies by the Senegalese government,which neverthelessmaybe seen as an accomplishment.ThePolicyBriefonInfantandYoungChildFeeding,forinstance,“wasvalidatedbytheMinisterofHealthandimplementationisunderway.”208TheMinistryofHealthandSocialWelfarealsostartedto revise decrees related to the Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes and the CodexAlimentarius,buttheprocesswasnotcompletedasof2015.209

TheNationalStrategyofFoodSecurityandResiliencewaseffectivelyupdatedundertheaegisoftheSE-CNSA.Itisbasedonapolicydocumentthatwasdraftedin2010butnotvalidatedbypoliticalauthorities at that time. The strategy includes the followingoverarching vision: “The Senegalesepopulation, especially the most vulnerable to food and nutrition insecurity, has easier andsustainable access to sufficient, healthy andnutritious foodwith strong resilience capabilities by2035.”210Thestrategyaimstocoordinatevariousinitiativesintherealmoffoodsecurity,toprovidegeneralguidelineson thebest response to foodcrises,aswellas toachieve foodsecurity in thelongterm.Thepolicyisyettobeoperationalizedintoimplementationplans.

Empirical evidence suggests that conditions imposed by Canada and the European Union havepromptedtheSenegalesegovernmenttoacceleratetheelaborationandadoptionofthestrategyinearnest.211CanadianofficialsaccompaniedtheirSenegalesecounterpartsandattendedmeetings,

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butdonotappeartohavesteeredthecontentofthestrategytowardthegoalsoftheNewAlliancetopromotetheprivatesector.212Thestrategymayhelpto revitalize theSE-CNSA,anagencythathasbeenunderstaffedandunderfundedsince itscreation.However,withoutsufficientmeans toensure the monitoring of the various initiatives under the strategy, the document risks beingshelved.

Aseconddocument,theNationalPolicyfortheDevelopmentofNutrition,wasadoptedbytheCLMunder the New Alliance. It aims to “guarantee to all everywhere in the country a satisfactorynutritional status, notably among children under five, through the reduction of at least half ofundernutrition occurrences and the halt of the progression of overweight and obesity.”213Thedocument offers a comprehensive and nuanced assessment of the causes of malnutrition, andrecognizesthatwomenandchildrenareparticularlyatrisk.Thepolicyarticulatesitsactionsaroundthe concept of “nutritional self-sufficiency” in order to achieve diversified food diets with highnutritional values, and promote the consumption and processing of local products to remedymalnutrition.Thepolicyalsorecommendsbio-fortification,whichconsistsofenrichingstaplecropswith micronutrients through plant breeding. Finally, the policy invites the private sector tocontributetotheproduction,transformation,anddistributionofnutrient-richfood.

6.2PolicyChangestoIncreasePrivateInvestmentsinAgricultureProgress reports indicate that, after a slow start in 2013, the Senegalesegovernmentperformedbetter inmeeting itscommitments the followingyear. In total, thegovernmentwasexpectedtofulfill28objectivesbeforeJune2015.Ofthisnumber,18–or64%–wereachieved.However,only2out of 6 nutrition-related goals were accomplished. In 2015-2016, data indicates that thegovernmenthasattained42%oftheobjectivesitwasduetomeetbefore2015and27%ofitspolicygoalsafter2015.214

A general objective of the revised Cooperation Framework is to implement a simplified andbusiness-friendly fiscal and judicial apparatus, improve the competitiveness of the agriculturalsector,andpromote“highimpact”investmentbefore2016.Assuch,anewCodeofInvestmentisinpreparationandanapplicationdecree for thenewLawonPublic-PrivatePartnerships isunderstudy.However, the 2014 annual reviewnotes that theworking committee for thenewCodeofInvestmentwas ineffective. The 2015 report indicates that the “Harmonization of PPP legal andinstitutionalframeworksisunderway.”215Also,theSenegalesegovernmenthasabandonedtheideaofreducingcorporateincometaxfromitscurrentlevelof30%to25%.

The FONGIP, FONSIS and BNDE have also been established and are operational. However,proponents of small-scale agriculture question these measures. One NGO representative, forinstance,notesthatfundsthegovernmentdedicatestotheFONGIP,FONSIS,andBNDEcouldhavebeendeployedtosupportsmall-scalefarmers insteadofprivate investors:“It istotallyuncleartome.Weare told thatweneed theG7and theprivate sector to financeand implement theNAIPbecausegovernmentsdonothaveenoughmeans.AndIseethecreationoffunds[…]tosupportprivate investments in Senegal. I think that if there are available resources – because theseinstrumentsaresetupbythestate–theyshouldbeusedtohelpfamilyfarms.”216

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The Senegalese government recently passed a decree so that enterprises registered under theInvestment Code may now receive a full VAT (18%) exemption on agricultural equipment, afterapproval by a Commission in charge of ensuring that the material is destined for agriculturalpurposes.217This is probably one of the only measures that the NAFSN concretely expedited,althoughithadbeendiscussedbeforeSenegaljoinedtheNewAlliance.ANAFSNmeetingallowedtheMinistryofAgricultureandtheMinistryofFinancetosettleonthisissueandelaboratethelistofeligibleitems.218

Afewremarksonthisdecree.First, itonlyappliestocompaniesaccreditedundertheInvestmentCode,andnotEconomicInterestGroups(Groupementsd’IntérêtsÉconomiques–GIEs).InSenegal,mostfamilyfarms, iftheyareregisteredatall,taketheformofGIEs. It isalsounlikelythattheseGIEshavethecapacitytobuythekindofexpensiveequipmentcoveredbythedecreeinthefirstplace.Thebenefitsofthisnewmeasurewillthusmostlyaccruetoagribusiness.However, itdoesnotseemtoapplytocompaniesregisteredasfreeexportenterprises,ensuringatleastthatfirmstakingadvantageof thispolicy sell theirproductson thedomesticmarket. Finally, someexpertsquestionthesoundnessoffurtherrestrictingthetaxbaseofthestate.219

Despite these shortcomings, Canadian officials indicate that, overall, they are satisfied withSenegal’sadvancementsonthe5conditionsidentifiedtoreleaseCanada’sbudgetarysupport.Theycontentthat,inthelongterm,theNewAlliancehassetintomotionaprocessofstructuralchangethat will yield results incrementally. Indeed, development takes time. However, several otherstakeholdersfromthebusinesssectorandinternationaldonorcommunitywhobelievethatprivateinvestment in agriculture is the way forward find that the Senegalese government has notdemonstratedenoughleadershipontheNAFSN.

6.3ImpactsoftheNAFSNonPrivateInvestmentThechiefobjectiveoftheNewAllianceistofosterprivateinvestmentinagricultureasameanstoenhancefoodsecurity.Thisgoalhasnotbeenattainedsofar,despitesomepolicychangeseffectedbytheSenegalesegovernmenttoimprovethecountry’sbusinessenvironment.TheNewAllianceissomehowbasedonwishfulthinking;itassumesthatprivatecompanieswillautomaticallyinvestifthe government pledges to improve the business climate, and that development will ensue byvirtueofthesepolicyrevisions.However,barrierstoinvestmentarenotlimitedtothoseenunciatedbytheNAFSN;changesinoneindicatororareamaynotnecessarilyleadtoincreasedinvestment.220

ThenumberoftheNewAlliance’sprivatepartners inSenegalhasfluctuatedovertime,buttherearecurrently36companiesinvolvedintheinitiative.Ofthisnumber,29areSenegalese,and7areforeign.However,severalfirmslistedasbeingdomesticareinfactsubsidiariesofmultinationalsorarealsoactive in severalother countries.221Thatbeing said,majoragribusiness corporations thathave in thepastattractedcriticismbecauseof theirpolitical influence, significantmarketpower,and sometimes-controversial activities, such as Cargill and Monsanto, are absent as NAFSNparticipantsinSenegal.222Contrarytosomecritiques,itisnotevidentthattheNAFSNaimedto–orhadtheeffectof–openingthedomesticmarkettomultinationalcompanies.At least inSenegal,the New Alliance has not directly resulted in the creation of local enterprises or the arrival offoreignagribusinesscompanies.223

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Since theNAFSNwas launched,manycompanieshavedisplayedadecreasing levelof interest, ifnot an outright disappointment, in the initiative. Although external factors, such as turnovers instaff,might be at play, this feeling seems to be reflected in the review process. Several privatepartnersdidnotmaketheefforttoreportontheirprogress inthe lasttworeviews.FortheFirstProgressReport,89%ofthecompaniescompletedtheirfollow-upquestionnaire.Forthe2014-2015report, only 52% of the companies submitted an evaluation to Grow Africa.224This percentagedroppedto39%forthe2015-2016review.225ThelowresponselevelmakesitdifficulttomeasuretheNewAlliance’srealprogressinSenegal.

Despite thisdatadeficit, theNAFSNclaims that,betweenNovember2013andJune2014,privateinvestments inSenegal created 1,990 jobsandpositively affected67,773 small-scaleproducers, amajorityofwhom(58,217producers)hadaccesstothedirectpurchaseorprocurementofinputs.226In 2014-2015, private partners generated 926 jobs and reached 119,460 smallholders directly andindirectly,mainlythrough“financialanddataservices”(103,612producers)and“inputproductsandservices” (52,400 producers).227In 2015-2016, the NAFSN had an impact on 138,139 smallholders,primarily via “professional and managerial training” (70,615 smallholders).228 The number ofsmallholders tied toaproductioncontractwithaNAFSNprivatepartnerdeclinedmarkedly from48,392in2013-2014,to41,912in2014-2015,and2,732in2015-2016.

ItisalsodifficulttoaccuratelyassesstheeffectsoftheNewAllianceongender-relatedissues.Only17%ofthesmallholdersreachedbyNAFSNprivatepartners in2013-2014werewomen,against14%2014-2015 and 23% in 2015-2016. In 2015-2016, of the 926 jobs the NAFSN created, 40% were forwomen.In2015-2016,womenoccupied21%ofthe4,226newjobsgeneratedbyNewAllianceprivatepartners.229These figures are theonly available dataon the impacts of theNAFSNonwomen inSenegal.DespitetheNAFSN’savowedcommitmenttoempoweringwomen,availabledataindicatethatjobscreatedandservicesrenderedbyprivatepartnersmostlyaccruetomen.

Taken together, companies that have completed their questionnaires declared having invested$134.75million in2013-2014and$34.1million in2014-2015. In2015-2016, thetotal investmentby10companies corresponded to $22.29 million, for a cumulative amount of approximately $191.14millionsincethebeginningoftheNAFSN.Thissumrepresents30%oftheglobalamountcommittedundertheNewAllianceinSenegal.230While7companiesachieved100%oftheirplannedinvestment,atleast15lettersofintenthavebeenputonholdsincetheNAFSNwaslaunched.231

Table2:EvolutionofthePrivateSector'sCommitmentsundertheNewAllianceinSenegal

Nov2013-June2014 July2014–June2015 July2015-June2016Numberofcompletedsurveys 32 17 14Numberofsmallholdersreached 67,773 119,460 138,139Numberofjobscreated 1,990 926 4,226Levelofinvestment($) 134,748,000 34,108,000 22,292,400

In sum, many private partners are experiencing delays in the implementation of their projects,althoughsomeenterprisesmayhaveaccomplishedtheircommitmentswithoutreportingthemtotheNewAlliance.However,NAFSN’sdifficultiesareprobablyalsoduetothelackofoversightintheselectionofcompanies.Itseemsthattheactivitiesthatfirmsplannedopportunistically,inresponseto the NAFSN, have been pursued less thoroughly. Indeed, several commentators consider that

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manycommitmentsmadeundertheNewAllianceinSenegalwereunrealistic.Incontrast,seriousbusinessesinSenegalarecommittedtocarryingouttheiractivitieswithorwithouttheNAFSN,astheyhaveemphasizedduringinterviews.

Grow Africa has supported a few companies in Senegal in identifying their difficulties. For themoment,thisassistanceremainslimited.Policychangesmay,however,beacceleratedinthefutureif Grow Africa were to become more involved. By facilitating the dialogue between privatecompanies and national governments, Grow Africa aims to defend the interests of the privateagribusinesssector.However,thepursuitoftheseinterestsmayverywellruncountertothefoodsecurity goals the New Alliance purportedly aims to advance. In sum, there is a risk that GrowAfrica’s corporate agenda supersedes both Senegalese development priorities and food securityimperatives.

Box 1. Rice Production in the Senegal River Delta: Comparing Two Business Models

The Senegalese government aims to attain rice self-sufficiency by 2017. Under the New Alliance, eight enterprises have promised to invest in the rice sector. Based on the results presented in the two progress reports, it appears that only Coumba Nor Thiam (CNT) and Compagnie agricole de Saint-Louis (CASL) have implemented their stated objectives in any sustained manner. CNT mainly offers agricultural services to small-scale producers and buys their crop at the end of the season. In contrast, CASL cultivates rice itself over large expanses of land. Both models have different implications for concerned communities, even though CNT and CASL combine the two business models to varying degrees.

Coumba Nor Thiam (CNT): Created in 1987, CNT is a Senegalese company that cultivates approximately 500 hectares per season on its own agricultural land.232 In addition, it enters into production contracts with smallholders over 3,250 hectares per crop season, for a total of 7,000 hectares a year. The company does business with about 2,500 peasants, either on an individual basis or as members of 350 GIEs. Of this number, 4% of its customers – or 100 people – are women. CNT borrows funds from the National Bank for Agricultural Credit (Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal – CNCAS), buys seeds and fertilizers, and distributes them to peasants at the start of the crop year. CNT also provides harvest and processing services to farmers. Producers reimburse the company in bags of rice at the end of the season. After they have repaid their debt, farmers can keep or sell their surplus production as they see fit.

At the NAFSN’s inception, CNT proposed plans for a series of investments over three years. They included developing “rice cultivation with a pump station for irrigation,” creating a storage facility, buying cultivation and processing equipment, and acquiring a new transportation fleet. CNT’s total commitment amounted to $2 million. According to the first progress report, “Operations are fully set up and investment made. More than 6,000 small producers have been reached.”233 The second progress report claims that CNT had fully honoured its commitments with banks, installed a pumping station to irrigate 2,000 hectares of land, and acquired two hydraulic excavators, one truck, and one combine harvester.

CNT’s business model presents advantages for peasants in a context of decreasing state support for agriculture. CNT offers a more flexible solution to credit than the CNCAS, which imposes relatively restrictive loan and repayment terms. For instance, producers who default on their loans with the CNCAS may request a credit from CNT at the start of the agricultural season. CNT then reimburses the loan directly to CNCAS, thus absorbing the financial risk on behalf of individual peasants. CNT is unable to meet demand at the moment, as more producers solicit their services than they can support.

While these arrangements offer a short-term solution to financial difficulties, they remain an alternative to a banking system that is oblivious to rural realities and forces peasants into a perpetual cycle of indebtedness.

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Because there is insufficient credit available to smallholders, CNT is able to charge relatively high interest rates. Individuals who repeatedly fail to reimburse CNT may have part of their land temporarily seized by the company until they pay off their debt. Some producers would prefer the liberty offered by the bank, which allows them to subcontract agricultural services to the enterprise of their choice. Overall, however, CNT meets smallholders’ need for credit and machinery in the absence of other options.

Compagnie Agricole de Saint-Louis (CASL) : Founded in October 2011, CASL has received loans from the African Development Bank and the European Investment Bank. CASL “integrates the entire value chain, from land development to processing and sales under trademark.”234 In 2013, CASL announced that, within three years, it would develop 4,500 hectares of paddy fields, of which it will cultivate 4,000 hectares twice a year. It is also constructing a warehouse to dry and store 36,000 tons of rice and erecting a processing unit with a capacity of 16 tons/hour, or 70,000 tons a year. Finally, CASL intends to sign production contracts with smallholders for over 1,500 hectares annually. Expected investments total $89 million.

CASL initially planned to cultivate rice in the Fouta region that borders the Senegal River Valley, but it was ousted from the first commune where it intended to implement its activities. CASL originally requested 4,000 hectares of land in one block. However, to accept the project, traditional landed elites asked for conditions that CASL deemed inadmissible. CASL then approached a second commune where it wanted 1,500 hectares, but residents, supported by the civil society organization ENDA Pronat, also rejected the company, fearing a case of land grab. CASL subsequently moved its activities to the Delta.

This time, CASL contacted landholders directly to obtain land. The firm acquired a little more than 2,000 hectares of land from two sets of actors.235 First, it negotiated with three villages located on the outskirts of the plantation. Some villages ceded a portion of their parcels in exchange for which the CASL developed land that producers could till themselves. Other villages decided instead to sell their land for $250 per hectare. Second, the company also negotiated with individual owners who, for the most part, had acquired land around 1988.236 In this area, formal land allocations are considerably more widespread than in other regions of Senegal, limiting the likelihood that customary right holders would lose their land forcibly.

CASL’s business model has both advantages and drawbacks for farmers. On the one hand, CASL employed a voluntary approach to access land. The compensation fees it offered are higher than those that most companies propose in similar deals. In absolute terms, however, they remain relatively small and represent a one-time payment for the permanent loss of a productive asset. Producers agreed to sell their land because of the employment prospects and the company’s promise to provide water. CASL allows farmers to use its irrigation and drainage canals for a reasonable user fee. It has been reported that several people who were living outside the commune have returned to cultivate their land now that water is available. The firm also built a costly drainage system to desalinate land that individual producers cannot afford. As a result, the company is able to cultivate parcels that were left idle for many years.

On the other hand, several villagers who parted with their land indicated that they would have preferred to cultivate it themselves. CASL also benefits from access to public infrastructure, including an outfall237 erected with funds from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). It also receives subsidized fertilizers. Because of its influence with the government, the company is able to obtain inputs before smaller producers.

Table 3. CNT and CASL compared

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To attain rice self-sufficiency, Senegal needs to bridge an important production gap. Companies such as CASL that cultivate vast areas may help supply the urban market with local rice and contribute to food security. For its part, CNT supports smallholders who practice farming in adverse conditions. Over the years, they have accumulated a technical mastery, resulting in yields similar or higher than those of CASL, an agribusiness that has substantial resources at its disposal. This is an important insight: small-scale agriculture has considerable potential that remains untapped. Offering greater support to family farmers could increase domestic rice production, while also providing rural employment.

6.4ImpactsofNAFSNProjectsonLandandSeedsSeveral critics are concerned that corporate projects under the banner of theNewAlliancemayprompt landgrabs. Indeed, someprivatepartnershoped that theirparticipation in theNAFSN inSenegalwould facilitate access to land. There is no indication that the NewAlliance has helpedconclude deals on behalf of investors, even though the Cooperation Framework insists on theimportanceof contractualarrangementsà la PDIDAS.Asamatterof fact, severalNAFSNprivatepartnerslamentthatlimitedaccesstolandstillrepresentsamajorconstrainttotheirinvestments.

Basedontheauthor’scalculations,iftheywereallexecuted,NAFSNprojectsinSenegalwouldhavecovered at least 71,229 hectares. Of this number, at least 17,659 hectares were supposed to becultivatedthroughcontract-basedschemes.238Suneorplannedtoacquire20,000hectaresof landtoproduceseeds,anendeavourthatseveralNGOsviewedasapossibleinstanceoflandgrabbing.ThisprojectisunlikelytocometofruitionatthemomentduetoSuneor’sinternalproblems.239

The seed certification program produced an estimated 10,972 tonnes of certified seeds in 2015,which is a small quantity.240The three NAFSN progress reports in Senegal note that humanresources, laboratories, and equipment are insufficient to run the program and ensure propermonitoring. Also, the 2015 Joint Review of the Agricultural Sector notes that the project oftargetingrecipientsthroughashortmessagingservices(SMS)systemencounteredseveralglitches.

6.5LimitedSenseofStakeholderAccountabilityCanadadeclinestotakeresponsibilityforthemeasuresadoptedandtheresultsobtainedundertheNAFSN.IntheviewofCanadianofficials,“theNewAllianceisneitheraprogramnoraproject.”Inconsequence,theyholdthatCanada’saccountabilityliesprimarilywiththeG7andismeasuredwithrespecttotheachievementofitspromisesindicatedintheCooperationFramework.AccordingtotheCanadianteam,Canada'smaincommitmentispolitical.Thecountryisresponsiblevis-à-visitsG7peers,ratherthantoSenegal.CanadianstaffalsomaintainthatthemostimportantindicatoroftheNewAllianceisnottheprogressaccomplishedbytheprivatesectorandrespectoftheirLOIs,butthestepstakenbytheSenegalesegovernmentonreforming itsagriculturalpolicy framework. Inthis view, the Cooperation Framework represents a tool to achieve better transparency andcoherence in that it provides a snapshotof variousprojects and initiativesunderway in thehostcountry.TheNAFSNoffersabenchmarksystemthatclarifiescommitments,definesindicators,andensuresmonitoring. The idea is tomake stakeholder objectives public in order to increase theirsense of accountability. Ultimately, the New Alliance is supposed to incentivize participants torespectthepromisesrecordedintheCooperationFramework.

InSenegal,however,stakeholders tendtopass thebucktoeachotheranddecline responsibilityfor the shortcomings of the NAFSN. NGOs point to the slow progress of the private sector to

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underlinethe latter’s ineffectiveness incomparisontosmallholders.Firmsblamethegovernmentfor administrative delays in policy changes. The Senegalese government says that privatecompanies find false pretenses not to implement their commitments. State officials also remarkthat, while the government exhaustively reviews its progress each year, many members of theprivatesectordonotreportontheiraccomplishments.Consequently,theSenegalesegovernmenthasanincompleteknowledgeofbusinesses’levelofinvestmentundertheNewAlliance.

Several actors, including private partners, recognize that the companies’ achievements aredisappointinginlightoftheLOIs.ACEOopines:“Therearepeoplewhosubmittedlettersofintent.Theyhaveabandonedbut their lettersarestill there [in theCooperationFramework].TheygaveenormousnumbersfortheirlettersofintentTheSenegalesestatepubliclycommittedtotheNewAllianceonthisbasis.Thesecompaniesmustanswerfortheiractions!”241Onegovernmentalofficialalsoremarks:“FortheNAFSN,wereceivedalotoflettersofintention.Alot!Therewasoptimism.[…]Butintermsofachievements,wearedisappointed.Werealizedthatthedeclarationofintentisonethingbutthematerializationofthatdeclarationisanother.”242

TheseresultsseempartlyrelatedtotheinnerlogicoftheNAFSN,whichhasnomeanstoenforcecommitments.243While someCEOs consider that they have amoral responsibility to fulfill theirpledges, many do not feel obliged to do so. As one private partner explains: “It is true thatcommitmentsarepublic.Butthereisnobindingcharacterattachedtothesecommitmentsifnoaccompanimentmeasuresareofferedinreturn.Ihaveveryclearobjectives,buttheirrealizationdependsonmycapacitytoraisefunds.IfIdonotfindthemanddonotfulfillmypledges,noonecan hit me over the head because the NAFSN does not help me to find means of achievingthem.”244When interviewed about their accomplishments, somemembers of theNewAlliancehadevenforgottenthecontentoftheircommitments.

6.6SenegalinPerspective:RegionalConsequencesoftheNAFSNTheNAFSNhasnotyetexertedprofoundandvisibleimpactsonagricultureinSenegal,at least incomparisontothehypegeneratedatitsinception.Thismodestinfluenceseemspartlyduetothefact that since the 2000s, Senegal has been pursuing multiple initiatives to attract privateinvestment in agriculture. The effects of the New Alliance may appear more pronounced forcountriesthatwereless inclinedtosupporttheprivatesector inthepast.Thelackofperceptibleresults in Senegal is also attributable to a steady demobilization of NAFSN stakeholders. Inparticular,iftheSenegalesegovernmentcontinuestoencourageprivateinvestmentinagriculture,itdoesnotnecessarilydosoanymoreinreferencetotheNAFSN.

TheoveralllevelofactualizedprivateinvestmentsinthetenAfricancountriesoftheNewAllianceremainslow.AsofSeptember2016,privatecompaniestakingpartintheNAFSNhadonlyinvested$2.99billionasawhole,representing25%ofthe$12.15billionpromisedsince2012.245AccordingtoGrow Africa’s executive director, William Asiko, the disparity between commitments andrealizations isattributabletopolicyuncertainty,suggestingthatsomeAfricanstatesmaybeslowtoimplementchangesthatincentivizeprivateinvestment,andthatreformseffectivelyconductedrequire time to produce visible results. In this general context of low achievements, theNAFSNprogressesunevenly,dependingoneachgovernment’spoliticalwillandcountry’ssocio-economicsituation.

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ThelevelofaidmoneyprovidedbytheG7thatcountriesactuallyexpendcanbeusedasaproxytomeasuretheirengagementwiththeNAFSN.AsofMarch2014,Senegalhadexpended24645.6%ofitsplannedfunding,or$122.85millionofanexpectedamountof$269.26million.OnlyIvoryCoasthada lower disbursement rate (13.7%). Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, andTanzaniaallusedmorefundsinabsolutetermsthanSenegal.In2015,Senegalalsoexhibitedalowrate against disbursements planned to date: it expended only 59% of available funds ($334.36million as of June 2015). This figure indicates an improvement on last year, but remains low incomparisonofBurkinaFaso(531%),Malawi(421%)orMozambique(233%).247

According to NAFSN’s criteria of success, East African countries seem to perform better. Forinstance,AsikoregardsEthiopiaasdoingwellatpromotingabusiness-friendlyenvironment.Inhisview, this country has adopted “very sound policies,” including the creation of agro-processingzones, the establishment of land banks, and the improvement of road infrastructure.248AmongWestAfricancountries,NigeriahasbeenkeentousetheNewAllianceframeworktoguideitspolicychanges and collaborate with the newly created Nigeria Agribusiness Group, a private-sectorcoalition.AccordingtoaGrowAfricarepresentative,theNigeriangovernmentembracestheNewAlliance as a vehicle to restructure agriculture and transform it into a business. In this country,NAFSNobjectivesseemtobeadvancingmorequickly.

Otherstatesaremoreinconsistent.IvoryCoastelaborateditsCooperationFrameworkshortlyafterithademerged fromcivilwar. In this context, thegovernmentwasmorevulnerable topressurefrom foreigndonors.MNCsalsodominate in theNAFSN in IvoryCoastdue to thedeclineof thedomestic private sector following the period of violence.249However, Ivory Coast eventuallywithdrewfroma100,000-hectarericeproductiondealsignedwithLouisDreyfusCommoditiesthatwas included under the NAFSN.250As of November 2015, the New Alliance was also reportedlyprogressing slowly in Burkina Faso. Several measures contained in the country’s CooperationFramework were recycled items from previous initiatives, such as the Agropole Bagré, anagriculturalcorridorprojectthatgeneratedcriticismfrompeasantorganizations.251

Attheotherendofthespectrum,BeninseemstohavedesignedaCooperationFrameworkthatismore considerate of smallholders. For instance, the country favoured national firms instead ofMNCsinitschoiceofprivatepartners(22enterprisesarelocalwhile2areforeign).252Beninisalsoone of the four countries that accepted projects carried out by producer organizations.253Asmentionedpreviously,itistheonlygovernmentthattooknewmeasuresonquestionsofnutrition(Senegal and Ivory Coast simply reiterated existing commitments in their CooperationFrameworks).Finally,Beninistheonlycountrythathasdevelopedindicatorstogaugetheimpactsof the NAFSN onwomen.254At least on paper, Benin has crafted amore balanced approach toagriculturaldevelopmentundertheNewAlliance.

Variable approaches and results between countries do not mean that the whole enterprise isdevoidofconsequencesatthecontinentallevel.AsoneNGOrepresentativeobserves:“thereisnoexplicit homogenisation of policies, but implicitly it is evident that the role and the place of theprivate sector in national frameworks for accessing resources is a constant feature of the NewAlliance.”255TheNAFSN represents a building block in a global landscape of initiatives that have

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soughttoreshapeAfrica’sagriculturesincethe2000s.256Assuch,theNewAllianceshouldnotbeconsidered in isolation.While itsdirect impactremains limited inSenegal, itmayhavecumulativeeffectswhen combinedwith other efforts that aim to liberalize seeds and land in Africa. Theseinitiativesmaydisproportionatelybenefitagribusinesstothedetrimentofsmallholders.

CONCLUSIONThe New Alliance aims to create an environment conducive to increased private investment inAfrican agriculture. While some studies have assessed the impacts of the initiative in variouscountries,nonehasexaminedthespecificroleofCanadainthisprogram.Additionally,manyoftheexistingreportsdrawonadocumentaryanalysis,notempiricalresearch.ThisstudyspecificallyaimstoremedythislacunawithaparticularfocusonSenegal,andtoprovideanaccountbasedonfieldresearch. This researchhas found the following answers to the series of questions askedby theFSPG.

WhatisCanada’sinvolvementintheNAFSN?Asafacilitator,CanadahasliaisedwiththeSenegalesegovernment,privateenterprises,aiddonors,and CSOs to implement the NAFSN. In this capacity, Canada has mostly accompanied theSenegalesestateindraftingdocumentsandconveningmeetings.WhileCanadainvitedSenegaltojointheNAFSN,ithasnotintervenedinthespecificcontentofthepolicychangesinitiatedbytheSenegalesegovernmentapositionthat, inprinciple,encouragesSenegal tohave localownershipoverthedirectionoftheNewAlliancewithinitsborders.ThegovernmentofSenegalseemsindeedtohaveretainedarelativedegreeofindependenceinthedefinitionofitspriorities,atleastinitially.Canada’sinvolvementintheNewAllianceinSenegalhasgraduallydeclinedsinceitwaslaunched.

WhatinitiativeshavebeensupportedbyCanadathroughtheNAFSN?Canadadidnot takepart in the selectionprocessanddoesnot fundNAFSNprivatepartners. ItsfinancialhelpundertheNewAllianceinSenegalfalls intothreecategories:agriculturalprograms,budgetary support, and logistical assistance. The Canadian Embassy in Senegal approved orrenewed most of its flagship programs related to agricultural development and food securitybetween 2009 and 2012, before the New Alliance was created. These programs count towardCanada’sfinancialpledgestotheNAFSN.Inaddition,Canadahasrecentlymadethereleaseof itsbudgetary support conditional on the Senegalese state fulfilling five objectives delineated in itsCooperationFramework.Finally,Canadahasfinancedtheorganizationofworkshopsandhiringofexternal consultants to assist the Senegalese government in steering NAFSN activities. Overall,CanadadoesnotappeartohavededicatednewfundstoSenegal,buthasratherreroutedmoney.Nevertheless,theNAFSNhasseeminglyprovidedpoliticalsupporttomaintainfundsandprojectsatagreaterlevelthanmighthavebeenthecasewithoutCanada’sleadroleinSenegal.

What is themotivation for theSenegalesegovernmentand theprivatesector toengage in theNAFSN?Atfirst,stakeholderswhoagreedtoparticipateintheNewAlliancehadhighexpectationsfortheinitiative. The Senegalese government was hopeful about the NAFSN because it largelycorrespondedto itsvisionofagriculture. Indeed,sincethe2000s,the leitmotifoftheSenegalesestate has been that agricultural development is to be achieved through increased private

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investment, although family farms must be preserved. Besides, Senegal did not want to beexcluded from a global initiative that seemedmajor at the time. For their part, private partnershoped to strengthen their political leverage with the Senegalese government, improve theircorporatevisibility,andestablishcommercialpartnerships.

WhataretheunderlyingassumptionsoftheprojectsfundedthroughtheNAFSN?CompaniesthatparticipateintheNAFSNdonotreceivedirectfinancialsupport.TheNAFSNhasnotdefined clear guidelines to chooseprivate partners in Senegal. The goalwas rather to recruit asmanyenterprisesaspossible.TheselectionprocesswasdevolvedtoMonitorDeloitte,aconsultingfirmpaidbyUSAID.SomecompanieswerealreadysupportedbyUSAIDortheUSEmbassy.Otherswere in touchwith APIX. Because theNAFSN has not screened private partners in a systematicfashion,ithasadmittedsomecompanieswithratherunrealisticlettersofintention.Mostofthemhad already planned the activities they communicated in their LOIs. While the operations orapproach of some private partners involved in the New Alliance in Senegal are perhapsquestionable from the perspective of those who advocate for family agriculture and ecologicalpractices, other NAFSN companies support small-scale farmers through sourcing schemes,processingactivities,oraccesstocreditandservices.

HowdostakeholdersperceiveresultsachievedbytheNAFSN?Senegal has made efforts in the past to improve its business environment for entrepreneurs.Indeed, the Senegalese state had previously internalized the vision promoted by internationalpolicycirclesthatprivate investment inagriculture isadvisable.CanadianandSenegaleseofficialsconsiderthattheNewAlliancehasofferedanadditionalopportunityforthegovernmenttocenterthediscussionon thespecificpreoccupationsandneedsof theprivate sectorand tobetter takethemintoaccount.However,itispossibletosensethattheSenegalesegovernmenthasgraduallydistanceditselffromtheNAFSN.

Indeed, the momentum the New Alliance mustered at the outset progressively withered away.Moststakeholders,betheyopponentsorproponentsoftheNAFSN,considerthetangibleresultsobtainedinSenegaltobebelowexpectationssofar.Assessmentoftheprogramrevealsasharedlack of ownership and sense of disappointment. Given the relatively simplistic solution toagricultural development that the NAFSN offers, it is not entirely surprising that its impacts arelimited. For themoment, it remains difficult to ascertain howprivate investment in agribusinessmay foster food security and nutrition, although the entire enterprise is based on this positedrelationship. Another theoretical assumption underpinning the New Alliance is that the privatesectorisacriticalleverinalleviatingpoverty.TheSenegalesecasestudyprovideslittleevidencetothiseffect.

Thesemodestresultsareduetoanumberoffactors.TheNewAllianceessentiallyfunctionsasanumbrella that gathers multiple governmental, private, and donor projects with no compulsorymechanismstoenforce itsobjectives.TheNAFSNinSenegalrepresentsyetanother initiative inacontext where several parallel and overlapping agricultural programs already existed or werecreated in the meantime. It basically reorganizes money and programs to fit a paradigm ofagricultural development that now explicitly includes the private sector. Most stakeholdersinvolved intheNAFSNseemtohavetheirownagenda,whichtheywouldprobablyhavepursued

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whether or not the initiative was created. Several commitments announced in the CooperationFramework were already planned. The New Alliance appears to rebrand existing governmentalobjectives,donorfunds,andcompanies’businessplanswithlimitedaddedvalue.

HowhastheNAFSNinSenegalandotherAfricanmembercountriesinfluencedpoliciesrelatedtolandandseedlaws?TheNAFSNdoesnotvisiblyhavethesamedeleterious impactson landandseed laws inSenegalthatcriticshavepointedtoelsewhere.Inthatcountry,theNewAlliancefocusesontheproductionofcertifiedseedsbutdoesnotlimittheuseandexchangeofpeasantseeds.Neitherdoesitmodifythe current lawonGMOsor introducenewseed legislation. Senegal hadalready initiateda landreform before the NAFSNwas established, indicating that it would have conducted this changeregardlessoftheNewAlliance.WhiletheNewAllianceencouragestheimplicithomogenisationofagricultural policies across participant countries, it is not a binding agreement. African countriesdisplay varying levels of interest and involvement in the NAFSN. In brief, the New Alliancerepresents an additional force in fosteringprivate investment in agriculture, but is not in itself adeterminantinstrumentofchange.

Are there lessons to learn from theNAFSN that can informpolicyonprivate sector andpublicpartnershipsusingOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)?In sum, the NAFSN in Senegal is neither a panacea for the problems plaguing agriculture as itsproponents argue, nor the cunning scheme to subjugate Africa to capital as portrayed by itsdetractors.Althoughnotalltheirworrieshavebeensupportedbyevidence,criticsstillhavesomewell-foundedconcernsabouttheNAFSN.WhileagricultureinAfricaundeniablyrequiresadditionalfunds, theNAFSNhas includedcompaniesasdevelopmentpartners ina relativelyuncriticalway.The NAFSN in Senegal has not empirically demonstrated so far that the involvement of privateenterprisesinagricultureleadstobetterdevelopmentoutcomes.Thetransformationofagricultureand the commodification of land entail risks for small-scale farmers who still contributeoverwhelminglytofoodproductioninAfrica.Givinggreaterconsiderationtothepotentialnegativerepercussions that private investment in agriculture can have for small-scale farmers wouldstrengthentheNewAlliance.

On the other hand, agricultural businesses in Senegal are admittedly confrontedwith difficultiesthatlimittheircapacitytosupplythedomesticfoodmarket.Thesecompanieshavemadedemandson the government that can benefit small-scale farmers (e.g. improvement of transportationinfrastructure,adecreaseinelectricitytariffsorbetteragriculturaltraining).Theycanalsoprovidebusinessopportunities to smallholders.However,more attention shouldbegiven to the specificneedsoffamilyfarmingtoensurethatprivatepartnershipsreachsmallholdersinatrulybeneficialmanner.

Canadianstaff inSenegalhasusedtheNewAllianceasanopportunitytodeepenpolicydialoguewith the Senegalese government. Canada already carries out excellent agricultural programssupportingSenegalesesmallholders,whichcouldbeenhancedbytheinclusionoffamilyfarmsintogovernmentalpolicies.Inacontextwhereithasbeenlargelyneglectedformorethantwodecades,smallholder agriculture exhibits unexploited potential. The Senegalese government itself hascommittedtosupportfamilyagriculturealongsideagribusiness.Canadacouldalsousetheplatform

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ofexchangescreatedforcivilsocietyorganizationsundertheNAFSNtoenrichthecontentof itsownagriculturalprograms.

The inclusion of private partners in agricultural developmentwas notmentionedwhatsoever inCIDA’s2009FoodSecurityStrategy,althoughitmakesreferencetovaluechains.IfCanadawishestopursuethisdirection,strategicthinkingbasedonempiricalevidenceontherelationshipbetweenprivate investment and poverty reduction is required.257If Canada continues to support thestrengtheningofvaluechains,anotheravenuewouldbetoreinforcefarmers’organizationssothattheycansuccessfullyclaimadvantageouscommercialpoliciesfromthegovernment,negotiatefairand inclusive contract terms with private partners, or even set up their own sourcing andprocessing structures.258In sum, Canada is invited to pay attention to priorities established bynationalgovernments,aswellascivilsocietyandfarmers,inaspiritofgenuinecountryownership.

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ENDNOTES1TheNAFSNwaslaunchedbeforeRussiawasexpelledfromtheG8inMarch2014.Forthesakeofclarity,“G7”willbeusedthroughoutthereport.2TheWhiteHouse2012.3EachAfricancountryhasa leadpartnerfromtheG7undertheNewAlliance.Benin ispairedwithGermany;BurkinaFasowith France; Ivory Coast andMalawiwith the EuropeanUnion; Ethiopia, Ghana, and Tanzaniawith theUnitedStates;MozambiquewithJapanandtheUnitedStates;andNigeriawiththeUnitedKingdom.4GovernmentofCanada2013.5All informants in the studywere offered anonymity. To conceal the identity of the interviewees, their names andspecificpositionsarenotrevealed inthis report. Inaddition,althoughtheopinionsthat individualshaveontheNewAlliancemaydiffer,theyarereferredtoasagroupinordertoavoididentificationandpotentialblamingofparticipantstothisresearch.6AllamountsareexpressedinCanadiandollars($),unlessotherwisestated.ForeigncurrencieshavebeenconvertedtoCanadiandollarswiththewebsiteOanda,usingcorrespondingdateswhenpossible.7 L’Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security(http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement_on_Global_Food_Security[1],0.pdf\, Accessed01/03/2017).8WiseandMurphy2012,14.9DeSchutter,Preface,inJamartetal.2014,7.AccordingtoAFSI’sFinalReport,asofDecember14,2012,AFSIdonorshad “disbursed 67 percent of the total pledge,with Canada, Italy, theNetherlands, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and theUnited Kingdom at full disbursement”. http://www.state.gov/s/globalfoodsecurity/rls/rpt/laquila/202837.htm#3(Accessed20/09/2016).10DeSchutter2015,14.11ThefullcontentoftheLOIswasnotmadepublicduetobusinessconfidentialityconsiderations.12http://www.caadnet/about-us(AccessedNovember3,2015).13http://www.nepad.org/nepad/knowledge/doc/1787/maputo-declaration(Accessed03/11/2015).14http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/final_report_minsiter_stmc-aewr_dec_2017.pdf(Accessed06/02/2017).15https://new-alliance.org/commitments(Accessed14/08/2016).16NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritioninAfrica2014,9.Notethatto“overseeandimplement”isnottodecidethecontentinthefirstplace.17TheWhiteHouse2012.18LeadershipCouncilTermsofReference.September2014,http://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/Leadership%20Council_Terms%20of%20Reference_Sept%202014%20final.pdf(Accessed02/11/2015).19 The composition of the council in 2014 was posted on the New Alliance website (http://www.new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/2014%20Leadership%20Council%20Members.pdf, accessed 03/11/2015).However,thelistfor2015and2016wasnotmadeavailable.20https://www.growafrica.com(Accessed28/08/2016).ThetwocountriesthatparticipateinGrowAfricabutnotintheNAFSNareKenyaandRwanda.AccordingtoWEF,“GrowAfricawasinspiredbyapartnershipapproachdevelopedbyTanzanianandglobal leaders,supportedbytheWorldEconomicForum’sNewVisionforAgriculture initiative,during2009-2011.In2010,PresidentJakayaKikweterequestedtheForum’ssupporttomobilizeprivate-sectorinvestmentandpublic-privatesectorcooperation insupportofTanzania’snationalagriculturepriorities.Atthepresident’srequest,amultistakeholder task force developed a blueprint for investment in the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor ofTanzania(SAGCOT)[…].”ThispartnershipledtothecreationofGrowAfricaattheregionallevel(2016,4).21NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritioninAfrica2014,8.22InterviewwithaGrowAfricarepresentative,Dakar,January14,2016.23GrowAfricadoesnotdefinevaluechains in itsofficialdocument.Intheliterature,valuechainsbroadlyrefertothesequenceofactivitiesfromconceptiontoconsumptionofaproduct.Ateachsegmentofthechain,asetofactorsorcompaniesaddsvaluetoaproduct.Intheagriculturalsector,avaluechaincanbebrokendowninto5majorstages:1)Research and development (companies create innovative products); 2) Input distribution (companies sell seeds,

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fertilizers, machinery, and infrastructure to producers); 3) Farming (farmers produce and harvest); 4) Sourcing andtrading(companiesbuyandmarketrawagriculturalproducts);5)Processingandmanufacturing(companiestransformand package agricultural products); 6) Retail and export (companies sell finished products to other firms andconsumers) (Gradl 2012, 16-17). A value chain can be local or global, with different risks and opportunities forsmallholders.24 https://www.feedthefuture.gov/article/scaling-seeds-and-technologies-partnership-will-accelerate-progress-reduce-hunger-poverty(Accessed26/09/2016).25http://agra.org/new-partnership-to-strengthen-the-private-seed-and-agricultural-inputs-sector-in-senegal-with-thousands-of-farmers-to-benefit/(Accessed29/04/2016).26White2013,2.27White2013,13.28McKeon2014.29Curtis2015.30Curtis2015;Diedhiou2013;Jamartetal.2014;McKeon2014.31Jamartetal.2014,24-25.32NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritioninAfrica2015,1.33White2013,18.34White2013,22.35DeSchutter2015,12;34.36McKeon2014,8.37Inthecontextofthisstudy,4criteriaareemployedtodefinefamilyfarms.1)Familyfarmsmostlyrelyonnon-salariedfamily labour to accomplish agricultural activities. 2) They also consumepart or totality of their production for theirsubsistence needsor use revenues from cash crops for that purpose. 3) Family farmers are often smallholderswhocultivate small land areas. 4) The farm capital and productive assets are part of the family patrimony, but they areusually negligible, if not insufficient, toprocure inputs, yield agricultural surpluses, andensure livelihoods above thepovertyline(Boscetal.2015,FAO2012).Incontrast,entrepreneurialagriculture1)exclusivelyreliesonhiredlabourthatdoesnotownthemeansofproduction(Boscetal.2015,43),2)producesforthemarketonly,3)oftentakesplaceonvastswathesoflandorplantations,4)isheavilymechanizedanddependentoninputs.Althoughfamilyfarmingisoftenopposedtoagribusinessasexclusivecategories, inactuality,“thereexistsagradientofsituations”betweenthetwo.Family business agriculture is an intermediatemodel, inwhich the family owns the capital, but employs permanentsalaried labourandonly consumesa residualportionof itsproduction (Boscetal. 2015).Thehiringofemployeesorpartial mechanization can lead to an increase in cultivated areas, indicating that family farmers are not necessarilysmallholders.38Bichard2014,15.39DeSchutter2015,18.40Pateletal.2015,23.41Diédhiou2013.42For instance, Jamartet al. calculate that,of a totalof 213projectsbetween2012and2013, 119wereconductedbymultinationals or their subsidiaries,while only 94were carried out by African firms in their domesticmarkets. Fourmultinationals (United Phosphourous Limited, Export Trading Group, Cargill, and Yara) are present in at least fourcountriesundertheNAFSN,foratotalof18projects(Jamartetal.2014,27).43Hong2012.GrowAfricaalsoclaimsthat70%ofthecompaniesthatsignedLOIsareAfrican-owned(WEF2016,5).44ParisDeclarationonAidEffectiveness,http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf(Accessed23/08/2015).45White2013,12.46McKeon2014,14.47Pateletal.2015,23.48CitationfromaWhiteHousepressrelease,mentionedinMurphyandWise2012;Henriques2013,6.49Provost,Ford,andTran2014.50McKeon2014,12.51Provostetal.2014.52Diedhiou2013.

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53FourprivatecompaniesoftheNewAlliance(Monsanto,DupontPioneer,SyngentaandLimagrain)controlmorethan50%oftheglobalseedmarket(Jamartetal.2014,43;45).54Hong 2013. “[M]ost investments (by quantity) are focused on sourcing more crops from smallholder farmers. Inaddition,projectedinvestmentdollaramounts,whichareonlyprovidedforabouttwo-thirdsoftheprojects,showthatboth sourcing/trading and farming are at the top of the agenda.” The author calculates thatNAFSN investments insourcing and trading amount to US$2,793,150,000, while companies intend to invest US$152,660,000 in the inputsector.55McKeon2014,12.56Jamartetal.2014,45.57Bailey2012.58Jamartetal.2014,39.59McKeon2014,12.60Curtis2015,7;Jamartetal.2014,39.61DeSchutter2015,19.62Jamartetal.2014,40.63Curtis2015,5.64Curtis2015,12.Theauthordistinguishesbetweenlandgrabsthat leadtodispossession inviolationofhumanrightsand large-scale land acquisitions that do not necessarily involve the expulsion of current users. Curtis specifies in afootnotethatthefigurereportedinthemaintextforSenegalalsocompriseslandattributedundertheSustainableandInclusiveAgribusinessDevelopmentProjectfinancedbytheWorldBank(ProjetdeDéveloppementInclusifetDurabledel’AgrobusinessauSénégal–PDIDAS):“51,730hectaresoflandallocatedtoNewAlliancecompaniesand55,000hectaresof landallocatedunder thePDIDASproject” (2015,37, footnote50).AfterActionAid’s reportwaspublished,PDIDASwassizeddownto10,000hectares.EventhoughthePDIDASismentionedinSenegal’sNAFSNframework,theyaretwodistinctinitiatives.Theauthoralsoamalgamatesanothercontestedproject,Senhuile-Senéthanol,withtheNAFSN.65McKeon2014,10.66Jamartetal.2014,32;Wise2015.67Curtis2015,5.68McKeon2014,10;Curtis2015,6.Senegalplanstocreateagriculturalcorridors,butitdoesnotcitethisasanobjectiveinitsCooperationFramework.69Jamartetal.2014,31.70Curtis2015,16.71Jamartetal.2014,34.72http://eba.worldbank.org(Accessed24/07/2016).73Jamartetal.2014,33.74MurphyandWise2012.SeealsoHenriques2013.75Call of Civil SocietyOrganizations to theirGovernmentson theNewAlliance for FoodSecurity andNutrition inAfrica,released at the World Social Forum in Tunis in March 2015 (http://www.actionaid.org/2015/06/call-civil-society-organizations-their-governments-new-alliance-food-security-and-nutrition-, Accessed 29/08/2016). Several SenegaleseNGOshave endorsed thedeclaration: ASPSP, EndaPronat, Fahamu - Réseauxpour la justice sociale, FédérationdesONG du Sénégal (FONGS - Action paysanne), Forum social sénégalais (FSS), African Network on the Right to Food(ANORF),WILDAF/Sénégal.76Pateletal.2015,22-23.77Jamartetal.2014,47.IvoryCoastandSenegalhavenotelaboratednewmeasures.Theysimplypledgedtoimplementexistingregulations.78Jamartetal.2014,50.79Jamart et al. 2014, 51-52;McKeon 2014, 13. Conclusions about the effects of agribusiness on gender relations arehowevermixed.Ontheonehand,“Theliteratureoncontractfarmingsuggeststhatlandaccessmayshiftfromwomen,who cultivate subsistence crops, to men, who are more likely to sign contracts for cash crops with agribusiness”(Vermeulen and Cotula 2010, 88). On the other hand, women can be hired as farm labourers. For women, wageemployment in large-scaleestateproduction(incontrasttosmallholdercontractfarming)canhelptoreducegenderinequalitiesandopennewopportunitiesforeconomicindependence(MaertensandSwinnen2009).

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80Curtis2015,31.81Jamart2014,51.Senegal’sCooperationFramework includesapolicy indicator to“Reducethegendergap inaccessand control over productive assets and resources,” but reviews do not monitor its achievement. The omission ofgender issues in New Alliance Cooperation Frameworks might reflect the fact that women’s empowerment inagriculturedoesnotrepresentapriorityforAfricancountries–anattitudethatmaybedifficulttochangeifoneistorespecttheprincipleofnationalownership.82Bichard2014;Curtis2015,33;Diedhiou2013;McKeon2014,12.83Jamart2014,35.84Jamart2014,36.85Provostetal.2014.86Diedhiou201387 https://blogs.oxfam.org/en/blogs/14-10-06-leaving-leadership-council-new-alliance-food-security-and-nutrition(Accessed27/08/2016).88McKeon2014,13.89http://www.new-alliance.org/resource/2014-leadership-council-members(Accessed24/08/2016).90PersonalcommunicationwithROPPArepresentative,Dakar,12/01/2016.91Created inMarch 2015, the CAADP Non-State Actors Coalition (CNC) is “a platform to unite farmers’ groups, civilsociety organizations, and private sector actors. This coalition of non-government organizations and networks isgrowing, with more than 100 organizations from 45 nations identified so far”(https://www.feedthefuture.gov/article/grassroots-african-coalition-fights-inclusive-food-policies-more-action,Accessed24/01/2017).92AfricanUnionCommission,andCAADPNSACoalition2016.93 Fertile Ground. Assessing CIDA’s investments in food and farming. July 2013.http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/working_groups/2013_07_19_Fertile_Ground_FSPG.pdf(Accessed30/08/2016).94PrimeMinisterofCanadaStephenHarper2012.95PrimeMinisterofCanadaStephenHarper2012.TheG20institutedGAFSPin2009tocoordinateofficialdevelopmentassistancecommittedunderAFSI.96TheIndependentCommissionforAidImpact(ICAI)reportsasimilarsituationintheUnitedKingdom:“Approximately£600 million of UK Government expenditure is designated as New Alliance expenditure. There is a misconceptionamong certain parts of the media and civil society that this is an additional £600 million being used to supportcommercial activities. In fact, the majority of this expenditure, approximately £480 million, consists of pre-existingagriculturalprogramswhichhavebeenrelabelledasNewAllianceprograms”(2015,5).97Intermsofvolumesdisbursed,theUnitedStateshasexpendedthelargestamount–$1.7billion–totheNewAllianceso far, followedby theEuropeanUnionand theUnitedKingdom. Italydisbursed the lowestamount– $15.87million(NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritionandGrowAfrica2015,9;26).98Data isavailableforEthiopia,GhanaandSenegal.OnlyJapanfaresbetterwithadisbursementrateof144%againstproratedcommitments.Incomparison,Italyhasthelowestrateofdisbursementstodate(19%)(NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritionandGrowAfrica2015,9;26).99Forinstance,ItalylaunchedAFSIin2009,whileCanadaannouncedtheMuskokaInitiativeattheG7SummitinJune2010.100Senegalwould have been approached as a prospective signatory of theNAFSN ahead of Obama's visit to Dakar(InterviewwithanUSAIDofficial,Dakar,December21,2015).101WiththeexceptionofBelisleSolutionNutritionInc.–LeRanchdeOuassadou,a jointventurebetweenaCanadiancompany and a Senegalese one, theywere indeed no Canadian firms participating in theNAFSN. This joint venturesubsequentlywithdrewfromtheNewAlliance.NoCanadiancompanyhasjoinedtheNewAllianceinSenegalsince.102InterviewwithaCanadianofficial,Ottawa,April26,2016.103InterviewwithaCanadianofficial,Ottawa,April26,2016.104Canadianfundingforinternationalfoodassistanceandnutritionhascontinuedtogrowinthepastyears.Despitetheincrease, Canada’s overall spending on aid to agriculture declined from a high of $670million in 2009-2010 to $346millionin2014-2015,whilesupportforagriculturalresearchremainedconstantoverthesameperiod(FSPG2016).ODAforagriculturedecreasedtopre-AFSIlevels(FSPG2015).

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105InterviewwithaCanadianofficial,telephonefollow-up,July7,2016.106Despite numerous requests, it has been impossible to obtain Canada’s yearly funds for agriculture in Senegal. Itseemscomplicatedtobreakdownthetotalbudgetbyspecificitems.However,allbutoneoftheinterviewedCanadianofficialsholdthattheNAFSNhasnotledtoabudgetincrease.107InterviewwithaCanadianofficial,Dakar,December4,2015.108 http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/vWebCSAZEn/44EA8B00E4B48D7785257E610035A62C (Accessed22/09/2016). “Canadawill alsoprovide $20million in technical assistance tohelpvariousdepartmentsmanagepublicfundsandensureservicedeliverytotheSenegalesepopulation”(GlobalAffairsCanada2016).109Activities under the Budgetary Support to the Plan Sénégal Émergent include “(1) support for the Senegalesegovernmenttodevelopandimplementpublicpolicies,streamlinedprocessesandtaxincentivestostimulategrowthintheagricultural andextractive sectors; (2)developmentand implementationofanational strategy topromote foodsecurity and nutrition; (3) development of instruments to effectively manage public spending; and (4) technicalassistance in the form of advice, training and equipment for government employees.” According to the author’scalculations, nutrition and agricultural programs account for 60% of the program’s budget. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/vWebCSAZEn/44EA8B00E4B48D7785257E610035A62C(Accessed22/09/2016).110TheAfricanUnionandNEPADrequestthateverycountryproducessuchareport.Toconductthe2014-2015review,theSenegalesegovernmentreceivedassistancefromAfricaLead,“USAID’sprimarycapacitybuildingprograminsub-SaharanAfrica.”111Combined together, the variable tranches come to $5million, bringing the total annual budgetary support to $10million.112TheEuropeanUnionalsorequiredthatthestrategybecompletedfordisbursingpartsofits11thDevelopmentFund,whichenteredintoforceonMarch1,2015.Oneofthefocalsectorsofthefundconcernsfoodsecurityandagriculture.However, the NAFSN is not mentioned in the document. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-senegal-edf11-2014_fr_0.pdf(Accessed29/08/2016).113Oneconditionattachedtothevariableportionofthebudgetarysupportisnotrelatedtofoodsecurity.114USAIDfinancedthereviewoftheprivatesectorandDAPSAevaluatedgovernmentalcommitments.115RépubliqueduSénégal2014b,19.116Incomparison,theUnitedStateshaddisbursed$230.51million(RépubliqueduSénégal2015a,27).117According to 2015 Joint Agricultural Review, Canada's disbursements as of December 31, 2014 amounted to $33.2million.AsofDecember31,2015,thissumwasestimatedat$68.28million(RépubliqueduSénégal2016b,59).118TheNAIPpoliticalcommitteedependsontheofficeofthePrimeMinister,whiletheNAIPtechnicalcommitteefallsunder the authority of DAPSA at the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Equipment (Ministère de l’Agriculture et del’ÉquipementRural-MAER).119USAID and Monitor Deloitte also began to think about possible policy reforms before the NAFSN was formallylaunched inSenegalandseeminglydiscussedtheserecommendationswiththegovernment.Someofthemwerenotincorporated as specific commitments in the Cooperation Framework, regarding for instance lease-financing. A fewothersappearaspolicyobjectives,suchasbettertargetingrecipientsofagriculturalsubsidies.120Bichard2014,13.Thisseemstocorrespondtoatypicalpattern,however.InMalawi,theCooperationFrameworkwasreleasedthreemonthsafterthecountryhadjoinedtheNewAlliance(Pateletal.2015).121InterviewwithaSenegaleseofficial,Dakar,04/01/2016.122Bichard2014,13.123InterviewwithaSenegaleseofficial,phone interview,28/05/2016. In total, at least8Senegalesecompaniesof theNewAlliancearealsoassistedbytheUSundertheguiseofdifferentaidprogramsinSenegal.Typically,USprogramsdoofferexpertandtechnicalsupportbutdoesnotprovidefunds.124Nonetheless, Canada subsequently facilitated the accession of the Association Sénégalaise pour la Promotion duDéveloppementparlaBase(ASPRODEB)totheNewAlliance.ASPRODEBisthetechnicalarmoftheNationalCouncilforRural Cooperation (Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération des Ruraux – CNCR), the largest and mostrepresentativepeasantorganizationinSenegal.125Bichard2014,14.126 https://www.land-links.org/2013/06/g8-takes-steps-to-improve-land-governance-enhance-transparency/ (Accessed09/12/2016). “The partnership is aimed at helping train officials (including local authorities) and civil society

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representativesontheprinciplesoflandtenureassetoutintheVoluntaryGuidelinesontheResponsibleGovernanceofTenureof Land, Fisheries andForests and theAfrican Frameworkon LandPolicy, on reform land law. Itwill setupadatabaseandaLandObservatoryonlandtransactionsandputinplacetrainingandinformationtohelpSenegalgetthebest out of commercial land deals”(https://www.donorplatform.org/index.php?option=com_cobalt&task=files.download&tmpl=component&id=2422&fid=15&fidx=0&rid=2131&return=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZG9ub3JwbGF0Zm9ybS5vcmcvY29iYWx0P3N0YXJ0PTM2MA%3D%3D(Accessed09/12/2016).AlthoughsomeNGOshavecriticizedthispartnership,itsobjectivesonpaperseembenign.127AccordingtoJamartetal.,USAIDfundstheAfricanUnion’scommitteeinchargeofoverseeingtheNAFSN(2016,10).128In her address on the occasion of the annual review of Canada's bilateral cooperation programwith Senegal onAugust30,2016,theMinisterofInternationalDevelopment,Marie-ClaudeBibeau,doesnotmentiontheNewAllianceinSenegal(http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1119129,accessed27/01/2017).129RépubliqueduSénégal2013a,4.130RépubliqueduSénégal2013a,4.131RépubliqueduSénégal2013a,9.132Monitor Deloitte 2013, 8. Personal notes, “Partenariats Public-Privé et la NASAN: infrastructures, exploitationsfamiliales et autonomisation économique des femmes”, Cérémonie officielle consacrant le lancement de la NouvelleAlliancepourlaSécuritéalimentaireetlaNutrition(NASAN)auSénégaletl’ouverturedelaconférenceannuelleduSystèmed’AnalysestratégiqueetdeGestiondesconnaissances(ReSAKSS),Dakar,12novembre2013.133Rapportdel’ateliernationaldelancement,8.134RépubliqueduSénégal2016b,53-54.135Interviewwithaprivatepartner,Dakar,January18,2016.136InterviewwithaSenegaleseofficial,phoneinterview,May28,2016.137RépubliqueduSénégal2013a,11-12.138“TheaimofthisCodeistocontributetotheprovisionofsafeandadequatenutritionforinfants,bytheprotectionandpromotionofbreast-feeding,andbyensuringtheproperuseofbreast-milksubstitutes,whenthesearenecessary,on the basis of adequate information and through appropriate marketing and distribution”.(http://www.who.int/elena/titles/regulation_breast-milk_substitutes/en/,Accessed29/08/2016).139RépubliqueduSénégal2013a,12.PlacedunderthedirectionoftheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)andtheFoodand Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Codex Alimentarius provides “international foodstandards,guidelinesandcodesofpractice”toguaranteefoodsafetyinternationally.“Whilebeingrecommendationsfor voluntary application by members, Codex standards serve in many cases as a basis for national legislation”(http://www.codexalimentarius.org/codex-home/en/Accessed06/09/2015).140RépubliqueduSénégal2013a,6-7.141ThischangeseemstohavebeensuggestedbytheNewAlliancetofacilitatetrackinginallcountries.142RépubliqueduSénégal2013a,7.Thenotionof“internalconsultationframeworks”isnotdefinedinthedocument.143RépubliqueduSénégal2014b,9.144Bichard2014,24.145For instance, Zena Fruit International processes local fruits that often go bad during the growing season.WhileMamelles Jaboot importsmilk powder, it buys homegrown cereals to turn them into couscous. The company signspurchasecontractswithpeasantsthroughwhichitfinancesthepurchaseofinputsandbuystheproductionattheendoftheseason.146RépubliqueduSénégal2013a,7.147RépubliqueduSénégal,2014a:8.148Bichard2014,24.149Within the aid donors’ platform in Senegal, there exists a consultative subgroup on food security and ruraldevelopment. “The extended group's mission is to implement the principles of the Paris Declaration, improvecollaboration and information sharing amongTFPs, structure anddeependialoguewith theGovernmentof Senegal[…]” (http://www.undp.org.sn/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=310, accessed 24/01/2017, author’stranslation).150ItisunclearastowhetherCSOstookthisdecisioninaconsensualandrepresentativemanner,astheydifferintheirapproachesandvisionsoftheNAFSN.

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151The Voluntary guidelines “promote secure tenure rights and equitable access to land, fisheries and forests as ameansoferadicatinghungerandpoverty,supportingsustainabledevelopmentandenhancingtheenvironment.Theywere officially endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security on 11 May 2012”,http://www.fao.org/nr/tenure/voluntary-guidelines/en/(Accessed24/06/2015).152RépubliqueduSénégal2013a,8.153Although there is a tension between the discourse of agricultural liberalization that Wade proclaims and themaintenance,ifnotincrease,ofstateinterventioninsomedomains.SeeOyaandBa2013.154ForacomprehensiveanalysisoftheNAIP,seeBenkahla2011.155Gabas,Ribier,andGiordano2015,22.156http://www.primature.sn/Le-Fonds-de-Garantie-des.html(Accessed07/09/2015).157http://www.primature.sn/Le-Fonds-souverain-d.html(Accessed07/09/2015);http://www.presidence.sn/yoonu-yokkute/presentation.html(Accessed07/09/2015).158Lejecos2014.159DiméandBa2016,1;6.SeealsoJamart2014.160According to the FAO, food security rests on 4 pillars: physical availability (i.e. “adequate supply of food at thenational or international level”, access (i.e. sufficient food access at the household level); utilization (i.e. sufficientenergyandnutrientintake),andstabilityoftheotherthreedimensionsovertime(FAO2008).161The NAFSN organized a panel on the private sector’s role in nutrition at the launching ceremony, in which aconsultantfromBACDIparticipated.However,thepaneldidnotspelloutconcretestrategiestoensurethattheprivatesectoreffectivelyimprovesnutritionoutcomes.162A study using household data illustrates that in the tomato sector in Senegal, a highly integrated value chaincontrolledbyaforeignfirmforexportsgeneratedjobsfortemporaryseasonalworkersordaylaborers,contributingtopoverty reduction (Maertens, Colen, and Swinnen 2008, 6). According to Maertens et al., “small farmers can gainimportantly in vertical coordination schemes with the agro-industry through enhanced access to inputs, reducedproductionandmarketingrisks,improvedtechnologyandproductivity,andultimatelyhigherincomes”(2008,5).163BuildingontheworkofAmartyaSen,SophiaMurphynotes,“thosewithgreaterpurchasingpowergetfoodwhilethosewithoutsufficientincomeorentitlementgohungry”(2005,7).164Leeetal.2012,12328.Accordingtotheauthors,“Bilateraloligopoliesaretheleastbeneficialtosmallholdersbecauseoftheirstrictrequirementsanddirectcontrolbyleadfirms”.165Vorley2016.Sevilleetal.alsonotethat“Interestingly,formalchainstendtoprovidegreaterincomesecuritybutnotnecessarilyhigherprices”(2011,42).166Sevilleetal.2011,42.167VermeulenandCotula2010,5.168http://www.bilaterals.org/?the-epa-would-liberalize-the&lang=en(Accessed27/09/2016).169RépubliqueduSénégal2016a.Thisstrategyislargelybasedonthedocument’spreviousversion.170Thestateagencyinchargeofproducingandcertifyingseeds,theSonagraines,wasdismantledin2000(Gueye2014,19).ThelawobligestheSenegalesegovernmenttoprovide40,000tonnesofcertifiedgroundnutseedsperyear.Asaresult, the governmentmust certify 80,000 tonnes of seeds produced by third parties tomeet the annual need of120,000tonnes.Accordingtostateagents, the levelofsupervision is inadequatebecauseof insufficientmeans(IRIN2013).Inthiscontext,somesubsidizedoperatorswhoaresupposedtodistributecertifiedseedsunscrupulouslysellun-binseedsinstead.171GRAINclaimsthatNericarice“jeopardisesthesurvivalof local ricevarieties”becausepeasantsmaybecomeover-relianton it (2009,2).DetractorsalsocontendthatNericaseedsneedtobeused inconjunctionwithmorechemicalfertilizersandpesticidesthandopeasantseeds.Incontrast,proponentsofNericaarguethatthevarietyhelpstoboostproductive yields in the context of rain-fed agriculture. Also, peasants can keep Nerica seeds from one season toanother.172For the Senegalese Association of Peasant Seeds Growers (Association sénégalaise des producteurs de semencespaysannes – ASPSP), peasant seeds are more suited to the needs of farmers. (http://www.bede-asso.org/accueil-2/terroirs-sources/lassociation-senegalaise-des-producteurs-de-semences-paysannes-aspsp/english-communique-de-laspsp-association-senegalaise-des-producteurs-de-semences-paysannes-sur-la-semence-ecremee/, Accessed17/03/2016).

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173Pre-basicseedsareproducedfromvarietiesthatISRAselectsandconservesbecauseoftheirspecialgeneticmakeup.174Gueye2014,21.Oneofthecompaniesauthorizedtoproducepre-basicseedsisTropicasem,whichisalsoamemberoftheNAFSN.175“The OECD Schemes for the Varietal Certification of Seed Moving in International Trade promote the use ofagriculture seed of consistently high quality. Certified seeds are produced - and officially controlled - according tocommon harmonised procedures in 58 participating countries” (http://www.oecd.org/tad/code/seeds.htm, Accessed06/11/2015).176APS2015.177 http://terrethique.org/articles/vers-l’adhesion-du-senegal-au-systeme-des-semences-de-l’ocde/ (Accessed26/08/2016).178However,Senegal,alongwithotherWAEMUcountries,isintheprocessofadoptingaregionalregulatoryframeworktoauthorizeGMOs(Diallo2014).However,thisinitiativehasnodirectrelationtotheNAFSN.179InterviewwithaSenegaleseofficial,phoneinterview,May28,2016.180Despiteitsambiguities(Ndiaye2016),analystshaveinterpretedthelawaseffectivelyforbiddingGMOsinSenegal.181Anemphyteusis isa“Leaseofadurationbetweennineandninety-nineyears,bywhichthetenantoremphyteuticlesseeacquiresan immoveablereal right,emphyteusis, inreturnforanannual rent[…]andanundertakingtomakeimprovements.” (https://nimbus.mcgill.ca/pld-ddp/dictionary/show/1098?source=ED2EN, Accessed 28/08/2016). ThecurrentlegislationauthorizesemphyteuticleasesinSenegal,butonlyontheprivatedomainofthestate.Towncouncilsthatadministerlandofthenationaldomainonlyconferusagerightsunderaconditionofexploitation.Accordingtoanexpert sitting on CNRF’s technical committee, the idea behind granting leases instead of outright property rightsconsists of avoiding distress sales and permanent land cessions in the hand of strangers to the community, whileallowingtenantstotakeoutloansandinvestintheland.182Personalnotes,March24,2016:Séanceacadémiquesolennelle:«LeFoncierauSénégal:EtatdesLieuxetPerspectivespour la Modernisation de l’Agriculture », organized by Académie Nationale des Sciences et Techniques du Sénégal(ANSTS), Dakar. See also http://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/macky-sall-laquo-pas-question-d-immatric_n_177924.html(Accessed25/03/2016).183Diagne2016.184http://roppa-afrique.org/IMG/pdf/cncr.pdf(Accessed12/01/2016).185Thepolicydocumentwillhavetobetranslatedintolawsanddecreestobeeffective.186RépubliqueduSénégal,2016c:26.187RépubliqueduSénégal2014a,15.188http://www.ipar.sn/Note-de-synthese-no2-processus-d-elaboration-de-la-reforme-fonciere-au-Senegal.html(Accessed29/08/2016).189RépubliqueduSénégal2016b,107.190DeSchutter2015,13.191 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/12/02/times-are-hard-and-uncertain-senegal-adopts-climate-smart-agriculture-to-mitigate-effects-of-climate-change(Accessed24/05/2016).192AccordingtotheownerofLaiterieduBerger,apartneroftheNewAlliance,“Thetaxonimportedmilkpowderis7%,while all the taxes associated with collecting local milk add up to 30%.” (Maclean 2016) The high level of taxationrepresentsabottleneckinmilkprocessinginSenegal.ThisissuewasdiscussedduringNAFSNmeetingstonoavail.193IPAR2015.194Bichard 2014, 13. In Senegal, three political structures are responsible for supervising food security and nutritionissues.TheCLMandtheSE-CNSAarebothundertheauthorityofthePrimeMinister'soffice.Additionally,theOfficeofFoodSecurity(Commissariatàlasécuritéalimentaire–CSA)operatesundertheaegisoftheGeneralDelegationofSocialWelfareandNationalSolidarity(DélégationGénéraleàlaProtectionSocialeetàlaSolidaritéNationale–DGPSN),whichisinturnplacedunderthePresidency.195InterviewwithaSenegaleseofficial,Dakar,December6,2015.196Bichard2014,13.197A Canadian official also declared that ASPRODEB’s inclusion shows how the NAFSN was able to foster theirentrepreneurialspirit.Despitethesereservations,theentryofASPRODEBintheNewAlliancemaybecommended.

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198Nabaloum2015.Aswell,ICAIobserves,“afrustrationfrombusinessesthathighly-publicisedinitiativessometimesdonottranslateintoaction.InGhana,forexample,wespoketothreebusinessmembersabouttheNewAlliance[..].Theywerenotclearaboutitsagendaorapproachandcouldnotidentifywhatdifferenceitwasmaking”(2015,16).199Interviewwithaprivatepartner,Dakar,January4,2016.200Self-reportingseemstobecommontoallNAFSNparticipantcountries.201InterviewwithCanadianofficials,Ottawa,April26,2016;Telephonefollow-up,May13,2016.202Canada conducted a study on its own initiative to measure non-financial realizations of aid donors, but theconclusionswerenotintegratedinthefinalNAFSNreview.203NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritionandGrowAfrica2015,24.204The variables the NAFSN uses to measure how smallholders are impacted include: mechanization products andservices,productioncontracts,openmarketsourcing;technicalandmanagerialtraining;financialordataservices;andinputproductsandservices.Thesecategoriesarenotdefined.205NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritionandGrowAfrica2015,22.206NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutrition2014,38-39.207AccordingtoNAFSN’sglobalreport,“Assessmentofprogressmade in2014/15showsthattheNewAllianceglobalcommitmentstoadvanceenablingactionsaremostlyonplan,withthemosttangiblesupportbeinggrantstospecificcommitments,forexample,toassistwithinfrastructureinvestmentsorseedproduction.”(2015,2)208RépubliqueduSénégal2014b,18.209RépubliqueduSénégal2015a,112.210RépubliqueduSénégal2015c,45,[author'stranslation].211Personalcommunicationwithprivateconsultant,November10,2015.212November 21, 2015: Réunion du comité technique restreint pour l’élaboration de la Stratégie Nationale de SécuritéAlimentaireetdeRésilience2015-2035,organizedbytheSecrétariatexécutifduConseilNationaldeSécuritéAlimentaire(SE-CNSA),Dakar.213RépubliqueduSénégal2015b,8.214RépubliqueduSénégal2016b,46.215RépubliqueduSénégal2016b,108.216Interview with a civil society representative, Dakar, November 30, 2015. The same comment applies to PDIDAS.ThroughaWorldBankloan,thegovernmentdevelopslandaroundtheGuiersLakeandNgalamValleyintheDeltaforthe production of export horticulture. The original allocation key provided that 40% of developed land would bereturnedtoresidentsand60%distributedtooutside investors.Followingoppositiontothisscheme,eachoftheninecommunesinvolvedwiththeprojectnowestablishesitsowndistributionratio.217Arrêtéfixantlesmodalitésd’applicationdel’article373alinéa2duCodegénéraldesImpôts,19février2016.Thelistofeligible items includes 1) tillage equipment; 2) seeding and fertilization equipment; 3) irrigation equipment; 4)harvestingequipment;5)storageandtransportationmaterial;6)spareparts;7)hydro-agricultural facilities, includinginputs.Thismeasureisinadditiontoexemptionfromcustomsduties.218InterviewwithaCanadianofficial,Dakar,December14,2015.219Interviewwithanexpert,Dakar,December14,2015.220InterviewwithanAPIXagent,Dakar,January11,2016.221CompagnieagricoledeSaint-Louis(CASL),wascreatedandismanagedbyArthurStraightInvestment,aFrenchfirm.Anotherfirm,whichisconsidereddomestic,TeyliomGroup,wasfoundedbyaSenegalesebusinessman,butnowhasitsheadquartersinGeneva,Switzerland,andisactiveinseveralcountriesinWestandCentralAfrica.LesGrandsMoulinsdeDakar (GMD) belongs toGroupeMimran, a powerful company that has its headquarters in Switzerland and alsooperatesinIvoryCoast.Sentenac,throughitsbranchSocas,plansinvestmentsthroughajointventurewithaEuropeancompany.HortisisasubsidiaryofGreenseed,aUScompanyalsopresentinMaliandBurkinaFaso.222The Coca-Cola Company had plans to invest in different African countries under the aegis of the New Alliance.Senegalwasmentionedasa“potential”countrywherethefirmcouldexpand itsactivities,but itdoesnotappear inthe country’s Cooperation Framework in the end.https://growafrica.com/sites/default/files/mou/TCCC%20Source%20Africa%20LOI%20FINAL.pdf(AccessedMay24,2016).223PerhapswiththeexceptionofTeyliom’sbranchContinentalFood,butitdoesnotseemtohavecarriedoutactivitiessincetheNAFSNwasinauguratedinSenegal.

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224AlocalconsultantwashiredfromMarch3to20,2015tocanvassprivatepartners.Despiteherdedicatedworkandfrequentreminders,companiesdemonstrateda low levelof interest inrespondingtothequestionnaire.GrowAfricathendecidedtotake iton.However, itarrived late inSenegalandhadtoconductSkype interviewstocompletethesurvey.APIXandDAPSAwereonlyremotelyinvolvedinthedata-gatheringexercise.Duringthisresearch,GrowAfricamadeeffortstocollaboratebetterwiththeSenegalesegovernmenttoimprovethecollectionofinformation.225RépubliqueduSénégal2016b.226RépubliqueduSénégal2014b,23-24.227RépubliqueduSénégal2015a,24.IntheNewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritionandGrowAfrica’sjointreport,thenumberofsmallholdersthattheNAFSNreachedisestimatedat221,559(2015,22).228RépubliqueduSénégal2016b.229RépubliqueduSénégal2016b,48.230Based on the author’s calculations. Investments between November 2013 and June 2016 (US$126,520,136 +US$25,776,549 + US$21,261,032 = US$173,557,717)were divided by the total amount announced under the NAFSN inSenegal, includingcompaniesthathave left theNewAlliance inthemeantime(US$584,802,838).SeeAppendix7 formoredetailsonplannedinvestments.The2015JointReviewofAgricultureinSenegalarrivesatdifferentnumbers,with82%ofinvestmentsrealized,basedontotalplannedinvestmentsestimatedatUS$109,014,880(RépubliqueduSénégal2016b). It isunclearas towhether thisamount refers to totalplanned investments for the lastyearonly,or if it isaresultofthelownumberofrespondentstothequestionnaire.TheJointReviewalsoprovidestwodifferentnumbersforthelevelofactualinvestmentin2015(US$21.26millionandUS$23.8).231RépubliqueduSénégal2016b,47.Inthe2015JointReviewofAgricultureinSenegal,theNAFSNevokedforthefirsttimethepossibilityofcancellingnon-realizedinvestmentintentionsfromitsportfolio.232DuringtheSpring2016campaign,CNTcultivated636hectares.233NouvelleAlliancepourlaSécuritéAlimentaireetlaNutrition2013,41.234http://www.compagnieagricole.com/en/en-savoir-plus.html (Accessed 03/09/2015). CASL has an agreement withLouisDreyfusCommoditiesthatitbuysatleast50%oftheproductionforcommercialization.235The rural council allocateda first sliceof 1,500hectares toCASLon July4, 2013.OnMarch 15, 2014, the companyobtained533additionalhectares,including6hectarestobuilditsplant.Thelandisdistributedinthreemainblocks,plusthesitefortheplant.AccordingtotheCommunalLandUsePlan(Pland’Occupationetd’AffectationdesSols–POAS),thecommuneofDiamacovers149,000hectares,outofwhich65,557areprimarilyreservedforagro-pastoralactivities.CASLhasalsosecured350hectaresinthecommuneofGandon,buthasnotstartedcultivationactivitiesyet.236In1988,thecentralstatetransformedpioneer land intorural landadministeredbytheruralcouncil, leadingmanyindividualstoclaimlandparcels.Bélières,Bosc,Faure,Fournier,andLoscharguethaturbanandruraleliteswhowere“seekingtoengage inwhatwasthoughttobea ‘profitable’activityofrice-growing,tookpart inamajor landgrab.”Thislandrushresultedinthegrantingofmorethan50,000hectaresintheareaofRoss-Béthiobetween1987and1991(2002,12).However,severalright-holdersonpaperdonotknowwheretheirparcelisphysicallylocatedbecausetheyhaveleftitidle.237Anoutfallisacanalthatfallsintoabodyofwater.Outfallsarenecessarytodrainwaterfromfloodedpaddyfields.CASLdischargessaltywaterinanoutfallthatflowsintothemouthoftheSenegalRiver.238Thisnumbermaybehigher,asnotall firmshavespecified in theCooperationFramework if theycultivate landorcontractoutproduction.Progressreportsdonotmentiontheactualareasoflandundercultivation.239WhileSunéorisstillconsideredamemberoftheNewAlliance, inrecentyearstheenterprisehasbeenundergoingsevere financial difficulties that have forced the Senegalese government to restructure the company and find newbuyers.ItisunlikelythatSunéorwillbeabletorespectitsNAFSNcommitmentsinthesecircumstances.240RépubliqueduSénégal2016b,65.241Interviewwithaprivatepartner,Dakar,January22,2016[author'stranslation].242InterviewwithaSenegaleseofficial,Dakar,December18,2015[author'stranslation].243TheestablishmentofconditionsforCanada'sbudgetsupportcanbeinterpretedasawaytogivemoreteethtotheNewAlliance.244Interviewwithaprivatepartner,Dakar,January4,2016[author'stranslation].245AfricanUnion2016.

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246“Proratedfundingintentionsareanestimatedportionofthetotalfundingcommitmentexpectedtobeallocatedbymid-2014.Disbursementsdonotreflectallfundsthathavebeenallocatedtothecountries,butratherfundsthathavebeenexpended.”(NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritioninAfrica2014,22).247NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutritionandGrowAfrica2015,10.248Mulupi2016.InitsGrowAfricareport,theWEFunderlinesthatMozambique,Ghana,Kenya,andEthiopiahavemadenoticeableimprovementsinestablishingplatformsthatencouragedialoguebetweenthegovernmentandtheprivatesector(2016,10).249InterviewwithaNGOrepresentative,phoneexchange,May5,2016.250Douet2015.251InformationonBurkinaFasoandIvoryCoastderivesfromobservationsanddiscussionsduringaneventorganizedbyaSenegaleseNGOinDakar.ThreepanellistswereinvitedtosharetheexperienceoftheNAFSNintheircountries.252Jamartetal.2014,27.253AccordingtoJamartetal.,ofthe213projectsthattheNewAlliancecomprisedatthetime,only3werecarriedoutbyproducerorganizationsinBurkinaFaso,BeninandMalawi(2014,2-3).254Jamartetal.2014,10;27.255Interviewwithacivilsocietyrepresentative,phoneexchange,May5,2016.256ThemostrecentinitiativeinthisdirectioninSenegalisthecreationofyetanotherplatformthatCAADPandNEPADrecently launched. The platform gathers the government and investors to foster dialogue and increase privateinvestmentinagriculturefromthecurrentlevelof10%to20%(Dieng2016).257Theabsenceof a clear relationshipbetweenaiddonor’partnershipswith theprivate sectoron thehandand thereductionofpovertyontheotherhasbeendocumentedinothercontexts.Forinstance,ICAIconsidersthattheeffortsofBritain’sDFIDtoengagewithbusinessesdonotnecessarilycatalyzeinvestmentsorthat“toomuchoftheimpactofthesebusinesseswouldhavebeenachievedinanyevent”(2015,35).Also,“Thereislittlerobustinformationavailabletoshowtheimpactofbusinessindevelopmentonthepoor.[…]Althoughtherehasbeenashiftinbusinessattitudetowardssustainabledevelopment,businesseswillstill tendtoprioritisemoreprofitableactivitiesandareas.Theyareless likely to target themost remote,marginalisedpeople” (2015, 23). Speaking about theNAFSN in particular, ICAIgoesasfarastostatethat“DFID,aswellasitspartners,shouldbereadytoembraceandlearnfromfailure”(2015,32).258VermeulenandCotula2010,95.TheworkofCECIwithonionproducersinSenegalisoftencitedasanexample.

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AfricanUnion.2016."AUcallsforimprovedcoordination&collaborationwithprivatesectortoimproveAfrica’sagriculturalpotential."PressReleaseNo326/2016,September19.http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/pressreleases/31423-pr-pr_326-_au_wef_forum_.pdf(Accessed27/09/2016).

APS.2015."LeSénégal,membredusystèmedecontrôledelaqualitédessemencesdel'OCDE."AgencedePresseSénégalaise5juin.http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201506051851.html(21/05/2016).

Bailey,Rob.2013."MixedResultsonG8NutritionInitiatives."June12.ChathamHouse,https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/192217(Accessed21/09/2016).

Diagne,Mamadou.2016."Réformefoncière:LedocumentdelaCnrfsoumisàlaDgid."LeSoleil,20août.http://www.lesoleil.sn/2016-03-22-23-21-32/item/54058-reforme-fon…document-de-la-cnrf-soumis-a-la-dgid.html?tmpl=component&print=1(Accessed23/08/2016).

Diallo,Ibrahima.2014."Révisiondelaloisurlabiosécurité-VersuneintroductiondesOGM."SudQuotidien,24décembre.http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201412241313.html(Accessed29/04/2016).

Diédhiou,Famara.2013."Non!L’Afriquenevendrapassesterres."PambazukaNews,21octobre.http://pambazuka.org/fr/category/features/89306(Accessed01/11/2015).

Dieng,Ngoundji.2016."LeSénégalveutporterl’investissementprivéà20%."May10.http://www.nepad-caadp.net/agriculture-le-sénégal-veut-porter-l’investissement-privé-à-20(Accessed10/05/2016).

Douet,Marion.2015."Riziculture:LouisDreyfusdéchanteenCôted’Ivoire."JeuneAfrique,7janvier.http://www.jeuneafrique.com/4310/economie/riziculture-louis-dreyfus-d-chante-en-c-te-d-ivoire/(Accessed24/08/2016).

FAO.2008.AnIntroductiontotheBasicConceptsofFoodSecurity.EC-FAOFoodSecurityProgram,www.foodsec.org/docs/concepts_guide.pdf(Accessed25/09/2016).

FAO.2012.Smallholdersandfamilyfarmers.http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability_pathways/docs/Factsheet_SMALLHOLDERS.pdf(Accessed22/09/2016).

GlobalAffairsCanada.2016."MinisterBibeauannouncesdevelopmentprojectsinSenegal."August30.http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1118509(Accessed23/09/2016).

65

GovernmentofCanada.2013."CanadatakesaleadershiproleinhelpingSenegaljointheG-8NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutrition."June8.http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/FRA-6874617-FTG(Accessed05/09/2015).

Gueye,Mohamed.2014."ProductiondesemencessélectionnéesauSénégal.Unlongsautd’obstacles."DéfisSud,Avril,mai,19-21.

Hong,David.2012."NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutrition:Part1."ONE,December10.https://www.one.org/us/policy/policy-brief-on-the-new-alliance/(Accessed21/09/2016).

Hong,David.2013."NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutrition:Part2."ONE,April9.https://www.one.org/us/policy/new-alliance-for-food-security-and-nutrition-part-2/#_ftn1(Accessed21/09/2016).

IRIN.2013."LeSénégalpeineàgarantirlaqualitédessemences."1octobre.https://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/98863/le-sénégal-peine-à-garantir-la-qualité-des-semences.

Lejecos.2014."EnvironnementdesAffaires-Unedizainedemesurespharesàmettreenoeuvreaucoursdessixmoisàvenir."LeJournaldel'EconomieSénégalaise,3juillet.http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201407040024.html(Accessed24/05/2016).

Maclean,Ruth.2016."'Crazymilkofthedesert'transformingthelivesofSenegal'sdairyfarmers."TheGuardian,September24.https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/sep/24/crazy-milk-of-desert-senegal-dairy-farmers-africa(Accessed24/09/2016).

Mulupi,Dinfin.2016."Policyuncertaintyholdingbackinvestmentinagriculture."HowwemadeitinAfrica,23June.http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/policy-uncertainty-holding-back-investment-agriculture/54852/(Accessed30/06/2016).

Murphy,Sophia,andTimothyA.Wise.2012."G-8puntsonfoodsecurity…totheprivatesector."ThinkForwardBlog,May22.http://www.iatp.org/blog/201205/g-8-punts-on-food-security-…-to-the-private-sector(Accessed05/09/2015).

Nabaloum,AbdelAziz.2015."NASAN:incompréhensionoudésillusiondesproducteursburkinabè?"aOuaga.com,22mai.http://news.aouaga.com/h/67332.html(Accessed07/04/2016f).

Ndiaye,Hamad.2016."RisquesliésauxOgm:Sommes-nousbienprotégés?"Seneweb.com,6avril.http://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/risques-lies-aux-ogm-sommes-nous-bien-pr_n_178962.html#(Accessed22/08/2016).

PrimeMinisterofCanadaStephenHarper.2012.Canada'ssupporttothe2012G-8NewAllianceforFoodandNutritionSecurity.Ottawa,Ontario,18May,http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2012/05/18/canadas-support-2012-g-8-new-alliance-food-and-nutrition-security(Accessed04/09/2015).

PrimeMinisterofCanadaStephenHarper.2012.FoodSecurityandNutritionProjectinSenegal.Dakar,Senegal,11October,http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2012/10/11/food-security-and-nutrition-project-senegal(Accessed06/09/2015).

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Provost,Claire,LizFord,andMarkTran.2014."G8NewAlliancecondemnedasnewwaveofcolonialisminAfrica."TheGuardian,18February.http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/18/g8-new-alliance-condemned-new-colonialism(Accessed26/08/2015).

TheWhiteHouse.OfficeofthePressSecretary.2012."FactSheet:G8ActiononFoodSecurityandNutrition." May 18. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/18/fact-sheet-g-8-action-food-security-and-nutrition(Accessed04/09/2015).

Touré, Pathé. 2016. "SUNEOR - LePrésidentMacky Sall engage la restructuration."Le Journal del'Economie Sénégalaise, 8 avril. http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201604281220.html (Accessed03/05/2016).

Vorley, Bill. 2016. "Big brands like Unilever aren't the answer to helping Africa's farmers." TheGuardian, August 31. https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/aug/31/unilev...a-farmers-inclusive-business-agrifood-development?CMP=share_btn_tw(Accssed09/09/2016).

Wise, Timothy A. 2015. "The Great Land Giveaway inMozambique."Dollars & Sense: RealWorldEconomics, March-April. http://dollarsandsense.org/archives/2015/0315wise.html (Accessed11/04/2016).

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APPENDIX1:LISTOFINTERVIEWEDPARTICIPANTSStakeholders Name #SenegalesePrivatePartners

AgroseedAssociationSénégalaisepourlaPromotionduDéveloppementparlaBase(ASPRODEB)CoumbaNorThiam(CNT)LocafriqueMamellesJabootSHAMZenaExoticFruits

1121111

InternationalPrivatePartners

CompagnieagricoledeSaint-Louis(CASL)Soldive

21

Subtotal 11SenegaleseGovernmentalOfficials

AgencenationalechargéedelaPromotiondel’Investissementetdesgrandstravaux(APIX)ComitédepilotageduPNIA/PrimatureComitérégionaldesuivienvironnementaletsocialdeSaint-Louis(CRSE)Commissionnationalederéformefoncière(CNRF)Directiondel’Analyse,delaPrévisionetdesStatistiquesAgricoles(DAPSA)Ministèredel’agricultureetdel’équipementrural(MAER)StrategicAnalysisandKnowledgeSupportSystems(SAKSS)SecrétariatExécutifduComiténationaldesécuritéalimentaire(SE-CNSA)

12111112

Subtotal 10Technical andFinancialPartners

EmbassyofCanadatoSenegalBureaud’appuiàlacoopérationcanadienne(BACDI)GlobalAffairsCanada(GAC)UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)GrowAfricaProjetdedéveloppementinclusifetdurabledel'agrobusinessauSénégal(PDIDAS)

112311

Subtotal 9Civil SocietyOrganisations

Conseilnationaldeconcertationetdecoopérationdesruraux(CNCR)EndaPronatCOPAGENAfricanNetworkontheRighttoFood(ANORF)ActionHumainepourleDéveloppementIntégréauSénégal(AHDIS)Conseildesorganisationsnongouvernementalesd'appuiaudéveloppement(CONGAD)InstituteforResearchandthePromotionofAlternativesinDevelopment(IRPAD/Afrique)

1111111

Experts InitiativeProspectiveAgricoleetRurale(IPAR)DepartmentofGeography,UniversitéGastonBerger(UGB)

21

Subtotal 10Localauthorities MunicipalCouncil

Centred'appuiaudéveloppementlocaldel’ArrondissementdeNdiaye(CADL)21

Villagers CoumbaNorThiam(CNT)CompagnieAgricoledeSaint-Louis(CASL)

98

Subtotal 20Total 60

Twointerviewsandanumberoffollow-upswereconductedoverthephone.Allparticipantswereofferedanonymity.

68

APPENDIX2.WORKSHOPSANDMEETINGSATTENDED1) November 12, 2013:Cérémonie officielle consacrant le lancementde laNouvelleAlliance pour la

SécuritéAlimentaireetlaNutrition(NASAN)auSénégal,Dakar.

2) July 21-23, 2015: 2ème Atelier National sur laMise en oeuvre des Directives Volontaires pour unegouvernance responsable des régimes fonciers applicables aux terres, aux pêches et aux forêtsdanslecontextedelasécuritéalimentairenationale,organizedbyMinistèredel'Agricultureetdel'Equipement rural (MAER), Commission nationale de réforme foncière (CNRF), Comité depilotagesurlesDVauSénégal(COPIL),FAO,IPARandCNCR,Dakar.

3) November 12, 2015: Panel sur les méthodes de compensations dans le cadre d’installation deprojetsconvoitantdesterresàusagepastoral,forestieretminier,organizedbyIPAR,Dakar.

4) November13,2015:RéunionderestitutionetdepartagesurlesperspectivesetrecommandationsissuesdelarencontredeSélinguésurlaConvergencedesluttesautourdeladéfensedesterresetdel’eau,organizedbyCopagenetForumsocialsénégalais,Dakar.

5) November 17, 2015: Termes de référence de l’atelier d’échange sur le projet Rechercheparticipativeetplaidoyer sous régionalpourun changementdepolitiquesdedéveloppementenfaveurdelasécuritéalimentaire,organizedbyEndaPronat,Dakar.

6) November 20, 2015: Regards croisés sur l'investissement dans l'agriculture en Afrique dans lecontextePost ECOWAP+10, organizedbyCentreAfricainpour leCommerce, l'Intégrationet leDéveloppement (CACID), Secrétariat Permanent de la Plateforme des organisations de lasociétéciviledel'Afriquedel'Ouest(POSCAO),l'InitiativeProspectiveAgricoleetRurale(IPAR)etAssociationdesFemmesdel’Afriquedel’Ouest(AFAO),enpartenariatavecOSIWA,Dakar.

7) November 21, 2015: Réunion du comité technique restreint pour l’élaboration de la StratégieNationaledeSécuritéAlimentaireetdeRésilience2015-2035,organizedbytheSecrétariatexécutifduConseilNationaldeSécuritéAlimentaire(SE-CNSA),Dakar.

8) November24-25,2015:WorkshoponLarge-scaleLandAcquisitions(LSLAs)andAccountability inAfrica,organizedbytheInternationalDevelopmentResearchCenter(IDRC),Dakar.

9) November26,2015:StrategicDialogue:ForaResponsibleLandTenureGovernance,organizedbytheCanadianEmbassyinSenegal,Dakar.

10) November 27, 2015: Meeting with the Canadian Embassy in Senegal and Grow Africarepresentatives,Dakar.

11) January12-14,2016:Améliorerlespolitiquesd’autosuffisanceenrizenAfriquedel’Ouest:Défisetopportunités,organizedbyIPAR,IDRC,CSEA,CIRES,Dakar.

12) March 24, 2016: Séance académique solennelle : « Le Foncier au Sénégal : Etat des Lieux etPerspectives pour la Modernisation de l’Agriculture », organized by Académie Nationale desSciencesetTechniquesduSénégal(ANSTS),Dakar.

APPENDIX3:NAFSN’SENABLINGACTIONSTheNAFSNcollaborateswithvariouspartnersonanumberof“globalenablingactions” thatarecarriedout inallormostAfricancountriesthatparticipate intheNewAlliance. InadditiontotheSSTPdiscussedabove,theseactionsincludetheInformationandCommunicationsTechnology(ICT)Extension Challenge Fund, “managed by USAID and supported by the United Kingdom'sDepartment for International Development (DFID), the Gates Foundation, and the InternationalFund for International Development (IFAD).”259 This fund promotes “ICT-enabled agricultureextensionservices”inEthiopia,Ghana,Malawi,Mozambique,Senegal,andTanzania.

TheAgricultureFastTrackFundseemstobe theonlyNAFSN-related initiative thatdirectly fundsprivateprojectsinordertotransformideasinto“bankableinvestments.”EstablishedintheAfricanDevelopment Bank, this “multi-donor trust fund” “has approved 12 project preparation grants,enabling firms to finance project design work such as feasibility studies, market analyzes,environmental impact, and other activities required by banks and other investors to issuecommercial loans” for a total of US$ 6.5 million.260The NAFSN also continues GAFSP, whichreceivedUS$ 573.3million in new funding in 2012-2013 andUS$ 107million in 2014.261TheNAFSNprovides support for the SUNmovement,which “Principlesof Engagementguide actors as theywork in a multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder space to effectively working together to endmalnutrition,inallitsforms.”262InSenegal,CanadaleadsthegroupofSUNinternationaldonors.

Inaddition,theNewAllianceisinvolvedinprojectstogeneratedataonthestateofagriculture.InpartnershipwiththeConsultativeGrouponInternationalAgriculturalResearch/InternationalFoodPolicyResearch Institute (CGIAR/IFPRI)andtheForumforAgriculturalResearch inAfrica (FARA),theNewAllianceisinvolvedinthecreationofaTechnologyPlatformthatoffers“asetofmodelingtoolsthatsynthesizesavailableempiricaldatatohelpcountriesassessthepotentialimpactsofnewtechnologiesonyields,income,nutritional,andenvironmentalindicators.”263CanadaisadonortoCGIAR and FARA. The primary objective of another project, the Global Open Data Initiative forAgriculture and Nutrition (GODAN), is to “help support global efforts to make agricultural andnutritionallyrelevantdatagloballyavailableandunrestricted.”264

TheNewAlliancealsosupports thePlatformforAgriculturalRiskManagementsponsoredbytheWorld Bank, which aims to “identify key risks to food and nutrition security and agriculturaldevelopment.”265Lastly, the Global Action Network (GAN) on agriculture insurance is a newadditiontothehostofEnablingActions,launchedbytheInternationalLabourOffice(ILO),withthesupportofUSAID.266GAN is“acommunityofexpertsandpractitionersthatseekstoaddressthegapsthathindertheresponsibleandsustainablescalingofagricultureinsurance.”259http://agrilinks.org/blog/new-alliance-ict-extension-challenge-fund-two-key-challenges(Accessed05/11/2015).260NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutrition2014,37.261NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutrition2014,24.NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandGrowAfrica2015,12.262http://scalingupnutrition.org/about-sun/the-vision-and-principles-of-sun/(Accessed21/12/2016).263NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutrition2014,38.264http://www.godan.info(Accessed26/09/2016).265NewAllianceforFoodSecurityandNutrition2014,39.266http://www.impactinsurance.org/news/2015/february/launch-global-action-network(Accessed26/09/2016).

APPENDIX4:CANADA’SAGRICULTURALPROGRAMSINSENEGAL

Name ExecutingAgency—Partner

Goal Start—End

Period

MaximumContribution

($)

ContributionundertheNAFSN($)

ProgrammeforLandUseandEconomic

DevelopmentoftheNiayes

Region(PADEN)

GovernmentofSenegal-Ministryof

EconomyandFinance

“Increasetheincomeofproducers(bothwomenandmen)throughthedevelopmentofhorticultureandforestry”andimproveinfrastructureandservicesavailableto

producers

2009/11/23–

2018/03/29

19,985,962 19,941,362

TechnicalAssistancetoLandUseandEconomic

DevelopmentoftheNiayesRegion

TecsultInternational

Limitée

“SupporttheGovernmentofSenegalindevelopingalandusedevelopmentplanfortheGreatCoastofSenegal(Niayesregion)”

2003/07/18–

2016/03/31

3,144,590 1,546,746

EconomicDevelopmentof

CasamanceProgramme(PADEC)

GovernmentofSenegal-Ministryof

EconomyandFinance

Develophoney,mango,cashew,andbananavaluechainsfocusingonrevenue-generatingactivities.“Targetsoperators(individuals,communitygroups,andassociations),apexorganizations,andpoliciesandinstitutions”

2009/10/06–

2018/03/29

19,841,144 12,335,871

SupporttoRiceProduction

ProjectforFoodSecurityinSenegal

(BeyDunde)

Allianceagricole

internationale(CECI,

Socodevi,UPA-DI)

“Increasericeproductionintheself-managedperimetersoftheSenegalRiverValley”;improve(1)availabilityoffundsforriceproducerstoprocureinputs;and(2)capacitybuildingforruralorganizationsto

developeffectiveprocurementandmarketingservices

2010/03/08–

2014/12/31

6,836,398 805,580

IntegratedSupporttoFoodSecurityand

Nutrition(ISFSN)

WorldFoodProgramme

(WFP)

Reduceundernourishmentandchronichunger,andhelpthegovernment

reconstituteitsseedstockofcereals,fruitsandvegetables

2012/11/13–

2015/10/05

20,000,000 20,000,000

IntegratedNutritionProjectfortheKoldaandKedougouRegions(PINKK)

MicronutrientInitiative

Promotehealththrough“localproductionofnutrient-denseaswellasnutritionally-

fortifiedfoods,micro-financetosupportincomegeneratingactivitiesforwomen,and

institutionalcapacitybuildingforlocalgovernmentsandcommunities”

2015-2020 20,000,000 4,000,000

Total 89,808,094 58,629,559

Data source: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/fWebCSAZEn?ReadForm&idx=00&CC=SN(accessed22/06/2016)andpersonalcommunicationwithGlobalAffairsCanada,July7,2016.

71

APPENDIX5:THENEWALLIANCEINSENEGAL:ATIMELINEIn March 2013, Canada invited Senegal to join the New Alliance. After Senegal had decided tointegratewiththeNAFSN,thegovernmentaddressedacorrespondencetotheChairpersonoftheAfricanUnionCommission in this regardonMay27, 2013.Senegal’saccession to theNAFSNwasofficiallyannouncedonJune8,2013,during theG7Summit inLondon.A roundtableon theNewAlliancewasorganizedduringthevisitofBarackObamatoSenegalonJune28,2013.

Afterward, the Senegalese government carried out a series of consultations to elaborate theNAFSNCooperationFramework.OnJuly16,thePrimeMinisterpresidedataworkshopwithprivatefirms,CSOs,and technicaland financialpartners.AsecondworkshopwasheldonJuly30duringwhichprivatecompanieswereinvitedtoregisterthedifficultiestheyencounteredinthepursuitoftheir businesses. Monitor Deloitte oversaw the organization of this event. Two subsequentmeetings were convened on August 2 and 14, with civil society organizations and internationaldonors respectively. As separate meetings were held with different stakeholders, there was noopportunityforallstakeholderstocometogetheranddiscuss jointlyhowtheNewAlliancecouldbeimplementedinSenegal.

AfirstversionoftheCooperationFrameworkwasfinalizedandsubmittedtoTFPsonSeptember13.On October 4, the two committees that coordinate NAIP approved an amended version of theCooperation Framework, which was validated by all stakeholders on October 8. Under thepresidency of then Prime Minister Aminata Touré, the Interministerial Council, a body thatsupervises policy reforms andprovides feedback to thePresident of theRepublic, approved thedocumentonOctober30,2013.TheprogramwaslaunchedinSenegalonNovember12,2013,duringanofficialceremonyalsopresidedbythePrimeMinister.

AconsultationworkshopwassubsequentlyorganizedwiththeprivatesectoronApril30,2014,todiscussprogressonstatedgoals.ThemeetingwaschairedbytheSpecialAdvisoronAgriculturetothePrimeMinister and attendedby thePresidentofNAIP’s technical committee, an agent fromAPIX, a Canadian Embassy employee, an official from USAID, and representatives of privatecompanies.AnotherworkshopwasheldwithproducerandcivilsocietyorganizationsonMay20,2014,withattendancefromroughlythesameinstitutionalstaff.AmeetingwasconvenedonJune17, 2014, to approve the first annual report of NAFSN in Senegal. Mahammed Boun AbdallahDionne,previouslytheMinisterinchargeofexecutingthePSE,becamethenewPrimeMinisteronJuly6,2014.OnNovember14,2014,arevisedCooperationFrameworkspanningtheyears2014-2017wasendorsed.TwoothermeetingswereconvenedwithprivatepartnersonNovember30,2014,andinMarch2015.GrowAfricagathereddatafortheSecondProgressReportoverApril2015.

TheworkshopfordiscussingandapprovingtheAnnualJointAgriculturalReviewwasorganizedonOctober8-9,2015.OnFebruary5,2016,DAPSAandGrowAfricaconvenedataskforcetoelaboratethequestionnairetobecirculatedtoNAFSNprivatepartnersforthecomingyear.ThereviewforNAFSN’sthirdyearinSenegaloccurredinJune2016andwascompletedinSeptember2016.

APPENDIX6:MAINORGANIZATIONSANDGOVERNMENTSINVOLVEDINTHENAFSN

INSENEGAL

73

APPENDIX7:NAFSN’SBUSINESSSECTORSANDPLANNEDINVESTMENTSBusinessSector Company PlannedInvestments

(US$)267AGRICULTURALINPUTSANDPHYSICALCAPITALProductionandsaleofseeds AfricaGraines 2,750,000

Agrophytex 500,000Agroseed 2,326,000ASPRODEB 34,200,000Hortis 50,000NouvelleMinoterieAfricaine(NMA)268 N.aNovel269 N.aSEDAB 800,000SIFCA270 N.aSodefitex271 1,200,000Sunéor 20,000,000TROPICASEM 2,370,000

Manufactureoffertilizers Agrophytex 1,910,000SEDAB 1,000,000

Productionanddistributionofagriculturalmaterial

ASPRODEB 30,400,000Negodis 1,000,000Locafrique 4,000,000

Productionofcattlefeed ComptoirCommercialMandiayeNdiaye(CCMN)272

N.a.

GrandsMoulinsdeDakar(GMD)273 N.a.Sentenac 2,000,000VitalAgro-industries 1,000,000

Subtotal 105,506,000AGRICULTURALPRODUCTIONRiceproduction CompagnieagricoledeSaint-Louis

(CASL)67,310,000

ComptoirCommercialMandiayeNdiaye(CCMN)

N.a.

CCBMCODERIZ 1,200,000CoumbaNorThiam(CNT) 1,900,000GroupeTeylium274 N.a.VitalAgro-industries 54,600,000NovelGroup N.a.

Productionofothercereals(maize,millet,sorghumandpulses(black-eyedpeas,groundnuts,soy)

Agrophytex 320,000Belislesolutionnutritioninc.–LeRanchDeOuassadou275

N.a.

ETSAdiouSene 130,000

74

BusinessSector Company PlannedInvestments(US$)267

GroupeTeylium N.a.NouvelleMinoterieAfricaine(NMA) N.a.SEDIMA276 N.a.SHAMSénégal277 N.a.Sodefitex N.a.

Fruitproduction SHAMSénégal N.a.Soldive 1,300,000

Animalproduction(livestock,avicultureandfishfarming)

Belislesolutionnutritioninc.–LeRanchDeOuassadou

N.a.

GénéraleAlimentaireAfricaine(GAA) 1,416,000LaiterieduBerger 2,300,000SEDIMA N.a.SHAMSénégal N.a.

Subtotal 130,476,000STORAGE,PROCESSING,ANDTRANSPORT Milkprocessing LaiterieduBerger 860,000Foodprocessingandpackaging(flour,tomatopaste,fruitjuice,etc.)

ASPRODEB 9,500,000GénéraleAlimentaireAfricaine(GAA) 1,000,000ETSAdiouSene 30,000ExportTradingGroup 10,000,000MamellesJaboot 162,000PATISEN 80,000,000Sentenac 2,000,000Sociétégénéraled’investissementetdecommerce(GIC)

397,000

ZenaExoticFruits 1,184,000Soldive 854,000

Shelling,crushingandstorageofrice,cerealsandpeanuts

ComptoirCommercialMandiayeNdiaye(CCMN)

N.a.

Copéol 39,000,000CoumbaNorThiam 200,000ExportTradingGroup 10,000,000GénéraleAlimentaireAfricaine(GAA) 6,100,000GrandsMoulinsdeDakar(GMD) N.a.GroupeTeylium N.a.SEDIMA N.a.Sodefitex 1,000,000NovelGroup 50,000,000VitalAgro-Industries 1,000,000

Ginning,storageandhandlingof Sodefitex 4,400,000

75

BusinessSector Company PlannedInvestments(US$)267

cottonProcessingandsaleofseafoodproducts

Sentenac 1,500,000SOPASEN 8,540,000PirogueBleue 320,000

Packaging CompagniedeFilatureetdeSacherie(COFISAC)

2,130,000

Subtotal 230,177,000TRAININGANDFINANCIALSERVICESPeasanttraining,pilotfarmsandsupporttoproducerorganizations

Agrophytex 330,000Agroseed 4,413,000LaiterieduBerger 5,300,000AfricaGraines 750,000MamellesJaboot 66,000Sodefitex 1,000,000

InsuranceProducts Sociétéderéassurancesuisse278 N.a.Subtotal 11,859,000Total279 584,802,838Sources:FirstCooperationFramework,RevisedCooperationFramework,RevueconjointeduSecteurAgricole2014,LettersofIntent.267NAFSNprogressreportsinSenegaldonotcontaininformationonprivatepartners’actuallevelsofinvestmenttakenindividually.SincethebeginningoftheNewAlliance,thefollowingcompanieshaveceasedtoprovidefeedbackontheadvancementoftheirNAFSNobjectives:Belislesolutionnutritioninc.–LeRanchDeOuassadou,Hortis,GrandsMoulinsdeDakar(GMD),ExportTradingGroup,AfricaGraines,ComptoircommercialMandiayeNdiaye(CCMN),CopeolSenegal,Générale alimentaire africaine (GAA), La Laiterie du Berger, La Pirogue Bleue, Nouvelle Minoterie Africaine (NMA),Patisen,Sedima,GroupeSentenac,SHAMSénégal,Suneor,Teyliom,Tropicasem,VitalAgro-Industries.268NMAhasnotdisaggregateditsinvestmentintentionsbasedonspecificitems(productionoforganicsoyandseeds).Intotal,thecompanypledgedtoinvestUS$7,300,000.269Novelplannedinvestmentsintheproductionofcertifiedseeds,aswellasthecultivationandcommercializationofrice,foratotalofUS$50,000,000.Thecompanyhasnotprovidedadetailedbreakdown.270SIFCA’sinvestmentplansarenotspecifiedinNAFSNdocuments.271Inadditiontoamountsindicatedinthetable,SodefitexintendstoinvestUS$3,300,000fortherenewalofitsvehiclefleetandUS$600,000fora“QualitySafetyEnvironment”certification.272CCMNannouncedinvestmentstotallingUS$8,184,838buthasnotprovidedspecificamountsbyfieldsofactivities.273Intotal,GMD’sinvestmentpledgeundertheNAFSNamountstoUS$2,500,000.274GroupeTeyliompromisedtoinvestUS$5,500,000inriceproductionandprocessingactivities.275Belislesolutionnutritioninc.–LeRanchDeOuassadouhadplannedinvestmentsexceedingUS$3,000,000.276SedimaaimedtospendatotalofUS$25,000,000indifferentbranchesofactivities.277SHAMSénégalprojectedtoinvestUS$1,400,000infruit,cereals,andanimalproduction.278Sociétéderéassurancesuisse’sinvestmentsprojectsarenotquantifiedinNAFSNdocuments.279Thegrandtotalincludesnon-availablebudgetlinesbyfieldsofactivitiesinthetable.

FoodSecurityPolicyGroup(FSPG)c/oCanadianFoodgrainsBank,P.O.Box767,Winnipeg,MBR3C2L4,Canada